

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

EXEMPLAIRE N° 307
COPY

N A T O S E C R E T

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
21st August 1981

DOCUMENT
C-M(81)54

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)

Note by the Secretary General

The attached report by the Economic Committee has been prepared on the basis of the conclusions reached at an experts' meeting and taking account of several subsequent national contributions. It has to be considered as a background study on Soviet penetration in the Third World during the last quarter century, and represents a reference document on the subject.

2. This report is forwarded to the Council for information.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

This document consists of: 47 pages
Annex I of: 44 pages
Annex II of: 5 pages
Annex III of: 9 pages

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Annex II as a whole is "NATO CONFIDENTIAL". However, each page taken separately bears the following classification:

Page 1: U	Page 3: C	Page 5: C
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All pages in Annex III are "NATO SECRET", except for the front page (Page 1) which is UN.

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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)

Report by the Economic Committee

OBJECT AND SCOPE OF REPORT

Object

- (i) Since 1977 annual reports on Communist arms sales and economic aid to LDCs have been prepared by the Economics Directorate for the main purpose of monitoring Communist penetration in the Third World. Attention has also been paid to comparisons of Communist economic aid with that afforded by the West in order to verify the value of the former with respect to the latter, in purely quantitative terms. The object of this year's report is to study Communist influence in LDCs through economic aid, arms sales, technical and military assistance, training programmes and the like over the period of twenty-five years since their inception, and, if possible, to see what Communist behaviour reflects of intentions. Areas of major pressure are identified, policies analysed and quality of aid and arms surveyed. The aim of the 1980 report is not only to detect short-term trends, but especially to pinpoint the long-term strategy, comparative size, motives, costs, effectiveness, and directions of Communist activities in LDCs.

Scope

- (ii) All penetration measures or moves have an economic facet, for even training a small gang of guerrilleros entails costs. However, this paper concentrates only on the most sizeable economic aspects of Communist penetration in LDCs and particularly those which admit of a quantitative assessment, namely:
- (a) arms supplies;
 - (b) economic aid;
 - (c) military advisers and economic technicians in LDCs; and
 - (d) training of LDCs personnel (military, academic, professional) in Communist countries.

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- (iii) Trade with LDCs is not dealt with in depth, unless it is particularly beneficial - e.g. by containing a subsidy element - or it involves the defence sector. At any rate, arms and aid represent about three-quarters of Soviet exports to LDCs(1), and therefore in analysing these two items the major part of trade is implicitly considered. Items (a) and (b) above will be dealt with separately in the following pages, whilst personnel and training programmes (Items (c) and (d)) will be consolidated in one section.
- (iv) The first part of the paper covers the subject verbally whilst the second part, formed by three Annexes and collected under the common heading of "Statistical Material", contains the quantitative information contributed by Allied experts or derived from Soviet and East European open sources, mainly national yearbooks. Country by country data will be found in the appropriate regional section of the Annexes.
- (v) Definitions used throughout this paper are given on page 3 of Annex I, whilst on pages 4 and 6, respectively, country coverage is defined and sources and methods are described(2). However, at this point it might be useful to draw the reader's attention to the fact that different sets of figures for arms supplies, economic aid, and Communist personnel in LDCs were presented by various Allied services, and therefore a decision was to be made as to which data should be used as main indicators of Communist penetration. For practical purposes, the experts agreed that the following figures be chosen:
- (a) UK estimates for country-by-country and total economic aid;
 - (b) German estimates for country-by-country and regional distribution of Soviet bloc arms supplies;
 - (c) US figures for total Soviet bloc and Chinese arms supplies; and
 - (d) US figure for all Communist activities relating to personnel and training, both technical and military.

(1) Arms alone currently (1979) represent 60-70% of total Soviet exports to LDCs.

(2) The sources are also exhaustively listed at pages 46 and 47 of main text.

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- (vi) "Differences arising between (b) and (c) were to be treated as "statistical discrepancies". It is to be noted, as a general rule, that US annual totals for economic aid deliveries (not adopted as main reference in the text but presented at Annex I) do not differ significantly from UK estimates. However, economic aid commitments show sizeable differences in some years. These are mainly due to the difficulty of assigning specific credits, contracted as a result of open-ended "framework agreements", to a definite year. On the other hand, arms supplies estimates vary considerably, principally as a consequence of different pricing methods followed by US and German experts. Therefore, the ensuing "statistical discrepancy" is sometimes large."

PART I - INTRODUCTION

The geo-political context

1. In the quarter century since its inception, Soviet bloc economic aid has served as an effective complement to arms supplies - the spearhead of Soviet penetration - to foster the Kremlin's interests in the Third World. However, upon an objective analysis and despite its spotty successes, Soviet economic aid reflected the limitations of the Soviet economy. As a result, it has been inadequate in quantity, generally unimpressive in quality and has often been unsuited to the needs of the recipient countries. It has left several monuments to outdated technology, to Soviet inefficiency and to the weaknesses of the Soviet economy itself. Since several years, it has undergone heavy criticism by the LDCs in various fora, and it has not been able of itself to bring a single country into the Communist orbit. Afghanistan was almost an exception, with the USSR providing far more aid than the West, but assassinations and finally military occupation were necessary to complete the work. And the Soviet Authorities may well be feeling the economic burden of supporting their own developing satellites, particularly Cuba and Vietnam. On the other hand, Soviet arms sales and the ubiquity of Soviet bloc personnel represent a massive presence in LDCs. From the quality, terms, and price viewpoints, Soviet weaponry is attractive to Third World customers, and the USSR "holds a certain leverage - as far as ammunition and spare parts go - on several LDCs. The Soviet Union has definitely established itself as a major, reliable, and fast delivering supplier. As a result, its deliveries soared from \$500 million in 1965 to \$6,615 million in 1979, supplemented by another \$595 million from Eastern Europe."

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An overview of Communist presence in LDCs

2. Soviet programmes in LDCs were launched with a \$6 million loan to Afghanistan in 1954 and \$250 million arms sales to Egypt in 1955. In 1956, Czechoslovakia was the first East European country to afford aid to an LDC (Afghanistan again), and in the same year China entered its first economic aid commitments to Egypt, Indonesia and Nepal. Communist deliveries started in 1956 and followed the progression outlined in Table 1, which shows that the real foundation of Soviet influence in LDCs is to be found in arms sales(1). Economic aid is a useful, sometimes very effective instrument for spearheading the offensive but has not proven as effective an instrument for sustaining relationships. East Europe has traditionally played a subsidiary rôle to Soviet efforts, and their aid is mostly oriented to promote trade in countries agreed by the USSR. The Chinese, in their separate and sometimes competing effort, have mounted an inexpensive, down-to-earth economic aid programme that fits the needs of the poorest LDCs.

3. In the twenty-five years since 1954, the Soviet Union has responded to aid opportunities in 76 countries. Extensions amounted to \$15.5 billion of economic aid (7.7 delivered) and \$47 billion of military aid (35.3 delivered) according to UK estimates. It may be useful to recall that the US estimates of \$18 billion of economic aid extended and \$8.0 billion delivered do not appear to convey a much different picture. The USSR has trained 69,000 LDC nationals from 100 developing countries at Soviet academic institutions, another 33,000 in technical skills, and about 46,000 in military skills. Eastern Europe has supplemented the Soviet efforts with \$7.9 billion of economic aid extensions (2.4 delivered) and \$4.3 billion of military commitments (3.4 delivered), supplying large numbers of economic and military technicians. China has offered \$4.3 million of economic aid (2.4 delivered) and only \$1.1 billion of military assistance (barely \$920 million delivered). The basic statistics as to deliveries mentioned in this paragraph are reproduced in Table 2. Again, it can be recalled that US total estimates for economic aid afforded by Eastern Europe and China show some differences - more marked than in the Soviet case - from the UK data: Eastern European aid extensions are recorded at \$10 billion (\$3.5 billion delivered) and Chinese ones at \$5 billion (\$2.7 billion delivered).

(1) In economic terms this reflects the degree of specialization of the Soviet economy in arms production.

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4. Its long-term military and economic aid programmes have enabled the USSR (with East European help) to forward important strategic, geo-political, and commercial objectives at low cost - particularly in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The aid programmes have: (a) given Moscow strategic bases; (b) established dependence on Soviet sources for military and to a lesser extent, industrial equipment; (c) earned much-needed hard currency from military hardware and technical services; (d) built up trade relations with some LDCs; and (e) penetrated the military power structures in key Third World nations. Furthermore, economic agreements increasingly feature repayment in raw materials of considerable value to the Soviet economy. All these factors may be perceived more clearly when each of the four pillars of Communist economic penetration (arms supplies, economic aid, personnel in LDCs, and training programmes in Communist countries) are analysed separately in some detail.

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Table 1

<u>Communist countries: Arms and economic aid deliveries to LDCs in retrospect. Million current \$.</u> <u>(1954-1979)</u>						
	<u>Soviet Union</u>		<u>East Europe</u>		<u>China</u>	
	<u>Arms</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Arms</u>	<u>Aid</u>	<u>Arms</u>	<u>Aid</u>
1954	-	--	-	--	-	--
1955	-	--	-	--	-	--
1956	-	12	-	--	-	2
1957	-	33	-	10	-	10
1958	-	98	-	17	-	25
1959	-	110	-	15	-	38
1960	-	107	-	17	-	42
1961	-	187	-	28	-	49
1962	-	208	-	77	-	52
1963	-	305	-	100	-	51
1964	-	345	-	92	-	49
1965	-	382	-	95	-	55
1966	500	322	50	105	75	61
1967	500	276	25	80	25	59
1968	500	344	75	93	25	56
1969	450	337	80	98	25	54
1970	995	369	75	151	30	111
1971	865	392	125	170	60	170
1972	1,215	456	75	155	80	237
1973	3,135	576	130	119	80	274
1974	2,225	683	210	139	25	221
1975	2,040	402	285	187	100	184
1976	3,085	434	330	176	100	167
1977	4,705	436	345	161	75	152
1978	5,400	462	470	155	95	137
1979	6,615	417	525	163	70	123

Notes: - = not available -- = zero Source: Annex I, table on page 14

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Table 2

<u>Communist economic relations with LDCs: Summary data</u> (\$ million)			
	<u>USSR</u>	<u>East Europe</u>	<u>China</u>
<u>Trade:</u>			
Exports in 1979	9,600	5,341(*)	2,425(*)
Imports in 1979	4,866	4,849(*)	1,525(*)
<u>Arms:</u>			
Deliveries in 1979	6,615	525	70
Deliveries 1954-1979	35,340	3,405	920
<u>Economic Aid:</u>			
Deliveries in 1979	417	163	123
Deliveries 1954-1979	7,693	2,403	2,379
<u>Personnel in LDCs(1):</u>			
Military in 1979	14,460	1,405	375
Technical in 1979	32,635	48,195	12,860
<u>Trainees from LDCs(2):</u>			
Military 1954-1979	45,585	6,345	3,150
Academic 1954-1979	68,525	48,840	1,455
Professional 1954-1979	32,760	17,475	1,080

- Notes: (1) Present in LDCs for at least one month. Personnel estimates exclude 34,315 Cuban military "advisers" and 13,610 Cuban economic technicians.
 (2) Numbers refer to persons departing for a Communist country, irrespective of training completion.
 (*) 1978

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PART II - ARMS SUPPLIES

A. SOVIET UNION

Origin of Military Assistance-(1955-1966)

5. The USSR, originally willing to supply arms to almost any LDC at low prices and on good repayment terms, parlayed its initial \$250 million Egyptian deal of 1955 into a half billion dollar a year programme by the mid-1960s. Ten years later Moscow was selling LDCs \$5 billion worth of arms annually. Soviet military aid was especially attractive to newly independent countries that hoped to modernize their outmoded colonial arms inventories. The USSR offered fast delivery, free training, maintenance services, and such financial inducements as: (a) large discounts off list prices; (b) 8-10 year deferred payments at 2 per cent interest, and (c) acceptance of local goods in repayment. At the start the Soviets took advantage of Arab-Israeli tensions, Yemen's conflict with the United Kingdom over Aden, Afghanistan's border dispute with Pakistan, the Indian-Pakistan recurrent crises, and Indonesia's territorial conflict with the Netherlands and Malaysia.

6. In addition to exploiting the large new financial returns from military sales, the Kremlin gave overriding weight to political/military considerations - as, for instance, in aiding nationalist movements in Africa and elsewhere.

7. Top priority went to Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa--initially ~~Egypt(1), Iraq and Syria,~~ and later Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen. Afghanistan has been a smaller but steady buyer since 1956, whilst India and Indonesia(2) became big buyers somewhat later.

Upward trend in military sales (1967-1973)

8. The rapid growth in Soviet arms sales in this period was stimulated by three major developments: (a) the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, which triggered unprecedented Soviet supply operations to the Arab Confrontation states; (b) the opening of Moscow's modern weapons arsenal to LDCs as a reaction to Israel's deep penetration raids of Egypt in 1970; and (c) the emphasis on raising commercial and financial returns from arms sales following the rise in oil prices in 1973/1974.

(1) The ouster from Egypt was started with Sadat's expulsion of Soviet troops in 1972 and was completed soon after the October 1973 war.

(2) The \$880 million Soviet arms programme in Indonesia ended abruptly with the abortive Communist coup in October 1965.

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9. Moscow's willingness to sell its most modern weapons set the stage for full-scale Soviet competition with Western suppliers in the lucrative Middle East arms market. Moscow no longer could be identified as a seller of last resort purveying outmoded, reconditioned equipment. The \$750 million arms deal with Egypt in 1970 provided advanced SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles (previously deployed only in the USSR and Eastern Europe) and 7,500 soldiers to man them; this is the first important example of the Soviets providing combat units to operate modern equipment in Third World countries. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Cubans sometimes acted as surrogates for the Soviets in active combat.

Escalation of Arms Supplies (1974-1979)

10. Higher prices, more complex weapons, and Arab oil wealth sent Soviet sales soaring from \$34 billion in 1974-1979, giving the USSR one-fourth of the world arms market and second rank behind the United States as a supplier. (Table 3). Price inflation drove the ruble cost of arms up 70 per cent over the six-year period, 100 per cent when prices are converted into dollars at prevailing exchange rates(1). If expressed in 1973 constant dollars, sales for 1974-1979 would be closer to \$24 billion, or almost three times the annual rate of the preceding six years.

11. Because of the October 1973 war, Syrian orders for Soviet arms tripled and Iraqi purchases were seven times as great in 1974-1979 as in 1967-1973. The Soviet policy of greatly expanding hard currency earnings from arms sales affected even politically prized customers, such as Ethiopia. Four major Arab clients (Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria) accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total sales in 1974-1979, with orders ranging from \$3.8 billion by Algeria to \$8.2 billion for Iraq. Sales to India (\$2.3 billion) and Ethiopia (\$2.1 billion)(2) together accounted for another \$4.4 billion, or nearly 15 per cent of the total, Afghanistan and Peru trailing at a distance.

(1) Therefore, the dollar value of Soviet arms trade over the last several years has been driven up by: (a) substantially higher ruble prices for Soviet equipment (about 70 per cent greater overall than in 1973); (b) the increased value of the ruble in terms of the dollar (12 per cent higher than in 1973); and (c) Moscow's willingness to supply big ticket advanced weapon systems on short notice. In the 1950s and 1960s the USSR supplied mostly post World War II types of equipment; in recent years, Moscow has been replacing the older equipment with more sophisticated weapons carrying high price tags. For example, a MiG-21 bis fighter (one of Moscow's most popular current exports) sells for \$3 million a copy, compared with \$260,000 for a MiG-17, its earlier counterpart. Comparatively speaking, by the late 1970s Soviet prices has moved up to or above Western cost levels, a factor which may have induced India, Iraq and Libya to make larger purchases from Western sources in 1977-1978.

(2) Ethiopia is the only major new arms customer since 1974.

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Table 3

	USSR: Military Agreements with Major Third World Clients				
	Million current US \$				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>1955-1959</u>	<u>1960-1966</u>	<u>1967-1973</u>	<u>1974-1979(1)</u>
<u>Total</u>	47,340	690	3,830	8,675	34,145
Iraq	9,820	130	435	1,090	8,165
Syria	8,035	205	120	1,970	5,740
Libya	6,745	-	-	125	6,610
Algeria	4,145	-	245	100	3,800
Egypt	4,130	215	945	2,950	20
India	4,070	-	825	905	2,340
Ethiopia	2,105	-	-	5	2,100
Afghanistan	1,205	125	225	150	705
Other	6,085	15	940	1,380	4,655

Note: (1) Estimates in this column do not correspond to the German figures reproduced in the tables at Annex I. See the methodological note on page 6 of the same Annex.

Source: US estimate: AC/127-D/639, p.21

12. Moscow's sales of expensive late model equipment - which sometimes pre-dated exports of this equipment to CEMA Allies - in the late 1970s included sales of (a) MiG-25 jet fighters to Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria; (b) MiG-27s to Syria; ~~(c) IL-76 transports and SA-9 surface-to-air-missile system~~ to Iraq, Libya, and Syria; and (d) T-72 tanks to Algeria, India, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

13. These advanced weapons have required more extensive training and maintenance and a larger number of Soviet bloc military technical advisers: from a few hundreds sent to Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, and Indonesia in the mid-1950s, their number had grown to nearly 3,600 by the mid-1960s and to 10,100 in 1970. After a decline in the mid-1970s, (posted in 16 LDCs) the number of Soviet bloc military advisers went up sharply again in 1979 to more than 15,800 persons. The USSR provided most of the supporting services needed for assembling equipment, training LDC personnel in use and maintenance, and advising LDC commanders.

Organization

14. Probably, arms sales policy was first defined as a means to exert influence at the 20th Party Congress (1956) (celebrated for Khrushchev's "secret" report on Stalinism). The philosophy of Soviet military assistance centred on the unique opportunity arms sales offered Moscow to infiltrate the nascent

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countries of the Third World, resentful against the colonial past of the West and widely dominated by recently born local military establishments. In the beginning, arms supplies were not a business undertaking, but a matter of political and strategic opportunities.

15. These sales, supported by the vast Soviet military-industrial complex, were co-ordinated and organized right from the start by a newly created (1957) body, the "State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations" (GKES), which is also - very significantly - the executive body for economic aid. The "Main Technical Directorate" of GKES, responsible for arms deals, is under strict military control, but the directives are dictated by the Politburo via the Council of Ministers of the USSR. GKES is an independent body and functions beside the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Armament agreements are not concluded without the participation of military agencies, and foreign trade enterprises are called in only for handling the deliveries.

The Economics of Soviet arms supplies

16. It is occasionally maintained that Soviet bloc arms sales, primarily those of the USSR, are incorporated into the medium-term and long-term economic plans. International events would have an impact on the direction of arms supplies, but not on their overall volume. However, as arms supplies primarily served political opportunistic purposes, large-scale planning of such exports is unlikely to have taken place at least until the seventies.

17. In the first years of Soviet arms sales there were apparently no plan targets. The deliveries mainly consisted of surplus and obsolete products and partly of materials which had been phased out by the armed forces or taken from the strategic reserves. If at all, plan targets probably existed only for replacements and the supply of spare parts.

18. In the early 70s Moscow stepped up arms deliveries to LDCs dramatically, thus establishing itself as a reliable supplier often of last resort. Granting favourable terms - grants, discounts, long repayment periods and low interest rates, barter transactions and occasionally debt cancellation - resulted mainly from the Soviet objective to increase its influence in the Third World.

19. However, beginning in 1979 (by which time the Soviet Union had established itself as a steady source of modern weapons) the USSR has been able to exploit the economic aspects of arms exports. Indeed by then the USSR had become a keen buyer of Western products and the sales of military hardware presented themselves as an important source of foreign exchange. As a result, arms exports have become an important calculation in SOVIET hard currency availability.

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20. Arms agreements with LDCs are now concluded at harder terms for the recipients. Hard currency is required from virtually every client irrespective of his financial position. As a result, between 1975 and 1978, Soviet foreign exchange earnings from weapons probably averaged at US \$2 billion per year, and reached \$4 billion in 1979.

21. However, in some instances, for reasons of political expediency, the USSR still grants more liberal terms, including discounts from list price and (especially in the case of India) repayment in local currency. The Soviets have almost never cancelled debts although they have agreed to rescheduling the debts of a number of LDCs.

22. Pricing flexibility, ability to make concessions on the terms of payment and preparedness to deliver without delay and in large quantities if necessary, represent the pluses of Soviet supplies and - inversely - a serious challenge to Western competitors in the Third World.

23. Purchasing arms abroad is bound to create some sort of dependency of the buyer on its supplier, not just for special weapons systems, but especially for spare parts. Therefore many countries equipped with Soviet military hardware feel compelled to continue to buy arms from the Soviet bloc. The more so as licences to produce Soviet military hardware have been granted recently to only one LDC and on only two lines of equipment(1).

Successes and Failures

24. Moscow's failures are well known. The debacles in Indonesia and Egypt, in particular, caused severe political embarrassment and economic loss to the USSR. Even so, in the case of Egypt, Moscow could take comfort in a nearly-20-year relationship that (a) had given it clout as a world power, (b) had established its bona fides in the Third World, and (c) had provided a base for spreading Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa.

25. Among the successes of the military assistance programme, Moscow can number the obtaining of (a) base rights in several countries; (b) the use of port facilities in Iraq, Syria and Ethiopia, (c) use of airports in Mali and Guinea during its venture into Angola, and (d) use of facilities in India and South Yemen (and previously in Somalia) for naval and air intelligence operations.

(1) Reference is made to Soviet authorization to India for tank and aircraft production under licence. However, this was preceded by Soviet authorization to Egypt concerning more limited spare part production.

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26. In 1975 when the USSR was denied port and repair privileges for its Mediterranean fleet in Egypt, Moscow gained access to facilities in Algeria and Tunisia (on a commercial basis). After being expelled from Red Sea naval and air reconnaissance facilities at Berbera in 1977, Moscow transferred operations to Aden and now plans to expand facilities at Assab, Ethiopia. The Aden Base supports the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron; helps the Soviets to maintain a naval presence near Western oil routes; and serves as a staging area for air reconnaissance of the Indian Ocean and for ferrying supplies to Ethiopia.

27. Moscow also has profited economically from its arms sales programme: (a) by 1970 and in every year until 1978, arms exports kept the USSR's trade with LDCs out of the red (see Annex I, table on page 14, where trade balances with and without arms are presented), (b) non-grant military deliveries accounted for at least one-third of Moscow's exports to the LDCs in 1970 and 55-60 per cent in 1974-1979 (Annex I, table on page 14), (c) Moscow has expanded its hard currency receipts from arms sales to about \$4 billion in 1979 (about 15 per cent of its total hard currency earnings), from \$1.5 billion a year in 1974-1975 and \$2 billion in 1976-1978.

28. Although LDCs sometimes have become disenchanted with heavy-handed Soviet methods, internal LDC political changes have normally been responsible for reversals in the programme. The customer list continues to grow; sales have increased as the advantages of fast delivery, low cost technical services, and access to advanced equipment have overshadowed drawbacks in the programme.

29. From time to time, Moscow has withheld vital spare parts, technical services, and ordnance to exact concessions, or punish Third World clients. In addition to the well-known Soviet denial of spares to Indonesia, Egypt and Somalia, Moscow pressured Iraq in 1975 to curb its search and destroy operations against Kurdish nationalists by withholding deliveries of ammunition and spare parts for Iraqi aircraft and ground weapons. Late in 1977-1978, it used similar measures against Syria during the incursion into Lebanon. Recently, Iraq, Libya, and India have diversified more widely their sources of arms in order to reduce dependence on the USSR.

Outlook

30. The USSR will continue to pursue an expansive weapons export policy and deliver weapons in practically all major geopolitical areas. Economic aspects of weapons exports, particularly foreign exchange earnings, will continue to play an important part although subordinate to political and strategic considerations. Due to more favourable and flexible Soviet terms, Western competitors might lose some ground.

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31. Withholding spare parts, ammunition and/or initial deliveries will, as in the past, be used to enforce the Kremlin's objectives.

32. Within the framework of the division of labour the other Soviet bloc countries will continue to be called in for the production and exports of certain weapons and, if certain political difficulties arise, may act in place of the USSR in the Third World.

B. EASTERN EUROPE

Volume and Nature

33. Whilst in the last quarter century East European economic aid deliveries to LDCs represented about one fourth of the cumulative Soviet bloc total, the corresponding arms deliveries to LDCs represented a mere 8%. The complementarity of Eastern Europe to the USSR in arms deals is even more pronounced than in economic aid. In the latter, without assuming formal control over its partners' programmes, Moscow influences the selection of targets and the timing of commitments; in arms trade, Eastern Europe's rôle is confined - more often than not - to fulfilling Soviet framework agreements, and tasking the supply to a certain country is merely a matter of "division of labour". This was apparent right from Moscow's first commitment - \$250 million of military goods to Egypt, handed out through Czechoslovakia.

~~34. The Soviet bloc as a whole follows a coherent arms supply policy, designed to support Moscow's economic, political, ideological and strategic aims. To carry out this unified policy, national programmes are co-ordinated. As a result the leeway for bilateral agreements between East European countries and LDCs is limited, and national arms-export policies have proven to be consistent with Soviet foreign policy. Thus, it is not surprising that the \$4.3 billion East European military agreements in the last 25 years have been directed largely to major Soviet clients(1).~~

Organization

35. In the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries armament transactions with third countries fall within the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defence; here too, bodies of the foreign trade ministries are concerned only with the actual delivery of the weapons. In the case of all arms exports the "Supreme Command of the Warsaw Pact" and CMEA departments have co-ordinating functions. Needless to say, private arms trade is not possible in the Soviet bloc countries.

(1) The \$47.3 billion extended by the USSR were directed to 53 clients, with 85% going to 8 key target LDCs, as shown in table 3 above.

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36. In the future East European arms supplies will follow the pattern of Soviet sales, largely because their arms are either of Soviet design or complement them. The supplementary rôle of Eastern Europe will continue to be reflected in a 5-10% share in total bloc deals.

C. CHINAVolume

37. China is a minor supplier of arms to LDCs, to the tune of \$60-100 million per annum. Peking's extensions in a quarter century totalled \$1.1 billion, mostly to Pakistan and selected African nations. Unlike economic aid, Chinese arms deals are no real challenge to the Soviet bloc, although they help to consolidate China's influence in LDCs.

Outlook

38. Despite its new, more aggressive, arms sales policy, given the backward state of the country's armament industry, which heavily relies on the production of outdated Soviet models, China is unlikely to play a relevant rôle - at least in quantitative terms - on the world's arms market.

PART III - ECONOMIC AIDA. SOVIET UNIONOrigins

39. Soviet economic aid started with an offer to Afghanistan in 1954, closely followed by offers to Egypt, India, Indonesia and Syria. During the Stalinist era it was an ideological dictum that economic aid was the conscience money paid by the Colonialist powers to their former colonies in some compensation for previous exploitation, and this is still repeated when comparisons with Western aid are made by, for example, the LDC representatives at the Manila meeting of UNCTAD V in May 1979.

40. At the end of the Stalinist period, Soviet leaders became convinced that an economic aid programme could be an important instrument in extending Soviet political and economic influence, and also a way of gaining strategic advantages. On the other hand, Soviet trade with the LDCs in 1954 was only 4% of its total foreign trade, and also was in considerable deficit (Annex I, table on page 14); and it would have been clear that an economic aid programme would increase exports to these countries, and their repayments would provide the USSR with some of the raw materials and reduce Soviet hard currency commitments.

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Organization

41. By 1957 the Soviet Union had set up the State Committee for Economic Relations (with non-Communist developing countries), the GKES(1). It is responsible directly to the Council of Ministers, and its Chairman (since 1958 Skachkov) has ministerial rank. However, the GKES does not make such political decisions as the countries to receive aid or the global amount of aid to be extended or disbursed. Its main function is to administer the programme - to negotiate the agreements and contracts and to implement the projects.

Recipient Countries

42. Basically the USSR started giving economic aid for three reasons although there is some overlap. Primarily the effort was made to use economic means to neutralize all the LDCs on or near the Soviet frontier, and from the early days considerable aid was offered to Syria, Iraq, India and Afghanistan; the results have been mixed, with both failures and successes. The second series of aid recipients could be termed the opportunistic group - Egypt, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, PDRY falling out with the West; and India depending heavily on Western aid but wishing to show its non-aligned position. The third reason has been economic: Guinea was known to have bauxite seriously deficient in the USSR; the aid offers (albeit little taken up) to Argentina and Brazil were made in an effort to redress the trade balance(2) and the latest open-ended extension of up to \$2,000 million to Morocco is aimed at its phosphates although the international politics of the two countries in that area are widely divergent. Although fifty-one LDCs have received Soviet economic aid since 1954(3), in only 17 of these is the Soviet Union at present active; and of the considerable aid offered to the Latin American countries only a little over one-fifth has been drawn - here clearly the competition with the terms and quality of US aid is generally too strong, and these countries prefer payment for their exports in hard currency rather than East European industry.

- (1) In January 1979 the Scientific Research Institute was established to function as a special research arm of GKES to look at aid problems. The 120 member staff will study Soviet economic aid programmes in 10-12 of the largest recipient countries and will assess new aid opportunities, especially in the energy and metallurgical fields. The staff is also tasked with improving the methodology for evaluating progress in the aid programme.
- (2) It has to be noted that Latin America's credits are for the most part included in trade agreements providing general lines for expanding trade that may or may not be used. In cases where the credits are for specific items, the drawdown is more assured.
- (3) According to our record, contained in the "Country Distribution" section of Annex I, the recipients were located as follows: 21 in Sub-Saharan Africa (Annex I, page 20); 5 in North Africa (page 27); 7 in the Middle East (page 27); 10 in South and East Asia (page 34); and 8 in the Americas (page 41). This counting excludes, of course, Communist Developing Countries (Annex II, page 4) i.e. another six recipients after subtracting Kampuchea and Laos to avoid double counting.

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Forms of Aid

43. Up to the end of the 1960s Soviet aid in the larger developing countries (Egypt, India, Iran) took the form of the export of large industrial projects: the Aswan High Dam; steel-works in Bhilai and Bokaro in India, Isfahan in Iran and Helwan in Egypt; power stations, aluminium and heavy engineering plants and so on. Such exports were well within the capability of the USSR to provide, and although the economics of building such plants from the recipient countries' point of view may have been controversial, they were not too badly out of step with Western standards.

44. By the 1970s, however, most of these countries were becoming saturated with such capital industry, and although its construction reached a peak in 1974 few such projects are now contemplated - apart from some extensions of existing plants. Note, however, that funding for heavy industrial aid projects was recently provided to India, Morocco, and Algeria. The larger projects planned by the USSR are now aimed at a more valuable economic return: already by 1975 Guinea was beginning to provide a large proportion of Soviet bauxite imports from the Kindiya mine developed entirely by the USSR; a plant is to be built in India for producing alumina for export to USSR; and a \$2,000 million loan to Morocco is for the exploitation of phosphate deposits complete with the infrastructure of road, rail and port development to satisfy the Soviet bloc's growing needs for fertilizers.

45. As far as the poorer and smaller LDCs are concerned, the USSR has little to offer them as a whole; such countries basically need hard currency and often food, and these are two commodities which the USSR can ill afford. Cuba has been a heavy drain on the Soviet economy, and Vietnam is now becoming one; the fear of extending this responsibility would inhibit too close economic involvement in other LDCs, and indeed could affect the extent of future economic involvement in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sends its advisers and technical experts, normally at considerable direct cost to the host country; it is believed that Afghanistan alone pays for its Soviet advisers out of aid funds.

Aid Terms

46. Soviet aid terms have frequently been published; one of the most typical was the Soviet-Tanzanian agreement of 1966, which allowed for interest at 2½% payable at the beginning of the first year after delivery, and capital repayment over 12 years payable from 12 months after delivery. Other agreements have carried interest rates of 3%, and repayment periods have varied

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between 10-15 years, giving an average grant element (making certain assumptions on grace periods at discount rates) of about 36%. Repayment mostly takes place in goods or occasionally in soft currency.

Levels of Aid

47. The level of Soviet aid extensions has fluctuated very considerably (Annex I, table on page 10). Until recently such extensions were tied to the cost of specific projects which were usually completed, albeit some years later (it has been calculated that Soviet aid extensions are drawn on average nearly 8 years later). Unused portions of such aid lapsed; although they may on occasion have been revived for other projects. Recent extensions, however, have included open-ended credits in which named projects may be completed under them but others may never see the light of day and the original global extension does not necessarily lapse. As a proportion of total past credits, total drawings on Soviet aid peaked in 1974 at 56%, but by 1979 had fallen to its more normal level of about 50% because of larger than usual new commitments made in 1975 and 1978 on which drawdowns could hardly have begun.

48. The absolute level of gross Soviet economic aid disbursement reached a peak of \$382 million in 1965 which it did not regain until 1971 (Annex I, table on page 10); it climbed steadily to a new peak of nearly \$700 million in 1974, but since then it has stagnated at its present level of about \$400-500 million, and in volume terms has decreased every year since 1974. Net transfers (gross deliveries less repayment and interest flows) have fallen from their peak of \$285 million in 1965 to their present level of minus \$30 million. When considered as a proportion of Soviet exports to LDCs, gross Soviet aid has fallen from its peak of over one-third in the early 1960s to a level of around 5% in 1979 and in the same year LDC repayments and interests represented some 9-10% of their exports to the USSR. However, in computing aid as a percentage of identified trade, a disbursement figure may be used of \$575 million.

Aid and trade

49. The Soviet economic aid programme can be said to have contributed considerably towards one of its original objectives, the increase in Soviet exports. The table on page 14 of Annex I shows the rise of Soviet trade with LDCs in the period 1954-1979. However, it should be noted that Soviet global statistics for trade with the LDCs, reproduced in the mentioned

table after conversion into US \$, are thought to incorporate most of Soviet arms sales as well as some other variants, neither of which are specified in trade-by-country figures.

B. EAST EUROPE

Origins

50. East European aid started immediately after that of the USSR; Czechoslovakia signed an aid agreement with Afghanistan in 1955; in 1956 the GDR offered aid to Indonesia; in 1958 Poland offered aid to Argentina and Indonesia, and Romania to India; in 1959 Hungary extended aid to Guinea and finally Bulgaria offered her first aid to Indonesia in 1961. In all these cases the donors were following in the Soviet footsteps, although recipient countries were selected according to their needs for the exportable surplus of the individual donor.

Recipient countries

51. As for the Soviet Union, the main East European exportable surplus is in capital industry(1), and such exports are normally appropriate only in the few populous developing countries that are already on the road to industrial development and are satisfied with communist industrial standards. East European aid is more evenly spread than Soviet aid - to 42 countries, of which 26 were drawing aid in 1979. A large proportion of aid credit offers to Latin American countries are commercial in nature and have not been taken up - barely 20% of the aid offered was drawn; this is another clear example of the inability of Soviet bloc industry to match Western standards.

52. There are a few notable points in the division of the LDCs among the East European countries. All 6 have given aid to Syria, Egypt, Ghana and Indonesia; but of the other main recipients of East European aid, India and Iran have had none from East Germany alone, and only Poland and Romania to Morocco (and Romania no longer operates there). (According to US sources, however, India and Iran have received East German credits; all East European countries have provided credits to Morocco; and Romania is still active in Morocco). In addition, although total Soviet aid extensions are more than double East European offers, they are almost exactly equal to East European offers in the cases of Syria, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Iran. Finally,

(1) Excluding arms. When they are brought into the analysis, the Soviet Union turns out to be specialized in exporting arms to LDCs more than anything else (55-60% of exports to LDCs in 1974-1979) whilst arms have always been below 10% of East European exports to LDCs. (Annex I, table on page 14).

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there have been concerted aid efforts on certain countries at certain periods: Indonesia and Chile, for example, and Iran has had a long sustained aid effort by all the East European countries. This does suggest some agreement among the CMEA countries, particularly in more recent times, to concentrate their aid rather than spread it too thinly over the ground.

Joint Companies

53. Another phenomenon, (dating back to the mid-1960s), of East European economic penetration has been the formation of joint stock companies with the developing countries into which the East European country concerned invests a share of the initial capital - usually in the form of equipment or expertise. There are already well over a hundred of these companies, which normally operate in areas where the East European partner requires the product - whether raw materials or industrial output; they cannot, however, be quantified in aid terms.

Bulgaria(1)

54. Bulgaria is the least active of the East European countries as regards aid, with total offers of some \$535 million and disbursements of about \$140 million. Her aid has been very widely spread in small doses, going to 25 countries with average extension to each of only about \$21 million. The principal aid partners have been Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and Iran, and the favourite form of aid food processing, agriculture and fisheries.

Czechoslovakia

55. Czechoslovak aid offers total about \$2,600 million, and disbursements about \$700 million. Czechoslovakia is by far the largest donor of East European aid (accounting for 30%); its aid has gone to 30 countries with an average extension of about \$90 million each. Its principal partners have been India, Egypt, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Its aid has included power stations and a wide variety of medium and light industrial plants - cement plants, car factories, sugar mills, textile and shoe plants and so on.

German Democratic Republic

56. East Germany has extended about \$1,020 million, of which about \$400 million has been disbursed. Because of its specialization in heavy and electrical engineering its exports

(1) The data relating to each Eastern European country reported in the following six paragraphs are UK estimates. According to the US records, Eastern European cumulative commitments in the 25 years under review were as follows: East Germany \$2.2 billion; Hungary \$1.1 billion; Poland \$1.36 billion; and Romania \$2.35 billion. For the significance of discrepancies, see page 6 (v) and (vi).

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have a poor market in most of the less developed countries and now that they are saturated with such industries East German aid is falling off. It has gone to only 20 countries, with an average extension of \$50 million to each. The GDR's principal customers have been Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and Syria, and aid has been mainly in the electrical and electronic fields. More recently the GDR has been providing communications equipment for the use of police in some black African countries.

Hungary

57. Hungary has also been little engaged in aid. It has offered a total of about \$750 million, of which \$280 million have been drawn largely for alumina and aluminium plants in which Hungary specializes. Its aid has gone to 20 countries with an average extension of about \$38 million to each. Its principal partners have been Iraq, Algeria, India and Syria.

Poland

58. Poland was a major contributor to East Europe's aid programme, but its share of the total not surprisingly has fallen from 22% up to the end of the 1960s to only 13% now. Its total aid offers amount to \$1,094 million, and its disbursements \$395 million. 24 countries have drawn Polish aid from average extensions of about \$46 million each. Its principal partners have been Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Algeria and India, and Poland has marked up one of the rare successes in Latin America with a considerable aid programme in Brazil. Much of Polish aid has been in the field of coalmining in which it specializes, but this obviously only rarely has application in the developing countries and Polish aid has spread over such areas as agriculture, shipping, mineral exploitation, sawmills, and sugar plants.

Romania

59. Romania's aid programme has been very large for the size of its economy, with extensions amounting to \$1,800 million and drawings \$480 million. Its aid has gone to 25 countries with an average extension of about \$74 million to each. A quarter of its aid disbursement has gone to Syria, where it built the Baniyas oil refinery and has built a phosphate plant and grain silo. Its other main customers have been Iran, Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Romania's expertise has wider application among the LDCs than that of the other European countries in that it specializes in geological surveys and mineral exploitation, and in the more developed countries it has been able to provide up-to-date oil refineries and chemical works.

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Levels of Aid

60. The range of East European aid commitments has not been so wide as for Soviet commitments. For non-European LDCs, the range in the 1970s has remained between \$181 million and \$889 million - although in 1979 it is estimated to have fallen to about \$10 million(1). As is shown in the table on page 10 of Annex I, gross aid disbursement has been fairly steady at around \$150 million a year since 1970, although repayments have eroded the net aid down to \$4 or \$5 million during the last few years. Drawings, however, have been very poor as a proportion of extension; only 30% of East European aid offers have been disbursed, the lowest proportion being attributable to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania (26% each).

Aid and Trade

61. Like the Russians, the East European countries can point to a considerable improvement in the quantity, the share and the balance of their trade with the LDCs. All have increased the proportion of their trade with the LDCs, and all but East Germany and Hungary have very much improved the balance (Annex I, tables on pages 12, 13 and 14)(2).

C. CHINAOrigins and Principles

62. Chinese aid also started soon after Soviet aid, and its first commitments to non-communist developing countries ~~were to Egypt, Indonesia and Nepal in 1956. It has differed~~ from Soviet and East European aid in many respects: it is aimed at poorer countries in general; it is more labour intensive (e.g. roads, railways, construction); it is much more generous in its terms; and the Chinese working on the aid projects live at a similar standard to the local population, whereas the Russians and East Europeans live on a much higher level. It is based on aid principles which were first drawn up by Chou En Lai in 1964, to which they have generally adhered:

- (a) Aid should not be charity, but mutually beneficial (although the benefits to China have mainly been political).
- (b) No privileges for China.
- (c) Interest-free or low interest loans with possibilities of rescheduling (all Chinese aid is now interest-free).

- (1) The difference in estimates is substantial. The US records show \$730 million pledged by Eastern Europe in 1979 (table on Page 5 of Annex I). The large unexplained disparities in figures results from differences of information bases including coverage, rather than differences in methods of computing.
- (2) The tables mentioned contain a fresh estimate of Soviet and East European trade with LDCs derived from the respective national yearbooks, supplemented by CMEA and UN yearbooks (the latter for exchange rates).

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- (d) Help the economy of the recipient country towards independence (although this is not always directly compatible with (a) above).
- (e) Generally aimed at low capital investment with quick return.
- (f) Free replacement of unsuitable equipment.
- (g) On-the-job training of local staff to take over all management.
- (h) Acceptance by Chinese advisers of local living standards.

Organization

63. China has an administration which parallels the Soviet GKES; it was originally an Office of the State Council which was raised to a Commission in 1964 and since 1971 has become the Ministry for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries. From 1961 until the beginning of 1977 it was headed by Fang Yi, but he was replaced then by (Mrs.) Chen Muha. Cultural, technical and scientific co-operation are under the aegis of the Association of the Chinese People for Foreign Cultural Relations, and the commercial aspects are dealt with by the Commission for the Promotion of International Trade and Co-operation, while emergency relief aid is supplied by the Chinese Red Cross.

Recipient Countries

64. Half Chinese aid has gone to Sub-Saharan Africa and over half of that has gone to Tanzania and Zambia for construction of the Tan-zam Railway; but Chinese aid has been particularly suitable for the poorest LDCs, and in 1979 the Chinese were still active in 27 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the rest of Chinese aid Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have been the main beneficiaries, with considerable amounts also going to Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Mali, Guinea, Mauretania and Congo, while alone of communist countries China is still giving aid to Zaire.

Forms of Aid

65. Unlike Soviet bloc aid, which has been 90% tied to projects, over one-third of Chinese aid is in the form of commodities or for budget support, relief or simply to cover the LDCs' trade deficit with China. However, most Chinese aid is indirectly tied to projects because the commodities supplied on credit are used to generate local currency for paying the local costs of these projects, except for infrastructure. Of the projects which have been built with Chinese aid mention has already been made of the Tan-zam Railway, and China has built

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several roads - particularly in neighbouring Nepal and Pakistan - bridges, textile mills (and other light industries), buildings such as hospitals, civic centres and sports stadia and a few power stations and agricultural and irrigation schemes.

Aid Terms

66. Chinese aid terms are altogether very much more generous than Soviet bloc aid. Of total Chinese aid disbursement of \$2,379 million, 23% has been direct grant aid. Of the rest, the terms in the first few years were similar to that of the Soviet bloc at 2% or 2½% with repayments over 10-15 years, but by the 1960s interest-free loans began to predominate, and since 1962 all loans have been free of interest with maturities spread over 20-30 years including grace periods of 10-15 years, giving an average grant element of 75-85%. Taking into account the fact that direct grants have become more common recently and that China has often granted prolongation of grace periods or even debt cancellation, the average grant element at the present time is likely to be nearer the Western level of 90%. Repayment has generally been accepted in local goods.

Levels of Aid

67. Chinese commitments have been falling in recent years (Annex I, table on page 10) from a peak of \$704 million in 1970 to \$91 million in 1978. In 1979 commitments were \$135 million. An important new effort to expand its programme has recently gotten under way. Drawings have been about the same level as East European gross aid since 1970, but because of its much more generous terms, Chinese net aid transfers have surpassed either Soviet or East European aid since then. Total drawings are 55% of Chinese aid offers, somewhat better than the drawings on Soviet aid of 50% and a considerable improvement on the East European figure of 30%.

Aid and trade

68. The table on page 14 of Annex I shows how Chinese trade with the developing countries has developed since the mid-1960s. It has grown very considerably both in absolute terms - in 1978 it was four and a half times its 1965 value - and as a proportion of China's total trade. Doubtless, Peking's aid programme has helped to foster Chinese commercial penetration on Third World markets.

PART IV - COMMUNIST PERSONNEL AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES

A. MILITARY ADVISERS

Historical trends

69. Although less numerous than economic technicians (51,000, including Cuban troops, vs 108,000 in 1979), military advisers represent the most effective Communist human presence in LDCs. As shown in Table 4, the Soviet bloc has traditionally outnumbered China, which has always maintained a low profile in military deals with LDCs.

Table 4

<u>Soviet Bloc and Chinese Military Advisers in LDCs: 1965-1979</u>				
	Number of Persons(1)			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979(2)</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,730</u>	<u>10,635</u>	<u>9,425</u>	<u>16,240</u>
<u>USSR and Eastern Europe</u>	<u>3,635</u>	<u>10,125</u>	<u>8,220</u>	<u>15,865</u>
North Africa	605	1,020	1,005	2,835
Sub-Saharan Africa	400	965	1,580	3,990
East Asia	520	-	-	-
Latin America	-	-	35	110
Middle East	1,500	7,820	4,900	4,780
South Asia	610	320	700	4,150
<u>China</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>510</u>	<u>1,205</u>	<u>375</u>
Sub-Saharan Africa	70	410	1,165	305
East Asia	25	-	-	-
Middle East	-	75	-	-
South Asia	-	25	40	70

- (1) Minimum estimates of number present for one month or more. Numbers are rounded to nearest five.
 (2) See Annex I, pages 23, 30, 37 and 44 for the country distribution.

Source: US estimate, AC/127-D/639, p. 23

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70. Even excluding the Cubans, Soviet bloc personnel in 1979 was over four times its 1965 number. Its growth came to a stop in the mid-seventies, probably because of the use of Cuban surrogates in 1975. However, despite Havana's helpful hand, Soviet bloc personnel doubled between 1975 and 1979. Such an increased penetration into LDCs was favoured by more extensive training and maintenance required by the advanced weapon systems which the Soviet Union started selling to its prime clients. Indeed, Moscow proved to be willing to provide most of the supporting services needed for assembling the equipment, training local personnel in use and maintenance, and advising LDC commanders. All these services, together with the occasional availability of Cuban mercenaries, make Soviet bloc arms supplies particularly attractive.

Present situation

71. In 1979 the 14,460 Soviet and 1,405 East European advisers present in LDCs for one month or more were supplemented by 34,315 Cubans. It is to be noted, from a qualitative point of view, that the limited number of East European personnel often focussed on special services, such as the creation and operation of security and intelligence organizations, whilst the vast Cuban contingent has been used for combat (Angola and Ethiopia) and for training of local units. Only two other Communist countries besides the Soviet bloc (including Cuba) and China are regular suppliers of military instructors: North Korea and Yugoslavia. As a result, the overall picture in 1979 was as follows:

Table 5

<u>Communist military advisers present in LDCs for one month or more during 1979(1)</u>	
Soviet Union	14,460
East Europe	1,405
Cuba	34,315
Sub-total Soviet bloc	<u>50,180</u>
China	375
North Korea	500
Yugoslavia	230
TOTAL	<u>51,285</u>

Note: (1) Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

Source: US estimate, AC/127-D/639, p. 92

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72. Cubans alone made up two-thirds of the 51,300 Communist military advisers, instructors, technical personnel, and troops posted in the Third World in 1979. In the same year Soviet personnel abroad grew by one-third as Moscow beefed up the number of its technicians to Afghanistan in anticipation of its late-year invasion.

73. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for almost three-fourths of the total Communist personnel abroad, with 32,000 Cuban troops still stationed in Angola and Ethiopia. The region has a heavier concentration of technicians per dollar of equipment delivered compared with the Middle East - North Africa and South Asia because of (a) the sizeable combat contingents in Angola and Ethiopia and (b) the requirements stemming from the recent introduction of modern weapons into these two countries.

Outlook

74. The number of Soviet bloc military advisers is likely to continue to swell as a result of expanding Soviet influence, increased involvement and interventionism in LDCs, growing arms sales, and more sophisticated weapon systems consigned to Moscow's clients. Chinese and other Communist personnel, on the other hand, will play its traditionally marginal rôle on the world's military assistance scene.

B. ECONOMIC TECHNICIANSHistorical trends

75. The rapid growth of exports (both weapons and non-military commodities) from Communist countries to LDCs (Annex I, table on page) was paralleled by an expansion of Communist economic technicians on the spot, as shown in table 6. However, between 1975 and 1979, East European personnel increased at a much faster pace than trade, as those countries were selling their technical skills separately from goods deliveries, mostly to oil producing countries (22,500 to Libya, 5,500 to Algeria, 3,275 to Iraq, and 1,500 to Kuwait in 1979).

76. It is notable that Chinese personnel, contrary to the Soviet bloc was halved between 1975 and 1979. This does not reflect trade patterns, as Chinese exports to LDCs increased by an average 10.9% (1975-1978) in current terms (and around 4.4% in real terms). Such contraction is rather due to the quality of Chinese staff abroad, largely made up by common workers utilized in road and railway construction. As major projects, such as Tan-Zam, were completed and no new large scale ones were undertaken, the number of Peking's technicians sharply diminished.

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Table 6

Soviet, East European, and Chinese economic technicians in LDCs; 1960-1979					
	Number of Persons (1)				
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979(2)
<u>Total</u>	<u>6,285</u>	<u>17,720</u>	<u>23,930</u>	<u>58,330</u>	<u>93,690</u>
<u>USSR</u>	<u>4,245</u>	<u>9,285</u>	<u>10,645</u>	<u>17,975</u>	<u>32,635</u>
North Africa	-	885	2,420	3,110	7,450
Sub-Saharan Africa	300	1,735	1,585	2,995	5,640
East Asia	180	395	150	25	35
Europe	-	-	-	-	-
Latin America	5	5	30	355	340
Middle East	1,470	3,705	3,935	8,400	13,785
South Asia	2,290(1)	2,560	2,525	3,090	5,385
<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>1,080</u>	<u>4,070</u>	<u>5,215</u>	<u>14,870</u>	<u>48,195</u>
North Africa	-	1,755	2,285	9,915	30,395
Sub-Saharan Africa	190	765	755	1,235	4,800
East Asia	90	115	65	30	55
Europe	-	-	-	-	10
Latin America	65	70	150	275	255
Middle East	560	800	1,295	3,025	12,120
South Asia	175	565	665	390	560
<u>China</u>	<u>960</u>	<u>4,365</u>	<u>8,070</u>	<u>25,485</u>	<u>12,860</u>
North Africa	-	80	465	595	930
Sub-Saharan Africa	55	2,535	6,505	22,625	9,325
East Asia	190	425	100	35	160
Europe	-	-	-	70	125
Latin America	-	-	-	70	155
Middle East	700	435	745	1,310	1,135
South Asia	15	890	255	780	1,030

Notes: (1) Minimum estimates of number present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to nearest five.

(2) See Annex I, pages 23, 30, 37 and 44 for the country distribution.

Source: US estimate, AC/127-D/639, p. 35

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Present situation

77. About 108,000 Communist economic technicians were working in 78 LDCs in 1979, sustaining the overall high levels set in 1978. Out of the total, East Europeans had the largest contingent (Table 7), accounting for about 45%. A 7 per cent increase in the number of East Europeans and a 20 per cent gain in Soviet personnel in 1979 roughly offset the nearly 10,000 reduction in China's African contingent. The number of Cubans in Angola dropped by 2,000 last year, balanced by sharply increased numbers in Latin America - 1,600 teachers and doctors in Nicaragua, 600 construction workers in Jamaica, and 250 technicians of various skills in Grenada.

Table 7

<u>Communist economic technicians present in LDCs for one month or more during 1979</u>		Number of Persons(1)
Soviet Union	32,635	
East Europe	48,195	
Cuba	13,610	
Sub-total Soviet bloc	94,440	

China	12,860	
North Korea	1,055	
TOTAL	108,355	

Note: (1) Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

Source: US estimate, AC/127-D/639, p. 103

78. Nearly two-thirds of the Soviet technicians worked in Middle East and North African countries, with employment on development projects outnumbering administrative jobs three to one. In Sub-Saharan Africa almost as many Soviets were employed as teachers and doctors as on project work. On the whole, as shown in Table 8, Soviet economic personnel is concentrated in heavy industry.

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Table 8

Soviet economic technicians in LDCs by branch of activity.
Percentage values 1979

Heavy industry	40%
Teachers	19%
Power and irrigation	17%
Geologists	6%
Agriculture	5%
Doctors	5%
Other branches	8%

Source: US estimate, AC/127-D/639, p. 14.

79. As many as one-half of the Communist technicians in LDCs were under commercial contracts. These included: (a) 23,500 East Europeans and Soviets in Libya, working largely on public works and agriculture; (b) 5,500 in Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly in Angola and on an oil pipeline in Nigeria; (c) 5,500 in Iraq and Kuwait; (d) 2,350 Cubans in Iraq and Libya; and (e) several thousand Communist doctors, teachers and administrators scattered elsewhere under various contracts.

80. Soviet hard currency earnings in 1979 from hiring technical skills were probably around \$150 million and Eastern European around \$500 million. The figure for Eastern Europe is higher because of greater numbers and higher salaries. About one-half of the East Europeans (22,500) were in Libya alone in 1979. Another 11,200 worked for other oil-producing countries, while only about 16,300 Soviets worked for oil-producing nations (1,000 in Libya).

81. Chinese technical services impose the smallest drain on LDC economies because no hard currency payments are required; LDCs pay only the local subsistence costs (the equivalent of about \$1,200 a year) for housing, food and transportation. In 1979 the PRC set up the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) to sell its technical services to developed country contractors, especially for work in the Third World; the Chinese are asking \$5,400 annually for skilled labourers, and up to \$15,000 for other skilled personnel.

Outlook

82. There is no reason to predict that the number of Communist economic technicians will not continue to follow its historical growth pattern, i.e. at approximately the same pace as the current value of non-military exports to LDCs. Recent trends indicate that the increase in economic technicians is indeed slightly more rapid than that in non-military exports despite substantial reductions in Chinese personnel, as shown in Table 9. Moreover, the policy of rapidly expanding both

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Table 9

Annual average increase of non-military exports and economic technicians in LDCs - Percentage rates. 1966-1979		
	<u>Non-military exports</u>	<u>Economic Technicians</u>
1966-1970	7%	6%
1971-1975	24%	20%
1976-1979	9%	10%

Sources: Calculated from table 6 above and table on page 14 of Annex I.

exports and hired technical services to LDCs responds to an urgent need of East European countries for importing raw materials with which the Soviet Union alone is no longer in a position to supply them with any longer.

C. TRAINING PROGRAMMES

83. A summary of Communist training programmes is presented in table 10 (country-by-country details are given in Annex III, tables on pages 6-7 for academic and pages 8-9 for military training).

Table 10

	Number of persons(1)			
	<u>USSR</u>	<u>East Europe</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Personnel from LDCs trained in Communist countries.				
Military personnel				
Departures in 1955-1979	45,585	6,345	3,150	55,080
Departures in 1979	1,795	380	15	2,190
Academic students				
Departures in 1956-1979	68,525	48,840	1,455	118,820
Departures in 1979	8,010	5,805	50	13,865
Being trained, end 1979	30,970	24,025	350	55,345
Technical trainees				
Departures in 1956-1979	32,760	17,475	1,080	51,315
Departures in 1979	1,970	1,005	-	2,975

Note: (1) Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

Source: US estimates, AC/127-D/639, pp. 94-95, 106-107 and 110.

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84. The figures show that the civilian programmes involved three times more trainees over the past quarter century than the military one, with the - somewhat unexpected - exception of China, which over the period 1955-1979 trained 3,150 military staff against 1,455 students and 1,080 technical trainees.

85. Of course, a large majority of military personnel is trained in the USSR - 83% - whilst only 58% of students are sponsored by Moscow. In an historical perspective, the number of LDC students being schooled in Soviet bloc countries has grown dramatically, particularly in the period 1975-1979, whereas academic training in China has always played a minor rôle (and disappeared in the aftermath of the "cultural revolution"), as shown in table 11.

86. Soviet educational programmes have added considerable numbers to the ranks of professional and skilled workers in 100 LDCs. Returning students, however, apparently have not greatly increased Soviet influence in the countries to which they return; few seem to have changed their political persuasions after four to five years of residence in the USSR; indeed, some have become intensely anti-Communist. Only a handful of these Soviet-trained individuals have attained cabinet level status, mostly because they compete with the better trained and more numerous professionals who were educated in the West.

87. The Kremlin seems to see its educational programme for LDCs in a favourable light. It has continued to expand the number of places for LDC students (8,000 in 1979) at increasing cost (\$7,500-\$8,500 a year per student at present, compared with about \$2,000 in 1960); in most instances, the Soviets pick up the tab. About one-third of the 68,500 academic students have come from Sub-Saharan Africa; another third from the Middle East (especially Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Iran); and nearly 20 per cent from South Asia (largely Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh).

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Table 11

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<u>Academic Students from LDCs being trained in Communist Countries(1)</u> <u>at the end of given years: 1965-1979</u>				
	Number of Persons			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1979</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>15,915</u>	<u>21,415</u>	<u>28,435</u>	<u>55,345</u>
<u>USSR</u>	<u>10,435</u>	<u>12,695</u>	<u>17,920</u>	<u>30,970</u>
North Africa	170	610	1,555	1,825
Sub-Saharan Africa	4,895	6,260	8,040	12,865
East Asia	1,250	270	220	25
Europe	-	-	-	15
Latin America	935	1,640	2,190	2,860
Middle East	2,125	2,790	3,615	6,745
South Asia	1,060	1,125	2,300	6,635
<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>5,025</u>	<u>8,720</u>	<u>10,410</u>	<u>24,025</u>
North Africa	325	680	1,040	1,605
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,475	3,445	4,230	10,795
East Asia	720	375	115	10
Europe	-	-	-	10
Latin America	305	780	890	2,150
Middle East	955	2,985	3,410	6,405
South Asia	245	455	725	3,050
<u>China</u>	<u>455</u>	-	<u>105</u>	<u>350</u>
North Africa	15	-	-	35
Sub-Saharan Africa	260	-	70	205
East Asia	75	-	-	-
Europe	-	-	-	5
Latin America	-	-	10	-
Middle East	5	-	15	10
South Asia	100	-	10	95

(1) Numbers are rounded to nearest five. Most are estimates based on scholarship awards.

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PART V - CONCLUSIONS

Soviet Union

88. The fundamental objectives of Soviet policy and programmes in relation to the LDCs remained unchanged. Negation and denial of Western influence, the change of status quo situations considered detrimental to the Soviets and the eventual pre-eminence continued to be the basic Soviet aims. The fundamental constraint, the avoidance of a direct military confrontation with the United States, influences all related decisions. Probable gains are assessed constantly against potential risks.

89. Long-term advantages take precedence over the occasional humiliation of short-term setbacks. And, flexibility, rapid response and adherence to contract arrangements are manifested repeatedly by Soviet actions pertaining to arms deliveries and related services to LDCs.

90. On the other hand, in the quarter century of its economic aid programme, Moscow has recruited only a few adherents to its ideology. The Soviet programme has not been spared the difficulties plaguing most aid programmes in the Third World. In some cases important Soviet aid clients have switched allegiance to the Western camp. The Kremlin nonetheless must view the returns from its programme as satisfactory, possibly even good, in relation to cost. Economic aid has imposed a negligible drain on Soviet domestic resources even considering that aid requirements must be wedged into an already over-committed economy. Aid disbursements are running at the equivalent of about one-twentieth of 1 per cent of Soviet GNP. Furthermore, in recent years repayments have begun to exceed disbursements, creating a net inflow of resources.

91. Soviet aid provides only about 1 per cent of worldwide official development assistance to LDCs. It was never meant to compete with other aid programmes on a global scale. Rather, it was designed to compete in a few target areas, often through project assistance not available from other donors. In general, Moscow has succeeded in maximizing the impact of its comparatively small effort, for example, it has gained considerable recognition from a handful of highly visible large industrial projects, notably in India, Egypt and Syria.

92. Another important spin-off from the aid programmes has been the rapid expansion in Soviet-LDC trade. The programmes opened new markets for Soviet capital goods; machinery and equipment exports now account for one-half of Moscow's civilian

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exports to the Third World. Soviet-LDC two-way trade amounted to \$14.5 billion in 1979, compared with \$254 million in 1954; the share of LDCs in total Soviet trade rose to almost 15 per cent. Meanwhile, annual receipts from Soviet project assistance include these important commodities:

- (a) 13 billion cubic meters of natural gas transported through \$125 million of Soviet-built pipelines in Afghanistan and Iran (natural gas deliveries have recently been interrupted by the turmoil in the area).
- (b) 120-130 b/d of crude oil from Syria and Iraqi national oil industries which the USSR helped to create with \$250 million of aid.
- (c) 2.5 million tonnes of bauxite from Guinea's Kindia deposits, and alumina from a Soviet-built plant in Turkey.
- (d) 1 million tonnes of fish through joint fishing arrangements and payoffs for low-cost Soviet aid to LDC fisheries.
- (e) 1 million tonnes of steel products annually from Soviet-built Indian plants.
- (f) The prospective receipt of five million tonnes of phosphate annually under the deal with Morocco.

93. LDCs have grumbled about delays in construction, and Moscow's failure to cover local costs and to provide turnkey projects; they nonetheless continue to accept Soviet proffers of economic assistance. Most, but not all, Soviet economic programmes have managed to survive LDC political change, discontent with the progress of the programme, weaknesses in local infrastructure, and a general insufficiency of local labour skills and material resources. From some projects the time between credit extension and the beginning of deliveries has been as much as five years; in Algeria, steel plant construction dragged on for more than ten years. On the average, Soviet aid offers take 8 years to deliver.

94. The USSR has earned large amounts of hard currency from the technical services provided along with the aid programme and, more recently, from commercial contracts. In 1978-1979 these earnings soared to \$150 million a year because of the rise in salaries. LDCs were charged for administrators, teachers, doctors, technicians, and the contract workers whose skills Moscow has begun to market.

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East Europe

95. East European economic policies towards LDCs are heavily conditioned by the USSR. As far as arms sales are concerned, the satellites are little more than delivery agents for the Soviets, and economic aid has also been carried out mainly in the wake of the USSR. However, in non-military trade, East European countries have not neglected their own economic self-interest. With their growing dependence on the developing countries for raw materials - particularly oil - they seek to maximize their earnings from exports, and since the developing countries have lower quality standards than the advanced countries, the former represent more viable markets. Eastern Europe's main problem has been the poor quality of much of their exportable surplus and the competition with the West in quantity and quality - exemplified by their conspicuous failures in Latin America. Nevertheless, the table on page 14 in Annex I shows the extent to which East European trade with the LDCs has risen since the start of the aid programme and how the balance of trade has improved: much of this can be directly attributed to the East European economic aid programme and some to arms sales they carry out either with Moscow's assentment or within the framework of the "Socialist division of labour" in the production and sale of weapons.

China

96. The Chinese have not considered the economic ends of their aid so important (being much more autarkic than the East Europeans) and their aid programmes have mainly sought political benefits. These have been the cementing of relations with border countries, providing a counter to Soviet aid and showing the Third World that they understand them and their needs better than the super powers.

97. Pakistan and Nepal remain friendly to China, although in the former case the fear of India and the USSR would in any case make Pakistan look for allies; extra offers of aid have been made to countries which have had difficulties with the USSR, such as Egypt and Somalia; and the Chinese have shown themselves at comparatively little cost to understand the needs of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa much better than have the Russians or East Europeans - or indeed the Cubans.

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98. This paper has dealt with the economic relations between Communist countries and the non-Communist developing world - LDCs, as defined in Annex I, pages 3 and 4 - focussing mainly on the economic aspects of worldwide Communist penetration. The size of overall Communist aid, i.e. including Communist recipients has not been evaluated in the paper. However, this facet is not unrelated to Soviet penetration, because the comparative size and effectiveness of Communist aid influences the allegiance of each LDC, whilst aid to Communist countries represents a drain on resources which: (a) has an impact on domestic economic trends, and (b) limits the amount of resources available to non-Communist recipients. The following paragraphs will deal with Communist economic aid from this angle, with the main stress on the comparative aspects(1).

Total economic aid to developing countries

99. To assess the real contribution to development as well as the actual drain of domestic resources, total Communist aid has to be quantified and analysed. Table 12 shows that when such major aid recipients as Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia are considered, all Communist net aid was over 14% of the total in real terms during the 1970s and about 16% in 1979. Of course, the Soviet Union plays the overwhelming rôle in Communist aid and the percentage of GNP it devotes to economic assistance is comparable to that of the DAC countries of the OECD.

100. This rather flattering picture is mainly the result of Soviet pricing policy in its trade with Cuba, which grants Castro substantial subsidies. Largely because of the slump in world sugar prices after 1975, the Cubans received some \$2.5 billion of subsidies on sugar exports in 1979; another \$21 million were raised over and above the world price of nickel. Finally, Cuba was also entitled to oil price concession at even better terms than the other CMEA countries, which meant yet another \$532 million grant in 1979. "Normal" aid, in the form of a development grant of \$2.1 billion spread over five years, gave Cuba another \$400 million; thus, with rounding, Soviet price and aid were \$3.5 billion in 1979, or 25% of total Cuban GNP. In addition Soviet aid to Vietnam was worth about \$540 million, and to Laos about \$30 million on the average in the

(1) All the quantitative information we possess on Soviet bloc economic aid and arms supplies to Communist recipients is contained in Annex II. The scattered bits of information available on the corresponding Chinese assistance do not lend themselves to tabulation.

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last five years. Mongolia is a special case, for it is practically a Union's Republic and - in view of its low stage of development - is allowed to run a permanent trade deficit. If the latter is assumed to correspond to net aid deliveries, Ulan Bator has been receiving an average \$540 million a year, the same as Vietnam (with a population of 1.6 million as against 52.2 of Vietnam). Since Soviet aid terms to Communist developing countries are much more generous than to non-Communist recipients, the average grant element of Soviet aid does not look ungenerous.

Table 12

	1979		1970-1979 total in 1979 prices	
	\$ million	%	\$ million	%
Western Aid	24,351	69.4	184,000	70.8
OPEC Official Aid	5,197	14.8	38,900	15.0
Communist Aid	5,539	15.8	36,800	14.2
USSR	5,031	14.3	31,000	11.9
East Europe	424	1.2	3,500	1.3
China	84(1)	0.2	2,300(1)	0.9
GRAND TOTAL	35,087	100.0	259,700	100.0

Note: (1) ~~Excluding some aid to Communist recipients~~

Sources: Western and OPEC aid: Annex I, page 15;
Communist aid: *ibidem* for LDCs, and estimated from Annex II, pages 4 and 5, for CDCs.

101. East European aid is less distorted by the inclusion of Communist recipients. The East European countries also are expected to pay an enhanced price for Cuban sugar, and have offered some long-term trade credits, but these cannot be quantified in aid terms. East European aid to Vietnam, however, is more clearcut, with each country contributing to Vietnam's Five Year Plan from Romania's \$20 million to East Germany's \$210 million - making an average of about \$140 million for the last five years, balancing out the repayments by the non-Communist LDCs.

102. China also gave considerable aid to Vietnam in 1978, and even after the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia kept up some of its aid projects, but the level is now not likely to be as high as the \$300 million estimated for 1978.

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Economic aid to non-Communist developing countries (LDCs)

103. The \$5.5 billion economic aid handed out by Communist donors in 1979 was of little help to LDCs, which received only 2.7% of it (\$151 million) in net deliveries, as shown in Annex I, table on page 15. The Soviet Union directed barely two thirds of 1% of its aid to LDCs in 1979, and for the 1970s as a whole its share in the world's total economic aid to LDCs was just 1%. It is unlikely that the 140 LDCs in the world, which received about \$40 million net from Moscow in 1979 were much comforted by the fact that Havana alone was taking in \$3.5 billion. All the evidence we possess - and which is not contradicted by Soviet bloc sources(1) - indicates that by any standards Soviet and East European net aid is negligible; it is certainly no match for Western aid either quantitatively or as a share of the donor countries' GNP, and only China matches Western aid in grant element.

104. It can be estimated(2) also that Soviet economic aid offers take on average about 8 years to deliver, East European about 11 years and Chinese also about 8 years. In contrast, Western aid is normally committed and used each year, and there is therefore virtually no delay in deliveries.

105. A further advantage of Western aid is that a large amount is multilateral, giving the recipient country the choice of where to buy its needs, and even if bilateral there is normally a wide choice of suppliers in the donor country. In contrast however Communist aid is all bilateral, the donor country fixes the price (and the exchange rate) and there is rarely more than one supplier offered. On the other hand price overruns on Communist aided projects are rare, and when they occur (as, for example, in the case of the Tan-zam Railway) the extra costs are often written off. A distinct virtue of Communist aid is that repayment is normally permitted in goods.

(1) A direct confirmation of the consistency of the estimates offered in this paper with those held by national offices in Soviet bloc countries is given by the following passage from Neues Deutschland, the GDR leading daily, of 27th October 1979 (reported by ADN in English): "More than 70 per cent of credits totalling sixteen thousand million roubles which CMEA member countries have granted developing countries at most favourable conditions, have gone into industrial projects". At the 1979 average exchange rate of 0.65539 roubles per \$1, total CMEA extensions were therefore \$24.4 billion according to the source. The figures of aid extensions presented in Annex I of this paper are: USSR, \$15.54 b; East Europe, \$7.90 b; total, \$23.44 b. It would be vain to look for a better correspondence between Eastern and Western figures.

(2) By taking total drawings up to the end of 1979 and back-tracking to the time when cumulative extensions were at that level.

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106. Another advantage of Western aid is that it is normally made in convertible currency and therefore can be used to cover local costs. The Chinese have usually got over this problem by selling their own exports under the terms of the aid agreement within the recipient country. The Russians and East Europeans have been unwilling to do that, and all local costs have normally had to be met directly by the recipient country - including the salaries and expenses of the donor country's aid personnel. This particular aspect was severely criticised by the less developed countries at the UNCTAD meeting in Manila.

Communist aid in the LDCs' perspective

107. Owing largely to the nature and limitations of the Soviet economy, Soviet aid has been inadequate in quantity, generally unimpressive in quality and has often been unsuited to ~~the needs of the recipient countries. It has left several~~ monuments to outdated technology, to Soviet inefficiency and to the weaknesses of the Soviet economy itself. It has not been able of itself to bring a single country into the Communist orbit; Afghanistan was almost an exception, with the USSR providing far more aid than the West, but assassinations and finally military occupation were necessary to complete the work. And the Soviet Authorities may well be feeling the economic burden of supporting their own satellite DCs, particularly Cuba and Vietnam.

108. Many of the LDCs have profited from playing off ~~Communist aid against the West. In spite of the disparity,~~ LDCs may have felt that they could get more aid from the West if Communist aid was filtering in, and a few have even gone so far as to sacrifice aid for ideological reasons. India has been very much aided in her industrial development in that the bulk of her steel and heavy engineering products now come from Soviet aided plants, and the share of output which is in surplus while India's economy develops to absorb it is accepted by the USSR in repayment. In a similar way Iran's industrial development has benefited from Soviet aid when the West was debating the appropriateness of providing plants for producer goods at that stage of their development.

109. Until recently the developing countries were slow to criticise Communist aid, in contrast to their constant attacks on the inadequacy of Western aid - for which through UNCTAD and OECD they were setting targets of grant element terms and percentages of GNP. At the UNCTAD V meeting in Manila in 1979, however, they attacked the Communist countries as a whole for

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the inadequacy of their aid in quantity, quality and the terms under which it was offered. The CMEA countries did not reply with defensive statistics, but repeated the ideological formula of their never having had colonies and therefore not being responsible for compensating for former exploitation, but this excuse was not accepted by the LDCs. Thus they have shown that they are fully aware of the inadequacy of Communist aid by any standard, and that they will continue to harass the Communist countries to raise their contribution.

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LIST OF SOURCES

This list includes only the publications actually used in drafting the paper. It is by no means a complete bibliography on Communist economic relations with LDCs.

A. Papers presented to the 12-13th June meeting

AC/127-D/639

"Communist Aid Activities in the Third World, 1979 and 1954-1979, Note by the United States Delegation" (Secret). Used for overall arms sale figures, and personnel and training programmes. Accordingly, Parts II and IV of the present report are heavily dependent on this US paper.

AC/127-D/634

"Twenty-five Years of Communist Aid to the Less-Developed Countries, Note by the UK Delegation" (Confidential). All figures on economic aid and most assessments contained in Part III of the present report are derived from this UK paper.

UK Delegation

"USSR and East European Economic Aid to Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea, 1970-1979" (Unclassified). This sheet, circulated during the meeting, represents the basis for Annex II and the international comparisons of the Postscript to the present report.

AC/127-D/641

"Supply of Arms and Defence Equipment by Soviet Bloc Countries to Countries of the Third World from 1973-1979, Note by the German Delegation" (Confidential). Country-by-country arms supply figures contained in Annex I and II are derived from this paper. Differences between the sum of German estimates and the US totals in AC/127-D/639 have the nature of Statistical Discrepancies.

AC/127-D/638

"CMEA Countries and the North-South Dialogue, Note by the German Delegation" (Restricted). Background document on Soviet Bloc-LDCs trade.

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German Delegation	Speaking notes of experts (not for circulation but made available to the IS). Several segments of Part II of the present report derived from these notes, particularly the organizational set-out.
Canadian Delegation	"Soviet and East European Arms Deliveries to LDCs 1955-1980: An Interpretation of Trends" (Restricted). It relates to both strategic, political and economic penetration into the LDCs. It was mainly used in tracing the geo-political scenery contained in the Introduction to the present report.
Italian Delegation	"Libya: potentiel militaire et lieux avec le Pacte de Varsovie" (Secret). Used as a check source for deliveries to Moscow's best cash client.
French Delegation	"L'URSS en Afrique du Nord: les motivations de nouvelle approche économique" (No classification indicated). Used as check reference; "La place de l'Inde dans la strategic asiatique de l'URSS" (Confidential). A case study of one of Moscow's primary economic recipients.

B. Preceding NATO reports in this series

C-M(79)33	"Atlas of Soviet Bloc Arms Supplies to Developing Countries" (Secret).
C-M(80)4	"Communist Economic Aid and Arms Supplies to Less Developed Countries" (Secret).

C. Yearbooks

National, CMEA, and UN yearbooks from 1960 on were used in supplementing the statistical material contained in Annex I and II, particularly with respect to foreign trade and exchange rates. The World Bank Atlas, 1969 to 1979 issues, was used for data on LDC population and GNP. The Annual Economic Report of the President provided us with implicit GNP deflators used to compute real term values. Specific reference to the source is made at the bottom of each table.

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NATO SECRET

ANNEX I to
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TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)

STATISTICAL MATERIAL
(1954 to 1979 inclusive)

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METHODS AND DEFINITIONS

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ABBREVIATIONS

SOVIET BLOC The USSR and Eastern Europe as a whole.

EASTERN EUROPE Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania.

DAC Development Assistance Committee within OECD. Member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, and the United States. The DAC countries represent all the Industrialized West, except for Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and South Africa.

LDCs Less Developed Countries: all non-Communist recipients of aid.

CDCs Communist Developing Countries: all Communist recipients of aid, both in Europe and in other Continents.

DCs Developing Countries: all recipients of aid, i.e. LDCs and CDCs as a whole.

ODA Official Development Assistance (see definition of "Economic Aid").

NOTES

AREA COVERED Annexes I and III cover LDCs, i.e. all developing countries other than Communist Developing Countries. Annex II covers CDCs, i.e. Communist Developing Countries.

PERIOD COVERED 1954-1979. Soviet economic aid programs started in 1954 with a \$6 million agreement with Afghanistan. Chinese economic aid programs started in 1956 with \$57 million in loans offered to Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nepal. Soviet and Chinese military assistance to LDCs started in 1955.

MAPS The maps contained in this paper have been prepared by the NATO Graphics Service for the purpose of illustration. The denominations used and the boundaries shown do not imply any judgement on the legal status of any territory.

ERRATUM Countries are arranged in alphabetical order. However Seychelles are erroneously listed before Senegal in the section "Sub-Saharan Africa", and Morocco before Mauritania in the section "North Africa".

DEFINITIONS

ECONOMIC AID The sum of Private Grants and Official Development Assistance. The latter is defined as grants or loans: (i) undertaken by the official sector; (ii) at concessional financial terms

ARMS SUPPLIES This expression covers both agreements and deliveries of arms. Whenever data are presented, it is specified whether they refer to agreements or deliveries.

BILATERAL FLOWS Provided directly by a donor country to an LDC.

MULTILATERAL FLOWS Channelled via an international organisation active in development (e.g. UNDP).

AGREEMENT A firm obligation by a supplier to furnish assistance, specified as to volume, purpose, financial terms, and conditions.


DELIVERY Actual provision of funds or material. Inverse flows of repayments and interest are not taken into account (therefore the phrase "Gross Delivery" is often used).

DISBURSEMENT Refers to economic aid and often called "Net Delivery" or "Net Disbursement"; it is the actual provision of funds net of capital repayments on earlier loans. It represents the net capital outflow from the donor country, as well as the net capital inflow into the recipient country. Interest payments are not deducted in assessing disbursements, since they are a payment for a service, and not a capital transaction.

NET TRANSFER The net outflow of aid resources from the donor country, i.e. deliveries net of both capital and interest repayments.

GRANT ELEMENT The measure of the concessionality (softness) of a loan, as expressed by the present value of an interest rate below the market rate over the life span of a loan. Conventionally the market rate is taken as 10 per cent. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 per cent; it is 100 per cent for a grant; and it lies between these two limits for a soft loan.


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THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATION of LDCs is ADOPTED in this PAPER



* Data for these countries are included in subtotals for "Near East" and specified in the footnotes to the tables.

** No aid or arms deliveries from Communist Countries are recorded to Oceania yet.

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ANNEX I to
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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID* and ARMS SUPPLIES to LDCs: COMPARISON of ESTIMATES. Million US \$.

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID																											
Agreements	213	1049	403	939	310	376	445	205	931	784	648	569	1881	500	864	2123	206	
UK estimate	1241 ^a	291 ^a	379 ^a	476 ^a	200	1125	655	715	815	1935	980	425	3060	1720	
US estimate	
Deliveries	
UK estimate	-	-	12 ^a	33 ^a	98 ^a	110 ^a	107 ^a	187 ^a	208 ^a	305 ^a	345 ^a	382 ^a	322 ^a	276 ^a	344 ^a	337 ^a	369 ^a	392	456	576	683	402	434	436	462	417	
US estimate	-	10 ^a	20 ^a	45 ^a	150 ^a	95 ^a	90 ^a	185 ^a	245 ^a	295 ^a	400 ^a	380 ^a	335 ^a	310 ^a	310 ^a	355 ^a	390	420	430	500	705	505	465	545	485	500	
EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID																											
Agreements	14	361	565	156	186	173	521	181	501	684	591	889	386	257	1165	313	10	
UK estimate	294 ^a	132 ^a	220 ^a	403 ^a	195	485	920	605	820	510	800	405	1575	730	
US estimate	
Deliveries	
UK estimate	-	-	10	17	15	17	28	77	100	92	95	105 ^a	80 ^a	93 ^a	98 ^a	151 ^a	170	155	119	139	187	176	161	155	163		
US estimate	75 ^a	115 ^a	125 ^a	105 ^a	145	190	170	210	230	250	375	470	380	255	
CHINESE ECONOMIC AID																											
Agreements	90	328	125	127	28	56	-	704	478	580	379	300	273	103	119	91	1	
UK estimate	164 ^a	50 ^a	54 ^a	16 ^a	780	585	605	600	280	365	150	195	220	135	
US estimate	
Deliveries	
UK estimate	-	-	2	10	25	38	42	49	52	51	49	55	61 ^a	59 ^a	56 ^a	54 ^a	111 ^a	170	237	274	221	184	167	152	137	123	
US estimate	90 ^a	100 ^a	70 ^a	70 ^a	70	190	260	240	255	185	320	235	240	160	
SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES																											
Agreements	
G estimate	
US estimate	475 ^a	625 ^a	550 ^a	485 ^a	2000	1710	1845	3020	6370	3960	6030	3614	5802	4188	
Deliveries	
G estimate	
US estimate	550 ^a	525 ^a	575 ^a	530 ^a	1070	990	1290	3265	2435	2325	2017	2541	2156	1882	
Dollar deflator (1979 = 100)	3608	3686	3802	3930	3993	4081	4151	4188	4265	4327	4395	4492	4640	4777	4991	5242	5522	5804	6045	6395	7013	7686	8085	8560	9193	1.00	

Notes * In economic aid, UK estimates include aid to Malta and Turkey. US estimates include aid to Malta, Turkey and Greece. Extensions to Greece - totally drawn before 1979 - are reported at \$ 8 million.
 a These estimates are reproduced from CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1976 to 1979 issues.
 - = zero
 ... = not presented on an annual base in the national contributions. G estimates of arms supplies, on their hand, are only being established since 1973.

Sources G estimate: AC/127-D/641, Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
 UK estimate: AC/127-D/634, Table on page 6 for agreements and Table at Appendix A for deliveries.
 US estimate: AC/127-D/639, Table 2 for arms supplies and Table 7 for economic aid.
 Dollar deflators ("Implicit GNP Deflator"): Economic Report of the President, Washington, January, 1980, Table B-3.

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N A T O
SOURCE:

Numerical information on Communist aid and arms supplies to LDCs was received from several Allied countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to a consensus reached at the Economic Committee meeting with experts held 12th-13th June 1980, German, UK and US figures form the basis for the estimates reproduced in these Annexes, with the following qualifications.

ESTIMATES of COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID are those offered in:

AC/127-D/634: "Twenty-Five Years of Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries" (Note by the UK Delegation)

ESTIMATES of COMMUNIST ARMS SUPPLIES are those offered in both:

AC/127-D/641: "Supply of Arms and Defence Equipment by Soviet Bloc countries to the Third World from 1973 to 1979" (Note by the German Delegation); and

AC/127-D/639: "Communist Aid Activities in the Third World, 1979 and 1954-1979" (Note by the United States Delegation),

supplemented - for the years 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969 - by figures derived from:

CIA, "Handbook of Economic Statistics", 1976-1979 issues.

For the sake of reference, all the aggregative information contained in these three contributions is brought together in the above table. It is seen that, whilst estimates of economic aid deliveries in the two sources (UK and US) are largely consistent, economic aid commitments and arms supplies differ, sometimes significantly. Such discrepancies do not derive from different areas and/or types of aid covered, but rather they reflect discrepancies in timing and genuine differences in intelligence.

In the case of economic aid agreements there arise serious timing problems, for an increasing number of "framework agreements" concluded between LDCs and communist partners are followed in succeeding years by specific contracts. As a result, the pertinent year of aid extension cannot always be established univocally.

As far as arms supplies are concerned, although agreements are also subject to much more limited timing problems, the main cause of divergence in estimates lies in intelligence available to different allied services as to either quantity and/or prices of Soviet arms (for the value of supplies is determined as the sum of quantities times their respective prices).

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Differences in quantities of arms delivered depend on the information collected on the spot or otherwise. Some cargoes are noticed... some are not, by a particular national service. That is how the business of intelligence has always worked, and differences in this respect are bound to persist.

Differences in pricing Communist arms arise from our relative ignorance of their actual "price list". In the case of the Soviet Union, Western experts are convinced that there exists one, and only one, such list, although mark-ups or discounts are applied to different clients depending on trade and/or political considerations. This year the US has revised its estimate of the Soviet arms price list and the new list appears to be the best that can be done in the present conditions. Therefore, US figures for Communist arms supplies to LDCs as a whole represent the agreed estimates of annual totals.

On the other hand, German estimates of Soviet bloc arms supplies present the advantage of a country-by-country breakdown, which helps to identify the direction of Communist arms trade. Therefore, these are used whenever country and/or regional distributions are examined, keeping in mind that German estimates are not always based on Soviet actual trade prices: whenever the latter are not known, prices applied refer to the value of "comparable" weapons in the West, having regard to the age and the sophistication of supplies, as well as special mark-ups or discounts to individual customers.

The US uses a uniform, updated, actual-trade price list, without any allowance for individual increases or rebates (which are likely to balance out if only the totals are considered), and in the experts' opinion price differences (not quantities delivered) are mainly responsible for the discrepancy between US and German estimates of arms supplies to LDCs. This difference is referred to as "Statistical Discrepancy" in the appropriate tables.

As agreed by the Economic Committee during the 12th-13th June 1980 meeting with experts, estimates in Annex II, relating to Communist Developing Countries, are reproduced from the following sources (for economic aid and arms supplies respectively):

UK Delegation: "USSR and East European Economic Aid to Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea, 1970-1979" (circulated during the meeting)

AC/127-D/641: "Supply of Arms and Defence Equipment by Soviet Bloc Countries to the Third World from 1973 to 1979" (note by the German Delegation).

Finally, Annex III contains estimates of LDC personnel trained in Communist countries, reproduced from AC/127-D/639, Appendix B.

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**COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID AND ARMS SUPPLIES TO
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)**

1954 - 1979

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COMMUNIST ARMS SUPPLIES to LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. 1955-1979 totals and 1973-1979 regional distribution. Million current US dollars.

	Agreements											Deliveries											Deliveries in constant 1979 \$	
	1955-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1955-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970-79	1973-79
SOVIET BLOC																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	65	370	410	545	858	1891	1190	30	75	236	250	930	824	161	...	2921
N.Africa & Near East	5612	5735	2390	4900	970	3561	1798	4231	3055	1737	1610	1362	1081	1511	...	19508
South & East Asia	70	38	625	265	1780	350	1200	80	35	42	65	49	251	210	...	857
Americas	12	37	35	320	6	-	-	25	12	9	92	200	-	-	...	415
SUBTOTAL (G estimate)	5759	6180	3460	6030	3614	5802	4188	4366	3177	2024	2017	2541	2156	1882	...	23701
Statistical discrepancy	-2739	190	500	-135	5576	-2782	4427	-1101	-742	301	1398	2509	3714	5258	...	11550
TOTAL (US estimate)	6810	1200	1710	1845	3020	6370	3960	5895	9190	3020	8615	5900	1070	990	1290	3265	2435	2325	3415	5050	5870	7140	41029	35251
SOVIET UNION (US estimate)	5875	1150	1590	1690	2890	5735	3325	5550	8715	2465	8365	5060	995	865	1215	3135	2225	2040	3085	4705	5400	6615	37833	32530
EAST EUROPE (US estimate)	935	50	120	155	130	635	635	345	475	555	250	840	75	125	75	130	210	285	330	345	470	525	3196	2721
CHINA (US estimate)	265	65	80	80	25	90	40	145	75	135	140	210	30	60	80	80	25	100	100	75	95	70	966	675
TOTAL COMMUNIST (US estimate)	7075	1265	1790	1925	3045	6460	4000	6035	9260	3155	8750	6110	1095	1050	1365	3340	2460	2425	3520	5125	5965	7205	41995	35926

Notes ... = not available - = zero

Methodological note As customary whenever measurements are performed by different sources or observers, a statistical discrepancy arises here relating to the precise size of Soviet Bloc arms supplies to LDCs. Both German and US estimates are presented above because the former has the advantage of offering a geographic breakdown of supplies, whilst the latter is probably closer to the value of supplies in actual sale prices, following the Soviet price list as reconstructed by way of intelligence. For more details, see the Chapter "Sources and Methods" at the beginning of Annexes.

Sources G estimates: AC/127-D/641, Tables 2.1 and 2.2, pp. 5-10
US estimates: AC/127-D/639, Appendix B, Table 2, p. 88.

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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Gross and net flows. 1954-1979. Million current US dollars.

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
SOVIET UNION																											
Agreements	213	1049	403	939	310	376	445	205	931	784	648	569	1881	500	864	2123	206	
Gross deliveries	-	-	12	33	98	110	107	187	208	305	345	382	322	276	344	337	369	392	456	576	683	402	434	436	462	417	
Capital reimbursements	-	-	-	-	1	4	12	21	30	46	54	78	107	137	166	189	216	242	264	283	297	319	369	377	385	379	
Net disbursements*	-	-	12	33	97	106	95	166	178	259	291	304	215	139	178	148	153	150	192	293	386	83	65	59	77	38	
Interests	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	5	7	10	14	19	24	29	32	35	39	43	46	51	58	63	64	65	67	68	
Net transfers**	-	-	12	33	96	104	92	161	171	249	277	285	191	110	146	113	114	107	146	242	328	20	1	-6	10	-30	
EAST EUROPE																											
Agreements	14	361	565	156	186	173	521	181	501	684	591	889	386	257	1165	313 ^a	10	
Gross deliveries	-	-	10	17	15	17	28	77	100	92	95	105	80	93	98	151	170	155	119	139	187	176	161	155	163		
Capital reimbursements	-	-	-	-	1	2	4	5	7	14	22	30	38	46	53	60	67	79	92	103	110	115	121	129	134		
Net disbursements*	-	-	10	17	14	15	24	72	93	78	73	75	42	47	45	91	103	76	27	36	77	61	40	26	29		
Interests	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	2	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	13	15	17	18	19	20	21	22	24		
Net transfers**	-	-	10	17	14	14	23	71	91	74	68	69	34	38	35	80	90	61	10	18	58	41	19	4	5		
SOVIET BLOC																											
Agreements	227	1410	968	1095	496	549	966	386	1432	1468	1239	1458	2267	757	2029	2436 ^a	216	
Gross deliveries	-	-	12	43	115	125	124	215	285	405	437	477	427	356	437	435	520	562	611	695	822	589	610	597	617	580	
Capital reimbursements	-	-	-	-	1	5	14	25	35	53	68	100	137	175	212	242	276	309	343	375	400	429	484	498	514	513	
Net disbursements*	-	-	12	43	114	120	110	190	250	352	369	377	290	181	225	193	244	253	268	320	422	160	126	99	103	67	
Interests	-	-	-	-	1	2	4	6	8	12	18	24	30	37	41	45	50	56	61	68	76	82	84	86	89	92	
Net transfers**	-	-	12	43	113	118	106	184	242	340	351	353	260	144	184	148	194	197	207	252	346	78	42	13	14	-25	
CHINA																											
Agreements	90	328	125	127	28	56	-	704	478	580	379	300	273	103	119	91	1	
Gross deliveries	-	-	2	10	25	38	42	49	52	51	49	55	61	59	56	54	111	170	237	274	221	184	167	152	137	123	
Capital reimbursements	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	4	6	8	9	11	13	15	17	18	20	24	30	39	
Net disbursements*	-	-	2	10	25	38	42	49	52	51	48	54	58	55	50	46	102	159	224	259	204	166	147	128	107	84	
Interests	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Net transfers**	-	-	2	10	25	38	42	49	52	51	48	54	58	55	50	46	102	159	224	259	204	166	147	128	107	84	
TOTAL COMMUNIST																											
Agreements	317	1738	1093	1222	524	605	966	1090	1910	2048	1618	1758	2540	860	2148	2527 ^a	217	
Gross deliveries	-	-	14	53	140	163	166	264	337	456	486	532	488	415	493	489	631	732	848	969	1043	773	777	749	754	703	
Capital reimbursements	-	-	-	-	1	5	14	25	35	53	69	101	140	179	218	250	285	320	356	390	417	447	504	522	544	552	
Net disbursements*	-	-	14	53	139	158	152	239	302	403	420	431	348	236	275	239	346	412	492	579	626	326	273	227	210	151	
Interests	-	-	-	-	1	2	4	6	8	12	18	24	30	37	41	45	50	56	61	68	76	82	84	86	89	92	
Net transfers**	-	-	14	53	138	156	148	233	294	391	399	407	318	199	234	194	296	356	431	511	550	244	189	141	121	59	

Notes * Disbursements are defined as Deliveries less Capital reimbursements. This is the main concept used by international organizations to assess economic aid.
 ** Net transfers are defined as Disbursements less Interests on outstanding loans. They represent the actual drain of resources from donor countries into LDCs.
 a \$81 million subtracted for cancellation of Czech extension to India.
 - = zero
 ... = not presented on an annual basis (1954-1962 cumulative totals available as a sum of values expressed in current dollars).

Source AC/127-D/634, p. 6 and table at Appendix A. The source specifies that, unless known to be otherwise, the basis for calculation of repayments is as follows:
 a) USSR & East Europe: - Capital repayments are 1/12 of amount drawn pa for 12 years from 2nd year after delivery.
 - Interest amounts to 2 1/2% pa on balance of drawings for 12 years starting 1st year after delivery.
 b) China: Capital repayment at 1/25 of amount drawn pa for 25 years from 6th year after delivery. Interest nil.

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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION of COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to LDCs. 1954-1979. Million current US dollars.

	Agreements											Deliveries											Deliveries in constant 1979 \$	
	1954-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1954-69	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970-1979	1973-1979
SOVIET UNION																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	693	9	28	1	1	10	73	29	24	4	85	238	14	22	25	27	58	28	29	26	22	14	370	266
N.Africa & Near East	2845	121	637	242	177	140	1279	361	491	2000	97	1153	235	286	218	279	258	250	263	245	252	203	3497	2218
South & East Asia	3014	9	209	217	470	219	529	10	348	109	24	1641	116	81	99	245	349	101	118	138	165	172	2184	1671
Americas	279	66	57	324	-	200	-	100	1	10	-	34	4	3	14	25	18	23	24	27	23	28	245	209
TOTAL*	6831	205	931	784	648	569	1881	500	864	2123	206	3066	369	392	356	576	683	402	434	436	462	417	6296	4364
EAST EUROPE																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	272	10	103	55	3	83	17	3	20	120	-	63	2	4	1	2	7	13	1	2	5	7	58	46
N.Africa & Near East	1551	117	208	486	342	432	281	242	1138	128	10	318	83	102	100	81	105	123	129	116	113	116	1462	970
South & East Asia	792	14	5	25	164	114	88	12	7	59	-	398	42	35	35	21	22	30	29	29	29	29	428	234
Americas	306	40	185	118	82	260	-	-	-	6	-	48	24	29	19	15	5	21	17	14	8	11	240	115
TOTAL*	2921	181	501	684	591	889	386	257	1165	313	10	827	151	170	155	119	139	187	176	161	155	163	2188	1365
SOVIET BLOC																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	965	19	131	56	4	93	90	32	44	124	85	301	16	26	26	29	65	41	30	28	27	21	428	312
N.Africa & Near East	4396	238	845	728	519	572	1560	603	1629	2128	107	1471	318	388	318	360	363	373	392	361	365	319	4959	3188
South & East Asia	3806	23	214	242	634	333	617	22	355	168	24	2039	158	116	134	266	371	131	147	167	194	201	2612	1905
Americas	585	106	242	442	82	460	-	100	1	16	-	82	28	32	33	40	23	44	41	41	31	39	485	324
TOTAL*	9752	386	1432	1468	1239	1458	2267	757	2029	2436	216	3893	520	562	511	695	822	589	610	597	617	580	8484	5729
CHINA																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	349	451	299	192	333	185	177	54	20	29	-	166	49	72	119	134	137	109	91	73	62	43	1265	895
N.Africa & Near East	214	43	101	167	30	35	-	32	43	-	-	81	13	12	17	44	16	29	28	23	22	28	315	243
South & East Asia	743	210	36	136	16	80	85	7	56	60	-	356	49	86	87	90	68	45	46	49	46	42	883	502
Americas	-	-	42	91	-	-	11	10	-	2	1	-	-	-	14	6	-	1	2	7	7	10	62	39
TOTAL*	1306	704	478	586	379	300	273	103	119	91	1	603	111	170	237	274	221	184	167	152	137	123	2525	1639
TOTAL COMMUNIST																								
Sub-Saharan Africa	1314	470	430	247	337	279	266	85	64	153	85	467	65	99	146	163	202	150	121	101	88	65	1693	1167
N.Africa & Near East	4610	280	946	895	549	607	1560	635	1672	2128	107	1549	331	400	435	403	378	400	418	383	387	347	5274	3431
South & East Asia	4549	233	250	378	649	413	702	29	411	309	24	2395	206	201	221	356	440	176	194	215	240	243	3495	2407
Americas	585	108	284	533	82	460	11	110	1	18	1	82	28	32	47	45	23	45	42	48	39	49	547	363
GRAND TOTAL*	11058	1091	1910	2053	1617	1759	2539	859	2148	2608	217	4493	630	732	749	967	1043	771	775	747	754	704	11009	7368

Notes * Small differences with the table above arise from rounding.
- = zero

Source AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B, p 8; Table C, p. 15; Table D, p. 22; and Table A, p. 1.

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SOVIET BLOC TRADE with LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Millions of national currency (valuta) units. 1954-1979.

	USSR		BULGARIA		CZECHOSLOVAKIA		EAST GERMANY		HUNGARY		POLAND		ROMANIA	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1954	88.1	140.6	90.1	47.4
1955	127.8	176.2	175.0	128.5	245	319
1956	241.0	248.9	10.8	9.5	203.4	186.0
1957	326.6	372.6	307.9	261.2
1958	414.5	405.5	326.1	340.5	154.4-	162.0
1959	387.7	439.2	307.4	318.6	166.1-	171.2
1960	303.7	481.1	23.4	17.5	1535	1279	390.2	401.1	679	679	399	407	246.2-	253.1
1961	525.5	507.2	40.4*	29.1*	1589*	1265*	542.5	370.1	885	861	452	353	317.6-	331.7
1962	889.5	525.9	38.1*	27.9*	1642	1251*	378.3	350.1	815	951	489	439	352.1-	394.6
1963	820.7	583.8	45.1*	33.2*	1628	1448	367.3	363.5	877	1068	539	501	301.9-	331.1
1964	868.0	563.8	53.4*	39.5*	1796	1421	449.5	441.6	1003	1340	674	641	384.3-	407.7
1965	1010.4	734.1	65.2	48.1	1901	1507	581.8	524.3	1225	1331	720	876	428.7-	441.4
1966	1090.6	783.5	81.2	49.6	2202	1659	711.9	537.2	1109	1478	716	724	528.9-	587.8
1967	1207.0	698.3	97.3	72.5	1918	1489	717.9	558.8	1291	1356	761	605	931.9-	1016.8
1968	1263.1	774.0	118.2	101.2	2138	1465	682.7	549.9	1185	1357	792	759	856.5-	952.7
1969	1520.1	992.1	126.3	112.0	2375	1492	793.2	649.5	1519	1460	946	817	945.5-	1040.2
1970	1835.7	1145.6	152.0	100.9	2462	1629	807.2	794.2	1605	2083	1099	817	1104.6-	1131.8
1971	1827.2	1270.7	172.4	140.3	2891	1653	934.8	779.5	1630	1862	1097	861	1105.3-	1196.5
1972	2007.9	1350.0	179.2	146.0	2786	1869	867.2	626.8	1832	2029	1093	929	1434.0	1087.1
1973	2936.5	1738.6	230.5	159.0	2661	2336	1001.8	816.0	2078	2527	1092	1020	1760.9	1380.3
1974	3388.7	2384.0	458.4	308.9	3560	3222	1279.3	1887.8	2969	3884	2216	1673	3535.2	3127.9
1975	3310.0	2998.8	488.2	215.2	4019	2819	1530*	1720*	3136	4304	2921	2025	4984.0-	5269.5
1976	3740.1	2805.1	479.3	241.6	3934	2927	1740	2180	16293.5*	21775.7*	3036	1955	5660.5-	6077.9
1977	5336.7	2997.2	627.3	273.6	4752	4137	1990	2520	20520.3	26508.3	3458	2322	6226.4-	7714.1
1978	5714.8	2831.0	742.1	238.2	5343	3308	1860*	3170*	21000*	27000*	3391	2721	6254.0-	6787.1
1979	6291.5	3189.3	879.2	254.4	5445	3750	3720	4051

Sources: USSR: *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR 1918-1966*, pp. 62-63 for the period 1954-1965; 1966-1978: *Idem*, annual issues, Table III; 1979: *Idem*, monthly issue, March, 1979. BULGARIA: 1956: *Statisticheski Godishnik na NR Bulgaria 1970*, p. 324; 1960, 1965 and 1970-1978: *Idem*, 1979 issue, p. 376; 1979: *Statisticheski Spravochnik 1980*, p. 163. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: *Statistická Ročenka CSSR 1970*, p. 410 for 1960, 1963-1967; *Idem*, 1976, p. 428, for 1968-1975; *Idem*, 1979, p. ... for 1976-1978; 1979: *Statistické Přehledy 1980/61*. EAST GERMANY: 1954-1974: *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1975*, p. 263; 1975 and 1978: turnover from *Idem*, 1979, p. 232 distributed following CIA Handbook 1979, pp. 106-107 and AC/127-D/634, p. 20, respectively; 1976-1977: turnover from *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1978*, p. 232, distributed following the proportion of the ruble values from *Statisticheskiy Ezhgodnik SEV 1977*, p. 325, and *Statistical Yearbook of COMECON 1978*, p. 325, respectively. HUNGARY: 1960-1975, US \$ values in JEC, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, 1977, p. 808, reconverted into forints at the exchange rate reported in UN, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1978*, p. 578; 1976: *Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 1976*, p. 269; 1977: *Idem*, 1977 issue, p. 305; 1978: *CIA Handbook 1979*, pp. 106-107. POLAND: 1955 and 1960-1969: *Rocznik Statystyczny 1970*, p. 358; 1970-1974: *Idem*, 1975 issue, p. 343; 1975-1977: *Idem*, 1978 issue, p. 288; 1978: *Idem*, 1979 issue, p. 305; 1979: *Bank Handbony w Warszawie S.A.*, April, 1980. ROMANIA: Calculated from the following: 1958-1959: *Anuarul Statistic al RPR 1963*, pp. 399-402; 1961-1969: *Anuarul Statistic al BSR 1970*, pp. 563-567; 1971: *Idem*, 1976 issue, pp. 376-383; 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975-1978: *Idem*, 1979 issue, pp. 492-499. Minimum values are obtained by adding up trade with individual LDCs, whilst maximum values are obtained by adding all the residual (undistributed trade) to minimum values, although an unknown part of such a residual should be attributed to developed countries. (1972-1974: COMECON Yearbooks 1973-p.353, 1974-p.333, 1975-p.325, Russian ed.)

Notes: * Estimated or interpolated a. Since January, 1976, Hungary has expressed foreign trade in domestic, rather than valuta forints.

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SOVIET BLOC TRADE with LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Millions of current US dollars, 1954-1979.

	USSR		BULGARIA		CZECHOSLOVAKIA		EAST GERMANY		HUNGARY		POLAND		ROMANIA		EAST EUROPE			
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1954	97.9	156.2	21.5	11.3
1955	142.0	195.8	41.7	30.6	61.5	79.8
1956	267.8	276.6	9.2	8.1	48.4	44.3
1957	362.9	414.0	73.3	62.2
1958	460.6	450.6	26.4	21.8
1959	430.8	488.0	28.1	21.0
1960	537.4	534.6	20.0	15.0	213.2	177.6	92.9	95.5	57.8	57.8	99.8	102	41.6	23.1	525.3	±0.13%	471.0	±0.11%
1961	583.9	563.6	34.5*	24.9*	220.7*	175.7*	129.2	88.1	75.4	73.3	113	88.3	54.1	40.1	627.0	±0.24%	490.5	±0.14%
1962	988.3	584.3	32.6*	23.8*	228.1	173.8	90.1	83.4	69.4	81.0	122	110	62.2	45.3	604.5	±0.67%	517.0	±0.10%
1963	911.9	648.7	38.5*	28.4*	226.1	201.1	87.5	86.6	74.7	91.0	135	125	52.8	51.0	614.5	±0.49%	583.0	±0.26%
1964	964.4	626.4	45.6*	35.8*	249.4	197.4	107.0	105.1	85.4	114.1	169	160	66.0	49.2	722.0	±0.35%	659.5	±0.16%
1965	1122.6	815.7	55.7	41.1	264.0	209.3	138.5	124.8	106.9	113.4	180	219	72.5	59.5	818.0	±0.19%	767.0	±0.07%
1966	1211.8	870.6	69.4	42.4	305.8	230.4	169.5	127.9	94.5	125.9	179	181	93.1	57.0	911.0	±0.61%	764.5	±0.14%
1967	1341.1	775.9	83.2	62.0	266.4	206.8	170.9	133.0	110.0	115.5	190	151	162.4	62.3	983.0	±0.77%	730.5	±0.48%
1968	1403.4	860.0	101.0	86.5	296.9	203.5	162.5	130.9	100.9	115.6	198	190	150.8	81.6	1010.0	±0.86%	808.5	±1.06%
1969	1689.0	1102.3	107.9	95.7	329.9	207.2	188.9	154.6	129.4	124.4	237	204	165.5	110.0	1158.5	±0.65%	896.0	±1.51%
1970	2039.7	1272.9	129.9	86.2	341.9	226.3	192.2	189.1	136.7	177.4	275	204	186.4	129.4	1262.0	±0.20%	1012.5	±0.10%
1971	2030.2	1411.9	147.4	119.9	401.5	229.6	222.6	185.6	138.8	158.6	274	215	191.8	139.0	1376.5	±0.59%	1048.0	±0.15%
1972	2422.1	1628.5	165.9	135.2	420.2	281.9	224.1	162.0	169.5	187.7	297.0	252	259.3	196.6	1536.0	±0.04%	1215.0	±0.05%
1973	3988.4	2361.4	237.7	163.7	454.7	400.4	287.9	234.5	219.1	265.5	325.9	305.3	350.6	274.8	1875.9	±0.01%	1644.2	±0.01%
1974	4478.0	3150.6	472.6	318.5	609.3	551.9	367.6	342.5	324.6	424.6	667.0	503.6	711.3	629.4	3152.4	±0.01%	2970.5	±0.01%
1975	4588.3	4156.9	504.3	222.3	719.9	504.5	440*	494*	366.1	501.9	879.2	609.5	1031.5	725.8	3940.8	±0.74%	3058.5	±1.30%
1976	4960.9	3720.7	496.1	250.1	681.7	507.4	540	626	392.3	523.3	913.8	588.5	1180.9	1116.3	4205.0	±1.02%	3611.5	±0.39%
1977	7247.0	4064.8	661.6	288.5	848.6	738.7	572	724	501.6	646.8	1041	698.9	1402.5	1080.0	5027.5	±3.01%	4177.0	±0.85%
1978	8366.0	4141.2	824.6	264.7	985.7	610.3	534*	911*	555*	710*	1011	806.8	1430.0	1545.8	5340.5	±1.11%	4848.5	±1.35%
1979	9599.6	4866.2	980	280	1010	690	1200	1310

US \$ equals	rubles	leva	koruna	marks	forints	sloty	lei				
1954-1971	.90000	1.170	7.2000	4.200	11.740	4.0000	6.0000
1972	.82900	1.080	6.6300	3.870	10.810	3.6800	5.5300
1973	.73625	.9696	.9710	5.853	5.834	3.480	9.482	9.518	3.351	3.341	5.0226
1974	.75675	.75668	0.9700	5.843	5.838	3.480	9.148	...	3.322	...	4.9700
1975	.72140	.9678	.9681	5.583	5.588	3.480	8.565	8.575	3.322	...	4.9700
1976	.75392	.9661	.9662	5.771	5.769	3.480	41.528	41.615	3.322	...	4.9700
1977	.73640	.73736	0.9482	5.6000	...	3.480	40.912	40.982	3.322	...	4.9700
1978	.68310	.68362	0.9000	5.419	5.420	3.480	39.902	38.084	3.354	3.373	4.56
1979	.65539	0.9(p)	5.42(p)	3.237	...	4.47

Sources Trade values in national currencies as from the preceding table converted into dollars at the exchange rate quoted above. Small discrepancies arise from rounding. Figures for Romanian trade represent the mid-point estimate of the bracket offered in the preceding table. Exchange rates are the annual averages provided by each country and reported in: UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1978, pp. 1087, 311, 392, 502, 578, 895, and 920. Exchange rates for Romania in 1978 and 1979 are derived from IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1980/7. Other rates for 1979 are derived from: USSR, AC/127-D/634 (Bank of England calculations); Poland, Bank Hanlowy W Warszawie S.A., April, 1980; and assumed to be the same as in 1978 for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

Notes * Interpolated or estimated. ... = not available. *** = not applicable. (p) Preliminary.

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COMMUNIST TRADE, ARMS SUPPLIES and ECONOMIC AID to LDCs, Million US \$.

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	
SOVIET UNION																											
Exports, Total	97.9	142.0	267.8	362.9	460.6	430.8	337.4	583.9	988.3	911.9	964.4	1122.6	1211.8	1341.1	1403.4	1689.0	2039.7	2030.2	2422.1	3988.4	4478.0	4588.3	4960.9	7247.0	8366.0	9599.6	
Arms delivery	500	500	500	450	995	865	1215	3135	2225	2040	3085	4705	5400	6615	
Economic aid	-	-	12	33	98	110	107	187	208	305	345	382	522	276	344	337	369	392	456	576	683	402	434	436	462	417	
Imports	156.2	195.8	276.6	414.0	450.6	488.0	534.6	563.6	584.3	648.7	626.4	815.7	870.6	775.9	860.0	1102.3	1272.9	1411.9	1628.5	2361.4	3150.6	4156.9	3720.7	4064.8	4141.2	4866.2	
Balance, Total	-58.3	-53.8	-8.8	-51.1	10.0	-57.2	-197.1	20.3	404.0	263.2	338.0	307.0	341.2	565.2	543.4	586.8	766.8	618.3	793.6	1627.0	1327.4	431.4	1240.2	3182.2	4224.8	4733.3	
Excluding arms	-159	65	43	137	-228	-247	-421	-1508	-898	-1609	-1845	-1523	-1175	-1882	
EAST EUROPE																											
Exports, Total	525	627	604	615	722	818	911	983	1010	1159	1262	1377	1536	1876	3152	3941	4205	5028	5341	...	
Arms delivery	
Economic aid	-	-	-	10	17	15	17	28	77	100	92	95	105	80	93	80	75	170	155	119	139	187	176	161	155	163	
Imports	471	491	517	585	660	767	765	731	809	896	1013	1048	1215	1644	2971	3059	3612	4177	4849	...	
Balance, Total	54	137	88	32	65	51	147	253	202	263	250	329	321	232	182	882	594	851	492	...	
Excluding arms	97	228	127	183	175	204	246	102	-28	597	264	506	22	...	
SOVIET BLOC																											
Exports, Total	863	1211	1593	1526	1686	1491	2123	2324	2413	2848	3302	3407	3958	5864	7630	8529	9166	12275	13707	...	
Arms delivery	
Economic aid	-	-	12	43	115	125	124	215	285	405	437	477	427	356	437	435	520	562	611	695	822	589	610	597	617	580	
Imports	1006	1054	1101	1232	1286	1583	1635	1506	1669	1998	2285	2460	2844	4006	6121	7215	7332	8242	8990	...	
Balance, Total	-143	157	492	295	401	358	488	818	745	849	1016	947	1115	1859	1509	1314	1834	4033	4717	...	
Excluding arms	-62	293	170	319	-54	-43	-1175	-1406	-926	-1011	-1581	-1017	-1153	...	
CHINA																											
Exports, Total	455	510	515	500	515	455	535	615	1115	1595	1780	1705	1865	2425	...	
Arms delivery	75	25	25	25	30	60	80	80	25	100	100	75	95	70	
Economic aid	-	-	2	10	25	38	42	49	52	51	49	55	61	59	56	54	111	170	237	274	221	184	167	152	137	123	
Imports	405	385	260	230	290	300	370	625	935	1045	870	765	1385	1525	...	
Balance, Total	50	125	255	270	225	155	165	-10	180	550	910	940	480	900	...	
Excluding arms	50	230	245	200	125	105	-90	100	525	810	840	405	805	...	
TOTAL COMMUNIST																											
Exports, Total	2396	2633	2839	2913	3363	3757	3942	4573	6979	9225	10309	10871	14140	16132	...	
Arms delivery	
Economic aid	-	-	14	53	140	163	166	264	337	456	486	532	488	415	493	489	631	732	848	969	1045	773	777	749	754	703	
Imports	1988	2020	1766	1899	2288	2585	2830	3469	4941	7166	8085	8097	9627	10515	...	
Balance, Total	408	613	1073	1015	1074	1171	1112	1105	2039	2059	2224	2774	4513	5617	...	
Excluding arms	-12	523	415	519	76	62	-260	-1301	-401	-201	-746	-612	-348	...	

Notes ... = not available
- = zero

Sources Trade: Soviet Bloc: preceding table; China: CIA, Handbooks 1976-1979.
Arms deliveries: 1970-1979: AC/127-D/639, Table 2; 1966-1969: CIA Handbooks 1976-1979.
Economic aid: AC/127-D/634, Table at Appendix A.

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INTERNATIONAL BALANCE of NET AID DELIVERIES (DISBURSEMENTS)* to LDCs. Million US \$.

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970-79 total in 1979 prices	
											\$million	%
WESTERN AID (DAC)												
Official Devpt Assistance (ODA)	6786.5	7690.5	8538.2	9350.7	11302.0	13587.4	13665.5	14695.7	19982.0	22377.0		
Private Grants	857.5	912.8	1035.9	1364.5	1217.3	1341.8	1391.7	1488.7	1663.2	1974.0		
Total to Developing Countries	7644.0	8603.3	9574.1	10715.2	12519.3	14929.2	15057.2	16184.4	21645.2	24351.0		
less												
ODA to Communist Dev Coun (CDCs)	-38.6	-3.6	38.9	156.3	113.2	477.5	275.8	332.3	380.2	(400)		
equals												
(W) SUBTOTAL to LDCs**	7682.6	8606.9	9535.2	10558.9	12406.1	14451.7	14781.4	15852.1	21265.0	23951.0	181404	79.9%
OPEC OFFICIAL AID												
Official Devpt Assistance (ODA)	357.1	(500)	(600)	1307.8	3446.6	5516.9	5594.7	5846.9	4338.0	5197.1		
less												
ODA to Communist Dev Coun (CDCs)	-	-	-	-	0.5	40.0	6.1	-	-	(-)		
equals												
(O) SUBTOTAL to LDCs	357.1	(500)	(600)	1307.8	3447.1	5556.9	5600.8	5846.9	4338.0	5197.1	40365	17.8%
COMMUNIST AID to LDCs												
USSR	153	150	192	293	386	83	65	59	77	38	2241	1.0%
East Europe	91	103	76	27	36	77	61	40	26	29	841	0.4%
China	102	159	224	259	204	166	147	128	107	84	2273	1.0%
(C) SUBTOTAL to LDCs	346	412	492	579	626	326	273	227	210	151	5355	2.4%
GRAND TOTAL (W + O + C)	8386	9519	10627	12446	16479	20335	20655	21926	25813	29299	227123	100.0%

Notes * Gross deliveries less capital repayments.
** Including aid to Gibraltar, Greece, Portugal and Spain, totaling \$143.3 million in 1978.
- = zero
() = extrapolation

Sources DAC and OPEC aid: latest estimates available in OECD publications, i.e.:
OECD, Development Cooperation, 1979 Review, Paris, November, 1979;
OECD, Press Release of June 19, 1980, Resources for Developing Countries;
DAC, Chairman's Report for 1980, Restricted paper, Paris, September 15, 1980.
Communist donors: AC/127-D/654, table at Appendix A.

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
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COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION

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ECONOMIC PROFILE of SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1978)

	Year of independence	Area (000km ²)	Population (000)	GNP	
				Total (\$ million)	Per capita (\$)
Angola	1975	1245.7	6739	2000	300
Benin	1960	115.8	3326	770	230
Botswana	1966	569.8	747	460	620
Burundi	1962	28.5	4271	610	140
Cameroon	1961	475.4	8065	3700	460
Cape Verde	1975	4.0	319	50	160
Central Africa	1960	626.8	1909	480	250
Chad	1960	1284.6	4320	620	140
Comoros	1975	1.8	390	70	180
Congo	1960	349.7	1460	780	540
Djibuti	1977	23.3	320	140	450
Eq. Guinea	1968	28.0	346	110*	340*
Ethiopia	-	1178.5	31011	3640	120
Gabon	1960	264.2	539	1930	3580
Gambia	1965	10.4	570	130	230
Ghana	1957	238.3	10972	4250	390
Guinea	1958	246.1	5133	1070	210
Guinea Bissau	1974	36.3	762	160	200
Ivory Coast	1960	323.8	7836	6580	840
Kenya	1963	582.8	15187	4830	320
Lesotho	1966	30.3	1279	360	280
Liberia	1822	111.4	1742	820	460
Madagascar	1960	595.7	8298	2050	250
Malawi	1964	95.1	5780	1010	180
Nali	1960	1204.4	6297	760	120
Sudan	1956	2504.5	17390	5540	320
Mauritius	1968	1.9	918	760	830
Mozambique	1975	786.8	9945	1360	140
Niger	1960	1266.5	5005	1110	220
Nigeria	1960	924.6	81039	45720	560
Rhodesia	1980	391.1	6913	3320	480
Rwanda	1962	25.9	4514	830	180
Sao Tome	1975	1.0	85	40	490
Seychelles	1976	0.4	63	70	1060
Senegal	1960	196.8	5377	1830	340
Sierra Leone	1961	72.3	3296	690	210
Somalia	1960	637.1	3743	470	130
Swaziland	1968	17.4	526	310	590
Tanzania	1961	939.7	16871	3880	230
Togo	1960	57.0	2418	770	320
Uganda	1962	235.7	12420	3220*	260*
Upper Volta	1960	274.5	5553	870	160
Zaire	1960	2344.0	26410	5510	210
Zambia	1964	745.9	5295	2530	480
TOTAL		21093.8	335399	116210	346

* 1977

Source World Bank Atlas 1979

SECRET

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SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES to SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1973-1979. Million current US \$.



	Agreements						Deliveries						1973-79 total in constant 1979 \$			
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Agreements	Deliveries
Angola	-	(150)	250	(80)	(95)	20	(30)	-	negl	(150)	80	95	170	39	801	629
Benin	-	-	-	negl	negl	-	-	-	-	negl	-	negl	negl	-	negl	negl
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Burundi	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl	-	negl	negl
Cameroon	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	5	-	negl	negl
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	negl	-	-	-	negl	negl
Central Africa(b)	-	-	-	-	-	(6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
Chad	-	-	-	(7)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(a)	-	negl	negl	6	6
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(7)	-	negl	-	-	-
Congo	-	-	-	(20)	negl	-	negl	negl	-	negl	-	-	-	-	9	9
Djibuti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eq. Guinea	-	(5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	10	5	negl	negl	25	18
Ethiopia	-	-	negl	100	750	520	(negl)	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	-	-	-	-	-	(1000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	7
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	50	640	480	54	2566	1386	
Ghana	-	-	(100)	6	(negl)	-	-	negl	-	-	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	(10)	(15)	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea Bissau	(10)	-	-	negl	(negl)	-	-	10	-	15	negl	negl	12	8	138	negl
Ivory Coast	-	-	-	(negl)	-	-	-	8	negl	-	negl	negl	negl	8	35	56
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	13
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malawi	-	-	-	-	7	(10)	(5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	-	-	10	10	-	-	-	-	negl	negl	5	7	5	24	18	
Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	negl	5	-	-	-	-
Niger	-	25	-	7	(125)	(50)	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	18
Nigeria	-	100	-	(250)	negl	(1200)	20	-	negl	18	72	125	50	230	292	
Rhodesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	4	46	negl	negl	1777	98
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sao Tome	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seychelles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Senegal	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl	negl	negl	negl
Somalia	negl	(10)	35	20	(6)	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Sudan	-	20	negl	negl	-	-	-	40	10	46	17	negl	negl	negl	negl	negl
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92	147
Tanzania	negl	60	-	negl	-	-	-	(20)	-	negl	-	-	-	-	29	29
Togo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uganda	45	-	-	(30)	-	-	-	negl	negl	6	negl	45	(10)	negl	86	71
Upper Volta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	10	25	15	negl	5	-	-	-
Zaire	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	107	90
Zambia	-	-	-	(10)	-	(10)	(85)	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	65	370	410	545	858	1891	1190	30	75	236	250	930	824	161	6087	2921

Notes (a) French sources quote deliveries of armored vehicles and other material.
 (b) According to US and UK sources \$ 5 m were delivered in the period 1973-78.
 (c) French sources quote deliveries of vehicles and other material.
 - = zero
 negl = less than \$ 5 million
 () = unconfirmed

Sources Table: AC/127-D/641, p 5 and 8.
 Notes: C-M(80)4.

NATO SECRET

ANNEX I to
C-M(81)54

TOTAL COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	1.5	3	3	78.5	3.5	-	-	83	8	
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	3	-	4	-	2.3	-	2.5	-	2.5	-	2	45	16.5	
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	1	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.5	-	0.7	-	0.5	20	3.5	
Cameroon	7.8	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	75	0.5	-	4	-	2.5	-	0.5	-	0.9	-	1.4	-	1	80.8	14.8	
Cape Verde Is.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Central African Republic	4	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.9	-	1.1	-	0.6	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	7	3.4	
Chad	2.2	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.8	45	0.8	-	1.8	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	47.2	6.1	
Congo	34	16.3	-	2.2	-	3.4	24	2	-	2.3	2.4	3.9	10	9.5	-	5	-	6.4	-	6.7	-	2.5	70.4	60.2	
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	0.5	-	1.7	-	0.5	-	0.5	25	7.7	
ETHIOPIA	11.7	20.4	-	2.1	84	2.1	-	1.1	-	1.2	-	7.5	-	6.5	2.5	7.6	20	8.7	44.6	8.4	85	8	153.1	73.6	
GABON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.3	0.1	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.2	24.3	0.8
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	0.5	16	2
GHANA	246.1	67.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	1.7	-	2.4	-	3.7	-	2	-	2	-	1.5	246.1	80.8	
GUINEA	276.9	134.4	10	7.9	-	8.2	-	11.1	-	16.1	80	39	-	15.1	-	7.4	-	6.9	-	5.2	-	0.6	366.9	252.1	
GUINEA (BISSAU)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.2	1.3	1	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.6	0.7	-	0.1	24	4.6
IBERIA	66.8	6.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.4	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	66.8	7.4	
LIBERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	25	-	
MADAGASCAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	4	11.1	0.1	60	0.2	15	0.4	-	1.4	-	1.6	-	4.5	92.7	12.2	
MALI	382.9	124.2	-	7	-	4	-	2	-	2.3	-	4	1	1.2	-	2	-	2.1	-	2.2	-	4	185.9	197.2	
MALI (BURKINA FASO)	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	0.1	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	0.6	
MOROCCO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	-	11	0.7	-	2.1	-	2.7	-	2.5	69	8.2
NIGER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	0.1	-	2.7	-	2	-	2	-	2	50	8.8	
NIGERIA	14	-	6.7	-	28	0.4	0.7	2	-	2	-	1.2	-	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	-	49.4	7.6	
RWANDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	0.3	0.1	-	0.2	-	4.5	-	4.4	-	4.3	-	2.5	-	0.5	22.5	16.3	
SENEGAL	6.7	-	-	1	-	-	1	45	1.2	-	1	-	0.5	-	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	51.7	5.8	
SEYCHELLES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.8	-	-	-	3.8	-	
SIERRA LEONE	28	2.8	-	1	40	1.5	-	1	-	0.7	-	2.5	-	2.1	-	2.7	-	2.9	-	2.7	-	3	68	22.9	
SOMALIA	86.5	41.3	-	2.5	137	7.5	1.5	3.5	-	10.5	10	19.7	60.5	26.1	-	28.4	-	20.6	-	16.3	-	5	295.3	181.4	
SUDAN	104.2	12.5	51	1.5	116	5.4	-	3	-	12.1	-	15	3.2	9.5	-	8.2	20	5.1	-	7.6	-	6	294.4	85.9	
TANZANIA	82.4	30.6	200	30.5	-	58.5	3	75.1	-	51.2	73	13	1.5	18	27	13	20	9.1	-	7.4	-	7.2	408.9	313.6	
TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	-	-	0.3	-	1	-	0.6	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	0.6	-	0.5	46	3.7	
ZAMBIA	30.3	4.1	-	3.2	-	1.7	-	6.7	-	5	-	1.5	7	1	-	1	-	1.1	-	1	-	1	37.1	27.5	
UPPER VOLTA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.4	-	-	-	0.1	1	0.5	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	0.2	52.4	1.2	
ZAIRES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	0.6	-	4	-	2	-	4.3	-	5.1	-	2.5	-	2	100	18.7		
ZAMBIA	23.8	3.2	200	5.3	-	4.7	50	35.2	13	50.1	51	71.9	-	15.2	27	20.6	-	9.7	-	5.1	-	8.1	164.8	249	
SUB-TOTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	1517.6	466.8	469.7	65.2	430	98.6	247.2	145.5	336.9	163	278.7	201.9	265.9	149.6	85	120.8	64.2	100.6	152.5	87.6	85	64.5	3728.7	1664.1	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.

- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table A.

NATO SECRET



NATO SECRET
 SOVIET ECONOMIC AID to SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* 1954-1979. Million current \$US.

ANNEX I to
 C-M(81)54

COUNTRY	1954-1959		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979			
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings		
AFRICA - SUB-SAHARAN																								
ALGERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	1.5	3	3	5.5	5.5	-	-	-	8	8	
ANGOLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
BURUNDI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
CAMEROON	7.8	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	0.5	-	1	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.4	-	-	7.8	4	
CAPV VERDE IS.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.1	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	2	1.4	
COTE D'IVOIRE	2.2	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.8	-	0.8	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	2.2	
CUBA	8.8	5.8	-	0.4	-	0.8	-	0.5	-	0.6	-	0.5	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	8.8	8.8	
GUINEA BISSAU	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	
ETHIOPIA	100	17.3	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	1	-	1.5	-	2.5	-	3.5	85	5	185	35
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
GUINEA	99.8	32.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	99.8	33.8	
GUINEA BISSAU	182.5	72	-	2	-	5	-	10	-	14	-	36	-	10.2	-	5	-	5	-	4.5	-	182.5	163.1	
IBERIA (MOROS)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	1.2	1	1	1.2	1.2	0.6	0.6	-	4	4	
KENYA	48.7	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.4	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	48.7	4.4	
LESOTHO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
LIBERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	0.1	-	0.4	-	0.6	-	0.6	-	2.5	13	3.8
MAURITANIA	62.9	34	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	0.3	-	0.5	1	0.2	-	0.9	-	1.2	-	1.4	-	1	62.9	64.5
MAURITANUS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
MALAWI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	0.5	-	1.5	-	1.8	-	1.5	13	5.3
MALI	-	-	6.7	-	-	8.4	0.7	2	-	2	-	1	-	0.7	-	0.7	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	7.4	7.4	
MARSHALL ISLANDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	
MOROCCO	6.7	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1.2	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.7	3.7	
MYANMAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
NEPAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
NIGERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
RUANDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
RUSSIA	6.7	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1.2	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.7	3.7	
SEYCHELLES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
SIGMA LEONE	28	2.8	-	1	-	1.5	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.1	-	28	6.9	
SOMALIA	60.7	34.5	-	1.5	27	6	-	1.5	-	2	10	7.5	60.5	9.4	-	12	-	5.5	-	-	-	158.2	79.9	
SUDAN	36.2	12.5	-	1.5	-	3	-	-	-	1.2	-	1	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	36.2	21.9	
TANZANIA	19.8	0.5	-	0.5	-	8.5	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	1	-	2.1	-	1.9	80	1	-	3.2	-	3	19.8	16.2
TIBET	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TUNISIA	15.5	1	-	3	-	1.5	-	6.5	-	1	-	0.5	7	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.6	-	0.5	-	0.5	22.5	19.1
UPPER VOLTA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
YEMEN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
ZAMBIA	7	7.7	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	0.6	-	0.3	7	7
SUB-TOTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	692.6	8.1	8.7	14.1	28	27.2	0.7	75.1	0.5	27.1	10	57.8	72.7	27.9	28.5	28.6	24.2	26.1	4.1	21.5	85	14.1	955	302.6

NATO SECRET

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
 - = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B.

NATO SECRET

EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID to SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*. 1954-1979. Millions current \$US.

COUNTRY	1954-1959		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings
AFRICA - SUB-SAHARAN																								
ANGOLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BENIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BURUNDI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CAMEROON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CAPE VERDE IS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.1	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
CHAD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CONGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	0.4	10	0.9	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	0.4	12.4	2.7	-
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ETHIOPIA	1.7	3.1	-	2	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	0.5	2.5	0.1	20	0.1	44.6	0.9	-	1	84.1	13.7
GABON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GHANA	108.3	28.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	1.7	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	108.3	31.5
GUINEA	31.4	19.4	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	80	1	-	4.4	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.1	111.4	25.4	
GUINEA (BISSAU)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KENYA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LIBERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MADAGASCAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALI	22	5.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	5.2
MAURITIUS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MOZAMBIQUE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NIGER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NIGERIA	14	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	0.7
SENEGAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SEYCHELLES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SIERRA LEONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SOMALIA	4.2	2	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	5.7	3.5
SUDAN	68	-	10	-	75	2.3	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	1	3.2	0.2	-	0.1	-	-	-	3.2	-	2.4	156.2	9.9
TANZANIA	6.8	4.1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3.3	2.9	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	0.2	13.3	7.6	
TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UGANDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UPPER VOLTA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ZAIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ZAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	3	-	-	1.9	-	1.2	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	-	3	51	6
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	271.7	62.6	10	2	103	4.4	54.3	1.4	3	2	83.4	7.1	16.7	12.5	2.3	1.4	20	1.6	199.6	4.6	-	7.1	684.4	106.7

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B.

NATO SECRET

CHINESE ECONOMIC AID to SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings	Extensi- ons	Draw- ings
ANGOLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BEKIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	4	-	2.3	-	2.5	-	2.5	-	2	45	16.5	-	-
BURUNDI	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	1	-	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.5	-	0.7	-	0.5	20	5.5	-
CAMEROON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CAPE VERDE Is.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHAD	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	-	4	3
COMO	25.2	10.5	-	2	2.6	24	1.5	1.7	-	3	-	8.3	-	4.6	-	6	-	6.5	-	2	49.2	46.7	-	-
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	0.5	-	1.7	-	0.5	-	0.5	24	7.7	-
ETHIOPIA	-	-	-	84	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	-	1.5	-	5	-	6	-	6.1	-	4	-	2	84	24.9	-
GABON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.5	0.1	-	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	0.2	24.5	0.8	-	-
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	0.2	-	0.3	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	16	2	-
GHANA	42	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.5	-	0.6	-	3.4	-	1.5	-	1.8	-	1.5	42	15.5	-
GUINEA	51	43	10	5.9	3.1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	0.7	-	2.4	-	1.8	-	0.6	-	0.5	63	63	-
GUINEA (BISSAU)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	0.1	-	0.1	20	0.6	-
IBERIA	18.1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.1	3	-
LIBERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	25	-	-
MADAGASCAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	4	11.3	0.1	60	0.2	-	0.3	-	1	-	1	-	2	79.3	8.6	-
MALI	98	65	5	2	-	-	-	2	-	3.5	-	-	-	1.1	-	1.1	-	0.8	-	3	98	87.5	-	
MALITVIA	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	0.6	-	-
MORITANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56	-	-	0.2	-	0.8	-	0.9	-	1	56	2.9	-
MOZAMBIQUE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	0.1	-	2.7	-	2	-	2	30	8.8	-	-
NIGERIA	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	4.5	-	4.4	-	4.3	-	2.5	-	0.5	22	16.5	-
SENEGAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.4	-	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.2	45	2.1	-	-
SIERRA LEONE	-	-	-	40	-	-	0.5	-	0.7	-	2	-	2	-	2.5	-	2.7	-	2.6	-	3	40	16	-
SOMALIA	21.6	4.8	1	110	1.5	-	2	-	8	-	12	-	16.1	-	16.1	-	15	-	16.5	-	5	151.6	98	-
SUDAN	-	41	-	41	0.1	-	2.7	-	10.5	-	11	-	9	-	8	20	5	-	4.5	-	3.5	102	59.1	-
TANZANIA	55.8	26	200	30	58	-	75	-	51	73	12	-	13	27	11	-	6	-	4	-	4	355.8	280	-
TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	0.3	-	1	-	0.6	-	0.3	-	0.4	-	0.6	-	0.5	16	5.7	-
UGANDA	14.8	3.3	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.2	-	1	-	1	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	14.8	8.4	-
UPPER VOLTA	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.4	-	-	0.1	-	0.7	-	-	0.4	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.2	52.4	1.2	-
ZAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	0.6	-	4	-	2	-	4.3	-	3.1	-	2.5	-	2	100	48.7	-	-
ZAMBIA	16.8	2.5	200	5	4.5	-	35	10	30	31	70	-	31	27	18.5	-	8	-	4.5	-	5	304.8	236	-
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	349.1	166.1	451	49.1	299	72	192	119	311.4	351.9	385.1	317	176.5	309.2	54	90.8	20	72.9	28.8	61.5	-	42.1	2089.3	1094.8

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* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979. - = zero

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table D.

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ANNEX I to
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COMMUNIST TECHNICIANS in SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Number of persons present for one month or more during 1979.



	COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS							COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS						
	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Subtotal	Soviet Bloc			North Korea	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Subtotal	Soviet Bloc			North Korea	Yugo slavia	
			USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China			USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba*	China		
Angola	9270	9260	500	2260	6500	10	20420	20400	1000	400	19000	-	-	20
Benin	225	25	5	-	20	200	30	30	10	-	20	-	-	-
Botswana	10	-	-	-	-	10	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
Burundi	450	50	15	35	-	350	15	5	5	-	-	-	10	-
Cameroon	730	20	15	5	-	700	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cape Verde	40	35	25	-	10	5	70	70	50	15	5	-	-	-
Central Africa	430	250	210	40	-	180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chad	20	10	10	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Congo	1680	1180	850	80	250	500	375	375	50	25	300	-	-	-
Djibuti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eq. Guinea	400	250	250	-	-	150	380	240	40	-	200	100	40	-
Ethiopia	2250	1950	1000	500	450	300	14275	14250	1000	250	13000	-	-	25
Gabon	70	20	-	20	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gambia	105	20	-	20	-	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	195	75	15	60	-	120	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea	1070	845	350	295	200	225	135	135	45	40	50	-	-	-
Guinea Bissau	140	90	40	10	40	50	110	110	50	10	50	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	20	20	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Liberia	105	5	-	5	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	495	135	70	40	25	235	120	45	30	-	15	-	75	-
Malawi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	885	485	460	25	-	400	185	180	180	-	-	5	-	-
Mauritius	15	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique	1510	1400	350	450	600	100	755	740	475	50	215	15	-	-
Niger	190	15	10	5	-	175	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	1865	1735	1250	475	10	100	55	55	55	-	-	-	-	-
Rhodesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rwanda	55	15	15	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sao Tome	315	215	10	5	200	100	50	50	-	-	50	-	-	-
Seychelles	15	5	5	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Senegal	515	115	40	75	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sierra Leone	420	20	15	5	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	1050	50	-	50	-	1000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	460	10	-	10	-	450	35	-	-	-	-	30	-	5
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanzania	1320	220	100	40	80	1100	210	150	150	-	-	55	5	-
Togo	435	5	5	-	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uganda	65	-	-	-	-	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Upper Volta	55	5	5	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zaire	530	280	10	270	-	250	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	-
Zambia	1010	10	-	10	-	1000	240	195	30	30	135	45	-	-
TOTAL	28415	18825	5640	4800	8385	9325	37520	37035	3170	820	33045	305	130	50

Notes * Including 32000 Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia.
- = zero
... = not available

Source AC/127-D/639, Table 4, pp. 92-93 and Table 9, pp. 103-105.

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
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ANNEX I to
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ECONOMIC PROFILE of NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST (1978)



	Year of independence	Area (000km ²)	Population (000)	GNP	
				Total (\$ million)	Per capita (\$)
NORTH AFRICA		6878.0	85641	75560	882
Algeria	1962	2460.5	17701	22290	1260
Egypt	-	1000.3	38686	15520	400
Libya	1951	1758.6	2745	18960	6910
Norocco	1956	409.2	18914	12610	670
Mauritania	1960	1085.2	1545	420	270
Tunisia	1956	164.2	6050	5760	950
NEAR EAST		5550.9	84674	230540	2723
Baharain	1971	0.6	368	1510	4100
Cyprus	1959	9.3	646	1370	2110
Iran	-	1647.2	35849	75100*	2180*
Iraq	-	445.5	12216	22720	1860
Israel	1948	20.7	3716	15300	4120
Jordan	1946	96.1	2985	2270	1050
Kuwait	1961	16.1	1212	18040	14890
Lebanon	1943	10.4	3011	3290**	1070**
Oman	1970	212.4	839	2160	2570
Qatar	1971	10.4	223	2840	12740
Saudi Arabia	1932	2331.0	7870	63310	8040
Syria	1946	186.5	8088	7490	930
UAE	1971	82.9	804	11440	14230
Yemen, North	1962	194.3	5098	2960	580
Yemen, South	1967	287.5	1749	740	420
TOTAL		12428.9	170315	306100	1797
Pro memoria					
Malta	1964	0.3	335	730	2160

* 1977
** 1974

Source World Bank Atlas 1979

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SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES to NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST. 1973-1979. Million current US \$.



	Agreements							Deliveries							1973-79 total in constant 1979 \$	
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Agreements	Deliveries
NORTH AFRICA	3000	4015	1575	1500	220	2425	467	2412	1700	1197	880	702	458	506	17683	10666
Algeria	-	-	500	-	100	850	(70)	12	negl	35	200	140	145	65	1762	698
Egypt	(3000)	(1000)	(40)	-	25	10	(57)	2400	700	150	(180)	12	negl	12	6266	5195
Libya	negl	(3000)	1000	1500	(90)	(1565)	(340)	negl	1000	1000	500	550	313	429	9582	4757
Morocco	-	15	35	-	5	-	-	-	negl	12	negl	negl	-	-	73	16
Mauritania	-	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Tunisia	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
NEAR EAST	2612	1720	815	3400	750	1136	1331	1819	1355	540	730	660	623	1005	15246	8842
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	-	negl	-	-	-	(negl)	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	negl	negl
Iran	(10)	-	-	500	-	negl	-	negl	negl	negl	negl	-	-	-	634	7
Iraq	567	680	360	(2500)	negl	(30)	(56)	290	430	330	385	170	245	160	5505	2597
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuwait	-	-	-	(400)	(50)	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	(negl)	(15)	(negl)	553	16
Lebanon	negl	-	-	-	-	(negl)	-	negl	-	negl	-	negl	(negl)	(negl)	negl	negl
Oman	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	(2000)	1000	365	negl	700	(1000)	(1000)	1500	900	190	310	460	280	550	7934	5652
UAE	-	-	negl	-	-	negl	-	-	negl	-	-	-	negl	negl	negl	negl
Yemen, North	-	-	70	-	-	(6)	(175)	-	-	negl	10	10	13	(175)	273	213
Yemen, South	(35)	40	(20)	negl	-	(100)	(100)	29	25	20	25	20	(70)	120	347	357
TOTAL	5612	5735	2390	4900	970	3561	1798	4231	3055	1737	1610	1362	1081	1511	32929	19508

Notes - = zero negl = less than \$ 5 million () = unconfirmed

Source AC/127-D/641, pp. 7 and 10.

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
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ANNEX I to
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TOTAL COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.

COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
AFRICA - NORTH																									
Algeria	301	79.5	74.1	29	227	43.5	150	36.5	104	41.6	-	36.5	159.5	39	290	42.6	-	48.3	-	50.4	-	47.8	1305.6	494.7	
Egypt	1584.5	277.5	-	64.6	337	73.5	30	88.5	130	110.5	160	86.5	-	92	-	84	100	61.5	14	36	10	45.7	2385.5	1640.5	
Mauritania	7.3	1.2	-	0.5	20.5	0.2	-	0.5	2	1	35	1.5	-	7.1	-	3.6	-	4.5	-	3.1	-	3	64.8	26.2	
Morocco	88.8	7.5	44	9	-	17	-	17.5	-	15	-	15	-	6.5	12	2.5	-	1.8	2013.7	5.5	-	9	2178.5	106.5	
Tunisia	110.2	22.5	-	3.7	-	5	40	4.5	10	4	-	4.8	-	0.2	75.8	0.4	51	2.1	-	3.5	-	13.6	287	64.5	
SUB-TOTAL AFRICA-NORTH	2091.8	388.2	118.1	106.8	604.5	139.2	220	147.5	246	172.1	195	144.3	159.5	44.8	397.8	133.1	191	118.2	2027.7	118.5	10	119.1	3221.4	2331.8	



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS AND MALTA																									
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	-	1.0	-	0.2	-	0.1	5.0	1.3	-	
Iraq	7,097.4	151.3	54.0	92.0	-	64.3	20.0	92.0	277.0	80.5	-	76.5	-	82.5	-	90.0	-	63.5	-	63.3	-	6.6	1408.4	882.9	
Iran	453.1	141.3	65.1	47.0	297.4	62.5	200.0	51.5	-	67.5	-	77.0	-	76.0	-	82.5	130.0	78.0	-	80.5	-	90.8	1465.6	894.5	
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41.0	1.0	-	1.0	-	1.9	41.0	3.9	
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.6	4.4	-	1.0	-	1.4	-	3.5	-	4.0	-	3.0	-	3.0	-	3.0	42.6	23.3	
YEMEN (South Yemen)	47.7	3.0	43.2	6.5	28.3	20.0	31.3	10.5	0.7	7.2	-	8.15	-	7.7	32.0	9.8	-	14.4	-	13.3	97.0	16.8	280.4	109.35	
Syria	442.7	159.0	-	38.5	15.0	40.3	203.0	42.0	25.0	32.1	412.0	47.1	40.0	61.1	-	70.0	300.0	69.5	100.0	62.5	-	70.6	1667.7	813.5	
Turkey	373.5	18.0	-	29.0	-	55.0	158.0	30.0	-	37.0	-	18.5	1230.0	20.0	200.0	26.0	1000.0	31.0	-	38.5	-	34.4	2961.5	387.4	
YEM (North Yemen)	143.8	87.6	-	10.6	-	8.5	20.0	6.3	-	5.0	-	5.3	-	4.5	84.1	7.1	29.5	3.3	-	3.8	-	3.4	193.3	144.6	
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS & MALTA	2,548.2	560.6	162.3	223.6	340.9	261.0	674.9	286.7	302.7	230.3	412.0	234.6	1400.0	255.3	277.0	285.4	1520.5	264.7	100.0	268.1	97.0	227.6	7765.5	3047.6	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table A.

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ANNEX I to
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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID to NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST*. 1954-1979. Millions current \$US.

COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
AFRICA - NORTH																									
ALGERIA	228	50	-	27	187	30	-	25	-	27	-	20	-	26	290	22.6	-	25	-	26	-	26.5	705	105.4	
EGYPT	998	6.7	-	42	220	49	-	61	-	58	-	60	-	62	-	37	-	41	-	39	-	29.7	1218	1468.7	
MAURITANIA	5.3	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	1	-	0.6	-	1	5.3	3.5
MOROCCO	42	2.5	44	7	-	15	-	13.5	-	10	-	11	-	2.5	-	0.5	-	0.3	2000	5	-	8	2086	75.3	
TUNISIA	35.2	15.5	-	2	-	2	-	2.5	-	2	-	2	-	0.2	45.8	0.3	-	0.5	-	1.1	-	1	79	29.4	
TOTAL - AFRICA - NORTH	1304.5	738.5	44	78	407	96	-	102	2	97	-	93.2	-	90.8	135.8	80.5	-	67.8	2000	71.7	-	66.2	4093.3	1581.7	



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS AND MALTA																									
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	525.3	104.0	54.0	66.0	-	64.0	-	68.0	174.0	66.0	-	55.0	-	60.0	-	65.0	-	50.0	-	50.0	-	6.3	751.3	654.3	
Iraq	308.1	142.5	22.5	27.0	220.0	35.0	-	30.0	-	48.0	-	56.0	-	47.0	-	55.0	150.0	55.0	-	57.5	-	60.5	700.6	611.0	
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41.0	1.0	-	1.0	-	1.9	41.0	5.9	
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
YEM (South Yemen)	15.7	1.5	-	3.0	10.0	4.0	-	3.0	0.7	3.2	-	3.5	-	3.0	25.0	6.6	-	9.0	-	8.8	97.0	10.6	146.4	56.2	
Syria	232.0	98.0	-	28.0	-	28.0	84.0	32.0	-	26.0	140.0	20.0	49.0	26.0	-	28.0	300.0	51.0	-	25.8	-	24.8	805.0	577.6	
Turkey	371.5	18.0	-	29.0	-	35.0	158.0	80.0	-	37.0	-	18.5	1230.0	20.0	-	26.0	-	30.0	-	36.3	-	32.4	1761.5	382.4	
YAR (North Yemen)	82.6	50.0	-	3.5	-	4.0	-	3.0	-	1.5	-	1.5	-	2.5	-	1.3	-	0.8	-	0.6	-	0.5	82.6	69.2	
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS & MALTA	1540.2	414.0	76.5	156.5	230.0	190.0	242.0	216.0	174.7	181.7	140.0	164.5	1279.0	158.5	25.0	181.9	491.0	176.8	-	180.2	97.0	137.0	4295.4	2154.6	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-79.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B.

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ANNEX I to
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EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID to NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
AFRICA - NORTH																									
ALGERIA	21	5.5	74.1	1	-	10.5	130	8.5	104	11.6	-	13.5	159.5	11.5	-	19.5	-	20.3	-	21.4	-	18.5	508.6	141.6	
EGYPT	501.6	192.5	-	22.5	137	24.5	30	27	100	22	160	25.5	-	22	-	17	100	15.3	14	14	10	14	1052.6	396.5	
MAURITANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
MOROCCO	46.8	5	-	2	-	2	-	4	-	4	-	4	-	4	-	2	-	1.5	15.7	0.5	-	1	60.5	31.0	
TUNISIA	77	7	-	1.7	-	3	-	2	10	2	-	2.3	-	-	30	-	35	1.5	-	1.3	-	6.1	152.0	26.9	
SUB-TOTAL AFRICA - NORTH	646.4	210	74.1	27.2	137	40	180	41.5	214	40.6	160	45.3	159.5	37.5	30	38.5	135	38.8	27.7	37.2	10	39.4	1773.7	596	

COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS and MALTA																									
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	-	1.0	-	0.2	-	0.1	5.0	1.3	
Iran	532.1	47.5	-	26.0	-	20.5	20.0	24.0	103.0	14.5	-	21.5	-	22.5	-	25.0	-	13.5	-	13.3	-	0.3	655.1	228.6	
Iraq	245.0	1.0	42.6	20.0	37.4	87.5	200.0	21.5	-	19.0	-	21.0	-	27.0	-	25.0	-	22.0	-	21.5	-	28.8	425.0	234.3	
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
OMAN (South Yemen)	22.0	-	-	1.0	18.5	1.5	11.3	2.5	-	0.5	-	0.65	-	0.7	7.0	0.4	-	1.4	-	2.0	-	1.7	58.8	2.35	
Syria	194.4	52.5	-	8.5	15.0	12.0	75.0	9.5	25.0	5.5	272.0	17.1	121.0	35.1	-	39.5	-	37.5	100.0	35.7	-	43.3	802.4	296.4	
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200.0	-	1000.0	1.0	-	2.0	-	2.0	1200.0	5.0	
YEMEN (North Yemen)	11.9	7.1	-	0.6	-	0.5	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	small	-	2.5	0.5	-	1.0	-	0.5	14.4	10.5	
MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS & MALTA	905.4	108.1	42.6	56.1	70.9	62.0	306.3	57.8	128.0	39.5	272.0	60.25	121.0	85.3	212.0	89.9	1002.5	76.9	100.0	75.7	-	76.9	3160.7	788.45	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table C.

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ANNEX I to
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CHINESE ECONOMIC AID to NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.

COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings
AFRICA - NORTH																								
ALGERIA	52	24	-	1	40	3	-	3	-	3	-	3	-	1.5	-	0.5	-	3	-	3	-	3	92	48
EGYPT	85	15	-	0.1	-	-	-	0.5	10	10.5	-	1	-	8	-	10	-	5	-	3	-	2	115	75.1
LIBYAN ARAB	4	0.7	-	0.5	20.5	0.2	-	0.5	-	1	35	1.3	-	7	-	3.5	-	3.5	-	2.5	-	2	59.5	22.7
MOROCCO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-
TUNISIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	0.1	16	0.1	-	1.1	-	6.5	36	8.3
TOTAL NORTH AFRICA - NORTH	141	39.7	-	1.6	60.5	3.2	40	4	30	34.5	35	5.8	-	16.5	32	14.1	16	11.6	-	9.6	-	13.5	354.5	154.1



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings	Extensions	Drawings
MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS and MALTA																								
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	-	-	-	-	40.0	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	2.0	-	2.5	-	1.0	-	1.5	-	1.5	40.0	9.0
Jordan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.6	4.4	-	1.0	-	1.4	-	3.5	-	4.0	-	3.0	-	3.0	-	3.0	42.6	25.3
YEMEN (South Yemen)	12.0	1.5	43.2	2.5	-	4.5	20.0	5.0	-	3.5	-	4.0	-	4.0	-	2.8	-	4.0	-	4.5	-	4.5	75.2	40.8
Syria	16.5	8.5	-	2.0	-	0.5	44.0	0.5	-	0.8	-	0.4	-	-	-	2.5	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	2.3	60.3	19.5
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
YEMEN (North Yemen)	44.3	30.5	-	6.5	-	4.0	20.0	3.0	-	3.5	-	4.0	-	2.0	-	1.8	27.0	2.0	-	2.2	-	2.4	91.5	61.9
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST plus CYPRUS and MALTA	72.6	40.5	43.2	11.0	40.0	9.0	26.6	12.9	-	9.3	-	9.8	-	11.5	-	17.6	27.0	11.0	-	12.2	-	17.7	309.4	154.5

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table D.

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
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COMMUNIST TECHNICIANS in NORTH AFRICA & NEAR EAST. Number of persons present for one month or more during 1979.



	COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS							COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS							
	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Subtotal	Soviet Bloc				North Korea	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Subtotal	Soviet Bloc				North Korea	Yugo slavia
			USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China				USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China		
NORTH AFRICA	41400	39695	7950	30645	1100	955	750	3330	2850	2800	35	15		330	150
Algeria	11900	11600	6000	5500	100	300	-	1030	1030	1000	15	15		-	-
Egypt	775	750	500	250	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Libya	25255	24500	1000	22500	1000	5	750	2300	1820	1800	20	-	-	330	150
Morocco	2325	2300	250	2050	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	455	55	50	5	-	400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	690	490	150	340	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NEAR EAST*	28000	26725	13275	11800	1650	1235	40	5850	5780	4230	550	1000	-	40	30
Baharain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iran	2200	2200	2000	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	12900	12625	8000	3275	1350	275	-	1105	1065	1000	65	-	-	10	30
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	1025	1025	25	1000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuwait	1575	1550	50	1500	-	25	-	5	5	5	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oman	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	6050	6000	1000	5000	-	25	25	2510	2480	2300	180	-	-	30	-
UAE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yemen, North	510	160	150	10	-	335	15	130	130	125	5	-	-	-	-
Yemen, South	2030	1580	750	530	300	450	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	69400	66420	21225	42445	2750	2190	790	9180	8630	7030	585	1015	-	370	180

Notes * This subtotal includes the following economic technicians: 125 Chinese and 10 East Europeans in Malta, and 1300 Soviets and 275 East Europeans in Turkey. No military technicians were present in either country.

Source AC/127-D/639, Table 4, pp. 92-93 and Table 9, pp. 103-105

- = zero


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ECONOMIC PROFILE of SOUTH & EAST ASIA (1978)

	Year of independence	Area (000km ²)	Population (000)	GNP	
				Total (\$ million)	Per capita (\$)
Afghanistan	-	647.5	14616	3530	240
Bangladesh	1971	142.5	85641	7630	90
Bhutan	-	46.6	1259	120	100
Burma	1948	678.6	32205	4900	150
Cambodia	1954	181.3	7973*	500*	65*
Korea, South	1948	98.4	36616	42460	1160
India	1947	3136.5	645896	112660	180
Indonesia	1945	1906.2	135993	48820	360
Laos	1955	236.8	3300	300	90
Malaysia	1957	131.3	13300	14540	1090
Maldives	1965	0.3	145	20	150
Nepal	-	141.4	13627	1580	120
Pakistan	1947	803.0	77337	17530	230
Philippines	1946	330.4	45639	23250	510
Singapore	1965	0.6	2355	7690	3260
Sri Lanka	1948	65.5	14350	2720	190
Taiwan	1949	32.3	17139	23930	1400
Thailand	-	512.8	44345	21790	490
TOTAL		9092.0	1187736	333970	281

* 1977

Source World Bank Atlas 1979

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SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES to SOUTH & EAST ASIA. Million current US \$. 1973-1979.



	Agreements							Deliveries							1973-79 total in constant 1979 \$	
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Agreements	Deliveries
Afghanistan	(40)	-	125	(35)	(30)	(250)	-	-	-	negl	25	14	235	150	575	453
Bangladesh	(30)	-	-	-	negl	-	-	(30)	-	negl	negl	-	-	-	47	53
Bhutan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Korea, South	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	-	30	500	230	(1750)	(100)	1200	50	35	30	40	35	16	(60)	4331	335
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Laos	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	-	-	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Maldives	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Pakistan	-	-	-	negl	-	-	negl	-	-	-	negl	-	-	negl	negl	negl
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	negl	8	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl	12	-	-	-	-	11	16
Taiwan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	70	38	625	265	1780	350	1200	80	35	42	65	49	251	210	4965	857

Notes - = zero negl = less than \$ 5 million () = unconfirmed

Sources AC/127-D/641, pp. 6-7 and 9-10

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TOTAL COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to SOUTH & EAST ASIA*. 1954-1979. Millions current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings
SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA																								
Afghanistan	758.8	599.0	-	32.0	-	25.5	166.0	32.5	20.0	17.0	65.0	26.5	426.0	28.5	2.0	25.0	13.0	29.4	-	33.7	24.0	35.0	1454.8	844.1
Bangladesh							175.5	58.0	69.5	60.0	84.6	25.1	74.0	20.8	-	25.6	62.0	17.6	-	23.3	-	2.3	465.6	252.7
Burma	121.6	42.6	-	2.5	5.0	2.0	-	18.5	-	12.0	-	10.0	-	5.0	10.0	4.0	-	4.0	140.0	5.5	-	5.0	276.6	111.1
Cambodia (1)	132.7	75.9	-	1.0																			132.7	76.9
India	1927.9	1042.5	-	89.5	-	56.0	-	66.9	460.0	374.5	-	396.0	-	42.0	-	48.1	335.0	41.1	-	43.7	-	46.0	2641.9	1946.3
Indonesia	769.3	306.5	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	2.5	-	0.3	771.6	311.3
Laos (1)	10.0	4.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.0	4.0
Nepal	86.1	61.0	-	6.0	4.0	6.5	35.0	6.2	3.0	10.2	-	3.7	85.0	6.2	4.0	7.9	-	9.4	4.2	8.6	-	7.5	221.3	137.2
Pakistan	637.7	242.5	209.5	34.0	209.0	61.0	-35.5	49.0	71.0	71.0	238.0	57.3	31.0	60.0	10.0	71.6	-	101.1	102.3	110.3	-	114.5	1455.0	865.3
Philippines													31.0	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	31.0	1.5
Sri Lanka	124.9	60.5	25.1	18.5	12.3	48.0	56.5	20.5	25.9	11.0	-	21.0	55.0	13.0	3.0	11.3	1.3	12.1	60.0	11.8	-	12.0	382.0	239.7
TOTAL - SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA	4949.0	2394.5	32.6	205.5	230.3	201.0	377.5	820.6	649.4	555.7	422.6	439.6	702.0	175.5	29.0	193.5	411.3	215.2	208.8	239.9	24.0	243.1	7865.5	4884.1

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-79.
- = zero.
(1) Excluding 1975 onwards.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table A.

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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID to SOUTH & EAST ASIA*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA																									
Afghanistan	700.1	540.0			28.0	23.0	122.0	19.0	15.0		22.0	426.0	25.0		20.0	15.0	23.6		27.2	24.0	30.0	1285.3	772.0		
Bangladesh							141.0 ⁽²⁾	52.0	36.0 ⁽³⁾	36.0	6.0	18.0	48.0	15.0	16.5	10.4			1.3		9.0	231.0	188.0		
Burma	15.6	13.0																					25.6	14.0	
Cambodia (1)	25.0	15.5		0.5										10.0	1.0								23.0	16.0	
India	1581.2	890.0		72.0	42.0		49.0	160.0	160.0		288.0		30.0		40.0	535.0	31.9		36.2		38.0	2278.2	1637.0		
Indonesia	370.0	103.0																							
Laos (1)	8.0	2.0																	2.3	0.3		0.3	372.1	103.0	
Nepal	21.1	18.0		0.5	0.5		0.2	3.0	2.2		0.2		0.2		0.6		0.8	4.2	0.2		0.5	28.3	21.0		
Pakistan	264.7	78.0	14.0	209.0	10.0	46 ⁽²⁾	5.8	71.0	10.0	213.0	18.0		25.0		55.0		65.0	102.5	84.0		88.0	814.0	404.0		
Philippines																									
Sri Lanka	30.0	20.5	8.5	0.5	0.5	5.0		1.5		2.0		3.0	55.0	6.0		5.5		5.8		6.0		93.8	61.0		
TOTAL SOUTH AND EAST ASIA	3013.9	1640.0	8.5	115.5	209.3	80.5	177.0	98.7	170.0	245.2	219.0	49.2	529.0	111.2	10.0	118.4	148.0	137.3	108.8	163.2	24.0	171.8	5157.5	3223.8	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-79. Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B.
 - = zero.
 (1) Excluding 1975 onwards.
 (2) Transfer of extensions to East Pakistan of \$46m from Pakistan to Bangladesh.
 (3) Transfer of East Pakistan drawings of \$26m to Bangladesh.
 (4) 200,000 ton wheat loan valued at \$36m.

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
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EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID to SOUTH & EAST ASIA*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1959		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA																									
Afghanistan	10.5	7.5	-	0.5	-	-	-	2.5	20.0	-	10.0	2.0	-	1.0	2.0	2.5	-	3.3	-	4.0	-	3.0	42.5	26.5	
Bangladesh	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.5 ⁽²⁾	8.0	33.5	4.0	78.8 ⁽⁴⁾	7.1	26.0	3.8	-	9.1	7.0	7.0	-	6.0	-	7.0	179.6	32.0	
Burma	24.0	2.0	-	2.5	3.0	2.0	-	11.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	140.0	3.0	-	2.0	169.0	24.0		
Cambodia (1)	17.4	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.4	3.4	
India	344.7	192.5	-	17.5	-	14.0	-	17.9	100.0	14.5	-	8.0	-	12.0	-	8.1	-	9.2	(-81) ⁽⁵⁾	7.5	-	8.0	363.7	309.2	
Indonesia	277.3	197.5	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	-	277.3	161.7	
Java (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nepal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pakistan	64.0	20.5	9.5	10.0	-	12.0	(-9.5) ⁽²⁾	4.0	-	1.0	25.0	3.3	31.0	10.0	10.0	9.6	-	7.6	-	5.9	-	8.5	130.0	84.4	
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	0.5	31.0	1.5
Sri Lanka	53.9	13.0	4.8	9.0	-	7.0	-	1.0	10.2	1.0	-	2.0	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68.9	34.0	
TOTAL - SOUTH AND EAST ASIA	791.8		14.3	41.5	3.0	35.0	25.0	34.9	163.7	20.5	115.6	22.4	88.0	29.8	12.0	29.3	7.0	28.6	59.0	29.1	-	29.0	279.4	698.5	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table C.

- = zero.
- (1) Excluding 1975 onwards.
- (2) Transfer of \$9.5 million East Pakistan extensions to Bangladesh.
- (3) Transfer of \$5 million drawings by East Pakistan to Bangladesh.
- (4) Includes earlier undated extension of \$50 million.
- (5) Cancellation of unspent balance of \$81 million of 1973 Czech extension to India of \$100 million.

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CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH & EAST ASIA*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA																								
Afghanistan	28.0	11.5	-	3.5	-	2.5	44.0	11.0	-	2.0	95.0	2.5	-	2.5	-	2.5	-	2.5	-	2.5	-	2.0	127.0	45.0
Bangladesh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55.0	0.2	-	6.0	-	6.3	55.0	12.5	-
Burma	84.0	27.0	-	-	-	-	7.0	-	12.0	-	10.0	-	5.0	-	3.0	-	3.0	-	2.5	-	3.0	84.0	72.5	-
Cambodia (1)	92.3	55.0	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92.3	55.5	-
India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	122.0	46.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	122.0	46.0	-
Java (1)	2.0	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.0	2.0	-
Nepal	65.0	45.0	-	5.5	4.0	6.0	35.0	6.0	-	8.0	-	5.5	85.0	6.0	4.0	7.5	-	8.6	-	8.4	-	7.0	195.0	109.5
Pakistan	309.0	144.0	200.0	30.0	-	41.0	-	45.0	-	60.0	-	36.0	-	25.0	-	27.0	-	28.5	-	20.4	-	18.0	309.0	479.9
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	41.0	27.0	9.8 ⁽²⁾	9.0	32.0	36.0	56.5	18.0	15.7	8.0	-	16.0	-	6.0	3.0	6.0	1.3	6.3	60.0	5.8	-	6.0	219.5	144.1
TOTAL SOUTH AND EAST ASIA	745.3	395.5	209.8	48.5	36.0	85.5	135.5	87.0	15.7	90.0	80.0	68.0	85.0	44.5	7.0	45.8	36.3	47.1	60.0	45.6	-	42.5	128.6	961.8

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.
(1) Excluding 1975 onwards.
(2) \$0.9M addition to 1962 total of \$8.5M plus new extension of \$0.4M

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table D.

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COMMUNIST TECHNICIANS in SOUTH & EAST ASIA. Number of persons present for one month or more during 1979.

	COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS							COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS						
	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Soviet Bloc					North Korea	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Soviet Bloc					North Korea
	Subtotal	USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China		Subtotal	USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China			
Afghanistan	3775	3700	3500	200	-	200	-	4000	4000	4000 ^a	-	-	-	-
Bangladesh	145	115	65	50	-	30	-	30	-	-	-	30	-	
Bhutan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Burma	165	15	10	5	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Cambodia	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Korea, South	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
India	1285	1285	1100	185	-	-	150	150	150	-	-	-	-	
Indonesia	30	30	10	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Laos	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Malaysia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Maldives	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nepal	335	10	10	-	-	325	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Pakistan	1025	750	650	100	-	275	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	
Philippines	40	30	5	25	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Singapore	5	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sri Lanka	410	85	60	25	-	325	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Taiwan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Thailand	10	10	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL	7225	6035	5420	615	-	1190	-	4220	4150	4150	-	-	70	

Notes * Communist country since 1975
- = zero
a. Excluding more than 50,000 Soviet troops.

Source AC/127-D/639, Table 4, pp 92-93 and Table 9, pp. 103-105.

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ANNEX I to
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ECONOMIC PROFILE of the AMERICAs (1978)

	Year of independence	Area (000km ²)	Population (000)	GNP	
				Total (\$ million)	Per capita (\$)
Anguilla	1967*	0.4	50	30	660
Antigua	1976	0.5	74	70	950
Argentina	-	2771.3	26371	50250	1910
Bahama	1973	11.4	218	570	2620
Barbados	1966	0.4	250	490	1940
Belize	1964**	23.2	132	110	840
Bolivia	-	1098.2	5290	2690	510
Brazil	-	8521.1	119430	187190	1570
Chile	-	740.7	10734	15180	1410
Colombia	-	1139.6	25136	21790	870
Costa Rica	-	51.0	2110	3250	1540
Dominica	1977	0.8	77	30	440
Dominican Rep.	-	48.7	5128	4680	910
Ecuador	-	274.5	7550	6890	910
El Salvador	-	21.4	4382	2810	600
Grenada	1974	0.3	106	60	530
Guatemala	-	108.9	6627	6040	910
Guyana	1966	215.0	836	460	550
Haiti	-	27.7	4831	1240	260
Honduras	-	112.2	3441	1650	480
Jamaica	1962	11.4	2131	2350	1110
Mexico	-	1978.8	65470	84150	1290
Neth. Antilles	1.0	246	780	3150
Nicaragua	-	147.9	2490	2100	840
Panama	-	75.7	1826	2350	1290
Paraguay	-	406.6	2893	2450	850
Peru	-	1284.6	16820	12440	740
St. Lucia	1960*	0.6	120	80	630
St. Vincent	1960*	0.4	105	40	380
Surinam	1975	142.7	389	820	2110
Trinidad & Tob.	1962	5.1	1137	3310	2910
Uruguay	-	187.0	2892	4660	1610
Venezuela	-	911.7	13965	40710	2910
TOTAL		20320.4	333257	461720	1385

Notes: * Dependent territory with full internal autonomy as a British "Associated State". Source World Bank Atlas 1979

** Self-governing British colony.

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ANNEX I to
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SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES to the AMERICAS, 1973-1979. Million current US \$.



	Agreements							Deliveries							1973-79 total in constant 1979 \$	
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Agreements	Deliveries
Anguilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Antigua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Argentina	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	(negl)	-	-	negl	negl
Bahama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belize	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Chile	negl	-	-	-	-	-	negl	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grenada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	negl	negl
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mexico	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Neth. Antilles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Panama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	(12)	(37)	35	320	6	-	-	25	12	9	92	200	(negl)	520	415	
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Vincent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surinam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad & Tob.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	-	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
Venezuela	-	(negl)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	negl	-	-	-	-	negl	negl
TOTAL	12	37	35	320	6	-	-	25	12	9	92	200	-	520	415	

Notes - = zero negl = less than \$ 5 million () = unconfirmed Source AC/127-D/641, pp. 6 and 9.

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ANNEX I to
C-M(81)54

TOTAL COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID to AMERICAS*. 1954-1979. Millions current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN																								
Argentina	168.7	37.7	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	4.5	450.0	1.0	-	4.5	-	8.4	-	11.5	-	12.1	-	6.0	618.7	87.7	
Bolivia	-	-	27.5	-	25.0	2.0	0.3	1.0	-	3.0	-	2.5	-	4.3	-	6.5	-	9.5	16.0	6.3	-	10.0	68.8	45.1
Brazil	299.6	37.9	-	20.0	-	23.5	-	16.0	-	5.5	-	11.5	-	25.2	-	5.5	-	5.5	-	6.0	-	9.2	299.6	167.8
Chile	62.0	-	-	-	150.0	-	409.0	26.0	57.0	24.5	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	678.0	50.5
Colombia	2.0	1.0	-	1.0	12.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	-	-	1.5	-	1.2	-	3.0	114.0	7.8
Costa Rica	-	-	10.0	-	15.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	25.0	1.8
Ecuador	10.0	2.0	-	2.0	5.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.0	6.4
Guyana	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.0	-	-	0.2	10.0	0.2	11.0	2.3	-	1.8	-	7.0	-	7.2	-	25	48.25	28.7
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.7	1.2	-	1.2	1.9	1.0	-	2.5	11.6	3.9
Peru	6.0	-	99.0	-	72.0	2.0	98.0	3.0	25.0	5.5	-	4.5	-	6.4	-	18.9	1.2	10.0	-	4.8	-	8.4	257.2	63.5
Uruguay	34.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	5.0	3.5	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	46.3	14.5
Venezuela	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.0	-
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	584.8	81.6	107.5	28.0	284.0	32.0	533.3	47.0	82.0	45.0	460.0	22.8	11.0	45.1	109.7	42.3	1.2	48.2	17.9	38.6	1.25	49.1	2192.65	179.7

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table A.

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ANNEX I to
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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID to AMERICAS*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN																									
Argentina	115.0 ⁽¹⁾	32.5	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	4.5	200.0	1.0	-	2.5	-	8.4	-	7.8	-	8.1	-	6.0	115.0	72.4	
Bolivia	-	-	27.5	-	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	2.0	-	1.5	-	3.3	-	6.2	-	9.2	10.0	6.0	-	6.8	27.5	39.4	
Brazil	85.0	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.5	-	15.5	-	5.5	-	5.2	-	5.0	-	9.2	85.0	51.4		
Chile	57.0	-	-	-	40.0	-	324.0	11.0	-	15.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	421.0	24.5	
Colombia	2.0	1.0	-	1.0	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	100.0	-	-	1.5	-	1.2	-	3.0	104.0	7.8		
Costa Rica	-	-	10.0	-	15.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	0.1	-	0.2	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	25.0	1.8	
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Paraguay	-	-	30.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	2.5	-	3.0	-	3.6	-	3.4	1.2	3.1	-	2.8	-	3.3	31.2	22.7	
Uruguay	20.0	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.0	4.0	
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	279.0	33.5	67.5	4.0	57.0	3.0	324.0	14.0	-	24.5	200.0	18.1	-	23.0	100.0	23.5	1.2	27.3	10.0	21.1	-	28.3	1036.7	222.3	

*. Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table B.

(1) Out of a \$100m loan extended in 1958, only \$32.5m was disbursed and remainder lapsed in 1961.

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ANNEX I to
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EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID to AMERICAS*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979		
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN																									
Argentina	53.7	5.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	290.0	-	-	2.2	-	-	3.7	-	4.0	-	-	303.7	15.0		
Bolivia	-	-	-	25.0	1.0	0.3	-	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	0.3	-	0.3	6.0	0.3	-	3.2	31.3	8.3		
Brazil	214.6	37.9	-	79.0	-	25.3	-	16.0	-	5.5	-	1.0	-	11.7	-	-	0.3	-	1.0	-	-	214.6	115.0		
Chile	5.0	-	-	110.0	-	20.0	1.0	37.0	3.0	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	192.0	6.2		
Colombia	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.0	-		
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Ecuador	10.0	2.0	-	2.0	3.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.0	6.4		
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	1.3	-	1.3	-	1.3	-	1.0	-	2.5	10.0	2.4	
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Paraguay	6.0	-	25.0	-	30.0	2.0	98.0	2.0	25.0	3.0	-	1.5	-	2.5	-	15.5	-	6.9	-	2.0	-	5.1	184.0	40.5	
Uruguay	16.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	5.0	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	26.5	10.5		
Venezuela	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	
TOTAL - LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	305.8	48.1	40.0	24.0	185.0	29.0	118.3	19.0	82.0	14.5	260.0	4.5	-	20.8	-	17.1	-	14.0	6.0	8.3	-	10.8	977.1	210.1	

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero.

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table C.

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ANNEX I to
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CHINESE ECONOMIC AID to AMERICAS*. 1954-1979. Million current \$US.



COUNTRY	1954-1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979		1954-1979	
	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings	Exten- sions	Draw- ings
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN																								
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	-	-	-	-	-	-	65.0	14.0	-	5.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65.0	19.4
Colombia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	0.2	-	0.2	11.0	1.0	-	0.5	-	5.7	-	6.2	1.25	7.5	18.25	21.5
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.7	1.2	-	1.2	1.9	1.0	-	2.5	11.6	5.9
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Puerto Rico	-	-	-	-	42.0	-	-	-	-	Mag	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.0	0.5
Uruguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	-	-	-	-	42.0	-	91.0	14.0	-	6.0	-	0.2	11.0	1.3	9.7	1.7	-	6.9	1.9	7.2	1.25	10.0	156.85	47.5

* Countries in this area not listed above received no aid throughout the period 1954-1979.
- = zero

Source: AC/127-D/634, Appendix B, Table D.

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ANNEX I to
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COMMUNIST TECHNICIANS in the AMERICAS. Number of persons present for one month or more during 1979.



	COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS						COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS							
	TOTAL COMMUNIST	Soviet Bloc				North		TOTAL COMMUNIST	Soviet Bloc				North	Yugo slavia
		Subtotal	USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba	China	Korea		Subtotal	USSR	E.Eur.	Cuba		
Anguilla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Antigua	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Argentina	35	35	10	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belize	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	215	215	200	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brazil	75	75	20	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Colombia	35	35	25	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominica	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	10	10	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grenada	250	250	-	-	250	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	135	60	10	25	25	75	5	-	-	-	5	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	650	600	-	-	600	50	10	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
Mexico	60	50	15	35	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Neth. Antilles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	1600	1600	-	-	1600	-	200	-	-	-	200	-	-	-
Panama	15	5	5	-	-	10	30	-	-	-	30	-	-	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	120	110	50	60	-	10	110	-	110	-	-	-	-	-
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Vincent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surinam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trinidad & Tob.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uruguay	15	15	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	10	10	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3225	3070	340	255	2475	155	365	365	110	-	255*	-	-	-

Notes * Including 5 undistributed -- zero

Source AC/127-D/639, Table 4, pp. 92-93 and Table 9, pp. 103-105.

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ANNEX II to
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**SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC AID AND ARMS SUPPLIES TO
COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CDCs)**

1970 -1979


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
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INDOCHINA



AMERICAS



EAST ASIA

ECONOMIC PROFILE of COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CDCs), 1978.

	Communist regime since	Area (000 km ²)	Population (000)	GDP	
				Total (\$ million)	Per capita (\$)
EAST EUROPE	...	284.5	24539	54260	2211
Albania	1945	28.7	2606	1920	740
Yugoslavia	1945	255.8	21933	52340	2390
AMERICAS	...	110.9	9718	7860	810
Cuba	1959	110.9	9718	7860	810
INDOCHINA	...	750.7	63452	9670	152
Kampuchea	1975	181.3	7973*	500*	65*
Laos	1975	236.8	3300	300	90
Vietnam	1954/1975	332.6	52179	8870	170
EAST ASIA	...	1685.1	18641	14000	751
Mongolia	1922	1564.6	1575	1470	940
North Korea	1948	120.5	17066	12530	730
TOTAL	...	2831.2	116350	85790	737

* 1977

Source World Bank Atlas 1979

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ANNEX II to
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SOVIET BLOC ARMS SUPPLIES to COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CDCs). 1970-1979. Million current US \$.

	Agreements										Deliveries									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
EAST EUROPE	negl	100	90	75	12	- ^a	negl	negl	-	40	25	negl ^a	...
Albania	negl		-	-	negl	- ^a	-	-	-	-	negl	- ^a	...
Yugoslavia	-	100	90	75	(12)	- ^a	negl	negl	-	40	25	negl ^a	...
AMERICAS	10		-	80	62	80	60	10	negl	6	15	62	98	145
Cuba	(10)		-	(80)	(62)	(80)	(60)	10	negl	6	15	62	98	145
INDOCHINA	-		72	65	100	2005	-	290	negl	25	40	125	190	1500
Kampuchea	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-
Laos	*	*	*	*	*	(42)	(65)	negl	5	-	*	*	*	*	*	negl	10	25	negl	-
Vietnam	-		30	-	(100)	(2000)	-	(290)	negl	25	30	100	(190)	(1500)
EAST ASIA	15	6	-	5	-	-	-	15	6	-	-	-	negl	-
Mongolia
North Korea	(15)	(6)	-	(5)	-	-	-	15	6	-	-	-	negl	-
TOTAL	25	106	162	225	174	2085	60	315	6	31	95	212	288	1645
Pro-memoria:																				
Total Soviet Bloc economic aid	1123	958	1356	1310	433	2383	3149	3780	4617	5388	598 ^b	748 ^b	787 ^b	889 ^b	374 ^b	1322 ^b	2153 ^b	2898 ^b	3785 ^b	4381 ^b

Notes a. First half of the year
... = not available
- = zero
() = unconfirmed
negl = less than \$ 5 million

b. Minimum estimate of gross deliveries. It covers all recorded deliveries to Cuba and Soviet trade surplus with Mongolia.

Sources AC/127-WF/591, pp. 3 and 6 (G estimates).
AC/127-D/641, pp. 6 and 9.

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ANNEX II to
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SOVIET ECONOMIC AID to COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CDCs). 1970-1979. Million current US \$.

	Agreements										Deliveries									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
EAST EUROPE	-	-	540	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	540	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AMERICAs	352	210	28	359	70	1340	1848	2380	3030	3491	442	635	649	653	331	954	1598	2190	2960	3531
Cuba	352	210	28	359	70	1340	1848	2380	3030	3491	442	635	649	653	331	954	1598	2190	2960	3531
Sugar subsidy	156	56	-20	93	-429	470	1035	1500	2400	2538	156	56	-20	93	-429	470	1035	1500	2400	2538
Nickel subsidy	49	57	23	56	38	22	35	80	40	21	49	57	23	56	38	22	35	80	40	21
Oil subsidy	6	13	14	67	433	312	378	400	190	532	6	13	14	67	433	312	378	400	190	532
Project aid	141	84	11	143	28	536	400	400	400	400	(231)	(509)	(632)	(437)	(289)	(150)	(150)	(210)	(330)	(440)
INDOCHINA	320	340	380	420	50	490	540	520	580	865
Kampuchea	*	*	*	*	*	50	85	*	*	*	*	*
Laos	*	*	*	*	*	40	40	20	30	30	*	*	*	*	*
Vietnam	320	340	380	420	50	450	500	500	500	750
EAST ASIA	285	247	306	365	364	379	456	577	658	637
Mongolia**	140	102	161	220	219	319	452	577	658	637	140	102	161	220	219	319	452	577	658	637
North Korea	145	145	145	145	145	60	4	-	-	-
TOTAL	957	797	1254	1144	484	2209	2844	3477	4268	4993

Notes * A communist regime was established only in 1975. Prior to that date, aid is recorded in the appropriate regional section of Annex I.
** Data refer to current trade deficits with the USSR. No better approximation of Soviet aid to Mongolia is available to NATO's Economics Directorate.

- = zero ... = not available () = cfr. Sources

Sources East Europe: CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1979, p. 120.
Cuba, Indochina and North Korea: UK Delegation, except for project aid to Cuba, derived from C-M(80)34, Annex I, p. 4.
Mongolia: Soviet Foreign Trade Yearbooks.

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ANNEX II to
C-11(81)54

EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AID to COMMUNIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CDCs), 1970-1979. Million current US \$.

	Agreements										Deliveries									
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
EAST EUROPE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AMERICAS	96	81	12	66	161	54	143	(131)	(167)	(213)
Cuba	96	81	12	66	161	54	143	(131)	(167)	(213)
Sugar subsidy	16	11	-23	16	176	49	103	131	167	213	16	11	-23	16	-176	49	103	131	167	213
Project aid	80	70	35	50	15	5	40
INDOCHINA	70	80	90	100	110	(120)	(162)	(172)	(182)	(182)
Kampuchea	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Laos	*	*	*	*	*	...	20	30	40	40	*	*	*	*	*
Vietnam	70	80	90	100	110	120	142	142	142	142
EAST ASIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia
North Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	166	161	102	166	-51	174	305	303	349	395

Notes * A communist regime was established only in 1975. Prior to that date, aid is recorded in the appropriate regional section of Annex I.
- = zero ... = not available () = Data slightly incomplete

Sources East Europe: Economics Directorate record.
Other areas: UK Delegation.

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ANNEX III to
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ACADEMIC, TECHNICAL
and
MILITARY TRAINING
of
LDCs PERSONNEL
in
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

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ANNEX III to
C-M(81)54

Number of Persons

**Academic Students From LDCs
Trained in Communist Countries¹**

	Departures to Communist Countries								Being Trained as of December 1979			
	1956-79				1979				Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China				
Total	118,820	68,525	48,840	1,455	13,865	8,010	5,805	50	55,345	30,970	24,025	350
Africa	56,850	33,025	22,805	1,020	5,850	3,305	2,515	30	27,330	14,690	12,400	240
North Africa	8,235	4,065	4,120	50	670	385	280	5	3,465	1,825	1,605	35
Algeria	5,020	2,415	2,590	15	350	150	200	..	1,950	950	1,000	..
Libya	115	55	60	..	15	5	10	..	115	55	60	..
Mauritania	640	555	75	10	95	80	15	..	305	220	75	10
Morocco	1,145	650	495	..	60	50	10	..	470	300	170	..
Tunisia	1,315	390	900	25	150	100	45	5	625	300	300	25
Sub-Saharan Africa	48,615	28,960	18,685	970	5,180	2,920	2,235	25	23,865	12,865	10,795	205
Angola	1,330	565	765	..	350	235	115	..	1,145	395	750	..
Benin	510	355	145	10	60	50	10	..	275	255	20	..
Botswana	165	105	60	..	5	5	25	25
Burundi	640	435	200	5	90	35	50	5	310	105	200	5
Cameroon	1,140	710	430	..	35	25	10	..	140	115	25	..
Cape Verde	395	350	45	..	70	50	20	..	395	350	45	..
Central African Republic	1,020	555	285	180	70	55	15	..	485	230	250	5
Chad	625	540	75	10	70	55	15	..	375	305	60	10
Comoro Islands	55	40	..	15	5	5	25	25
Congo	2,255	1,640	600	15	195	150	45	..	1,330	800	530	..
Djibouti	10	10	5	5	10	10
Equatorial Guinea	420	290	130	..	25	25	270	270
Ethiopia	4,120	2,305	1,800	15	800	400	400	..	3,400	1,600	1,800	..
Gabon	715	10	695	10	25	5	20	..	510	10	500	..
Gambia	165	165	20	20	45	45
Ghana	2,935	1,530	1,375	30	300	100	200	..	920	500	420	..
Guinea	2,575	1,310	1,220	45	125	75	50	..	1,000	575	410	15
Guinea-Bissau	640	360	280	..	90	50	40	..	440	225	215	..
Ivory Coast	950	250	700	..	150	50	100	..	940	240	700	..
Kenya	2,340	1,470	860	10	115	100	15	..	715	575	140	..
Lesotho	210	120	85	5	10	5	5	..	50	25	25	..
Liberia	165	65	100	..	20	..	20	..	125	45	80	..
Madagascar	1,285	1,055	225	5	330	300	30	..	1,165	1,000	165	..
Malawi	30	15	15
Mali	1,730	1,210	520	..	95	60	35	..	600	400	200	..
Mauritius	390	310	80	..	45	40	5	..	185	150	35	..
Mozambique	580	365	215	..	75	50	25	..	425	275	150	..
Niger	545	435	85	25	50	35	10	5	230	155	50	25

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ANNEX III to
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Number of Persons

**Academic Students From LDCs
Trained in Communist Countries¹ (continued)**

	Departures to Communist Countries								Being Trained as of December 1979			
	1956-79				1979				Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China				
Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)												
Nigeria	4,760	2,610	2,135	15	875	250	625	..	2,575	1,030	1,545	..
Reunion	75	70	5	..	10	5	5	..	45	40	5	..
Rhodesia	550	265	285	..	75	50	25	..	275	180	95	..
Rwanda	415	375	40	..	5	5	165	125	40	..
Sao Tome and Principe	20	10	10	..	10	5	5	..	20	10	10	..
Senegal	740	555	155	30	65	40	20	5	315	210	75	30
Sierra Leone	1,170	960	195	15	95	80	10	5	435	380	40	15
Somalia	2,425	1,820	565	40	20	..	20	..
Sudan	3,550	1,390	2,105	55	105	25	80	..	1,605	410	1,140	55
Tanzania	2,310	1,310	825	175	230	125	100	5	965	525	415	25
Togo	610	490	100	20	60	60	420	360	40	20
Uganda	1,215	900	285	30	250	150	100	..	400	270	130	..
Upper Volta	465	430	35	..	20	20	330	330
Zaire	1,485	765	710	10	65	35	30	..	420	35	385	..
Zambia	885	440	245	200	85	85	340	255	85	..
East Asia												
Burma	3,170	1,630	1,405	135	35	25	10	..
Indonesia	535	250	265	20
Kampuchea ²	1,935	1,030	825	80	10	..	10	..
Laos ²	220	60	150	10
Malaysia	420	255	145	20
Philippines	5	5	5	5
South Vietnam ²	25	25	20	20
Thailand	20	..	20
Thailand	10	5	..	5
Europe												
Malta	30	15	10	5	10	5	5	..	30	15	10	5
Latin America												
Argentina	11,170	6,805	4,350	15	845	515	330	..	5,010	2,860	2,150	..
Bolivia	430	225	205	..	10	5	5	..	65	60	5	..
Brazil	855	485	370	..	35	25	10	..	150	95	55	..
Chile	530	280	250	..	10	5	5	..	70	35	35	..
Colombia	710	520	190	..	10	5	5	..	50	30	20	..
Costa Rica	1,345	775	570	..	110	100	10	..	1,035	505	530	..
Dominican Republic	710	450	260	..	100	50	50	..	610	360	250	..
Ecuador	495	305	190	..	40	25	15	..	260	165	95	..
El Salvador	1,515	880	635	..	100	50	50	..	890	335	555	..
French West Indies	285	150	135	..	10	5	5	..	120	30	90	..
French West Indies	130	85	45	..	10	5	5	..	75	45	30	..

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ANNEX III to
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Number of Persons

**Academic Students From LDCs
Trained in Communist Countries¹ (continued)**

	Departures to Communist Countries				Being Trained as of				December 1979			
	1956-79				1979				Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Latin America (continued)												
Guatemala	105	85	20	..	5	5	25	25
Guyana	310	130	180	..	20	5	15	..	95	20	75	..
Haiti	150	75	75	..	10	5	5	..	30	20	10	..
Honduras	370	245	125	..	50	25	25	..	190	115	75	..
Jamaica	45	25	20	..	10	5	5	..	45	25	20	..
Mexico	675	410	255	10	35	25	10	..	140	65	75	..
Nicaragua	390	275	115	..	45	25	20	..	170	130	40	..
Panama	550	340	210	..	75	25	50	..	220	125	95	..
Paraguay	20	10	10
Peru	1,015	750	265	..	120	100	20	..	635	610	25	..
Uruguay	65	35	30
Venezuela	470	270	195	5	40	20	20	..	135	65	70	..
Middle East	33,190	17,695	15,405	90	1,995	800	1,195	..	13,160	6,745	6,405	10
Bahrain	280	250	30	..	30	25	5	..	180	150	30	..
Cyprus	2,435	1,050	1,385	..	320	120	200	..	1,175	475	700	..
Egypt	3,410	1,370	2,040	..	100	50	50	..	250	125	125	..
Greece	170	5	160	5	140	..	140	..
Iran	360	65	270	25	270	5	255	10
Iraq	5,400	2,755	2,620	25	675	100	575	..	1,015	250	765	..
Israel	75	75
Jordan	4,350	2,100	2,250	..	350	200	150	..	4,230	1,980	2,250	..
Kuwait	135	80	55	..	10	5	5	..	115	60	55	..
Lebanon	1,425	925	500	..	55	50	5	..	490	450	40	..
North Yemen	2,250	1,425	800	25	15	..	15	..	555	455	100	..
Oman	15	15
South Yemen	1,950	1,115	835	..	290	200	90	..	910	660	250	..
Syria	10,705	6,255	4,440	10	150	50	100	..	3,830	2,135	1,695	..
Trucial States ¹	150	130	20
Other	80	80
South Asia	14,410	9,355	4,865	190	5,165	3,385	1,760	20	9,780	6,635	3,050	95
Afghanistan	8,090	5,015	3,070	5	4,685	3,000	1,685	..	6,430	4,000	2,430	..
Bangladesh	1,700	1,220	465	15	75	65	10	..	1,000	660	325	15
India	2,235	1,330	900	5	135	85	50	..	1,160	1,000	160	..

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ANNEX III to
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Number of Persons

**Academic Students From LDCs
Trained in Communist Countries (continued)**

	Departures to Communist Countries				Being Trained as of							
	1956-79				December 1979							
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
South Asia (continued)												
Nepal	1,035	875	50	110	60	50	..	10	585	550	..	35
Pakistan	445	335	100	10	90	80	5	5	205	125	70	10
Sri Lanka	905	580	280	45	120	105	10	5	400	300	65	35

¹ Numbers are rounded to nearest five. Most of the estimates are based on scholarship awards.

² Data are through 1974 because Communist governments were formed in 1975.

³ Data represent students from the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain before these countries became independent.

Source: AC/127-D/639, pages 108-111

This table is Secret.

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	Number of Persons							
	1956-79				1979			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Technical Trainees From LDCs Departing for Training in Communist Countries¹								
Total	51,315	32,760	17,475	1,080	2,975	1,970	1,005	..
Africa	12,945	6,015	6,580	350	1,025	520	505	..
North Africa	5,505	1,885	3,620	..	350	150	200	..
Algeria	4,760	1,435	3,325	..	350	150	200	..
Libya	25	..	25
Mauritania	50	50
Morocco	325	270	55
Tunisia	345	130	215
Sub-Saharan Africa	7,440	4,130	2,960	350	675	370	305	..
Angola	600	335	265	..	350	235	115	..
Benin	785	465	320
Burundi	45	..	25	20	20	..	20	..
Cameroon	30	30
Central African Republic	120	85	35
Congo	130	75	50	5
Ethiopia	235	65	120	50
Ghana	800	445	345	10
Guinea	1,695	1,255	440
Kenya	125	10	115
Liberia	10	..	10
Madagascar	20	20
Mali	615	400	175	40
Mauritius	80	80	60	60
Mozambique	285	100	185	..	150	50	100	..
Nigeria	650	275	375	..	75	25	50	..
Senegal	100	100
Somalia	370	285	85
Sudan	110	15	95
Tanzania	420	60	260	100	20	..	20	..
Uganda	60	55	5
Upper Volta	60	60
Zambia	95	15	55	25
East Asia	1,115	360	345	410
Burma	245	50	140	55
Indonesia	485	300	185
Kampuchea ¹	385	10	20	355

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ANNEX III to
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	Number of Persons							
	1956-79				1979			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Europe	35	..	35
Malta	35	..	35
Latin America	535	295	230	10
Argentina	20	15	5
Bolivia	5	5
Brazil	15	5	10
Chile	55	20	35
Colombia	35	15	20
Ecuador	25	20	5
Guyana	45	30	5	10
Mexico	130	85	45
Peru	205	100	105
Middle East	25,155	17,210	7,725	220	1,350	850	500	..
Cyprus	100	50	50
Egypt	9,375	5,610	3,765	..	100	100
Iran	5,260	4,475	785
Iraq	4,490	3,125	1,355	10	1,250	750	500	..
North Yemen	890	445	235	210
South Yemen	450	405	45
Syria	2,590	1,245	1,345
Other	2,000	1,855	145
South Asia	11,530	8,880	2,560	90	600	600
Afghanistan	2,075	1,620	455	..	100	100
Bangladesh	990	790	200
India	6,000	4,270	1,730
Nepal	190	140	10	40
Pakistan	2,070	1,915	120	35	500	500
Sri Lanka	205	145	45	15

¹ Minimum estimates of the number of persons departing. Numbers are rounded to nearest five.
² Data are through the end of 1974 because a Communist government was formed in 1975.

Source: AC/127-D/639 pages, 106-107

This table is Secret.

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ANNEX III to
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Number of Persons

**Training of LDC Military Personnel
in Communist Countries¹**

	1955-79				1979			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Total	55,080	45,585	6,345	3,150	2,190	1,795	380	15
Africa	18,900	14,420	1,760	2,720	1,375	1,000	360	15
North Africa	4,150	3,580	555	15	415	195	220	..
Algeria	2,410	2,195	200	15	150	150
Libya	1,595	1,310	285	..	265	45	220	..
Morocco	145	75	70
Sub-Saharan Africa	14,750	10,840	1,205	2,705	960	805	140	15
Angola	60	55	5	..	NA	NA
Benin	30	30	10	10
Botswana	10	10
Burundi	75	75
Cameroon	125	125
Cape Verde	120	120	120	120
Chad	145	120	25	..	40	15	25	..
Congo	1,005	505	85	415	150	150	NA	..
Equatorial Guinea	200	200
Ethiopia	1,790	1,290	500	..	150	100	50	..
Ghana	180	180
Guinea	1,305	885	60	360	15	15
Guinea-Bissau	100	100
Liberia	5	..	5	..	5	..	5	..
Madagascar	115	55	60	..	85	25	60	..
Mali	420	360	10	50	5	5
Mozambique	480	400	30	50	15	15
Nigeria	825	790	35	..	95	95
Sierra Leone	150	150
Somalia	2,585	2,395	160	30
Sudan	550	330	20	200
Tanzania	3,005	1,970	10	1,025	150	150
Togo	55	55
Uganda	990	790	200
Zaire	175	175
Zambia	250	190	..	60	120	105	..	15
East Asia	9,300	7,590	1,710
Indonesia	9,270	7,560	1,710
Kampuchea	30	30

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ANNEX III to
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Number of Persons

	1955-79				1979			
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	China
Latin America	780	780	55	55
Peru	780	780	55	55
Middle East	18,875	16,370	2,505	..	760	740	20	..
Egypt	6,250	5,665	585
Iran	315	315
Iraq	4,400	3,710	690	..	70	60	10	..
North Yemen	1,360	1,360	180	180
South Yemen	1,095	1,075	20	..	NA	NA
Syria	5,455	4,245	1,210	..	510	500	10	..
South Asia	7,225	6,425	370	430	NA	NA
Afghanistan	4,010	3,725	285	..	NA	NA
Bangladesh	485	445	..	40
India	2,285	2,200	85
Pakistan	430	45	NA	385
Sri Lanka	15	10	..	5

'Data refer to the estimated number of persons departing for training. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

Source: AC/127-D/639, pages 94-95

This table is Secret.

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