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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, (16e) on Wednesday, 15th December, 1965, at 10 a.m.

PRESENT

1997 1998

President of the Council: The Hon. Paul Martin

Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak:
H.E. Mr. L. Moyersoen:
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of National Defence
Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin:

The Hon. Paul T. Hellyer:
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff:

Secretary of State for External Affairs, President of the Council
Minister of National Defence
Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup:
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram:
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen:

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister for Defence
Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville:
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer:
H.E. Mr. P. de Leusse:

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministre des Armées
Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. Gerhard Schröder:

H.E. Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel:
H.E. Mr. Wilhelm Grewe:

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Federal Minister for Defence
Permanent Representative

1999

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GREECE

H.E. Mr. C. Mitsotakis: Minister for Economic
Co-ordination
H.E. Mr. S. Costopoulos: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Melas: Minister of Finance
H.E. Mr. T. Rentis: Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Ch. X. Palamas: Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Emil Jónsson: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Henrik Sv. Björnsson: Permanent Representative

ITALY

The Hon. Attilio Piccioni: Minister without Portfolio
The Hon. Giulio Andreotti: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini: Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. Pierre Werner: Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Antoine Wehenkel: Minister for the National Economy
and the Budget
H.E. Mr. Marcel Fischbach: Minister for the Armed Forces and
Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter: Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. H.N. Boon: Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Otto Grieg Tidemand: Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. George Kristiansen: Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira: Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Gen. Gomes de Araujo: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. Vasco da Cunha: Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu: Minister for National Defence
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi: Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt.Hon. James Callaghan:
The Rt.Hon. Denis Healey:
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh:

Chancellor of the Exchequer
Secretary of State for Defence
Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk:
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara:
The Hon. Harlan Cleveland:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J.A. Roberts:
Mr. F.D. Gregh:

Deputy Secretary General
Deputy Secretary General -
Assistant Secretary General
for Economics and Finance
Assistant Secretary General
for Scientific Affairs
Executive Secretary

Dr. John L. McLucas:

The Lord Coleridge:

ALSO PRESENT

Lt.Gen. Baron C.P. de Cumont:
Admiral A.G. Ward:
General L.L. Lemnitzer:

Admiral T.H. Moorer:

Admiral Sir Varyl Begg:
Maj.Gen. W.W. Stromberg:

Chairman, Military Committee
Chairman, Standing Group
Supreme Allied Commander
Europe
Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Channel
Standing Group Representative

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III. MILITARY QUESTIONS

A. Present Status of the NATO Military Effort

(1) Standing Group Intelligence Appreciation

1. The CHAIRMAN said that Ministers' consideration of the present status of the NATO Military Effort would begin with the Standing Group's Intelligence Appreciation which would be presented by the Chairman of the Standing Group, Admiral Ward. Ministers would note that this year, in response to a recent decision of the Council, the Intelligence Appreciation had already been circulated to them and would also be the subject of a short presentation by Admiral Ward, in order to allow time for any discussion which Ministers might wish to have on the matter.

2. Admiral WARD then gave his presentation.

3. The COUNCIL:

noted the Standing Group Intelligence Appreciation and the statement by the Chairman of the Standing Group. (MCH-175-65)
(CH(65)142)

(2) Briefing by the Chairman of the Military Committee

4. General Baron de CUMONT (Chairman of the Military Committee) said that the previous year he had pointed out the fields in which progress could be made, but progress had been slow in 1965. For example, he had said the previous year that the HAWK air defence barrier was incomplete and that only the 36 United States batteries were deployed; at the present time only four additional batteries were fully deployed, leaving a gap of 84 batteries. It had been said that 39 batteries would be deployed in 1966, thus providing a total of 79 out of the 124 which the countries had acquired.

5. He would now deal with three questions. First, as was known, a deadlock had been reached in the field of Infrastructure. On several occasions the Defence Ministers had agreed that the programme of work for common funding should be established for 1966 to 1970, but he could only conclude that their financial colleagues had turned a deaf ear to their wishes.

6. In its first fifteen Slices, the Infrastructure programme had produced a network of military installations which had never been equalled in peacetime and which he could readily compare with the roads of the Roman Empire and the German autobahns. That network would survive and would be evidence of the past effectiveness of the Alliance. However, to fail to finish and to perfect it would be a proof of weakness and of a lack of solidarity which would not escape the enemy.

7. There might be an argument which could help the Ministers to solve the problem of percentages. The systems needed for carrying out operations were becoming increasingly more elaborate and costly, but those requested in Slices XVII to XX no longer required such large installations as the systems which had already been constructed, such as airfields. £400 million had been spent on airfields but that amount had been increased by the cost of the land - about £50 million - borne by the host countries. The actual total of future expenditure would not be increased in that manner and would, therefore, not be so high, a factor which should render cost-sharing easier.

8. If the deadlock continued, there would be no more Infrastructure and the communications system would not be modernised; and the latter would not have the efficiency and speed required to allow of the political authority to play its rôle in making the decisions for a nuclear war. The Meeting of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers of 27th November, 1965 showed the importance of that rôle.

9. His second point was that the solidarity of the Alliance in the face of the possible threat, although that solidarity still existed, was no longer as evident as it had been fifteen years previously. If this were to be noticed by the enemy, it might lead him into temptation. He would quote a recent example: that of the study on Hellenic Thrace. The study had been carried out under the assumption that the Soviets would not move, and there was no direct Turkish participation in the work. If that study were to fall into the hands of the Bulgarians, they would think that an attack on the Greeks might not necessarily provoke a Turkish response. To exclude Turkey from the study was to deny the existence of Atlantic solidarity and to create a danger which need not exist.

10. It seemed obvious to him that, if Bulgaria mobilised seven or eight divisions on the Greek Thrace/Macedonia border, the Turkish Government and the Inter-Allied Commander at Izmir, fearing the outflanking of the defences of the Turkish Straits, would take precautionary measures at Adrianopolis. The presence of the four Turkish divisions of the 5th Corps on the Maritza, combined with the arrival of United States reinforcements and SACEUR's Mobile Force, would nip any Bulgarian inclination in the bud. He was informed that the Bulgarians were well aware of the Greek-Turkish disagreement over Cyprus and possibly doubted that a joint action would be mounted against them. He looked upon the Greek-Turkish disagreement as a family quarrel which would not prevent those two nations from standing together should a threat arise. The very understanding attitude of General Sunay and General Tsolakas during the discussions on Command in the Mediterranean/Black Sea was the best example of this.

11. His last point was the rôle and morale of the armed forces during the years of cold war under the shelter of the atomic umbrella. The military were asked to prepare for war, yet everything had to be done that could be done to avoid it. The military had to be ready, armed and trained with the aim of deterring the enemy, but not of fighting him. The true victory would be in never having to resort to war; the arms and training had to be perfect but not used. If, unfortunately, operations had to be undertaken, the ambition could not be to win the war since mutual annihilation was not victory. The aim was to show the enemy that he could not win either and that the intention was not to destroy him but to keep him within certain limits. Thus the soldier would fight with one hand tied behind his back, or at least he would have the impression of doing so. In the higher echelons that type of war would necessitate a new type of courage, a special clear-mindedness and very great intellectual discipline. Those wars which were not fought, those combat operations which must not be lost, but which must not be won too overwhelmingly, were difficult to wage. They entailed close co-operation between the military power and the military machine, mutual trust, understanding by the civil authority of the military capability and understanding by the military authority of the self-imposed political limits.

12. The military authorities were in being to serve the political authority, both national and Atlantic. To serve well they must be permanently and closely associated with the establishment of plans which had as their real aim the maintenance or the speedy re-establishment of peace. That close association was necessary at the national level between Ministers (the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence who formed the nucleus of the Defence Committee) and Chiefs of Staff, just as it was in the international field between the NATO Council and the Military Committee.

13. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, unless Ministers had any particular comments to make on what had just been said by General de Cumont, the military situation of the Alliance be discussed in the context of the 1965 Annual Review, which was the next sub-item on the Agenda. Some of the points raised by General de Cumont on Infrastructure and the contingency study on Hellenic Thrace could, if desired, be discussed under sub-items C and D. If this were agreeable to the Council, he proposed that action at this stage should be limited to taking note of the statement made by the Chairman of the Military Committee.

14. The COUNCIL:

took note of the briefing by the Chairman
of the Military Committee.

(3) The 1965 Annual Review

Document: Draft Resolution on the 1965 Annual Review (C-M(65)134) ✓

15. The CHAIRMAN wished to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that this year it was being asked to approve a Resolution on the Annual Review itself rather than on defence, as had been the case since 1959. This would enable Ministers to adopt the firm force commitments for end-1966 which had emerged from the Annual Review exercise, while in a separate resolution, to be discussed under Item III C of the Agenda, Ministers would be able to give guidance with regard to future defence planning.

16. There were two footnotes, one by Greece and one by Turkey, in which the authorities of those two countries drew attention to the fact that the implementation of the force goals they were invited to undertake for 1966 were dependent on the provision of adequate and timely aid from their NATO Allies. He wished to suggest that the discussion of military assistance to Greece and Turkey be deferred until Item III D of the Agenda had been reached.

17. The COUNCIL:

approved the Resolution on the 1965 Annual Review(1).

C. NATO Defence Planning(2)

Documents: Report by the Defence Planning Committee:
C-M(65)138 ✓
Draft Resolution on Defence Planning:
C-M(65)139 ✓

18. The CHAIRMAN said that there were two documents under reference and that he expected that the Council would find it more convenient to have a single discussion upon the two, since the Resolution flowed from the Report.

19. He would not take up time with a detailed exposition of the documents but would like, however, to make two general remarks.

20. The background against which the Council met was no longer one of apparent détente or of announced reductions in Russian defence spending. Within the last ten days there had been ample evidence of hardened Soviet attitudes in Mr. Kosygin's interview with the New York Times and Mr. Gromyko's remarks in Moscow. Moreover, the Council would have read that, on top of the

(1) Subsequently circulated as C-M(65)134(Final)

(2) At the suggestion of the Chairman, this sub-item was examined before sub-item III B.

improvements in Soviet military power to which there had been reference in the Standing Group Intelligence Appreciation, the next Russian defence budget showed an increase of 5%. As Mr. Healey had said the previous day the interpretation of figures of that sort would always be rather uncertain, but at the very least, he (the Chairman) thought that the increase could be taken as intending to serve warning of Soviet determination not to relax their cold war pressures upon the West.

21. These developments seemed to him to underline the significance of paragraph 14 of C-M(65)138, in which the Defence Planning Committee had ventured to remind the Council of the importance of political decisions upon the effort which governments were prepared to ask their countrymen to devote to defence, and the risks that they were prepared to accept. The proposals now before the Council for the acceptance in principle of a revised Annual Defence Planning Review procedure did not affect this in any way, indeed they reinforced it. It was for the political authorities to provide the military with clear and precise guidance; that was to say, after listening to military advice, to make a comprehensive assessment of the threat, to accept the risks and to decide what resources could be made available. The political authorities should take the responsibility for accepting the risks, and the military, having previously pointed out the risks, should advise on how the available resources could best be used to minimise them. That was more or less what happened in member countries in a national context. The purpose of meetings such as the present one was to give similar guidance within an Alliance framework to the international military authorities of the Alliance.

22. It was, of course, quite clear from the Defence Planning Committee Report and from the documents on which it was based that the Major NATO Commanders did not regard the BRAVO forces as the minimum strength required to accomplish their assigned mission. They had drawn attention to the risks which the BRAVO sets of forces implied; and it seemed self-evident that those risks would be increased if the BRAVO sets of forces should be scaled down in places to approximate more closely to national planning.

23. In the Military Committee's report the assessment of the risks pointed sharply to the probability of an early need to employ nuclear weapons, and great stress was placed upon the importance of achieving satisfactory machinery for the timely release of such weapons. That point was taken up in paragraph 10 of the Draft Resolution, which he regarded as the most important and practical of the numerous measures which the Defence Planning Committee was recommending to the Council. The point was already implicit in MC 14/2, and its significance seemed to him to be increased by the Military Committee's Risks Assessment of the BRAVO forces and by the evidence that the non-military implications of those forces might make their attainment impossible for some time. These were some personal reflections which might provide a starting point for discussion.

24. Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) said that at the May 1965 Ministerial Meeting the fundamental problem of reconciling force goals with resources had been discussed. The Military Committee had said that the BRAVO sets of forces would be acceptable, subject to the adoption of a system for the timely political release of nuclear weapons and to the strengthening of the flanks. He made two points. First, no system could be considered a satisfactory alternative to the provision of the forces required; secondly, the reinforcement of the flanks of the Alliance could not be provided by forces from other sectors. An examination should be made of the best way to face the nuclear threat which overhung Europe. The flanks of the Alliance should be strengthened and, in a crisis, supported by mobile forces. The best guarantee of obtaining the timely political release of nuclear weapons was in having strong conventional forces. Thus present conventional forces should be strengthened both qualitatively and quantitatively.

25. The Military Committee and SACEUR had underlined the risks inherent in accepting the BRAVO force posture. But in that respect it was also necessary to take account of available national resources and to bear in mind that neither the intensity of the threat nor those resources were constant factors. Thus goals could not really be finalised for a long period ahead, but should be determined on the basis of the priorities existing within the various sectors of the Alliance and within their available resources. The BRAVO set of forces could form the basis for further study and in due course be modified as far as possible to meet the operational requirements of the Military Authorities.

26. He was pleased to be able to inform the Council that a bilateral agreement had been reached with Mr. McNamara for the production, for the most part in Italy, of F104S fighter aircraft (suitable for carrying air-to-air missiles) to the value of approximately \$410 million. Any member country wishing to participate could negotiate with the parties concerned.

27. Italy could accept the United States proposal on the Annual Defence Planning Review (five-year rolling plan) having suggested at an early stage that it be made more flexible and brought into line with NATO procedures.

28. The financial evaluation carried out by the International Staff required detailed national study, and would be useful to show the extent to which the BRAVO forces could be met. In addition Italy approved the Resolution on Defence Planning and wished to commend the work carried out by the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Major NATO Commanders and the International Staff.

29. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) said that he wished to speak on three subjects: NATO Force Planning, the ACE Mobile Force and the emergence of Communist China as a military power.

30. On the first subject, his Government fully supported the Resolution on Defence Planning. The introduction of the "five-year rolling plan" and a further review of the force goals proposals in relation to national plans before their acceptance were steps which would eventually lead to stronger forces and to more realistic military plans. Between the present meeting and that of May 1966, a thorough examination of the force goals would, it was hoped, take place. At present there was a serious lack of balance between military forces, military plans and defence budgets; between men, their equipment and ammunition; between combat units and their necessary support units; between active and reserve forces and amongst nations so far as financial contributions to the military strength of the Alliance were concerned. The United States was proud of the efforts made in the past five years by several member countries to strengthen their forces, but that country found it difficult to understand why it should have to support a huge force and a large budget as its contribution to NATO when some of its members were not only reducing their contribution but were planning to do so even to a larger extent in the future.

31. On the second point, SACEUR had said that neither the BRAVO forces nor any attainable national forces could realistically protect the Northern and Southern flanks of the Alliance; therefore, an effective and readily available force was required for that purpose. It was necessary to conclude that a mobile force was lacking and that there was no plan at present for its future formation. The present force was too small, lacked adequate air-lift and required financing; moreover, its deployment on the flanks would weaken the centre. He proposed that those nations that were capable to contribute to an effective mobile force should take the matter in hand urgently and work out a suitable organization, including financial arrangements. The purpose of the Alliance could be advanced by the contributions of willing and interested nations. The best way of protecting the flanks could be determined and the necessary force organized for that purpose, in order to transform the present paper force into a strong, fast-reacting and effective military body able to reinforce the flanks.

32. On the third point, that of the emergence of Communist China as a military power, he pointed out that the United States was deeply involved with the immediate problem of Vietnam, which was difficult to solve because of Communist China. Since 1960, the United States military budget had increased by \$10 billion each year to raise, in the past five years, by about 45% the number of combat-ready divisions, by 50% the tactical air force, by 100% the air-lift facilities and by 1,000% the counter-insurgency forces of the type being employed in South Vietnam. Thus the United States had been able to deploy over 250,000 men in South-East Asia (of whom 180,000 were in South Vietnam) without denuding its forces in Europe and elsewhere and without having to call up reserve forces (on which \$2 billion a year were expended). The United States did not intend to redeploy major combat forces from Europe to South-East Asia.

33. Looking beyond the immediate problem of Vietnam, he suggested that the Western nations should now consider what preparations were necessary to face, five years from now, the increasing military power of Communist China.

34. China devoted an average of 10% of the GNP to military expenditure and had done so over the past ten to fifteen years. The size of its army was about 2,300,000, excluding a large trained reserve of manpower. It was estimated that one-third of the army had achieved full combat strength in the last four years. Although equipped with large numbers of obsolete aircraft, the air force was strong and operated some 16,000 Mig 15s and 17s, about 150 Mig 19s and perhaps 50 Mig 21s. The submarine force was being expanded; and there was one ballistic missile submarine for which ballistic missiles should be available in 1967 or 1968.

35. China's large conventional force could not be ignored; it had already been used against its neighbours and prevented the attainment of peace in Vietnam. It was possible that China's efforts at subversion might be applied in Africa and Latin America. In the last few years China had shown an increasing interest in those areas and sought to install Communist bases. In fact recruits from those countries were being trained in China at the present time. Had China been in a position to give real military assistance to such countries as the Congo in the past two years, the danger would have been greatly increased. China's Defence Minister had given fair warning that support and aid had been given, was being given and would continue to be given to revolutionary wars.

36. In the nuclear field China had detonated two devices. It was estimated that in the next two years it could conduct a moderate test programme and could stock from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons. MRBMs were being developed for production in 1967 or 1968; by the early mid-seventies some 80 to 100 might be stocked. It appeared that even ICBMs were being developed and would be available by the mid-1970s. There was sufficient fissionable material available for nuclear warheads and for bombs for delivery by long-range aircraft.

37. While China was not able to challenge the Alliance at present, it would be in a far better position to do so in five to ten years' time - not a pleasant prospect.

38. He suggested that the subject should be discussed in the Council at a future date under such heads as:

- First, is it likely that Communist China over the next two or three decades will both seek to extend her political control over large areas of Africa, Latin America and Asia and undertake as well to acquire the military strength to carry out such aggression?

- secondly, if Communist China does succeed in achieving political domination of large areas of the world beyond her borders, are the vital interests of the members of NATO adversely affected by such action?
- thirdly, if they are, what, if anything, can we do to build the political, economic and military power to contain Communist China within her present borders?

He strongly endorsed the remarks of Mr. Rusk on this subject the previous day and suggested that Permanent Representatives look into these questions as they related to the Alliance as a whole, so as to prepare the way for future discussions by Ministers on this subject.

39. In reply to a question by the Chairman, he suggested that those nations wishing to, and able to, contribute to the ACE Mobile Force should discuss the problem with the NATO Military Authorities in order to determine the requirements of such a force.

40. General GOMES de ARAUJO (Portugal) said that his Government approved the Resolution on Defence Planning. He would, however, make two observations, the first on the proposed Annual Review, the other on the posture which was to serve as a basis for further study with a view to their eventual adoption of firm force goals.

41. The United States proposal for an annual defence planning review was a real requirement in view of the existing gap between force goals and country plans. Any reservation which Portugal might have on the proposal was on the machinery required for its application, and not on its fundamental principles. He expressed gratitude at the United States' willingness, after discussion in the Defence Planning Working Group, to make the proposal more flexible, in order to enable each country to introduce the new procedure gradually in the light of its resources and to ascertain how it differed from the present Annual Review procedure.

42. He was grateful to the Military Authorities for the work that had been carried out on the preparation of the ALPHA and BRAVO force goals. The former showed exactly what the Military Authorities required but had not been accepted because of their prohibitive cost and of their political implications. The BRAVO posture led to certain risks and these had been clearly stated in Paris by the Military Committee the previous day. Even if present enemy intentions did not appear to threaten the Alliance, the situation could well change in the light of the international political scene and of the NATO force levels. It should be noted that Soviet forces were being modernised and increased both qualitatively and quantitatively. His country noted with satisfaction the report of the NATO Military Authorities (MCM-150-65) in which the risks of the BRAVO posture were stated, together with the ways of reducing them; and therefore considered that the establishment of a suitable machinery for the timely release of nuclear weapons was of the greatest importance.

43. Referring to the particular problems of his country, he said that the extent of its sacrifice was shown in the Secretary General's note (C-M(65)120). In 1965, Portugal, in order to maintain its territorial integrity, would have allotted to defence a greater percentage of GNP than any other member of the Alliance. Thus Portugal would not be able to devote more resources to NATO than it was doing at the present time.

44. The defence of Portuguese territory in Africa represented, because of its strategic position, a real contribution by Portugal to the Alliance both militarily and politically. From the military point of view, because a large number of men had been and were being trained for an emergency, such training being undoubtedly valuable for the European theatre as well; and because of the strategic value of the territories and of the naval constructions that would contribute to the maritime defence of NATO. From the political point of view, because a stable and multi-racial community was being built up in Africa, factors which were of capital importance for the evolution of underdeveloped countries. It was necessary to ensure that Africa was developed in such a way that it did not become either Communist or anti-European. If the enemy were enabled to outflank the Alliance, the defence not only of Europe but of the Western hemisphere would be seriously compromised.

45. Mr. TOPALOGU (Turkey) said that the Alliance had been unable to resolve two fundamental problems during recent years; the elaboration of a strategy capable of combining the objectives of NATO with the possibilities of the Alliance and in conformity with present world conditions, and the drawing up of a NATO force structure capable of implementing this strategy effectively and satisfactorily. He sincerely hoped, however, that in May or June 1966 Ministers would be able to approve force goals for the Alliance up to and including 1970, as proposed in the Draft Resolution on Defence Planning.

46. He recalled that from the beginning of the defence planning exercise, Turkey had agreed with SACEUR that with respect to land and air forces, the ALPHA force goals represented, from a strictly military point of view, the minimum acceptable force posture required by Turkey for the defence of the South-East flank, although Turkey had frequently stated that they contained certain unacceptable deficiencies in respect of naval forces. It was, however, the primary objective of Turkey to ensure the realistic implementation of the force goal studies and to prevent the formulation of an unrealistic strategy, based on existing or planned forces, and also an unbalanced force structure. Such considerations, together with the inadequacy of Turkey's economic capabilities and of current external military assistance for the realisation of the ALPHA force structure, had caused Turkey to support the decision to set aside the study of the ALPHA force goals.

On the other hand, it was agreed that the BRAVO sets of forces were only a projection, until 1970, of the present insufficient level of the Turkish forces, based on the assumed maintenance at their actual level of current Turkish defence expenditures and foreign aid. This deficient force structure, which created a grave situation for Turkey in the performance of its defence tasks, particularly with respect to air and naval forces, was obviously unacceptable to Turkey. In this respect, he emphasised that Turkey's particular exposure to enemy aggression on account of its geo-political and geo-strategic position made a sufficient force level vital for its survival, while the increasing threat to Turkey due to its tasks assumed in the common defence necessitated the maintenance of a sufficiently strong force structure to enable accomplishment of the Turkish defence mission. These two factors, he stressed, had to be met by Turkey's very limited and already overstrained economic resources, together with its expected external aid.

47. For these reasons, the necessity for a reasonable reconciliation of these requirements with Turkey's capabilities had compelled the Turkish Government to propose to the Defence Planning Committee the Turkish BRAVO force posture, an improved version of the SHAPE BRAVO posture, intended to enable Turkey to perform its common defence tasks with minimum acceptable risks and to eliminate the inadequacies existing in SHAPE's goals with regard to air and naval forces. Turkey had noted with great satisfaction that its views had been shared by the Military Committee in MCM-150-65 regarding the vital importance of increasing the defence capabilities of the flanks.

48. Referring to the Draft Resolution on Defence Planning, he indicated that Turkey could agree to paragraph 2 on the understanding that the Turkish BRAVO posture would be taken as a basis for future studies. The fact that Turkey did not object to the Draft Resolution should not be interpreted as Turkish approval of SHAPE's BRAVO posture. In his opinion, paragraph 8 should be clarified to the effect that the studies to be conducted with a view to determining the Turkish force goals would take as their starting point the Turkish BRAVO posture and that the Turkish force goals would be presented to Ministers in May or June 1966, together with the non-military factors referred to in paragraph 5, as the result of all the studies initiated in this respect. Moreover, effective preparation by Turkey of a meaningful long-term force posture, based on a five-year defence planning, depended on the availability of precise information concerning the amount of external military assistance to be provided to Turkey over the same period.

49. Referring to paragraph 7, he emphasised that Turkey would make every endeavour to adapt her current procedures to the recommended new Annual Defence Planning Review on a five-year basis, but he urged that consideration be given to the necessity for Turkey to conduct certain time-consuming studies in order to adjust its defence budget structure to this new system. Pending the final determination of the Turkish force goals, however, Turkish national plans over the five-year period would have to be based on the Turkish BRAVO posture.

50. As regards the points covered in paragraph 9, Turkey would submit its views to the forum in which the proposed studies would be discussed. With regard to the review of the existing machinery for the timely release of nuclear weapons referred to in paragraph 10, he recalled that he had explained the views of his Government at the recent meeting of the Special Committee and had distributed a memorandum containing Turkish proposals on possible ways of improving the existing machinery. If these were found acceptable by NATO, Turkey would then submit further details.

51. Mr. HEALEY (United Kingdom) said that although at Ottawa in 1963, Ministers had established the reconciliation of force requirements with resources as their common aim, yet at the present time, the NATO Commanders still based their recommendations on the ALPHA goals, which, six months previously, every NATO government had unanimously agreed to be unworthy of consideration, and the documents presently before the Council were based on the BRAVO posture which, being almost equally unrealistic, the United Kingdom Government had no intention of implementing. While it was true, as Mr. McNamara had suggested, that the real threat to NATO's common survival from developments outside Europe might periodically cause countries to apportion their defence expenditure differently, he reminded Ministers that the United Kingdom was, in fact, closer to meeting the BRAVO goals than most other NATO countries on account of its current expenditure of up to 100% more than these countries of its national wealth on defence. Maintenance of the BRAVO posture would necessitate increased expenditure by the United Kingdom of only 3.6% and the raising of 7,400 more men, while comparable figures for Germany were 13% and 120,000 men, for Belgium 29.3%, for Denmark 37.4% and for the Netherlands 45.6%. While he would favour the maintenance of the BRAVO posture if this would encourage other countries to increase their effort, in fact the strongest supporters of the BRAVO forces were those falling shortest of them and still reducing their defence expenditure. He believed that the BRAVO forces so far exceeded political and economic feasibility that they had become an excuse for inertia, rather than an incentive to effort on the part of an Alliance confronted by a formidable enemy with a realistic approach to defence problems.

52. The desire of some countries to embrace goals which they had no intention of trying to meet should not, he urged, distract the Alliance from two urgent and vital tasks; the first was to determine how to make the best use of existing resources, on which problem he felt that recent contingency planning, particularly with regard to the flanks of the Alliance, had shed much valuable light. In this connection, he heartily supported Mr. McNamara's remarks regarding the importance of strengthening the ACE Mobile Force. This would permit an assessment of the desirable readjustments in effort within the existing level of defence expenditure in order to

obtain a better balance among NATO forces, a knowledge of what practical measures would increase NATO's self-defence capability and a decision regarding necessary readjustment in strategic plans to ensure the effectiveness of deterrence where defence was impossible. The second task was to adopt a five-year rolling defence programme based on real national plans, to enable national governments individually and the Alliance collectively to develop, over at least five years, economically practicable and militarily desirable plans, in order to maximise their military capability within the given economic limits; this approach, he believed, much more than the adoption of the BRAVO posture, would aid Defence Ministers confronted with real national difficulties in achieving a rational defence expenditure and would help to ensure a steady increase in NATO's military capability. If Ministers agreed, as he felt was implied in the Draft Resolution, to base the five-year programme on economic and political realities, then he would be prepared to accept the Draft Resolution and not to discard the present BRAVO posture for another six months.

53. Mr. TIDEMAND (Norway) said that although all subscribed to the concept of forward defence, it might prove difficult to hold a defence posture aiming at a military balance throughout the length of the NATO front: the defence posture in each locality must be viewed in the light of the total defence potential and of the political solidarity of the Alliance.

54. Turning to the defence of the North-Eastern flank, which was of particular concern to his country, Mr. Tidemand said that the Norwegian defence budget had increased by 46.3% between 1959/1960 and 1965, and by 26.6% between 1963 and 1965, in comparison to an increase of 23.8% in the civil budget over the latter period. This increase, together with American aid, had allowed an almost total replacement of the Navy, a significant replacement programme for aircraft, and some modernisation of Army equipment.

55. The scope and number of joint exercises held with the participation of Allied forces had recently increased - a development warmly welcomed.

56. NATO Infrastructure projects were of equal importance for the defence of the North-Eastern flank. They would facilitate a rapid deployment of all Allied forces, making possible joint operations in this area, and making the best use of those forces' mobility. Similar requirements existed in other forward areas of the Alliance, and Norway therefore fully supported the Secretary General's efforts to obtain an early agreement on the financing of the new long-term NATO Infrastructure programme.

57. Mr. Tidemand then stressed the importance of continuing the "Contingency Study for Northern Norway" initiated by the Defence Planning Committee at the request of Defence Ministers during their meeting in the Spring of 1965. He emphasised the need for close co-operation between SACEUR and SACLANT to ensure a sufficient deterrent on the North-Eastern flank.

58. Norway could agree to the proposal to accept the BRAVO sets of 1970 forces as a basis for further study and planning, but it must be clearly understood that BRAVO forces in Norway, based on present NATO standards, would entail unacceptable increases in expenditure in Norway, as in some other member countries. When the studies mentioned in paragraph 3(b) of the Draft Resolution were carried out, it should not be forgotten that geographical, demographical and other important factors varied considerably in the different parts of the European Command. These factors were of special importance when force goals for the Norwegian Army were assessed and established.

59. He could accept in principle the institution of an Annual Defence Planning Review on a five-year basis, a procedure which should more reliably permit taking decisions on the use of defence resources. Preparations for a rolling seven-year defence plan for Norway had in fact already been initiated, so no major difficulties were foreseen in making the necessary adjustment to a NATO five-year plan.

60. In conclusion, Mr. Tidemand confirmed that Norway could accept the Draft Resolution on Defence Planning.

61. Mr. von HASSEL (Germany) said that during the preceding discussion of two of the most significant issues within the Alliance, defence planning and the nuclear problem, it had sometimes been suggested that the proximity of Germany to the enemy had led to overestimation of his potential danger and power. However, differences of perspective could not change the fact that the military potential of the Communist bloc had not diminished. The Soviet Union might today be acting with caution for tactical, political and economic reasons, but the intentions of a Communist régime might change very rapidly.

62. In spite of some measures of rationalisation in the fields of manpower and material in order to overcome domestic difficulties, the Soviet military build-up continued unabated. In this connection, Mr. von Hassel recalled that a manoeuvre conducted in the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany during the Autumn of 1965 had, apart from propaganda purposes, demonstrated that within a short time, strong airborne forces had been transported over a distance of 1,000 km for immediate commitment on the battlefield, and that the employment of subversive elements in the rear of the Blue forces was played for the first time as a part of the scenario. From this, from Standing Group Intelligence and from the 5% increase in the military budget of the Soviet Union, it might be concluded that the Soviet military capability remained unchanged.

63. The satellite states appeared to exercise for the first time a certain influence on the overall command of the Warsaw Pact organization, hitherto firmly controlled by the Soviets. The Pact seemed to be undergoing a gradual change from its past coalitionist structure under Soviet control to a quasi-integrated form. The flexibility of the strategic principles and operational doctrine within the Soviet bloc should also be noted: according to the military strategic concept of the Soviets, a war in Europe would be a nuclear war, though whether it would begin with conventional operations, with partly nuclear operations, or by a nuclear exchange was not specified. The Soviet bloc forces were consequently trained and equipped for nuclear operations in accordance with that doctrine, while retaining the capability to fight conventionally, thus allowing the political and military leaders a high degree of flexibility.

64. Although the desire of member nations to reduce defence expenditures was understandable, there should be no feelings of false security, and adequate forces must be maintained. In this context, Mr. von Hassel thanked Mr. McNamara for his statement that the United States did not intend to redeploy United States combat units from Europe to Vietnam.

65. During the first decade of the assignment of German forces to NATO, completed in 1965, Mr. von Hassel felt that Germany had, on the whole, met her obligations despite all obstacles, though it might be contended that the defence budget had not grown in the same proportion as non-military expenditures over the past two years. The stability of a nation rested not on its military strength alone, however, but equally on its economic, financial and social equilibrium, and therefore greater efforts than before had been devoted recently to these factors. German forces were now required to go into a phase of consolidation to achieve qualitative personnel improvements. The modernisation of equipment to increase the combat-effectiveness of Army units would simultaneously be undertaken. Thus Germany would continue to work towards co-operation with her Allies in the programming, development and production of new weapons and modern equipment. Assistance to the economically weaker Allies would be maintained.

66. In force planning, a new phase in the life of the Alliance was now being entered. Mr. von Hassel welcomed the American proposal for a "rolling five-year plan", which had proved successful in the United States and had already been adopted in Germany. This procedure, readily adaptable to technological and scientific progress was applicable both nationally and to the Alliance as a whole, but would require some time to get under way. Consequently, it should not be implemented before the 1967 to 1971 planning period.

67. In the past, planning had been based on the recommendations of the NATO Military Authorities, who based their estimates on the threat and their own mission, but who were not in a position to assess adequately the non-military factors involved. Consequently, hardly any country was able to meet its force goals. Under the new procedure, a sober and objective estimate of the situation on the part of the NATO Military Authorities was still indispensable, as planning should not solely be adjusted to the current political situation or economic and financial considerations. The advantages of two systems would thus be combined.

68. The expert proposals on force planning from the NATO Military Authorities were still the basis of military requirements and of the calculation of the risks involved in not meeting them. Force goals should not merely be an addition of the various country programmes. Common force goals adapted to a given military mission were necessary to give SACEUR those forces needed to implement the vitally necessary forward defence concept.

69. In view of the military and geographical position of the Federal Republic of Germany in the centre of Europe, and its economic and industrial capabilities, any attack, limited or otherwise on the territory of the Federal Republic must provoke the immediate implementation of the Emergency Defence Plans (EDP). Half-hearted measures would benefit neither the Federal Republic nor the Alliance as a whole, but would lead only to disaster. To admit the possibility of an isolated conflict situation in the Federal Republic would certainly increase, rather than lessen, the danger of a miscalculation on the part of the enemy.

70. In conclusion, Mr. von Hassel said that a profound structural analysis was not necessary to demonstrate that the conventional forces of Germany and her Allies were insufficient either to provide a credible deterrent or to undertake an effective defence. The defence of the Alliance was obviously dependent on nuclear weapons, and its security could be safeguarded only if the entire nuclear potential of the Allies were used to complement their defence efforts, and to implement the vital forward defence policy. Clearly German efforts in the interest of the common defence of the Allies and their need for security did not stem - as was suggested by Soviet propaganda - from a claim to national power, let alone from the desire for revenge. It would seem to be a legitimate concern of the non-nuclear member countries, which were contributing their share of conventional forces to the deterrent and to allied defence, to have a share in nuclear responsibility as well. The Special Committee should be able to contribute to the solution of this problem.

71. Mr. MESSMER (France) said that in informing the Military Committee that it accepted the BRAVO force posture, his country had added certain remarks which were contained in Appendix V to MCM-150-65. He wished to draw attention to these remarks and to recall in particular that France considered the BRAVO force levels as sufficient to put into effect the MC 14/2 strategy. France regarded this strategy, however, as not very efficient from a military point of view, since it consisted, in time of aggression, of a supporting action for the flanks carried out by mobile forces under SACEUR.

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72. France had also indicated to the Military Committee that it could not accept an increase in the volume of NATO-assigned forces above their present level. France would, of course, endeavour to furnish the information relating to the forces already assigned, when this was requested for the intermediate study in 1966 and later under the review for the five-year plan. He stressed, however, that in common with other nations, France could only provide information for the period covered by its current national planning i.e. in France's case, the current plan approved by Parliament covered the period from 1965 up to 1970.

73. He ended by drawing attention to the importance for France and all her Allies alike, of paragraph 10 of the Resolution before the Ministers. France believed that it was the Council's duty to exercise its powers fully and directly in this matter.

74. Mr. de JONG (Netherlands) began by saying that he had been impressed by the information given by Mr. McNamara on the threat from China, and he agreed that this matter should be watched and studied.

75. Turning to the long-term force goals for the Alliance, he said he had no doubt that the difficulties which had still to be faced could be overcome, and he stressed the importance of the need for agreement on such goals.

76. Concerning the Resolution before Ministers, which proposed that the BRAVO forces be accepted with certain provisions, he said there were three main factors to be considered. The first was the different approach, set out in paragraph 12 of the Report submitted to the Council, which the Major NATO Commanders had used in developing their BRAVO posture. From this, it seemed that SACEUR's goals were more ambitious than those of SACLANT and CINCHAN. He felt these different starting points should be taken into consideration during the coming reconciliation of BRAVO forces with national possibilities.

77. The second factor was the urgent question of standards. While it was useful to have general standards as a reference for planning purposes, he felt rigidity in their application would lead - and in fact had led - to unacceptable results. He therefore welcomed the suggestion that new studies should be called for, giving due consideration to the specific conditions in certain countries and areas without falling short of operational requirements.

78. The third point concerned the breakdown between countries. Although it was only intended as a means for calculating the non-military implications, it was now being proposed as a basis for the coming reconciliation studies. He added that the figures in the International Staff analysis had no status, but illustrated that the assumed increases in defence expenditure were distributed very unevenly between the various countries.

79. The combined effect of these three factors had resulted in considerable imbalances between countries and between services. He felt it was important to see that such discrepancies should not be reflected, but rather corrected in the reconciliation studies. In this connection, he quoted the example of the Netherlands. With the theoretical breakdown, and if full NATO standards were really applied, the total Netherlands defence expenditure would have to be increased by 45%. Almost half of this increase resulted from an assumption which had no foundation in Netherlands possibilities or plans and it was for this reason that the Netherlands had reluctantly been obliged to insist on a reservation to be included in the Report. With that reservation, he said that his country was prepared to participate in the necessary study to establish agreed force goals next May.

80. He suggested that, to take full account of the three factors he had listed, emphasis should be laid on a dialogue between NATO and national military authorities, with a view to ascertaining how BRAVO forces could be reached within national capabilities. He was sure that in this way a satisfactory balance between possibilities and priorities could be achieved. A general two-sided approach would thus be maintained. Member nations should avoid force planning amounting to a mere addition of unilaterally developed national programmes, while the NATO Military Authorities should retain the possibility of giving their independent views on the military requirements and the risks involved in adopting various force postures. But the NATO Military Authorities would have to bear in mind the means likely to be available, and he stressed that the only valid yardstick must be military effectiveness within economic possibilities.

81. He concluded by saying that these considerations also applied to the longer-term procedures, and it would be clear from what he had said that the Netherlands wholeheartedly supported a rolling five-year plan. However, he recognised that it had been impossible in the past for many member nations to provide planning data for five-year periods. He thought nations would hesitate to provide more or less concrete figures for longer periods ahead, because such data might still be regarded as implying some measure of obligation. He was convinced nevertheless that a way of overcoming or at least mitigating this difficulty could be found.

82. Mr. COSTOPOULOS (Greece) referred to the Report MCM-150-65 of the Military Committee, from which it emerged that the Military Authorities considered that, if the BRAVO force posture were accepted, certain corollaries must also be included, without which NATO would not be able to carry out its defence mission. In particular, it was recognised that the flanks of the Alliance would be exposed to more than an acceptable degree, and the Military Authorities therefore recommended that measures be taken to bring

up the defence of the flanks to the level of the rest of the Allied front. He said the Alliance was in agreement on the general lines of these recommendations, and the defence of the flanks figured among the main points in the Resolution before the meeting. He said that without wishing to minimise the value of the mobile forces, he had to emphasise that the permanent defences of the flanks must be strengthened by increasing the defensive potential of the local forces - the forces of those countries situated on the flanks of the Allied front.

83. Concerning the South-East flank of the Alliance, he recalled that a special study had been carried out by an Ad Hoc Working Group two years ago but no concrete measures had followed, despite the need for them. He wished to draw attention to the fact that the political stability and economic development of a country like Greece, which was under a direct threat and was a constant target for international Communism, depended on the feeling of security which could be instilled in the people. He said the Greek Government was doing everything possible to reinforce confidence in NATO defence among its people. But he stressed that this was not sufficient. Confidence should not be based on vague hopes and theoretical studies, and he felt NATO should demonstrate in concrete terms, and as quickly as possible, that the countries on its flanks were equal partners in the Alliance. This problem confronted the Greek Government and NATO alike, and he urged the Alliance not to shirk this responsibility for the future.

84. He then turned to the remarks by Mr. McNamara on the growing military rôle of China. He wished to recall that China had already created a bridgehead in Europe, notably in one of Greece's neighbours, Albania. It was therefore essential that this new threat to Greece be taken seriously in defence planning.

85. He went on to stress the remark made by the Chairman of the Military Committee to the effect that the plans for the defence of Greece's Northern frontier, notably in Thrace, also concerned Turkey. He said the Greek Government was absolutely in agreement with this remark, but recalled with regret that Turkey had declined an invitation to participate in the work of the group studying contingencies in Hellenic Thrace. He suggested that the Turkish Delegation might like to state if Turkey's position on this matter was still the same.

86. He then submitted a statement about certain intelligence from the Greek Military Services concerning Greece's Northern neighbours on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and invited the Chairman to circulate this statement if he saw fit(1).

(1) Subsequently circulated as PO/65/636 ✓

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87. Mr. GRAM (Denmark) said that the Danish point of view had already been expressed in the Defence Planning Committee and the Working Group, but that he wished to touch on one major point. In preparing its documents the International Staff had used the NATO standards, especially those of SACEUR. He knew that to a limited extent the standards had been adapted to Danish Army Forces. However, from the papers on the non-military implications it was evident that, for example, manning levels in the first and second Echelon Forces greatly exceeded actual levels in the Danish Forces. Primarily for lack of manpower, it would not be possible to raise the manning levels to SACEUR's standards, whose achievement would mean that approximately 2% of the Danish population would be on active service. This would be too heavy a burden for a small country in which a high rate of employment was necessary to sustain the national economy.

88. Mr. Healey had just said that it was unlikely that any government would devote a greater share of its Gross National Product to defence. He agreed with Mr. Healey, but added that it was the intention of the Danish Government to raise defence expenditure concurrently with the termination of the grant aids from which Denmark had benefited up to now.

89. With these remarks he could accept the Draft Resolution.

90. Mr. MOYERSOEN (Belgium) made four points. Firstly, the Council was invited to accept the BRAVO sets of forces as a basis for further study and subject to final determination of their feasibility in the light of national capabilities. He could agree to this proposal in these terms. It was known that the BRAVO posture far outlay the possibilities of a number of countries, including Belgium. To recognise this truth could not harm, and on the contrary, should help to make defence plans more effective. It was now up to the Military Authorities to indicate the supplementary risks involved in any adjustments to the BRAVO posture; and it was for the Council to take a political decision in full knowledge of these risks and of the limits imposed on the defence effort by political and financial realities in each country.

91. Secondly, he was in full agreement with the proposed five-year plan. Thirdly, with regard to the mobile forces to which Mr. McNamara had referred, he pointed out that the Belgian Army made an effective contribution to these forces and was prepared to continue contributing.

92. Finally, he emphasised that the NATO forces could only be effective in their major rôle of preventing war if the potential enemy knew that NATO would not hesitate to employ all means of defence including, if necessary, nuclear weapons. It was from the point of view of deterrence that Belgium attached particular importance to the steps aimed at measures ensuring that there would be a timely decision on the use of nuclear weapons.

93. Mr. HELLYER (Canada) said that in noting the Report and in adopting the Draft Resolution, he would make the following observations.

94. Firstly, the Resolution merely invited the Council to accept the BRAVO sets of forces as a basis for further study pending final determination of their feasibility. However, certain assumptions underlay what some of the Major NATO Commanders seemed to think might be possible for Canada, which assumptions he considered unrealistic. This could be discussed further in the months ahead.

95. Secondly, he accepted in principle the Annual Defence Planning Review on a five-year basis, which was complementary to current developments in Canada. Thirdly, in considering possible shifts in the Canadian contribution, he noted the requirement for a more effective mobile force. He agreed that the present force was too small, inadequately financed, and without adequate air-lift. This requirement, however, did not seem to have been reflected in the BRAVO posture, which was fundamentally a re-working by the military authorities of present national contributions. This raised the question of the reality of the force goals established by the military. He suggested that between now and May 1966, some clarification should be sought of this apparent disparity. Canada was interested in discussing ways of improving the effectiveness of its defence contribution, particularly of the mobile forces, and would join in any studies that might be set up to this end. Canada had established a mobile command which should provide a very significant increase in strategic mobility.

96. Mr. McNamara had raised the question of imbalances which existed in force structures and military expenditures. No doubt these were significant and deserved consideration. Mr. McNamara had, however, also mentioned the staggering amount of money spent since World War II on defence by the NATO nations. Yet in many parts of the world the West found itself seemingly on the defensive, and one wondered, looking at NATO strategic concepts, if these vast expenditures did in fact achieve the results in mind. He thought that these problems deserved further consideration.

97. Subject to the provisos he had made, Canada was prepared to accept the Draft Resolution.

98. Mr. TOPALOGLU (Turkey), referring to the question raised by Mr. Costopoulos, said that he thought that there was a misunderstanding. If it was a question of NATO contingency plans, Turkey was naturally prepared to carry out all its responsibilities. However, in the case of a particular exercise Turkey had considered that the exercise was too academic and lacking in reality. A distinction should be made between the Turkish attitude as regards a particular exercise and the general attitude of Turkey regarding NATO defence plans.

99. The CHAIRMAN, summing up on sub-item C, "NATO Defence Planning", noted that the question of mobile forces raised by Mr. McNamara would be examined by the Council without prejudging any position and in the light of the statements made, with a view to making further progress.

100. On the problem of China, Mr. McNamara had raised from the military angle a question which Mr. Rusk had raised from the political angle. He emphasised that this was simultaneously a major political and a major military question deserving the closest attention by the Council. He proposed to bring it before the Council early in 1966 for further thorough study.

101. With regard to the decisions the Council was invited to take today, he noted that all countries were prepared to approve the Resolution in the light of the statements made, on the understanding that no statements should be interpreted in any way conflicting with the terms of the Resolution. In particular, paragraph 3 of the Resolution left it open for each country and for the military to discuss all situations without any previous general decision.

102. He wished to add a few words about the rôle of the military in this exercise. He thought that the military authorities had done an excellent job of work, as already recognised in the Defence Planning Committee. It was the task of governments to review and decide on military suggestions with respect to their military, political and economic implications, taking the risks which they, as the highest political authority of the Alliance, considered acceptable. In this complex situation the military would certainly co-operate by adapting their work in order to allow governments to make the best use of the resources available. However, this exercise had been intended throughout as a multi-lateral exercise in which strategic requirements and resources should be confronted and reconciled. It should not be decided beforehand that resources could not be changed. There might come a time when the risk changed, and as a consequence the decision of governments might also change. He hoped that at that time it would be possible to adapt the military situation to any new political situation.

103. In the light of these comments he invited the Council to adopt the Draft Resolution on Defence Planning.

104. The COUNCIL:

(1) adopted the following Resolution(1):

(1) Subsequently circulated as C-M(65)139(Final) ✓

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

1. HAVING REVIEWED the conclusions and recommendations of the Defence Planning Committee contained in C-M(65)138 and the report of the Military Committee contained in MCM-150-65:

2. ACCEPTS the BRAVO sets of 1970 forces as submitted by the Major NATO Commanders(1) as a basis for further study and planning, taking account of the points made in the discussions of the Defence Planning Committee(2), and subject to and pending final determination of their feasibility as indicated by examination of national capabilities and proposed programmes when completed.

3. DIRECTS the Defence Planning Committee to arrange for further studies, based upon the BRAVO forces and the reports submitted by the Military Committee(3) and by the International Staff(4) and particularly directed to the following fields:

- (a) Adjustments necessary to bring more closely into alignment the BRAVO sets of forces, composed of country contributions as assumed in the International Staff reports, and national capabilities and force plans, due consideration being given to the risk assessments, conclusions and recommendations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Military Committee report.
- (b) The feasibility and implications of adjustments to some or all of the levels of readiness, manning, training, equipment and provision of stocks required for the attainment of the BRAVO force levels at NATO standards, taking due account of the military effectiveness of the various force contributions and of the fact that geographical, demographical, and other factors vary in different parts of the NATO area.

4. INVITES member countries to afford all necessary facilities for the conduct of the studies directed above, and, in the light of the studies, to review, and complete or revise on a year-by-year basis and including manpower, equipment and cost implications, their programmes relevant to the defence of the Alliance up to and including 1970.

5. DIRECTS the Defence Planning Committee to arrange for a comparison of the BRAVO sets of forces referred to above with national programmes drawn up by countries under paragraph 4 above, in time for Ministerial review at a meeting in May or June 1966.

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- (1) SACEUR's document SHAPE 129/65 dated 15th July, 1965.
SACLANT's document SER 3068/end-70/C-917 dated 1st August, 1965.
CINCHAN's document CH. 001053/24 dated 30th July, 1965.
 - (2) DPC/R(65)8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
 - (3) MCM-150-65.
 - (4) DPWG/D(65)26 and DPWG/D(65)31.

6. AGREES to review in May or June 1966 the results of the studies described in paragraph 3 above and the comparison of the country programmes and BRAVO force levels described in paragraph 5 above, with a view to approving force goals for the Alliance up to and including 1970.

7. ACCEPTS IN PRINCIPLE, for implementation starting in January 1967, the institution of an Annual Defence Planning Review on a five-year basis and REQUESTS the Council in Permanent Session to draw up the necessary revisions in the Triennial/Annual Review procedures.

8. NOTING that the work undertaken on the defence problems of the South-East Region remains to be completed and RECOGNISING the urgency of those problems, REQUESTS the Defence Planning Committee to arrange for its continuation, and NOTES WITH APPROVAL that the Defence Planning Committee has arranged for expedited study of possible methods for improving NATO's capabilities on the flanks and of the "Turkish BRAVO" force proposals, with a view to the submission of proposals to Ministers in May or June 1966.

9. NOTES that the Defence Planning Committee has also:

- (a) requested the NATO Military Authorities to complete their study of SACEUR's request for medium-range ballistic missiles in Allied Command Europe and to submit it to the North Atlantic Council not later than 31st March, 1966;
- (b) given instructions for the preparation of assumptions and Terms of Reference for the study of possible maritime contingencies that might arise within the area of Allied Command Atlantic.

10. INVITES the Council in Permanent Session to expedite the initiation of a study, in consultation with the NATO Military Authorities, for a review of the existing machinery for the timely release of nuclear weapons and its possible improvement.

- (2) noted the report by the Defence Planning Committee (C-M(65)138);
- (3) noted the statements made in discussion.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, (16e).