

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Index

EXEMPLAIRE

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NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(61)27

Summary record of a restricted meeting of the Council,
held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIIe,
on Friday, 23rd June, 1961 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. D. U. Stikker

<u>BELGIUM</u>	<u>GREECE</u>	<u>NORWAY</u>
Mr. A. de Staercke	Mr. M. Melas	Mr. J. Boyesen
<u>CANADA</u>	<u>ICELAND</u>	<u>PORTUGAL</u>
Mr. J. J. McCardle	Mr. B. Möller	Mr. F. de Magalhães Cruz
<u>DENMARK</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>TURKEY</u>
Mr. M. A. Wassard	Mr. M. Pinna Caboni	Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u>	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>
Mr. P. de Leusse	Mr. P. Reuter	Sir Paul Mason
<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>
Dr. G. von Walther	Mr. H. Scheltema	Mr. T. K. Finletter

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Mr. A. Casardi
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:	Mr. F. D. Gregh
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:	Mr. R. W. J. Hooper

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Assistant Secretary General for
Production, Logistics and
Infrastructure:

Mr. Johnson Garrett

Assistant Secretary General for
Scientific Affairs:

Dr. W. A. Nierenberg

Executive Secretary:

The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative:

Maj. Gen. R. H. Barry

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I. DISARMAMENT

Previous reference: C-R(61)26

1. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE gave the Council an account of the present situation at the end of the fourth session of the US/USSR disarmament talks.

2. It seemed clear that the basic Soviet purpose in the disarmament talks which began on 19th June was to draw the United States into precedent-setting substantive bilateral negotiations. Simultaneously, the Soviets wished as a result of these discussions to establish "general and complete disarmament", as interpreted by the Soviets, as the exclusive basis for future negotiations in a broader forum organized on a tripartite or, at minimum, 5-5-3 basis. The Soviets had refused in the talks so far to agree that the purpose of this bilateral exchange of views was to continue the Stevenson-Gromyko effort of last March to lay the groundwork for a resumption of the multilateral disarmament negotiations disrupted by the Soviet walkout and abrogation of the agreement establishing the 10-nation committee. They contended that the purpose of the talks was first to have a substantive exchange of views on specific disarmament plans, on the basis of which it would be determined whether it was useful to reach agreement on composition and on a statement of the task or framework for negotiations.

3. The Soviets now disclaimed that there was any "meeting of minds" between Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Gromyko on the date of 31st July for the resumption of negotiations. They stated that the date still remained to be agreed, and that agreement would be contingent upon prior establishment that (a) the purpose of the negotiations was to draw up a treaty for general and complete disarmament and that (b) as a result of the present talks it was clear that the substantive positions of the US and USSR were sufficiently close for multilateral negotiations to offer real hope of bridging the remaining gaps. The Soviets had said that there was no purpose in resuming negotiations in the absence of sufficient agreement on substance to hold out a reasonable promise of success.

4. Failing this, the Soviets would probably seek to establish the United States as unwilling to accept general and complete disarmament as the purpose of the negotiations and as having drawn back from its previous acceptance of the General Assembly decisions on this matter, which the Soviets were attempting to interpret as endorsement of the Soviet position.

The Soviets would probably take the line that the United States was again unready for meaningful substantive discussions, that there was no point in agreeing to a resumption of negotiations in the present circumstances, and that high-level General Assembly consideration of disarmament was now necessary. They would try to show that the United States perpetrated a fraud on the General Assembly by "buying off" the substantive debate in March with an implicit promise that it would be ready for full-scale bilateral disarmament negotiations in June and July.

5. The Soviets had resisted any discussion of the forum, stating that this matter should be taken up only after substantive issues had been settled. They had said privately however that they viewed the United States 5-5-10 proposal as a "clever" move made for its public appeal, but as completely unacceptable as the basis for negotiations, since it would, by drawing additional western allies such as Japan, Pakistan and Argentina into the negotiations, upset the present parity balance which they claimed to be the only realistic basis for proceeding.

6. The United States had been holding to the line that the purpose of the present talks was to discuss and recommend the framework and composition for negotiations which the United States assumed were to start 31st July. The United States would be ready to present the United States plan and discuss the Soviet plan at that time, and not before. The United States believed that detailed discussion of, and negotiations on, plans should be participated in by the broader group of countries whose vital interests were involved and who would have to participate in disarmament arrangements. The US and USSR could not arrogate to themselves the right to settle questions of substance "à deux", which, although the Soviets disclaimed this as their intent, would be the effect of following the procedure they suggested. In any case, the United States had no intention of being drawn into any type of negotiations on specific plans until its own plan was ready, and preferably until a framework was agreed which would not exclude the consideration of plans based on principles along the lines of those advanced by the United States. However, the United States was ready and willing to discuss, in the present talks, any substantive issues relative to the question of the framework, and had indeed already volunteered its views on a number of these issues, such as the need to recognise the interdependence of total disarmament and the development of institutions for peaceful change, its unwillingness to exclude possible partial measures until the entire programme was worked out, and the need for adequate verification throughout and not just at the end of the disarmament process.

7. The possibility could not be discounted of a sudden shift in the Soviet position to the point of willingness to discuss and adopt a statement of the framework for the negotiations and the postponement of the discussion of specific plans until multi-lateral negotiations were resumed. However, it seemed more likely the Russians would propose recessing the present talks until 31st July if the United States was not ready to proceed with the discussion of plans before then. In the event the Soviets maintained their present position, the United States might itself elect to take the case to the United Nations on the ground that Soviet unwillingness to return to negotiations in a multilateral forum, except on their own terms, was clear evidence that they are not interested in serious negotiations but merely in propaganda. Moreover, Soviet reneging on the private Gromyko-Stevenson understanding regarding the 31st July date was another vivid example of the Soviet word not being worth very much. The United States would wish to delay such a move until a plan was worked out with their allies and consultation had taken place in the Council.

8. In answer to a question by the Turkish Representative, the United States Representative repeated that he thought the Soviets now intended as a propaganda manoeuvre to claim that the United States had tried to avoid a discussion on disarmament in the General Assembly in March by promising that a discussion would take place in August. His government was now considering possible future moves, among them the preparation of a Western 5-power plan which would be submitted to the Council for consultation and then presented to the United Nations in order to refute any Russian allegation that the West did not desire to discuss disarmament.

9. The TURKISH and GREEK REPRESENTATIVES emphasised that the West should now take the initiative in forestalling any Russian propaganda move.

10. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he would convey this suggestion to his authorities.

11. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed the hope that a Western 5-power plan might be drawn up at an early date and presented to the Council.

12. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made and agreed to continue discussion at a later meeting.

II. COUNCIL INVITATION TO SACEUR

13. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council might invite General Norstad to brief it on his ideas on the mobile task force and on his current presentations to Ministries of Defence, the briefing to be of a preliminary nature with a view to clearing the ground before the Council put formal questions to the NATO military authorities on defence plans. He understood that General Norstad would be prepared to give such a briefing.

14. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, wholeheartedly supporting this proposal, said that he would welcome SACEUR's views on the mobile force, which was one of the major problems facing the Council.

15. In answer to a question by the French Representative, the STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that the Military Committee was now studying this question and that it was hoped in a few weeks' time to present a document to the Council on the mobile force.

16. The CHAIRMAN emphasised that the discussion with SACEUR would only be a preliminary one, and that no decision would be taken until after study of the appropriate documents.

17. The BELGIAN and TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES thought that, in addition to the mobile force, there were a number of questions which might be put informally to General Norstad.

18. The CHAIRMAN re-emphasised that any discussion with SACEUR would be a preliminary one. Later the Council might decide to discuss defence matters with the NATO military authorities and should then decide with which NATO military authorities. He thought that at a later date SACIANT might also like to explain his ideas to the Council.

19. The COUNCIL:

agreed to invite General Norstad to attend a meeting of the Council on Friday, 30th June, 1961 at 10.15 a.m., to give a briefing as suggested by the Chairman.

III. DEFENCE MATTERS

Documents: PO/61/449
PO/61/573

20. The CHAIRMAN invited the United Kingdom Representative to open the discussion.

21. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he proposed to develop further the suggestions he had made on 6th June on the way in which the Council might approach the strategy problem. As he had said then, the Council should now try to get away from a philosophical discussion of concepts and start a discussion of concrete cases. Before proceeding to specific problems he emphasised that the first and most important consideration, on which he thought the whole Council was agreed, was to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, i.e. to ensure that NATO's defensive posture was such that the enemy was in no doubt that whatever form of attack he contemplated, NATO could deal with it effectively, immediately and with the appropriate force. The Alliance already had well-developed plans, set out in the basic political and military directives and the MC 70 goals, for achieving the desired defensive posture and there was clearly no intention on anyone's part to weaken the forces of the deterrent. The problems arose in considering what improvements and modernisation were needed in the present level of forces. It was essential for the Council to ensure that, when asking governments to improve their defence efforts, either by modernisation or by bringing up their forces to scale, it was in fact dealing with matters within the defence capacity of the West.

22. On 6th June he had suggested that, in the light of the United States document, PO/61/449, the Council should approach the problems under four main headings:-

- (i) the principle of balanced forces, in particular the balance between conventional and nuclear arms.
- (ii) the desirability of flexibility both in the use and composition of NATO Forces and between these forces and those maintained by NATO countries outside the NATO area, to meet the world-wide communist threat.
- (iii) Costs, i.e. what could the Alliance afford in the way of improvements, taking into account the resources likely to become available.
- (iv) the desirability of establishing a system of priorities.

He had given an indication of the United Kingdom's preliminary views on (i) on 6th June. These were contained in the Council record, C-R(61)23, but he was prepared, if the Council wished, to circulate them in a note. On (ii) he recalled that a number of member countries had commitments throughout the world, and it was necessary to ensure that the defence of one area did not detract from efforts elsewhere. The importance of the question of cost was obvious. As regards priorities, he thought the Council should consider these in the first place using political judgement. The Council should determine the nature of the threat, and with military advice, how this threat should be dealt with. It should try to estimate the various threats to which the West might be subjected, and to determine which of these were the most probable or the most urgent and should therefore be guarded against to the first degree when the question arose of the modernisation and improvement of the forces. These questions were being considered by his authorities and he hoped to be able to indicate their ideas in future weeks. He would put forward some tentative ideas at this stage. Firstly, the "spectrum" of threats ranged from one extreme to the other. At one extreme there might be a massive all-out attack by the Soviets and it was for this reason that adequate forces were required, including strategic deterrent forces at a high state of preparedness. From the political angle, his authorities considered that this was perhaps not the most urgent threat; nevertheless, it must be faced. At the other end of the scale, there was the possibility of an accident, e.g. one enemy battalion might over-step a frontier and thus create an incident which normally could be dealt with on a conventional basis. Such incidents presented no serious problems: they would clearly be dealt with by the conventional forces available.

23. However, in the middle of the "spectrum" was a series of problems which the Council should now try to define. One example was a massive conventional attack by, say, 25 to 40 divisions. Again, his government did not consider that this was one of the most likely threats, and certainly not if NATO maintained a normally strong defensive posture. The Berlin situation clearly fell within the middle area, but he did not propose to expand on this since special considerations applied.

24. There were other possible threats which were perhaps less improbable than those he had already cited; for example, there might be inside a NATO peripheral frontier some form of rising or action in which those concerned might appeal for help to their communist friends. The appeal might be found irresistible and the Russians or a satellite might move, say, 3 to 5 conventional divisions with the avowed limited purpose of succouring the rising, restoring the position and then returning to their country of origin. The temptation for these divisions to stay might be

strong, and it might be a subsidiary motive of the move. Another possibility was a "biting off" action involving a small piece of NATO territory, e.g. by Bulgaria in Thrace.

25. The drawing up of a list of threats in an order of probability was primarily an exercise in political judgement although it would of course be necessary for the Council to test its ideas against expert military advice. He suggested that having made this assessment the next step might be to invite the NATO military authorities to give the Council their views of what forces would be needed to meet them, bearing in mind - and he could not repeat this too often - that the object of our forces was to deter aggression in all forms.

26. On the question of cost, it would be necessary to determine what expenditure was involved, and what modernisation and improvements were required in order to meet the threats. It might be necessary to take a calculated risk in not modernising or improving in one field, but NATO should not dismiss the possibility of any threat nor let its guard down more than could be helped. The Council should then think in terms of agreeing what particular matters deserved a first call on expenditure. For example, as regards the danger of a "biting off" action to which he referred, the right answer might be SACEUR's mobile force. Here he would welcome a discussion with SACEUR, which would provide a useful illustration on the wide problems to be tackled by the Council.

27. The United Kingdom Representative concluded by inviting the Council to agree that:-

- (a) the over-riding consideration must be to maintain the credibility of the deterrent (by which he meant the sum of deterrent forces including the strategic deterrent);
- (b) the Council should approach the strategy problem on the basis of the four points he had suggested;
- (c) it should establish in order of probability the range of threats with which the Alliance was faced and make a broad assessment of the balance of forces required to meet them. The first part of this exercise would call primarily for political judgement;
- (d) it should test its views on priorities against military advice but recognising that in the last resort the judgement and the responsibility for laying down priorities must rest with the Council.

28. Finally he referred briefly to the document circulated by the German Delegation (PO/61/573). He welcomed this document as a useful contribution to the discussion. It clearly called for detailed study. Its main points as he saw them were:-

- (a) that nothing must be done to detract from the credibility of the deterrent;
- (b) that NATO's forces must achieve the correct balance.

These were two considerations with which he was in full agreement.

29. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE was in general agreement with the United Kingdom views on the credibility of the deterrent, on which he made the following comments. He thought that the deterrent was many-sided, but that the basic deterrent, to prevent any Soviet adventures in Europe, was still the strategic air deterrent, which was largely a United States responsibility. His government agreed that this deterrent must be maintained. The United Kingdom Representative had, however, talked of other aspects of the threat, for example a "biting off" move on the flanks of the Alliance. The United States document PO/61/449 was basically intended to ensure an adequate deterrent against such a threat, and to show the Russians that, even if the West was reluctant to use nuclear weapons, it was not prepared to accept minor incidents without retaliation.

30. He welcomed the idea that SACEUR should explain to the Council his views on the mobile task force. He was interested in knowing whether such a force would be adequate to deal with two or three incidents simultaneously, and adaptable to even more serious circumstances. There was the possibility of escalation. An incident might start with one battalion, which would eventually be reinforced by three to five divisions which was a considerable force to meet with conventional defence. The United Kingdom Representative had said that it was perhaps improbable that an attack would start with 25 to 40 divisions, since this would mean that the Soviets desired all-out war. Nevertheless the United Kingdom Representative's statement postulated conditions which, if they were accepted, might mean a very substantial Soviet force at work. For example, if there were three of these thrusts going on simultaneously, this might involve as many as fifteen divisions in three different places and, with escalation affecting a five-division operation, it could very quickly mount to figures in the twenty division area. The Council should envisage the possibility of a "pause", during which the enemy could be held until he had realized that his action, if pursued, would provoke ultimate retaliation. If the credibility of the deterrent was to be maintained, the Council should think about the number of Communist divisions which are immediately deployable in case of escalation.

on, for example, three fronts. At this stage he was not considering the question of cost; the alliance should see what it needed first and then think about its feasibility. He agreed that the Council should consider "priorities of threats". Nothing in the United States document should be taken to mean that his government had closed its mind to any ideas whatsoever. His government continued determined to enmesh the United States in the defence of Europe, since the defence of the free world was indivisible; and it was seeking true consultation with its allies.

31. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE, giving his preliminary views on the United Kingdom statement, thought that it had two main aspects: firstly the deterrent, i.e. how to avoid war indefinitely, and secondly how to spend the least possible for the best defence results. Hitherto the theory of the deterrent had been based on atomic retaliation in all cases; now it was being suggested that the type of retaliation would depend on individual cases. He thought this new theory a doubtful one, but it should be discussed with the Supreme Commanders.

32. In his opinion, the questions of balanced forces, cost, priorities, as well as flexibility were all brought about by financial preoccupations. He pointed out that his country was certainly among those which were in a position to understand fully the necessity to avoid imposing a crushing military burden on the economy of member countries, but, he further stated that since the very existence of the Atlantic Community was at stake maximum efforts should be displayed. He thought that defence might be organized in two ways. The first way, the wrong way, was to cut one's coat according to the cloth available, which might mean having a quite inadequate coat. The second way, the right way, was to consider first what was the minimum amount of cloth necessary, i.e. the NATO military authorities should be asked to state the minimum defence requirements. In fact, a compromise would probably be necessary between these two methods. However, such a compromise should only be resorted to when it proved unavoidable, and when this occurred, greater priority should be accorded to the "right way", otherwise the calculated risk as described by the United Kingdom Representative might constitute the source of a fatal error. It was not possible to take as a basis the enemy's intentions, since the enemy purposely tried to mislead. The assessment must therefore be based on facts and geography, in the same way as military plans were drawn up. In this context he drew attention to the point that, when soldiers prepared alternative plans they based their main plan on the worst contingencies. For all these reasons political assessment of the risks could not have priority over the military assessment in the building up of the NATO defence requirements.

33. That was why he had asked in previous meetings of the Council for an urgent and thorough exchange of views with SACEUR and SACLANT, and he felt very happy to learn that General Norstad would be able to come to the Council meeting on Friday, 30th June.

34. Finally he thought that, in the assessment of threats and risks, these should not be considered on a piecemeal and fragmentary basis but as a whole. That was why it would prove to be very misleading if the Berlin situation were not included when considering the spectrum of threats.

35. The CHAIRMAN noted that what the United Kingdom was suggesting was an assessment of risks based on an analysis of the enemy's intentions; here the deployment of his forces would have to be taken into account. He thought that SACEUR in suggesting the idea of the mobile force had been thinking along the same lines. He noted that what the Council was discussing was an estimate of the present threat, and not the long-term one.

36. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE, introducing the document PO/61/573, said that he considered the deterrent to be of value only if it was credible and if NATO was able to answer any kind of attack. Since "priorities" of attack could be chosen only by the aggressor, NATO must be prepared for all eventualities. One condition of credibility was a balance of forces; if there was not a balance, the enemy would then choose the weakest point. As a first step in establishing its plans the West should assess the enemy's equipment and deployment of forces.

37. Commenting in detail on document PO/61/573, he made the following points.

Paragraphs 4 and 5

38. His authorities objected to the use of the confusing term "pause". With the present ratio of military power between East and West, the period which the military command could obtain to enable the political authority to take a decision could, at the most, be measured in hours.

Paragraph 11

39. His authorities established a link between the creation of SACEUR's mobile task force and the problems of co-ordinated NATO research, development and the production of improved weapons and the integration of logistic and training facilities. The reason for this link was firstly, the conviction that such a "fire brigade" could only accomplish its mission if its striking power was not reduced by continued dependence on separate national weapons systems, training methods and logistic facilities.

Secondly, his authorities considered that such a task force could serve as a kind of training brigade for the testing of new weapons, training methods and integrated logistic facilities.

Paragraphs 12 to 15

40. Here the main anxiety of his authorities was the risk that it might be overlooked that the MC 70 planning goals were minimum goals. His authorities therefore felt that all member countries should make additional efforts. An attempt which would merely be confined to the determination of priorities would not be adequate to produce the increase in security considered necessary and desired by all. He drew particular attention to the statement in paragraph 13 that in the course of the Annual Review the responsible NATO authorities had in recent years always underlined with particular urgency the serious gaps still existing in the build-up of NATO's nuclear fire power.

Paragraph 17

41. The question of NATO control related to the status of the 5 Polaris submarines and their combat mission. His authorities were of the opinion that the term "commitment" which had been used several times in connection with the 5 Polaris submarines should be clarified. They thought that it might be better to replace the term "commitment" by the term "assignment", and would especially be glad to be assured that the submarines would not be under the command of SACLANT, but of SACEUR.

Paragraph 18

42. The term "European theatre of war" was defined in the mission that SACEUR had received from NATO. The term included a part of the enemy's territory the depth of which was defined by, inter alia, the enemy's potential in the fields of manpower, economy, and armaments comparable to that of Western Europe. General Norstad had asked that in order to accomplish his mission the Supreme Allied Commander Europe should be provided with a certain number of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. However, five Polaris submarines would only represent part of this MRBM force.

Paragraph 20

43. He assumed that the stationing of additional Polaris submarines in the area of SACEUR was, among other things, a financial problem; this meant that the number and the rate of commissioning of these submarines were also related to the international financial and economic problems of the United States. It was in view of this situation, and with the desire

of making available to SACEUR as soon as possible forces commensurate with his requirements, that his government had offered a contribution in terms of personnel and money. Its suggestion that this multinationally-staffed and financed Polaris fleet should be placed as an integrated unit under NATO command, was based on the firm conviction that notwithstanding such contributions in terms of personnel and money the Polaris submarines should not be subjected to any national control.

Sub-section (7) (following paragraph 20)

44. His government put forward several proposals on the control and use of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the opinion expressed by the Council, his government agreed to postpone for the time being the discussion of the problems dealt with in this section. If the Council felt ready to tackle these problems, he would be glad to give detailed explanations of the proposals.

45. He would welcome comments and would be glad to answer any questions on the document, which he hoped would serve as a useful basis for discussion.

46. The COUNCIL:

agreed to resume discussion at a later date.

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IV. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

47. Thursday, 29th June, 1961 at 10.15 a.m. (Plenary Session).

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

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