

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE
COPY

359
N°

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
26th January, 1965

NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(64)54

Summary record of a meeting of the Council held
at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on
Tuesday, 15th December, 1964 at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

President : H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak
Chairman and Secretary General : Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
(President of the NATO
Council).
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative.

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin : Secretary of State for
External Affairs.
The Hon. Paul Hellyer : Minister of National Defence.
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative.

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative.

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux : Permanent Representative.

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel : Federal Minister for Defence.
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe : Permanent Representative.

NATO SECRET

GREECE

H.E. Mr. S. Stephanopoulos : Vice-President of the Council
and Minister for Economic
Co-ordination.
H.E. Mr. S. Costopoulos : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. P. Garoufalias : Minister of National Defence.
H.E. Mr. C. Mitsotakis : Minister of Finance.
H.E. Mr. Ch. X. Palamas : Permanent Representative.

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Pétur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative.

ITALY

The Hon. Giuseppe Saragat : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The Hon. Giulio Andreotti : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative.

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. P. Werner : Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. A. Wehenkel : Minister for the National
Economy and the Budget.
H.E. Mr. M. Fischbach : Minister for the Armed Forces,
Assistant Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter : Permanent Representative.

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns : Minister of Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative.

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister of Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Mr. Georg Kristiansen : Permanent Representative.

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. General Gomes de Araujo : Minister of Defence.
H.E. Mr. Vasco da Cunha : Permanent Representative.

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin : Minister for Foreign Affairs.
H.E. Mr. Ilhami Sancar : Minister of National Defence.
H.E. Mr. Ferit Melen : Minister of Finance.
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative.

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt.Hon. P.C. Gordon Walker : Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
The Rt.Hon. Denis Healey : Secretary of State for
Defence.
The Rt.Hon. L.J. Callaghan : Chancellor of the Exchequer.
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh : Permanent Representative.

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State.
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara : Secretary of Defense.
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative.

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J.A. Roberts : Deputy Secretary General.
Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General,
Assistant Secretary General
for Economics and Finance.
Mr. R.W.J. Hooper : Assistant Secretary General
for Political Affairs.
Mr. Johnson Garrett : Assistant Secretary General
for Production, Logistics
and Infrastructure.
Dr. John L. McLucas : Assistant Secretary General
for Scientific Affairs.
The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary.

ALSO PRESENT

Lt.Gen. C.P. de Cumont : Chairman, Military Committee.
General Sir Michael West : Chairman, Standing Group.
General L.L. Lemnitzer : Supreme Allied Commander
Europe.
Admiral Harold P. Smith : Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic.
Admiral Sir Wilfrid J.W. Woods : Allied Commander-in-Chief
Channel.
Major General W.W. Stromberg : Standing Group Representative.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIE - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONTENTS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Paragraph Nos.</u>
I.	Review of the International Situation and of East/West relations	1 - 69

I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said that, in as far as East/West relations were concerned, the major event of importance in recent months was undoubtedly the departure of Mr. Khrushchev. He believed that Ministers would be prepared to accept the evaluation of the Expert Working Group on this subject and that there had been no fundamental change in Soviet policy; however, before reaching definite conclusions, it would be prudent to observe the manner in which the new Soviet leadership applied the principles which apparently it continued to respect.

2. Khrushchev's departure would indeed appear to have been motivated by his failure to apply fully the principles of collective leadership. He had, moreover, been somewhat discredited by setbacks over Cuba, the German question and, at home, over agriculture; and his conflict with China had taken on considerable importance in Soviet policy. He had also incurred criticism by reason of his wish to have peaceful coexistence recognised as part of the communist doctrine.

3. An indication that Soviet policy towards Belgium continued largely unchanged had been provided by the recent visit to Belgium of Mr. Roudnev, the Vice-Chairman of the Praesidium, whose attitude in discussions had been consistently friendly.

4. In Africa, prior to the Stanleyville intervention the Soviet Union had apparently taken only small interest in the Congo, and had left unhampered the work of the United Nations. Since the intervention, the Soviet reaction had been couched in increasingly violent language; in private discussions, however, Mr. Spaak had noted a more moderate attitude on the part of the Soviet representatives. He felt that close attention should be given to future Soviet attitudes on this question within the United Nations, since these would provide a useful basis on which to forecast the general trend of Soviet foreign policy. Over the Congo, the Soviet Union had in fact to decide whether it wished to align itself with the position of the extremist African nations or that of the more moderate ones.

5. The position of the bloc countries with respect to the Congo was far less rigid and categorical than in 1960; this would appear to confirm the thesis that certain of these countries wished to improve their relations with the West. On the other hand, the rapid and violent reaction of Yugoslavia appeared to be motivated by fear of an unwelcome Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

6. Mr. Spaak went on to reaffirm the continued need to maintain and reinforce the Alliance, and particularly the urgency of bettering political consultations between its members. In this latter respect, he pointed out that, according to the reports of the Expert Working Groups, the Alliance was losing valuable opportunities to develop a common policy regarding problems in Africa and Asia. While he favoured intensification of consultation, he was somewhat sceptical, in view of the irregular course of world events, as to the desirability of stepping-up the periodic meetings of Foreign Ministers; it might, he suggested, be preferable if all or several Foreign Ministers were to attend meetings of the Permanent Council when events justified this.

7. Turning to press allegations that the Alliance was presently in a state of disarray or crisis, Mr. Spaak said that the problems facing NATO should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. He personally was convinced that the present difficulties had arisen because the military and strategic concepts of the Alliance needed review and that to be valid these concepts must correspond to the most probable political hypothesis.

8. He suggested, therefore, that Ministers might wish to renew to some extent the mandate in this respect which they had given the Permanent Council at the Ottawa meeting in May 1963. If a decision to renew the mandate could be taken unanimously that would mean that the obstacles which had prevented the Permanent Representatives from fulfilling the tasks conferred upon them would have been removed.

9. On the question of the Multilateral Force, Mr. Spaak confessed that he was not at all clear as to the present situation. He regretted the proliferation of bilateral discussions on this problem, which prevented the other partners from getting a clear picture of the situation.

10. He was prepared to accept the existing arrangements whereby the nuclear defence of the West was ensured primarily by the United States; and he could also agree to the continuance of efforts to provide Europe with a reasonable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons.

This attitude was prompted by:

- (a) his confidence in the repeated assurances of the United States that it would loyally stand by its allies;
- (b) his conviction that, from its very outset, a war between East and West would inevitably involve the United States.

11. He acknowledged, however, that this position might not be altogether acceptable to certain countries which were larger than Belgium.

12. The United States had therefore made proposals in order to solve the problem. The only reproach which could be addressed to them in this respect was that they had possibly made them too late. It was true that the creation of an Atlantic Force would reinforce NATO by binding the United States to Europe, and that it would slow the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

13. He would not go into the technical problems raised by the creation of an Atlantic Force; such problems existed but were not insurmountable.

14. Perhaps even greater were the political difficulties raised by this project, and in particular the need to establish who precisely should have the right to employ the Atlantic Force. In this connection he asked:

- (a) Whether an Atlantic Nuclear Force could conceivably be used without the agreement of the United States? This would appear unimaginable, given that the United States would be an essential partner in such a Force, whose use would inevitably draw that country into an all-out nuclear war. In these conditions, what was the precise value of the Force?
- (b) Whether this project should be given such major importance in view of the fact that an Atlantic Force would represent only some 1% of the total nuclear potential of the West, while the United States would remain free to use the remaining 99% as it chose.

15. Mr. Spaak recommended that the question of the Atlantic Force should be further discussed on a multilateral basis, and that it should be ensured that this project did not harm the unity of the Alliance. There were evidently two questions which should be considered in this context:

- (a) Could European countries which possessed national nuclear forces be asked to incorporate these in an Atlantic Force, without retaining the right to withdraw them in the event of a national emergency? While he personally believed that no need would, in fact, arise for the use of a

national nuclear force in an isolated war, the wishes which had been expressed by some nations in this connection must not be discounted. He therefore suggested that it might be possible to extend to nuclear forces the present arrangements, whereby conventional forces could be withdrawn from the Alliance in time of national emergency.

- (b) It would appear reasonable that nuclear strategy for the defence of Europe should be a common undertaking, in which a number of the European countries should have their part. Therefore, while he opposed the concept of a directory in the political field, he was prepared to support that of a nuclear directory, which would allow certain European countries to participate in nuclear strategic planning and perhaps even in the use of nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe.

Consideration of these questions would, he felt, prove more fruitful at the present time than confusing discussions on difficult technical problems or on the utilisation of the Force. Further studies should be conducted with patience and prudence, in the realisation that the Atlantic Force was not essential to the defence of Europe, and that an agreement on this project between only a limited number of countries would be of little value if it was to promote discord within the Alliance.

Expressing disquiet that the member countries of the Common Market should have divergent views on the question of the Multilateral Force, Mr. Spaak said that these divergencies might well seriously hinder the promotion of political unity in Europe. He recommended, therefore, that the Six should attempt to resolve this question among themselves. This would not, however, be possible until a specific proposal had been put forward by France in face of the United States proposals.

16. Mr. SARAGAT (Italy) said that the whole question of East/West relations was still affected by the fall of Mr. Khrushchev. He recalled that, up to his departure, the dialogue with the West could be regarded as a permanent feature of Soviet policy and that, if the USSR, while seeking to maintain the status quo in Europe, had shifted its efforts towards the Third World, it had done so with a degree of

caution which contrasted with the aggressiveness peculiar to the policy of China. As regards the causes of Mr. Khrushchev's departure, he thought it was too early to attempt to define them in detail. Generally, the causes seemed to indicate that conditions would not change and his successors would be exposed to the same wearing-down process as their predecessor. In particular, they must overcome the difficulties encountered in the relations with China where, in the guise of an ideological dispute, a struggle for power had long been taking shape. The Soviet policy towards the West might, within certain margins, reflect variations in the relations between Moscow and Peking and the rise or ebb of the influence of the pro-Chinese movement which, in Moscow, was pressing for a return to orthodoxy.

17. As regards the key problems of relations between Moscow and Peking, he did not believe that, in the long run, the clashes left much prospect of a wholehearted reconciliation. From a short-term point of view, he even felt that the recent contacts between Moscow and Peking had confirmed that their positions remained unchanged and, although Moscow had declared its continued adherence to peaceful coexistence, there were no signs that Peking had developed a deeper sense of international responsibility since it had acquired an atomic capability. He recalled, in connection with Soviet relations with the West, that the positions recently adopted by the Soviet Union with regard to Viet Nam and the Congo had shown that it was stepping up its support for the revolutionaries of the Third World and that this trend had already been apparent during the last year of Mr. Khrushchev's tenure of power.

18. He thought that while the Soviet Union was hardly likely, in Europe, to abandon its policy of maintenance of the status quo, it might, outside Europe, attempt to gain more influence, if only not to be ousted by the Chinese. He said that the present ferment in the Third World and the increase in Communist, and particularly Chinese, penetration were cause for great concern in the West, and that the latter must expect Soviet strategy to make the most of such issues as decolonisation and disarmament. In Eastern Europe, he believed that the movement towards national autonomy was irreversible and could only be accelerated by the loss of prestige following Mr. Khrushchev's downfall.

19. The policy of the Alliance towards the Communist world, he said, must bear in mind the two main facts which emerged from his analysis of the situation:

- the weakness of the new Soviet team;
- the influence of China and the countries of Eastern Europe on the action of the Soviet leaders.

He was convinced, and the present crisis in the Communist world bore him out, that peaceful coexistence had been so far of more benefit to the West than to the Soviet Union. He therefore concluded that the dialogue with the Communist world was not only necessary for reducing the risk of nuclear war, but was also a profitable political operation. Discussions on disarmament should form part of the dialogue, particularly in view of the anxiety aroused, even in the Third World, over the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons following the Chinese explosion. He was convinced that the Atlantic Alliance would be acting fully in accordance with its interests, if it were to help the Third World; economic aid given to underdeveloped countries had become an indispensable instrument of the economic and political strategy of the Atlantic Alliance.

20. In order to improve the cohesion of NATO, it would be necessary to push ahead with integration in all fields including the military field. To this end, consultation should be increased at all levels and a political programme should be drawn up in order to emphasise the world-wide mission of the Alliance and to co-ordinate its action with regard to the Third World. Any decrease of solidarity would be dangerous, since it could be taken as evidence for the thesis of Peking that the West had hitherto profited from the softness of Khrushchev. The advantages of full cohesion of the Alliance had clearly been shown during the Cuban crisis, when, in view of the position unanimously taken by the West, the Soviet Union had renounced the use of nuclear blackmail and committed itself to peaceful coexistence. The lessons learnt at that time would also hold true for the new task put before the West, which was to contain the aggressive action of China in Asia and Africa, and to help the unaligned countries to resist the ideological and political attractions of Communism. Such co-operation was also necessary for any action vis-à-vis the countries of Eastern Europe. In his opinion, the Alliance must pay due heed to the evolution which was taking place, and adapt itself to it. He pointed out that these countries were very anxious to step up their trade with the West, and that if commercial exchanges were increased, there would be a corresponding decrease in the economic dependence of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union. While recognising that a policy aimed at increasing trade should not be pursued at the expense of the strategic and political interests of the Free World, he thought that every opportunity should be seized for increasing bilateral contacts and establishing dialogue with Eastern bloc countries.

21. In conclusion, he said that the fall of Mr. Khrushchev seemed to him to signify the end of a first phase in the policy of détente, and that in spite of difficulties this period had proved the value of the East/West dialogue.

22. He thought that the West should logically continue along the lines already laid down, i.e. push ahead with Atlantic and European integration, encourage the East/West détente and speed up co-operation with the Third World. These three factors were, in his opinion, complementary and inseparable.

23. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that, since the Ministerial Meeting in The Hague, the future of the Alliance and its objective of deterring nuclear conflict had been fundamentally affected by the change in leadership in the Soviet Union, the explosion of the first nuclear device by Communist China, the yet unresolved Western differences on nuclear strategy and the Cyprus dispute which continued to weaken the South-Eastern flank of NATO.

24. Although it was difficult to predict the future course of Soviet foreign policy, it seemed that the new Soviet collective leadership did not intend to abandon the policy of de-Stalinisation, but to follow, in the short-term, more traditionally cautious policies than Khrushchev and to avoid alienating the military hierarchy. A settlement was unlikely between the conflicting demands for economic resources, particularly as between defence expenditures and consumer goods. The new leadership had preserved its freedom of action in seeking solutions to current problems by basing its policies on those laid down at the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. In the present period of uncertainty, continuing vigilance was necessary as well as some cautious initiative. He felt that the new leadership, adhering to Soviet policies of the previous two years, would maintain the confidence of the Eastern European régimes and might not wish to define their position on Berlin and Germany, while continuing to avoid tension and incidents in and around Berlin. It was important that Western attitudes should encourage the recent trend towards an amelioration of conditions in Eastern Germany. From recent contacts with Eastern European leaders, he believed that the fall of Khrushchev was unlikely to affect the general evolution towards greater autonomy due to the strong centrifugal forces in Eastern European countries. The new Soviet régime had recently attempted to reduce hostility with Communist China, but had revealed no modification to its policy on basic issues. In the absence of any provocative Western policies, the Sino-Soviet divergence was likely to continue in the competition for leadership of the international communist movement, especially in the less-developed parts of the world.

25. Referring to Western relations with the new Soviet régime, he stressed the need for vigilance and manifestation of firm Western unity in the defence of the freedom of Berlin,

as well as for maintenance of a flexible policy, as followed by the Federal German Government, in seeking to encourage trade and other developments capable of improving the lot of the East German population. Although new Western initiatives leading to useful negotiation on Berlin and Germany were unlikely to be successful in the near future, he suggested that the West should re-examine its eventual negotiating positions and that more frequent and comprehensive reports should be received from the Four to enable useful discussion in the Council in Ministerial or Permanent Session.

26. A major Soviet initiative on disarmament was unlikely in view of their continuing exploitation of their current proposals and of ideas advanced by the non-aligned countries. The Soviet Union did not seem prepared to respond favourably to recent Western initiatives on limited measures, but the Chinese nuclear test had revealed the mutual interest of the Soviet Union and of the West in seeking further measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Although recent bilateral efforts to secure Soviet concurrence in the elaboration of an international agreement, based on the Irish resolution in the United Nations in 1961, had been unfruitful in view of Soviet consideration of the creation of a multilateral nuclear force as incompatible with its definition of non-dissemination, yet the West should confirm its refusal to engage in dissemination and its willingness to negotiate its prevention. Nations having the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, but not engaged in a weapons programme, should agree not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons, and the nuclear powers of the Alliance should indicate in the United Nations the type of non-dissemination treaty which could be negotiated with the Soviet bloc. Thus in any agreement reached by NATO with regard to its nuclear arrangements, it was important to take into consideration Soviet reactions and the effects of such arrangements on the principle of non-dissemination.

27. Recent events in China emphasised the urgent need for a comprehensive review of Western attitudes towards Communist China. Despite the improbability of the Soviet Union and China bridging their divergent interests and ideologies in the long-term, the Soviet Union was likely, in the short-term to show a cautious attitude on international questions directly affecting Peking. Reaction of the non-aligned nations to the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device had been well-balanced and in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia, the West should support India and Japan in their determination to maintain their nuclear policy for peaceful purposes. China had reaped political and psychological benefits in the

non-aligned world from its nuclear test, which demonstrated the ability of an Afro-Asian country to achieve, seemingly with little external aid, very advanced scientific progress. In view of the increasing danger to world stability caused by China's policy, especially in the non-aligned world, it was very important for NATO to continue to consult in depth on Chinese developments.

28. Communist China was intimately connected with events in Viet Nam, which created a very serious political and military situation for the West and no change of the Chinese attitude could be expected in the near future. However, in view of the wide influence and interest of China in Asia, it would be advantageous, in all problems which the West faced over China, to examine the possibilities of establishing a more realistic and widely understandable Western position towards China.

29. Referring to the nuclear problems of the Alliance, he recalled that Canada had decided not to participate in the working level talks on the Multilateral Nuclear Force. When the MLF feasibility studies, conducted on a technical basis without commitment by governments, had developed in advance of any exchange of views on nuclear arrangements within NATO into proposals, which might have a dividing effect on the Alliance, his government had decided to express its views. At the recent meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Ottawa, he had suggested a compromise approach which would explore the possibility of using existing machinery within NATO to ensure a greater sharing in the military direction of the Alliance. He was of the opinion that the MLF studies, together with the United Kingdom proposals concerning an Atlantic Nuclear Force, the views of the French Government and the proposals of Mr. Spaak required careful consideration by all national governments, and that the question of the nuclear defence arrangements of the Alliance should be discussed on a NATO-wide basis under the direction of the Secretary General at an appropriate time.

30. Referring to the state of the Alliance, he recalled that at The Hague, Ministers had identified many of the general principles fundamental to the unity of the Alliance. He now urged the need for a systematic and profound examination in the NATO forum of the type of alliance most suited to national needs and the conditions of the 1970's, together with a study of the commonly accepted objectives of the Alliance, whose continuing adaptability depended on the mutual discussion of all its members. Since public opinion would be reassured to know that discussion of the future progress of the Alliance, initiated at The Hague, was currently being continued, he proposed that the Communiqué should contain a reference to such discussion and that Permanent Representatives should undertake a study of the commonly accepted objectives of the Alliance.

31. Dr. SCHROEDER (Federal Republic of Germany), underlining the close context between East/West relations and the state of the Alliance, said that in the last fifteen years the world had undergone fundamental changes.

32. The balance of power between East and West had altered in that:

- the Soviets had built up a nuclear potential with which they could threaten not only Europe but also the American continent;
- the nuclear potential of the West had been increased, although to a limited degree, by new developments in the United Kingdom and France;
- Germany had contributed conventional forces to the Alliance, which had been strengthened in that field;
- the United States had improved the number, range and technical perfection of its nuclear weapons to an extent which continued to ensure it an overwhelming superiority;
- finally, since the first Chinese nuclear explosion, it had become known that Communist China's nuclear potential was growing at an alarming speed.

33. Considerable political changes had also occurred during the same period:

- the dissolution of the monolithic Eastern bloc into a polycentric system and the schism between Moscow and Peking;
- the shift of emphasis in the communist offensive to Asia, Africa and South America;
- the economic and political rebirth of free Europe;
- the rapid emancipation of the coloured world with all its dangers; the internal chaos, vulnerability to communist infiltration, lack of experience in international politics, primitive nationalism and racial hatred.

34. As was to be expected, the Alliance had been affected by all these changes, but in the resulting process of fermentation the Alliance should be seen, as

President Johnson said in his speech at Georgetown University on 5th December, as in the midst of a change rather than in the midst of a crisis. Its task was not to be driven by events but to understand the motive forces of the change, and to adapt itself to meet the new requirements.

35. Member nations working together should find a new reply to the question of whether the Alliance was still necessary at a time when the Soviet expansion in Europe had come to a standstill and many no longer believed in the danger of massive aggression. Should this be regarded as the calm before the storm or as part of a process of long-term change in the form of the threat? The reply might be made as follows: the present relative peace in the European-Atlantic region was entirely due to the fact that the balance of power and a sufficient position of strength in that region was being maintained. Both the Berlin and the Cuban crises had arisen without prior warning indications, and Khrushchev's fall also revealed how quickly the scene could change in Moscow. The Alliance should remember that surprises were always possible.

36. The conclusion to be drawn was that as long as an opponent had to be faced, whose military power extended from Vladivostok to the Elbe, who possessed a human potential by 1970 of 360 millions, and a gross national product equal to 21% of the gross national product of the whole world, the Atlantic Alliance between Western Europe and North America would be an indispensable safeguard to the peace and security of all its member nations, none of whom should indulge in the illusion that these laws of political gravity could be evaded.

37. Once it had been agreed that the Alliance was still necessary, even if for reasons which were different from those for which it was originally conceived, the question of its future organization should be considered.

38. Nobody had yet produced valid arguments to deny that the presence of 400,000 American soldiers on European soil was a decisive factor in the balance of power between East and West - militarily, psychologically and politically. The inevitable political consequence of this was that the organization of the Alliance should be adapted to cope with such long-term massive stationing of forces, and with the technical, military and psychological co-operation necessary to ensure a defensive system within Western Europe which functioned as smoothly as possible as an integrated whole. This was the arrangement which had applied in the past and would also apply in the future, but it did not take into account the changes which the Alliance was called upon to understand and to control.

39. The monolithic and centralised Eastern bloc constructed by Stalin no longer existed and had been replaced by a complex and frequently divided enemy which had to be dealt with by flexible and varied political methods. Since 1956, the report by the Three Ministers on Non-Military Co-operation had been the instrument for this purpose, but it had never been fully exploited, and it was possible that a renewed undertaking by the Alliance to apply more actively the principles which it had adopted years ago might be more useful for its present purpose than the creation of new machinery.

40. Since the consultative procedure to be found in the Report of the Three Ministers knew no geographical limits, it offered an opportunity to respond to the shifts of emphasis in communist activity and aggressiveness towards Asia, Africa and Latin America. This covered the requirement for joint consultation, but within the next few years the Alliance had to find a constructive and up-to-date solution to the requirement for common action also expressed by the Three Ministers.

41. In particular, a solution had to be found to the internal problem of the Alliance arising from the new-found strength of Europe, which, by virtue of its independence and power, now occupied an influential position in the free world. This did not mean that the Alliance was thereby rendered superfluous, as the late President Kennedy in his unforgettable speech at Philadelphia on 4th July, 1962 and President Johnson in his speech at Georgetown both made clear when they spoke of an equal partnership between Europe and America. On the contrary, political independence in the present-day world could only be preserved through co-operation between like-minded partners.

42. At the same time, the terms "independence", "equality" and "partnership" should be understood against the background of the real power situation and no profession of equality could remove the fact that between major and minor powers, between the rich and the poor, between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, there was a difference in real power which raised problems in an Alliance such as NATO.

43. In the past, NATO had mastered problems of this kind, which were not new and were also to be seen in other international organizations, and its members could be confident that a solution to the new and increasingly urgent problem of the relation between nuclear and non-nuclear powers would be found. The problem involved not so much a question of rank but the basic questions of the national

security of each member country. For example, the security of the Federal Republic and in particular that of its outpost Berlin, depended upon the reliability of the nuclear guarantee of those of Germany's allies who possessed the necessary weapons to give it effect. Moreover, the survival of the narrow area of the Federal Republic bordering on the Iron Curtain depended on whether this guarantee was brought to bear in time (i.e. in a few hours or minutes if necessary), since even a so-called "conventional war" could reduce this area in a few hours to a state similar to, or worse than, that of the 8th May, 1945. The decision to observe a pause before the strategic nuclear weapons were used would probably mean that the Federal Republic and several of her immediate neighbours would disappear from the surface of the earth before the decisive weapons were actually used. It was therefore obvious that Germany could not be indifferent to the question of nuclear strategy. These considerations had inspired the positive interest with which the project of a multilateral POLARIS fleet, presented four years ago by Secretary Herter at the NATO Council, had been studied. The project, in the form which it had assumed during the negotiations of the past year, was certainly not an ideal answer to the problem, but it was a practical, politically and militarily sensible solution which could put the Alliance one step forward towards solving its nuclear difficulties.

44. It would be premature at this meeting to discuss such a controversial subject because the proposals of some members had not yet been presented in a mature and precise form, but the Federal Government continued to adopt a positive attitude towards the project and remained prepared to examine alternative proposals of a constructive nature.

45. It was now indispensable to tackle the nuclear problems of the Alliance in a way which would bring it one step closer to achieving the common aim, i.e. the participation of the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance - who thought it desirable or necessary to have a say in nuclear strategy vitally affecting their own security - on the basis of their own contribution to a Multilateral Force designed to improve the nuclear defence of Europe in the field of medium-range ballistic missiles. The Government of the Federal Republic therefore hoped that the negotiations on the Multilateral Force would come to an early and successful conclusion.

46. Since the Germany and Berlin problem had been discussed at the Ministerial Meeting in The Hague, Khrushchev had been overthrown but the change of leadership in Moscow should not raise hopes of a new Soviet policy on

the question, or of a new attitude to free Europe and the West in general. It should rather be assumed that the new Soviet Government would try to avoid the policy of experiments, while continuing to exploit the general and understandable desire for a détente in order to obtain international recognition of the division of Germany. The policy of the Federal Republic in its contacts with Moscow and with the capitals of other Soviet bloc states was clear; within politically acceptable limits to improve the atmosphere of relations with the Soviet bloc by establishing trade missions and personal contacts wherever possible. The invitation to the Soviet Head of Government to visit Bonn, extended to Khrushchev and still valid for his successors, formed part of this policy.

47. Relations between the Federal Republic and the other part of Germany required more thought. The Pankow régime was trying to exploit the attitude and the desire on the part of the 58 million people in free Germany to look after the 17 million in the oppressed part, in order to wring from the Federal Republic through constant pressure that which, if conceded, would amount to acquiescence in the division of Germany. The Federal Republic's policy with regard to Germany could be summed up as follows: an obligation to act where the welfare of fellow countrymen in the Soviet zone was at stake, and a responsibility to respond to the Soviets who determined the fate of the Soviet zone, while at the same time maintaining a reserve towards the régime of the Soviet zone.

48. It was important, in this connection, to consider whether the West should visibly step up its policy regarding Germany and the problem of security. The Pankow-Moscow Agreement of the 12th June, 1964 and the attempts of the Eastern bloc to discuss the German question in Cairo, revealed that the other side was active. However, the most pointed example was Pankow's constant endeavours to exploit the division of the country in order to establish political contacts with the Berlin Senate or the Federal Government. The negotiations on pass agreements, talks on the expansion of traffic communications with Berlin, visits of old-age pensioners to the Federal Republic of Germany, were all part of an attempt to get the Federal Republic to sign documents which would confirm the division of the country.

49. It had to be stated frankly that skilful moves on the part of the Federal Government to establish necessary technical contacts without becoming involved in the question of political recognition were not possible without an active Western policy with regard to Germany. It had been

suggested that a too formalistic attitude should not be adopted on the question of technical contacts with Pankow, but this could only be accepted as long as such conduct did not create the impression that the Federal Government had resigned itself to the division of Germany. The cost of such mistakes would be borne by all Western nations and not by free Germany alone, since the past had shown that each time the Eastern bloc gained confidence, critical situations became aggravated.

50. Acceptance of technical contacts could be regarded as justified, provided such a policy was seen as an expression of Western self-confidence, visibly demonstrated. This could best be achieved by pursuing an active Western policy on the German question. Any attempt by the United Nations to impose a solution would have disastrous consequences.

51. The Federal Government considered that such an active Western policy was necessary not only to achieve specific German objectives, but to ease relations in Central Europe, which was, in turn, the only means to achieve the relaxation of tension based on the freedom and security of all European peoples.

52. The Federal Republic was prepared to pursue a flexible policy, free from rigidity and dogma. It expected its friends to support its active policy in Germany by an equally active policy in the rest of Europe. Both were part of one larger policy directed towards the accomplishment of the tasks which gave Western co-operation its true meaning, namely, not merely to safeguard freedom where it already existed, but to restore freedom where it had been lost.

53. Mr. ERKIN (Turkey) agreed with earlier speakers that the change in Soviet leadership since the previous Ministerial meeting in The Hague might have important implications on Soviet policy throughout the world. He said that in his recent visit to Moscow, he had got the impression that the Soviet Authorities not only objected to Mr. Khrushchev's personal style of government, his nepotism, and his refusal to consult and inform the Praesidium, but that they also feared that the foreseeable rupture in Sino-Soviet relations would lead to deteriorating relations between Russia and other communist parties, and that it would generally weaken the communist world. Differences of opinion on economic, military and domestic policy, as well as the intended visit to Bonn, had also contributed to Mr. Khrushchev's fall from power.

54. The claim of the new leaders that Soviet policy would continue along the same lines as before, in accordance with the principle of peaceful coexistence, would seem to be borne out by their actions so far. The numerous problems besetting the régime (the economy, Sino-Soviet relations, the need to consolidate relations between different Communist parties and to retain the leadership of the Communist bloc), explained this restraint from any aggressive action in the international field.

55. Mr. Erkin said that it was difficult to know at present whether or not another individual would emerge as a leader from the present system of collective government. In any case, the international situation was increasingly uncertain since the fall from power of Mr. Khrushchev and it was therefore essential that NATO should demonstrate its solidarity and an unflagging vigilance in order to dissuade any possible new attempts at Communist aggression.

56. Reviewing the problem of Sino-Soviet relations, Mr. Erkin said that no substantial change for the better seemed likely. China had developed into an effective rival to Russia in many spheres of influence, especially in Asia, where the acquisition of a nuclear capacity would have considerable repercussions. There was a feeling among some countries that China might pursue a less aggressive policy once she was admitted into the United Nations.

57. Soviet reactions to further talks on European security and disarmament were difficult to gauge in the circumstances, but the new leaders seemed intransigent in their opposition to a solution of the problem of Germany and to the MLF. However, bilateral relations between Russia and the countries of the Western bloc were continually improving.

58. Mr. Erkin emphasised that this last point was certainly true of Turkey. During his visit to Moscow in November 1964, a cultural pact had been signed and increased trade exchanges had been agreed. There had been a frank exchange of views with the Soviet leaders on several different problems and a resultant improvement in relations between the two countries. Visits to Turkey by Mr. Podgorny and Mr. Gromyko would follow early in 1965. Relations were also improving, especially on trade and tourist levels between Turkey and Roumania and Bulgaria, and Mr. Erkin emphasised how important he considered such an extension of contacts between East and West to be.

59. Concluding his brief analysis of East/West relations, Mr. Erkin said that he would like the Council to

take note of the ever-increasing number of local conflicts throughout the world which might develop into wider conflicts, and of the danger they represented.

60. Reviewing the situation in the Middle East, Mr. Erkin said that the situation with regard to co-operation between the CENTO countries was satisfactory. In addition, a new scheme of "Regional Co-operation" had been brought into being during the summer meeting of the Heads of State held in Istanbul, proof of a desire to achieve even closer co-operation in non-political and non-military spheres. This should allow Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to play a more constructive rôle in the Middle East.

61. Despite the fact that the recent Arab Summit Meeting seemed to show that the Arab countries favoured a restrained policy in the face of the Israeli decision to use the waters of the Jordan, the arms race between Israel and the Arab countries was continuing, and must be considered a potential threat to world peace and the stability of the Middle East.

62. The relations between the Arab states were influenced by suspicions vis-à-vis Nasser's ambition to dominate the Arab world. As regards the problem of the Yemen, Nasser must have realised that a military solution to the problem was not within his grasp, and his diplomatic position had been weakened by the attribution of responsibility for failure to adhere to the 1963 agreements to the United Arab Republic by the Secretary General of the United Nations. In the meantime, Egyptian troops were not respecting the cease-fire agreed on the 8th November, 1964 and it was difficult to envisage a situation which would allow these troops to be withdrawn.

63. The military régimes in both Syria and Irak seemed to be fundamentally unstable. The threat of Egyptian intervention in both countries meant that Turkey had to be very vigilant in keeping a close eye on her southern frontier, particularly since Soviet interest in the Middle East was demonstrated by the according of new loans to the United Arab Republic and the delivery of arms to Irak, which followed Mr. Khrushchev's visit in May 1964. The chief exponent of Soviet policy was still Nasser, whose influence led the Arab and African countries to follow the Soviet line on such questions as colonialism, foreign military bases and disarmament.

64. Going on to review the situation in the Far East, Mr. Erkin said that without doubt the Alliance ought to support the United States in their onerous efforts to stem

the spread of Communist infiltration in Vietnam. Other problems which had to be faced were those of the hostility between India and Pakistan, and of the fear of the latter country in view of the delivery of arms to India by the West.

65. The meeting of the non-aligned countries in Cairo had revealed two definite separate political tendencies, one moderate and one extreme, and severe disagreement had only been obviated by avoiding the discussion of outstanding controversial problems between the States actually represented at the meeting.

66. Mr. Erkin reminded the Council that the second Afro-Asian Conference, due to take place in Algiers in March 1965, was above all sponsored by China and Pakistan, and that China was anxious to play the rôle of the leader and to exclude Russian participation.

67. In discussing this problem, as well as those of relations between Pakistan and India or Malaya and Indonesia, Turkey would try to play a moderating rôle.

68. Concluding his review, Mr. Erkin said that NATO was passing through a difficult stage, owing to the fact that the ambitions of its different members were not clearly enough defined. The Alliance had served an essential purpose in the past, and must remain coherent and united. Turkey considered the Atlantic Alliance to be a permanent concept, which must be maintained by constant efforts to achieve increased European unity and greater Atlantic interdependence. This would only be possible if members of the Alliance considered their long-term interests, and were really determined to find a solution to their problems within the framework of Atlantic solidarity.

69. The COUNCIL:

agreed to continue discussion that afternoon.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.