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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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18th December, 1978

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AD HOC GROUP ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PORTUGAL AND TURKEY

TEXT OF THE PRESENTATION GIVEN BY THE TURKISH  
DELEGATION ON 14TH DECEMBER, 1978

Note by the Secretary

I have been asked by the Chairman to circulate the attached text of the briefing given by Brig.Gen. S. Esengun to the Ad Hoc Group at its meeting on 14th December, 1978.

2. Due to special circumstances, the information contained in this document has been made available by the Turkish Authorities on the strict condition that its circulation is limited and subject to special handling procedures by Delegations, national authorities, the NATO Military Authorities and the various branches of the International Staff directly concerned with Military Assistance to Turkey. For this reason this document is being addressed to the Defence Counsellors personally who are asked to satisfy themselves as to its handling and further distribution. The distribution list is given on page 2.

(Signed) C. PAOLINI

NATO,  
1110 Brussels.

This document consists of: 43 pages

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BRIEFING TO  
THE AD HOC GROUP  
FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
TO PORTUGAL AND TURKEY  
14th December 1978

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Mr. Chairman,

The Turkish authorities have warmly welcomed your invitation to brief the Ad-Hoc Group on our military requirements.

I am most privileged to be here with my team today on this occasion. However, the picture which I shall portray today is not to be so cheerful as can be expected. It goes without saying that many of you are already aware of the severe economic and military problems of Turkey.

The briefing (VIO-1) consists of an overview of Turkey's strategic position, her NATO role and the corresponding Warsaw Pact threat, the Turkish defence efforts, economic situation, the requirements, the effects on the lifting of the embargo, and recommendations.

I. TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION :

Strategic importance of Turkey has been emphasized up to now in several NATO documents. The most recent one is the "Appreciation of the military situation as it will affect NATO through 1986". It points out "Turkey is of immense strategic importance to NATO".

Indeed, Turkey has a unique geographical position and thus plays an important part in NATO. She physically separates the Soviet Union from the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

In terms of territorial dimension; Turkey is the largest member of NATO Europe, sharing a common border of nearly 1.000 km with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria and having over 1.000 km of coastline opposite the Soviet Union on the Soviet-dominated Black Sea. This covers the largest common border between a NATO member and the Warsaw Pact.

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(VIO-2A) Turkey blocks the sea route from the Black Sea and the most direct air routes from Southern Russia to the Mediterranean.

Turkey is also an obstacle for the Soviet Union to reach the Middle East oil resources.

The further assets that she provides to NATO are the strike bases and surveillance facilities covering the Soviet heartland.

## II. THE THREAT AGAINST TURKEY

The threat to Turkey posed by the Warsaw Pact is, of course, formidable.

The ground threat is shown on the chart (VIO-3). This consists of 24 mechanized, 4 armoured and 2 airborne divisions plus 3 armoured, 1 airborne, 1 helicopter assault brigades, 1 airborne regiment, 2 amphibious assault regiments and 3 amphibious assault battalions.

Up to 18 of these divisions can be expected to move from Bulgaria into Turkish Thrace while the rest could be committed against the Eastern border.

Two airborne divisions and 2 brigades could be committed in either direction to influence the battle.

The 340 ships present a strong amphibious threat in the Black Sea against the Turkish Straits.

As for the air threat, it consists of 1000 medium bombers and strike/attack aircraft.

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The objectives of Warsaw Pact against Turkey could be summarized as follows : (VIO-3A)

- To seize and control the Turkish straits in order to obtain free access to the Mediterranean for its large Black Sea fleet.
- To neutralize the Turkish armed forces so as to secure its operations against the Middle East oil resources.
- To occupy Turkey for their subsequent operations in the Mediterranean to envelop NATO Europe from the South.

This is an agreed NATO assessment regarding the Soviet aims against the South-Eastern flank.

For the last several years a considerable effort by the Soviet Union has gone into improving and expanding her capabilities on both flanks, a development which demonstrates her intentions . . .

I can not help protracting the threat portion of this presentation, since it constitutes the key element to determine the required military force, and the Soviet build-up is a source of concern.

The fall of Afghanistan and the internal conflict in Iran now sound the alarm for NATO.

Let me quote some excerpts from an interesting study which was published by the university of Edinburgh entitled "The Soviet Options and the Southern Flank": "Though the frontal thrust in the central Europe may offer certain advantages, the build-up on the flanks promises to facilitate the deep envelopment of NATO, a process made more realistic with the rapid expansion of Soviet air power".

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..... "The Soviet effort must be concentrated upon the rapid occupation of Thrace and the Turkish Straits in order to gain access in the Aegean. To the East, an attack on Eastern Turkey would be the first step in building the land bridge to Syria and Iraq".....  
"On closer inspection, Soviet options in the Southern Region appear not to be options but -favourable choices - at all. The Soviet command has no choice but to attempt to "get" the US sixth fleet, for a variety of compelling reasons". The study concludes that NATO would have to look closely and continuously at its Southern flank.

I believe, any delay in this respect would worsen the situation in the Southern Region.

III. THE OBJECTIVES FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES :

The broad NATO objectives for the Turkish Armed Forces are as shown on the charts :

1. LAND FORCES (VIO)-4

- a. To defend the Turkish Thrace and Straits, which is one of the most critical area of NATO.
- b. To defend Eastern Turkey and prevent Soviet forces from reaching the Middle East and the Mediterranean through Turkey.

2. THE NAVAL FORCES (VIO)-5

- a. To control the Turkish Straits, thereby keep the Soviet Navy in the Black Sea,

.../...

thus prevent it from reinforcing the Thrace.

- b. To support land operations in the Thrace.
- c. To protect and control the sea lines of communications.
- d. To keep waterways open to friendly forces and engage the Soviet navy in order to ensure maritime superiority in coastal areas.

3. THE AIR FORCE : (VIO) -6

To ensure the security and integrity of the Turkish Armed Forces by carrying out offensive and defensive air operations.

IV. DEFENCE EFFORTS :

Now, I would like to touch upon Turkey's efforts for the collective defence of the Alliance.

Presently, Turkey commits the following forces to NATO :

1. LAND FORCES (VIO) -7

a. ASSIGNED

15 Divisions

17 Brigades plus I regiment

b. OTHER FORCES FOR NATO

1 Division

3 Brigades plus I regiment

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The total is 16 divisions, 20 brigades and 2 regiments.

2. NAVAL FORCES (VIO) -8

OTHER FORCES FOR NATO

- 21 Destroyers (DD/DE/PC)
- 15 Submarines (SS)
- 19 Fast patrol boats (FPB/FPBG)
- 6 Helicopters (ASW)
- 9 Mine layers
- 21 Mine sweepers
- 13 Maritime patrol aircraft

3. AIR FORCES (VIO) -9

NATO COMMAND AND ASSIGNED

- 16 Tactical fighter squadrons
- 3 Transport squadrons
- 8 Sam squadrons
- 23 Helicopters

4. Although she is a less prosperous member of the Alliance, Turkey has, for long, continued to sustain these forces in order to meet all NATO military commitments, and endeavoured to upgrade them qualitatively through national resources and external aid.

However, from the outset of the 1970's, the external aid gradually decreased, then, came the embargo. These developments have hampered the modernization efforts, as well as the sustaining of existing forces.

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It is sad to note that the comprehensive requirement list which was handed to the members of the Ad-Hoc Group is the result of accumulating deficiencies over the past years.

Turkey, for many years, has allocated to her defence needs more than 5% of her gross domestic product. In addition to this, for the periods 1974/1975 and 1979/80, the Turkish government has earmarked an extra 37.2 billion T.L. which adds to the already heavy financial burden for defence.

Just to give a general idea about the defence effort, I would like to quote some figures :

The defence budget of 1976 was 28% of the entire state budget.

In 1977, it was 22.3%.

These figures, I believe, demonstrate the sincere Turkish efforts for the security needs of the Alliance.

This might have continued in the coming years, but, the economy has deteriorated and this makes it more and more difficult to support defence efforts at the present level. Although programmed earlier, we are, nowadays, unable to purchase modern weaponry and equipment due to foreign exchange shortages. Therefore, Turkey expects an Alliance-wide approach to handle this situation, if the common threat outlined earlier is considered serious and solidarity indispensable.

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V. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION :

Now, a brief look at the present economic situation :

Although the Turkish economy, with an annual growth rate of 7%, has considerably developed in the last decade, Turkey still remains a less prosperous member of the Alliance with a per capita gross domestic product of little over 1.000 US. dollars, compared with an average of 4900 US. dollars for the European members of the Alliance.

The deficit in the balance of payments is gradually widening. This was 2.3 billion US. dollars in 1976. It further increased in 1977 to 3.4 billion dollars. The main reason for this is the decrease in foreign currency inflow. Purchases of military materials from abroad also aggravated it.

We are concerned that 1979 might develop into a more bleak economic picture.

As the Foreign Minister of Turkey expressed in the Council meeting if the expected assistance is not extended, both as to its ~~timeliness~~ and to its level, our industrial production, operating at present at only 45% of its capacity, shall threateningly fall further and come to a standstill. Our export promotion efforts shall be jeopardized, inflationary trends shall become unmanageable, and unemployment shall increase to an unmanageable level, and this with the most undesirable social and political consequences.

It goes without saying that Turkey's exceptional defence efforts have also been an important factor adversely affecting the economy.

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VI. THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES FOR THE PERIOD 1979-83 :

1. The requirements for this period have been addressed in the NATO Force Plan. Therefore, I shall not repeat them here.

The estimated cost of these requirements, with the 1976 prices, amounts to 4.5 billion U.S. dollars. 1.5 billion dollars of this total are planned to be met by national resources, and the equivalent amount of Turkish liras has been earmarked. However, it seems that foreign currency shortages would hamper the armed forces' procurement programmes. For this reason, we are trying to make use of foreign credit facilities such as the US foreign military sales and the German Hermes credits to realise projects which are to be accomplished through national resources.

If we deduct the 1.5 billion dollars, there remains 3 billion dollars. According to the NATO Force Plan this entails allied assistance. The largest portion in this amount will be absorbed by the modern type aircraft of 5 squadrons.

The needs which require allied assistance are as follows :

- Land Forces (VIO-10)
- Naval Forces (VIO-11)
- Air Force (VIO-12) and (VIO-12A)

These requirements reflect important deficiencies which have accumulated over the past years.

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How and to what extent would these be met by the allied countries and what approach is to be adopted ?

It is up to this Group to determine the ways and the means. But it occurs to me that there may be three options which are not ~~exha~~exhaustive. The first one is a NATO common funding approach. If such a course is adopted, the provision of 600 million dollars per year would be required during this planning period. Secondly ; material aid could help eliminate the existing shortfalls and deficiencies in acquiring modern weaponry and equipment. In this case, the provision of second generation major items of equipment to be phased out from the inventories could be considered as an alternative. Should this approach be adopted, the total cost of 3 billion dollars will considerably decrease. We have so far received some positive reactions from certain allies. Further positive steps could bring practical solutions to our most urgent requirements.

The third approach could be a combination of financial and material aid.

2. Even if the alternatives mentioned are implemented; the shortfalls of spare parts and tools, would still exist in the three services, which are of vital importance for maintaining the existing forces. The related list which was distributed last May has now been reviewed and updated and a good number of items have been deleted. The Turkish Delegation will inform you of the changes later on. I would like to stress that, as far as the overall priority is concerned, the spare parts and tools have the first priority in all deficiencies. Next comes the following :

LAND FORCES (VIO)-13

The inventory of the land forces presents

.../...

numerous and serious deficiencies. Moreover, the available equipment are quite obsolete. These are indispensable requirements to bring the forces up to agreed NATO standards. We could list them in order of priority under these broad headings :

1. Communications and Electronic Warfare Equipment
2. Ammunition Stocks
3. Air Defence
4. Armour and Anti-Armour
5. NBC Equipment
6. Artillery and Fire Direction Equipment
7. Various Wheeled Vehicles
8. Engineering Equipment particularly Bridging Equipment
9. Helicopters

In the 1978 DPQ replies of various nations it has been noted that certain equipment will be replaced, such as : (VIO-14)

- CH-47 C Helicopters
- 105, 155 MM Howitzers (Towed or Self-Propelled)
- APC
- Various wheeled vehicles

It is believed that some of the deficiencies which I mentioned earlier in broad terms can be remedied by the equipment which nations plan to replace but which are still technically serviceable.

If nations can establish a definite list comprising the types and quantities of these equipment, the matter could then be further discussed on a bilateral basis.

As for the Naval Forces (VIO)-15 ; the destroyers, destroyer escorts and submarines which are shown on the chart are of World War II generation and were provided

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by the US. They are old and should be phased out.

Now the Air Force (VIO)-16: The attrition replacement aircraft are depicted on the chart. These are badly needed to fill up the existing squadrons.

VII. THE EFFECTS OF THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES

- a. Upon removal of the embargo on the 26th of September 1978; part of the grant-aid of 85 million dollars, which had been planned to be given during the years 1970-1974, was received. The rest is expected to be delivered in 1979. The equipment so far released are as follows :

(1) LAND FORCES (VIO)-17

- Radio sets
- Tow launchers (30) and mounting kit
- Law, anti-tank missile (17723)
- Voltmeter and similar measuring equipment
- OH-58 B helicopter (3)
- Fire direction set
- M 106 A 1 self-propelled howitzer (3)
- M 113 A 1 APC (44)
- Spare parts for various army vehicles and weapons.
- Training aids and publication

(2) NAVAL FORCES (VIO)-18

- Spare parts for ships and aircraft,
- MK-37 torpedoes.

.../...

(3) AIR FORCE (VIO)-19

- SAM modification kits
- Aircraft spare parts
- Radio sets

b. The 175 million dollars worth of equipment which are planned to be procured through US. FMS credits in 1979 are as follows :

(1) LAND FORCES (VIO)-20

- Spare parts for M-48 tanks
- Purchase of some ammunition
- Communication equipment and spare parts

(2) NAVAL FORCES (VIO)-21

- Spare parts for ships
- Procurement of ammunition
- Procurement of harpoon G/M
- Spare parts for some weapon systems
- Equipment necessary for modernization of ships
- Payment for the overhaul of some ships

(3) AIR FORCE (VIO)-22

- 111 million dollars (Payment for F-4E aircraft)
- Spare parts for aircraft

c. You will appreciate that these are far from being sufficient to meet the substantial requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces.

VIII. WHAT WE ARE EXPECTING FROM OUR ALLIES IN THIS PERIOD OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY

As I attempted to indicate in my previous

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remarks, the present financial constraints frustrate Turkish Armed Forces to continue making foreign purchase which take almost 80% of the total procurement programme. If such a situation goes on, the defence capability would further be depleted. It is believed that only a common practical approach could cope with the defence problems of Turkey. To this end, our proposals are as follows :

1. Firstly; strictly limited foreign exchange resources obviates the allocation of necessary funds for the acquisition of modern weaponry, other arms, equipment, certain spare parts and tools to maintain the existing forces. Therefore, first and foremost, grant-aid and loans are most desirable. However, we are open to consider other approaches. For instance, our Allies could supply to Turkey the materials listed in part VI of this briefing at symbolic prices, or on a long term credit basis with nominal (LOW) prices. As is known, United States and Germany extend defence support to Turkey in this manner.
2. Secondly; our Allies could also extend credits and technology to Turkey in order to enable us to improve and develop our defence industry, so that we can procure those items within the country. Furthermore, certain schemes encouraging joint production and procurement within the Alliance, would greatly alleviate the effects of difficult economic situation.
3. Lastly; we propose that those un-sophisticated Turkish products shown on the chart (VI0-23)

.../..

be purchased by our allies so that we would be able, at least to a certain extent, to finance our most urgent requirements.

IX. CONCLUSION

Thus, I have very briefly reviewed Turkey's role within the Alliance and her defence requirements.

Turkey believes that she is making an important contribution to the collective defence with her large Armed Forces as well as with her geo-strategic position.

It must be recognized that, with its present critical economic problems Turkey cannot shoulder such a heavy burden. Therefore, an alliance-wide approach ought to be formulated for the elimination of deficiencies so that Turkey can meet and maintain her NATO military commitments.

Before closing my remarks, I would like to express our gratitude to the United States and Germany for their support to our defence efforts and I am also most obliged to those countries who <sup>have</sup> already expressed their favourable intentions to take a common step for solving the problems outlined in this presentation.


This concludes the briefing.

VIO-1

OUTLINE OF THE BRIEFING

- I . TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION
- II . THE THREAT
- III . NATO ROLE OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES
- IV . DEFENCE EFFORTS
- V . ECONOMIC SITUATION
- VI . THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
- VII . THE OUTCOME OF THE EMBARGO
- VIII . RECOMMENDATIONS
- IX . SUMMARY

VIO-2A



USSR

RUMANIA

BLACK SEA

TURKEY


SYRIA

IRAN

IRAQ

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VIO-3A

THE OBJECTIVES OF WARSAW PACT AGAINST TURKEY

- TO SEIZE AND CONTROL TURKISH STRAITS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN FREE ACCESS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR ITS LARGE BLACK SEA FLEET.
- TO NEUTRALIZE THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES SO AS TO SECURE ITS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MIDDLE EAST OIL RESOURCES.
- TO OCCUPY TURKEY FOR THEIR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ENVELOP NATO EUROPE FROM THE SOUTH.

N A T O   S E C R E T

LAND FORCES

1. TO DEFEND THE TURKISH THRACE AND STRAITS WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL AREA OF NATO
2. TO DEFEND THE EASTERN TURKEY AND PREVENT SOVIET FORCES FROM REACHING THE MIDDLE-EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH TURKEY

NAVAL FORCES

- 1 . TO CONTROL THE TURKISH STRAITS THEREBY KEEP THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE BLACK SEA, THUS PREVENT IT FROM REINFORCING THE SOVMEDRON .
- 2 . TO SUPPORT LAND OPERATIONS IN THE THRACE
- 3 . TO PROTECT AND CONTROL THE SEA LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.
- 4 . TO KEEP PORTS AND WATERWAYS OPEN TO FRIENDLY FORCES AND ENGAGE THE SOVIET NAVY IN ORDER TO ENSURE MARITIME SUPERIORITY IN COASTAL AREA .

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A I R   F O R C E S

TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY  
OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES BY CARRIYING  
OUT OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE AIR  
OPERATIONS .

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LAND FORCES

ASSIGNED

UNIT / TYPE	QUANTITY
DIVISION	15
BRIGADE	17
REGIMENT	1

OTHER FORCES

UNIT / TYPE	QUANTITY
DIVISION	1
BRIGADE	3
REGIMENT	1

TOTAL

UNIT / TYPE	QUANTITY
DIVISION	16
BRIGADE	20
REGIMENT	2

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VIO-8

NAVAL FORCES  
(OTHER FORCES)

UNIT TYPE	QUANTITY
DESTROYER (DD/DE/PC)	21
SUBMARINE (SS)	15
FAST PATROL BOAT (FPB/FPBG)	19
HELICOPTER (ASw)	6
MINELAYER	9
MINE SWEEPER	21
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (MPA)	13

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VI0-9

A I R   F O R C E S

UNIT / TYPE	QUANTITI Y
FBA AND IDF SQUADRONS	16
TR SQUADRONS	3
SAM SQUADRONS	8
HELICOPTER	23

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VIO-10

## LAND FORCES REQUIREMENTS

NO.	T Y P E	QUANTITY
1	TOW WEAPON SYSTEM	290
2	MILAN WEAPON SYSTEM	438
3	MAN PORTABLE AIR DEFENCE MISSILE SYSTEM	180
4	LOW LEVEL IMPROVED HAWK TYPE SAM (FOR 2 BNS)	72
5	HELICOPTER (GENERAL PURPOSE)	70
6	NIGHT FIGHTING AIDS (FOR SELECTED COMBAT VEHICLES AND SMALL ARMS)	739
7	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS (FOR GUN AND MORTARS)	170
8	CRITICAL AMMUNITION STOCKS (TO UPGRADE TOW, MILAN, COBRA, LAW AND H/J MUNITIONS TO 25 COMBAT DAYS AS INDICATED IN 1979-1984 FORCE GOALS - TU EL 27)	-

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# NAVAL FORCES REQUIREMENTS

NO.	T Y P E	Q U A N T I T Y
1	DESTROYER (DD)	5
2	DESTROYER ESCORT (DE)	1
3	SUBMARINE (SS)	12
4	GUIDED MISSILE FAST PATROL BOAT (FPEG)	1
5	MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (MPA)	12
6	HELICOPTER (ASW/ASM)	10
7	LANDING SHIP DOCK TANK (LSD/LST)	6
8	MINE LAYER COASTAL (MLC)	1
9	MINE SWEEPER	3
10	SHORE TO SHIP GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM	6
11	WAR RESERVE STOCKS	-

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## TURKISH AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS

NO	TYPE	QUANTITY
1	MODERN TYPE FBA/AWX AIRCRAFT (F-100 REPLACEMENT)	36
2	RF-4E AIRCRAFT (RF-5 REPLACEMENT)	12
3	MODERN TYPE FBA/AWX AIRCRAFT (3 SQN'S OF OLDER AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT)	54
4	SAM_CAP EUROPEAN CONFIGURATION MODIFICATION KITS	8
5	SHORAD MISSILE FIRING UNIT	108
6	SHORAD GUN FIRING UNIT	354
7	AIR DEFENCE IFF/SIF (MK XII MODE IV CAPABILITY)	VARIOUS
8	MODERN TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT	40
9	ESM AIRCRAFT WITH EQUIPMENT	2
10	ELECTRONIC CALIBRATION AIRCRAFT WITH EQUIPMENT	2
11	MOBILE RADAR	3
12	MOBILE TACAN	4

N A T O S E C R E T

VIO-12A

## TURKISH AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS

NO	T Y P E	Q U A N T I T Y
13	M O B I L E   G C A	5
14	C O M M U N I C A T I O N S   A N D   E L E C T R O N I C E Q U I P M E N T	V A R I O U S
15	E W _ E C C M   C A P A B I L I T Y   F O R   I F F ,   C O M M . A N D   N A V I G A T I O N   E Q U I P M E N T	
16	N B C   S E L F   P R O T E C T I O N   E Q U I P M E N T   F O R A I R C R E W	V A R I O U S
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VIO-13

1. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT
2. AMMUNITION STOCKS ETC.
3. AIR DEFENCE
4. ARMOUR AND ANTI-ARMOUR
5. NBC EQUIPMENT
6. ARTILLERY AND FIRE CONDUCT EQUIPMENT
7. VARIOUS WHEELED VEHICLES
8. ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT  
PARTICULARLY BRIDGING EQUIPMENT
9. HELICOPTERS

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VIO-14

SOME EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE PHASED OUT BY MEMBER  
COUNTRIES

- CH-47 C HELICOPTERS
- 105, 155 MM. HOWITZERS  
(TOWED OR SELF PROPELLED)
- APC
- VARIOUS WHEELED VEHICLES

N A T O   S E C R E T

VIO-15

URGENT REPLACEMENT OF TURKISH NAVY

NO	T Y P E	Q U A N T I T Y
1	DESTROYER (DD)	5
2	DESTROYER ESCORT (DE)	1
3	SUBMARINE	12
4	GUIDED MISSILE FAST PATROL BOAT (FPBG )	1

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VIO-15

-35-

-35-

VIO-16

### TURKISH AIR FORCE ATTRITION REQUIREMENTS

NO	T Y P E	QUANTITY
1	F_ 104 G	19
2	TF_ 104 G	10
3	F_ 104 S	10
4	F_ 5 A	17
5	F_ 5 B	12
6	RF_ 5 A	19
7	F_ 4 E	6
8	C_ 130 E	3
9	T_ 37 C	20
10	UH_1 H HELICOPTER	15

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VIO-17

LAND FORCES

- RADIO SETS
- TOW LAUNCHERS (30) AND MOUNTING KIT
- LAW, ANTI-TANK MISSILE (17723)
- VOLTMETRE ETC.,
- OH-58 B HELICOPTER (3)
- FIRE DIRECTION SET
- M 106 A 1 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER (3)
- M 113 A 1 APC (44)
- SPARE PARTS FOR VARIOUS ARMY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS.

VIO-18

NAVAL FORCES

- SPARE PARTS FOR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
- MK-37 TORPEDOES

AC/299-N(78)5

VIO-19

AIR FORCES

- SAM MODIFICATION KITS
- AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS
- RADIO SETS

N A T O   S E C R E T

N A T O   S E C R E T

AC/299-N(78)5

VIO-20

LAND FORCES

- SPARE PARTS FOR M-48 TANKS
- PURCHASE OF SOME AMMUNITION
- COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS

N A T O   S E C R E T



N A T O   S E C R E T

AC/299-N(78)5

VIO-21

NAVAL FORCES

- SPARE PARTS FOR SHIPS
- PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION
- PROCUREMENT OF HARPOON G/M
- SPARE PARTS FOR SOME WEAPON SYSTEMS
- EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR MODERNIZATION OF SHIPS

N A T O   S E C R E T

N A T O   S E C R E T

AC/299-N(78)5

VIO-22

AIR FORCES

- 111 MILLION DOLLARS (PAYMENT FOR F-4E AIRCRAFT)
- SPARE PARTS FOR AIRCRAFT

N A T O   S E C R E T

VIO-23

<u>ITEM NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>ANNUAL AVAILABLE QUANTITY FOR EXP.</u>
1.	7,62 MM CARTRIDGES (BALL)	5.000.000
2.	7,62 MM CARTRIDGES (4 BALL + 1 TRACER)	2.000.000
3.	.30 CAL M2 CARTRIDG.	1.000.000
4.	.30 CAL. CARTRIDGES (4 M2 + 1 M25)	1.000.000
5.	12.7 MM CARTRIDGES	2.000.000
6.	81 MM M43 MORTAR AMMO.	20.000
7.	90 MM HE GUN AMMO.	20.000
8.	90 MM HEAT AMMO.	5.000
9.	105 MM HOWITZER AMMO.	40.000
10.	4,2 " HE AMMO.	10.000
11.	120 MM RIFLED MORTAR AMMO.	10.000
12.	120 MM TAMPELLA AMMO.	20.000
13.	155 MM HOWITZER AMMO. M107 (COMPLETE ROUND)	5.000
14.	155 MM GUN AMMO. M101 (COMPLETE ROUND)	5.000
15.	8" HOWITZER AMMO (COMPLETE ROUND)	5.000
16.	G3 AUTOMATIC RIFLE (INC. 5 MAGAZINES)	7.500
17.	MG3 MACHINE GUN	1.000
18.	120 MM RIFLED MORTAR	50

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