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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 14th October, 1974

ACTION SHEET C-M(74)56

COMMUNIST AID TO THE THIRD WORLD

Action Sheet

At its meeting on 2nd October, 1974, the Council took note of the report by the Economic Committee in document C-M(74)56.

2. See C-R(74)45, Item III paragraphs 12 to 26.

(Signed) G. SEKERIS
Executive Secretary

- Notes: (1) This Action Sheet is part of, and shall be attached to, document C-M(74)56 as the top sheet
 - (2) This Action Sheet may be considered as "Unclassified" when separated from the document to which it refers

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO SECRET

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 11th September, 1974

DOCUMENT C-M(74)56

COMMUNIST AID TO THE THIRD WORLD(1)

Report by the Economic Committee

The present paper amalgamates the salient findings of the Experts' meeting on Communist aid to the developing countries during 1973 and of two papers submitted by national delegations(2). Of the two papers, the French deals exclusively with the economico-political aspects of Soviet military penetration throughout the Third World, while the United States paper deals comprehensively with aggregate Communist aid to LDCs in 1973 both in terms of aid/trade and military assistance.

A. SALIENT TRENDS

- 2. As in 1972 both the USSR and perhaps to a less extent China, continue to grow increasingly selective in their aid giving. There is now a closer examination of each request for help, and while the use of economic aid in support of political or ideological objectives is never forgotten, where these objectives are lacking or of no great importance, the Soviets are certainly less inclined to provide aid than ten years ago. There is a definite trend for the Soviets to specialise in more aid with larger-scale projects, i.e. iron and steel plant construction, oil prospecting and extracting, etc. where the Soviets are relatively highly experienced.
- 3. In recent years, there have been several changes in the commodity composition of Soviet trade that accelerated in 1972. Imports a decade before were dominated almost entirely by crude materials and food. Cotton and crude rubber were especially high on the import list of crude materials at that time. By 1972, the pattern had drastically changed with food becoming more prominent

This document consists of: 9 pages
Annex I of: 1 page
Annex II of: 5 pages

(1) All non-Communist developing countries outside Europe.
 (2) Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in Less Developed Areas of the Free World, 1973 (United States);
 La Penetration Militaire Sovietique dans les Pays du Tiers Monde (France. Reference: C-M(73)78, dated 27th September, 1973 (SECRET)).

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in the total. Raw materials declined to less than one-fourth of Soviet imports, down from one-third in 1971, while food rose. Fuels accounted for almost 13% of the total in 1972, up from 6% in 1971. Also noteworthy was the ongoing increase in the importance of the Soviet Union as a market for less developed countries' manufactures (e.g. cotton yarn, textiles, footwear) especially from Egypt and India. To some extent these imports reflect Moscow's willingness to facilitate repayment of aid.

- 4. The geographic spread of Communist commitments in general in 1973 revealed a marked shift away from the Latin American countries which in 1972 had been the second largest recipients (after the Middle East) by some \$540 million, although admittedly the bulk of this was committed to Chile and remains frozen. The African continent continued to attract aid from the East European countries and above all from China: however, for the second consecutive year, virtually no new Soviet aid commitments to sub-Saharan Africa were noted. The value of the Communist bloc's new aid commitments to the Asian countries (assessed at \$229 million) was also down by \$139 million on the 1972 figure, although it was anticipated that Brezhnev's visit to India in late 1973 would tend to modify this downturn (see below).
- 5. Increasing Soviet interest in Asia has crystallised to a great extent in relations with India. Agreements have been signed in such diverse fields as oil exploration and refining, space technology, coal mining, and a satellite launching pad, to name just a few. This has been capped by a trade protocol signed late in January 1974 intended to increase Indo-Soviet commercial exchanges by as much as 55% in 1974 over last year as a first massive step towards doubling of trade by 1980 as envisaged in the Brezhnev-Gandhi agreement.
- 6. The Chinese too are examining more cautiously the use of credits from Peking. This may be partly because the Chinese do not wish to over-extend their experts. However, in general requests for aid are being assessed in far greater detail than hitherto. In addition, there are no signs that the Chinese are seeking another "prestige project" to follow their aid on the Tan-Zam railway, which was half completed by the end of 1972.
- 7. Finally, the pattern of Soviet aid remains basically unchanged. It is still given on three levels. At the highest level, aid is part of political policy. In India, Egypt and Indonesia, the Soviets have tried to extend their sphere of influence at the expense of the West. At the second level, aid is used to protect Soviet interests in peripheral countries. The general aim has been to create a favourable climate of opinion in which Soviet aims can be pursued. To some extent the Soviets have been successful here, although direct imitation of Soviet methods of internal economic management have been rare. At the third level, Soviet tactics have been simply to maintain a presence in uncommitted countries and play a waiting game, the long-term being presumably to extend Soviet influence whenever a suitable opportunity arises.

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B. SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- 8. Economic aid, originally conceived as a political instrument, is increasingly emphasizing closer economic ties with LDCs as the character of Soviet and East European aid is broadened. Again in 1973, CEMA, under Soviet leadership, attempted to portray itself as a viable international economic entity open to outside countries. It also moved toward multilateralizing some of Eastern Europe's and the USSR's aid undertakings in LDCs through the use of a one billion "transferable ruble" fund that went into operation on 1st January, 1974. Moscow and Eastern Europe also increased the number and responsibilities of their intergovernmental commissions during 1973 and increased their offers of joint ownership ventures with the LDCs.
 - 9. Economic aid slowed somewhat during 1973, as deliveries totalling \$610 million and new aid extensions of \$1.5 billion ran below 1971-1972 levels. India, Iran, and Egypt, traditionally large recipients of Communist aid, accounted for almost 60% of the total aid extended in 1973. The largest share of China's aid, however, as in most recent years, was allocated to Africa. Chinese credits in the \$50 million to \$100 million range went to Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Zaire all first-time recipients of Chinese development aid.
 - 10. Economic aid deliveries dropped for the second successive year from the record \$715 million reached in 1971 to \$610 million in 1973. The reduced activity reflected the completion or near-completion of construction on several major projects (steel mills in Egypt, India, and Iran; stage 1 of the Euphrates Dam in Syria; and the Tanzanian sector of the Tan Zam railroad).
- 11. The LDCs paid an estimated \$420 million of principal and interest on their economic aid debt in 1973, up about 20% from 1972. Although repayments to the USSR still were the largest part of the total, those to Eastern Europe were rising more rapidly. In the aggregate, repayment to Eastern Europe exceeded the flow of new East European aid deliveries. Soviet aid, net of repayments, moved closer to a zero flow in 1973, while the LDCs had hardly begun to make repayments to the PRC because of long grace periods allowed and the no-interest provision for China's aid.
- 12. Moscow's \$850 million military resupply of the Arab belligerents in the October Middle East war was the biggest news of an otherwise uneventful year and reaffirmed Soviet determination to retain an influential position in the area. Its fourth quarter shipments, drawing on some commitments made in previous years, resulted in a record \$1.9 billion of Communist arms delivered to LDCs in 1973. Military aid commitments totalling \$1.3 billion in

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1973 also were at a near-record level. More than 85% of the new aid was extended to Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. The only other major recipient of military aid in 1973 was India, which received \$140 million of arms from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Moscow extended \$15 million to Peru - its first military assistance to a South American nation.

13. Both the number of Communist economic technicians present in the LDCs (43,000) and the number of LDC academic (5,400) and technical (3,700) trainees departing for training in Communist nations increased in 1973. The USSR absorbed about two-thirds of the new arrivals, and Eastern Europe accounted for almost all of the remainder. In spite of vastly expanded Communist-sponsored facilities and programmes for technical training within the LDCs, the number going to Communist countries for training rose 55% in 1973 because of the increased need for more sophisticated training than is available domestically. Although only 1% of the departing trainees went to the PRC, more than one-half of the non-military technical personnel stationed in the LDCs were Chinese, and most of these were in Africa.

C. ECONOMIC AID

- 14. Communist commitments of more than \$1.5 billion of economic aid to the less developed countries in 1973 brought the 20-year-old programme to the \$17 billion mark. Only about 42% has actually been delivered. Although extensions in 1973 surpassed those in most previous years, they were almost 20% below the record 1971-1972 levels, when annual aid extensions averaged almost \$1.9 billion. All donors except the USSR reduced their undertakings somewhat during 1973, compared with 1972. India, Iran, and Egypt were the major recipients, accounting for almost 60% of the total aid extended in 1973.
- 15. As in most years, the USSR was the largest Communist aid donor in 1973. More than 85% of Moscow's total aid went to only two countries \$350 million of grain to India and \$190 million to expand the Soviet-built steel mill in Iran. The USSR also provided Pakistan with \$70 million in credits, part of which was to replace aid cancelled under old credits, and extended \$10 million in token assistance to seven African nations, mostly for famine relief.
- 16. Of particular significance, 1973 was the year when several major Soviet aid projects, representing Soviet outlays of more than \$700 million, reached important stages of completion. In Egypt, the \$160 million Helwan steel mill reached nearly a million-ton capacity with completion of its first stage of expansion; 1973 was the year in which the first stage of the Soviet-aided steel mill in Iran was commissioned and preliminary work was begun on the mill's expansion from 600,000 tons to 1.2 million tons.

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- By 1973, most of the deliveries to the first stage of the \$225 million 1.7 million-ton Bokaro steel mill in India had already been made, and the plant was completed early in 1974. During 1973 the first stage of the Euphrates Dam in Syria was completed with \$133 million of Soviet aid.
- Moscow's agreement to provide Delhi with 2 million tons of grain was the most dramatic of its aid offerings in 1973. In spite of the relatively hard terms (five years to repay, after a two-year grace, and zero interest), this is the largest amount of commodity assistance ever committed to a less developed country by the USSR, and in a year characterized by worldwide grain shortages. It was ten times the tonnage of Moscow's previous record grain commitment, and its value accounted for more than half of Moscow's total aid commitments for 1973. In the previous 19 years, Moscow had allocated less than 5% of its total aid programme to commodity shipments.
- Eastern Europe's aid, although somewhat more widely distributed than the Soviets', also concentrated on a few recipients. Algeria, Egypt, India, and Iran each received about \$100 million in credits. Two of these (Algeria's and Iran's) came from Poland, which had a banner year in 1973. Warsaw's aid commitments were the largest it had ever undertaken in a single year. They followed immediately on Poland's previous record of almost \$150 million in 1972. Czechoslovakia extended the other two \$100 million credit lines, which accounted for most of Prague's credits in 1973. The remainder included early 1973 credits of \$19 million to Chile and \$20 million to Afghanistan. Commitments by Bulgaria and Hungary added \$25 million to the undertakings of Eastern Europe.
- In spite of the 30% drop in PRC commitments in 1973, the aid package had no surprises. As in most years since the revival of Chinese aid following the Cultural Revolution, the largest share of the aid was allocated to Africa (90% in 1973). And as before, the big PRC development credits (ranging from \$50 million to \$100 million) went to first-time aid recipients in this case Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, Upper Volta, and Zaire - which received about \$320 million in aid commitments, mostly for dams and agricultural complexes and light industry.
- 21. The PRC also provided small grants of food to the droughtstricken countries in Africa. In its only other aid venture of the year, China provided grants of grain to Sri Lanka and Egypt. Its assistance to Egypt was the only emergency economic assistance other than medical supplies that Egypt received from the Communist countries during the October war.
- Since the beginning of 1970, drawings on Chinese aid have moved up and down with changes in the delivery pattern for the Tan-Zam railroad. Reflecting this change, deliveries shot up

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 $2\frac{1}{3}$ times between 1970 and 1971. On the other hand, completion of the Tanzanian sector during 1973 meant a 50% drop in these deliveries from 1971-1972 levels. Although work accelerated during 1973 on the Zambian portion of the road, it was not nearly fast enough to compensate for the decline in the Tanzanian sector.

D. ECONOMIC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

- 23. The number of Communist non-military technicians in the LDCs rose again in 1973, to almost 43,000. China sent more than one-half, mostly to transportation projects, in Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia. The USSR sent about 30% and East European countries the remainder.
- 24. Algeria and Libya accounted for 55% of the 7,300 East Europeans working in LDCs. Algeria also played host to the largest number of Soviet technicians (1,800) stationed in the LDCs. Most Soviet technicians are sent to the less developed countries in connection with project-related activities. In Algeria, however, and in several other North African nations, many Soviet personnel are also employed in non-project positions such as planners, teachers and doctors.
- 25. By the end of 1973, about 28,000 persons from less developed countries had gone to Communist countries for technical training. In 1973 the number of trainees departing for schooling in Communist countries had risen to more than 3,700. About 2,600, or 70% went to the USSR, a somewhat higher proportion than before; and the rest went to Eastern Europe. Again, in 1973, no trainees were going to the PRC, which has received only about 750 since the programme began. China has not provided training in its own institutions, partly because Chinese projects use relatively simple technology and because Peking floods its projects with Chinese technicians and labourers who do most of the work and provide on-the-job training to locals.
- 26. Training within the LDCs is being conducted in Soviet-built facilities for vocational training as well as in secondary and university-level institutes. Moscow has set up 23 training institutes for secondary and higher education in 11 developing countries with a capacity to train 15,400 students annually. By the end of 1972 the USSR had completed 67 vocational training centres in 12 countries and was scheduled to complete work in 1973 on 30 additional centres in Algeria, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. Soviet aid provided for building these training facilities in developing countries is in the \$100 million range.

E. MILITARY AID

27. Communist countries extended a near record \$1.3 billion in new military aid to less developed countries in 1973, bringing total commitments since the inception of the programme in 1955 to \$11.7 billion. What began as a quiet aid year moved into high gear

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in October as the USSR and, to a lesser extent, East European nations rallied to support their Arab clients' military needs. Instead of the military aid programme hitting an eight-year low, Communist agreements to supply arms jumped in the last quarter to more than twice the value of commitments during the first nine months of the year. For 1973 as a whole, the more than \$1.1 billion in aid for Syria, Egypt, and Iraq overshadowed all other under-Communist military deliveries to the LDCs hit a record \$1.9 billion in 1973, almost double the previous high of \$1 billion recorded in 1970. The USSR was responsible for more than \$1.8 billion of the total for 1973, mostly to the Arab nations. The larger share was made after war broke out in the Middle East on 6th October. The 1973 deliveries brought total deliveries for the entire programme up to more than \$10 billion, or about 90% of the total extended.

- As regards cost and extent of Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria during and soon after the 1973 war, reliable data are scarce. The value of the cost replacement figures during this period is subject to different interpretation and may be explained partially through differences in computation methodology. example, certain Western countries exclude arms which have been paid for in cash (i.e. not under credit arrangements) from their military aid assessments: in this connection, it is known that the Soviets called for hard currency settlement of arms supplied to Egypt/Syria in this period, and presumably have been receiving it from the oil-rich allies of these two countries. Nevertheless, a reasonable assessment would be that the cost of replacing Egypt's losses totalled around \$850 million and those of Syria about \$750 million which would bring the total of Communist arms deliveries to that area to about \$2,320 million during 1973. Soviet deliveries were probably sufficient to replace almost all Egyptian/Syrian losses of equipment during the war.
- Moscow's \$15 million arms accord with Peru, signed in March, is the Communist countries! first military aid agreement with a South American nation. Modest in amount, it involves relatively unsophisticated medium tanks, mobile maintenance shops, and spare parts. India, the USSR's largest non-Arab recipient of military aid, received additional new aid during 1973, totalling more than \$125 million. Other small Soviet commitments included \$2 million to Morocco for reactivating its programme, which had lain dormant for seven years, an \$8 million credit to Yemen (Aden), and \$1 million of grant aid to Yemen (San'a).
- 30. Eastern Europe's aid, although heavily concentrated in Egypt and Syria, included a \$13 million commitment to India and token amounts of aid to Afghanistan, Congo and Lebanon. was confined to a small accord with Congo (\$1 million) and a larger commitment to Pakistan, the details of which are not known.

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F. MILITARY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

31. The total number of Communist military technicians in less developed countries in 1973 declined to about 7,000, one-third less than in the previous year. The drop was all in Soviet and East European technicians, whose number fell by 40% from the 1972 high to somewhat less than 6,000 in 1973. Personnel from the PRC rose from less than 900 in 1972 to 1,000 in 1973. Most of the decline in the number of Soviet and East European personnel stationed at LDC military installations was accounted for by the reduction of almost 5,000 men in Egypt, following their expulsion in July 1972 and the 350-man cutback in Algeria.

G. TRADE

- 32. Almost 60% of Communist trade with the Third World was with countries of the Near East and South Asia, which also accounted for the largest absolute increase in trade during 1972. African nations ranked second as trading partners and those of Latin America third. For China, however, Africa was the principal partner, followed by East Asian countries.
- 33. Communist trade with the less developed countries rose to record dollar amounts in 1972, with all Communist country groups sharing in the increase. Total turnover rose 16% above 1971 to more than \$7 billion, but a substantial part of this gain reflects changed currency values resulting from dollar devaluation. Communist trade with the developing nations also grew at a lower rate in 1972 than trade with developed market economies. It represented a small percentage of the total trade of most of the LDCs, except for a few countries, such as Egypt, India, and Syria.
- 34. In 1972, for the first time since 1960, the Communist countries, except the PRC, ran an unfavourable trade balance with the developing nations, as imports shot up 27% and exports rose only 7%. Large deficits with India, Brazil and Malaysia accounted for most of the Soviet deficit. The USSR accounted for 44% of total Communist-LDC trade, while East European countries as a group accounted for 37% and the PRC 17%. China's trade with the less developed countries registered the most important gains in 1972 30% above 1971.
- 35. In view of the only relative success of Moscow's purely economic policies of assistance in the Third World during recent years, Soviet military penetration through, in some cases, massive aid programmes to certain developing countries, took the stage in 1973. Moscow's military resupply of Syria and Egypt was the biggest news in an otherwise uneventful aid year, and reaffirmed Soviet determination to retain an influential position in the Near East. The only surprise in the package was the ready Soviet

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
response to Egypt's arms requirements. In spite of strained relations, Moscow replied with immediate, huge deliveries of weaponry previously denied Egypt, and further confirmed Cairo's dependence on the USSR. China followed its post-Cultural Revolution aid pattern with continuing large commitments to Africa.

- 36. Beyond the record \$1.9 billion in military deliveries in 1973, a slowing of economic aid deliveries to \$610 million and the somewhat lower aid commitments totalling \$1.5 billion, there was an intensification of Soviet efforts to broaden the character of economic co-operation. The aid currents perceived in recent years became more pronounced in 1973 as they were translated into action programmes. Soviet and East European aid, originally conceived as a political instrument, moved further into the field of economic interest. As part of its effort to include elements of LDCs' trade in Soviet-East European economic plans, closer ties with the Third World have become a dominant theme of Soviet and East European economic aid policies.
- 37. In recent years, COMECON members under Moscow's leader-ship, have attempted to show COMECON as a viable economic entity open to all interested nations "without discrimination", and in 1973 reportedly prepared a scheme for establishing relations with non-member countries. Although some LDCs have been approached only one or two have shown any interest in opening a dialogue with COMECON, and there are no current applicants.
- 38. To boost the flexibility of Soviet-East European development aid, the International Investment Bank set up in April 1973 a one billion "transferable ruble" fund for economic and technical assistance to the developing nations. The fund will be used for constructing new and modernising existing industrial and agricultural enterprises, and further to provide 15-year credits in transferable rubles and hard currency. In addition, Moscow's four Western-based hard currency banks are making available larger amounts of short-term credits for financing LDC global trade.
 - 39. The Council is invited to take note of this report.

(Signed) Y. LAULAN Chairman

NATO, 1110 Brussels.

Table 1






Table 1 Communist Economic Aid Extended to Less Developed Countries 1973

Million Current US \$ 1

					Easter	n Europe		
	Total	al USSR	Total	Bulgaria	Czecho- slovakia	Hungary	Poland	PRC
Total	1,509.0 ²	620.2	503.5	20.0	243.7	5.1	231.8	388.2
Africa	451.5	9.0	97.7			••••	97.7	344.8
Algeria	97.7		97.7			••••	97.7	****
Cameroon	71.0	••••			••••	••••	••••	71.0
Chad	50.6	0.9	••••	••••		••••	****	49.7
Congo	4.4	4.4					••••	
Mali	10.9				****	••••	****	10.9
Mauritania	3.1	1.0		••••		••••		2.1
Niger	2.2	0.9			,	••••	****	1.3
Rwanda	0.5	0.5						
Senegal	49.5	0.4				••••	••••	49.1
Tanzania	0.4							0.4
Upper Volta	51.2	0.9			,		••••	50.3
Zaire	100.0			****		••••	••••	100.0
Zambia	10.0						****	10.0
East Asia	1.0	1.0		****	••••	••••	••••	••••
Burma	1.0	1.0	••••	****			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
Latin America	23.2		23.2	••••	18.7		4.5	****
Bolivia	4.5		4.5	••••			4.5	****
Chile	18.7	****	18.7	••••	18.7			****
Near East and South Asia	1,036.2	610.2	382.6	20.0	225.0	5.1	132.5	43.4
Afghanistan	28.0		28.0	8.0	20.0	·		
Bangladesh	24.0		24.0	12.0			12.0	
Egypt	128.0		100.0	,	100.0			28.0
India	455.0	350.0	105.0		105.0			
Iran	290.2	187.6	102.6		****		102.6	
Pakistan	71.5	71.0						0.5
Sri Lanka	14.0		,		****			14.0
Syria	15.0		15.0	••••	****	••••	15.0	
Yemen (Aden)	5.8	0.7	5.1			5.1		
Yemen (San'a)	1.8	0.9					••••	0.9

¹ Credits extended in foreign currencies converted into dollars at the average exchange rate for 1973.

Table 2 Communist Economic Aid Extended to Less

Developed Countries Million Current US \$

Table 3 Communist Economic Aid Drawn by Less **Developed Countries**

Million Current US \$

			Eastern					Eastern	
	Total	USSR	Europe	PRC		Total	USSR	Europe	PRC
Total	16 ,769	8 ,874	4 ,687	3 ,208	Total	7 ,070	4 ,527	1,320	1,223
1954-63	4,276	2,983	962	331	1954-63	1,530	1,147	275	108
1964	1.456	825	320	311	1964	555	375	115	65
1965	976	372	533	71	1965	515	350	90	75
1966	1.699	1,241	294	164	1966	500	335	75	90
1967	473	291	132	50	1967	515	300	115	100
1968	638	379	205	54	1968	485	300	115	70
1969	933	494	426	13	1969	490	330	90	70
1970	1,101	198	175	728	1970	520	345	110	65
1971	1.917	891	486	540	1971	710	405	140	165
1972	1.788	580	650	558	1972	640	330	90	220
1973	1,512	620	504	388	1973	610	310	105	195

² Including grants totaling \$10 million from the USSR and \$63 million from the PRC.

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Table 4

Communist Economic Credits and Grants to Less Developed Countries, Extended and Drawn 1954-73

Million Current US \$

Total. Africa. Algeria. Burundi. Cameroon Central African Republic. Chad.	3 ,956 860 20	USSR 8,337 1,310	Eastern Europe 4,652	PRC	Total	Eastern Total USSR Europe		
Africa. Algeria. Burundi. Cameroon. Central African Republic.	3,956 860 20	1,310	4,652				Butope	PRC
Africa. Algeria. Burundi. Cameroon. Central African Republic.	3,956 860 20	1,310		3 ,208	6,868	4,347	1 ,320	1,298
Algeria	860 20		896	1,750	1,314	561	138	615
Burundi	20	426	342	92	226	167	24	35
Cameroon			****	20				
Central African Republic		8	****	71	3	3		
_		2	****	4	6	2		4
		3		50	3	1		2
Congo	63	13	5	45	39	11	****	28
Dahomey				44				
Equatorial Guinea	25	1		24	1	1		
Ethiopia	203	102	17	84	27	18	9	
Ghana	239	93	104	42	62	31	26	5
Guinea		200	30	69	232	139	29	64
Kenya	. 67	49		18	7	4	••••	3
Malagasy Republic	. 9			9	4	••••		4
Mali		64	23	61	103	51	7	45
Mauritania		4		•27	8	2		6
Mauritius		5	••••	34				
Morocco		88	35		27	20	7	****
Niger		1	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	. 2	1		1 .
Nigeria		7	38		3	3		
Rwanda		i	••••	22	••••		••••	
Senegal		7	••••	49	4	3	••••	1
Sierra Leone		28		40	5	2		3
Somalia		66	5	132	71	42	3	26
Sudan		65	153	82	36	26	3	7
Tanzania		20	20	256	255	2	3	250
Togo				45	••••			
Tunisia		34	74	36	44	17	27	
Uganda		16	••••	15	16	12	••••	4
Upper Volta		1		50	2	1		1
Zaire				100	100			104
Zambia		6	50	228	128 465	2 142	168	126 155
East Asia		155	338	223			6	39
Burma		15 25	29	84 92	60 91	15 16	6	69
Cambodia			17	47	314	111	156	47
Indonesia		115	292	45	5			5
Europe		****	••••	45	5	••••	****	5
Malta		45.7	621	131	247	83	145	19
Latin America		457 44	12		40	34	145	
Argentina		30	30	••••	4	2	2	
Bolivia		90	241	****	111	25	86	
Brazil		235	139	63	65	15	33	17
Chile		233			3	3		
Colombia		10	18	****			••••	****
Costa Rica			15	••••	 6		 6	
Ecuador				 26				••••
Guyana		26	137	42	 12	4	 6	2
Peru		20	21		6		6	
Uruguay			10					••••
Venezuela		6 ,952	2 .832	1 ,059	5 ,039	3 ,741	869	429
Near East and South Asia	•			73	640	603	11	26
Afghanistan		826 154	40 60	11	80	58	11	11
Bangladesh				134	1,183	854	275	54
Egypt	. 2,114	1,205	775	134	1,100	004	210	UT
1-dia	0 404	1 042	472		1,263	1,034	229	
India		1 ,962 788	472 541	****	524	417	107	
Iran		554	440	45	284	199	85	
Iraq		21		103	. 85	20		65
Nepal		436	 51	341	200	65	16	119
Pakistan		39	63	145	122	24	16	82
Sri Lanka		317	298	51	307	212	83	12
Syria	. 666	317	200	91	901	212	99	
Yemen (Aden)	. 136	14	45	77	18	8	2	8
Yemen (San'a)		99	12	79	131	67	12	52

-3-Table 5

Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries 1

				Perso
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC •
	IVIAI	USSK	Europe	I NO
otai	43,090	12,725	7,225	23 ,140
Africa	31,145	4,460	5 ,075	21 ,610
Algeria	3,670	1 ,820	1 ,600	250
Burundi	20	10		10
Cameroon	5	5	••••	
Central African Republic	115	80	35	••••
Congo	595	145	· 10	440
Dahomey	15	••••	••••	15
Ethiopia	200	75	25	100
Ghana	50	10	10	30
Guinea	1,050	500	50	500
Kenya	90 5	25 5	50	15
Libya	2 ₇ ,515	15	2,500	****
Mali	525	150	2,300	350
Mauritania	220			220
Mauritius	40	••••	••••	40
Morocco	500	300	200	
Nigeria	255	175	50	30
Rwanda	85	****	••••	85
Senegal	70	****	••••	70
Sierra Leone	115	••••	5	110
Somalia	2,675	675	·	2,000
Sudan	375	25	50	300
Tanzania	8 ,760	150	10	8,6003
Togo	50	••••	••••	50
Tunisia	410	70	310	30
Uganda	295	85	10	200
Upper Volta	10	****	••••	10
Zaire	130		25	105
Zambia	8 ,300	140	110	8,050
Europe	35 35	****	••••	35 35
Malta	75	25	10	40
Burma	50	10		40
Indonesia	5			
Malaysia	15	15		
Thailand	5		5	••••
Latin America	400	185	165	50
Bolivia	25	15	10	••••
Brazil	25	****	25	
Chile	195	135	60	••••
Colombia	5	••••	5	••••
Ecuador	10	5	5	••••
Guyana	85		50	35
Mexico	5	5	••••	••••
Peru	50	25	10	15
Near East and South Asia	11,775	8 ,295	2,075	1 ,405
Afghanistan	925	800	25	100
Bangladesh	1,010	900	110 -	
Egypt	1 ,725	1 ,200	500	25
India	1,900	1,600	300	••••
Iran	1,105	1,000	100	5
Iraq Kuwait	1,040	815	200 5	25 5
Nepal	10 310	 10	_	300
Pakistan	360	150	 10	200
Sri Lanka	140	75	15	50
Syria	1,765	1,200	500	65
·	,	•		
Yemen (Aden)	700	200	100	400
Yemen (San'a)	445	105	110	230

¹ Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

² Including laborers in some countries, especially in Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.

^{*} Most of the 8,000 Chinese working on the Tan-Zam railroad are believed to have been transferred to Zambia by the end of the year.

⁴ By the end of the year, this number may have been increased to 15,000-16,000 as a result of personnel transferred from Tanzania.

-4-Table 6

Communist Exports to and Imports from Selected Less Developed Countries 1

ANNEX II to C-M(74)56

Million Current US \$

	PRC					Eastern Europe				USSR					aj ²	Tot		
	1972	19	<u> </u>	1971		1972	19		197	72	19	71	19	72	19	71	19	
Merch 1912 1103 1821 1821 1821 1821 1821 1821 1821 182	Imports	Exports	Imports	xports	ports	lu	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports			
March Marc	506.9	699.6							-	•	1,352.9	1,356.3	1,271.4	3,332.8	3,219.5	2,643.5	3,248.0	1
September 1	132.8	239.3 11.63				i												ica
Segretary of the control of the cont	0	Negl.																. • .
Canada Annes Republic. 1. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5.	Negl.	2.03	Negl.	2.1	1.0		3.04											-
Selection Select					****			****		0								
Section 1.5 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.		0.53							••••								0.9	· •
Depart 1.0		1.04																Congo
Semilar 1.2										-				_				*
Section 1.5		2.73.	0.6	2.2	1.03		6.68											· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Column		2.8			-						Negl.		****					
	1.63								5.88									Ghana
Company 174	0.3	1.3							2.7									
Liberts	4.5	3.4																•
Lishes 97 2 0.7 88.4 31.5 9 8 Negl 104 30.3 0.0 8.7 50.0 10.4 30.3 0.0 10.5 57 50.0 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5		2.03					3.53											
Manufaction 1.4 2.0 1.1 1.4 2.6 2.9 1.2 1.4 0.2 Manufaction 1.0		25 . 4 3										Negl.	9.9	39.5	86.6			
Martine 0	••••						_				_		- ·		_			Malagasy Republic
Marchester 1,10 1	••••																	
Secondary	19.2	18.4	_													-		
Sign	0	Negl.																•
Nigeria. 93.6 55.2 65.6 34.6 17. 46.5 10.0 2.0 33 1.1 3.2 5.4 5.4 10.0 2.0 33 1.1 3.2 5.4 5.5 0.1 4.2 6.5 10.0 2.0 33 1.1 3.2 5.4 5.5 0.1 4.2 6.5 10.0 2.0 33 1.1 3.2 5.5 0.1 4.2 6.5 10.0 2.0 3.3 1.4 6.5 10.0 2.0 4.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10	Negl.	1.I																
Seeggs		26.5 7.03											_		65.6			•
Signa Lemba.	0.5	4.0										_				4.7		Senegal
Something		2.53																
Property 19	41.6	26.0																
Tops:	19.0	71.1	11.8		3.0		6.1											
Tomain		1.8			-				1 . 0,	4.7								
	0.8												4.0	23.5	15.2			-
	6.3							5.6	2.5	0.8	4.1	Negl.	4.3	24.2	6.5	7.0	8.8	
Semilar 12	17.8			_									••••					Upper Volta
Medical		16.2												_				
Part	0	1.0																-
Spain	_	0.5	Negl.	0.2	7.6		20.0	6.5		-								
si Asiste 288.6 186.5 326.7 210.3 24.3 189.1 17.8 91.6 17.9 69.3 27.2 19.5 222.4 4.0 1.0 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5		14.7						55 . 1	49.9	27.7	25.3	10.0	11.1	134.2				•
Burna. 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5					_	,		45.3						210.3	326.7	196.5	288.6	· ·
Cambeddii. 0.3 18.6 90.7 14.1 1.2 11.2 11.2 3.2 8.2 7.9 2.4 4.6 5.9 31.2 5.0 72.1 microcensis. 0.5 2.1 12.8 5.7 112.7 1.7 8.0 1.0 0.5 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11	1.4.	9.0-				,					4.7	2.0		5.1	19.6	3.6	21.4	
Indonesis		72.9																
Semily	25.4	50.0	17.4															
Supplem		2.0			-0			~ 0 ~										
Thailand 9.8 6.7 13.5 2.7 2.8 4.6 3.4 3.9 7.0 2.1 8.5 1.6 8.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7	20.4	141.5		132.9						5.6	5.3	4.1	4.9	54.7				
188 Americk 17.7 83.1 85.6 66.6 61.9 2.1 23.5 72.2 27.7 17.0 88.1 18.9 85.6 1.0 6.5 0.1		_																
Argentias. 29.1 6.0.5 1.0 3.0 Negl. 10.0 1.0 3.0 Negl. 10.0 1.0 3.0 Negl. 10.0 1.0 3.0 Negl. 10.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1		0.5																
Dash 102.5 175.2 90.6 312.2 22.4 48.3 8.6 79.6 99.7 128.9 81.0 158.2 20.6 1.1		•	••••						11.0									-
Chile		1.04		0.6	158.23	3	81.03	128.9	99.7				_				-	
Colombia		0.4	16.04					0.4		8.8	14.0							
Costa Rice. 1.2 5.0 1.4 5.3 2.4 5.5 2.	0												1.2	27.4	22.6			
Dominican Republic 3.2 13.3 4.9 13.4 Negl 3.7 0.1 2.8 3.2 9.0 4.8 10.6											Negl.	2.4			1.4	3.6	1.2	Costa Rica
Ecuador.						3												=
El Salvador. 1.1		Negi.											-					
Manufare	0.6	1.1	0.3	0.8														
Demaile		****	••••															
Mexico 7,0 19.5 7,2 29.7 0.3 10.2 0.7 9.4 6.7 4.9 0.4 3.3 0.4 23.2 0.2 2.2 2.3 55.4 5.3 39.3 0.4 23.2 0.2 10.2		0.1										2.6		1.2				
Peru		0.1															7.0	
Trinidad and Tobago. 10. 1.0 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.9 8.2 1.6 12.3 0.1 Neg Urigusy. 12.3 Negl. 8.8 5.1 Negl 0.1 5.0 9.4 Negl. 5.4 0.1 2.0 0 3. Venesuels. 2.045.9 1,565.5 2,090.8 1,996.6 1,102.0 926.1 1,100.4 1,152.3 776.1 516.5 797.6 702.2 158.7 111.7 162. Aghanistan 33.3 39.6 49.1 38.3 50.3 38.4 46.1 37.3 30.0 1.2 38.4 Aghanistan 8.5 10.0													-			80.8		
Druguy 12.3 Negl. 8.8 5.1 Negl. 0.1 5.0 9.4 Negl. 5.4 0.1 2.0 0 3. Venesuela 12.3 Negl. 8.8 5.1 Negl. 0.1 5.0 9.4 Negl. 5.4 0.1 2.0 0 3. Venesuela 2.045.9 1.565.5 2.999.8 1.996.6 1.102.0 926.1 1.100.4 1.152.3 776.1 516.5 797.6 702.2 158.7 1111.7 162.8 162.5		Negl.																
ear East and South Asia 2,045.9 1,565.5 2,090.8 1,996.6 1,102.0 926.1 1,100.4 1,152.3 776.1 516.5 797.6 702.2 156.7 111.7 162.2 Afghanistan 33.3 39.0 49.1 38.3 50.3 38.4 46.1 37.3		3.3	0	2.9	0:1		5.4											
Afghanistan 53.3 3 9.6 49.1 38.3 50.3 38.4 46.1 37.3		162.3			702.2		797.6	516.5	776.1	1,152.3			_			-		
Bahrsin S. 10.0		3.04			****		****			37.3	46.1	38.4						
Bangladesh 35.6 23.4 10.0 0.7 10.0 0.7 10.0 0.7 10.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 <td></td> <td>10.04</td> <td></td> <td>10.0</td> <td></td> <td>8.5</td> <td></td>		10.04													10.0		8.5	
Cyprus 17.0 11.7 20.7 21.1 8.1 3.3 33.4 32.0 299.6 96.8 95.0 144.9* 211.8* 15.3 23.1 29. Egypt 497.7 459.5 497.6 544.8 381.3 334.1 322.0 299.6 96.8 95.0 144.9* 211.8* 15.3 23.1 29. India 288.9 432.6 352.9 570.6 129.2 284.2 167.6 378.1 156.8 146.5 184.2* 191.3 0 0 0 Irar 246.9 155.2 216.2 213.3 154.8 111.2 115.6 162.1 88.5 38.9* 81.2 37.0* 3.2 5.1 14. Irar 227.0 23.8 184.6 85.3 110.1 6.1 109.0 74.5 97.1 14.7 58.9 8.23* 19.6 3.0 11. Irag 227.0 23.8 18.1 10.2 10.2<	-	0.1																Bangladesh
Egypt. 497.7 459.5 497.0 544.5 581.5 534.1 522.0 220.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0		29.43																• •
India 288								00.0	30.0	299.0	322.0	304.1	381.3	544.8	497.0	459.5	497.7	Egypt
Tirat	0	0	0	0	191.3	3	184.23	146.5	156.8	378.1	167.6	284.2	129.2	570.6	352 9	432 6	288 0	T- dia
Iraq 227.0 23.8 184.6 85.3 110.1 6.1 109.0 74.5 97.1 14.7 58.9 8.23 19.6 3.0 11. Israel 32.3 17.5 32.5 15.1 32.2 16.2 32.4 15.1 0.1 1.3 0. Jordan 17.3 0.5 20.0 0.6 6.6 , 0.7 6.3 0.5 13.7 0.6 4.4 0 5. Jordan 17.3 0.5 20.0 0.6 6.6 , 0.7 6.3 0.5 13.7 0.6 4.4 0 5. Jordan 17.3 0.5 20.0 0.6 6.6 , 0.7 6.3 0.5 13.7 0.6 4.4 0 5. Weist 50.8 62.7 11.1 19.3 0.8 17.5 0 22.54 20.4³ 0.3³ 17.7³ 24. Lebanon 55.8 7.3 57.3 10.8 20.4 4.0 16.7 5.3 24.9 3.3 30.6° 5.5³ 10.5° 10.5° .		14.1						38.95	88.5	162.1	115.6							
Israel 32.3 17.5 32.5 15.1 32.2 16.2 32.4 15.1 0.1 1.8 0.5 Jordan 17.3 0.5 20.0 0.6 6.6 , 0.7 8.3 0.5 13.7 0.6 4.4 0 5. Kuwait 59.5 0.8 62.7 11.1 19.3 0.8 17.5 0 22.54 20.42 0.32 17.75 24 Lebanon 55.8 7.3 57.3 10.8 20.4 4.0 16.7 5.3 24.9 3.3 30.62 5.53 10.54 10.5 Nepal 2.7 3.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.7 2.04 2.04 Pakistan 119.6 120.4 75.8 84.0 28.7 38.9 21.2 22.6 54.6 50.5 28.9 43.4 35.0 30.2 24 Pakistan 119.6 120.4 75.8 84.0 28.7 38.9 21.2 22.6 54.6 50.5 28.9 43.4 35.0 30.2 24 Saudi Arabia		11.8								74.5	109.0	6.1	110.1		184.6			
Jordan 17.3 0.5 20.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7	-	0.1 5.6															32.3	•
Kusait 59.5 0.8 62.7 11.1 19.5 7.3 11.3 19.5 11.3		24.43																Jordan
Lebanon 55.8 7.3 57.3 10.8 20.4 4.0 10.7 0.7 0.7 2.04 2.04 Nepal 2.7 3.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.7		10.04																
Nepal. 2.7 3.1 0.7	•	****																
Pagistan. 21.1 5.4 6.0 5.4 0 15.0 0.1 0.1 Saudi Arabia 46.9 59.8 27.8 49.0 9.4 16.1 3.8 12.0 10.4 12.2 8.4 11.0 27.1 30.3 15. Sri Lanka 46.9 59.8 27.8 49.0 9.4 16.1 3.8 12.0 10.4 12.2 8.4 11.0 27.1 30.3 15. Syria 102.7 62.3 120.9 96.6 57.7 29.3 70.9 65.0 40.0 20.0 24.3 18.8 5.0 13.0 9.	17.5	24.0	30.2		43.4				54.6									
Sri Lanks									15.04									
Syria		15.6										16.1	9.4					
7.6 Nord 10.3 Nord 2.4 Nord. 7.9 Nord. 0.24 04 0.44 04 5.04 Nord. 2.	U 12.0	9.9	13.0	٠٠.٥	19.5		24.3	20.04	40.04	65.0	70.9	29.3	57.7	96.6	120.9			
7 6 North 10 3 North 2.4 Negl. 7.9 1981. 0.2	04 Negl.	2.04	Negi.	5.04	04	4	0.44	04	0.04	MT2	P A		. .					·
		1.34								_				Negl.	10.3	Negl.		Yemen (Aden)

Data for the USSR are from the official Soviet trade yearbooks. For other Communist countries, data are from official trade statistics of the less developed countries, in most cases as reported in the US Department of Communist countries, or the International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade. The Soviet data exclude ocean freight and insurance costs, whereas exports from other Communist countries include these costs but their imports exclude them. A leader entry (....) indicates that data are not available. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Including trade of the less developed countries with Albania, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, in million current US dollars, as follows:

	19	71	19	72
Fotal	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Total	68.9	51.3	96.6	50.4
	3.1	1.1	0.4	1.2
	54.1	41.6	89.0	40.0
	Negi.	0.1	ø	Negl.
	9.0	7.9	6.4	8.9
North Vietnam	2.6	0.6	0.8	0.4

⁸ Based on partial year data.

<sup>Estimated.
Excluding petroleum imports.</sup>

- 5 -

Table 7

Table 8

Communist Military	Aid	Extended	to Less
Develope	d Co	esintau	

Communist Military Aid Drawn by Less Developed Countries

			M	illion US \$				M	illion US \$
	Total	ussr	Eastern Europe	PRC		Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	11 .725	10,180	1,065	480	Total	10 ,390	9 ,060	885	445
1955-63	3.440	2,915	490	35	1955-63	2,870	2 ,355° 🤝	480	35
1964	890	870	15	5	1964	350	335	10	5
1965	385	260	45	80	1965	355	330	10	15
1966	515	450	15	50	1966	580	460	45	75
1967	645	815	78	55	1967	495	450	20	25
1968	530	460	45	25	1968	540	490	50	30
1969	430	340	85	5	1969	475	415	35	25
1970	1,090	985	40	65	1970	1,025	930	70	25
1971	1 .595	1,425	95	75	1971	910	770	75	65
1972	905	715	110	80	1972	865	745	45	75
1973	-	1 ,245	50	5	1973	1,925	1 ,810	45	70

Table 9

Communist Military Aid to Less Developed Countries, Extended and Drawn 1955-73

Million US \$

		Exte	nded			Dra	awn.	
	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	11,725	10 ,180	1 ,065	480	10 ,390	030, 6	885	445
Africa	760	620	40	100	635	505	35	95
Algeria	405	395	Negl.	10	300	290	Negl.	10
Burundi	5	Negl.		5	Negl.	Negl.	••••	
Congo	20	15	Negl.	5	10	5	Negl.	5
Equatorial Guinea	Negi.	Negi.	****	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.		
Ghana	10	10		Negl.	10	10	****	••••
Guinea	30	25	Negl.	5	30	25	Negl.	5
Mali	5	5		Negl.	5	5		Negl.
Morocco	35	15	20		35	15	20	
Nigeria	10	10		****	10	10	****	,
Sierra Leone	5	Negl.	••••	5	5			5
Somalia	70	70	****		70	70	****	
Sudan	85	65	10	10	70	60	5	5
Tanzania	65	Negl.	5	60	75	5	5	65
Uganda	15	10	5	Negl.	15	10	5	
Zambia	Negl.		****	Negl.	Negl.			Negl.
East Asia	1.340	1,105	200	35	1 .095	870	190	35
Burma	Negl.	Negl.	••••		Negl.	Negl.	****	
Cambodia 1	25	10	Negl.	15	25	10		15
Indonesia	1.315	1.095	200	20	1,070	860	190	20
Latin America	15	15		••••	5	5	****	
Peru	15	15			5	5	****	•
Near East and South Asia	9.610	8 .440	825	345	8,655	7,680	660	315
Afghanistan	475	455	20		400	380	20	
•	35	35			30	30		
Bangladesh	25	25	Negl.		20	20	Negl.	
Cyprus 1	3,480	3,135	345		3,440	3,095	345	
Egypt	•	1,390	125		1,215	1,105	110	
India	1,515				440	440		****
Iran	575	575	170	 N1	1,105	1.045	60	
Iraq	1,325	1,155		Negi.	1,105	1,045 5		
Lebanon	5	5 N1	Negl.					••••
Maldives	Negl.	Negl.			Negl.	Negl.	••••	908
Pakistan 1	400	65	Negl.	335	325	20	••••	305
Sri Lanka	5	Negl.		5	5	Negl.		5
Syria	1,605	1,470	130	5	1,515	1,420	90	5
Yemen (Aden)	55	50	5		50	45	5	••••
Yemen (San'a)	110	80	30	****	105	75	30	****

¹ In Cambodia and Indonesia, both Soviet and Chinese aid programs are inactive. In Cyprus the Soviet program is inactive further deliveries are unlikely. In Pakistan the USSR has stopped delivery of weaponry, although it is providing support-type equipment—particularly vehicles.