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REPORT OF THE
FOUR POWER WORKING GROUP
ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN RELATION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

March 6-15, 1957
Washington, D.C.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A Four Power Working Group composed of representatives of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany met at Washington from 6th March to 15th March, 1957. The Working Group had been instructed to consider the problem of the reunification of Germany in relation to European security on the basis of the work undertaken jointly in 1955 in connection with the two conferences at Geneva. The Working Group was also instructed to take into account developments since the Geneva conference and the proposals which had been made in this connection since that time by the Soviet Union.

II. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE GENEVA CONFERENCES OF OCTOBER, 1955

The Working Group divided this part of its review into four subjects, the results of which are set forth in attached annexes, and the most important elements of which are set forth in Section V, the conclusions of this report:

- (1) The Soviet Situation (Annex 1)
- (2) The Satellite Situation (Annex 2)
- (3) Specific German Situation (Annex 3)
- (4) The Western Position (Annex 4)

III. PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY PUT FORTH SINCE THE GENEVA CONFERENCES OF OCTOBER, 1955

The Working Group then reviewed the positions of the USSR on European security taken since the Geneva conferences, together with other proposals which had been made public during that period. These were analysed in terms of the categories into which they fell, and were evaluated. This part of the review appears in Annex 5, and the most important elements are reflected in Section V, Conclusions. Particular attention was given to the European security aspects of the Soviet Memorandum of November 17, 1956 (Annex 6).

IV. REVIEW OF WESTERN PROPOSALS AT GENEVA

Consideration was then given to the Western proposals at the Geneva conferences in light of the issues already considered by the Working Group. This review brought forth the following points:

The Western position at Geneva

The aim of the Western Powers was to secure the reunification of Germany by free all-German elections resulting in an all-German Government which would be free to choose its own internal and external policies. This was the basis of the "Eden Plan" for German reunification in freedom which was put forward at the Berlin Conference in 1954. The Soviet Government then made it clear that they would regard a reunified Germany which was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a danger to their security and therefore unacceptable. Since it was likely that an all-German Government would choose to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western Powers decided to offer the USSR certain security proposals, which would be applicable in this contingency. These were contained in the "Outline of Terms of Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany", which, together with a revised version

of the "Eden Plan", was put forward by the Western Powers at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers on 27th October, 1955. The Western Powers did not consider that, without the reunification of Germany, any new security arrangements would be of lasting value, since they would not eliminate the main cause of insecurity in Europe, which was the division of Germany.

The Soviet reaction

2. Mr. Molotov was entirely uncompromising. He made it clear that:

- (i) the Soviet Government would not agree to free elections in Germany, since this would lead to the elimination of the Communist regime in the Soviet Zone;
- (ii) a reunified Germany could, in the Soviet view, only come about as the result of direct negotiations between the Federal Government and the Soviet Zone regime;
- (iii) the Soviet Government would not accept the entry of a reunified Germany into NATO.

Possible Western Concessions

3. Could the Western Powers make any concessions which would represent an advance on the Western position at the last Geneva Conference? The answer is that, since such concessions could not, in present circumstances, be expected to induce the Soviet Government to relax their grip upon East Germany (as is set forth in Annex I of this Report), it would be foolish to make them. Once made, such concessions could not be withdrawn. The West would have weakened its position against the time when serious negotiations with the Soviet Government might begin and would have gained nothing in return meanwhile.

4. It follows that the Western powers should make no change in the basis of their Geneva proposals. But these proposals were deliberately misinterpreted by Mr. Molotov and in certain respects misunderstood in the West. Moreover, it is necessary to combat misguided ideas for "neutralising" Germany etc., which are now in circulation. If the Western powers are to fight and win the battle of public opinion, they must show to public satisfaction that they have a serious and constructive plan for Europe and Germany and that Soviet intransigence is responsible for the failure to reach agreement. With this end in view, is it possible to make an advance within the scope of the Geneva proposals and without altering their basis?

Amplification of the Geneva Proposals

5. After Geneva a section of Western opinion criticised the proposals on the grounds that the insistence of the Western powers on "freedom of choice" for an all-German Government was not convincing. It was suggested that since these proposals were based on German membership of NATO, the Western Powers were not prepared to contemplate seriously any other solution. The remedy lies in improved publicity, explaining the whole concept behind the Western approach to the problem.

6. The implications should be explained (as has been done by Herr von Brentano) of German neutrality voluntarily chosen. From a military point of view, a neutral Germany would mean the loss of the whole NATO forward position and would possibly result in the withdrawal of United States forces from the continent, with incalculable effects on NATO. Besides it is uncertain whether a power of the size and geographical situation of Germany could long remain neutral. In any case, until reunification has taken place and an all-German Government has been formed, there will be no authority in Germany competent to decide such a matter.

7. There have been suggestions that the West might seek Soviet agreement to German reunification in return for an offer of the neutralization of Germany. Our publicity should also deal with these suggestions and should explain what the situation would be for Germany if she were denied freedom of choice and if neutralization should be imposed on her. This would pose the problem of determining the scale and character of the armed forces which a neutralized Germany would be allowed to possess. This would involve an unacceptable return to a discriminatory international system.

8. The question has also been raised in the West (as it was by Mr. Molotov at Geneva) what arrangements were contemplated if a reunified Germany decided not to join NATO. Mr. Molotov was told at Geneva that the Western Powers had never taken the line that until a reunified Germany joins NATO there can be no treaty; that, on the contrary, they would be ready to sign a treaty concurrently with the signature of an agreement on the Eden Plan, which would enter into force in conjunction with the reunification of Germany; and that the provisions of the treaty could be brought into effect by steps to be agreed, so that it would not be necessary to wait until Germany had exercised her "freedom of choice" before the Soviet Union obtained certain benefits under the treaty. In the explanation of the Western proposals as tabled at Geneva it was stated that the treaty would be carried out by stages and that "the final stage would become effective when a reunified Germany decides to enter NATO and the WEU."

9. It might be possible to make the intention of the Western Powers, that some provisions of the treaty of assurance should enter into force before Germany had exercised her "freedom of choice", more convincing by proposing a definite timetable. This would help to dispel the impression, however unjustified, that the Western Powers were asking the Soviet Government to take a serious risk, by agreeing to reunification on the basis of free elections, without giving anything away in return until their full demand had been met. For example, the Western Powers might offer to bring certain of the provisions of the treaty into effect immediately after free all-German elections, e.g.

(a) Political

Undertakings concerning non-recourse to force and the withholding of assistance from an aggressor.

(b) Military

A start might be made in the establishment of a system of supervision and control in the restricted zones.

10. Although the question was discussed in the Paris Working Group in October 1955, no agreement was reached at that time on the correlation of the entry into force of the provisions of the treaty of assurance with the process of reunification. The proposal of the Western Powers was therefore explained as in paragraph 8 above. The arguments in paragraph 3 above, namely that the Soviet Government would pocket the proposal without giving anything in return, apply similarly to any amplification of the Western proposals as described in the preceding paragraph. This idea should therefore be held in reserve for possible use in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. If and when the idea is further considered, however, the dangers should be borne in mind of prematurely proposing specific commitments before the general context into which they will fit has become clear. The problem is highly complicated and technical, and possibilities in one field will be determined by the type and extent of agreement reached in other aspects of the settlement. Meanwhile, in so far as this question may have to be answered, Western publicity should draw attention to the explanation given to Mr. Molotov at Geneva (see paragraph 8 above). Western publicity could also take the line that the Western proposals at Geneva for a Treaty of Assurances were designed primarily to give the Soviet Union satisfactory reassurance against the most probable contingency. But if Germany were to choose neutrality, certain of the security provisions would apply while certain would not apply. Which security provisions would apply would have to be determined by negotiation in the light of circumstances at the time.

11. A further possible amplification of the Geneva proposals would be the precise formulation of the suggestion for a demilitarized zone which appeared in the Geneva proposals only in the form of a reference to "special measures" nearest the line of demarcation. Recently the Federal Government, in their Memorandum to the Soviet Government of September 2, 1956, have revived the idea of a demilitarized zone. There might be some political advantage in being able to put forward a precise proposal for the event that a reunified Germany chose to join NATO. Such a proposal could either provide for complete demilitarization of the Soviet Zone or for special arrangements governing the disposition of any military forces and installations. By demonstrating that the West had no intention of advancing its forces into the area evacuated by the Soviet forces, the Western Powers would do something to offset the idea that the Russians could legitimately refuse to retract their front line in order to enable NATO to advance its own. When this proposal was discussed in the Paris Working Group in 1955, it was opposed by certain delegations and also by SACEUR. Such a proposal should only be put forward after a careful study of its implications for German internal and external security and for the Western alliance in the light of all alternative possibilities and in the circumstances affecting negotiations. It would in any case not be appropriate to develop it at present for the reasons set out in paragraph 3 above, unless we become engaged in serious negotiations with the Soviet Government.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

1. Proposals put forward since Geneva

Proposals made by the USSR since the Geneva Conference have all been unacceptable to the Western Powers. Other ideas put

rward publicly likewise do not offer an acceptable basis for a dification of the Western position. The Working Group's analysis es not indicate that the Soviet Union is likely in the near future put forward new proposals which would offer the basis for tisfatory negotiation in the field of German reunification and opean security, nor that it would be receptive at this time to w proposals put forward on our side.

2. Significance of Eastern European developments

On the other hand, recent events in Poland and Hungary d an essentially new element which may be of great potential gnificance. Their immediate effects may be to produce a ghtening of Soviet control as has happened in Hungary and East rmany, as well as an attempt to circumscribe Polish freedom of tion. Nevertheless, these events are indicative of powerful w forces which the Soviets will probably find difficult to ppress. There is reason to hope that the West, strengthened by s own unity, may weaken the Soviet system through the development ' relations with the satellite states interested in enhancing their independence. Such development may in due course even force the oviets to an accommodation with the forces of nationalism and independence which in turn would produce a favorable effect on rman reunification. It may well be that this process is more kely to bring the Soviets to wish for an accommodation with us an if we were to offer new proposals on European security. The atter might be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness n our part.

3. Maintenance of Western strength

The requirements of Western security and the possibility e successfully exploiting the new developments in Eastern Europe ake it essential that the West continue to maintain and increase s unity and strength. In the face of continuing Soviet ntransigence, the maintenance of the NATO deterrent and forward strategy is of particular importance in this regard.

4. Necessity for public support of Western position

In these circumstances, the maintenance of public support or our policies in all of the NATO countries is of crucial impor- ance. Public opinion in the Western countries in general has isplayed some restiveness as a result of the lack of progress on e reunification of Germany and a European settlement, a feeling hich has been stimulated by events in Hungary and Poland. The orking Group has found that the problem presented by Western public opinion flows in part from a lack of understanding of the position dopted by the Western Powers with regard to German reunification nd of some of the basic elements of the problem of maintaining estern security. The problem of public opinion is, of course, f particular importance in Germany, where the development of he feeling that the problem of reunification is not being pressed n all feasible ways may have a decisive impact on the development f opinion with respect to German foreign policy. The mobiliza- ion of pressures on the Soviet Union with respect to these pro- lems requires persuasion of the uncommitted countries of the easonableness of the Western position and a demonstration of the rue character of the Soviet position.

B. Recommendations

1. The Western proposals at Geneva

(a) The basic position reflected in the proposals put forward by the Western Powers at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting on German reunification and European security should be maintained.

(b) Serious and concerted efforts should be made to present these proposals in a manner which will promote better understanding of them on the part of public opinion in the West.

(c) Further consideration should be given to clarification and possible amplification of the Geneva proposals, without commitment as to the timing of their submission.

2. Future tactics

The Working Group presents the following recommendations with regard to methods vis-a-vis the Soviet Government:

(a) A new four power conference would not be desirable in the foreseeable future. It would raise false hopes and the final outcome would be a disappointment to Western opinion. Should the USSR propose a four power conference, the Western Powers should reply that such a conference would only be of value after exchanges through diplomatic channels had provided a reasonable hope that the conference would be a success.

(b) The use of the United Nations as a forum for raising the problem of German reunification does not at this time appear to be desirable. It is recommended that the possibility should be kept in mind by the Four Governments.

3. Diplomatic action

The subjects of German reunification and European security should be pursued through diplomatic exchanges. A full presentation of the Western position could be made in replies to the Soviet note to the German Federal Government of October 22, 1956, and to the Soviet statement of November 17, 1956. Both of these Soviet communications present problems from a procedural viewpoint which require further consideration. Any restatement of the Western position on European security should preferably be made by all four powers, after co-ordination in the North Atlantic Council. On the other hand, the Western Powers should continue to maintain the position that they will not discuss matters relating to European security in the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee.

4. Plebiscite

The Working Group has considered the suggestion made by Signor Martino at the recent meeting of the Council on Western European Union, that a proposal be made to the Soviets for holding a plebiscite in all parts of Germany on Western and Soviet proposals for reunification. It recognises certain difficulties in this proposal but recommends that further consideration be given to this suggestion by the Four Governments.

5. Western co-ordination

(a) The Working Group recommends that the Four Governments should continue to co-ordinate closely all their actions bearing on the question of German reunification in order to give effect to their common policy in this regard as enunciated in Article 7 of the Bonn Convention on Relations. They should act in close consultation with the other NATO Governments.

(b) The Western Governments should, in joint consultation, follow closely developments in Eastern Europe for their possible favorable effect on German reunification and European security. Without inciting revolt or risking Soviet intervention, they should encourage the forces of independence in the satellites and should adopt a flexible attitude, facilitating the growth of Western influence by contacts and trade in non-strategic items.

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THE SOVIET SITUATION

After the upheaval of the last months of 1956, the optimism of the Soviet leaders at the XXth Congress has given way to a more sober view. Undoubtedly the pace of de-Stalinization has been slowed down, and the call for vigilance has been more marked. However, the main trends of the XXth Congress remain the same to a great extent. The evolution which began after the death of Stalin is revealed by the search for a better adjustment to reality. Nevertheless, this trend does not exclude crises or regressions and remains tightly controlled from the top. The general trend of the XXth Congress toward more flexible methods to ensure greater dynamism and better efficiency remains equally valid in foreign policy.

With respect to Europe, the USSR defends the status quo while trying to cause breaches in the Western alliances.

The recent Soviet proposals or declarations show clearly that the attitude of the USSR has not changed toward the major European problems.

For the time being, continuance of the partitioning of Germany remains an essential element of Soviet policy. The events in Hungary and Poland have shown the importance to the USSR of its military disposition in Eastern Germany. There is no reason to expect, under the present circumstances, that the USSR is contemplating the withdrawal of its forces from the "German Democratic Republic (GDR)" except under terms which would be unacceptable to the West. For strategic and ideological reasons, the Soviet Government thus continues to assert in the most positive manner that the solution of the German problem can be conceived of only through the rapprochement of the two Germanies that is favored by the USSR. It fosters this tendency by every possible means, as well as by any plans which would result in strengthening the "German Democratic Republic (GDR)" and in having the status quo of Germany accepted by the West.

Indeed, it is on this axiom of continuing the two Germanies that the recent proposals concerning European security (November 17) are based. They merely repeat in essence the Soviet proposals stated previously, in particular at Geneva. Seeking bilateral conversations with each of the Western governments is a method which is constantly used by the Soviets in their efforts to divide the Allies and to weaken NATO.

Although there is no reason to rule out all sincerity on the part of the Soviets, the insistence on the disarmament theme undoubtedly proceeds partly from the same intentions: to lessen the Western defense effort, to prevent German rearmament, and, by a progressive reduction of the forces agreed on, to obtain the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed in Germany, without making any major political concession.

No doubt, the very serious difficulties which may again be confronting the Soviet Government in the people's republics constitute for it an element of uncertainty. However, there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets have such a pessimistic view of that situation that they will be led to consider a substantial change in the bases of negotiation with the Western countries.

For four years, certain forces in the USSR have been able to play an increasingly larger role, although so far they have had no opportunity for action. This development, generally called a relaxation of tension, has been noticeable in the USSR and, until the Hungarian affair, in the satellites; perceptible in the relations between the USSR and the noncommitted countries; much less marked in relations between the USSR and the Western countries. While, from the long view, this development would be difficult to reverse, from the short view, it is subject to sudden changes, and even to reversals, in direction. It is not yet definitely fixed.

The problem that confronts the Western Powers is to ascertain how they can, in the present stage, test the true Soviet intentions and determine whether some day it will be possible to induce the USSR to consider seriously a policy of mutual respect and stability through a negotiated adjustment of interests.

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THE SATELLITE SITUATION

The Polish and Hungarian revolts have presented a major challenge to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, creating there a new situation which the Soviets will have to take into account in determining their position on European security and German reunification. Important factors which have contributed to creating this situation are: hatred of alien domination and in some countries traditional hatred of Russians; growing economic dislocation and lowering standards of living implicit in Soviet-dominated economic policies; growing divisions within the leadership of the Eastern European communist parties; relaxation of the sternness of police controls in Eastern Europe following Soviet "liberalization"; the disorienting influence of Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress denouncing Stalin's crimes; Soviet-Yugoslav "reconciliation", as well as later Yugoslav activities in Eastern Europe; and the divergent interpretations given to the doctrine of "separate roads to socialism". The Soviet Government realized that developments in Eastern Europe made it necessary for them to define a new relationship with the satellite countries, and this was reflected in the Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956.

As shown in Hungary, however, the Soviets are still clearly ready to use force to prevent the defection of any one of the satellites from the Soviet bloc.

The West must be careful in formulating its policies toward European security and German reunification to avoid proceeding on the assumption that at present pressures exist in Eastern Europe strong enough to force the Soviets into substantial concessions in these fields. Under present circumstances, it is unlikely that the Soviets will make any move on these problems since to do so might be interpreted as a weakening of their determination to maintain control in Eastern Europe. This task has become more difficult, but it is still within Soviet military capacity.

The support given by the Polish and Hungarian armed forces to anti-Soviet actions of their leaders, however, must have caused the Soviets to have serious doubts about the reliability of satellite armed forces, particularly should those armed forces be called upon to operate independently of Soviet armed forces. This development, as well as the changing nature of weapons systems, may cause the Soviets to scale down their support of and reliance upon satellite armed forces and inhibit their willingness to withdraw Soviet troops.

Nevertheless, the situation in Eastern Europe presents the Soviets with a dilemma. They must take account of nationalism in the area. They accordingly must seek to keep it under their own effective control. Each concession which the Soviets are forced to give to any of the satellites could in time lead to the demand for similar concessions in the others. If this development should take place, it should help to create conditions more favorable to an eventual settlement of the problem of German reunification and European security.

Western strength likewise limits the scope of maneuverability of the Soviets in dealing with the satellite problem, since the possibility of involvement of the West always exists.

German reunification is now even more closely bound to Eastern European events, especially those in Poland. In the longer run, if the Soviets find it necessary to make concessions in other Eastern European countries, pressures should increase for similar concessions in East Germany. Should concessions be granted resulting in a real relaxation of Soviet control, this could have a significant effect on the prospects for German reunification.

The outcome of Gomulka's efforts to consolidate his regime in Poland will have a particularly important impact throughout the bloc. The Soviets may find it difficult to tolerate much beyond the present Polish compromise without risk of serious political complication in Poland and elsewhere. At this stage it appears that Polish developments would be difficult for the Soviets to reverse. Nevertheless, if they judge that developments there pose a threat to Soviet control of the bloc, the Soviets may use force in Poland, despite the great risks.

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THE SPECIFIC GERMAN SITUATION

A. The Situation in the Soviet Zone

1. The events in Poland and Hungary have strongly influenced the attitude of the population of the Zone. More than ever before it rejects the Communist regime and its ideology. The brutal intervention of the Soviets in Hungary is absolutely condemned.

2. Since June 17, 1953, and the failure of the Berlin and Geneva Conferences to achieve reunification, the hopes of the population for a settlement by negotiation or by active intervention on the part of the West have declined. Any hopes of intervention which may have remained have been further dashed by the failure of the West to intervene in Hungary. On the other hand, the people of the GDR realize that the evolution which has occurred in some satellite countries ultimately may have a bearing on the course of events in the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) itself.

3. In view of the powerful political backing which the Communist regime finds in the strong Soviet occupation forces (22 divisions), and in view of the Soviet determination to employ them, if need be, against the population, open rebellion is regarded as hopeless. Yet, in wide circles, especially among workers and students a strong oppositional, almost revolutionary attitude can be observed.

4. This oppositional attitude is intensified by the discontent aroused by the deterioration of living conditions since the summer of 1956. The cessation of imports from Poland and Hungary aggravates the deficiencies connected with the system of a government-controlled economy. Supply is insufficient. The rate of work is reduced by shortages in supply and by "slowdown of work" slogans frequently followed by the workers. A further decrease of the production rate is the consequence.

5. The leading functionaries of the SED, conscious of the common danger, and of their dependence on Soviet support for their existence, stick together in solidarity and have so far succeeded in checking the restless population by means of clever tactics and a flexible system of threats, concessions, and empty promises.

6. The attitude of the Volksarmee (People's Army) and the Volkspolizei (People's Police) is at least uncertain. Whether it is really possible to use the Volksarmee against the population remains an open question. This does not exclude the possibility of using certain units under reliable Communist command for certain missions. The combat value of the so-called Kampfgruppen (Combat Groups) consisting of the personnel of industrial plants is low at this time of general depression.

7. Despite the general disciplined attitude of the population, the possibility of outbreaks which can no longer be directed by a cool calculation of the risks involved cannot be excluded. This applies in particular in the case of some unrest in Poland.

. General Aspects of the Reunification Problem

1. The population of the Federal Republic has hitherto accepted with patience the difficulties of achieving reunification. However, the longer these difficulties last, the more likely it is that doubts will be expressed as to the rightness of the course being followed. Public opinion may be tempted to entertain and support other solutions of the problem.

2. Such tendencies can be countered provided that the Federal Government and its allies continue to pursue together a constructive policy on reunification. Such a policy must convince the population that every reasonable chance is being used to induce the Soviet Government to give up their Zone.

3. The Western Powers cannot resign themselves to inactivity in the present situation since the continuation of the status quo in Germany is a source of trouble and a danger for the stability in Europe. A new rising in the Zone, the possibility of which cannot be excluded, could lead to a dangerous situation with unpredictable consequences. The position of Berlin is especially vulnerable in this connection.

4. One possibility is that the problem of German reunification might be raised in the United Nations. This would be unlikely to succeed unless a major number of the members of the Afro-Asian bloc were prepared to support the policy of the Western Powers in this question. The discussion in UN of German reunification would involve the risk of the endorsement by the UN of some compromise formula for the solution of the problem unacceptable to the Federal Republic, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Nevertheless the possibility should be further kept in mind by the Four Powers.

5. The next step will be for the Federal Government to reply to the Soviet Note of October 22, 1956. The German Delegation informed the Working Group that no final decision had been made as to the terms of the reply, about which they would wish to consult their allies.

6. The Working Group discussed the proposal made by the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Martino, that an all-German plebiscite should be held on the question whether reunification should be brought about by free elections or by negotiations between the Federal Government and the Pankow regime. The Group considered that such a proposal might result in counter-proposals from the Soviet side which could embarrass the West and confuse German public opinion. Nevertheless the Group agreed that this proposal should be further studied.

THE WESTERN POSITION

The advance of Communism in Europe has been halted at the point which it reached nine years ago. Attempts on the part of the Soviet Union to weaken the solidarity of the free world by playing on divergent interests between Western countries have so far been successfully resisted. But no progress has been made towards a European settlement, or, in particular, towards the reunification of Germany, without which there can be no permanent security in Europe.

2. The basic strength of the Western position lies in the North Atlantic alliance with its political and military co-operation between Western countries. The present NATO strategy of deterring all forms of armed aggression is essential to the safety of the West. Non-military co-operation in NATO and WEU is being progressively strengthened. The Report of the "Three Wise Men" has been adopted with its provisions for a greater measure of political co-operation within NATO. WEU is also becoming a going concern. Closer co-operation is developing between the Western European nations, e.g. progress towards the establishment of EURATOM, the Common Market and a Free Trade Area. These Organizations will contribute not only to the economic but also to the political cohesion of the West. Western economic strength, output and standard of living are still greatly in advance of that of the Soviet bloc, a fact which has an important impact upon the peoples of Eastern Europe and which must be maintained.

3. In the military field, it is hoped that there may be further development of co-operation between the Western nations in research, development and production of new weapons. Meanwhile, the German contribution to Western defence is just beginning to emerge. But, even when the NATO force goals including the German contribution are achieved, the Western numerical inferiority in men and conventional armaments will remain very great. Western advantages in nuclear capability, strategic aircraft, surface sea-power, and productive capacity must be maintained to offset Eastern advantages in land forces, tactical aircraft, submarines and the ability to allocate an unusually high percentage of peacetime production to military purposes.

4. Important limitations on the Western defense effort are:

- (a) the possible need for certain NATO countries to use some of their NATO forces to meet defense commitments elsewhere, such as may arise because of the various and changing forms of the Soviet-inspired Communist threat on a world front. This need, however, should in conformity with their NATO commitments be harmonized with the primary importance of protecting the NATO area;

- (b) the allocation of resources. Governments have to take account of the rising cost of new weapons and of the need for economic resources to deal with the Soviet threat in all its aspects, without endangering their economic stability, which is an essential element in their security. The continuing need, however, for men, money and material for NATO defense remains real.

In view of the Western numerical inferiority in men and conventional armaments (as mentioned in paragraph 3 above) it would be dangerous if considerable force reductions would result from these limitations unless balanced by a satisfactory reduction on the Soviet side.

5. Whereas the Soviet Union is able to rely on depth in Europe, the extent of NATO's European hinterland is limited by the Atlantic, which gives the Soviet Union strategic and tactical advantages. It enables them to make proposals for withdrawals of forces and abolition of foreign bases which are unacceptable to the West because they would involve the disruption of the whole Western defense structure. There is no doubt that for the time being the depth available to the West is the minimum necessary for Western security. But it must be borne in mind that wherever Soviet troops are stationed in Europe, even within their own frontiers, depth will be in their favor.

6. The Western Alliance can in general rely on the loyalty of its members and on the support of the populations of Western countries for a policy aimed at the maintenance of free institutions. As events have recently shown, the Soviet Union cannot rely on a similar loyalty for its policies. Conversely, the Western countries have to take account of their public opinion. The Soviet Union has no comparable problem. Proposals made by the West are not likely to result in popular pressure on the Soviet Government from within the Soviet bloc. But it is necessary for Western Governments to convince public opinion especially in these countries that the West has a constructive initiative of its own and that it is Soviet intransigence which is responsible for failure to reach agreement.

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EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY PUT FORTH
SINCE THE GENEVA CONFERENCES OF OCTOBER 1955

1. The working group has examined the various proposals concerning European security which have been put forth since the Geneva Conference of November 1955.

2. These proposals may, it seems, be classified in three principal categories:

- (a) proposals leading to the establishment in Europe of a unified security system in place of present organizations;
- (b) proposals leading to the establishment in Europe of a neutrality zone;
- (c) proposals leading to the conclusion of security arrangements between the members of the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Bloc.

3. These types of solutions are all compatible with various suggestions concerning the complete or partial evacuation of the Continent by the Anglo-American-Canadian forces or the creation of demilitarized zones of varying depth. In view of the important consequences of such proposals in the political field, as well as on the Western defensive structure, the group has devoted a special discussion to them. It has also examined the question of zones of limitation and of inspection of armed forces.

4. These types of solutions are all compatible with the unification of Germany. The group notes that all the proposals presented by the Soviet Union since the end of 1955 are based on the maintenance of the division of Germany. On the contrary, the Western Powers have always linked their proposals with the unification of Germany. There thus exists a fundamental difference which should be underlined as often as possible and which explains in great measure the lack of success of all efforts in this field to the present time.

5. The Establishment in Europe of a Unified Collective Security System

The group considered that none of the various proposals which were made on this subject (see Annexes 6 and 7) is worth further consideration.

(a) In fact, while such a system provides for the suppression of the Warsaw Pact - which would in all probability only be illusory - it would have as a principal consequence the dissolution of the Atlantic organization.

(b) Independently of this basic obstacle, a system of this nature contains within itself such serious faults that, in fact, it gives no security guarantee to its eventual participants.

(c) Any collective security system depends in fact on a certain community of views among its members. In the absence of this, there is no agreement on the origin of the aggression, and the collective security system can only result, in the event of a crisis, in a war between members.

(d) For the Soviet Union claims that a "Socialist" state cannot, by its very nature, be an aggressor and therefore, if it attacks, it does so as a matter of defense, as demonstrated by the military actions in Korea and Hungary.

(e) The idea that in such a system there would be no veto is equally erroneous. There is no security system in which a decision to go to war could be taken by a majority vote.

For these reasons, the group wishes to recommend that an effort be made to enlighten public opinion in the different countries about the real value of such proposals in the circumstances actually prevailing in Europe. It would probably be useful to emphasize particularly the fundamental difference between a system of this type which would ruin NATO without providing a substitute and the whole range of solutions inspired by the idea of a settlement between the two present systems.

6. Zones of Neutrality in Europe

Of the proposals in this category, some deal with Germany alone, some with the satellites alone, and some with a zone comprising both Germany and the East European states. These proposals deal both with voluntary neutrality (of the Swedish type) and with neutralization.

In general, the group believes that solutions of this nature are very difficult to put into effect in the part of Europe under consideration. All neutrality depends on a certain equilibrium. If it extends over too large an area in the West, one of the counter weights (in this instance that of the West) loses its strength, and neutrality cannot be maintained. This fundamental principle could have a particular bearing in the case of a unified Germany.

The idea of a zone of neutrality including Germany and the Eastern countries has serious drawbacks in the light of the above principles. There is, moreover, very little likelihood of obtaining the agreement of the Soviet Union to such an idea unless developments occur which cannot be predicted at present. It presents the risk if put forward by us of being used by the Soviet Union to draw the West towards the neutrality of Germany alone.

Under these conditions, the group feels that at the present time none of the proposed solutions can be considered as a basis for negotiation with the USSR. If solutions of this type were to be proposed by the USSR within the framework of the reunification of Germany in freedom and the liberation of the satellites, such offers would signify such a profound change in Soviet policy that they would have to be examined in the light of the new circumstances thus created.

7. Security arrangement between members of the Atlantic Pact and the Soviet Bloc

This type of proposal, based on the assumption of a reunified Germany, was put forward by the Western Powers at the Geneva Conference in November 1955. This problem having been analyzed in Part III of the main report, it would appear sufficient here to make the following points:

(a) An arrangement of this kind is flexible. It can contain political commitments (non-aggression - denial of support to an aggressor) and military (zones of limitation for forces as well as a reciprocal control system).

(b) It can be put into effect at the same time as the reunification of Germany and, if desirable, a certain amount of flexibility in the development of the two procedures could be envisaged.

(c) In view of the present situation in the Eastern European countries, notably Poland, proposals of this type are of particular interest to the West. The establishment of Western control posts in Poland, for example, would have an important political effect. They would provide certain assurances against an eventual massive return of Soviet troops.

For these reasons, the group feels that in present circumstances these proposals should be taken up again and widely publicized, although it realizes that the Western proposals for a security arrangement have not yet been seriously considered by the Russians.

8. Total or partial evacuation

The proposals concerning evacuation are of two principal types: some envisage reciprocal evacuation of the European Continent by English, American and Canadian troops on the one hand and by Soviet troops on the other; others propose evacuation only of certain zones.

With respect to the former, the group feels that such proposals cannot be considered.

(a) The structure of NATO would be destroyed.

(b) There would be a fundamental disparity in the strategic balance. Soviet forces would remain on hand, while a major part of the Western forces would be unavailable in case of crisis.

(c) The countries of Eastern Europe would be placed in a position in which they might anticipate their liberation, but it is possible that the reinforced weight of the Soviet menace would cause them to hesitate and that the process of liberation would be blocked.

(d) Europe would run the risk of being progressively drawn into the Soviet orbit.

(e) The psychological impact on populations and the political pressures on Western governments to adopt policies of accommodation with the Soviets, would destroy Western unity and security.

Furthermore there is no indication that the USSR proposes such a formula, limited to Europe and including the reunification of Germany in freedom.

With respect to the latter type, the group considered in particular the assumption of a withdrawal of German NATO forces into countries neighboring Germany. It felt that the disadvantages of such a withdrawal would largely outweigh any possible advantages.

The disadvantages are very serious:

(a) The Western military structure would be broken. The "shield" concept would disappear. The risks would increase considerably.

(b) Politically NATO would cease to be an organization of integrated collective defense and would emerge as an alliance without balance and on the way to disintegration.

(c) Psychologically such a retreat would be hard to reconcile with the maintenance of Anglo-American-Canadian forces on the continent. Public opinion in these countries might have difficulty accepting the financial burden of supporting a system which would have lost its real usefulness and would have only token value.

The principal advantage which the West would wish to obtain would be the reunification of Germany in freedom. But as there is no indication that the USSR is disposed to grant this counterpart, any proposal of this nature originating from the Western Powers would only have the effect of giving the Russians a new advantage without retaining any compensation. If this problem had to be considered, it would be important to bear in mind the fundamental security needs of NATO members.

If the evacuation were to cover a larger area than West Germany alone and extended to the Eastern countries or to certain parts of them, the problem would then have to be studied in the light of the obligations remaining on the countries located in this zone.

The same conclusions would apply to this latter type of proposal as to the former mentioned above (paragraph 6).

9. Demilitarized Zones

The different proposals on this subject can be broken down into two categories: large zones and more limited zones.

In general the group feels that demilitarization of a zone is not necessarily a security factor. Past experience in this regard is not very encouraging.

Nevertheless, and in certain conditions, the principle of a very narrow demilitarized strip on the border between the two systems and on the basis of a reunified Germany could be considered, if this appeared necessary in the course of negotiation.

As for larger zones, they are dangerous unless they are limited, for example, to Eastern German territory, which would appear unacceptable for the Russians. (See also Part III of the main report).

10. Zones of limitation and inspection

Numerous proposals, both Soviet and Western, concern this type of security arrangement. The reasons why no agreement has so far been possible on this question are mentioned above (see paragraph 6 on the problem of German unification). This problem is treated in particular in Part III of the main report.

EUROPEAN SECURITY ASPECTS OF
THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF 17th NOVEMBER, 1956

I. SUBSTANCE

Five of the Soviet proposals of November 17, 1956 in fact fall outside the terms of reference of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament inasmuch as they deal with questions of regional European security. Their inclusion among the Soviet disarmament proposals follows the pattern set in the Soviet note of May 10, 1956 and seems to be an attempt (a) to seek to obtain a European security arrangement based upon the status quo rather than one connected with arrangements on the reunification of Germany, (b) to create the appearance of Soviet willingness to reduce tensions in Europe.

It is fundamental to the Western position that any agreement on European security must come into effect concurrently with the reunification of Germany in freedom. The Western Powers should reiterate that only on this basis, which would eliminate a basic cause of tension in Europe, would they be prepared to enter into an agreement designed to meet legitimate security concerns of the Soviet Union resulting from the new situation. The West, on these conditions, remains prepared to exchange the following undertakings proposed at Geneva:

- (1) To renounce the use of force.
- (2) To withhold support from aggressors.
- (3) To provide for the limitation of forces and armaments in a zone of comparable size, depth, and importance on both sides, including special measures in those parts of the zone closest to the line of demarcation.
- (4) To reaffirm the right of individual and collective self-defense.
- (5) To reaffirm that a reunified Germany will have complete freedom to choose whether or not she will join NATO.
- (6) In the event that a reunified Germany should decide to join NATO, to create an obligation to react against aggression on the part of or against any NATO member.

Against this background, the five Soviet proposals of November 17 dealing with European Security have obvious defects:

A. Soviet proposal (3), to reduce during 1957 by one-third the armed forces of the US, the USSR, the UK, and France stationed in Germany with the establishment of appropriate control for this reduction is subject to the following comments:

- (1) It is a restatement of prior Soviet proposals for reductions of forces in Germany, the only new factor being the use of the figure of one-third.

- (2) The use of equal proportionate figures for East and West is patently preposterous if applied only to peripheral areas, in view of the basic advantages in numbers, depth, and geography which the Communist bloc has over the Western nations.
- (3) The creation of special controls for Germany discriminates against Germany without affording similar advantages to the West. It appears to be different from the type of control covered in paragraph (7) of the Soviet proposals, and, under the joint communiqué of January 7th, 1957, would call for East German participation.

B. Soviet proposal (4), to significantly reduce during 1957 the armed forces of the USA, the UK, and France stationed in NATO countries and the armed forces of the USSR stationed in Warsaw Pact countries, is subject to the following comments:

- (1) This proposal is a more specific version of earlier Soviet proposals, perhaps intended for local opinion in the satellites.
- (2) It assumes that both NATO and Soviet forces are stationed abroad for legitimate purposes of collective self-defense, while this is patently untrue of Soviet forces in the satellites.
- (3) There is an implicit assumption that equivalent reductions by East and West would not alter the balance of power. Given Soviet advantages in mass, depth, and geography, this is not the case. Legitimate minimum Western collective defense measures do not permit these actions.

C. Soviet proposal (5) is to liquidate in the course of two years foreign army, naval, and air bases on the territories of other states. This is subject to the following comment:

- (1) The right and responsibility of collective self-defense would thus be completely denied to the Western Powers, which would be defenseless in light of Communist abilities for piecemeal aggression.

D. The Soviets offered to accept aerial photography to a depth of eight hundred kilometers to the East and West of the line of demarcation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces. As this subject should basically be considered in the Disarmament Subcommittee and not in connection with European security matters, it is only necessary to note that it has already been pointed out to the Soviets that their proposal is a distortion of President Eisenhower's proposal in that it does not cover major centres of power. In addition, as worded, it tends to confirm the division of Germany.

E. The Soviets also propose a treaty of non-aggression among countries belonging to NATO and countries of the Warsaw Pact. A treaty of non-aggression without the resolution of the German problem and the creation of sound security measures would create a false sense of security without any gain for the West.

It is thus clear that the Soviet proposals are directed to these ends:

- (1) To confirm the division of Germany.
- (2) To weaken and destroy NATO and Western collective security.
- (3) To give a public impression of Soviet initiative.

On the other hand, the Western proposals present an inseparable pattern of mutually supporting undertakings which would:

- (1) Reunify Germany and thus eliminate a major cause of tension.
- (2) Create a new and more stable situation and afford legitimate security for all under it.
- (3) Recognize the need for collective self-defense instead of seeking to destroy it.
- (4) Deal with limitation of forces and armaments on a realistic basis, taking into consideration problems of mass, depth, and geography on both sides.

II. TACTICS

The Soviet proposals should be dealt with by the Western nations in light of the foregoing. The Western position that they should not be dealt with in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee should be repeated, as questions of regional security and questions inseparably linked to German reunification are beyond the purview of that body. In order to avoid inviting the question of a further four-power conference, they might be dealt with through diplomatic correspondence, which should be closely co-ordinated between the four interested powers and in consultation with the North Atlantic Council.

If the Soviets at London press the European security proposals, whether separately or as an essential part of their disarmament proposals, they should be rejected on these grounds.

It is for consideration, particularly in light of Soviet tactics in London, whether the West should take advantage of responding by note to the European security proposals of the USSR to place the Soviet proposals in proper public perspective as against the Western position.

LIST OF PROPOSALS ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY PUT FORTH SINCE THE GENEVA
CONFERENCES OF OCTOBER, 1955

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LIST OF PROPOSALS ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY PUT FORTH SINCE THE GENEVA
CONFERENCES OF OCTOBER, 1955

I. EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY AND GUARANTEES

A. Soviet proposals

1. January 28, 1956, Declaration of Warsaw Treaty Countries at Prague. It proposed agreement "first between certain" states, including the USSR, United Kingdom, France and United States. The nature of the agreement was not specified. It also proposed the establishment of "good-neighborly" relations between the USSR, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Italy, Czechoslovakia and the GFR and the normalization of relations between states not maintaining relations. Further, it proposed treaties of non-aggression between "appropriate states."
2. February 1, 1956, Bulganin Letter to President Eisenhower. It reiterated the Soviet Geneva proposal that the existing two groupings in Europe conclude a treaty and declared Soviet willingness to conclude treaties of friendship with the United Kingdom, France and "other countries" as well as with the United States, as proposed in Bulganin's letter of January 23, 1956.
3. October 22, 1956, Soviet Note to GFR. It reiterated the demand for "immediate measures to strengthen security in Europe" with the participation of the two existing German states. It inquired as to whether the GFR was prepared to enter undertakings with the "countries concerned" not to use force.
4. November 17, 1956, Government Statement attached to the Letters of the Western Heads of Government. It reiterated the proposal for non-aggression pacts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
5. November 18, 1956, Soviet-Polish Joint Statement. It asserted that agreement on disarmament "would undoubtedly promote creation of the necessary conditions" for the settlement of the German and European security questions.
6. December 3, 1956, Soviet-Rumanian Declaration. It stated that the two countries were "ready to make fresh efforts" to create a system of general European security.
7. January 7, 1957, Soviet-DDR Communiqué. It reiterated the proposal for establishment of a collective security system in Europe comprising "both German states."
8. January 18, 1957, Soviet-Chinese Communist Declaration. It called for abrogation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by a collective security treaty.
9. January 29, 1957, Soviet-Czechoslovak Statement. It stated that since the West had rejected Soviet proposals to liquidate existing groupings, the two governments were determined to "consolidate the Warsaw Treaty organization."
10. February 12, 1957, Shepilov's Speech to the Supreme Soviet. It emphasized that the United States should participate in European collective security and stated that "the time has really come to pool the efforts" of all interested in creating guarantees of peace and conditions for lasting economic cooperation in Europe.

11. February 20, 1957, Soviet-Bulgarian Declaration. The two countries agreed to "continue active efforts" directed toward the creation of collective security in Europe.

B. Western proposals

1. March 1, 1956, FDP spokesman Erich Mende proposed the conclusion of a treaty between the United States and the USSR and adhered to by the United Kingdom, France and Germany or, alternatively, a 15-power pact to include smaller nations.

2. April 20, 1956, SPD spokesman Erler at the Council of Europe demanded the formation of a regional security system with the United States and USSR as guarantors, in which a reunified Germany could participate.

3. May 3, 1956, Foreign Minister Pineau proposed a new plan incorporating disarmament, European security and German reunification.

4. July 10, 1956, Erler, writing in a special issue of the SPD paper Vorwaerts, called for an international police force instead of military alliances.

5. September 7, 1956. A Federal Republic note delivered in Moscow enclosed a memorandum offering military guarantees to the USSR which would enable it to agree to German reunification.

6. September 25, 1956, Adenauer, in a Brussels speech, called for an "elastic confederation" of European states.

7. November 21, 1956. A German Government spokesman declared that the Soviet disarmament proposal of November 19 appeared to be based upon the continued division of Germany and hence was unacceptable as a basis for a security system.

8. December 13, 1956. Basic Western position set forth in NATO political directive.

9. December 18, 1956. Secretary Dulles stated that the United States was not "contemplating any reduction of United States military strength in Europe" and was "not prepared to review the military situation in Europe on any basis which presupposes a line drawn through Germany".

10. January 23, 1957. Social Democratic Party statement called for the formation of a regional security system with the United States and USSR as guarantors in which a reunified Germany, not a member of a one-sided alliance, would participate.

11. In January 1957 Walter Lippmann in a Minneapolis speech stressed the need for the development of a new European security arrangement in view of the changed situation in Eastern Europe.

12. In February 1957 at the WEU Foreign Ministers meeting Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd proposed a "Grand Design" for European organization, political, military and economic, with a single parliament and open to neutral and perhaps in time Eastern European states.

II. DEMILITARIZED ZONES, LIMITED ARMAMENTS ZONES

A. Soviet proposals

1. January 28, 1956, Declaration of Warsaw Treaty Countries at Prague. It called for "special attention" to be given to the creation of a "special zone" in Europe (including both parts of Germany) in which armaments would be restricted and controlled. It also proposed an agreement not to station nuclear weapons on German territory.

2. February 14, 1956, Khrushchev Speech (public) to 20th Party Congress. It repeated the proposal of an agreement not to station nuclear weapons in Germany.

3. March 27, 1956, Soviet Disarmament Proposals at London Disarmament Talks. They proposed a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments which would include the territory of both parts of Germany and adjacent states. It also proposed ceilings on United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet forces stationed on foreign territory in Europe, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and units in the zone, joint inspection, and, pending final agreement, unilateral force reductions on German territory.

4. November 17, 1956, Soviet Disarmament proposals. They stated Soviet willingness to consider using aerial photography "in the area where basic military forces" of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries were located to a depth of 800 kilometers to the east and west of the present demarcation line.

5. January 7, 1957, Soviet-DDR Communiqué. It proposed the establishment of a restricted armaments zone in Europe" comprising both parts of Germany."

B. Western proposals

West European proposals on this point are listed under Sections III, IV, V and VI.

1. On December 11, 1956 in Staff Study No.5, Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, Senator Humphrey suggested exploration of proposals for a geographical zone in which military equipment and manpower would be kept at a prescribed limit.

III. THINNING OUT OF TROOPS IN GERMANY

A. Soviet proposals

1. May 14, 1956, the USSR announced a cut in military manpower and claimed that Soviet troops in Germany had been reduced by 30,000.

2. June 6, 1956, in a letter to Eisenhower, Bulganin called on the United States to emulate the USSR's reduction of troops in Germany.

3. January 28, 1956, A declaration of the Warsaw Pact nations called for the "withdrawal of foreign forces or....their numerical reduction in both parts of Germany."

4. November 17, 1956; The USSR proposed that forces in Germany be cut by one third during 1957.

5. January 7, 1957, a Soviet DDR Communiqué called for the "substantial reduction" of the armed forces of the four powers in Germany.

B.. Western proposals

1. March 1, 1956, FDP spokesman Mende proposed withdrawal of NATO troops behind the Rhine and of Warsaw pact troops beyond the Oder-Neisse line, with the resultant military vacuum to be filled by 12 or more West German Divisions.

2. January 11, 1957, Chancellor Adenauer favored the idea of a thinned out zone in Germany as promoting reunification though cautioning that the plan would neither solve problems of international tensions nor bring about reunification.

NOTE: Most Western discussion on this subject is imprecise and generally included in the proposals for complete withdrawal. See Sections V and VI.

IV. THINNING OUT OF TROOPS FROM OTHER EUROPEAN AREAS

A. Soviet Proposals

1. March 27, 1956, Soviet Disarmament Proposals, see item A.3. under Demilitarised Zones, Limited Armaments Zones (proposals regarding ceilings on foreign troops in Europe).

2. November 17, 1956, Soviet Disarmament Proposals. Proposed "significant reduction" during 1957 of US, UK and French troops on NATO territory and Soviet troops on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries.

B. Western Proposals

NOTE: No official Western support for such proposals. Unofficial discussion has not focused on this aspect of the troop deployment problem.

V. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM GERMANY

A. Soviet Proposals

The USSR has made no specific proposal involving the total withdrawal of foreign troops in Germany since November 1955.

B. Western Proposals

NOTE: Official Western positions have unanimously been that withdrawals are not practical under present circumstances. There have, however, been a number of non-official sources who have considered withdrawals as a possibility worth exploring. Representative examples are:

1. November 25, 1956, Washington Post editorial recommended total troop withdrawal in the context of German reunification.
2. December 19, 1956, Hugh Gaitskell proposed in Parliament that US and UK troops be withdrawn from Germany and Central Europe as part of a reunification settlement.
3. On December 26, 1956, Senator Sparkman suggested negotiations with the USSR on troop withdrawals.
4. January 9, 1957, George Kennon stated his view that no disarmament agreement with the USSR was possible if US and USSR troops faced each other in Germany.

VI. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM OTHER EUROPEAN AREAS

A. Soviet Proposals

1. November 17, 1956, Soviet Disarmament Proposal. Proposed liquidation, within two years, of all "foreign army, naval and air bases" on the territories of other states.
2. November 22, 1956, Shepilov at 11th UN General Assembly stated Soviet willingness to withdraw troops from Warsaw Pact countries as soon as the West "withdraws troops from West Germany and dismantles bases on foreign territory".
3. January 7, 1957, Soviet-DDR Communiqué demanded "abolition of military bases on foreign territory in Europe".
4. January 29, 1957, Soviet-Czechoslovak Statement demanded liquidation of military bases on foreign territory in Europe.

B. Western Proposals

NOTE: No official Western support for troop withdrawals under present circumstances. Non-official discussion usually emphasised withdrawals from Germany and Soviet withdrawals from the Satellites but avoided specific mention of US withdrawals from Western Europe other than Germany. A representative non-official US discussion of this subject is Kennan's testimony already cited.

VII. NEUTRALISATION OF GERMANY

A. Soviet Proposals

The USSR has not proposed the neutralisation of Germany as part of any program, for disarmament or European security or otherwise, though Soviet propaganda has suggested, extremely vaguely, that such an eventuality was not impossible.

B. Western Proposals

1. On November 25 and subsequently, The Washington Post recommended the exploration of the possibility of a neutralised Germany as part of a European settlement (See also Kennan testimony cited above).

2. February 19, 1957, German Defense Minister Strauss stated that while a reunified Germany might favor participation in the Western military alliance system, hard political realities might force it to make a decision on the "Austrian model".

NOTE: The SPD and certain other German groups held that reunification of Germany is feasible only if a reunified Germany is not included in NATO.

II. NEUTRALISATION AND NEUTRAL BELTS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE

A. Soviet Proposals

There have been no new Soviet proposals on this subject since the Geneva Conferences. Pravda, replying to certain questions raised by a group of British MPs, stated on February 10, that none of the Satellites could safeguard its security by means of neutrality as long as (1) NATO exists, (2) the West is motivated by the "theory and practice" of "rolling back Communism" and (3) "the imperialists pursue a policy of interference in the internal affairs" of the East European states.

B. Western Proposals

1. On December 18, 1956, Secretary Dulles said the United States is very open-minded to any suggestions that might be made to the status - whether neutralisation or otherwise - of satellite countries which would take away any fear by the USSR that they would be physically or militarily endangered if it facilitated the evolution to independence in the Satellites.

2. On March 8, 1957, Hugh Gaitskell at Dutch Labor Party Congress spoke in favor of a neutral belt including a reunited Germany and Eastern Europe but with NATO remaining intact.

NOTE: Non-official Western discussion in addition to the neutralisation of Germany has considered the possibility of a neutral belt extending further to the East.

III. CONTROL OF DEMILITARISATION MEASURES IN GERMANY

A. Soviet Proposals

1. January 28, 1956, Declaration of Warsaw Pact Nations (Prague meeting), mentioned the "establishment of necessary control" over the implementation of a suggested agreement for reduction of foreign forces in the DDR and of DDR and GFR troops.

2. January 7, 1957, Soviet-DDR communiqué claimed that the governments and parliaments of both the GFR and the DDR "as well as the organizations of the peace-loving German population...," should take part in reciprocal control" over a disarmament agreement among the great powers. This did not mention measures specifically applying to Germany, but certainly presumes them.

B. Western Proposals

NOTE: All Western suggestions concerning demilitarisation have recognised the need of supervision but have not developed their ideas on this subject in detail.

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X. CONTROLS OVER INDIGENOUS GERMAN FORCES

A. Soviet Proposals

1. January 28, 1956. Declaration of Warsaw Pact nations, Prague, called for "establishment of the necessary control" over implementation of an "agreement" for reduction of the armed forces of the GFR and the DDR.

B. Western Proposals

See Note IX, B.

XI. CONTROL OF DEMILITARISATION MEASURES IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A. Soviet Proposals

Soviet proposals have made only vague and general references to the means by which measures of demilitarisation would be enforced in Europe. Following are two representative references.

1. March 27, 1956. Soviet Disarmament Proposals mentions "joint inspection" to ensure measures envisaged for the European zone.

2. November 17, 1956. Soviet Disarmament Proposals Point 7 makes general reference to the establishment of "strict and effective international control".

B. Western Proposals

See Note IX, B.

XII. GERMAN REUNIFICATION

A. Soviet Proposals

1. February 1, 1956. Bulganin, in letter to Eisenhower, repeated that reunification could be accomplished only by agreement between the Germans themselves.

2. March 1, 1956. TASS statement, quoting "authoritative circles", reiterated that negotiations between DDR and GFR represented "the only way" to reunification, and insisted that the USSR could not negotiate for the DDR on this subject.

3. July 17, 1956. Soviet-DDR communiqué repeated that restoration of unity can come only through talks and agreements between the Governments of both German states.

4. October 22nd, 1956. Soviet reply to West German note of September 7 claimed that GFR failure to recognise the existence of the DDR is absurd, that the only means to reunification is through agreement between the two German states; that it is unrealistic to talk of all-German elections under present conditions; that participation of both German states in a European security system would advance reunification prospects; that a foremost requirement is a decisive change in the political line of the West German Government; and that the contention that reunification was

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four-power responsibility is without practical meaning.

5. October 26, 1956, Soviet note to the US, UK and France, submitting a copy of a note to the GFR, repeated their insistence on the necessity for a rapprochement between the GFR and the DDR.

6. January 7, 1957, Soviet-DDR communiqué repeated the in points of the October 22 note, adding nothing new.

7. February 5, 1957, Bulganin's letter to Adenauer made addition to previous proposals, even though claiming an improvement in Soviet-GFR relations would bring reunification nearer. Bulganin repeated that a rapprochement between the GFR and the DDR was "the only way of solving the German problem".

B. Western Proposals

1. On March 16, 1956, the Federal Republic, in a note to the three Western powers on the eve of the disarmament conference, coupled German reunification to disarmament and asked to be informed of the progress of the conference as it vitally affected Germany.

2. On July 21, 1956, Chancellor Adenauer, in reply to the Bulganin letter of June 6 on disarmament, rejected the idea that disarmament can be achieved before European security, and asserted that a split in Germany is a principal cause of international tension.

3. On September 7, 1956, the Federal Republic sent a memorandum on unification to Moscow, urging that it be brought about by free elections, and offering military guarantees to the USSR.

4. On October 6, 1956, Foreign Minister von Brentano in broadcast to the Soviet zone renewed his offer of military guarantees to the USSR which would enable her to agree to German unification.

5. On October 10, 1956, the US, UK and France endorsed the German position on unification contained in the Federal Republic's note of September 7.

6. In a major statement on January 23, the SPD reiterated its basic positions on reunification.

7. On February 28, 1957, Chancellor Adenauer, in reply to the Bulganin message of February 8, insisted that free elections must precede concrete steps toward reunification, and reiterated the position that the Federal Republic, as the only genuine German government, cannot negotiate with the GFR.

TE: Since US non-official discussion on reunification often mentions reunification in the context of troop withdrawals and neutralisation, see previous sections. There has been no western acceptance of Soviet insistence on direct Bonn-Pankow conversations. The necessity of free elections has never been questioned, although in January the Washington Post mentioned the possibility of a "loose confederation" including the Soviet Zone and the GFR.