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of a

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

THURSDAY 15th DECEMBER, 1966 at 3.30 p.m.

at the

NATO HEADQUARTERS

PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS (16e)

COMPTE RENDU

de la

REUNION DU CONSEIL

tenue le

JEUDI 15 DECEMBRE 1966 à 15h30

au

SIEGE DE L'OTAN

PORTE DAUPHINE, PARIS (16e)

*+ con no 1
dated 1/2/67*

*+ con no 2
dated 22/2/67*

OTAN/NATO
Paris (16e)

NATO SECRET

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REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS(contd)

(See also C-VR(66)68)

M. BROSIO

The floor is to Mr. Toumbas, the Foreign Minister of Greece, please.

M. TOUMBAS

M. le Président, ayant écouté les interventions des collègues qui m'ont précédé dans ce débat, je ne crois pas avoir à apporter des éléments nouveaux ou des appréciations qui ne soient pas déjà connues dans cette enceinte. Je me limiterai donc à quelques brèves observations portant sur des points qui, à notre avis, méritent une attention particulière.

La situation internationale, vue de la périphérie de la zone atlantique dans laquelle se trouve mon pays, ne présente pas un aspect différent de celui du centre. Une amélioration dans le climat de nos relations avec nos voisins balkaniques est en voie de progression. Nous y contribuons dans la mesure où nous enregistrons un désir analogue chez eux. Et je dois dire que ce désir existe aujourd'hui bien plus qu'autrefois. Avec la Bulgarie et la Roumanie, nos relations sont meilleures. Avec la Yougoslavie, elles continuent à être amicales. Cette évolution est encourageante. Elle correspond au climat de détente qui se fait actuellement sentir en Europe.

Ceci dit, nous ne perdons pas de vue les distances qui séparent notre monde du monde communiste. Nous désirons que ces distances soient progressivement réduites, non pas par des manifestations verbales, mais par des faits. Nous savons que la tactique communiste utilise l'alternance des crises et des répit dans le but d'endormir notre vigilance et de relâcher notre unité. Peut-être, me dira-t-on, qu'aujourd'hui il ne s'agit plus de tactique, mais de politique nouvelle émanant d'un véritable désir de détente, d'entente et de coopération. Nous voulons bien le croire dans la mesure où cela est prouvé en termes réels. L'état de l'Alliance ? Il n'est pas fameux. Pourquoi ne pas le reconnaître ? Mais l'Alliance se survit; elle est plus que jamais nécessaire, indispensable; elle a fait ses preuves dans le passé, et nous ne voyons pas d'autre garantie pour l'avenir. Nous sommes attachés avec fidélité à l'Alliance. Nous sommes sûrs qu'elle franchira le cap pour le plus grand bien de tous.

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M. TOUMBAS (suite)

A ce propos, je voudrais dire quelques mots sur le rapport du Secrétaire général concernant sa mission du "watching brief". Ce rapport fait état du dialogue gréco-turc sur Chypre et sur les relations entre les deux pays. Actuellement, le dialogue continue. Il reste confidentiel. Le secret, des deux côtés, a été bien gardé. C'est bien ce qui a permis au dialogue de continuer en évitant les écueils, le sabotage ; nous sommes soucieux d'aboutir. Nous serons heureux le jour où nous pourrons dire que nous avons ouvert l'accès à une entente. La question est sérieuse, difficile, dépendant de facteurs multiples ; mais si la tâche est ardue, elle ne saurait nous décourager. Je comprends que nos Alliés turcs sont animés du même esprit.

Il faut également reconnaître que le seul fait que la Grèce et la Turquie sont en train de causer, a produit une détente sensible dans le domaine des relations entre nos deux pays. En ce temps de crise que traverse l'Alliance, j'ai tout lieu de croire que vous verrez dans nos efforts communs une contribution appréciable à sa stabilité.

Je profite de cette occasion pour renouveler l'expression de notre reconnaissance à notre Secrétaire général, dont la sollicitude, éclairée de sagesse, constitue un facteur positif dans l'évolution des rapports gréco-turcs. Le "watching brief" continue.

J'aborde maintenant le problème des relations Est-Ouest. Notre point de vue est bien connu. Nous n'avons pas pu adopter la première partie du rapport qui nous est soumis par le Conseil permanent. Cette partie comprend ce que nous pourrions appeler les "considérants" de la politique de détente qui semble s'amorcer. Les raisons de notre désaccord sont contenues dans l'Annexe B au document C-M(66)84(Définitif). Je considère donc superflu d'y revenir. Mais j'ai été heureux de constater que les raisons de nos réserves ont eu un certain écho parmi nos alliés, et je voudrais remercier M. Luns de la mention favorable qu'il a bien voulu en faire.

Par contre, nous avons adopté les trois autres parties du rapport qui préconisent des mesures concrètes à prendre en vue de promouvoir la détente. Nous favorisons tout effort ayant pour but d'améliorer les rapports Est-Ouest. Si nous y arrivons, tant mieux. Sinon, nous aurons au moins l'avantage d'enrichir notre expérience et de ne pas éluder aussi facilement les réalités auxquelles nous avons à faire face.

Faisons de la détente en restant dans le réel et dans le raisonnable. Sur ce plan, il sera toujours plus facile de nous entendre ; mais laissons de côté ce que l'on pourrait appeler la philosophie de la détente. Inutile de rechercher ou, au besoin même,

M. TOUMBAS (suite)

d'inventer des raisons pour justifier une telle politique. Rien ne nous oblige à mettre en sourdine la menace qui pèse toujours sur nous ou de broser en rose le portrait du monde communiste. Une telle opération est non seulement inutile, mais elle risque aussi de se heurter à des différences d'appréciation bien légitimes. Mettons-nous d'accord sur ce qu'il est possible de faire, sans engager notre responsabilité envers l'Histoire qui, seule, jugera un jour du bien-fondé ou des erreurs de notre philosophie. La recherche de la paix n'a pas besoin d'excuses.

Je désire également ajouter qu'il serait extrêmement dangereux de faire de la sécurité en termes politiques ou faire de la politique en termes engageant notre sécurité. Ces deux notions sont interdépendantes. Cela est incontestable. Elles appartiennent cependant à des domaines différents dont il serait dangereux d'invertir les rôles. C'est bien ce que l'Union soviétique a toujours essayé de faire. Je vous cite en exemple la proposition orientale pour la conclusion d'un pacte de non-agression entre les pays OTAN et ceux du Pacte de Varsovie, ou la mise hors la loi de l'arme nucléaire. Une sécurité en papier, en paroles et en signatures n'est pas notre fait.

De même il serait également nocif d'essayer de faire de la politique dans le domaine de la sécurité, en adoptant, par exemple, des mesures affectant notre sécurité pour en tirer des arguments politiques à utiliser dans un sens ou dans un autre. Nous pensons que dans le domaine vital de la sécurité, qui n'est pas autre chose que le maintien d'un équilibre dissuasif de forces respectives, nous devons rechercher la détente par des mesures réciproques de désarmement ou même de désengagement.

Nous croyons, que tant que, ces deux conditions sont maintenues, nous pourrions affronter l'Est dans n'importe quelle enceinte et à n'importe quel niveau.

Les Soviétiques insistent pour la réunion d'une conférence sur la sécurité européenne. Il va sans dire qu'une telle confrontation ne saurait se faire sans la participation active des Etats-Unis et du Canada. Sous cette condition, je me demande si, au lieu de persister dans une attitude négative, nous n'aurions pas avantage à faire une contre-proposition, qui serait celle de réunir une conférence politique pour résoudre les problèmes politiques européens en même temps qu'une conférence militaire Est-Ouest, devant traiter des possibilités d'une réduction respective des forces adverses et d'un désengagement progressif dans le maintien de l'équilibre existant.

M. TOUMBAS (suite)

Si une telle proposition était acceptée, on pourrait s'engager dans un effort sérieux de détente. Dans le cas contraire, on mettrait fin à une propagande qui est en train de saper notre unité et la résistance morale de nos peuples. Bien que le conflit du Vietnam ne figure pas à notre ordre du jour, il n'est guère possible d'ignorer la menace qu'il constitue pour la paix mondiale. C'est là la source principale d'inquiétude et de soucis que nous inspire la situation internationale actuelle. C'est de là que provient l'obstacle le plus sérieux auquel sont venus se heurter les efforts déployés en vue de résoudre d'autres questions d'importance capitale, telles que celle du désarmement. C'est à cela qu'est due la résurgence de certains traits de la guerre froide que l'on avait cru à jamais écartés et abandonnés.

Je n'ai pas l'intention d'entrer dans le détail de la question. Je ne puis quand même dissimuler la déception que ressent mon gouvernement et le peuple hellénique du fait que les efforts réitérés des Etats-Unis et de nombre d'autres gouvernements, ainsi que des personnalités d'envergure internationale, en vue de la cessation du conflit, n'ont pas trouvé d'écho chez l'autre partie au litige. Nous sommes convaincus en Grèce que le différend du Vietnam doit être acheminé au plus tôt vers une table de négociation sur la base des Accords de Genève de 1954 pour y trouver une solution pacifique, juste et équitable. La Grèce qui, il n'y a pas longtemps, a connu une forme analogue de mouvement subversif armé, guidé et soutenu de l'extérieur, et qui a pu, grâce à l'appui précieux des Nations Unies et à l'assistance des Etats-Unis, sauvegarder son indépendance, sa souveraineté et l'intégrité de son territoire, la Grèce, qui a subi une expérience douloureuse des malheurs qu'entraîne pareille ingérence, ne peut qu'éprouver une sympathie profonde pour le peuple vietnamien. C'est pour nous une raison de plus d'avoir suivi, et de continuer à suivre avec une sollicitude et une appréciation toutes particulières, tous les efforts entrepris en cette matière et de leur apporter tout notre appui. Faire cesser l'éclatement et l'effet des armes par les armes n'est pas toujours facile, mais il est bien plus sage et plus humain de faire cesser l'emploi des armes par des négociations. C'est ce qu'exige la grande majorité de l'opinion publique mondiale, et c'est notre ferme espoir que ceux qui s'y opposent ne tarderont pas à se rendre compte du désastre dans lequel une persistance dans l'intransigeance et le fanatisme peut plonger non seulement leur propre peuple, mais la communauté internationale tout entière.

Merci, M. le Président.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. le Ministre. M. Çaglayangil maintenant.

M. ÇAGLAYANGIL

M. le Président, je ne pense pas que j'ai beaucoup à ajouter à ce qui a été déjà exposé sur la situation internationale en général. Notre évaluation de l'évolution des événements coïncide dans ses grandes lignes avec celle des collègues qui m'ont précédé. Naturellement, nos esprits sont dominés par les développements en Asie du Sud-Est. Nous souhaitons vivement l'aboutissement des efforts déployés en vue de restaurer la paix au Vietnam. Nous sommes encouragés par la plus grande cohésion qui se manifeste entre plusieurs pays asiatiques et par la réaffirmation de leur volonté de travailler en commun pour la paix et la stabilité de ce continent, dont dépend, dans une large mesure, la paix mondiale dans les circonstances actuelles.

Notre position vis-à-vis du problème vietnamien a déjà été maintes fois exposée. Nous restons persuadés que les Etats-Unis ont assumé dans cette partie du monde une lourde responsabilité. Ils ont consenti d'énormes sacrifices pour faire face à un péril débordant largement le cadre local. Etant convaincus comme nous le sommes de l'indivisibilité de la paix et de la solidarité globale entre les membres de notre Alliance, nous ne pouvons que prêter notre appui moral aux Etats-Unis.

Dans l'analyse de la situation internationale, j'estime que je dois m'arrêter quelque peu sur les développements au Moyen-Orient, qui ont pris ces derniers temps une tournure inquiétante. Nos préoccupations dans ce domaine proviennent principalement de trois sources :

Premièrement, l'accroissement de l'influence soviétique et communiste en Syrie ;

Deuxièmement, l'intensification de la confrontation entre Israël et les pays arabes ;

Troisièmement, l'aggravation des conflits et des divisions au sein même du monde arabe.

La combinaison de ces trois facteurs a de nouveau transformé le Moyen-Orient en un foyer de tension grave menaçant la paix et la stabilité de cette région et risquant de provoquer des conflits affectant, d'une part l'Occident et, d'autre part, l'Union soviétique.

Il est peut-être vrai que l'Union soviétique ne fait qu'essayer de profiter des occasions qui se présentent, car il est possible qu'elle considère, pour le moment, contraire à ses intérêts le déclenchement d'une grave crise dans cette région. Néanmoins, nous devons réaliser que le Moyen-Orient offre à l'Union soviétique un terrain propice lui permettant de promouvoir sa politique générale dans cette région, politique dont l'objectif est d'y installer une solide influence soviétique.

M. ÇAGLAYANGIL (suite)

Nous sommes particulièrement inquiets de l'emprise soviétique en Syrie et de la situation difficile dans laquelle se trouve la Jordanie. Quant à la situation en Irak, elle ne manquera pas d'être influencée par ce qui se passe dans ces deux pays. Nous estimons qu'il est dans l'intérêt de l'Occident de soutenir au maximum l'Irak et la Jordanie. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement l'Irak, nous appuyons les efforts de ce pays visant à restaurer sa stabilité intérieure, à normaliser ses relations extérieures et à maintenir la possibilité de poursuivre une politique indépendante tenant compte, en premier lieu, de ses propres intérêts. C'est la préservation de la stabilité en Irak et en Jordanie qui pourra le mieux contenir la situation dangereuse qui se développe en Syrie. Néanmoins, je dois ajouter que cette évaluation ne signifie nullement de notre part un préjugé à l'encontre des autres pays arabes. Tout au contraire, nous sommes décidés à continuer notre politique consistant à développer nos relations avec tous les pays arabes sans distinction, sur une base bilatérale, en nous gardant bien de nous immiscer dans leurs querelles et leurs conflits. Les progrès que nous avons réalisés jusqu'à présent dans ce domaine ont été extrêmement encourageants.

En me référant à la situation au Moyen-Orient, je voudrais aussi brièvement mentionner le Pakistan. Vous connaissez tous les répercussions du conflit du Cachemire sur la politique extérieure du Pakistan. Mais je voudrais ici réitérer notre conviction que l'orientation du Pakistan dépend également, dans une large mesure, de la compréhension et de la sympathie dont fera preuve l'Occident envers ce pays. Nous considérons que, quelles que soient les fluctuations de la politique pakistanaise en raison de ses relations avec l'Inde, ce pays continue à attacher une très grande importance à ses liens avec l'Occident.

Comme à chaque session de décembre vous nous avez présenté, Monsieur le Président, un rapport sur votre mission de surveillance au sujet des relations entre la Grèce et la Turquie. Lors de notre dernière réunion, nous avons avec mon collègue M. TOUMBAS informé le Conseil de l'accord intervenu entre la Turquie et la Grèce en vue d'entreprendre des contacts et des échanges de vues sur la question de Chypre. Ces échanges de vues ont commencé à la fin du mois de juin dernier et se sont poursuivis jusqu'à ce jour avec certains intervalles. Je ne suis pas en mesure, à ce stade, d'exprimer une opinion sur le résultat possible de ces discussions. Je voudrais cependant souligner qu'elles se sont déroulées dans une atmosphère empreinte de bonne foi mutuelle.

M. ÇAGLAYANGİL (suite)

La situation à Chypre et surtout les derniers développements concernant l'envoi d'armes et d'équipements par la Tchécoslovaquie rendent plus nécessaire que jamais une solution rapide de ce conflit. L'accord sur les armes, qui a été conclu avec la Tchécoslovaquie par l'administration grecque chypriote, et les livraisons déjà effectuées de mitrailleuses, de bazookas et de véhicules blindés, constituent une violation sérieuse des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité et risquent d'aggraver la tension à Chypre en accentuant le déséquilibre militaire entre les deux communautés. Nous espérons que nos Alliés examineront cette question avec toute l'attention qu'elle mérite et ne manqueront pas d'exercer leur influence pour arrêter cette nouvelle importation d'armes dans une île qui est déjà saturée. En ce qui nous concerne, nous sommes gravement inquiets devant cette nouvelle tentative de l'administration grecque chypriote. Nous suivons de très près la situation et nous espérons que nos démarches, destinées à empêcher que ces armes demeurent entre les mains de l'administration grecque chypriote, aboutiront sans délai. Autrement, nous serons obligés d'étudier et d'adopter toutes les mesures qui s'imposent pour sauvegarder la sécurité de la communauté turque face à ce nouveau péril.

Monsieur le Président, la question des relations Est-Ouest constitue cette fois encore notre principal sujet de discussion avec le but d'arriver, si possible, à des moyens d'application politique. Il s'agit, à nos yeux, d'un problème capital car la politique des pays de l'OTAN dans ce domaine, au cours des années à venir, aura une influence considérable sur l'évolution de la situation, tant en Europe que dans le monde. Mais, ce qui est non moins important, l'attitude individuelle et collective des membres de l'OTAN dans les relations Est-Ouest déterminera aussi, dans une très large mesure, le degré de notre cohésion et de notre solidarité et sera susceptible d'affecter, en conséquence, l'avenir même de notre Alliance. Le Conseil Permanent a discuté les divers aspects de ce problème. Bien que sa première partie soit rédigée dans une langue un peu trop adoucie par rapport aux réalités, nous approuvons dans ses grandes lignes le document C-M(66)84 et surtout le chapitre relatif au rôle que l'OTAN est appelée à jouer dans les relations Est-Ouest. Nous estimons également que l'Italie a pris une initiative ingénieuse en suggérant l'idée de la publication d'un manifeste qui établirait les lignes essentielles des politiques individuelles des membres de l'Alliance envers l'Europe orientale. Les buts que nous visons en tant qu'Alliance dans nos rapports avec les pays de l'Europe de l'Est, nous les avons déclarés avec clarté dans le dernier communiqué publié à Bruxelles. Le Président Johnson a d'autre part fait, le 7 octobre, une déclaration d'une grande importance, dans laquelle il a élaboré sa vision de l'avenir d'une Europe unie et de la Communauté atlantique. Ces objectifs, nous les approuvons entièrement.

M. ÇAGLAYANGIL (suite)

Cependant, nous ne pouvons que constater l'écart qui existe entre ceux-ci et les objectifs poursuivis par l'Union soviétique et les pays d'Europe orientale. Les concepts de "détente" et de "coopération" continuent d'avoir des significations différentes des deux côtés de la ligne. En ce qui nous concerne, il s'agit de créer graduellement les conditions dans lesquelles un terme sera mis à la division de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe. En revanche, pour l'Union soviétique, ainsi que pour les pays de l'Est, la détente signifie la consolidation et la confirmation du statu quo en Europe, entre autres la légalisation de la division de l'Allemagne. Les Soviétiques sont, il me semble, de plus en plus explicites à ce sujet. D'autre part, à en juger par les termes de la déclaration de Bucarest, les conditions posées par les pays d'Europe orientale pour la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité en Europe vont même au-delà d'une simple demande d'acceptation du statu quo. Cette déclaration exige, en effet, d'autres mesures allant de la dissolution simultanée des Pactes de Varsovie et de l'OTAN au démantèlement des bases militaires, au retrait de toutes les troupes étrangères, à la limitation des forces armées en Allemagne fédérale et dans la zone d'occupation soviétique, à la création de zones dénucléarisées.

Pouvons-nous supposer, dans les circonstances actuelles, que, malgré la proclamation de ces buts communs, l'Union soviétique et les pays d'Europe orientale ne sont pas à même d'entreprendre une action conjointe ? Je ne le crois pas. Nous observons certes une évolution significative dans la direction d'une plus grande liberté d'action chez les pays de l'Est vis-à-vis de l'Union soviétique; mais cette liberté d'action et le pluralisme qui en découle n'ont pas l'ampleur qu'on leur attribue toujours. Elle se manifeste surtout dans les affaires intérieures. Par contre, en matière de politique extérieure, les pays de l'Est continuent à suivre une ligne de conduite calquée sur celle de l'Union soviétique. Dans certains cas, ce parallélisme provient de la communauté d'intérêts qui lient ces pays à l'Union soviétique en ce qui concerne les problèmes européens, ou de raisons idéologiques. Dans d'autres cas, c'est le poids de la puissance soviétique qui impose une limite bien définie à la liberté d'action à laquelle aspirent peut-être certains pays d'Europe orientale, notamment la Roumanie.

Dans presque tous les cas, une communauté de destin existe entre les partis communistes, ou du moins entre les leaders de ces partis. Ceci est en tout cas l'impression que nous avons clairement recueillie au cours de nos récents et multiples contacts avec les dirigeants des pays d'Europe orientale.

M. CAGLAYANGIL (suite)

Nous savons aussi que l'Union soviétique s'efforce, par tous les moyens, de renforcer encore davantage la coordination entre les membres du Pacte de Varsovie dans le domaine de la politique extérieure, afin d'éviter tout risque de dissidence au sein de ce pacte. Je voudrais aussi noter que même le conflit sino-soviétique, qui pourtant a été, à l'origine, le facteur le plus important du polycentrisme dans le monde communiste, semble fournir paradoxalement un point d'appui aux dirigeants soviétiques pour pousser leurs partenaires à serrer les rangs autour de Moscou.

Ces observations m'amènent à conclure que nous affrontons, dans le Pacte de Varsovie, un groupe d'Etats qui s'efforcent d'atteindre des buts communs par une action étroitement coordonnée. La question se pose donc de savoir si nos efforts pour atteindre des buts politiques précis peuvent être efficaces et fructueux sans un certain degré de consultation et d'harmonisation au sein de l'OTAN également. D'ailleurs, même si la situation dans le cadre du Pacte de Varsovie était différente, même si nous étions en face d'initiatives individuelles et dispersées, il faudrait toujours un degré minimum d'harmonisation pour influencer le cours des événements dans la direction que nous souhaitons. Il faut souligner qu'un manque d'harmonisation aurait surtout des répercussions regrettables au sein même de l'Alliance. Nous ne pouvons en effet oublier que toute initiative politique à l'égard de l'Union soviétique et des pays de l'Est est susceptible d'avoir, à plus ou moins longue échéance, des conséquences pour les autres membres de l'Alliance et pour l'Alliance dans son ensemble.

Si nous n'arrivons pas à harmoniser nos politiques de façon à concilier nos intérêts mutuels, quelles seraient les possibilités de préserver la confiance réciproque qui est à la base même de notre cohésion ? Et ce facteur a une importance accrue à un moment où notre Alliance traverse une période difficile et où notre solidarité est mise à l'épreuve.

Nous devons donc nous abstenir de donner à nos opinions publiques l'impression que certaines initiatives ou prises de position sont le résultat du relâchement des liens d'alliance et de l'effritement de notre solidarité.

Je suis profondément persuadé que tout progrès que nous pourrions attendre de la détente, ou de l'entente, avec l'Est serait plus qu'annulé par les dangers que provoquerait la dislocation de l'équilibre politique et militaire qui constitue aujourd'hui même le fondement de la paix en Europe.

M. CAGLAYANGIL (suite)

Les raisons qui nous obligent à rester membre de l'Alliance atlantique devraient également nous imposer le devoir de concilier nos intérêts mutuels dans le cadre de l'intérêt général de l'OTAN. C'est en partant de ces considérations, M. le Président, que nous accordons notre soutien à tous les accords destinés à promouvoir les relations Est-Ouest, pourvu qu'ils soient harmonisés et concertés au sein de l'Alliance.

C'est dans cet esprit que nous nous efforçons de notre côté de développer nos relations avec l'Union Soviétique et les autres pays de l'Europe de l'Est. En fait, dans quelques jours, nous allons recevoir en Turquie M. Kossyguine qui sera le premier Président du Conseil soviétique qui visite notre pays.

M. le Président, je crois que les vues que je viens d'exprimer sur les relations Est-Ouest montrent amplement combien nous sommes attachés à la cohésion de l'OTAN et combien nous considérons cette solidarité comme un facteur crucial et permanent de notre politique extérieure. Il est donc naturel que nous accueillions avec grand intérêt et sympathie toute initiative visant à revitaliser l'OTAN et à confirmer notre foi dans l'Alliance Atlantique. C'est dans cet esprit que nous accueillons l'initiative de M. Harmel et nous espérons que sa suggestion ouvrira la voie à une étude approfondie d'où résulteraient des recommandations concrètes tendant à cimenter la solidarité entre tous les membres de l'Alliance et à créer un véritable "Partnership" atlantique que nous avons à coeur. Je voudrais cependant mettre l'accent sur un aspect important de l'avenir de notre Alliance. Nous sommes, en Turquie, convaincus que nous ne devons jamais perdre de vue que notre Alliance est d'abord et avant tout une Alliance défensive, destinée à assurer la sécurité de tous ses membres. Or, pour assurer d'une façon adéquate cette sécurité, nous sommes obligés d'évaluer l'ampleur de la menace militaire dirigée contre nous, non pas en des termes subjectifs, mais en des termes objectifs. Autrement dit, nous ne pouvons pas évaluer cette menace simplement en fonction des intentions que nous attribuons à nos adversaires, mais en fonction de leur véritable potentiel militaire. Si nous n'avions pas choisi cette voie jusqu'à présent, je suis sûr que l'OTAN n'aurait jamais réussi à jouer un rôle de dissuasion.

Cette nécessité de maintenir un potentiel défensif adéquat s'impose, non seulement pour la sauvegarde de notre sécurité, mais également pour la réussite des initiatives politiques destinées à asseoir sur des bases solides la paix en Europe et à ouvrir la voie à une coopération entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Ce qui importe à ce stade des relations Est-Ouest, ce

M. CAGLAYANGIL (suite)

n'est pas de convaincre l'Union Soviétique et ses partenaires du Pacte de Varsovie que l'Alliance Atlantique est en voie d'affaiblissement, mais bien de leur donner l'image d'une alliance solide qui, tout en se proposant de sauvegarder et de servir les intérêts légitimes de ses membres, compte sincèrement atteindre ses buts dans une réconciliation avec les pays d'Europe orientale sur la base d'un règlement juste et équitable des problèmes politiques qui divisent le Continent. Merci, Monsieur le Président.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le Ministre.

Avant de donner la parole à M. Nogueira, M. Toumbas voudrait dire un mot sur les livraisons d'armes à Chypre.

M. TOUMBAS

Monsieur le Président, je regrette que mon collègue turc ait cru devoir se référer, dans ce débat amical, à la question de la fourniture par la Tchécoslovaquie à la République de Chypre d'une certaine quantité d'armes destinées à la police chypriote. Je ne me ferai pas ici l'avocat du Gouvernement de Chypre, il est notoire que le Gouvernement hellénique, qui n'a pas été mis au courant de cette action du Gouvernement Chypriote, a immédiatement et efficacement réagi. Nous avons chargé le Chef d'Etat-Major de notre défense, le Général Tsolakas, de se rendre en mission à Nicosie et de négocier avec le Président Makarios la mise en dépôt contrôlé de cet armement. Nous avons réussi sur ce point à obtenir des assurances satisfaisantes et nous entendons poursuivre dans ce sens nos efforts afin que les appréhensions que la Turquie pourrait avoir à ce sujet soient dissipées. Nous sommes les premiers à être intéressés au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité à Chypre. Nous voulons réserver au dialogue que nous avons engagé avec nos alliés turcs toutes les chances d'aboutir. Il faut cependant reconnaître qu'aussi longtemps que Chypre sera reconnue comme un Etat indépendant, son gouvernement sera censé assumer ses propres responsabilités, et cela plus particulièrement dans le domaine réservé de sa sécurité. Nous ne croyons pas que le recours à la violence puisse arranger les choses. Bien au contraire, toute action dans ce sens risquerait de mettre le feu aux poudres et de provoquer une catastrophe dans laquelle tout le monde, y compris l'Alliance, serait perdant. C'est pourquoi nous faisons tout notre possible pour amener par des moyens pacifiques - et nous en avons averti nos amis turcs - les autorités chypriotes à donner des garanties satisfaisantes pour le règlement de ce nouveau problème qui vient de surgir inopinément. Merci, Monsieur le Président.

Mr. BROSIO

Merci, Monsieur le Ministre. M. Nogueira, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. NOGUEIRA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Speaking on the state of the Alliance, the first thought which crosses one's mind relates to the crisis which the Alliance is facing. There is no point, Mr. Chairman, in saying or suggesting that everything goes well, because everything is not going well within the Alliance. We all realise the seriousness of the crisis, we are all aware of the situation which calls for urgent consideration. There is no point, Mr. Chairman, in going through the detailed difficulties confronting us, nor is it advantageous to indulge in any theoretical speculations.

For my purpose today, I only need to underline a few facts. The first basic consideration seems to me to be an obvious one; the situation which the Atlantic Alliance was called upon to deal with has changed. We are today facing an entirely different situation. Back in the year 1949, Western Europe was facing a direct and frontal threat from the Soviet Union. The rest of the world was then relatively free from such a threat. In meeting the situation prevailing in 1949 and in the years which immediately followed, we can say that the Alliance was very successful indeed. But since 1955 and 1960 many very important developments have taken place in the world at large. This is a reality which we have to face and which we have to acknowledge.

I am not suggesting that the threat of the Soviet Union against Western Europe has diminished in any way. I believe it to be as strong and as dangerous as before. But, whereas the threat of the Soviet Union was in 1949 confined to Europe, now in 1966, and for some time, it has become a global threat. We know and we are aware of the tension between the Soviet Union and China; we know that the control over the satellite countries is probably less rigid than before. All this is true. But when it comes to face the West, when it comes to attack the West, when it comes to seek to undermine and subvert the West, then the Communist threat is as violent and determined as ever. And what does the Alliance do? We seem to be very complacent about ourselves. We go on maintaining a very solid and firm solidarity within the restricted geographical area of the Alliance, but we feel entirely free to show hostility to one another outside that area. We think and operate within the same philosophy as in 1949. We think and operate within the same state of mind as in 1949. We think and operate within the same political framework as in 1949. But the Communist world does not do the same. They have ventured into new fields. They have literally spread their activities throughout the world, and they are very active in Central and South America, in Africa, in the Middle East, in the Far East and elsewhere.

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

As for ourselves, Mr. Chairman, we are still thinking and acting very much along the lines of 1949, and we keep talking and hammering on about the same topics, arguing about political consultation and we are always very careful to conceal and disguise ourselves before the rest of the world from being an Alliance, as though there were something humiliating or shameful in being a member of the Atlantic Alliance.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, we are meeting a global attack from the Communist world with very limited solidarity. We are meeting the global Communist challenge and confrontation with very restricted and more than hesitant solidarity. This is not working, Mr. Chairman, and in the view of my Delegation, it will not work.

Does it surprise anyone that many, if not most of the Allies, are not pleased with the operation of the Alliance and do not find in it the measure of support to which all of us seem to be entitled? Does it surprise anyone that many of us give to the Alliance less and less co-operation and seem to seek in other directions the protection of their legitimate national aspirations and interests?

I am sure that we all agree that the Alliance cannot and should not be a one-way proposition. Or could it be, Mr. Chairman, that the countries of the Alliance, individually and collectively, have no interests and responsibilities, I mean legitimate interests and responsibilities, outside the geographical area of the Alliance. It is true that among ourselves, we discuss problems concerning outlying areas and affecting the most remote corners of the world. But we debate them without the slightest intention of formulating and reaching an agreed policy. Or could it be that the Alliance has entrusted to some of us only, the defence of those interests and responsibilities.

Clearly, no-one has been given a mandate for that purpose, and any such actions can only be explained as the pursuance of national policies.

Be it as it may, Mr. Chairman, we are fast approaching the year of 1969, and the year of 1969 will be a crucial year. Time flies quickly and it is not too soon to prepare ourselves for that date.

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

If we wish to overcome the present crisis of the Alliance, I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we have to face this situation clearly and squarely and start asking ourselves some searching questions.

The political philosophy and the political framework of the Alliance have to be profoundly reappraised and revised. We do not have so much to reform the structure of the Alliance, we have rather to reform ourselves and our state of mind.

I think, Mr Secretary General, that we should try to answer some pertinent questions. What is the Alliance all about? What threat has the Alliance to meet? Is there in the world only one challenge to the West, or are there many challenges under different guises and names? Knowing that there are different types of wars, conventional wars, nuclear wars, subversion wars, liberation wars, etc., why is it that the Alliance seems to be only prepared and willing to fight a certain type of war which we know is not going to take place anyway? I know the answer is that such a war is not taking place precisely because we are prepared for it. But then other wars do take place and, as we are not prepared for them, we do not seem to fight them successfully and this is to make a typical understatement. When I say fighting in this context, Mr. Chairman, I mean fighting in political terms, of course, not in military terms.

And then you should also ask whether, apart from the Alliance's geographical area, whether there are other areas and divisions of the world where the Alliance, as such, has vital interests in political terms and in terms of security as well. The United States, for example, seems to have, and quite rightly so, a deep concern for the security of Latin America and it is also increasingly realised that the security in the far Pacific is also vital and, what is more, should be of concern to our Alliance in the view of the United States Government.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if we are to improve and enlarge our relations with the Eastern countries, we have to place ourselves at least in a position of equality. Western Europe cannot afford to be a mere peninsula of Asia encircled by a hostile or unfriendly or unreliable world. To avoid that, the security of the Atlantic Ocean, both North and South, is vital, as is the security of the Mediterranean Sea and of the access to the Indian Ocean, and that means the security of the coastlines in the South Atlantic with all its islands.

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Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

Only yesterday, our military authorities pointed out that the Soviet Union has 330 conventional submarines and 49 nuclear submarines. We should add to these an already powerful merchant fleet which provides logistic support to the Soviet Navy on the high seas. Are we to watch these developments from the fence and at the same time allow the opponents a free hand, or what is worse, to pursue a policy which actually helps them?

Now, Mr. Secretary General, these are some of the bare and naked realities we have to face when we proceed to rethink and revise our Alliance. It all boils down to a few important aspects. First, the geographical area of the Alliance has to coincide with its global interests and responsibilities and commitments and therefore it has to be enlarged so as to practically impress the whole world.

Secondly, the solidarity among ourselves cannot be narrowly confined to a certain set of problems or to a certain geographical region, but it has to be as firm and as global as the global attack we are supposed to meet and to defeat. We have to realise, Mr. President, that the forces at work in various parts of the world are of the same origin and of the same nature. They simply take on different names or apply different methods in accordance with the local conditions and requirements.

And thirdly, we have to devise a system of political consultation which may provide a real forum to establish a platform for an agreed policy with the highest possible common denominator.

Having emphasised these three points, I think, Mr. Chairman, I should at once make it clear that, when I argue in favour of a global commitment and in favour of a global solidarity, I am not suggesting that the countries located outside our geographical area should become members of the Alliance and I am not suggesting either that all of us should go to war because there is a friction or a conflict engaging one Ally in some part of the world or other. This is certainly not the view of my Government, and it is clear that no Ally should expect to have its views and policies fully endorsed and approved by the Council. I do mean, however, that the political solidarity should work in such a way as to prevent an Ally from pursuing a policy of outright hostility towards other Allies.

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

The power of the Alliance stems from its military capabilities, but it would be far greater if it would also show firm unity in the will to defend its legitimate interests and positions. It is said that the Alliance has been able to keep peace. It is true, but that peace has been peace through terror and if we keep losing one political position after another the balance of terror and the military deterrent may still be there in physical terms but there will be no public opinion and no will-power to support it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, starting from the three points I ventured to outline, and in view of the obvious need for reflection and study, I think that all of us should address an appeal to you, as Secretary General of this Organization, for suggestions as to how we should proceed in practical terms, because I do refuse to believe that we are going to do nothing and it might well be that the Secretariat should be entrusted with the duty of drawing up the Terms of Reference or the mandate, or for any limited group or for the Council in Permanent Session to undertake the necessary studies and investigations.

I further suggest, Mr. Chairman, that member governments should be required to submit their ideas and proposals in writing and that national and international military experts should be asked to try, with whatever group is formed or appointed, to carry out the task and formulate recommendations for our consideration.

In this context, Mr. Secretary General, the proposals presented to us this morning by Mr. Harmel are of extreme usefulness. They have our agreement in principle and I hope that we shall be in a position to present constructive suggestions or amendments to the Belgian draft resolution in due course.

Now, Mr. Chairman, since we are supposed to make only one statement at this session of the Council, I beg the Council's indulgence in order to say one word or two on some specific subjects.

On Latin America, an area to which we pay considerable importance and attention, I should say that in some countries the situation points to certain improvements from the social and political point of view. As the Council is aware, we have very special relations with Brazil and we are happy to see those relations developing to a very considerable extent in recent times. We received last September the official visit of the Foreign Minister of Brazil and during that visit various important agreements were signed.

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Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

One of them is a cultural agreement with, we hope, very far-reaching consequences, inasmuch as it provides, among other things, for the free exercise of liberal professions in one country by the nationals of the other country, and for the recognition of university degrees of one country by the other. The other Luso-Brazilian agreements provide for economic and industrial co-operation, special systems of payments, free ports in each other's territories, etc.

I think, Mr. President, that what is taking place in the context of the Luso-Brazilian relations is a great step forward in the building-up and in the expansion of the Luso-Brazilian community.

On the United Nations, I believe it is only fair to say that never before has a General Assembly been so demagogic, so extreme, so irresponsible and so useless. Some have taken the International Court at The Hague as a serious institution whose decisions should be implemented and all this was very much stressed and underlined in respect of the question of South-West Africa in the belief, it seems, that the decision of the World Court would go against South Africa. But it did not, and then the General Assembly of the United Nations savagely attacked the Court, discarded its decision and adopted on South-West Africa a resolution which, and this is a point I wish to stress before this Council, would, if implemented, bring about every possible danger, quite apart from being an illegal resolution, no matter what one may or may not think about South African racial policy. Many of the problems have been debated and discussed in the United Nations and many of the resolutions have been adopted - nothing, of course, concerning the really great problems, the really serious issues, confronting us throughout the world. The United Nations has become a parochial or provincial organization, spending its time debating regional problems of limited interest and scope. It is always possible to gather for that purpose huge majorities, and because of it some are very impressed as though the majority of the votes in the Assembly corresponded to the real forces or to real power in the world, which it does not. Only the day before yesterday Mr. Walter Lippman, the well-known American commentator on international affairs, and who so much admires the organization, wrote the following, and I quote:

"The United Nations has no more force than the force which its strongest members will provide themselves or will approve of".

This means, Mr. Chairman, that when a country invokes a certain resolution of the United Nations to justify a certain policy, that country is in agreement with that policy and that resolution fits and furthers the national policy of that particular country, and this because no country implements the resolution against vital national interests.

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Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

We ourselves, Mr. Chairman, to the surprise of no one, have as usual been the victims in the General Assembly, which once again has adopted outrageous resolutions against Portugal. In all fairness, Mr. President, I must point out that some members of the Alliance voted against the resolution, namely Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. I wish here, Mr. Chairman, through you, to express to them our appreciation. Other members have abstained. No member of the Alliance this time has voted against Portugal. This, Mr. Chairman, I submit is a very remarkable performance and it did not bring down the Alliance, it did not make the Alliance collapse.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it is not my usual way to single out any particular country, but this time I think I have to address myself to the Delegation of Denmark and I do hope that the Danish Minister understands how unavoidable are the few words I shall be saying on this point.

Speaking before the Committee of Twenty-Four, the Danish Delegate considered Portuguese policy as anachronistic and disastrous. He went on to say that the Danish Government absolutely condemned, and I am quoting, absolutely condemned Portuguese policy, which he described as being shameful or unworthy - indigne is the word that was used in French - and the same Danish Delegate went on to make a few further remarks of the same unpleasant nature. We would have understood, Mr. President, a correct expression of disagreement if an Ally finds it essential to say so in public, which we doubt. Many countries here represented have stated their views many times, not always in agreement with us, and they have voted against us in the United Nations. But they have always done so with that forbearance and with that measure which have always to be kept.

The Danish Delegate, however, spoke in such terms, took such a patronising and moralising attitude, that it became unbearable. I am sure the Danish Delegation agrees that this is not the type of solidarity which one should expect from an Ally within the Alliance.

On the situation, in Africa, Mr. President, and without at all going over details in the various complex aspects of the problems of that Continent, I just want to share with the Council our very deep concern at the situation in various countries of that Continent, but more specifically in the Congo. In the Congo (Kinshasa).

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

I just want to tell the Council that we have been very patient and very measured in our reactions against the aggressive policy of the Congolese Government. But, owing to certain events in recent days, we have lost our patience, which many countries do nowadays, and it may interest the Council to know therefore that yesterday we have closed all the frontier with the Congo, with all that implies in all fields. I am sure the Congolese Government does not in any way desire or need the co-operation of Portugal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Nogueira. Mr. Brandt now.

Mr. BRANDT

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, world politics nowadays show many symptoms of a transition from one epoch to another. More than twenty years have passed since the end of World War II; that is about a period of history, the period in which political ideas and treaties are showing signs of oncoming age, and in which a new generation is growing up that tends to draw up a balance sheet and to look out for new tasks.

The proposal made by our Belgian colleague, Mr. Harmel, attempts to take into account this idea of change and changing circumstances, in that it suggests an analysis of the events that have taken place since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. I believe that this analysis can be very helpful in making it clear to us where we stand today. I, therefore, welcome the Belgian proposal, which contains a number of interesting and valuable suggestions. I doubt, however, Mr. Chairman, if it is the most efficient method to establish a group of "wise men" to deal with this problem. I think we should rather keep this matter in our own hands and take any further decisions at a Ministerial level. The decisions of the Ministers should have to be carefully prepared by the Permanent Representatives, thus the Belgian proposal for co-operation within the Alliance could bring forth fruitful results and enable us to make NATO even more a forum of consultations on East/West talks and relations, a matter to which our colleagues - Mr. Krag, Mr. Martin, Mr. Brown and others - have made important contributions during this discussion here today.

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

Independent of the various questions we have come to discuss here, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to explain to you how the Federal Republic of Germany views some essential aspects of its situation. Please, let me first of all underline, with emphasis that the will to preserve peace and promote international understanding is the first word and the basic concern of the foreign policy of my Government. It is true that any foreign policy serves in the first place the interests of the nation. But, in a world in which the destinies of the peoples are so closely connected, no-one may shirk away from bearing his share in the responsibility for these peoples and for peace in this world. We are conscious of this responsibility and therefore advocate the consistent and effective policy of peace that will remove political tension and call a halt to the arms race.

When forming a new German Government, two weeks ago, on a broad basis, we attached great value to underlining our readiness to work for peace. This is the criterion for our efforts toward European unity and the sound development of the North Atlantic Alliance, as it is for our efforts to improve relations with our neighbours in the East and if possible to ease the situation in divided Germany.

After the evil aberrations to which our people fell victim, Germans seized their chance, took with determination the road leading to the community of the free nations. We have established a democratic state which has proved stable and in which radical trends have failed to prevail. In our efforts, we were from the outset confronted with most difficult problems. Towns and villages, roads and factories had to be rebuilt. The people who had lost any and all political orientation, had to be given new objectives. Every fifth inhabitant of the Republic of Germany was a refugee or an "expellee" and had to find his place in the reconstruction of our economy. The partition of our people and the fear of further Soviet advance were problems which lay heavily on our people, on our economy and on our society.

If we were nevertheless successful in building up our state, Mr. Chairman, this was to a large extent due to a stimulating factor. By this I mean the hope for a new, free and unified Europe, the hope for a European community in which our people could live together with the other peoples of our continent, with equal rights and ultimately reunified. Such a Europe has been the goal of the Germans in the Federal Republic; this is what they have worked for.

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Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

Consequently our participation in Atlantic co-operation has always been viewed in connection with our European policy. The basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany itself provides for the possibility of a transfer of several rights to supra-national organizations.

The Federal Republic, as you all know, has placed all its armed forces under the supreme command of NATO. It has renounced, vis-à-vis its Allies, any production of ABC weapons, agreed to limitations in the production of other weapons and accepted controls. In order to eliminate any misunderstanding, it has clearly been stated in the policy statement of the Federal Republic Government of 13th December that we seek neither national control of atomic weapons nor national ownership of such weapons.

And perhaps I should also add that the Federal Republic has co-operated very seriously in building up the European communities and hopes that they will be developed further, both economically and politically. And if I say economically, of course I include the problems discussed by Monsieur Fanfani and developed in the Italian proposal to which we are happy to give our support.

In short, Mr. Chairman, what we sought was a close meshing of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western Alliance. We have linked our destiny closely to the Alliance and to a European union forming under its shield. This was all the easier as our Allies endorsed our legitimate national aim - the right of self-determination also for our people and a peace settlement which would permit our people to live under the roof of one common state. I was very happy earlier today when I listened to the President of the French Republic and heard him underlining his belief, which we knew from before, in the historical necessity of bringing about the unity of the German people.

But my fellow countrymen are asking today, what have been the results of this policy during the past year? which hopes have become realities? Now, to this I answered at home, and I would answer along the same lines here, that the most positive result is, without doubt, the fact that the policy of the Western Alliance has preserved peace in Europe. Thanks to the Alliance, we have overcome great international crises provoked by Soviet threats and ultimatums. As Governing Mayor of Berlin of many years standing, I was an immediate witness to the relatively successful efforts of our Alliance in standing up in unity to dangerous situations. The bitter fact remains that the inhuman wall could not be prevented.

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

But it is naturally a highly positive achievement that West Berlin continues to belong to the free part of Germany, thanks to the determination of the three protecting Powers and the other partners of the Alliance, and that it could develop economically and culturally in spite of its special situation.

On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, it cannot be denied that the hopes for German unity, which large numbers of our people entertained in connection with our accession to the Alliance, have so far not been fulfilled. But as things are, nobody can name any dates by which they might be fulfilled. The political facts have so far prevented a solution of the German question, or, if someone around the table prefers the other expression, the German part of the European question.

Our friends in Europe and on the other side of the ocean are today inclined to believe that a general relaxation of tension and the change in the relations between Western and Eastern Europe will also have favourable effects on the problem of German reunification. I do not disagree with this line of thinking, but I would ask you to understand our position which cannot just consist of waiting for the results of an automatism that may eventually work in our favour and I am happy that Mr. Luns in his speech also described the situation in divided Germany as the kind of a condition, one of the conditions, which have to be looked upon. When one talks about solving the European problem, we cannot and shall not give up our legitimate aims. But we shall pursue them in a manner which is not in conflict with any reasonable efforts to bring about a relaxation of tension. This is not a tactical position, but an expression of our conviction that also in the question of our unsolved national problem, peace and understanding are involved. We are no frivolous troublemakers. On the contrary, we want to eliminate the trouble spot of the German partition which is at the same time a European division. We want to eliminate it by peaceful arrangements and restore peace to our people both with itself and with the world. And we have now decided to make greater efforts to ensure that the two parts of our people will not drift apart during its partition. We wish to do all in our power to promote human, economic and cultural relations with our countrymen in the other part of Germany and if possible, thereby, bridge the gulf, not deepen it. We want, even in divided Germany and knowing everything we have to know about the set-up in the other part of Germany, we want to ease things, not harden them. I was happy last evening in a discussion with the Foreign Ministers of the three countries which carry a special responsibility for

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

Germany - France, Great Britain and the United States - that these colleagues of mine showed great interest for this special aspect of our situation and I understand that some results of our discussion may be put in the discussions here tomorrow as part of the Communiqué by the Council.

In these efforts, my dear colleagues, we ask for the understanding and for the moral and political support of our friends and allies. We rightly consider that the Federal Government, constituted as it is, through free and legitimate elections, is authorised to speak for the German people as a whole. This continues to be right. Our friends and allies should, however, also know that we in the Federal Republic have no intention of tutoring our countrymen in the other part of Germany. I personally should rejoice, and I think all my colleagues in the German Government would, if they, our fellow countrymen in the other part of Germany, during the period, the years ahead of us, also could benefit from the advantages of international exchange in the fields of economy and culture. Anyhow, contacts established between administrative bodies in the two parts of Germany are not tantamount to recognising a second German state. Such contacts become indispensable in alleviating the misery of a people torn apart - in handling these contacts we are determined to maintain our legitimate claims.

We know, Mr. Chairman, we Germans, that we have to be patient. On the other hand, however, one must be aware of the fact that in both parts of Germany a certain growing concern and disappointment is making itself felt. This is not only due to the continuing partition of the people, but also to the slow progress made on the road to a unified Europe. Viewed against this background it should at least be understandable that there are voices in Germany asking: "Was the hope for a Europe that would also support our interests as we would support those of the other partners perhaps no more than a dream, which is now vanishing away? Will the European Economic Community be in a position to fulfil its mission if the political superstructure of some kind of European unification should turn out to be unfeasible?"

In addition, there are those in my country who ask whether the desire for a relaxation of tensions between East and West and for an arrangement with the Soviet Union might not become so dominating that the partition of our people will be overlooked. Parts of our public are concerned over the possibility that the Communist propaganda thesis, according to which our claim for the right of self-determination is a road block to a relaxation of tension, might gain ground also in the West.

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

I think it is known to all assembled here that the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany at that time could only be brought about against serious objections voiced by a good many persons in our political life and large parts of our population. I am told that here in this building, the Federal Republic has often been asked to increase its defence contribution. Today we are sometimes told, not by the Governments of our Allies but nonetheless by the press and in parliaments, that we have too many armed forces. Well, we can at any rate assume our defence burdens only within the limits of our economic and financial resources. But we are determined to stand by our commitments.

Nevertheless we are asked by our people: "what exactly is our position today in the Alliance?" It appears that there is hardly any difference of opinion on the need of some reform in the course of the next few years. The Federal Government would not shirk from discussing this problem with its Allies on a basis of trust. It, the Federal Government, wishes to take an active part, without endangering the security of all concerned, in a policy of relaxation of tension between the East European states and the partners of the North Atlantic Treaty. I therefore repeat, the Federal Republic of Germany is not, and does not want to be an obstacle on the road to a peaceful and secure future, which is in the common interest of all of us.

We shall not allow ourselves to be shaken in this opinion by aggressive statements made against us by Communist leaders in their own countries, in neutral states or in the countries of our Allies.

Germany for centuries has been a bridge for purely geographical, and also for economic and cultural reasons, a kind of a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. Now that the line dividing East and West is less sharply drawn than it was still a few years ago, we would be happy if we could take over again, within the limits of the possible, without illusions but with all good will, the task assigned to us by geography. We are still very far from this aim, but we shall continue in the endeavours that found an expression in the German peace note of March of this year. The Federal Government will make serious efforts to improve and normalise its relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries. We shall take concrete steps towards a relaxation of tension with the East and we welcome the fact that a policy directed towards this goal is accepted by the partners of the Alliance. I am sure that all of us here see not only the chances of such a policy, but are also aware of its limitations.

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

I would also like to speak to you, Mr. Chairman, and dear colleagues, in all frankness of the following phenomenon. Wherever the concept of large communities is fading away, the thinking in national categories is once more gaining ground. We may also observe such symptoms in Eastern Europe. The more the goal of a Communist community of states recedes into the background, the more they become conscious of their national interest in these countries, too. There are many in the West who are viewing this even as a hopeful sign and as an element of fruitful co-operation.

It has often been suggested to the Federal Republic of Germany that it should make its own contribution towards the overcoming of tension. We shall do so, in keeping with our interests and in accordance with our commitments within the Alliance. This is not an expression of a retroverted nationalism. If we are conscious of ourselves and try to speak with dignity, and perhaps even are able to do so, this is part of a process of regaining our health.

I know we have to put up with the fact that some extremist groups beginning to form in the Federal Republic are being observed and registered with particular attention abroad. They receive no less attention in my own country. But you may rest assured, Gentlemen, we have learned from the lessons of the past. Germany is not the only country with extremist groups. Extremist groups, of course, especially in Germany, should not be taken too lightly but they should also not be overrated. The forces of democracy are strong enough to deal with occasional difficulties of this nature. The Federal Government ask that a distorted picture presented by some, a distorted picture of our Germany of today, should not be taken at its face value. Our state and our people have shown that they deserve to be trusted. Notwithstanding the partition of Germany, the people in my country have demonstrated their readiness to make sacrifices for the common cause. Unfounded distrust is apt to promote the isolation of Germany consistently pursued by our common adversaries, and would serve to encourage those forces which have doubts in the Alliance and in Europe.

May I also ask you to bear this in mind: far more than half of the Germans living today, far more than half of them, were born after January 1930. This means that they were less than sixteen years old at the end of the war, or not even born. They cannot even morally be held responsible for what happened under Hitler. For the wrong done, however, and for the political consequences resulting for Germany from the war and from the actions of the Hitler régime, they too are liable.

Mr. BRANDT (Contd)

We are, however, perturbed by the fact that today, more than twenty years after the end of the war, and after our people have demonstrated its will to co-operate with the free nations in the pursuance of supranational aims, voices are raised again, even in friendly countries, condemning the whole of the German people as such. Such judgements are not only politically unwise, but false.

I have raised here the question of the position of the Alliance towards Germany. You have the same right to ask how the Federal Government and the German people stand towards the Alliance; for I know that in some of your countries doubts have been voiced concerning the German stand.

I will conclude by giving you a clear and unequivocal answer. The Federal Government is firmly convinced that our national tasks can only be solved in close co-operation with our Allies and that any loosening of our relations with our proven friends and Allies would jeopardise our security and get us into undesirable dependencies. The Federal Government and the political parties represented in our Parliament have not been and are not willing to adopt such a course. The North Atlantic Treaty and its Organization may be imperfect and may not meet some of the requirements an Alliance of today should fulfil. This should, however, not induce us to look for false alternatives or seek alternatives for ourselves alone. It should, I believe, rather cause us to do all we can to improve the Alliance so it can fully accomplish the tasks of the present time and of the future.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Brandt. This has been an impressive and important statement. Mr. Rusk will take the floor now.

Mr. RUSK

Mr. Chairman, I have listened with great respect to the statements made around this table and particularly wish to express appreciation for the extraordinary contributions made by certain of our colleagues who are at this table for the first time. I think the statement we have just heard was an extraordinary and effective exposition of a very important point of view. Since so much has been said, I will make my remarks in the form of interjections rather than a systematic presentation of our views on the many items on our Agenda.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

I would say to Mr. Harmel that we welcome the initiative which he has taken to look toward the future tasks of the Alliance. We would rather hope that, if we undertake such a study, it will have the most serious interest and attention of governments at the top, and that we will not let the examination of so serious a question become in any sense routine or be carelessly conducted, because the questions which are being asked go to the very heart of the Alliance and I would hope that governments would find a way to participate actively in the consideration of these great issues.

Mr. Luns made an interesting remark about the Parliamentarians. I know there are differences of views around the table, some of them perhaps coming out of differences in our constitutional systems. As far as we are concerned, we would welcome a stronger rôle for the Parliamentarians in the work of NATO. If there are some who are nervous about a Parliamentary body which speaks independently on subjects which are before Ministers, all I can say is that this is a way of life for us in our country and one gets used to it. I was glad that Mr. Çağlayangil called our attention to the explosive and critical situation in the Middle East and the Near East. Here is an area which is geographically contiguous to the southern flank of NATO; an area of the greatest importance in which the Soviets have been persistently intruding for some time. There are large shipments of arms to Egypt, Syria, Algeria, the Yemen, Somalia; explosive confrontations within the Arab world between the so-called progressives and the so-called traditional countries, and the ever-present Israel/Arab tension.

Mr. Chairman, I would think it would be important for the Permanent Representatives, if possible, to have a special meeting on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean before the holidays because the possibilities there are so ominous that it might be well for governments to be in touch with each other in some detail about those problems before we get too far away from each other.

On the East-West relations, my colleagues, I think, know the approach of the United States. A number of references were made to President Johnson's October 7th speech. We expect to follow up on the main lines there along with our Allies in a variety of directions. We will take up with our Congress in January our East/West trade legislation. We anticipate considerable difficulty in the Congress on that subject partly because of Vietnam, but nevertheless we shall pursue it. There may be an announcement in the next hours or day or so that the President is asking a distinguished American citizen on a private and informal basis to examine the possibilities of co-operation among the technically

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

advanced societies, Communist as well as free world, in the examination of certain problems of management and administration, where complex organizations are coming more and more into being, where exchange of information and experience of management problems could be of considerable importance. We understand that there is some interest in Eastern Europe in drawing upon the experience of the free world, and that informal exploration will be made not on the basis of any predetermined plan but on the basis of looking at the question, and we will hope to be in touch with both Governments and private institutions and organizations in connection with it.

When Mr. Gromyko came to the General Assembly of the United Nations this fall and spent a brief time in Washington, we were not at all sure what his attitude would be upon arrival. We thought that it was possible that he would say: "Because of Vietnam there is nothing to discuss." He did not do that. He, in effect, entered seriously into a discussion of a number of problems despite Vietnam, and even on Vietnam the conversation was calm and with a minimum of violent adjectives on both sides, and so we proceeded to the conclusion of a civil air agreement. We were able to give some additional impetus to the discussion of a space treaty, and we continued the discussion of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As members round the table know, we have been discussing non-proliferation in the Alliance and in Geneva and with the Soviet Union for at least three years, perhaps longer. Those discussions have gone round and round; they have encountered irrelevancies; they have gotten tangled up in metaphysical problems and it has been unfortunately difficult to find an agreement. We have had further discussions in New York as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and in connection with the discussions before the United Nations. We still do not see exactly how an agreement might be reached, but I think the discussions have gone just about as far as they can go, as discussions, and I think it is possible for us to share the nature of those discussions in such a way as to expose the areas in which some agreement might be found. We have, at all stages, made it clear to the Soviet Union that we could not ourselves agree to any of their suggestions or any language without full consultation with our Allies. I think certain clarification at least, has occurred. The discussions have been on the subject of warheads and not delivery vehicles. It is clear that we are not concerned about the situation of war; that the arrangements in wartime would not be wide open, and that the Treaty could not engage that problem. I think we have put to one side the question of how an Alliance makes a decision to go to war.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

We have not sensed concern on the part of the Soviet Union with present arrangements in NATO for the handling of nuclear weapons, and I would suppose that in so far as a non-proliferation treaty is concerned, they will not raise an objection to the Nuclear Committee which the Fourteen established yesterday. That is, the range of discussion has been narrowed somewhat; it appears to us that the two key issues are "what happens physically to nuclear warheads" and "whether the present nuclear powers turn over control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states". We will be in touch with our colleagues in the Alliance in the nearest future to look at some alternative language which might move us forward on this matter.

There is no agreement between the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on language, but I think it is possible now to make certain predictions about what would be possible, what would not be possible. But I would add the thought that on this question the answer is not resolved by agreement between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries, even if we should achieve that result. It seems quite clear that there are in other parts of the world countries who are going to come into such arrangements with the greatest possible reluctance. I'm thinking particularly, for example, of India and Japan - there may be others. And so this is a long path - I think we must work at it very hard, and we shall be in full consultation with the members of this Alliance.

I would like to say just a brief word about the Western flank of NATO in the Pacific Ocean. I have used that expression. Some of the newspaper men seem to think that somehow I am merely making a joke; but I think Mr. Paul Martin and I would want to remind ourselves that North America is in the North Atlantic Treaty area and that takes us out to the hundred and eightieth degree longitude, although Hawaii is not in that area; we're only forty-nine fiftieths in NATO. But out there on that flank there has emerged a new nuclear power to explode its fifth device at almost literally any moment, experimenting with missiles of intermediate and possibly longer range, and so, in the years ahead, we have the prospect of that problem to think very hard about.

We do not know exactly what is happening in mainland China, and I gather that we're in somewhat the same position as those of you who have diplomatic relations with Peking. It does not embarrass us not to know because I suspect that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao are not entirely clear about what is happening there. But, nevertheless, it seems to us that what is happening there is of the greatest possible importance. There may be a struggle of power among individuals - there may be a serious debate on policy going on in that vast country - there may be a transition between the veterans of the long march and the next generation, with all that that implies for possibilities, but surely it is a situation which deserves our closest attention.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

I think I told the Ministers in Brussels in the Spring that a Foreign Minister of one of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe said that the number one problem in the world today is turning Peking to peaceful coexistence. I am rather inclined to agree with him.

In our bilateral contacts with Peking we have had no encouragement. It may be that we have a special problem in this regard because of the island of Taiwan, Formosa, because in all of our discussions Peking continues to say that there is nothing to talk about unless we surrender that island. We have felt, and continue to feel and will, I think, persist in feeling, that it is not our island to surrender, that we cannot turn over these thirteen or fourteen million people to the mainland against their will, and so we have not been able to talk about disarmament or South-East Asia or exchanges, or the exchange of weather information or questions of that sort, because we run across that block in the road. We are prepared to continue to probe the possibilities with Peking but the bilateral problem that we have is the same as the United Nations faces, and that is that the price of interest on the part of Peking is in effect a destruction of the position of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

I would like to comment on Vietnam, not merely as a parochial interest of the United States but because it ramifies into so many other important world issues. We need not, I think, repeat what has been said here before on the underlying aspects of it. We believe that we have a treaty commitment to take action to meet the common danger in response to the attack which is now being delivered against South Vietnam. Again, we have, I think perhaps, a special interest in this problem in that part of the world because we have other treaties in the Pacific, with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. So that we have a fundamental and far-reaching interest in the problem of organizing a durable peace in the Pacific Ocean. And it does not seem possible for us to be negligent about one of our treaties in that area if we are to maintain the integrity of the other treaties in that area and their power to deter attack. And, indeed, may I say directly to my friends here, and also in great friendliness, that if there are elements in your public opinion that expect us to be unfaithful to our treaties in the Pacific and loyal to our treaties in the Atlantic, just tell them to forget it. It is not possible. It is not possible. These treaties, ours here at this table and others are part of an effort to organize peace following World War II. That has been pursued honourably, loyally and with a full regard for the necessities of building a peace, preventing World War III rather than throwing ourselves down a slippery slope toward World War III. I will not take your time to go into details on the situation in South Vietnam at the moment. I have just come from there.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

On the military side, the most vexing problem perhaps is not the organized battalions and the regiments that have come down from North Vietnam; there are at least 20 of those there. There is enormous power with which to deal with those larger organized units. The most vexing problem is the infrastructure of the guerilla and, as our friends in Britain learned in Malaya and as others have learned in other situations, that is an extremely complicated problem to get at. But we believe we are beginning to make some headway on that.

I must say that I was encouraged by the prospective political development there because an assembly which was recently elected is moving responsibly toward a new constitution. We think that they will complete their work perhaps by the middle of February and that there will be elections for a National Assembly toward the mid-year. On the economic side, the production of the country has been deeply disturbed by the operations of the guerillas and the military action, but some progress has been made in stopping the runaway inflation which threatened and we have some hopes there.

I would like to comment briefly on the international political aspects of the matter, because our central purpose there is to find a peaceful settlement of this struggle as soon as possible. And I should like, at this point, to express great appreciation to a number around this table for the assistance which they have been rendering in this effort. Our friends in Britain as co-Chairman, our friends in Canada as a member of the International Control Commission and certain others whose work has been done rather quietly and, I think, who would not wish to be named at this particular point. But a good deal of effort has been made by those around the table and we very much appreciate it. As far as we are concerned, we are prepared for any procedure; conference, direct discussion with those on the other side, intermediaries, the most private and discreet contact, the exchange of public declarations. If anyone can think of a procedure that might move this matter forward, we are willing to consider it. And on the substance, we are prepared to talk seriously about a final settlement or the most preliminary steps; we are prepared to talk about stopping the violence or de-escalating it in any fashion; we are prepared to de-militarise the de-militarised zone between North and South Vietnam; we are prepared to give assistance to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia to assure the neutrality and territorial integrity of his country more adequately; we are prepared to talk about Hanoi's four points so long as we can talk about other points; or we are prepared to talk with Hanoi about four points properly discussed and formulated which might become a basis of discussion; we are prepared to talk about prisoners of war.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

In other words, it is almost literally without precedent that one of the parties in a struggle has gone so far, so frequently, procedurally and now in substance to try to find some basis for peaceful settlement and we shall not cease, although I would have to say to you that some of our friends, including some neutralist friends in Asia, have told us that perhaps we have tried too hard for a peaceful settlement that this has lent itself to miscalculation and misunderstanding in Hanoi.

When one looks back at the experience of the last period, say the last year and a half, two years, one is driven to consideration of the essence of the problem; that is that men and arms continue to come from North Vietnam into South Vietnam; and so long as they continue to move, someone has to decide what to do about it. Get out of their way or meet them. And the United States has decided that we, and Allies that are there with us, must meet them. The tragedy of it is that, if Hanoi would abandon an effort to seize South Vietnam by force, peace could come by the end of today. By the end of today. I know of no other obstacle. But there cannot be peace on the basis of their seizure of South Vietnam and there will not be peace on any such basis. The element of reciprocity has long since disappeared from much public discussion of this situation.

If we were to say that we would not enter into any discussions of this matter unless the violence in the South is stopped, everyone would say, "You are being very belligerent". But when it is said that, of course, Hanoi cannot engage in any discussions or negotiations for as long as we are bombing North Vietnam, the tendency is to say, "That sounds very natural. Why not?".

On the 17th Parallel, the principal interest reflected to me these days, Gentlemen, is anxiety that the United States might be moving north through the 17th Parallel. At a time when we have been doing our best to try to demilitarise that DMZ and when there are three divisions of North Vietnamese troops in and just north of, streaming through that DMZ - reciprocity! If we were to say that, in connection with a peace settlement, we want to negotiate the internal structure of North Vietnam, everybody would say, "You are crazy!". But, when people say that a peace requires the negotiation of the internal structure of South Vietnam, they say, "Oh, that sounds very good. That is perfectly natural. Why not?". We have in mind the harbour in Haiphong; they have in mind the harbour in Saigon.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

A little dash of just old-fashioned fairness and reciprocity would clarify a good many of these issues in a good many sectors of public opinion.

It is said that it's all so very bad because the Vietnamese problem gets in the way of a détente with the Soviet Union. Twenty years ago last Monday, Iranian forces re-entered Azerbaijan and the governments at this table did not say to the Soviet Union: "My dear friend, help yourself to Azerbaijan". When the guerillas poured into Greece from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, we didn't roll out a welcome mat for them in the interest of détente. When Berlin was blockaded we didn't consider contributing Berlin to a détente. We didn't say: "Help yourself to the Republic of Korea in the interests of friendship". We didn't welcome the missiles in Cuba as a good neighbour in the Western Hemisphere.

Let us not misunderstand the basis for the prudence which has entered into the relations between East and West here in this part of the world. You're not going to get détente by giving away little countries to somebody who's got a big appetite. There is some pressure of time. The continuation of this kind of struggle carries with it its obvious dangers. And it reduces those dangers to eliminate the problem, and the longer the struggle continues, the greater those dangers could become.

I think also it is important for us to try to wind this matter up during this phase of events in China. I don't know what the result is going to be of the present situation in China. But if the result is to be that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao are able to assert their full control over the vast population of China and its resources, and re-dedicate themselves to a policy of militancy and hostility, then there are obviously dangers there. But if it should come out that Peking and Moscow, through some changes in Peking, find themselves moving together as a consolidated Communist bloc once again, obviously there are some dangers there, in the Pacific as well as potentially in this part of the world.

And in any event, there is always the problem of the impatience of the American people. And I hope that if you hear expressions of that impatience that you would understand it in part, even though we and you would wish to restrain it. It seems a tragedy that after all that has happened since 1945, it is still necessary once again for young people to go out and get themselves killed because somebody is trying to take another country by force.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

Our people do still recall that we are now running to about 180,000 casualties since the end of World War II. And it takes a little doing to be patient indefinitely under those circumstances. So there is an issue of time here which we are concerned about.

I would suggest that the issue of international solidarity is an important one, as it was important in these other crises which have occurred since 1945. Important from the point of view of its impact upon Hanoi. And I'm speaking of solidarity not just with South Vietnam and not just with the United States. I'm not speaking of the solidarity arising out of any NATO Treaty commitments, but I am thinking of the interest of countries around this table in a sense of solidarity with the free nations of Asia, who are confronted with new dangers in that part of the world - countries ranging from Japan all the way down to Australia - who are living next to this great danger building up there in the Pacific. I am thinking of the solidarity that ought to group itself around the simple notion expressed in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to preventing aggression, suppressing breaches of the peace, settling disputes by peaceful means, as the great lessons we learned from the events which led us into World War II.

The United States has now moved into Vietnam something more than 370,000 of our armed forces. We have done so without moving from the NATO area any major combat units, as Secretary McNamara and I told you a year ago would be the case. We intend to meet our commitments here just as we are meeting them in the Pacific. And so I think you need not have concern on that point. I suppose we are all victims to some extent of our own experience. But when I look back through some of these other episodes since 1945, and I think of the period when the guerrillas were moving on the city of Athens in great strength, and when the winter weather descended upon the airlift to Berlin, and when things looked dark at times for our British friends in Malaya, and when we were in that tiny perimeter around Pusan in Korea, and I think of the first week of the Cuban missile crisis. This Vietnam problem remains a manageable problem, a manageable problem. Of course there are dangers in it, as there have been dangers in all of these other situations, but if there is still need for a spot of courage there is still a full and adequate basis for a lot of confidence. Thank you very much.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary of State.

Je voudrais demander maintenant à M. Couve de Murville de prendre la parole.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE

M. le Président, la réunion qui se tient aujourd'hui est la seconde que nous avons depuis que la France s'est retirée de l'organisation militaire de l'Alliance. La réunion précédente avait eu lieu en juin à Bruxelles, si mes collègues se le rappellent, et nous avons eu alors de premières discussions, sans d'ailleurs beaucoup de résultats, autres que le choix du nouveau siège de commandement.

Depuis, il y a eu beaucoup de conversations, de séances, de discussions, - et au Conseil permanent et bilatéralement - entre les pays qui étaient directement intéressés par certains problèmes, et progressivement, me semble-t-il, les questions ont pu s'orienter vers une solution. Qu'il s'agisse du fonctionnement futur du Conseil et de la façon dont, à l'avenir, seront traités les problèmes militaires; qu'il s'agisse du siège du Conseil permanent; qu'il s'agisse du problème des forces et des installations américaines en France; qu'il s'agisse enfin du stationnement des forces françaises en Allemagne.

En ce qui concerne ce dernier point, je noterai simplement d'une part que les discussions ont commencé entre les Etats-Majors sur les hypothèses à prévoir pour le temps de guerre et d'autre part que les conversations franco-allemandes sur le statut des troupes sont pratiquement terminées et aboutiront sans doute bientôt à un accord formel.

Comme le disait ce matin M. Krag, dès le moment où nous en sommes venus au stade des techniciens et des militaires, on a pu commencer à arriver à des règlements. Il en résulte une sorte de stabilisation de la situation, une adaptation nouvelle à une situation dont, bien entendu, la France était responsable. Et je crois pouvoir ajouter qu'il n'est pas résulté de tous ces changements et de tous ces accords déjà conclus ou en perspective à l'intérieur de cette Alliance et quant à la sécurité et à la défense, quelque sentiment d'inquiétude. Ceci est naturel, puisque d'une part la France pour ce qui la concerne n'a pas réduit son effort militaire, et que d'autre part, nous le savons, tout continue à reposer sur la dissuasion nucléaire et que celle-ci est en quelque sorte étrangère à l'Alliance atlantique proprement dite.

La réadaptation étant ainsi, sinon faite, du moins, je crois pouvoir le dire, en voie de l'être, tout naturellement les regards se tournent vers l'avenir. Quel sera, se demande-t-on, le rôle de cette Alliance atlantique dans l'avenir, et en particulier après 1969, qui est la date à laquelle se terminent les vingt premières années de fonctionnement de cette Alliance. Et il semble qu'il y ait à cet égard dans certains esprits des incertitudes, sinon des inquiétudes.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Nous avons devant nous sur ce problème une proposition qui a été déposée par la délégation de la Belgique, dont un certain nombre de nos collègues qui sont intervenus avant moi ont parlé, et au sujet de laquelle je suis heureux, pour ce qui concerne la délégation française, d'apporter à notre tour un accord.

Ce sentiment d'incertitude est naturellement la conséquence d'une sorte de prise de conscience que la situation générale dans le monde, ou tout au moins en Europe, s'est profondément modifiée. Il se peut que la France y ait dans une certaine mesure contribué, je veux dire à cette prise de conscience, et par la politique qu'elle pratique, et peut-être aussi par les décisions qu'elle a annoncées au mois de mars dernier au sujet de l'Organisation.

Pour notre part, je dois dire franchement que nous hésitons à partager ces sentiments d'inquiétude ou d'incertitude. Il nous semble que l'Alliance continuera après 1969 - et nous en sommes d'accord - et c'est ce qui nous paraît être le fait important, car le maintien de cette Alliance en lui-même crée ou constitue un élément d'équilibre et par conséquent un élément de paix.

Il résultera de la continuation de l'Alliance que les consultations politiques se continueront entre nous. Nous n'y avons pas d'objections et même nous y trouvons bien des avantages ; cela veut dire des consultations, des échanges d'informations et ainsi de suite ; cela ne veut pas dire naturellement que nous allons arriver d'une manière ou d'une autre à définir une politique extérieure commune, cela serait d'ailleurs impossible et en quelque sorte contraire à la nature même des choses. La France pour sa part est sortie de l'intégration militaire, parce qu'elle ne lui semblait plus convenir à la situation présente ; elle-même, et je pense aucun des autres pays de l'Alliance atlantique, ne serait partisan d'une intégration en matière de politique internationale.

Un bon exemple de ceci nous est donné, je crois, par un sujet qui a été déjà très abondamment débattu depuis ce matin autour de cette table, et ce sont les rapports Est-Ouest. Et là je me réfère à une expression qui a été employée ce matin par notre collègue M. George Brown, lorsqu'il disait qu'évidemment, dans cette affaire des relations Est-Ouest, il ne pouvait pas s'agir d'une approche de bloc à bloc.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Ces rapports Est-Ouest sont maintenant devenus le problème à la mode. Tout le monde en parle et cela marque assurément l'évolution profonde qui s'est produite depuis quelques années. Jadis, parler comme nous parlons aujourd'hui de ces rapports était considéré comme une inconséquence et peut-être presque comme un péché. Les choses ont bien changé et maintenant la façon dont on parle de ces rapports est entrée en quelque sorte dans le domaine des vérités premières ; et peut-être, tout naturellement, est-ce la raison pour laquelle nous éprouvons tant de plaisir à nous y ébattre. Il s'agit, bien entendu, des relations Est-Ouest en Europe, c'est-à-dire en réalité des rapports entre les pays européens.

Le point de départ de toute l'affaire - et naturellement de toutes les difficultés - c'est la division de l'Europe, et le fait additionnel que la ligne de division de l'Europe passe à travers l'Allemagne. Il y a, de ce fait, toute une série de grands problèmes qui se posent à nous et que tout le monde connaît : c'est l'avenir de l'Allemagne, ce sont les questions de sécurité et c'est la nécessité de parvenir un jour, peut-être, à un nouvel équilibre stable à l'intérieur de notre continent.

Depuis quelques années, dans ces rapports et compte tenu de cette situation et de ces problèmes, il n'est pas douteux qu'il s'est produit des changements importants ; changements qui résultent essentiellement de deux faits qui ont été bien souvent évoqués - y compris par moi au cours de séances précédentes - c'est d'abord que l'équilibre nucléaire a été confirmé par l'expérience, et notamment par celle de Berlin et celle de Cuba ; et c'est ensuite, peut-être d'ailleurs du fait de cet équilibre nucléaire, que, apparemment, les menaces ont cessé du côté de l'Est, toujours depuis les affaires de Berlin et de Cuba. Et c'est depuis ce moment-là qu'il est apparu que les conditions étaient peut-être nouvelles, et qu'il y avait peut-être les possibilités d'une évolution.

C'est, à notre avis, cet état de choses qu'il faut prendre comme point de départ pour en tirer des conséquences et la France, pour sa part, cherche à y contribuer par une politique délibérée qui s'appelle essentiellement la politique de la détente qui devrait dans notre esprit, si les choses sont possibles et si elles se développent, conduire à la coopération et peut-être, finalement, à l'entente. Il s'agit de normaliser la situation, de normaliser les rapports entre les pays européens en les développant entre tous, sans exception, dans tous les domaines, qu'il s'agisse de la politique, de l'économie, de la technique ou du culturel, de façon à chercher à créer une nouvelle situation, un nouveau climat en Europe et à la longue à rendre possible la discussion des grands problèmes qui se posent et d'abord, naturellement, au premier rang le problème de l'Allemagne.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

En d'autres termes, il nous semble que c'est par la détente que l'on peut arriver à faire des progrès et non par le maintien de la tension ; maintien de la tension qui a pour corollaire immédiat cette idée que, grâce à la puissance militaire, on finira par convaincre l'Union soviétique d'accepter nos points de vue. C'est une position qui ne nous a jamais paru réaliste et qui l'est, dans le monde actuel, de moins en moins.

Pour parvenir à cette détente, il s'agit évidemment d'établir des contacts entre tous les pays européens, c'est-à-dire entre les pays de l'Est et les pays de l'Ouest, à commencer par l'Union soviétique et en continuant par les autres pays de l'Europe orientale. Encore une fois, c'est ce que nous cherchons à faire. J'ai moi-même, au cours de cette année, rendu visite à tous ces pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale et je crois savoir qu'un certain nombre de mes collègues en ont fait autant, et visité quelques-uns, sinon la totalité des pays dont il s'agit.

Cette attitude, dans une large mesure, nous semble-t-il, trouve son correspondant à l'Est. Dans tous les contacts que nous avons pris nous avons noté un désir de développer les rapports et si possible de les détendre. Ceci est vrai en particulier de la Russie, et je rejoins sur ce point ce qui m'a semblé que M. Paul Martin nous disait ce matin en nous parlant du voyage qu'il a effectué récemment en Union soviétique. C'est la conclusion à laquelle nous sommes parvenus nous-mêmes à la suite du voyage qu'avec le Président de la République française j'ai fait à Moscou au mois de juin et à la suite de la visite que le Chef du Gouvernement soviétique nous a rendue ce mois même. Il nous a semblé que du côté de la Russie il n'y avait pas le désir d'avoir, ou de créer, des difficultés, qu'il n'y avait pas d'ambition à manifester à l'extérieur, son grand problème et sa grande préoccupation étant d'ailleurs à l'heure actuelle le problème de la Chine. Naturellement sur l'Allemagne les vues sont différentes et nous le savons bien. C'est une situation qui existe depuis longtemps et qui ne va pas certainement disparaître en un jour. Ce qu'il faut, c'est essayer de favoriser une évolution, et quand je dis une évolution cela veut dire naturellement une évolution de part et d'autre. A ce propos, je suis heureux de saluer ce qui a été dit tout à l'heure par notre collègue de la République fédérale, M. Willy Brandt, sur ce qu'est actuellement l'orientation de la politique allemande.

Tout ceci, qui n'est certainement pas nouveau pour mes collègues, vaut pour l'Europe et dans le cadre des questions qui sont du champ d'application de l'Alliance atlantique.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Il est évident - et notre collègue le Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis en a parlé à l'instant même avant moi - qu'il en va différemment dans d'autres régions du monde où l'on n'en est pas, certes, à la détente. La guerre du Vietnam continue et paraît même se développer dans des conditions qui sont préoccupantes ; il est clair qu'aussi longtemps qu'elle continuera il n'y aura pas de détente dans l'ensemble du monde et il est clair que ceci, en particulier, affecte inévitablement de manière sérieuse les rapports entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Nous le regrettons pour notre part profondément et d'autant plus que, en définitive, c'est le peuple vietnamien qui est la première victime de cette situation. C'est pour cette raison, et pour bien d'autres naturellement, que nous voudrions voir cette guerre cesser aussi rapidement que possible.

En attendant, et si un développement vers le mieux est possible en Europe, nous pensons qu'il faut y travailler et c'est ce que nous cherchons à faire. Nous sommes heureux de voir que de plus en plus nombreux sont les pays, à commencer par les pays membres de l'Alliance atlantique, qui s'orientent dans la même voie. Nous ne nous faisons aucune illusion sur les difficultés de l'entreprise, sur la longueur du processus et sur les possibilités qui existent à tout moment de retour en arrière. Mais enfin, c'est la direction qui s'offre à nous, c'est la direction où nous pouvons trouver quelque espoir de parvenir à des règlements et c'est, en réalité, la seule voie que nous puissions suivre.

En terminant, Monsieur le Président, je voudrais dire un mot sur la proposition qui a été déposée par la Délégation italienne au sujet des problèmes de la technologie. M. Fanfani nous a expliqué ce matin qu'il s'agit là d'un grand problème - et nous n'en doutons pas - que ses aspects sont multiples, qu'il est compliqué et difficile.

La première question est de chercher à déterminer ce dont il s'agit et quelles seraient les instances compétentes pour le traiter. Nous sommes par conséquent tout à fait d'accord pour que le Conseil permanent examine ces questions, nous fasse à leur sujet des propositions, étant entendu, naturellement, que ces questions elles-mêmes ne sont pas de la compétence de l'Alliance, qu'elles sont d'abord - à mon avis du moins - de la responsabilité des pays européens eux-mêmes, qui sont les principaux intéressés, et que, en définitive, et s'agissant de les traiter éventuellement dans un cadre plus large, c'est probablement l'OCDE qui serait l'instance la mieux appropriée.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. le Ministre.

M. le Président Werner ?

M. WERNER

M. le Président, mes chers Collègues, des devoirs impérieux de politique intérieure m'appellent à Luxembourg pour demain, et je ne voudrais pas quitter Paris sans avoir confirmé au Conseil l'invitation qui lui a été adressée par le Gouvernement luxembourgeois de tenir la séance de printemps à Luxembourg même. Mon pays se trouverait grandement honoré si le Conseil donnait suite à cette invitation. Je fais en même temps un appel à la coopération du Secrétariat général, un peu aussi à l'indulgence des délégations, pour nous permettre de résoudre les problèmes pratiques qui peuvent se poser pour la capitale d'un pays qui, évidemment, n'a pas l'expérience des grandes conférences comme les grandes capitales.

En tous cas, nous vous accueillerons avec la même cordialité que celle dont vous avez joui dans les autres capitales.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. le Président. Au nom du Conseil, je vous remercie de votre déclaration, je vous exprime la gratitude du Conseil et de tous les Alliés, et je suis sûr que cette invitation sera acceptée avec enthousiasme et que le Conseil aura chez vous un accueil non seulement chaleureux, mais très confortable sous tous les points de vue. Donc, cette décision sera prise naturellement demain, mais vous avez eu la bonté de vouloir bien avancer votre déclaration parce que, malheureusement, vous devez partir et nous quitter avant la conclusion de notre séance. Eh bien, je vous remercie aussi de cette attention, et je vous assure que demain le Conseil prendra une décision sur ce point avec ce sentiment de gratitude que j'ai voulu vous exprimer dès à présent.

Merci beaucoup M. le Président.

Does anyone else wish to speak on any point? I think that we may conclude this discussion, a discussion which, I feel, though extremely rich, extremely deep, extremely varied, and precisely because of this does not call for a long summing up. All these matters of the international situation and East/West relations have been explored in depth and in breadth in a way which is certainly useful and will certainly not be wasted but will be put to practical use, in view of the proposal by the Belgian Government, which will greatly help to concentrate all the contributions to the discussion and allow them to be studied and brought to some conclusion which will undoubtedly be positive for the future of the Alliance.

Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

May I just make a few points, which are rather practical points? One of them is, first of all, about the idea of an Atlantic Assembly which has been raised by Mr. Luns, and taken up by Mr. Rusk. I have already drawn the attention of the Permanent Representatives to this matter in a written communication telling them that I was planning to ask for a discussion on this proposal of the Parliamentarians' Conference at one of the next meetings of the Council. Consequently, I think that this suggestion will not be dropped without due consideration.

The second practical point which I would like to underline is what has been said to us by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey about their contacts on Cyprus. Fortunately, these contacts have been extremely secret, as I mentioned in my short report about the watching brief, and it is right that they should be so because secrecy is a condition of their possible success, I am therefore sure that the Ministers were not surprised not to have any details of progress and that they are all united in wishing that this progress, even if slow, will be continued and will reach some fruitful conclusion. In this respect, I think and believe that the incident concerning the weapons to Cyprus will be a minor one and may be kept under control by peaceful means. In this perspective and in this direction, both the Greek and Turkish Governments, I am sure will give their co-operation in order not to weaken, or to diminish in any way, by a minor incident the capital of good will they have gathered during these months and which should be very fruitful in the future.

There is, as the general discussion has revealed, a great deal of consensus about the general trend toward détente. This desire to improve in a real and practical way the relations with the Communist countries, the Soviet Union and East Europe countries has been shared by everybody. Of course, there are important different lines of approach to this problem, there are reservations and more caution on some sides, there is more boldness and hope on other sides, but the basic understanding of the problem exists and should bear its fruit during what I would call the Belgian exercise, which has been achieved by general consensus. There has also been a common understanding generally that the bloc-to-bloc approach should not be applied, not so much in shaping a policy on which there may be a difference of opinion about how far the Allies can go, but in implementing this policy in contacts with Eastern European countries. This idea that the bloc-to-bloc approach should be avoided in implementing policy has been generally accepted.

Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

Of course, everybody, in different degrees, but fundamentally in agreement, has also accepted that all this détente should develop on the basis of an assured security that the Alliance is there precisely to ensure for the free countries of Europe and of North America, and that the idea of a reasonable balance of power should stay because it is the very basic idea of our Alliance. There are also differences of opinion about the level at which the forces should be in order to reach this balance of power, but about this sound and realistic concept there is, I think, no difference here.

There has been a certain stress on a point which is that of trying to reach, in the course of this détente, an agreement about balancing the reduction of forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain, if possible. The Canadian Minister has developed this point very accurately, I think that this is certainly one of the aims, and I would say also one of the tests of the goodwill of the other side, because if we really succeeded in getting the other side to get down to real business on this point, we would certainly have already reached a very valuable stage in our effort to reach a détente.

In the light of all these basic concepts, and in the light of this general consensus, the report presented to the Ministers may be considered accepted in its general lines. As a starting point only, because there has been criticism, and there have been reservations on some part of it or on some others, in one sense or in another, it has been considered as a useful effort and a good start towards the further study of this important and, after all, long-standing development towards a real détente with the East.

We have listened, all of us, first of all, to the short, but very important considerations of Mr. Luns about the problem of détente in connection with the problem of Germany, and then, today, in the afternoon, we have listened to what has been, in my opinion, a very impressive, deep and responsible statement by the German Foreign Minister, which has explained in a way which certainly has struck all of us, the difficulty of reconciling the expectations of the German people for the solution of their problem with the need for and hope of détente which the German Government shares with the Alliance.

I am not going to add anything to that, because nobody is entitled to express the German policy except the German Government, and because this statement about German policy has been made today so attractively and so impressively that it will certainly remain as an excellent starting point for the further study of the problem of détente in relation to the complete political problems we have to face and solve in due time in Europe, including the German problem.

Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

I think that the discussion about this has been extremely fruitful and it should certainly be kept in mind very carefully by those who, in accordance with the Belgian proposal, will later study this problem.

A very minor problem has been left aside, and it has been left aside because it was of minor importance, but it was in my initial statement. It was in the paper for this meeting, and so I have to mention it. It is the problem of the publication of the list. It is not minor because it is negligible, it is minor in comparison with other larger problems. I would perhaps ask the Ministers to agree to the publication of this list. It has already been done and it is only a revised list. It is a matter which does not, after all, deserve a great discussion. I suppose that if no objections are raised after I have finished speaking, I may consider myself authorised to allow the publication of this list.

May I further mention two or three other points? One is that of the European Security Conference. This is a problem which is important. It has rightly been considered by several speakers, because although it is not imminent, one day or another it may become actual when some countries, perhaps of the East, may present some formal proposal, or some allied countries may make further suggestions here in this Council.

I think that there has also been a general consensus, at least among those who have touched upon this problem, about two points: that is that this Conference needs in any case, as a minimum, a careful preparation, and the time for it is not mature enough. The second point is that, in any case, a condition for this European Security Conference is the participation of Canada and the United States. These are two points on which, in my view, there is, and there should inevitably be, agreement in the Atlantic Alliance. Then there has been a suggestion by the Greek Foreign Minister; it is that the West could make a bold approach and take the initiative on this matter, offering fair and clear conditions for this Conference which would allow the West to put the East in difficulty in refusing and it would guarantee an orderly and fruitful development of the Conference, if the proposals were accepted.

Well, this may also be one of those proposals which could be studied later, either in the context of the Belgian study or in the Council itself at the appropriate time. It is worth consideration, because after all there is no reason why we should always leave it to the East to take the initiative.

Finally, I would just like to say that important problems of the outside areas have been mentioned. Vietnam has been referred to by many speakers, but all of us have certainly been impressed by the statement of Mr. Rusk in this respect,

Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

in which once again the point of view of the United States and its conviction of the extreme importance of this problem, not only for the Asian area but also for peace and respect for peace and international agreements in all the world, has been reasserted with great vigour and in a way which deserves not only respect but most careful attention, in particular, the idea of solidarity as Mr. Rusk explained it.

The problem of Rhodesia has been raised, the problem of the under-developed areas, of the wealthy and poor countries, the problem of the Middle East, about which Mr. Rusk has suggested discussion might take place before the holidays. I am afraid I am not going to satisfy this. It is not perhaps physically possible to do this, because we have only one Council meeting, and a busy one, before the holidays. But certainly this problem, if the American Delegation will be ready to activate it, may be examined very soon in the New Year, which is now imminent.

Everybody has also understood, I think, and given them the serious attention they deserve, the considerations of the Portuguese Minister about his conception of solidarity and the particular approach of his country towards certain general problems of the Alliance. He has also agreed to the necessity for the Belgian study and to the examination of the state of the Alliance. It is here that his point of view may be examined even if it is in contradiction with some other allies, but always in an atmosphere, I hope, of friendliness and of mutual confidence.

I have nothing else to say. I believe there is the Belgian proposal, which is now under discussion in a special group. Tomorrow we will see when that will be discussed, with the communiqué or before the communiqué, according to the development of the procedure.

Mr. Couve de Murville has anticipated, and I was glad that he did so, the last point of his statement concerning the technological co-operation question that he knows very well is on the Agenda of tomorrow. It will be discussed. It is an important proposal, but it will be resumed because it deserves careful attention, of course. It will be resumed tomorrow at the proper moment under the Agenda. I suppose that the Italian Foreign Minister will have to make a statement on it and at that moment we will see what conclusion we draw from it. For the moment we have only to register the acceptance by the French Government of the suggestion of the Italian Government.

Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

I think that at this stage I have nothing more to say but to ask the Council if it has any comment to make on my comments and then to see about the procedure to be followed for the work tonight, if possible, or tomorrow. Mr. Rusk, please.

Mr. RUSK

Mr. Chairman, on looking at my notes I find that I failed to express thanks to some twelve members of the Alliance for practical assistance which they are giving to Vietnam at the present time, and for that my apologies. You might be interested to know that there are more than 52,000 troops and more than 13,000 civilians from countries other than South Vietnam and the United States now in that country.

Several of you have asked me for indications as to the highest priority practical needs in Vietnam under present circumstances. I am taking the liberty therefore of furnishing to delegations some indications of what these practical needs are - there is a great variety of them - for your consideration. But I do want to express appreciation for the very considerable amount of help which the South Vietnamese are already getting from members of this table.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary of State.

May I just remind the meeting that we still have on the Agenda Defence Aid to Greece and Turkey which I suppose should not require very lengthy discussion. The Relocation of the Council, which certainly will need careful attention and some discussion perhaps. Then the Italian proposal for international technological co-operation already mentioned. Civil Emergency Planning, which will be a short item and then the communiqué of course which always takes some time.

I wonder if we could - it is now 6.35, it is already fairly late -- if we could adjourn until tomorrow, or just examine the Defence Aid to Greece and Turkey. This would allow the Council tomorrow morning, when we have a fresh mind, to examine relocation immediately and the Italian proposal for international technological co-operation. Is the Council prepared to examine aid to Greece and Turkey now? You would prefer to have it in the morning? Well, I made the suggestion in order to shorten our work tomorrow but the Greek Government is asking for a postponement until tomorrow. So I suppose that everybody is in agreement with this. Then the meeting is adjourned until tomorrow. Should we start at 10 o'clock? 10 o'clock please.