

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO SECRET  
SUMMARY RECORD  
C-R(68)9

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at  
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 39, on Wednesday,  
14th February, 1968 at 4 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

Mr. A. de Staercke

CANADA

Mr. Ross Campbell

DENMARK

Mr. O. Bierring

FRANCE

Mr. R. Seydoux

GERMANY

Mr. W.G. Grewe

GREECE

Mr. P.A. Cavalierato

ICELAND

Mr. N.P. Sigurdsson

ITALY

Mr. C. de Ferrariis  
Salzano

LUXEMBOURG

Mr. P. Mertz

NETHERLANDS

Mr. H.N. Boon

NORWAY

Mr. G. Kristiansen

PORTUGAL

Mr. A. Fortunato de  
Almeida

TURKEY

Mr. Nuri Birgi

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Bernard Burrows

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harlan Cleveland

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:

Mr. J.A. Roberts

Assistant Secretary General for  
Political Affairs:

Mr. J. Jaenicke

Assistant Secretary General for  
Defence Support:

Mr. Tyler Port

Assistant Secretary General for  
Scientific Affairs:

Dr. R. Schall

Executive Secretary:

The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Military Committee Representative:

Vice-Admiral Lee

Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee  
of Government Budget Experts:

Mr. H. Massberg

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I. STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS

Discussed in private session.

NATO SECRETII. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said he would limit himself to a few comments on the views expressed at the previous meeting by the German and Italian Representatives on the number of ratifications necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty and the amendments. His Authorities felt that the figure of 80 would be too high. He recalled that the number of ratifications needed for the entry into force of the United Nations Charter had been fixed at half the number of signatories. In spite of this, his Government would be prepared to consider a higher figure than 40, but it was not in favour of imposing too stringent conditions which might unduly delay the entry into force of the Treaty; it trusted in the stimulating effect of the first signatures. As regards the qualitative principle, its practical application seemed difficult and was bound to give rise to divergent interpretations. He referred to the difficulties which had been encountered in connection with the application of a quantitative criterion based on the cargo tonnage figures, when the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization Convention was signed. As regards the Federal Republic's proposals concerning ratification by all the members of the IAEA Board of Governors, this too seemed likely to result in undesirable delay in the Treaty's entry into force. Moreover, it would probably meet with opposition from the other countries. Finally, the Netherlands Government would have preferred the Treaty to be of indefinite duration but it agreed that 25 years was an acceptable compromise. It hoped that all the forthcoming discussions would not complicate or hold up the negotiations at Geneva.

2. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would first of all reply to the comments of the Netherlands Representative. He did not think the United Nations Charter could be compared with the Non-Proliferation Treaty as there were essential differences in these international agreements. The Charter was based on the principle of equality of all members of the United Nations, whereas this was not the case with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although, for the former, an average quorum could be acceptable, it was essential, for the latter, that the Treaty be accepted by a sufficient number of countries to convince the others that its underlying principles were equitable and well-balanced. In addition, he would have wished to hear from the

Netherlands Representative the exact figure which his Authorities would consider acceptable. He felt too that there was a tendency to exaggerate the importance of bringing the Treaty into force as soon as possible. In his opinion, what was much more important was to present the signatories with a set of fair and valid guarantees and provisions.

3. Turning to the introduction of the qualitative criterion and the frequency of review conferences, he also wished to reply to the comments made by the Danish Representative at the previous meeting. With regard to the frequency of review conferences, he could only confirm the reasons for his opinion that the amendment in question would prove to be a factor of stability and not of instability. He pointed out that this feeling was shared by many countries inside and outside the Alliance. He added that as the Treaty dealt with a continually developing subject it was necessary to have periodic reviews which, far from being a source of weakness, would help to give the Treaty some measure of credibility.

4. With respect to the difficulties of applying the qualitative criterion, he could not support the argument that the criterion would be arbitrary. In his view, the more advanced stage reached by some countries in nuclear industry development was an objective fact which left no room for arbitrary judgments. This criterion, after all, had already been adopted in another context by a body as sound and reliable as the IAEA. In this connection, he recalled that Annex IV of the last report of the Board of Governors listed the twelve non-nuclear-weapon member states of that body at present engaged in peaceful nuclear activities: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

5. With regard to the argument that the qualitative criterion option would give many countries a kind of veto on the entry into force of the Treaty, he felt for his part that this clause would be entirely in line with the spirit of the Treaty which, as at present worded, conferred on 25 countries, in addition to the nuclear states, the power to veto the approval and entry into force of the amendments. If such a high number of qualified accessions was required for even minor changes to the text of the Treaty, he thought it logical that a certain number of qualified accessions should be even more necessary for its entry into force if the aim was to provide it with more stable foundations, making for the greatest possible effectiveness.

6. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he wished to bring the Council up to date on the continuing discussions between the two Co-Chairmen on the question of periodic review. It would be remembered that he had already commented

on this question at the meeting of 31st January. Another meeting between the two Co-Chairmen had been held on 10th February. Ambassador de Palma had at that time reminded Mr. Roshchin that periodic review was clearly emerging as a key amendment which would be of key importance not just to a few countries but to many non-aligned countries. This had recently been indicated by the Swedish proposal made in the Committee of 18 on 8th February to the effect that there be an addition to the third paragraph of Article VIII providing for the possibility of review at intervals of five years after the first Review Conference if a majority of the parties to the Treaty so desired. Any proposal to this effect would have to be submitted by a majority of the parties to the depositary governments. Ambassador de Palma had urged that the Soviets agree to an Article on review which would not contain a nuclear power veto, explaining that the United States remained convinced that the inclusion of such a veto would sour and negate any benefits in terms of support to this that might be derived from introducing periodic review. Mr. Roshchin had said that his instructions had not changed and had asked for the views of the United States Delegation on the Swedish proposal. Mr. de Palma had replied that he had received no precise instructions, but that he was authorised to discuss with the Soviets an idea very similar to that in the Swedish proposal. Mr. de Palma therefore assumed there was a fair chance that if the Soviets could accept something along the lines of the Swedish proposal the United States could do so also. He had further explained to the Soviets that the United States continued to believe that it would encourage greater support from among the non-nuclear countries if there were provision in the Non-Proliferation Treaty for a "Preparatory Commission". Mr. Roshchin had undertaken to report this suggestion to his government. To sum up, although the Soviets were still resisting "periodic review", and the idea of a "Preparatory Commission", the United States was continuing to press them on these points and hoped that the Soviet Union would be more flexible in the future.

7. He then turned to the question of qualitative criteria for the entry into force of the Treaty. He began by pointing out that it was generally - perhaps even universally - agreed that a treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons was in the best interests of world order and must be as effective as possible. In order to achieve this, the United States was convinced - and he thought this was the generally shared view - that the Treaty must come into force as soon as possible. It was on this basis that the question of ratification and of entry into force had been approached. Clearly, anything that prolonged or complicated bringing the Non-Proliferation Treaty into force undercut its

effectiveness in averting possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the basis of this general assumption, the United States had carefully considered the number and composition of signatories which would be required to ratify before the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force. Experience with ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty showed that 9 months were required to obtain 30 ratifications, 16 months for 60 ratifications and two and a half years for 80 ratifications. It had therefore been decided that 40 ratifications, plus the nuclear weapon parties, would be a reasonable number since this would permit entry into force within a reasonable period of time while assuring widespread support from among the world community. Moreover, the United States could not agree to a ratification procedure under which a significant consensus of the international community could be frustrated by a few countries (which would almost certainly be outside the Alliance) which might have reservations concerning the Treaty or which might be tempted to hold up ratification for purposes totally unrelated to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a ratification procedure would, moreover, make almost irrelevant any fixed number of ratifications, since one veto could frustrate the intent of 40, or even 80 countries.

8. The United States had also concluded that it would be impossible to take civil nuclear energy capacity as a criterion in view of the controversy which would arise over defining and applying such a standard. For example, additional capacity, particularly if under construction as Italy had suggested, would be difficult to estimate if this were a criterion for defining the importance of countries in the nuclear power field. An even more serious objection to a qualitative standard would arise from the veto power accorded to certain non-nuclear countries. For example, if civil nuclear energy capacity were taken as the criterion, veto power might be extended to the following countries in terms of total reactor thermal megawattage: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, India, Japan, East Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands and South Africa. Some of these countries, outside the Alliance, had not yet affirmatively stated their readiness to sign a NPT. Moreover, to include the GDR (a distinct possibility under such a criterion) would raise a problem which he did not suppose any member of the Alliance wished to face.

9. Obstacles to entry into force would also be posed if the veto power were extended to members of the IAEA Board of Governors or even to some of them. Current members of the Board were as follows: the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Japan, India, Argentina, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, the Lebanon, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Philippines, Bulgaria, Turkey, Algeria, Ceylon and the Malagasy Republic. Since any one of these states could block

the entire treaty project, the United States believed that any proposal giving a veto power to a large and politically miscellaneous group of states would be unworkable and delay, or even preclude, the Treaty's entry into force.

10. Finally, he said that the IAEA Board of Governors formula had been agreed to in Article VIII on amendments, since the use of this formula obviated the need for a fresh selection of countries. While his Government had accepted this cumbersome proposal for amendments (to which no party was committed unless it agreed to the particular amendment), it did not wish to run the risk of applying it to the entry into force provision. The United States continued to believe that the only solution to the problem of finding a balance between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries lay through numbers and not names of countries. For this reason, the number of 40 had been selected, and the United States believed that, judging by the discussions that had already taken place, this solution was supported by a large majority of member countries, as well as by a large majority of the international community. In conclusion, the United States Representative stressed that great efforts had been made in recent months to consult within the Council in an effort to develop a draft treaty that would take into account substantial Allied concerns and be susceptible to the widest world support. He believed that this had resulted in a much better treaty draft. However, the United States did not believe that world interest could now be served by delaying or making more difficult the entry into force of the Treaty which all member governments had on several occasions recognised as being in the interests of all.

11. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities too were opposed to any arrangement based on a qualitative criterion whereby the Treaty could be ratified only subject to the agreement of certain civil nuclear powers selected because they were members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA or on the basis of some other criterion. He pointed out that if a provision was included to this effect, each of these countries - certain of which, such as India, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, had not yet undertaken to sign the Treaty - would be in a position to wreck the entire venture. In his view, the negotiations should be designed to secure a generally acceptable treaty, on the understanding that any state dissatisfied with the final text was quite at liberty not to sign it. However, he saw no reason to provide any state with the means to oppose the entry into force of the Treaty.

12. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statements.



III. 1967 ANNUAL REVIEW OF REMUNERATION FOR STAFF  
OF THE CO-ORDINATED ORGANIZATIONS

Document: PO/68/73

13. The CHAIRMAN invited the Council to approve the 47th Report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts (PO/68/73) dealing with the 1967 annual review of remuneration for the International Staff. He pointed out that the recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee were in line with the proposals of the Secretaries General where most countries were concerned. However, this was not true of Belgium, where there was a difference of  $\frac{1}{2}\%$  between the amount requested and the amount approved. Although this was only a small difference, he felt that from the psychological standpoint it could not be ignored. Speaking for himself, he was disturbed to note that the cost-of-living allowance which the Council was asked to approve following the first yearly review of salaries since the relocation of the Organization in Belgium was smaller than the rise in the cost of living in this country during the reference period. Faced as they had been with many difficulties, the members of the Staff were bound to be disappointed, all the more so since their salaries were now lower than they had been in France. He had already had occasion, when submitting the 1968 budget estimates, to inform the Council of the importance he attached to the yearly review in as much as he hoped that it would help to lessen the difficulties encountered by the Staff. He could not sufficiently stress the fact that, given the presence, in one and the same country, of two major international organizations such as NATO and the EEC, often with similar recruiting problems, it was essential that their systems of remuneration should be brought into line as far as possible. It was true that a great effort had been made in this direction during the special 1967 review of salaries rendered necessary by the move to Belgium. The results were not, however, entirely satisfactory since the NATO salary scales were still somewhat below those of the EEC. Moreover, instead of becoming narrower, this gap would widen as a result of the yearly reviews which had just been completed within the two organizations. This being the case, the Council would have no difficulty in understanding his concern that the next general review of salaries should lead to a real improvement in the NATO system of remuneration. There was no denying that, for the present, this system was less favourable than the EEC one, not only from the standpoint of salaries proper, but also, and in particular, from the standpoint of statutory benefits. Only a satisfactory solution to this problem would enable the Organization to recruit and retain the qualified staff it needed to carry out the tasks assigned to it.



14. The COUNCIL:

- (1) approved the 47th Report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts (PO/68/73);
- (2) took note of the statement by the Chairman.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE £ STERLING AND THE DANISH KRONER ON THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME

Document: C-M(68)2

15. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Infrastructure Committee was now in a position to confirm that the devaluation of the £ sterling and of the Danish Kroner which had occurred in November 1967 would have no adverse effect on the present Infrastructure Programme. The Infrastructure Committee also reported that it had adopted for all Infrastructure accounts hitherto expressed in £ sterling a conventional symbol, the "IAU" (Infrastructure Accounting Unit) based on the pre-devaluation rate of the £ sterling.

16. The COUNCIL:

took note of the Report by the Infrastructure Committee on the Consequences of the Devaluation of the £ sterling and the Danish Kroner on the NATO Infrastructure Programme (C-M(68)2).

V. SITUATION ON THE VON KARMAN INSTITUTE

References: C-R(67)7, Item IV  
C-M(67)6

Document: PO/68/105

17. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics, which was situated in the southern outskirts of Brussels, was a training and research institute for advanced aeronautical and aerospace science. It operated as a national institute with international funding. Although from 1960 to 1965 only eight member countries of NATO had contributed to its financing, based on the number of student places which individual countries wished to fund, in 1966 a new funding system had been agreed upon, to which all NATO countries contributed a given percentage. The Council had agreed on 17th February, 1967, that this formula, which had been proposed by Belgium and which fixed

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the Belgian share at 45%, be applied for the academic years 1966/1967 and 1967/1968. This new funding system had turned out to be very advantageous to the Institute's development, for the number of regular students (now 39) could be nearly doubled and equipment could be modernised to bring it up to date with the latest designs.

18. After this brief review, he recalled that the AC/168 Ad Hoc Group on the Financing of the Von Karman Institute had agreed on 22nd September, 1967, to a 1967/1968 budget of B.fr. 22.3 million. Belgium had placed a reservation on this decision which had not yet been lifted, so that, since 1st October, 1967, the Institute had operated without an accepted budget. On 3rd February, after a meeting of the Institute's Board of Directors, he had been informed by the Board's Chairman, Professor Young (United Kingdom), that the Belgian Government wished to reduce by half the share to which it had committed itself. Because of this one-sided modification, the Belgian Authorities, who were responsible for the functioning of the Institute, could not assume that the other countries would contribute their share. They therefore saw no alternative but to suggest that measures be taken to liquidate the Institute.

19. He stressed that he had been concerned about this development for two reasons: first it raised the question - and this was a very serious one - of the value of commitments entered into before the Council and secondly, he did not consider it less important that an Institute in which all the Allies co-operated should be endangered by a unilateral measure at a time when it was flourishing better than ever and when the Council was talking about strengthening technological co-operation in NATO. For this reason, and with the active co-operation of the Belgian Delegation and the full support of the Belgian Permanent Representative, he had written to the Prime Minister, from whom he had just received an entirely satisfactory reply to the effect that the Belgian Government agreed to meet its obligations and to contribute 45% of the total budget; however, it hoped that the negotiations which were due to begin within a few weeks with a view to deciding on the 1968/1969 budget would make it possible to reduce Belgium's share so that it could continue to contribute to the financing of the Institute. He proposed that the Council should consider the 1967/1968 budget as approved and that it should instruct the Ad Hoc Group on the Financing of the Von Karman Institute to consider what action should be taken to meet the wishes of the Belgian Government with respect to fiscal year 1968/1969 and to report to the Council in due course. In conclusion, he wished to thank the Belgian Representative and his assistants for their co-operation.

20. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said he understood that the Ad Hoc Group had placed this question on the Agenda for its next meeting. He fully agreed that it should be allowed to carry on its work. He added that he saw no reason why the correspondence exchanged between the Secretary General and the Belgian Prime Minister should not be circulated to delegations.

21. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thanked the Chairman and the Belgian Representative for their help in finding a satisfactory solution to a problem which might have had serious consequences.

22. The COUNCIL:

- (1) approved the Budget for 1967/1968, as established by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Financing of the Von Karman Institute;
- (2) instructed the Ad Hoc Group to begin discussions on the financing of the Institute in fiscal year 1968/1969, bearing in mind the Belgian Government's views on the need to reduce its contribution, and to report to the Council in due course.

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#### VI. DATES OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING

23. The CHAIRMAN recalled that after receiving a letter from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe regarding the dates on which the latter proposed to hold its December meeting, he had requested the Permanent Representatives to enquire whether their Ministers would prefer the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held on Monday, 16th and Tuesday, 17th December or on Tuesday, 17th and Wednesday, 18th December. He felt that it was probably too early to hold a full discussion on this question at the present stage.

24. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said he could give the preliminary information that his Government was agreeable to holding the meeting during the third week of December, but would prefer it to begin on Tuesday, 17th December, so as to leave a day for contacts between delegations.

25. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government was ready to agree to the proposed dates for the Council of Europe meeting and to 16th December as the starting date for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. He asked to what extent the statement made by the United States Representative should be regarded as a proposal.

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26. The CHAIRMAN took it to be a suggestion, which the United States had been wise to make for the guidance of the Council. He proposed that delegations should keep this suggestion in mind when seeking instructions so that the matter could be taken up again later.

27. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statements, and agreed to return to this question at a future meeting.

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#### VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RELOCATION OF THE ORGANIZATION

28. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Fourteen, he had been requested by the latter to convey a message to the French Representative regarding certain problems which had to be settled between France and its Allies as a result of the departure of NATO from French territory. To this end, he had transmitted to the French Representative a document which had been agreed by the Group of Fourteen. The French Representative had replied that he would forward this document to his Government.

29. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statement.

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#### VIII. EXERCISE FIRST LOOK

30. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he and the United States Representative had announced on 19th April, 1967, that their Governments had decided to hold a joint arms control verification exercise in the United Kingdom in the course of 1968. (This exercise, originally known as CLOUD GAP 15, had now been re-named Exercise FIRST LOOK.) He had also announced that arrangements would be made for visits by observers from NATO member countries during the exercise. In September, Brigadier Ward, the British Director of the exercise, had given a detailed account of the preparations to the meeting of the Political Committee with Disarmament Experts. Planning for the exercise had since been progressing satisfactorily. The exercise would start as planned in July and would continue until the end of September. As regards visits by observers from NATO countries, it was felt that they would be most fruitful and informative if they took place early in August, by which time the exercise should be well under way.

The United Kingdom Authorities planned to invite each member of the Alliance to send two civilian or military observers for a visit of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 days to the exercise area. During the visit, they would be carefully briefed on the way in which the exercise was being undertaken. They would also have opportunities to watch the inspecting teams at work in the field. Detailed arrangements would be proposed and formal invitations would be extended in due course. The present intention was that the visit should take place during the week beginning 5th August.

31. He added that, since Exercise FIRST LOOK was likely to make an important contribution to an understanding of verification problems and so to contribute to progress in the international disarmament negotiations, it had occurred to his Authorities that there would be advantage in inviting the Soviet Union and all the other countries participating in the Committee of Eighteen to send observers on an appropriate occasion. The security aspects of their attendance would, of course, require careful attention, but there was much that could usefully be shown to them and such a visit would underline the importance of the contribution the exercise was expected to make to progress on disarmament. Assuming that its NATO Allies would see no objection to its plan to invite observers from the countries participating in the Committee of Eighteen, the United Kingdom Government proposed shortly to give the Russians and other East European countries participating in the Committee of Eighteen advance notice of its intention to issue an invitation, as there was a risk that a public invitation presented in the Committee without any preparation would be regarded as a purely propaganda move. The invitation would be officially confirmed later during the present session of the Committee of Eighteen. The countries in question would be invited to send two civilian or military observers each. Their visit, which would be quite separate from the visit by NATO observers, would probably last about the same time and take place a week later. The United Kingdom Delegation would keep the Council informed of Soviet and East European reactions to its invitation.

32. The ITALIAN and GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES said they would like time to inform their Authorities and ask for instructions.

33. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE wanted to know if the two groups of observers would attend the same operations.

34. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE replied that he had not received precise information on this point, but said that the security problems arising in the case of the Communist countries did not concern the NATO countries.

35. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE asked if Exercise FIRST LOOK would take place within the framework of normal United Kingdom military manoeuvres.

36. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE replied that he had not been given any details of the way in which the exercise would be conducted. He emphasised, however, that it was a combined operation to be carried out by the United Kingdom in concert with the United States for a very precise purpose, namely, the verification of arms control measures.

37. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE warned against confusing this exercise with a proposal he had made some time ago to the effect that NATO troops on manoeuvres should try out arms control methods.

38. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE urged the members of the Council to obtain speedy instructions from their governments to allow the matter to be discussed at a very early date. He reminded them of the importance of ensuring that the invitation to members of the Committee of Eighteen was presented in a satisfactory manner.

39. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE supported this statement. He recalled that the session of the Committee of Eighteen was due to end in mid-March. In the opinion of the United States, it was very important that this invitation should not be interpreted as a propaganda move.

40. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed full agreement with this point of view.

41. The COUNCIL:

- (1) noted the statement by the United Kingdom Representative regarding Exercise FIRST LOOK and the comments to which it had given rise;
- (2) agreed to continue the discussion at its next meeting.

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IX. FOLLOW-UP TO THE REPORT ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

Reference: PO/68/108

42. The CHAIRMAN recalled his proposal that if no objection had been put forward by Friday, 16th February, the decisions set out in PO/68/108 would be considered as final. One delegation had since requested that the deadline should be extended by one week to 23rd February. Another had informed him that it wished to submit an amendment. He proposed that this amendment should be circulated in writing before 23rd February so that the Council could meet as soon as possible after that date.

43. The COUNCIL:

approved the Chairman's proposal.

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X. DATE OF NEXT MEETING

44. Wednesday, 21st February at 10.15 a.m.

OTAN/NATO,  
Brussels, 39.

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