# CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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# <u>NATO SECRET</u>

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VERBATIM RECORD

of the

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

FRIDAY, 8th DECEMBER, 1972 at 9.30 a.m.

at

NATO HEADQUARTERS

BRUSSELS

COMPTE RENDU

de la

SEANCE DU CONSEIL

tenue le

VENDREDI 8 DECEMBRE 1972 à 9h30

au

SIEGE DE L'OTAN

BRUXELLES

OTAN/NATO, 1110 Brussels

This document consists of : 9 pages

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# II. COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY

## M. LUNS

La séance est reprise.

Je vous signale que, sous la direction de M. Kastl, les hauts fonctionnaires des délégations se sont penchés sur le communiqué, et ils ont vite fait : à 5 h 1/2 ce matin, on avait la première épreuve. Nous ferons notre possible pour que cela soit approuvé ce matin.

Ceci dit, nous continuons nos travaux avec le Point II de notre ordre du jour.

## Mr. LUNS

Gentlemen, under this item, Ministers are asked to consider the progress report of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, CCMS. You may know that, under the aegis of this Committee, there are currently eight pilot studies under way; two others, "Ocean Oil Spills", and "Disaster Assistance," have been completed and have now reached the follow-up stage. This follow-up is of course a distinguishing and essential element in CCMS work. And, I would submit to you that it deserves our continuing attention and support.

Now, if any Minister wants to comment on these excellent reports, it is now or never. No? So, I think we can take it that the Council is in agreement and has noted with satisfaction this report. No objections? Agreed.

We take up now Item III.

## III. REPORT TO MINISTERS ON REDIRECTION OF CNAD EFFORTS

## Mr. LUNS

I will now introduce our next subject, to wit, the reports to Ministers on the redirection of CNAD efforts. CNAD means Conference of National Armaments Directors.

A few explanatory observations may be in order.

Last Wednesday, Defence Ministers discussed this same report. No decisions were taken at the time, and could not be taken, because of the absence of France. But the discussion, of which France has been informed, has served as a useful preliminary to the Council's consideration of the report today.

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Mr. LUNS (Contd)

Now, the Council is only asked to note the report, since the CNAD will make a more complete report to Ministers in the Spring of 1973.

Now Gentlemen, over the years, NATO has consistently subscribed to the principle that it is in the interest of the Alliance to encourage its members to co-operate in research, development, and production of military equipment.

The results achieved by the different arrangements NATO has effected over the past two decades to encourage co-operation have rarely measured up to our hopes and expectations. The Conference of National Armaments Directors, being the latest in the series of such arrangements, is not quite, quite happy, is not satisfied, either. And the results of their considerations now lie before you in the report.

There seems to be a consensus of opinion that, insofar as information exchanges are concerned, the CNAD efforts have However, what we are trying to accomplish been successful. through administrative arrangements such as the CNAD, is really to promote more co-operative projects for the development and fabrication of military equipment and for related matters. So, indeed, the situation is not satisfactory. I would even say it is far from satisfactory. Our national policies for the equipping of our military forces, our traditional ways of thinking, the political and economic pressures that prevail and a whole host of conditioned reflexes, dictate how procurement officers go about their business and continue to thwart us. More international co-operation therefore depends upon what accommodation nations themselves are prepared to make in their own national policies. What in fact, the CNAD is saying to you the Ministers, is, we want your guidance and your assistance. Now of course, there is much more that can be said on this subject, but I think that any specific proposals should be delayed until our next meeting when we will be in receipt of a more elaborate report from the CNAD.

I made my remarks in order to underline what is really the matter, and to prepare Ministers and to condition, insofar as words are able to do so, their reflexes, their opinions and the directives they give in the months to come, because we all know that one of the weakest points of NATO has been, and still is, the failure of standardization of weaponry, in which the Soviet bloc has been so highly successful to such an extent that the Warsaw Pact powers, apart from Russia, have all now been equipped with the most modern and uniform material procured by them, or bought by them, from the Soviet Union or given by the Soviet Union.

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Mr. LUNS (Contd)

I vividly remember my visit to Turkey, when the very efficient and very able Turkish generals, whose courage and patriotism is legendary, explained to me that the Bulgarian Army now has such modern equipment that, even if Bulgaria launched aggression alone against Turkey, the Turkish forces, which are far superior to the Bulgarian forces, would have quite some difficulty in Thrace. This was explained to me with many details and emphasized by the way the Bulgarian Army is equipped. I give this example in order to reinforce some of the background I have just given you.

In the meantime, I don't think that the brevity of the current CNAD report should keep us from recognizing the seriousness of the problem or from initiating within cur respective capitals more active consideration of what is going to be done about it. In this respect, the able and distinguished Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Lord Carrington, made some very pungent and very relevant remarks on the whole problem.

May I take it that the fifteen nations accept this report and will, when the further report comes in the Spring, take into account all the underlying arguments in order that we might perhaps advance in the direction we all wish to advance but seem unable to although, to be completely fair, there are some encouraging signs of co-operation between European nations, and also between European nations and the United States, with regard However, that is to new arms procurement and standardization. just some encouraging signs. Is there any reaction all there is: If not, then I may take it that the to what I have said? Ministers take note of the report I have just explained to you and we will come back to it later on.

# I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION - SUMMING UP

#### Mr. LUNS

I now come to the usual summing up by the Chairman. I think, Gentlemen, that our meeting has provided for an exceptionally full consultation on the problems facing us individually as Governments, and collectively as an Alliance. May I concentrate my summing up on five main topics, namely Germany, CSCE, MBFR, other areas and finally the state of the Alliance.

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Mr. LUNS (Contd)

First, the German question. We have listened with great attention to Herr Scheel and Mr. Schumann, who also spoke on behalf of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Secretary of State Rogers. It was generally recongized that the Basic Treaty between the two German States represents a highly significant step towards further relaxation of tension, at the same time, both speakers urged Alliance members to maintain their solidarity in co-ordinating their policies with respect to the German Democratic Republic, noting that it would be highly desirable not to take any steps to establish bilateral relations with the GDR until the Basic Treaty had been signed It seems to me that general between the two German States. support for this position exists amongst us. With respect to the co-ordination of specific steps by Allied governments in their approaches to the GDR, Mr. Schumann proposed consultations by the Council in Permanent Session, which could get under At that time, we might determine what precise way next week. issues require consideration among the Allies.

I now turn to the CSCE and I would like to review where we now stand on the unresolved questions listed in my PO which was circulated to all of you. It was agreed that it was most urgent for the Council in Permanent Session to focus on the formulation of committee mandates. It will be done as I don't anticipate major difficulties.

On the format of a CSCE, flexibility will show and a consensus appears to be emerging in support of the three-stage formula, although it was stated that there should be no commitment to this until an Agenda and mandates had been developed in such a way that they satisfied us and that we decided that a full-scale conference is worthwhile. In addition, quite a few Ministers spoke against endorsement of the Soviet idea of the third phase being a summit meeting.

With respect to the military aspect of security, Ministers reconfirmed the view that a conference should concern itself with at least certain military aspects of security and that, therefore, Allied governments should advance their proposals for confidence-building measures. Many Ministers felt that a conference could in addition usefully discuss a general declaration on levels of forces in Europe. Mr. Harmel suggested that this issue could alternatively be dealt with in the context of Guiding Principles for Relations between the States and has circulated a draft text to that effect. I feel that these are questions which Permanent Representatives may have to look into again, with a view to finding a consensus.

As to the question of a declaration on principles, here again we have not advanced very far, but we have noted the importance Herr Minister Scheel attaches to the principle of self-determination and that Secretary Rogers desires to see the Soviets pinned down regarding their doctrine of limited sovereignty.

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# Mr. LUNS (Contd)

Lastly, on the Soviet proposal regarding permanent machinery, I detected a rather widespread reluctance to this idea in general and, in particular, to anything which might amount to a permanent political machine.

Now, turning to MBFR, Ministers noted the complexity and delicacy of the negotiations on which we are about to embark. They stressed the need for continued allied unity and, in this context, welcomed the solutions found for participation in MBFR talks and for a consultative process leading to agreement on a common approach to MBFR. Mr. Schumann recalled the dangers which his Government believes are inherent in MBFR and expressed the hope that these dangers could be limited in the negotiations.

As to the forthcoming MBFR exploratory talks, the Ministers concerned noted that the British draft guidelines and the Agenda papers will serve as the basis for the formulation of a common allied position; a task which the Council in Permanent Session will take upon itself as a matter of great urgency. believe that the approach and philosophy reflected in the British draft guidelines appear to be generally accepted. There was a concensus that the exploratory talks should not aim at any The Council, in elaborating the agreement on MBFR principles. common guidelines, will however take into account the view expressed by several Ministers that the exploratory talks should provide opportunity for exposing and taking soundings on certain principles for MBFR which Allied governments have developed over the past years. In this connection, it was noted with understandable satisfaction that Mr. Rogers reiterated, in no uncertain terms, the United States position that America will not conclude any bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union on MBFR matters.

Now, Gentlemen, I come to other areas. Here I have noted the emphasis quite justifiably placed by the distinguished Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Italy and Greece regarding the situation in the Mediterranean and the continuing tension in the Middle East; also the distinguished Foreign Minister of Portugal made some relevant remarks in this connection.

As for Cyprus, my watching brief enables me to follow developments there with all the attention they deserve and I am grateful to the Governments of Turkey and of Greece for briefing me so completely on all developments as they occur. It is most useful for me.

On SALT, I noted, allied interest in this sensitive subject and the United States assurance to continue full consultation in the same admirable way as the United States consulted the NATO Council in SALT I. I took note of the fact that the United States Government are very much aware of the fact that the SALT II talks are even more important, if possible, to their European Allies.

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Mr. LUNS (Contd)

Turning to the last subject, the state of the Alliance, it was recognized that the current diplomatic activity and political change present potential advantages but also some considerable risks. Both during the Defence Ministers Meeting on Wednesday and here in the Council, great stress has been laid on the imperative requirement for the Alliance to maintain and, wherever possible, to improve its military strength -more necessary now, during a period of negotiations and effort and also in the light of the rather frightening build-up of the Soviet military posture in all the sectors of armament: missiles, the army, air force and, not least, the navy. took note with great attention of the very eloquent words We which the British Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, pronounced in this connection. As Sir Alec put it, force reductions should follow, not precede On this subject, I would like to pay tribute and détente. to welcome President Nixon's letter to the Council, which Secretary Rogers read to us, reaffirming the United States pledge that, given a similar approach by its allies, the United States will maintain and improve its forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action from the East.

The enduring nature of transatlantic ties was emphasized by, I may say, all the Foreign Ministers here present and, of course, from both sides of the ocean - while the vital rôle of our Council in this context has been underlined.

In this respect, I may also note Herr Scheel's statement, echoed by other Ministers, that a European community does not regard itself as a bloc vis-à-vis the Alliance nor does it intend to behave as such.

Mr. Schumann specified that, although political consultation amongst the members of the Alliance is in integral element of progress towards political union, there need not be any contradiction between this and consultation in the larger, long-established framework of NATO; in this he was echoed by Mr. Harmel and Mr. Schmelzer, the Netherlands Foreign Minister.

Mr. Schmelzer observed that European union would be self-defeating if it were to compromise the Atlantic partnership. It was underlined, in this regard, that monetary and economic problems must be approached in the spirit of compromise a view which I personally strongly support and to which I already gave some utterance in our last Ministerial Meeting in December last year in Brussels.

Well, gentlmen, the above is a broad summary and covers the main points raised under Item I - Review of the International Situation.

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## Mr. LUNS (Contd)

Before leaving the subject, I want to say that I have noted that Ministers have noted all the reports mentioned under A, B and D of this Agenda Item.

Finally, on Items II and III of the Agenda, Ministers have noted the report of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and on the Conference of National Armaments Directors. Here may I mention the offer of the distinguished Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr. Sharp, to have the next CCMS meeting in Ottawa. If it is decided that the CCMS should meet on a rotating basis in capitals, the question of whether or not the Alliance will be able to avail itself of this possibility will be studied in the context of our rather tight, or even, as the Ambassadors noted our very tight budgetary situation.

#### DATE AND PLACE OF NEXT MINISTERIAL MEETING

## Mr. LUNS

In conclusion, I should like to express a collective appreciation to Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark for his invitation on behalf of the Royal Danish Government to hold the next Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen - a city which, for various reasons, is highly popular with men (and also with ladies), to which we will go with great pleasure in the Spring, and where we will combine work and a modest measure of pleasure.

#### COMMUNIQUE

 $\underline{/}$ The Council then considered the draft text of a Communique to the press. This was subsequently released after amendment as M2(72)14.7

### CLOSING STATEMENTS

## Mr. LUNS

Now gentlemen, I want to add one more word. I think we should not separate without wishing the United States of America all the best with the last programme of this stupendous adventure in which the United States have been engaged for two years without a moon shot. We have not talked about it very We took it more or less for granted but the incredible much. achievement of the United States of America stayed there for all to see, for all to know. I, for one, feel sure that all the Ministers will agree when I express our admiration to Mr. Rogers and when I express a very confident hope that this last moon shot will be as successful as nearly all the others were. Even in the one which was not successful the moon module was successfully We wish you all the best, Mr. Rogers. brought back.

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## Mr. ROGERS

Thank you.

## Mr. LUNS

Now, nothing more to be said I will conclude by saying that we have indeed had a very fruitful meeting which is in line with all the meetings of this very strong Alliance and I thank all the Ministers for their very positive contributions.

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Session adjourned.