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To: Permanent Representatives

ENGLISH

From: Secretary General

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19th May, 1970

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Attached is a summary, prepared by the Political Division, of selected statements on European security by Soviet, East European and other non-NATO government representatives. This report reflects information available at NATO through 30th April, 1970.

2. Material compiled previously on the same subject is to be found in PO/70/153, dated 24th March, 1970, and other references listed in the latter document.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

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I. SOVIET VIEWS

1. Remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev(1)

Following the first meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Consultative Committee, 3rd-5th April, 1970, the leader of the Soviet Delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev, stayed on in London for an additional two days. The only meeting which Mr. Kozyrev had with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was at a reception on 3rd April when they had an informal talk about European security, Berlin and On European security Mr. Kozyrev did not reveal Germany. anything new on the Soviet position. He accused H.M. Government of adopting a negative attitude towards a Security Conference. He said that an All-European Conference would lead to a great upsurge of economic and commercial co-operation and to co-operation in other fields, which might possibly be supervised by some sort of standing body. Mr. Stewart, in refuting the allegations about the negative attitude of H.M. Government, referred to the study of possible procedures for negotiation by In this context he mentioned, in addition to the Soviet NATO. idea of a conference, the possibility of a standing commission on East-West relations.

Mr. Kozyrev also had talks with the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Denis Greenhill) on European security. Mr. Kozyrev said that Soviet support for an All-European Conference was based on their desire to avoid any new military confrontation. Their proposals had the approval of the overwhelming majority of European countries. He commended the two items in the Prague Declaration (renunciation of force and European co-operation) and said that the question was not whether to hold a conference, He did not wish to overbut to fix a date, place and agenda. burden the conference and did not think that MBFR could be This matter would involve discussed at a first conference. disarmament and nuclear matters, with which not all European countries were directly concerned. The right forum was the A European Security Conference could help forward the CCD. various bilateral negotiations already in train, just as much as vice versa.

Mr. Kozyrev had further talks with the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and with senior officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In response to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's exposition of H.M. Government's European policy, Mr. Kozyrev said that the Soviet view of the EEC remained that it was a restricted economic grouping. Speaking personally, he said that he could not agree that Western European economic integration would favour the development of East-West trade. On the contrary, in both economic and political fields, it would lead to an "intensification of the split" and to the raising of new barriers.

(1) Information circulated by the UK Delegation on 14th April, 1970

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2. Brezhnev Speech

In a speech at Kharkov on 14th April, 1970, CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev spoke as follows concerning the Warsaw Pact's proposals on European security:

"A fundamental concern of our foreign policy was and continues to be strengthening peace in Europe. By demonstrating intolerance for the imperialist policy of militarism and revanchism and tirelessly exposing the designs of those who would like to reshape the frontiers in Europe, the socialist countries and the Communist and workers parties have presented a realistic programme to strengthen European peace. Such a programme provides for rejecting the use of force or threat of its use, recognising the territorial status quo in Europe as it has formed since World War II, developing mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations between all nations and states in Europe, regardless of the differences of their social systems. The proposals of the socialist countries are not directed against anyone's legal They are intended to promote international interests. collaboration on the basis of sovereign equality, non-interference in the affairs of others, respect for territorial integrity and the state independence of European countries.

Who can be against such proposals? Is it not clear that it is precisely along this course that a genuine normalisation of the situation in Europe is to be attained? It is no wonder that the idea advanced by the socialist countries for convening an All-European Conference of states on questions of security and collaboration is finding increasingly broader international support."

It will be noted that, in the third sentence of the first paragraph quoted above, Brezhnev added "cultural" relations to the trade, economic, and scientific-technical relations called for in the Prague Declaration. Apart from this small gesture, however, Brezhnev added nothing new to the wellknown Soviet position on this subject.

3. May Day Slogan

In the CPSU slogans for May Day, 1970, which were published in <u>Pravda</u> on 16th April, the slogan (No. 53) on European security, which appears below, does not differ significantly from the slogan published last October(1).

"Peoples in Europe: Intensify the struggle to create an effective system of collective security in Europe, for developing co-operation and mutual understanding between peoples:"

(1) See P0/69/550, paragraph 23

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4. Comments of the Soviet Counsellor in Ottawa

On 23rd April, 1970, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa had a further exchange of views with officials of the Department of External Affairs. In this meeting, which was a continuation of an earlier dialogue(1) on 28th January, the Soviet Representative probed for more details concerning the Canadian position on a possible conference on European security, and urged that Canada make counter-proposals with respect to the timing and the agenda of such a conference.

The Counsellor revealed little that was new concerning the Soviet position on a CES. Some of his comments did, however, serve to illustrate rather clearly the conceptions underlying the Warsaw Pact proposal for a declaration on the renunciation of the use or threat of force. For example, the Soviet Counsellor declared that the Czechoslovak events of 1968 had nothing to do with either European security or a CES; this was an internal matter of the socialist states, which had been resolved within the socialist family, including Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Counsellor maintained that the concept of the renunciation of the use of force would apply first of all in the sense of relations between the socialist and the capitalist countries of Europe; it was between them that a major conflict could be provoked and everything possible had to be done to prevent it. It had to be recognised, said the Soviet Representative, that Europe was divided into socialist and capitalist states and one must co-operate on those questions which could be positively resolved.

The Canadian officials took note of the Soviet Counsellor's reference to Europe divided between socialist and capitalist states and wondered in what category did Yugoslavia fall in that case? When the Soviet Counsellor replied that Yugoslavia was socialist "according to the Yugoslav Authorities", the Canadian officials remarked that what seemed pertinent was the Soviet definition, especially in the light of the earlier remark about the internal affairs of the socialist countries being settled by them. The Soviet Counsellor observed that all this went beyond what one had to discuss. The Canadian officials rejoined that it was not beyond the scope of a conference; the existence of such issues demonstrated that more preparation was required before even an agenda could be agreed. The Soviet Counsellor concluded this part of the exchange by saying that the Canadian views were not as positive as he had hoped, but that he would report them to Moscow.

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(1) See PO/70/117, Item 9, dated 17th March, 1970

5. Soviet-Czechoslovak Communique

The Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the official visit to Czechoslovakia of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, 16th-21st March, 1970, contained the following paragraphs:

"The two sides exchanged views on topical problems in Europe. They noted with satisfaction that the proposal for convening an All-European Conference on European Security is meeting with an ever broader positive response. The Prague statement of 31st October, 1969, which was adopted by the socialist countries, the initiators of the proposal for the convening of a conference, formed a good basis for the passing over in the near future from the preparation of this conference to practical measures. Where Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are concerned, the two countries will continue to strive, in keeping with the principles of the policy of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, for the convening of an All-European Conference and for the ensuring of its success.

"The relations to the German Federal Republic were also discussed in the talks.

"The Czechoslovak side stressed that it expects from the FRG Government an unequivocal admission of the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from its very incipience and that all consequences ensuing from this will be drawn.

"Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union hold the view that it would be of great importance for the reduction of tension and the strengthening of peace in Europe if the FRG were to shift to a policy of admitting the facts arising as a result of World War II and post-war developments. The two sides are also agreed that sight must not be lost of the danger of manifestations of revanchism and the activisation of neo-Nazi forces in the FRG and that permanent vigilance must be observed in respect of them."

II. EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS

6. Yugoslav Views

In mid-March, the Yugoslav Government distributed two documents(1) on European security and European co-operation, the contents of which are summarised below. The Canadian, Danish, French, German, Greek, Netherlands, Turkish, and United States Delegations(2) have confirmed receipt of these documents, which do not represent a new initiative for a Conference on European Security but are rather an exposition of Yugoslav views.

- The original text of these documents, as provided by the Danish Delegation, was circulated under cover of a memorandum from the Secretary of the Political Committee dated 25th March, 1970.
- (2) Information reported in the Political Committee on 24th and 31st March, 1970.

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The document on European security reflects the Yugoslav conception of an "evolution of relations" among European countries, in accordance with UN Charter principles, leading to the gradual elimination of blocs and the creation of conditions of full freedom and equality for all European countries. In the Yugoslav view, the starting point for this evolution should be a "recognition of the existing territorial status quo" and "existing German realities". The Yugoslavs favour the development of agreed rules of conduct in European relations, embodying the principles of sovereign equality, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states, abstention from the use or threat of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

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The Yugoslavs advocate a step-by-step approach to regional disarnament, commencing with modest measures such as limitations on military manoeuvres and prevention of foreign military bases in territories where they do not already exist. Eventually, the Yugoslavs envisage non-nuclear zones and zones of limited armaments in Europe, as well as various measures of disengagement.

An essential element in Yugoslav thinking, and one which distinguishes their position from that of the Warsaw Pact, is the principle that any reduction or freezing of armaments should be balanced and should cover both nuclear and conventional armaments and should, moreover, contribute to a reduction of pressure, or the possibility of pressure, on European countries, particularly the smaller ones. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia would wish to see regional disarmament measures included in the agenda of a Conference on European Security. The Yugoslavs favour the broadest possible participation in the preparation of the conference and its agenda and oppose "restricted 'preparatory bodies'", such as the "troika" suggested by Poland and Hungary. In other respects, Yugoslav views on a possible CES, in so far as these are reflected in this document, do not appear to differ significantly from those of the Warsaw Pact member countries.

The Yugoslav document on European co-operation calls for greater use of the facilities of existing international organizations in Europe, in particular the ECE, to promote co-operation in economic, scientific, cultural and technical fields, including agriculture, education and the environment. Yugoslav proposals on this subject are more comprehensive and detailed than those of the Warsaw Pact member states, and include suggestions (e.g. for a "free flow of information" between European countries) which would pose difficulties for the more orthodox Communist régimes.

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7. Hungarian-Polish Communiqué

The Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the official visit to Poland of Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter, 9th-12th March, 1970, contained the following paragraph:

"The Ministers discussed the fundamental problems of the international situation and devoted much attention to the consolidation of European security and the question of the preparation of a conference to promote European security and co-operation. They expressed the conviction that recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) of the post-war European territorial-political realities and, within that sphere, recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier of Poland, would pave the way to a normalisation of relations between the socialist countries and the FRG and would contribute thereby to a lasting stabilisation of the situation in Europe."

8. Rumanian Proposal for Preparatory Meeting(1)

In mid-March, the Rumanian Government circulated a new proposal on behalf of a Conference on European Security and co-operation, including a suggestion for a preparatory meeting to be attended by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of all the European countries concerned. Following the initial report by the UK Delegation(2), the Delegations of Belgium, Canada(3), Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxenbourg, the Netherlands, Norway(4), Turkey, and the United States confirmed that the Rumanian views had, in one way or another, been conveyed to their Governments as well. The UK Delegation reported that similar approaches were made to Finland, Sweden and Austria(5).

- (1) This item supplements and updates Item 9 of PO/70/153, dated 24th March, 1970.
- (2) See the letter and enclosure sent by the United Kingdom Representative on the Political Committee to that Committee on 12th March, 1970.
- (3) See the memorandum of conversation circulated by the Canadian Representative at the Political Committee's meeting on 18th March, 1970.
- (4) See Iten 10.
- (5) Information reported in the Political Committee on 18th, 19th, 24th and 31st March, and on 14th April, 1970.

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9. Background to Rumanian Proposal

According to information received by the Canadian Authorities from the Rumanian Anbassador in a NATO capital(1), the Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest called on President Ceausescu sometime in February or early March to seek Rumanian support for an initiative to form a commission composed of three countries (Poland, Finland and Belgium) to prepare for a Conference on European Security. President Ceausescu declined, and proceeded instead to instruct his Ambassadors in European capitals to explore the alternative idea of convening a preparatory meeting of officials representing Foreign Ministers (see previous item).

Reading from his instructions, the Rumanian Ambassador who provided the foregoing information explained that Rumania disliked the tripartite commission idea because it reflected a bloc-to-bloc approach and because they thought it important that all countries should have equal opportunity to contribute to the preparation of the conference. The Rumanians also contend that a preparatory meeting bringing together representatives of all participating countries is more in line with the terms of the Budapest Appeal of 17th March, 1969 and with the Finnish Memorandum of 5th May, 1969.

10. Visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng to Rumania

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng paid an official visit to Rumania from 9th-12th March, 1970. While there, he was given a presentation of Rumanian views on European security and co-operation(2) by Foreign Minister Manescu, who did not, however, refer specifically to the Rumanian proposal to convene a preparatory meeting of representatives of European Foreign Ministries (see Item 8). Foreign Minister Manescu said that the Rumanian Government considers it is necessary that all the states of the Continent should have the possibility of directly participating in all the stages for preparing, organizing and holding the European Conference with no obstacles, exceptions or discriminations in the conditions of full equality in rights, and that it is also necessary that no issue should be tackled from bloc-to-bloc within a restricted group of states.

- (1) See the letter and enclosure sent by the Canadian Representative on the Political Committee to that Committee on 20th March, 1970.
- (2) See the memorandum of conversation circulated by the Norwegian Representative at the meeting of the Political Committee on 19th March, 1970.

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In the Communiqué(1) issued at the conclusion of the visit, it was noted that there took place a broad exchange of views on some present international problems and especially on European security, underlining the necessity of achieving concrete actions for preparing the All-European Conference in which all interested states may take part.

11. Visit of Turkish President Sunay to Rumania(2)

During an official visit to Rumania, 13th-17th April, 1970, President Sunay was told by President Ceausescu that the need for establishing a system of security and co-operation was now accepted by every one, and that the divergences of opinion concerned only the questions of how to prepare and when to hold a conference to realise these objectives. President Ceausescu acknowledged that a conference could not be held in the near future, and he added that it is very important that the conference be well prepared and have every chance of success.

President Ceausescu said that interested countries could ask for the inclusion in the agenda of other subjects in addition to those contained in the Prague Declaration. He also said that Rumania did not approve of the method of bloc-to-bloc negotiation. He spoke approvingly of the talks being held by the Federal Republic of Germany with its Eastern neighbours, and said that Rumania's relations were developing positively with all the countries of Europe except Spain, where the present situation did not permit the establishment of diplomatic ties.

Concerning the Balkans, President Ceausescu said that Rumania enjoys good relations in such fields as culture, sport and science with all the other states of the region. He hoped that economic and political relations would also develop favourably, but recognised that this would require some time. When President Sunay raised the subject of disarnament, President Ceausescu referred briefly to the importance of denuclearisation of the Balkans.

In the Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit, the Rumanians agreed with the Turkish view that the major questions of European security should be resolved progressively, that the conference should be carefully prepared, and that all interested states should participate. The Rumanians wanted, but did not in the end insist upon, the inclusion of a phrase calling for the direct(3) participation of all interested states. This

- (1) Full text circulated to the Political Committee under cover of a letter from the Norwegian Representative dated llth April, 1970.
- (2) Information reported in the Council on 29th April, 1970.
 (3) See Item 10, first paragraph.

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may have been motivated by a desire to prevent a preparatory meeting, or a conference, being held at which only certain countries would participate and where other countries (among them Rumania) would be represented only indirectly, as for example through the "troika" formula proposed by the Poles and others (see Items 12 and 14).

12. Visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng to Bulgaria

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lýng paid an official visit to Bulgaria from 12th-15th March, 1970. In private conversation with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev, Foreign Minister Lyng received the impression that Bulgarian views did not differ significantly from those of the Soviet Union. For example, the Bulgarians supported the idea of establishing a kind of "troika", or commission composed of three countries (see Item 14) to prepare for a Conference on European Security(1).

In the Communique(2) issued at the conclusion of the visit, it was noted that a detailed exchange of views took place on some present international problems - especially on European security, underlining the necessity of achieving concrete actions for preparing an All-European Conference.

13. Comments of Bulgarian First Deputy Foreign Minister(3)

While on a private visit to Italy, the Bulgarian First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Grozev, met with Mr. Pedini, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other senior officials.

Mr. Grozev said that the agenda for a CES proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries was concrete and reasonable. The signature of a document on the renunciation of force would create a firm base for resolving other urgent problems, while the growth of economic and scientific relations, and even cultural relations, would increase mutual confidence.

It would be possible, said Mr. Grozev, to consider any constructive proposal, provided it were acceptable to all. In this connection, Mr. Grozev mentioned tourism and ecological questions (such as oceanography) and also cultural exchanges provided, however, that the latter did not become a means of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Mr. Grozev ruled out discussion of MBFR, since this would involve complex problems of nuclear disarmament and consequently delay the convening of the conference. Mr. Grozev also ruled out consideration of Germany and Berlin, since these matters are subject to Four-Power agreements.

- (1) Information reported in the Political Committee on 19th March, 1970.
- (2) Full text circulated to the Political Committee under cover of a letter from the Norwegian Representative dated llth April, 1970.
- (3) Information reported in the Council on 8th April, 1970.

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Mr. Grozev said that success in the bilateral talks between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR and Poland would be desirable, but should not be a precondition for convening a conference. Neither should it be necessary to have any preparatory meetings for a conference, since bilateral contacts have already served to clarify many aspects of the problems.

14. Comments of Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Busniak(1)

Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Busniak visited Brussels on 13th-14th April, 1970. In private conversation with Belgian officials, he expressed the view that the idea of a CES had won general acceptance. He envisaged Helsinki as the site, and thought that it still might be possible to convene the conference in the second half of 1970.

Busniak proposed that a group of three countries, for example, Finland, Belgium, and one Warsaw Pact member state, be designated to organize the preparations for the conference (see Item 12). Regarding the agenda, Busniak thought that the two subjects mentioned in the Prague Declaration, though limited in scope, were likely to lead to useful results. It was time now to discuss renunciation of force in a multilateral context, and progress in the bilateral talks now under way should not be considered a precondition. European co-operation should also be discussed in a multilateral context, and Busniak spoke of the possibility of expanding cultural relations.

Busniak regretted that the NATO December Ministerial Meeting seemed to have hardened positions and adopted an unfavourable attitude toward a CES. He thought that NATO's proposals were too ambitious and too vague, and that Prague was not sufficiently informed on Western views concerning certain disarmament questions. Busniak did not reject the Belgian contention that a declaration on the renunciation of force would need to be accompanied by regional disarmament measures.

15. Polish Draft Treaty on European Security and Co-operation

In accordance with a request made in the Political Committee on 21st April, 1970, the Political Division is preparing an analysis of recent Polish proposals on this subject, to be distributed separately.

(1) Information reported in the Political Committee on 21st April, 1970

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III. FINNISH ACTIVITIES

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16. Movements of Finnish Ambassador Enckell(1)

The Finnish Roving Ambassador, Mr. Enckell, had talks in Bern, Vienna, Belgrade, Paris, Brussels, Moscow and Warsaw(2). He was scheduled to visit Washington on 4th-5th May, 1970 and Ottawa on 7th-8th May(3) and is expected to visit Rome at the beginning of June(4).

⁽¹⁾ This item supplements and updates Items 10 and 11 of PO/70/153, dated 24th March, 1970.

⁽²⁾ Associated Press despatch dated 17th April, 1970; also information reported in the Political Committee on 14th and 21st April, 1970.

⁽³⁾ Information reported in the Political Committee on 31st March, 1970.

⁽⁴⁾ Information reported in the Political Committee on 14th April, 1970.