

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO SECRET  
SUMMARY RECORD  
C-R(65)45

Summary record of a meeting of the Council, held  
at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe.,  
on Wednesday, 27th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

<u>BELGIUM</u> Mr. A. de Staercke	<u>GREECE</u> Mr. Christian X. Palamas	<u>NORWAY</u> Mr. G. Kristiansen
<u>CANADA</u> Mr. G. Ignatieff	<u>ICELAND</u> Mr. H. Sv. Björnsson	<u>PORTUGAL</u> Mr. V. da Cunha
<u>DENMARK</u> Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	<u>ITALY</u> Mr. A. Alessandrini	<u>TURKEY</u> Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u> Mr. P. de Leusse	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u> Mr. P. Reuter	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u> Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
<u>GERMANY</u> Mr. W.G. Grewe	<u>NETHERLANDS</u> Dr. H.N. Boon	<u>UNITED STATES</u> Mr. Harlan Cleveland

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General : Mr. J.A. Roberts  
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant  
Secretary General for Economics  
and Finance : Mr. F.D. Gregh  
Assistant Secretary General for  
Political Affairs : Mr. R.W.J. Hooper  
Assistant Secretary General for  
Scientific Affairs : Dr. John L. McLucas  
Executive Secretary : The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative : Major General W.W. Stromberg

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I. STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS

(Discussed in private session.)

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II. REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND TRADE POLICY OF BULGARIA

Document: C-M(65)80

and

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III. CURRENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Document: C-M(65)81

1. The CHAIRMAN proposed, and it was agreed, that Items II and III be considered together.

2. In introduction, he said that as far as Bulgaria was concerned, the report showed that her economy had grown rapidly, in particular in the industrial sector, but that the expansion might slow down in the future. Given the country's heavy dependence on the Soviet Union there appeared to be, at present, little prospect of a marked shift of trade in favour of the West. Nevertheless, the report recommends that Western countries should adopt a flexible economic policy, favouring any tendency in Bulgaria to assert its own national interests.

3. In accordance with previous practice, the Committee of Economic Advisers had sent to the Council a report summarising the most significant aspects of economic development during 1964, and the opening months of 1965, in the Soviet Union (C-M(65)81).

4. The most striking features which emerged from this report could be summarised as follows:

- in 1964, the Soviet economy showed a marked improvement over 1963, but this was due to a favourable crop year. In fact, industry lagged behind its planned growth rate;

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- in 1965, results in agriculture were once more far from satisfactory and the gains in industry reported during the first half of the year might well be offset by the setbacks in agriculture;
- the Soviet Union had again been obliged to buy large quantities of wheat from the West. This would put a heavy strain on Soviet foreign exchange reserves and might result in a reduction of Soviet imports of industrial equipment and other goods from the West.

5. He also drew attention to the reference made in the report to the problem of unemployment in the Soviet Union. It was stressed that the main difficulty resulted from the geographical distribution of the labour force which was still far from satisfactory.

6. He invited comments.

7. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE thought that the following conclusions could be drawn from the most instructive report on Bulgaria:

- (i) Bulgaria was proceeding along the road to industrialisation, but progress was slow and her economy remained basically agricultural. By comparison with the pre-war level of production, Bulgarian agriculture was on the decline.
- (ii) A second factor to be taken into account was that the standard of living had fallen considerably. The Bulgarian people were subjected to hardships which made life extremely difficult.
- (iii) A third important point to be drawn was that in the Soviet camp, Bulgaria was much more than a satellite; she was a country which, in the economic field, was colonised by Moscow. This was also true in the military field. As a result, the possibilities of evolution towards greater independence were much more limited than in the other countries of the East.

- (iv) If this was true, one should be more wary in contemplating economic co-operation between Western countries and Bulgaria. One should take account of the likelihood of contributing, not to the liberalisation of the Bulgarian economy - such a liberalisation was no longer possible - but to the success of Soviet policy in that country. He thought that in the economic field, the West should have a "presence" while avoiding commitments to substantial contributions.

8. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that East-West relations would figure prominently in the Ministerial Meetings at NATO Headquarters in December, and he felt that the main points of interest should be delineated for the Ministers. For example, it seemed the Soviet leaders who had succeeded Mr. Khrushchev had been taking traditional attitudes to solving the Soviet Union's current economic difficulties. He was not sure what the political implications of these attitudes were for the West, but he felt that the Committee of Economic Advisers could assist Ministers by extracting the main issues.

9. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the report on Bulgaria had followed the reports already discussed by the Council on Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany. He understood that the Committee of Economic Advisers would shortly submit to the Council a consolidated paper summarising the conclusions that could be drawn from this series of reviews on individual Eastern European countries. He felt that this might constitute an important step towards satisfying the desire expressed by the Canadian Representative.

10. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the political implications of the reports deserved more study, if possible, in time for the Ministerial Meetings. Two factors which he felt should be given further study in connection with the report on the Soviet Union were the philosophical and political implications of the profit motive being introduced into the Soviet economy, and the way in which the Soviet Union was, paradoxically, supporting Western economy by buying wheat and drawing on its gold reserves to pay for it. He felt the political implications of this trade and its influence on peaceful coexistence between East and West should be further studied by the Committee.

11. The DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL/ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS said that the necessary elements for considering these two points might be compiled in the Committee of Economic Advisers and that the Committee might be able to report to the Council on these points before the Ministerial Meeting.

12. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that there would be a meeting of experts on the Soviet Union in November and also of Eastern European experts, and asked whether this matter should not be left to them.

13. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that what he had in mind was a document with five or six points, e.g. what importance should be attached to the Soviet trend towards applying traditional solutions to its economic problems, or the ways in which the Soviet Union was deliberately cultivating contacts with its free world neighbours, including Canada. While the expert reports were valuable, he thought the primary value of their meetings lay in the exchange of views among the experts themselves.

14. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the Council might well bring both the reports by the Committee of Economic Advisers and the experts together by discussing them later and extracting essential points for discussion by Ministers.

15. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE agreed with this view but felt that the Council's wish should be conveyed to the experts that they might concentrate on certain interesting aspects for the attention of Ministers.

16. The CHAIRMAN said the general feeling seemed to be that the Council should look at reports both by the experts and by the Committee of Economic Advisers, but added that this would require a good deal of preparation if it were to produce fruitful results.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he felt that the Chairman's remarks represented a good assignment for the experts and the Council. He added that the Ministers might also like to know what the Soviet Union and its allies were saying on world issues, particularly against the background of Soviet military technological progress, which he understood to be considerably greater than the Soviet Union had indicated, and the state of its internal economy. This, he felt, should be prepared in the form of a short paper covering the essential political implications.

18. He added that on paragraph 9 of C-M(65)81, the United States had information that the current harvest in the Soviet Union was more likely to be 20%, and not 10%, below the normal figure. This would mean a very bad harvest and would have a certain political importance.

19. He went on to say that the distribution and use of these reports, which he felt were interesting, well-developed and impressive, should be as wide as possible within NATO governments. He understood that there was a tradition not to produce such reports with NATO attribution for distribution to the press, but he felt it would be useful for governments to have summary analyses for distribution to academic communities and responsible press elements. He suggested that this might best be done by the governments concerned, rather than by NATO itself.

20. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his experience had been that there was difficulty in distributing NATO documents, since they fell into the limited distribution group even if not highly classified. It had been found difficult to separate one type of NATO document from the treatment received by others no matter what their content.

21. He said it would have been useful, for instance, for embassies in areas such as Latin America to receive NATO studies on their area for comparison with their own views, but he had found that such documents had not reached embassies and therefore lost part of their potential usefulness.

22. He added that a distinction should be drawn between reports by the Committee of Economic Advisers, such as C-M(65)81, which could be published, and reports by the regional experts, containing judgments which could cause offence in the areas concerned if published.

23. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE asked the Chairman why the reports by the Committee of Economic Advisers could not be declassified and distributed more widely.

24. The CHAIRMAN replied that the traditional procedure had been for the Council to take note of such reports and of any comments resulting from the discussion in the Council. Once this was done, the reports could subsequently be declassified. The Council had already approved a procedure to this end. The first possibility was to change the classification to UNCLASSIFIED, while the document would still maintain its NATO label. The second procedure, which had also been put into practice, allowed for the circulation of the text without any mention of its NATO origin, in which case the NATO Information Committee could, if necessary, assist governments with distribution. He suggested that the latter solution might be the most appropriate in this case.

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25. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE asked if the CONFIDENTIAL grading was in fact only necessary because this was a NATO-produced document.

26. The CHAIRMAN explained that it had been felt by some delegations that a document might have a different value if produced with the NATO label, rather than as a document whose origin was not disclosed.

27. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said he would accept the Chairman's remarks provisionally, but expressed certain doubts which he might bring up at a later stage.

28. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee of Economic Advisers might consider at its next meeting the problem of declassifying the report on the Soviet Union and of preparing a version that could be circulated as a document not bearing the NATO stamp. At the same time, the Committee should take into account the views expressed in the Council.

29. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE asked if the Committee of Economic Advisers could have a second look at this document, bearing in mind the possible use that might be made of it.

30. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

- (1) noted the reports on the Economic Situation and Trade Policy of Bulgaria and on the Current Economic Developments in the Soviet Union (C-M(65)80 and C-M(65)81);
- (2) requested the Committee of Economic Advisers to consider the declassification of the report on the Current Economic Developments in the Soviet Union with a view to wider circulation, in the light of the discussion in the Council;
- (3) took note of the statements made.

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IV. REPORT BY THE BOARD OF AUDITORS ON THE ACCOUNTS OF  
SACLANT/WESTLANT FOR THE YEARS 1963 AND 1964

Document: C-M(65)77

31. The COUNCIL:

approved the accounts of SACLANT/WESTLANT  
for the years 1963 and 1964.

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V. CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL AND THE EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA - FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Reference: C-R(65)35, Item II

Documents: MCM-98-65  
C-M(65)85

32. The CHAIRMAN said that document MCM-137-55 had recently been received and circulated. This document was a report by the Military Committee proposing an amendment to MC 34/3 and a system for appointing an officer to the new combined post of CINCHAN/CINCEASTLANT.

33. It would therefore seem sensible to consider the proposed reorganization as a whole the following week, taking into account both the Military Budget Committee report and the document just received from the NATO Military Authorities.

34. He proposed that Item V be postponed accordingly.

35. The COUNCIL:

agreed to postpone consideration of the co-ordination of Allied Command Channel and the Eastern Atlantic Area to its meeting on Wednesday, 3rd November, 1965.

VI. REVISED 1965 BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR THE RECONSTITUTED FULLY-FINANCED HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE (5th ATAF)

Reference: C-R(65)41, Item II  
Document: C-M(65)87

36. The CHAIRMAN said that following the decision of the Council to grant full financing from international funds to Headquarters 5th ATAF, the Military Budget Committee had now submitted, in accordance with the Council's instructions, revised 1965 budget estimates for this Headquarters. He asked whether the Council could approve the report C-M(65)87.

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37. The COUNCIL:

- (1) noted that the total credits required in 1965 for Headquarters Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5th ATAF) (including ADOC-Rome) amounted to It.l. 215,698,000 plus It.l. 143,000,000 contract authority(1);
- (2) taking account of the credits previously approved(2), approved supplementary credits for this Headquarters in the amount of It.l. 75,702,000 plus It.l. 143,000,000 contract authority and in the form indicated in column C of Annex A and Annex B to C-M(65)87.

NATO UNCLASSIFIEDVII. REPORT BY THE NATO BOARD OF AUDITORS ON THE ACCOUNTS OF THE HAWK MANAGEMENT OFFICE FOR 1963

Document: C-M(65)79

38. At the suggestion of the Chairman, the COUNCIL:

agreed to postpone consideration of the report C-M(65)79 until its meeting on 10th November.

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Reference: PO/65/512

Document: C-R(63)67, Item I

39. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its meeting on 20th November, 1963, the Council had approved the Minimal Facilities Programme as a portion of the overall NADGE Plan and agreed the provisional NATO financing of these facilities on the basis of the assurance given by the host countries concerned (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) that they would reimburse NATO for whatever sum they would have received towards financing these facilities in the event that there would not be final agreement of the overall NADGE Plan by 31st December, 1965.

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(1) See column A of Annex A to C-M(65)87.

(2) C-M(64)99 and C-R(64)60, paragraph 36, and MBC-D(65)47.

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40. For a number of compelling reasons, the original timetable upon which the date of 31st December, 1965 had been based could no longer be adhered to. It had become necessary to prolong the period of dialogue between the NADGE Management Office and SHAPE on the one hand, and the Consortia who were competing, on the other.

41. In the light of this situation, which had been carefully studied by the NADGE Policy Board, the Board had agreed to recommend to the Council that the deadline of 31st December, 1965 be changed to 31st March, 1966. The present timetable provided that before that date, the winning consortium would have been notified of the award.

42. He proposed, therefore, that the Council agree to extending the date involved to 31st March, 1966.

43. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that, contrary to the list of host nations referred to in the letter of 10th September by the Chairman of the NADGE Policy Board and contained in PO/65/512, Norway was not a host nation for the Minimal Facilities Programme.

44. The COUNCIL:

agreed to postpone until 31st March, 1966 the previous deadline of 31st December, 1965; and to amend paragraph (c) of C-M(63)91 accordingly.

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#### IX. COUNCIL PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE FALLEX 66

Document: C-M(65)45(Revised)

45. The CHAIRMAN said that he thought document C-M(65)45(Revised) was self-explanatory. It pointed out that the setting and scenario of the exercise had been revised to take account of various suggestions made by national Ministries of Defence and Supreme Commanders, and it suggested that that part of the exercise designated as TOP GEAR, which dealt with a period of rising tension but stopped short of a general nuclear exchange, was the most suitable for Council participation.

46. The Council would, of course, recall that it had agreed in 1964 to take part in suitable future exercises of the FALLEX kind. All he was now asking was that the Council should agree in principle to participate in TOP GEAR; that the FALLEX Working Group should be reconvened to make recommendations as to the extent and nature of Council participation, and that the Civil Emergency Co-ordinating Committee should advise on the extent to which the wartime civil agencies should play.

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47. He asked whether the Council was prepared to accept the recommendations in paragraph 10 of his note.

48. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that the Council was aware of the French position of non-participation in FALLEX 66. He also recalled the statement by his predecessor after FALLEX 64 regarding the incompatibility of the themes of that exercise with the strategic concept of the Alliance.

49. Subject to the French position of non-participation in FALLEX 66, he could approve the document C-M(65)45(Revised) and could agree to the proposed Council participation. As regards the reconvening of the Working Group, he thought that the presence of a French Representative would be superfluous and therefore that it was unlikely that France would be represented on the Group. Should, however, the Group wish to have liaison with the French Delegation, there would be no difficulty.

50. The CHAIRMAN noted that the French position was stated in the document.

51. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that before speaking of the substance of the matter under discussion he would like to raise a question of procedure. The wording of this item of the Agenda seemed to indicate that the Council discussion was restricted to the technical question of whether, and to what extent, the Council and the delegations should participate in this exercise.

52. However, he recalled that the German Representative at the Council meeting of 18th November, 1964, during the discussion of the results of FALLEX 64, had made the following statement:

"The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that it was desirable for the Council to be consulted at an early stage in military planning in order that the Council should be able to look at the proposed scenario of a future exercise."

As a result of this statement the Council decision taken at the time was amended; the final text was contained in paragraph 3 of document C-M(65)45(Revised). In accordance with this decision, the Council was to be "consulted at an early stage in the planning, in order, in particular, to determine the suitability and nature of any proposed Council participation".

53. He therefore understood the present discussion in the sense that while the Council was in particular talking about Council participation, it would also wish to discuss the scenario as such.

54. This question seemed to be of importance not only because, in the opinion of his Authorities, the Council as the highest body of the Alliance must have the right to determine itself the subject and scope of its discussion, but also because these major exercises had a far-reaching political significance. He need not call the Council's attention to the decision of the French Government, which the Secretary General had mentioned in his document and which the German Government regretted; he also recalled that exercise FALLEX 64 had led to profound domestic political discussions in Germany.

55. He then commented on exercise FALLEX 66 as a whole on the basis of the instructions he had received.

56. Firstly, he expressed the appreciation of his Authorities for the very thorough and well thought-out formulation of the scenario by all the military authorities concerned. The latter had made every possible effort to reconcile the common military interest in a useful exercise with the wishes of the national military authorities. His Government therefore agreed in principle with the scenario. He merely wished to raise the following points, to whose inclusion in the final wording of the scenario his Government attached the greatest importance:

- (i) In exercise TOP GEAR, during which neither the declaration of the R-Hour nor the declaration of the General Alert was foreseen, no major combat operations should take place on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. He therefore welcomed the fact that according to Annex D, paragraph 25, the ORANGE forces moving into the Federal territory would be contained in the vicinity of the borders. However, the Federal Government considered it necessary that the operations of the enemy against German territory provided for in paragraph 25 should be exactly laid down, according to number and depth of penetration of the ORANGE forces involved, when AFCENT proceeded to the detailed drafting of the intended course of the play.

- (ii) The final version of the Directing Staff Instructions provided for the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons by ORANGE to a certain extent during exercise TOP GEAR. He appreciated the fact that, on the basis of the exercise setting, the use of chemical weapons by ORANGE could be an important element of the decision on the selective use of nuclear weapons by BLUE. Nevertheless, for general political reasons, his Government was of the opinion that the use of chemical weapons by ORANGE should not be played, and that, as in the case of biological weapons, only a report on the suspected use of chemical weapons should be played.
- (iii) As far as the procedural side of the exercise was concerned, the exercise incidents should, as in the case of FALLEX 64, be pre-planned both for the declaration of alert stages and alert measures and for the decision on the selective use of nuclear weapons. For the rest, more opportunities should be created for free play than during exercise FALLEX 64.
- (iv) Finally, he asked that in all exercise documents the incorrect designations "West Germany" and "East Germany" which also appeared in the present document in numerous places, be deleted and replaced by the correct designations, i.e. "Federal Republic of Germany" and "Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany".

57. If these wishes were taken into account he could agree to the decisions recommended in paragraph 10.

58. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE raised two points. Firstly, as regards the recommendations in paragraph 10, Greece favoured more active participation by the Council, even to the extent of making appropriate political decisions when necessary. Secondly, with regard to the reference in paragraph 2 of Annex D to "guerilla activity in Austria and Hellenic Thrace", his Authorities wished to see the words, "guerilla activity" qualified by the addition of appropriate words (e.g. "through infiltration"). Their aim was to make it clear that what was here concerned was not a domestic problem but aggressive action from the outside. Wherever a reference was made in the document to guerilla activity it should be understood as resulting from infiltration.

59. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE asked whether the comment by the German Representative implied a Council decision today on the content of the exercise itself. If this was so, he could approve only subject to reference to his Government.

60. The CHAIRMAN suggested that if there were any doubts about the need for further Council consideration of this subject, a decision might be postponed to a later date.

61. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, as he saw it, the Council was now being asked to agree in principle to its participation in TOP GEAR, with the qualifications expressed by the German and Greek Representatives; also to reconvene the Working Group which, in his view, should study these qualifications. He said that he could agree to these recommendations without in any way implying that he was now passing judgment on the scenario.

62. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he also considered that the decision now requested of the Council did not imply any comment by the Council on the scenario. He noted from the general comments on page 11 that the scenario was an unreal one, and said that, notwithstanding the comments by the German and Greek Representatives, his Authorities would continue to regard the scenario as wholly unreal and existing purely for the purpose of the exercise. He therefore urged the Council to approve the recommendations in paragraph 10 today.

63. He had been instructed to say that his Government had stated in public its regret at the decision of the French Government not to participate in FALLEX 66 and at the request that French personnel in Allied Command Europe should be excused from participation. His Authorities would participate fully and do all in their power to make the exercise a success.

64. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that since the Council was today invited to take note of the report, he had been instructed to say that his Authorities attached great importance to the possibility of discussing in the Council the scenario of the exercise. If they could have the assurance that the military authorities accepted the amendments he proposed, he could today agree to the recommendations in paragraph 10.

65. Replying to the comment by the United Kingdom Representative, he agreed that the assumptions for the exercise were not real ones, but pointed out that they could have considerable political significance and repercussions for a given country.

66. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE supported the comments by the Canadian Representative, and also the comments by the German Representative regarding the repercussions of assumptions whether real or unreal.

67. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE noted the references made in Council to artificialities in the scenario and pointed out that in order to provide a framework in which the objectives of the exercise could be achieved, certain adaptations at the expense of realism had been necessary. He also wished to remind the Council that the scenario had been co-ordinated with the Ministries of Defence in capitals and with the International Staff. Nonetheless, the military were prepared and willing to take into account the points raised by the German and Greek Ambassadors.

68. In reply to a question by the United States Representative as to whether the Standing Group Representative was now accepting these amendments on behalf of the military; and at the invitation of the Secretary General, the Standing Group Representative stated he wanted to make it perfectly clear that as he had previously indicated, the military was ready and willing to take into account the points raised by the German Ambassador. He himself did not have authority to accept these changes in the scenario, but he would make a full report to the Standing Group in order to obtain guidance.

69. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve the recommendations in paragraph 10. He also agreed with the German Representative on the dangers of political repercussions arising from certain assumptions.

70. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objection to the recommendations in paragraph 10. He did not know whether his military authorities and the Department of Defence would agree to the proposed changes in the scenario, and therefore hoped that the Council would not be asked to approve them today. He had two further comments to make. Firstly, the Council was requested in paragraph 10(b) to agree in principle to participate in TOP GEAR "at least to the extent to which they participated in FALLEX 64". His information was that it was not the Council itself, but Council deputies who had participated in FALLEX 64. In many cases the decision-making machinery of governments had not been involved. He suggested that the Working Group might wish to review what kind of Council participation would be useful for the purposes of crisis management regarding the use of nuclear weapons.



71. Secondly, he said that he would like to go on record in support of the general sentiments of regret just expressed by the German and United Kingdom Representatives about the French decision not to participate. He supposed "this water had done over the dam"; and he understood that from a practical point of view the non-participation of French officers would not inhibit the conduct of FALLEX 66. But he would not want to pass up the opportunity to remind his colleagues of the importance which his Government attached to the integrity of the staff serving this Alliance in an international capacity. It would be curious if the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, the Middle East and South Asia turned out to have clearer command arrangements and to have more assurance of the responsiveness of their forces to their commanders than could be maintained in practice in the Major NATO Commands.

72. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been authorised to approve paragraph 10 of the document, but that in the light of the comments by the German and Greek Representatives, he thought it might be preferable to postpone a decision by the Council.

73. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE noted that the present discussion had gone far beyond the item on the Agenda. He thought that the Council was not being asked to discuss the contents of the Annexes to the document, since they were provisional documents for study by the Working Group before approval by the Council. He thought that the Council was being asked to decide only on whether it should participate in the exercise, and to what extent. A decision could therefore be taken today.

74. He took the opportunity to express the regret felt by his Government at the French position and at the withdrawal, for the purposes of this exercise, of French officers from an integrated command. It was the view of his Authorities that, as regards their functions, integrated officers came entirely under international command. In view of the possible further consequences he hoped that the French position would be studied further.

75. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve paragraph 10 of the document. He associated himself with the comments by the Netherlands Representative on the French position.

76. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE considered that the questions raised by the German Representative, with their political implications, went beyond the ability of the Standing Group to advise the Council and should be studied in a body competent to reconcile the military and political requirements, i.e. the Council or the Working Group. He suggested accordingly that the Council should at least agree to reconvene the Working Group, which would consider among other questions those now raised by the German and Greek Representatives.

77. After further discussion, the CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council might today approve paragraph 10(c) and (d) on the understanding that the political aspects of the scenario would be discussed at a later date.

78. The COUNCIL, subject to the understanding expressed by the Chairman above:

- (1) noted the report (C-M(65)45(Revised)) and the statements made in discussion;
- (2) agreed to defer a decision in principle on its possible participation in exercise FALLEX 66;
- (3) agreed to reconvene the FALLEX Working Group, under the Chairmanship of the Executive Secretary, to keep in touch with further planning by the military authorities, to keep the Council informed as necessary and to make concrete recommendations as to the extent and nature of Council participation;
- (4) invited the Civil Emergency Co-ordinating Committee to consider, in consultation with the technical committees concerned and with the national exercise advisers, the nature and extent of participation in FALLEX 66 of the NATO wartime civil agencies and to make recommendations to the FALLEX 66 Working Group.

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X. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

Wednesday, 3rd November, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.  
(Plenary Session).

OTAN/NATO,  
Paris, XVIe.

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