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*C/C* *1657*

AGV (74)14

COPY. EXEMPLAIRE No *X/82/6*

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PRECEDENCE ACTION	PRECEDENCE INFO	DATE-TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY	PRIORITY	201410Z	NATO WIDE

FROM: CHAIRMAN, MBFR WORKING GROUP

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AS REQUIRED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP AT THEIR MEETING ON 11 MARCH THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A DRAFT REPORT COVERING THE MEASURES IN C-M(73)83(FINAL) PARA 30(I)-(VI). IT SUPERSEDES AC/276-WP(74)7 AS AMENDED BY SITCEN 0705 DTGR 07 1545Z MARCH (74) AND SITCEN 0801 DTGR 08 1500Z. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TUESDAY MARCH 26.

SECURITY CLASS	NATO SECRET
ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER	2002
WORK STAMP	DOCUMENT EN PRÊT, A RENVoyer AU BUREAU I. 24 EXT. 2473

TEXT BEGINS:

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INTERNAL DISTR.

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~~NATO SECRET~~DRAFTMBFR - EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE STABILISING MEASURES  
LISTED AT PARA 30 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL)

At the request(1) of the Senior Political Committee, the MBFR Working Group have examined the possible stabilising measures listed in paragraph 30 of "The Alliance Approach to Negotiations on MBFR"(2), with the aim of providing advice on the military/technical implications, including the assessment of the effects of reciprocal application, of those measures.

2. The Working Group's examination has been based primarily on relevant technical and military studies(3) and has taken full account of contributions by the German, Turkish(4) and United Kingdom representatives.

Scope of this Paper

3. This paper addresses the first six measures listed at para 30 of C-M(73)83(Final). For ease of reference, these are listed below:

- a. Measure 1. Possible provisions for the disbandment of Soviet withdrawn forces without replacement from the Soviet Strategic Reserve.
- b. Measure 2. Possible provisions to put into reserve the Soviet withdrawn forces.
- c. Measure 3. Provisions to prevent the Soviet withdrawn forces to be deployed to the three Western Military, the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasian, and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts, as well as to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.
- d. Measure 4. Pre-reduction stabilising measures in the Area comprising the Soviet military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia

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- (1) AC/119-R(74)12
  - (2) C-M(73)83(Final)
  - (3) See AC/276-WP(72)3
  - (4) a. Turkish Delegation Note of 19 Feb 74  
b. Turkish Perm Rep letter of 11 Jan 74

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as well as Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. These measures would apply only to external NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces and to Soviet ground forces which may move into the aforementioned military districts.

e. Measure 5. Stabilising Measures for certain parts of the Leningrad Military District and for Norwegian territory.

f. Measure 6. Other stabilising measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

4. These measures fall into three distinct categories:

a. The first two deal with disbandment or placing in reserve of withdrawn forces.

b. The third, fourth and fifth are concerned with measures to prevent deployment of Soviet withdrawn forces to specified areas. Such an outcome could be achieved by various means, notably by clauses within an MBFR agreement or by application of constraints on movement of forces to the territories specified. In view of the content of para c. below, it has been assumed that these three measures envisage the application of movement constraints.

c. <sup>6</sup>Measure ~~5~~ postulates other stabilising measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

5. The succeeding paragraphs of this paper address the military/technical implications of these three groups of measures, in the order listed.

#### DISBANDMENT OR PLACEMENT IN RESERVE

6. This section addresses Measures 1 and 2 of C-M(73)83(Final), paragraph 30, i.e. those concerned with disbandment or placing in reserve of withdrawn Soviet forces. In view of the fact that these two measures are capable of different interpretations, the Staff Group believe it necessary to explain the approach they have adopted, thus:

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a. The measure at paragraph 2(a) (disbandment) is taken to mean that the Soviet units and formations withdrawn from the reduction area would cease to exist as formed units in peacetime, even as cadre or skeleton named units. The effect would be to reduce the Soviet peacetime establishment of formed military units;

b. The measure at paragraph 2(b) (possible provision to put in reserve the Soviet withdrawn forces) is interpreted to mean that the Soviet units withdrawn could remain in being as cadre or skeleton formations with minimal peacetime manning and, at most, training on a periodic pattern for short periods.

7. It is recognised that these measures could ~~also~~ <sup>more restrictively</sup> be interpreted to mean that:

a. For disbandment. After disbandment of withdrawn units and formations, the personnel who had manned these units and formations would be demobilised and ~~x~~ put into ~~x~~ civilian status.

b. For placement in Reserve. After placement of units and formations in reserve status (see 6b. above), the personnel who had manned these units and formations would ~~fall~~ be disposed as follows:

(i) A cadre to provide the peacetime nucleus of the reserve units, say not more than the 25% manning currently estimated for Category III Soviet divisions in peacetime.

(ii) The remaining personnel (75%+) would be demobilised and transferred to the Soviet manpower reserve.

<sup>more restrictive</sup> These/interpretations would result in a de facto ceiling on ground force manpower in the Soviet Union. This goes beyond the principal objectives of MBFR, which aims at a balanced outcome that will ensure undiminished security for all ~~x~~ members of the Alliance at a lower level of forces in Central Europe. √To pursue in that context a ceiling on Soviet ground

forces in Soviet territory could be militarily [dangerous] [disadvantageous] for NATO. [It could blur the real issue of the negotiations]: and could expand the geographic focus of the negotiations beyond Central Europe.]

8. The Working Group have therefore concentrated on the interpretations at para 6 above.

The Effect of the Measures Applied Unilaterally to Soviet Forces

9. The practical effect of the two measures, in the context of the approach at paragraph 6 would be broadly similar in military terms. The first would, however, effectively impose an upper limit, in Soviet territory, on the number of peacetime Soviet units/formations of the type withdrawn from the reduction area/ and is therefore more restrictive. The second measure (placing in reserve) would enable the Soviets to retain the units/formations in being as peacetime skeletons, capable of being fully equipped and manned in war and, in peacetime, of being trained. When withdrawn Soviet forces are put into reserve status, reactivation can be achieved in a few weeks because the skeletons of the original combat ready formations still exist. In case of disbandment reactivation would take much longer and might indeed not ~~even~~ even be considered by the Russians. In neither case would the Soviet manpower ceiling within Soviet territory necessarily be affected; personnel of the withdrawn formations/units, whether these formations/units were disbanded or placed in reserve status, could be absorbed, to the extent required by manning shortages or other factors, into other Soviet peacetime formations or units.

10. The net effect of either measure, in terms of military capability, would be to reduce the number of ready, standing Soviet formations/units in peacetime. There would be a reduction, in the early days of <sup>build-up</sup> ~~xxx~~, of the number of units/formations which the Soviets could bring to bear in combat. It has been pointed out, however, that the personnel of the disbanded units/formations might be used to increase the degree of readiness of other Soviet ground formations: and that such an improvement in readiness would mitigate if not neutralise the effect of the disbandment. SHAPE has ~~(x)~~ estimated(1) that it would take six days, in such circumstances,

(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S64/73, 19 Jul 73

for the Soviets to re-introduce five divisions (four tank, one MRD) into Central Europe from the three Western Military Districts.

11. In the same context (the Assessment of the "US Approach to MBFR") SHAPE has made the point that:

"(1) The conflict of interest between the flanks and Central Region is based on the assumption that withdrawn Soviet forces ~~were~~ will be kept on active duty in an area from which they threaten one of the regions of Allied Command Europe. Therefore, the security interests of all regions of ACE could best be safeguarded if conditions envisaged for Pact stationed forces withdrawn under Option 3 (of "US Approach to MBFR") were extended to those withdrawn under Options 1 and 2 (units to be disbanded and equipment stockpiled)."

The study also points out that:

"NATO security is diminished if, in an emergency, NATO withdrawn forces return to the theater later than Pact forces withdrawn under the same agreement. Thus, undiminished security is determined by two factors: status and redeployment capability of Pact forces and status and redeployment capability of NATO forces."

12. Furthermore, the net effect of these measures must be considered against the background verified in all the studies and analyses conducted by NATO and individual Allied Nations, that the Soviet peacetime superiority, force levels, and readiness, are such that the Soviets would not need to bring to bear all their available conventional armoured forces in war, either in Central Europe or on the flanks, to be assured of success in attack as/ <sup>long as the</sup> Allied response were restricted to conventionally armed forces. In all the computer-assisted war-gamed analyses of conventional campaigns conducted to date, the indications have been that the Soviets would on the Central Front achieve a breakthrough

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(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S64/73, 19 Jul 73, para 36  
para 37

of force withdrawal of the Allied FEBA by committing, at most, 54 divisions. If these indications are accepted, disbandment or placing in reserve of the withdrawn Soviet formations/units on the scale envisaged in Phase I of the Allied proposals would have no substantial effect on the outcome of a conventional phase in the early days of a war.]

13. Studies of the implications of MBFR in Central Europe for the Flanks of NATO have indicated that, on the flanks as in Central Europe, the Soviet forces available in peacetime are sufficient, without reinforcement in peacetime, to press the first stages of conventional aggression. Additional reinforcements could be brought up from the Soviet Union as necessary after initiation of the first Soviet thrust on the FEBA.

14. It remains true that any decrease in combat strengths of Soviet standing forces would enhance NATO's military posture, vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact in peacetime. The Turkish Authorities have argued cogently, in a letter by the Turkish Permanent Representative dated 11 Jan 74, and subsequently in discussion, that the Allies could make an excellent case for unilateral Soviet action. The Working Group believe that the Turkish case, in the context, is sound.

15. Essentially, there would be advantage for NATO if disbandment or reduction to reserve status of the withdrawn Soviet forces could be achieved on a unilateral basis. The advantage must be weighed against the effects of possible reciprocal demands. The implications of reciprocity are discussed below.

#### Possible Reciprocity

16. The crux of the issue is that the benefits achieved must be weighed against the disadvantages which would occur if, in seeking disbandment or placement in reserve of Soviet forces, the Allies were to be exposed to reciprocal measures.

17. Demands for direct reciprocal action, if made, would involve Canada, UK and US forces (US only in the first envisaged phase of MBFR).

These forces must rely for their initial reaction in an emergency upon active (regular) units, supplemented in the case of the UK by territorial reserves at immediate readiness. Therefore the ultimate impact of reciprocal actions - disbandment or reduction to reserve of units/formations - would reduce the capability of those forces to react in an emergency. While it is for the nations concerned to assess the precise implications of such a measure, it is believed that the effect would be to limit the scale on which those nations could respond to an emergency within NATO, whether in Central Europe or on the flanks. The importance of such delay would be enhanced, post reductions, partly because, the potential physical threat being undiminished, NATO will be more than ever dependent on effective mobilisation and partly because the NATO standing ready forces indigenous to continental Europe will have been reduced. The credibility and effectiveness of NATO's conventional response would both be diminished.

#### Conclusion

18. In respect of these first two measures, the Working Group conclude that:

- a. There would be advantage for the Allies if either the Soviet withdrawn forces were disbanded or placed in reserve.
- b. The advantage would be lessened to some extent if the Soviets used the personnel of the withdrawn units to raise the manning and readiness of other Soviet peacetime units/formations.
- c. Reciprocal application of these two measures to NATO (CA, UK, US) forces would be to NATO's disadvantage.

#### MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS AND OTHER MEASURES

19. The succeeding paragraphs address Measures (iii) to (vi) inclusive of C-M(73)83(Final), as listed at para 3 above.

#### Measure 3

20. The objective in measure 3 (i.e. the prevention of deployment



of Soviet withdrawn forces to military districts contiguous or adjacent to NATO territory) could be achieved by:

- a. Disbandment or placing in reserve the withdrawn Soviet forces.
- b. Applying movement constraints which would prohibit the permanent introduction of additional combat units into the prescribed military districts; and which for temporary increases would limit the scale of such increase and would provide for prior or simultaneous notification of movement of any significant military formation below the prescribed scale.
- c. By having a provision in an agreement under which the Soviets would undertake not to deploy withdrawn forces into the military districts listed.
- d. By concluding a non-circumvention agreement under which the Soviets would undertake not to relocate other forces than withdrawn forces in the military districts listed.

SHAPE in the context of the disposal of withdrawn forces have drawn attention to the requirement for collateral measures with a preference for a force limitation agreement covering the 3 WMDs.

21. Illustrative movement constraints have been considered which, if applied to the Soviet forces, would effectively meet the requirements of para 20b. The detail of such measures is summarised in an MBFR working group paper of 26 Feb 74(1) and those details are not further examined here. Movement constraints on this pattern, if applied to Soviet forces, would effectively constrain the Soviets from increasing the current level of forces on a permanent basis within the Military Districts listed; they would involve the removal of the forces withdrawn from the reduction area to Central Russia and/or the Military Districts East of the Urals. They would not impose or imply a ceiling on Soviet forces on Soviet territory.

(1) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/S64/73 dated 19 Jul 73

(2) AC/276-WP(74)8

22. Movement constraints are technically feasible and if applied  
 Soviet forces only would have a military advantage for NATO of broadly the same  
 character as described for disbandment of the Soviet forces in paragraphs 9,  
 12 and 13 above. In IMSWM-266-72 the MC agreed that "the proposed constraints,  
 although useful, will not affect Warsaw Pact or NATO capability in emergency  
 and war. Care should be taken to ensure that the effect of the constraints,  
 in security terms, is not overvalued. Their usefulness is, and will remain  
 restricted to the benefits claimed for them ..... and this is marginal in  
 military terms". However, as part of a package including reductions and  
 verification and other stabilising measures, they would have a cumulative  
 value.

Overt inspection to cover the very wide area concerned, to be effective, would require a very high number of inspectors and associated reporting staff. Verification of Soviet adherence to the movement constraints under review would presumably have to rely primarily on clandestine and national technical means.

23. Soviet counter proposals for reciprocal application of movement constraints could include the following:

a. The application of similar constraints on the territory of NATO nations contiguous to the Soviet Union and/or NSWP countries.

b. Pressure to apply similar constraints to the US, and possibly the Canadian and UK forces:

(i) in their own territories.

(ii) in territories and waters from which their capability could be brought to bear on WP territory.

(iii) to restrain them from effective reinforcement of any part of the area of Allied Command Europe.

24. The Norwegian Authorities have indicated that they would be prepared to accept certain movement constraints for their own forces in Norwegian territory provided that these were also applied to Soviet forces facing them (see AC/276-WP(74)8). Because of the relatively low level of Norwegian ground forces in Northern Norway, any such movement constraints - to be effective - would have to be set at a lower level than would be applicable in other areas of ACE. With regard to the southern flanks of NATO, the nations of the Southern Region will not accept reciprocal application of movement constraints within their respective territories;

and the other nations of NATO have undertaken to support their decision(1). In view of the foregoing decisions, the question of considering the reciprocal application of such measures in the territory of individual NATO nations is not discussed in this note. The issue devolves therefore to the military and technical implications of reciprocal constraints which the Soviet Union might seek under paragraph 23b. above. The effect of such efforts by the Soviets would be an extension of certain aspects of MBFR into forces and areas which have not been examined within the Alliance, and which would fall outside the scope of both the agreed Alliance ~~approach~~ approach to negotiations(1) and the forces and areas to be addressed in MBFR.]

25. Reciprocal application of movement constraints envisaged could:

- a. Seriously limit the freedom of movement of Canadian, UK and US forces at sea and in areas outside Europe in normal peacetime.
- b. Prevent or inhibit response to any emergency or request for assistance both in Central Europe and on the flanks.

26. It is the view of the Staff Group that such reciprocal application would not be tolerable militarily to NATO. The risk entailed by opening these subjects for discussion is a matter for political judgment. Again, the arguments leading to this conclusion are essentially those applied in section 1 of this paper.

Measure 4 (Pre-Reduction Stabilising Measures in certain Soviet Military Districts and in Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece etc. to External Forces).

27. The comments made in the preceding paragraph in relation to the possible movement constraints on Canadian, UK and US forces apply with equal force to this measure.

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(1) C-M(73)83(Final)

NATO SECRETMeasure 5.

28. Stabilising Measures for certain parts of the Leningrad MD etc. This has already been subject to comment in para 24 above.

Measure 6

29. Other stabilising measures etc. The measure at para 20c. taken entirely alone would not legally nor morally prevent the Soviets from deploying forces, other than those withdrawn, to the areas facing the flanks or to the three WMDs. It would not be verifiable in any reasonable time-scale.

30. The measures could, however, be combined with a non-circumvention agreement, which would include an undertaking by the Soviets not to deploy any additional forces to the areas facing the flanks or to the three WMDs. Taken together with these two measures, if honoured, would have the same effect as the movement constraints discussed above. The verification problem would be of broadly the same character as that discussed for movement constraints.

31. It is unlikely that NATO would have difficulty with a reciprocal arrangement which, within or in conjunction with a non-circumvention agreement, specified that withdrawn forces should not be deployed into specified areas in peacetime, provided that the specified areas were land territories in Europe, and therefore within the general context of MBFR. It is believed that NATO nations would not wish either to circumvent an MBFR agreement nor to reinforce such areas in the normal conditions in which an MBFR agreement would be valid. It is recognised, however, that such a <sup>non-circumvention</sup> arrangement could inhibit the deployment of the ACE Mobile Force to the specified areas, which factor merits careful consideration.

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NATO SECRETSUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS32. a. Measures (i) and (ii) (para 18)

(1) There would be advantage for the Allies if either the Soviet withdrawn forces were disbanded or placed in reserve.

(2) The advantage would be lessened to the extent that the Soviets might use the personnel of the withdrawn units to raise the manning and readiness of other Soviet peacetime units/formations.

(3) Reciprocal application of these two measures to NATO (CA, UK, US) forces would be to NATO's disadvantage.

b. Measure (iii)

(1) Movement constraints, if applied to Soviet forces only would have a military advantage for NATO (para 22).

(2) Norway would be prepared to accept certain movement constraints for her own forces, the nations of the Southern Region will not accept reciprocal application (para 24).

(3) Reciprocity affecting Canadian, UK and US forces would not be tolerable (para 26).

c. Measure (iv). Reciprocity affecting Canadian, UK and US forces would not be tolerable (para 27).

d. Measure (v). Reciprocity for certain parts of the Leningrad MD would be acceptable (paras 24 and 28).

e. Measure (vi)

(1) It is unlikely that NATO would have difficulty with a reciprocal arrangement which, within or in conjunction with a non-circumvention agreement, specified that withdrawn forces should not be deployed into specified areas in peacetime, provided that the specified areas were land territories in Europe, and therefore within<sup>+</sup> the general context of MBFR (para 31).

(2) A non-circumvention agreement might inhibit the deployment of the ACE mobile force, (para 31).

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