

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at
the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on Wednesday,
17th June, 1970 at 10.15 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

<u>BELGIUM</u>	<u>GREECE</u>	<u>NORWAY</u>
Mr. A. de Staercke	Mr. P.A. Cavalierato	Mr. R.T. Busch
<u>CANADA</u>	<u>ICELAND</u>	<u>PORTUGAL</u>
Mr. Ross Campbell	Mr. N.P. Sigurdsson	Mr. A. Fortunato de Almeida
<u>DENMARK</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>TURKEY</u>
Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen	Mr. C. de Ferrariis Salzano	Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u>	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>
Mr. F. de Rose	Mr. L. Schaus	Sir Bernard Burrows
<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>
Mr. W.G. Grewe	Mr. H.N. Boon	Mr. R. Ellsworth

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General: Mr. O. Olcay

Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs: Mr. J. Kastl

Chairman of the Economic Committee: Mr. Y. Laulan (Items III & IV)

Director of Information: Mr. J.L.W. Price (Item II)

Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge

Deputy Executive Secretary: Mr. K.W. Andreae (Items II-VII)

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Deputy Chairman: General T.R. Milton

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I. ATLANTIC POLICY ADVISORY GROUP

References: PO/69/329
C-R(69)35, Item III

Document: C-M(70)20

The CHAIRMAN opened the discussion on the Report on the last meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (C-M(70)20), which, he felt, called for three comments. As regards the substance of the Report, a notable feature was that it contained agreed conclusions which had been reached at a meeting attended for the first time by delegates acting on instructions from their governments. He recalled that the Council had undertaken to discuss these reports "in a careful and thorough fashion to determine whether there were any conclusions which might be adopted as guidelines for Alliance policy". In his view, the Sino-Soviet dispute had implications of very great importance for the Alliance and paragraph 5 of the Report was the most relevant to this side of the Council's discussions.

2. The second task was to examine whether, in the light of the experience gained from that recent meeting, there were any steps which could be taken to improve the arrangements made for this new type of APAG meeting, and also the methods and procedure adopted. It was with this in view that, in the cover note to the Report, the Chairman of APAG had submitted a careful and factual analysis of the way in which the guidelines laid down by the Council for these meetings had worked out in practice. Even if the Council decided that improvements were possible or that more flexibility of methods was required, this would in no way detract from the successful achievement reflected in the Report, and the aim should be to maintain, and even to exceed, this level of success at future meetings.

3. In conclusion, he drew the Council's attention to paragraph 7(b) and 7(c) of the cover note regarding the arrangements for the next meeting of APAG - which would follow the traditional format - and the subject to be discussed at this meeting.

4. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that, in the opinion of his Government, the first meeting of the new-format APAG represented an excellent beginning from the standpoint of advance preparations, attendance and the high standard of discussion. Although the United States did not fully concur in the contents of the Report or in the comments on the organization of the meeting which appeared in the Chairman's cover note, he was confident that any difficulties could be ironed out through consultation between the International Staff and delegations; these talks should be held well in advance of the Spring 1971 meeting. For example, his Authorities were anxious to find some acceptable way to ensure that national experts could continue to play a part in the drafting of APAG reports.

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5. Subject to these comments, he believed that the first six pages of the Chairman's Report, and especially the general conclusions, could be approved by the Council and - as was provided in APAG's Terms of Reference - "be adopted as guidelines for Alliance policy". He was also prepared to approve the arrangements so far made for the Ditchley Park meeting in September, but did not favour the Middle East as the topic for discussion. He recalled that at the March meeting, several members of APAG had indicated a preference for a discussion on the evolution of Soviet foreign policy. He shared this preference and suggested that the Ditchley Park meeting should focus on "the future evolution of Soviet policy towards Western Europe".

6. Turning to the substance of the Chairman's Report on the Sino-Soviet dispute, he expressed the conviction that it was still valid, both in its discussion of the issues and in its conclusions. Generally speaking, although events in Indo-China had created pressures for solidarity in the Communist world, they had resulted in a clear divergence between Chinese and Soviet policies towards Sihanouk and his government in exile. The Soviets had also attempted to create the impression that the Warsaw Pact had relevance to Asia as well as to Europe. While there had been some prospect of a superficial improvement in state relations, the border talks were still stalemated and the fundamentals of the Sino-Soviet dispute remained unaltered.

7. As regards Cambodia, he noted that, in response to the crisis, the Chinese and the North-Vietnamese had been acting in concert, while the USSR had followed a divergent course. Both Hanoi and Peking had recognised Sihanouk's government in exile, closed their missions in Phnom-Penh and opted for a militant "protracted war" line, whereas the Soviets had refused to recognise Sihanouk and continued to maintain their mission in Cambodia. They had remained silent on the strategy Hanoi should follow, apart from making occasional vague and contradictory noises about a negotiated settlement in Indo-China. While the Soviet leaders continued to call for the withdrawal of United States troops from South-East Asia, they accused the Chinese Communist leaders of undermining unity within the world Communist movement in countering "American imperialism" in Indo-China. These divergencies might simply reflect Soviet unwillingness to follow in the footsteps of the Chinese in dealing with Sihanouk, but were more probably a sign of conflicting opinions on the action the Soviet Union should take at this stage in the Indo-China conflict.

8. There had been no developments in the Sino-Soviet border talks. The widely-reported Soviet troop withdrawals from some areas on the border in late March had never been confirmed and had even been denied on several occasions by Soviet diplomatic sources. Similarly, the agreement to exchange ambassadors which had reportedly been reached at about the same time had apparently foundered. The Chinese had not agreed to the appointment of Stepakov, a high-ranking propaganda figure involved in a recent shake-up of the Soviet Information bureaucracy.

9. However, he felt that the most interesting recent development in Sino-Soviet relations, and the most significant in so far as NATO was concerned, was the Soviet Union's attempt to make the Warsaw Pact applicable against China as well as against Western Europe. Moscow's concern to broaden the interpretation of the Warsaw Pact was perhaps implicit in the language of revised bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and other Pact members: Bulgaria and Hungary (1967), and, most recently, Czechoslovakia (May 1970). The new treaties stipulated that they were applicable to armed attack against the contracting parties by "any" state or group of states. That Moscow regarded this language as applicable to Communist China as well as to the United States independently of a context involving Germany or Europe, had become clearly apparent only when the Soviet Union and Rumania had aired their differing interpretations of the Warsaw Pact in May, on the occasion of the 15th Anniversary of the Treaty and the 25th Anniversary of World War II.

10. A further indication of this trend was the fact that, on 22nd February, Marshal Yakubovsky had mentioned the hostile attitude of Communist China towards the Soviet Union in an article on the military posture of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; similarly, on 8th May, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, had discussed the significance of the Pact in a context involving "our defence in both West and East". On two other occasions in mid-May, Marshal Yakubovsky had described the Pact as "safeguarding peace and security in Europe and throughout the world" and as "a mighty security factor in Europe and on other continents". Finally, the commander of the Soviet border troops, General Kyryanov had written in "Pravda" on 28th May about the joint responsibility of socialist "brothers-in-arms" to guard their borders "as an integral part of the whole socialist community" in the context of a discussion of Sino-Soviet border problems.

11. In contrast, the Rumanians had emphasised their good relations with all socialist states, including China, and their co-operation with the armed forces of all socialist countries; they had also stated that the Warsaw Pact was applicable only in Europe. On 24th May, Belgrade's "Politika" had described the open discussion of Moscow's effort to turn the Pact against China, and Rumania's recalcitrance.

12. The USSR had evidently tried to familiarise Warsaw Pact members with its China problem, not only at conferences, but also through on-the-spot inspections. East European Party and Government officials had been taken on tours of the Soviet Far East and there had been some unconfirmed reports that Warsaw Pact military personnel had been seen in the vicinity of the Sino-Soviet border. It was quite unlikely that the Soviet Union foresaw any military requirement for East European participation in any conceivable Sino-Soviet hostilities. The Soviet effort was meaningful only in a political context, as part of Moscow's effort to preserve pro-Soviet Communist unity, isolate China and strengthen the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe.

13. As regards the attitude of China, the United States believed that, as a result of the Cambodian crisis, the Chinese Government had made some limited efforts to temper its public hostility towards the Soviet Union. Mao's encouraging conversation with Gankovsky at the May Day Rally in Peking, the seating of Kuznetzov and Gankovsky on the platform at the Rally on 20th May to demonstrate against United States entry into Cambodia, and a generally-felt warning of the Chinese attitude in informal contacts with Soviet diplomats were all indications of a studied Chinese effort to avoid blame for exacerbating tensions within the Communist camp.

14. As part of the same effort, the Chinese had initiated very few significant new direct anti-Soviet attacks since the joint May Day editorial, although they had continued to publish attacks on Moscow by foreign Parties. In the current campaign against the United States intervention in Cambodia, no mention had been made of the oft-repeated charge of Soviet-American collusion. For their part, the Soviets had been conducting a heavy barrage of anti-Chinese propaganda, suggesting a sense of concern and frustration over the recent turn of events.

15. In conclusion, he said that there was no prospect for the moment of a change in the fundamentals of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both sides knew, however, that overt hostility was politically damaging to their positions within the Communist movement during times of crisis and that gestures of unity worried their adversaries. Pressure from their Allies, particularly Hanoi, for a demonstration of solidarity must have been particularly strong in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the basic issues between the Chinese and the Soviets remained unresolved, with both sides determined to maintain their positions.

16. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, in terms of content, the latest Report was one of the best APAG had produced and that he was prepared to approve it as a whole, and particularly the conclusions in paragraphs 5 and 14. However, if the Council was to review the Report in detail, he would have to ask for instructions on certain points. His conclusions regarding the procedure which had been followed were fairly negative, since he felt that the discussions had been interesting and fruitful in inverse proportion to the extent to which delegates had been able to act on instructions from their Governments. At the same time, he recognised that the choice of topic would largely influence the degree of agreement and the nature of participation. One welcome innovation was that the Report itself had been more carefully prepared and that since its volume had been reduced, the essential points were brought out more clearly. On the composition of the Group at the last meeting, he felt that the best solution was for high-level operational officers to be associated with policy planners from capitals. In short, he was in favour of a format which was as flexible and as similar to the previous one as possible.

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17. On the topic for the Group's next meeting, he recalled that Canada had suggested the question of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Western Europe and that the reactions had not been very favourable. He still felt that the problems of the Mediterranean area were an enormous and difficult subject to handle.

18. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the conclusions in the excellent Report by the Chairman of APAG provided a firm basis for a subsequent analysis of Sino-Soviet relations which, in view of the risk of escalation they entailed, represented virtually the same threat to Europe as the Middle East conflict and should be kept under close review.

19. On the attitude the West should take to China, he expressed general agreement with the comments in paragraph 5. The line taken by the West should be based on the Alliance's two-fold concept of détente and defence and should not have the effect of prompting China to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. As regards the topic for the next meeting of APAG, he would prefer the Group to consider the problems in the Middle East, with special reference to the growth of Chinese influence, which might partly explain the more active rôle now being played by the Soviet Union. Finally, although he had no specific instructions on the practical arrangements for these meetings, he felt that more time was needed to gain experience before any changes could be considered.

20. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the general conclusions in paragraph 15 of the Report which, he felt, represented a balanced appraisal of the factors on which NATO should base its attitude. However, there were a number of specific points with which he did not fully agree. As regards paragraph 2, for example: "Continued Sino-Soviet Antagonism", he felt that there was very little likelihood of a limited rapprochement. In connection with paragraph 5, he said that while it was right to lay down the principle that the West should follow a policy of strict impartiality between the Soviet Union and China, it could not be denied that the Western countries had developed their relations with the Soviet Union more than with China. He thought that an effort should be made to increase contacts with the latter.

21. On procedure, he expressed the view that it had taken too long to prepare the Report. Confirming his Government's invitation for the next meeting, he said that a draft programme would be submitted to the Political Committee within the next few days, and asked for the names of participants by 12th July. He felt that the Middle East would be the best topic for discussion; this was partly because APAG had recently discussed Soviet policy but also because it would be difficult to avoid duplication with the Council's **studies on this question** in preparation for the December Ministerial Meeting. To avoid encroaching on current studies, it would be easier to deal with the Middle East.

22. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the general conclusions in the Report. He agreed with the German Representative that there was a need for more experience before conclusions could be drawn on the operation of the new system. As regards the topic for the next meeting, he was strongly in favour of selecting the Middle East in view of the long-term and short-term implications of the problem for Alliance policy, and also because this subject was more conducive to a free-ranging discussion.

23. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE agreed to the content of the Report and the conclusions set out therein. As regards the trend of events, there was reason to think that although the lower-level negotiations on the frontier problem had made no progress, the meetings in Peking between Heads of Delegations had provided an opportunity for a discussion on the Indo-Chinese problem and that China was taking a more flexible line in its dealings with the Soviet Union since it had postponed the Warsaw talks with a United States Representative.

24. While he agreed with the Canadian Representative on the format of the Report, he felt that the new arrangements should be tried out for a longer period. On the topic for the next meeting, he shared the United Kingdom Representative's preference for the Middle East problem which, he felt, might give rise to a wide-ranging discussion.

25. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE felt that C-M(70)20 was balanced in substance, moderate in its conclusions and generally acceptable. On future procedure, he expressed agreement with the points made by the German and Italian Representatives. He felt that it would be premature to draw conclusions from this initial experiment, although APAG should be able to call on high-ranking figures who were not absolutely bound by their instructions. For the reasons mentioned by the United Kingdom Representative, he would prefer the topic for the next meeting to be the Middle East. He added that Soviet policy was being discussed daily in the Council and the Political Committees. In any case, he felt that a general discussion would be of doubtful value in view of the many current negotiations whose outcome was not yet known and which would have a decisive influence on Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Alliance. Should the majority of the Council come out in favour of the United States proposal, he would have no objections in principle but would have to reserve his Government's position.

26. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE expressed agreement with the substance of the Report and the general conclusions it contained. Referring to the statement in paragraph 13 that a major reconciliation between the Soviet Union and China seemed most unlikely, he said that the possibility of a partial agreement on the frontier problem in the fairly near future could not be ruled out. The Soviet Union had good grounds for desiring this since, as the years went by, China would become

stronger and negotiations were likely to become more difficult. Also, the dispute itself was harmful to Soviet prestige. China, for its part, might not be interested in a rapid solution but, at the same time, it had nothing to gain from continued Soviet pressure on its frontiers. The Danish Government agreed with the United Kingdom that the isolation of China was a source of difficulty. It therefore urged that the points made in paragraph 5 should be set out in the general conclusions.

27. On procedure, he agreed that APAG should retain a measure of freedom in its discussions. For the reasons already mentioned by the United Kingdom and French Representatives, he would prefer the Group to discuss the problems of the Middle East at its next meeting.

28. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were inclined to believe that the most likely of the three possible developments in the Sino-Soviet conflict mentioned in the APAG Report was further antagonism without war. While they were in general agreement with the conclusions contained in the Report, they attached great importance to a strictly impartial or neutral line of behaviour on the part of the NATO countries. This should not, however, run counter to efforts aimed at Chinese participation in international co-operation. On the implications of major hostilities between the Soviet Union and China, they felt that the consequences for world peace would be such that it was difficult to see how there could be any "advantages", as was suggested in paragraphs 8 and 11 of the Report. As regards the statement in paragraph 3 that continued Sino-Soviet antagonism would give more freedom of manoeuvre to smaller countries in which the Soviet Union and China would be competing for influence, he said that it must also be borne in mind that the Soviet Union might then attempt to impose stronger discipline on the Warsaw Pact countries and thereby contribute to diminishing the chances of an East-West détente and rapprochement. Referring to paragraph 14, he expressed the view that more peaceful relations between China and the Soviet Union might have favourable effects on the overall international situation.

29. As regards the format of APAG meetings, his Authorities did not consider the present experiment to be entirely conclusive and therefore agreed that it should be pursued for at least another session. On the topic for the next meeting, he feared that if the Middle East conflict were selected, the Alliance might give the impression that it was trying to extend its field of interest. However, he was prepared to agree to the majority view on this.

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30. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he wholeheartedly endorsed C-M(70)20. While he felt that the previous system had been more flexible, he was agreeable to continuing this experiment. He had no specific instructions on the topic for the next meeting and was prepared to agree with the majority view.

31. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, basically, he could agree with the comments by the Chairman of APAG in paragraph 3 of the cover note regarding the high quality of the discussions. He felt that this experiment should be repeated. He also agreed that there were advantages in not trying to arrive at a unanimous position and endorsed the suggestions in paragraph 5 of the cover note regarding the drafting of reports. While he had not been very much in favour of the Middle East as the topic for the next meeting, he had been impressed by the United Kingdom's arguments and was prepared to agree to the majority view. He recognised that, should the question of Soviet policy be selected, there would be a danger of duplication with the Council's studies and that this might distort the conclusions drawn from the present experiment which, he felt, should be pursued.

32. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objection to the substance of the Report or to the conclusions it contained. He felt that it was most desirable for small countries to have access to reports of this kind, which they would be unable to prepare with their own limited diplomatic resources. On future work, he felt that experimentation with the new arrangements should continue; this applied particularly to the drafting of reports on the basis suggested in paragraph 5 of the cover note. As regards the topic for the next meeting, he could agree with the majority view, although he was inclined to favour the Middle East question.

33. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that although he had received no instructions on the Report, he felt it to be very satisfactory. His personal view was that the prospect of a reconciliation between the Soviet Union and China was too remote to be taken into consideration. He was in favour of continuing with the new arrangements on a trial basis. He would indicate later which topic his Government preferred for the Group's next meeting.

34. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities endorsed the excellent Report by APAG together with the conclusions it contained. He could agree to the date and place of the next meeting, although he was unable to take a position on the practical arrangements. However, he felt that this experiment should be pursued. While he could agree to the majority view on the topic for the next meeting, he pointed out that should the Middle East question be selected,

an effort would have to be made to ensure that there was a thorough-going exchange of views which went beyond what could be found in the press. On the other hand, he felt that a discussion on Soviet policy would be of immediate interest and might help to pave the way for negotiations.

35. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE joined previous speakers in endorsing the Report C-M(70)20 and urged that this experiment should be pursued. He could agree to the majority decision on the topic for the next meeting.

36. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that the Council was prepared to endorse the substance of the Report. He had noted that the further information provided by the United States, Netherlands and Danish Representatives confirmed the thesis that China did not wish to heighten tension. As regards the new arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 of PO/69/329, there was a general consensus that this experiment should be carried through to its conclusion, so that two further meetings would have to be held; however, he would see to it that representatives' comments on the drafting of reports were considered by APAG at its next meetings.

37. As regards the next meeting, he thanked the United Kingdom Representative for his Government's invitation, which he was pleased to accept. He noted that the majority of delegations were in favour of discussing the Middle East at this meeting and that four delegations had already agreed to fall in with the majority view. Although this topic was not strictly within NATO's purview, it had a considerable bearing on the situation in the Mediterranean and lent itself fairly well to a discussion without formal instructions. The question of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Europe might, perhaps, be considered at the Spring meeting, by which time the reactions to the Alliance's proposal for negotiations would have been fully established and assessed.

38. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, joined by the CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, said that he would inform his Authorities of the points which had been made in favour of a discussion on the Middle East and strongly recommend that they fall in with the majority view. He would report to the Council later on the decisions they took. However, he wholeheartedly agreed with the Turkish Representative that there was no point in holding a discussion unless the Group genuinely got to grips with the basic issues and went beyond everyday material. He added that there was just as much danger that a discussion on the Middle East would duplicate with the Council's studies as one on Soviet policy.

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39. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that long-range policy planners would be attending the next meeting and that the long-term outlook for the Middle East could be considered without instructions from governments.

40. The COUNCIL:

- (1) subject to the points made in discussion, approved the Report on the last meeting of APAG (C-M(70)20) and, in particular, the conclusions in paragraph 15 of this document;
- (2) thanked the United Kingdom Government for its invitation and agreed that the next meeting of APAG would be held from 14th to 18th September, 1970, at Ditchley Park;
- (3) subject to confirmation by the United States(1), Canada and Greece agreed that the topic for the next meeting should be: "The Long-Term Outlook for the Middle East and its Implications for NATO Countries";
- (4) took note of the points made in discussion regarding the implementation of the new arrangements dealt with in PO/69/329 and agreed that this experiment should be continued for the period indicated in this document.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

II. SURVEY OF THE NATO INFORMATION SERVICE OUTPUT 1969

Document: C-M(70)22

41. The CHAIRMAN invited the Council to consider the Report C-M(70)22, which had been prepared by Information experts on the basis of document AC/273-D(70)1 and, he felt, constituted a very thorough review of the NATO Information Service output. He pointed out that the Council was being asked to take a decision on the following three points:

- whether to accept the recommendations contained in the Report;
- whether to accept the thesis that the scale of information operations was too small in relation to the size of the problem and needed to be increased;
- how the funds for such an increase should be found.

In addition to these immediate problems, there was a longer-term problem, namely, the sharing of responsibilities for NATO Information work and the question of its practical organization.

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- (1) The United States confirmed its agreement at the Council's meeting on Tuesday, 23rd June

42. He drew attention to the detailed recommendations, the most important of which concerned a cut-back in the NATO Letter, and to the general recommendation concerning the whole scale of the operation. Pointing out that in paragraph 5 of the Report, the experts expressed the view that the NATO Information Service programme was too modest for an Atlantic community of over 500 million people, in 15 countries, speaking 11 languages, he said that this was the first time that the problem had been set in a general context. The limiting factor was the shortage of funds. As an illustration of this he said that it was often impossible to distribute NATO publications in several languages, that the very low film budget was not sufficient to produce even one good film a year, and then in only one or two languages and that the most important NATO book, "Facts and Figures", was distributed only on a very limited scale. Without going into the experts' recommendations, and particularly those concerning the visits programme and the activities directed at young people, he wished to point out that for there to be any improvement in the present situation, there would be a need for a bigger budget and fuller co-operation from national authorities.

43. In his view, there was a short-term and a long-term problem. The immediate problem was to find the funds needed to enable the Information Service to operate at a more realistic level in 1971. He would greatly prefer additional funds to be made available for this purpose, but the experts had also recommended that "consideration should be given to allocating to the Information programme a larger share of the total NATO budget". Should the Council consider that funds should be obtained at the expense of other activities, any proposals in this connection should be examined as quickly as possible in order that they might be put into effect in time for the Information Service's 1971 Budget. A Note had been drafted for the Council with detailed figures showing that an increase from the current level of expenditure of some B.fr. 40 million to B.fr. 62 million would be adequate for an effective programme. A cut-back on the "NATO Letter" would save B.fr. 3.5 million, leaving B.fr. 18,500,000 to be found.

44. The long-term problem involved more than the immediate allocation of funds. The material produced by the Information Service could serve a useful purpose only if the national authorities were prepared to co-operate fully in its distribution and if there was adequate distribution machinery. This raised the whole issue of the relative responsibilities of national authorities and the NATO Information Service, a problem which had not been dealt with in the Experts' Report. Since it could readily be understood that the national information services had their own scale of priorities, a solution to the problem could well be the establishment, with

the support and co-operation of the national authorities, of NATO regional offices, such as that which already existed in Iceland. This solution had already been adopted by the United Nations and the Common Market. He suggested that this possibility be examined in detail at the Conference of National Information Officials which was to be held in the autumn and that the Conference should report back to the Council in good time for the whole study to be submitted to Ministers in December.

45. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the Report before the Council was the culmination of a lengthy study which had been proposed by the United States Representative at the Conference of National Information Officials the previous autumn. After commending the International Staff and the experts for their work, he said that his Authorities were ready to adopt the recommendations contained in the Report, which were in keeping with present needs. He recalled that the 1969 survey had revealed the need to expand co-ordination with capitals when Information programmes were still at the blue-print stage as well as the shortage of basic data for assessing the use made of the Information Service's output and its effectiveness. In his view, the effects of adopting the experts' recommendations would be as follows:

- (1) the introduction of a specific procedure for the co-ordination, by the NATO Information Service, of programmed planning which was essential if the output of the Service was to be put to effective use in the capitals;
- (2) by requiring that the 1969 survey be made an operating tool for subsequent years, the basis for efficient programme management in NATO and in the capitals would have been established;
- (3) the introduction of the proposed reforms would prepare the ground for realistic judgements about where expansions and contractions could be made in the Information programme;
- (4) responsibility for approval of annual Information Service programmes would rest essentially with the Conference of National Information Officials held each autumn, in other words, with the users themselves.

46. As regards this last proposal, he pointed out that by transferring responsibility from the Information Committee to the national officials meeting each year, the Council would be adopting the most effective method of increasing co-operation between the professional Information officials in NATO and in the capitals. In his view, the presentation of programmes to members of delegations during meetings of the aforementioned Committee was no alternative to the continuing co-ordination with officials in capitals which the experts had called for. He therefore suggested that the Information Committee should be converted into an on-call working group which could be convened to prepare for the Annual Conferences of Information Officials or to consider any special Information problems. This suggestion should not be interpreted as an expression of disapproval of the Information Committee which had done excellent work at a time when circumstances were not as they were today.

47. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government had welcomed the work done by the experts and the steps taken by the Director of Information to give new impetus to NATO's Information activities. As regards the Report, his Authorities had accepted most of the recommendations on the technical aspects of these activities, but had not indicated whether they would approve an increase in credits. Should any decision be taken in this respect therefore, his agreement would be subject to confirmation. Recognising that the NATO Information budget was smaller than in other organizations, he said that while this could be justified when the usefulness of the Alliance had been freely acknowledged, a different approach was called for now that its relevance was being questioned by a sizeable body of the public. However, he felt that national authorities would agree more readily to an extension of NATO Information activities if the necessary funds could be found by cutting back on other activities. At the same time, he could not agree that the cost of distributing the "NATO Letter" should be met by member governments since the NATO Information Service would thus lose control of the distribution. On the other hand there was a need for some co-operation with national authorities for the checking of mailing lists. Referring to the United States Representative's suggestion, he remarked that this would be tantamount to transferring to the national services a task for which they were not prepared, since NATO Information activities accounted for only a very small proportion of their own work. Consequently, he was not in favour of any change in the existing procedure.

48. The CHAIRMAN remarked that the recommendations must be looked at from two angles:

- the policy change implied in taking a more liberal attitude on the release of information;
- the budgetary implications, which would have to be examined in detail by the Civil Budget Committee.

49. In order to reach a decision on these two points, the Council would need a report from the Committee showing the cost of implementing the different recommendations and suggesting how they should be funded, either from the present Information budget or from other budget chapters. Also, the Senior Political Committee might, perhaps, be asked for its views on the political aspects of the problem. An alternative solution would be to set up a mixed working group to examine the recommendations from these two angles and draw up a list of priorities.

50. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he was prepared to accept the recommendations in C-M(70)22 in the light of the Chairman's comments. After pointing out that information was a national responsibility, he expressed the hope that detailed budget proposals which he could recommend to his Government would be drawn up on the basis of the rough figures contained in the Annex to the working paper circulated to the Council.

51. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE approved the experts' technical recommendations as such, while acknowledging that their budgetary implications would inevitably be extensive. On this second aspect of the question, his position was roughly the same as that of the Belgian Representative. He urged that a detailed study should be made of the cost of the proposed measures and that an order of priorities should be drawn up for any new proposals. He was unable to commit himself for the present as regards the use to be made of any savings which could be achieved on specific chapters or the possibility of an additional contribution. He pointed out that national budget authorities were often reluctant to agree to the transfer of savings made on certain chapters to other activities. From a more general standpoint he agreed on the importance of closer co-ordination between national information services and NATO. The United Kingdom was prepared to increase its co-operation, particularly with regard to the use of NATO material and the visitors' programmes.

52. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the budgetary aspect of the experts' recommendations, questioned the contention that the Information budget was negligible in relation to the 500 million people to be reached. Since Information was essentially a national responsibility, it was for governments to take the steps they deemed necessary to brief the public on NATO activities. The budget was substantial, since it accounted for about 9% of the Organization's total civil expenditures. He had no objection in principle to an attempt being made to put the Information budget to better use or to the establishment of a list of priorities; however, he felt that the criteria put forward were unconvincing. While he felt that it was legitimate for the Secretary General to suggest appropriate transfers within the budget, he would not take the same view if the idea came from the experts. With proposals of this kind, there was a danger that priority would be allocated to certain categories of expenditure within the NATO budget which would tend to imply that the credits had been poorly managed in the past. He could not associate himself with any action which could be interpreted as a retrospective criticism. He added that in view of the responsibilities it would have, any working group set up to examine the consequences of the various recommendations should be of a high level. Finally, he said that his Government reserved the right to give its views on specific proposals before the basic principles were called into question.

53. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that while his Government was still reluctant to consider any increase in credits, it had no objection to a study in depth of the Information budget. His Authorities considered that the NATO Information Service was providing national services with adequate assistance. The only question to be solved was how to allocate funds between different Information activities. He was somewhat surprised that the Report recommended a cut-back in credits for the "NATO Letter" which he regarded as a very useful publication. He attached special importance to the help national authorities were given in sending groups of visitors to the Organization's Headquarters. In his view, the distance between the country of origin and Belgium should be taken into account in allocating funds. For these visits to be of real value, it was extremely important that the briefings given should continue to be of a high standard.

54. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his position was similar to that of the Netherlands. He was prepared to accept the technical recommendations, particularly those relating to a more liberal policy for the release of information, but could not agree to those contained in paragraph 5 of C-M(70)22. In his view, measures designed to increase the effectiveness of information methods should be applied gradually. Moreover, like the Belgian Representative, he felt that a more detailed assessment should be made of the expenditure called for and the savings which could be made. He considered the experts' recommendation for a redistribution of NATO credits premature to say the least.

55. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE could agree in principle to the experts' recommendations, subject to a detailed study of their budgetary implications and of the possible savings. He would not object to a study group examining the problem of priorities for the different recommendations.

56. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he had not received instructions on the Report. On the financial issue, he shared the French Representative's concern regarding the effects of the recommendations for a redistribution of credits within the NATO budget. Should any recasting of the budget be required, this should be considered when the yearly budget estimates were submitted. Although he had no objection in principle to a study group on Information problems he did not see that it could serve any useful purpose. Nor was he entirely happy with regard to the recommendation on the "NATO Letter" which generally was regarded in his country as a useful publication.

57. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had spoken on a number of occasions of the need for improvements in the activities of the Information Service. However, he had received no specific instructions on the way to tackle this problem and was unable to take a position on the experts' recommendations. He attached some importance to the "NATO Letter", which he regarded as the only means of publicising NATO's activities. The contacts arranged by the Information Service with journalists, students and teachers yielded excellent results in Italy and were even reported favourably in the Opposition press. In short, his Government, which had a liberal attitude on the question of Information was prepared to consider any suggestions and to subscribe to decisions based on more detailed cost assessments.

58. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE said that, by and large, he could agree with the Report and the experts' recommendations. However, he called for a study of priorities and possible savings before the provision of additional credits was contemplated.

59. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE accepted the Report but asked for further information on its budgetary implications.

60. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE supported the experts' recommendations. His Government felt that the Information Service was doing useful work whose scope should be expanded.

61. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he had not received instructions on this subject and therefore reserved his position.

62. Summing up, the CHAIRMAN said that there seemed to be no objection to the adoption of a more liberal policy with respect to the release of information on NATO activities. The need to determine the priority to be assigned to each Information activity had also been generally acknowledged. On the allocation of credits, he agreed with the French and Belgian Representatives that responsibility for information rested mainly with national authorities and that strictly speaking, the Conference of National Information Officials was not empowered to propose a redistribution of credits. However, the Conference, which had been instructed to suggest ways and means of improving the present situation, had no doubt considered how available resources should be used to the best advantage. On the practical issue, he noted that since a number of delegations were still awaiting instructions, the Council would be unable to come to a decision at the present meeting. He suggested that the Civil Budget Committee should be asked to cost the effects of the experts' recommendations in greater detail and that the National Information Officials should be instructed to investigate what other savings could be achieved within the Information budget. The question of allocating a larger share of the total NATO budget to the Information programme might be examined as a second step. Lastly he suggested that the Conference of National Information Officials, attended if possible by representatives from every country, should meet once a year beginning in 1971 to approve the Information programme for the ensuing year and allocate priorities. In conclusion, he pointed out that these tasks would inevitably delay the implementation of the experts' recommendations.

63. In response to a question by the Netherlands Representative, he agreed that one of the recommendations - namely, the cut-back in the "NATO Letter" to six issues a year, could be implemented immediately since the question of additional credits would not arise and the funds thereby released could be allocated to activities at the top of the priority list, namely filmed material, the visitors' programme, speakers' tours and increased distribution of selected publications.

64. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that if the Council adopted this suggestion he would have to reserve his position. He would find it difficult to accept a cut-back in the "NATO Letter". Also, his Authorities did not entirely agree with the order of priorities established by the experts.

65. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Survey of the NATO Information Service Output 1969 (C-M(70)22);
- (2) agreed that a more liberal policy concerning the release of information on current activities should be adopted by the Council and other NATO bodies;

- (3) agreed that the Conference of National Information Officials should meet annually with the maximum possible participation by all countries;
- (4) agreed that from 1971 onwards the NATO Information programme would be prepared on the basis of suggestions made at the annual Conference of National Information Officials with the participation of members of the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations;
- (5) invited the NATO Civil Budget Committee to analyse as soon as possible a detailed estimate, to be prepared by the Information Directorate, of the cost of implementing the recommendations contained in C-M(70)22;
- (6) agreed that the Conference of National Information Officials in Autumn 1970 should study ways and means of improving co-operation between the national and NATO information services;
- (7) subject to reservation by Norway(1), agreed that the monthly edition of the "NATO Letter" should be curtailed to six issues annually, and that the money thus saved should be used in accordance with the priorities established in paragraph 12 of the Experts' Report;
- (8) agreed to resume the discussion as soon as the Civil Budget Committee's Report had been received.

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III. CREDITS GRANTED BY NATO COUNTRIES TO CUBA

Reference: C-M(69)26
Document: C-M(70)26

66. The CHAIRMAN invited the Council to take note of the Fifteenth Report by the Economic Committee on the credits granted by NATO countries to Cuba (C-M(70)26). He drew attention to the statement in the Report that, in 1969, credits had risen by 16% to \$178.8 million and that exports had been slightly less than in the previous year.

(1) Reservation subsequently lifted

67. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that if document C-M(70)26 was to be more widely circulated, the footnote to paragraph 2 of the cover note to the effect that Portugal had not participated in the preparation of this type of report since 1962 should be deleted.

68. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE was in favour of undertaking a study on the economic situation in Cuba with the aim, in particular, of establishing the relative importance of the contribution made to the country's development by the credits granted by the various Western countries.

69. The CHAIRMAN suggested that a Note recently circulated by the United States might be taken as a suitable point of departure for this study.

70. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Report by the Economic Committee on credits granted by NATO countries to Cuba (C-M(70)26) and of the comment by the Portuguese Representative;
- (2) invited the Economic Committee to follow up its Report with a further study on the general economic situation in Cuba.

IV. CREDITS GRANTED BY NATO COUNTRIES TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Reference: C-M(69)27
Document: C-M(70)27

71. The CHAIRMAN drew the Council's attention to the Twentieth Report by the Economic Committee on credits granted by NATO countries to Communist countries during the year 1969. In 1969, outstanding credits had risen by 17% to more than \$4,000 million. There had also been a substantial increase in credits of over five years which, at the end of 1969, had represented more than 60% of the total. The increase in credits to the Soviet Union had been particularly marked; that country's share in total credits to Communist countries was now 38%, as against 55% for the East European countries and approximately 5% for mainland China. The most notable development in relations with the East European countries was a rise of 45% in credits to Czechoslovakia; this confirmed a trend which had become apparent in 1968 and which had continued after the Soviet intervention in August 1968.

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72. In conclusion, he said that the Economic Committee was at present considering how to amplify the material in C-M(70)27 as a basis for the study on the indebtedness of the Communist countries, in which several Permanent Representatives had expressed interest when the Council had discussed the Committee's programme of work.

73. On procedure, he asked whether the Council would be agreeable to Economic Committee reports being approved by tacit consent.

74. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that although these reports usually called for little comment, their submission to the Council gave delegations an opportunity to draw attention to any problems they felt to be of special concern.

75. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Twentieth Report by the Economic Committee on credits granted by NATO countries to Communist countries in 1969;
- (2) took note of the comment by the Netherlands Representative and agreed not to alter the procedure whereby reports by the Economic Committee were submitted to the Council.

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V. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

Document: PO/70/281

76. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the Note PO/70/281, asked whether the Council was prepared to request the Senior Political Committee to prepare a programme for further technical studies on MBFRs and submit it to the Council for approval as soon as possible.

77. The ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL for POLITICAL AFFAIRS said that the programme was being prepared and would be available for circulation as soon as the Military Authorities had submitted their comments, which they were expecting to do by 2nd July. He expressed the hope that the Council would be in a position to give the Political Committee final instructions within two weeks from that date.

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78. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the question of MBFRs had now entered upon a phase which might lead to active negotiations. He therefore urged that the programme of work to be prepared by the Senior Political Committee should be as realistic as possible and that it should not provide for any further studies or revisions of old studies of doubtful value.

79. The COUNCIL:

subject to the comment by the Danish Representative, invited the Senior Political Committee to submit a programme of further technical studies on MBFRs by 2nd July, with a view to giving instructions on this question by 15th July.

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VI. INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPHS 15 TO 17 OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE ROME MINISTERIAL MEETING

80. The CHAIRMAN recalled that during the discussions on the paragraphs of the Ministerial Communiqué dealing with the procedures for the transmission of the Communiqué and Declaration to other interested parties and the way they were to be interpreted, he had made it clear on several occasions that these paragraphs - and especially paragraphs 15 to 17 of the Communiqué and paragraph 4 of the Declaration - were closely interrelated. He also pointed out that while the Council had agreed that exploratory contacts with the East should be pursued on a bilateral basis, it had also felt that they should be founded on a common interpretation. He understood that the Canadian Representative had a number of suggestions to make regarding this interpretation.

81. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that during the Rome discussions on the Ministerial Communiqué and Declaration, important policy differences had emerged as regards the interpretation to be placed on these documents. While these differences were not necessarily harmful in talks with the other side, it was none the less essential for the Alliance to harmonise its views to some extent if it was to convey a meaningful message. In their talks with East European Governments, Canadian diplomatic representatives had detected some confusion as a result of the wide divergencies in the interpretations put to them by Western countries. His Government therefore felt that the West should try to narrow these differences, bearing in mind that the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers were due to meet in Budapest on and after 21st June. To this end, he wished to raise the following three basic questions, referring in each case to the Communiqué or Declaration language:

- (1) did the conditions imposed by the first sentence of paragraph 15 of the Communiqué apply to all multilateral approaches such as series of meetings, the nomination of a roving ambassador or the establishment of a standing commission? The answer to this question appeared to be in the affirmative. The word "talks" in paragraph 15 went back to the "exploratory conversations" in paragraph 14, which Ministers had stated that they were ready to multiply;
- (2) as regards the offer in paragraph 17 to hold exploratory talks on the possibility of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, was this independent of progress on Germany and Berlin? The reply was again in the affirmative, since MBFRs were dealt with in a separate Communiqué paragraph which was not tied to paragraph 15. Moreover, the invitation to hold talks in paragraph 3 of the Declaration made no mention of prior conditions. The exploratory talks referred to in this paragraph were those which would be held if and when the proposal on MBFRs met with a response. The arrangements for these talks would be different from those mentioned in paragraph 15 of the Communiqué. However, it was clear that progress on other subjects would facilitate progress on MBFRs;
- (3) was the other side's reaction to MBFRs a precondition, in the same sense as progress on Germany and Berlin, for further consideration by NATO of a European Security Conference? The reply in this case was in the negative. Although a positive reaction to the MBFR proposal would help to create a favourable climate for a Conference, no specific link had been established between the two.

82. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE felt that now that the Ministerial Meeting was over it was inadvisable to try to arrive at a new interpretation of Ministers' thinking and anticipate on the decisions they were to take in December. On condition member countries maintained their unity of purpose, he felt that they should be allowed a certain flexibility of approach as regards the follow-up on the initiative taken at Rome. The primary goal was to secure responses from the Warsaw Pact as a basis for the assessment Ministers were to make at their next meeting, when it would be appropriate to provide a final interpretation of the documents issued at Rome and decide whether the time had to come to initiate multilateral talks to pave the way for a European Security Conference.

83. Certainly progress in ongoing talks should be recorded before multilateral contacts were entered into. As regards the relationship between the proposal for MBFRs and paragraph 15, he agreed that, whatever progress was made with talks on other problems, a special procedure was warranted for the MBFR question. However, there was an interrelationship between all the issues considered in negotiations with the East and the quality of responses of Warsaw Pact countries on MBFRs was bound to be taken into account in assessing progress elsewhere and in taking a decision on the initiation of multilateral contacts.

84. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that since the Communiqué and the Declaration were the result of a compromise, any attempt to arrive at a more specific wording would simply accentuate the existing divergencies which, he felt, were not very far-reaching. In his view, the best way to obtain other countries' reactions on the prospects of achieving progress was not to confront them with a list of issues; in fact, were the Alliance to come forward with a new jointly-agreed interpretation of the Ministerial Declaration, it might even find itself involved in pre-negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.

85. He made the following comments on the questions raised by the Canadian Representative:

- (1) progress in the current negotiations should not be regarded as an absolute prerequisite for multilateral contacts. He was sure that, notwithstanding the various forms of approach adopted, everyone involved in the negotiations sincerely wished them to be successful;
- (2) the ideal would be for multilateral talks on MBFRs to go forward together with the multilateral exploratory talks referred to in the Communiqué, but this should not be insisted on at all costs and MBFRs should be dealt with independently if this was necessary to make progress. However, it appeared from the Warsaw Pact countries' reactions to date that they wanted to delay talks on MBFRs indefinitely or, at all events, until a European Security Conference had been convened with a limited Agenda;
- (3) it would be regrettable if there was a negative Warsaw Pact reaction on MBFRs which influenced the decision to be taken regarding the prospects of starting multilateral talks on other issues. Progress on MBFRs should not be regarded as a prerequisite for such talks.

86. He added that the points mentioned by the Canadian Representative were not the only ones which had come up during the latest bilateral talks. The need for exploratory talks following the bilateral contacts, the procedure for initiating these talks and the important question of whether MBFRs should also extend to nuclear weapons, had also come up. Many questions had also been raised in connection with paragraph 16(a) of the Communiqué. In his view it would be inadvisable at the present stage to give too specific an interpretation of the "principles which should govern relations between states" in relation to the Brezhnev Doctrine. It would be preferable by far to note the work of the United Nations Special Committee on the principle of free relations between states - assuming that the relations between the socialist countries and others were based on the same principle - so as to avoid giving the impression that the Alliance was calling for the formal renunciation of the socialist doctrine.

87. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE agreed that the compromise reached in Rome should not be called into question and that the formulation of a common interpretation was not feasible. This should not be taken as meaning that he disagreed with the Canadian Representative's answers to his own questions. He recognised that the purpose of the Rome Meeting had been to send out a signal on a European Security Conference and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions without, however, tying the two issues one to another. In his view, new interpretation could not influence the reply the Warsaw Pact countries would be preparing at their Budapest meeting.

88. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his position was very similar to those of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands Representatives. While accepting the logic of the Canadian thinking, he could not agree with the procedure proposed. He recalled that the wording of the Communiqué had deliberately been left fairly vague. Now that replies were beginning to come in from the countries to which it had been addressed, and with the Budapest meeting imminent, he thought it preferable to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The initial Moscow reactions on MBFRs were not entirely negative and a rigid interpretation might deprive the Alliance of its freedom of manoeuvre.

89. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE shared these views. He supported the line of action suggested by the United States Representative. The Political Committee should be able to make a first assessment of reactions and draw initial conclusions by early July. He hoped that the Western Foreign Ministers would not wait until the December Ministerial Meeting before meeting again, but would get together at the United Nations in the Autumn. Generally speaking, he felt that, in principle, the Alliance should not seek to agree on prior conditions or unduly detailed procedures.

90. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE agreed with all the comments warning against the danger of too specific an interpretation of the proposals put forward in the Communiqué and in the Declaration. In any case, he would find it difficult to endorse any new interpretation.

91. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE welcomed the United States Representative's pragmatic approach to the problem. He shared the United Kingdom Representative's view that the Alliance should not put itself in a position which could be interpreted as a pre-negotiation. He also felt that the method suggested by the Canadian Representative would enable the Warsaw Pact to make use of differences of opinion, although these were not on fundamental issues.

92. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that the text adopted at Rome did not require interpretation. He added that Mr. Schumann had replied in advance to all the questions raised by the Canadian Representative when he had described the bilateral contacts approach as the best means of bringing out different shades of opinion.

93. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he was without instructions from his Authorities; however, he thought that they would not see any need for a more specific interpretation of the Communiqué and Declaration before the next Ministerial Meeting, when it would be possible to take stock of the other side's reactions.

94. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE explained to the United States Representative that the purpose of his proposal was not to prejudge the outcome of the preliminary contacts in advance of the December Ministerial Meeting but to define the aims of the Alliance at a time when they were being put to the other side and thus to prevent the latter from making capital - not out of any lack of clarity of the documents but out of the confusion created by diverse explanations of them.

95. Summing up, the CHAIRMAN said that he had been glad to note from the discussion that the differences of opinion which existed were not on fundamental issues. It had been almost generally agreed that the compromise reached in Rome should not be prejudiced by a further attempt at interpretation. However, the Canadian Representative's suggestion was interesting in as much as it drew attention to the fact that a cautious attitude should be adopted towards countries to which the Rome documents were submitted. He hoped that the Council would be able to discuss the initial reactions of these countries before the summer recess.

96. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statements.

VII. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

97. Wednesday, 24th June at 10.15 a.m.

NATO,
1110 Brussels.