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WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(74)8

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR FOR THE FLANKS OF NATO - STABILIZING
MEASURES INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS

Note by the Staff Group

INTRODUCTION

1. In the paper "Alliance Approach to Negotiations on MBFR"(1), the Council instructed (paragraph 30) the study of certain provisions in order to enhance the effectiveness of a reductions agreement in Central Europe and to eliminate or mitigate any increase in the threat to the flanks as a result of MBFR in the Central Region. The Senior Political Committee in their meeting on 11th February, 1974(2) encouraged the MBFR Working Group to examine in greater depth the measures in C-M(73)83(Final), paragraph 30, sub-paragraphs (i) to (vii). Those in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) and in sub-paragraph (vii) are being examined separately(3). This paper deals with measures in sub-paragraphs (iii) to (vi). These are, for case of reference:

- (a) provisions to prevent the Soviet withdrawn forces to be deployed to the three Western, the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasian, and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts as well as to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries;
- (b) pre-reduction stabilizing measures in the area comprising the Soviet military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia as well as Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. These measures would apply only to external NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces and to Soviet ground forces which may move into the afore-mentioned Soviet military districts;
- (c) stabilizing measures for certain parts of the Leningrad military district and for Norwegian territory;

This document consists of: 7 pages
Annex I of: 3 pages
Annex II of: 1 page

- (1) C-M(73)83(Final), 18th October, 1973
- (2) AC/119-R(74)16, 15th February, 1974
- (3) AC/276-WP(74)7 (to be issued), and AC/176-D(74)1

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- (d) other stabilizing measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

2. As instructed by the MBFR Working Group(1), the aim of this paper is to synthesize and summarize the material and results of previous studies, which bear directly on the measures listed at paragraph 1(a) to (d) above. The main sources of the succeeding paragraphs are:

- (a) AC/276-WP(72)27, 29th June, 1972
- (b) AC/276-D(72)4, 26th October, 1972
- (c) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), 9th August, 1973
- (d) AC/276-WP(73)16/1, 9th October, 1973
- (e) AC/276-WP(73)38, 7th November, 1973.

GENERAL

3. Any Soviet withdrawn forces could be relocated in any Military District of the USSR or non-Soviet Warsaw Pact country, provided such location were outside the Reduction Area covered by an MBFR agreement. Reasons for choosing a certain relocation could be either military or political, dependent on using such forces as (a) a part of the first echelon (e.g. in Hungary), (b) a part of the second echelon (e.g. in the 3 WMDs), (c) a part of the strategic reserve (e.g. in Moscow MD), or (d) as a political pressure (e.g. at the Chinese border).

4. To prevent the relocation of Soviet withdrawn forces in certain areas deemed unfavourable to NATO's security, or their redeployment elsewhere within the USSR to relieve other Soviet forces which could be in turn relocated in the areas unfavourable to NATO's security, the following countermeasures could be envisaged:

- (a) disbandment of the forces concerned (which measure is the subject of a separate study);
- (b) limiting the force levels in the areas concerned to their present ones or to any agreed levels;
- (c) movement constraints measures with a built-in force limitation for the area concerned(2);
- (d) a non-circumvention agreement not to relocate withdrawn forces in certain areas nor to use them to relieve other forces with the purpose to have the latter relocate in certain areas.

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- (1) AC/276-R(74)3, 22nd February, 1974
 - (2) Annex I, paragraph 4

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5. No agreement or measure mentioned above should be so framed as to inhibit the essential movements of NATO forces in times of tension within or into areas covered by such an agreement or measure.

STABILIZING MEASURES

6. The measures listed in paragraph 1(a) to (d) above are examined below, against that general background, and in turn:

Measure Paragraph 1(a): Provisions to prevent the Soviet withdrawn forces to be deployed to the three Western, the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Northern Caucasian and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts as well as to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries(1).

The Soviet withdrawn forces could be prevented, wholly or partly, from deployment to the areas listed by the following possible measures(2).

- (a) An agreement to disband the Soviet withdrawn forces or to have them placed in reserve status. (This is being studied separately.)
- (b) An agreement by the Soviets within the context of an MBFR agreement not to deploy their withdrawn forces in the areas listed.
- (c) A non-circumvention agreement by the Soviets not to relocate other forces after their replacement by withdrawn forces, in the areas listed.
- (d) Development of movement constraints which would render illegal the introduction on a permanent basis of additional combat units from outside the areas listed(3).

7. Comments: The countermeasures in paragraph 6(a) to (d) above are listed in order of simplicity in application and likewise of magnitude to NATO's security. Disbandment or putting in reserve of Soviet withdrawn forces is for NATO the most simple and secure way of solving the problem. The measures

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- (1) Annex II
 - (2) The vastness of the total territory concerned, makes a Force Limitation Agreement a non-realistic solution
 - (3) Annex I, paragraph 4

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at 6(b) and (c) must be combined to have real significance and could be breached by the Soviets with less difficulty than measure 6(a). The measure at 6(d) has great merit, but carries the inherent disadvantage of a more intensive and therefore burdensome verification-system. Furthermore, this movement constraints measure must be set in force before the withdrawal actually takes place, to be of any use.

8. Measure paragraph 1(b): Pre-reduction stabilizing measures in the area comprising the Soviet military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia as well as Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. These measures would apply only to external NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces and to Soviet ground forces which may move into the afore-mentioned Soviet military districts.

Greece shares a common land frontier with Bulgaria whose forces could be reinforced by Soviet land forces transited through Rumania from the Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev Military Districts. This problem has already been studied(1) and the outcome of this study will be used freely in this present paper.

The measures proposed are:

- (a) A Force Limitation Agreement(2) to counter possible post-MBFR redeployments on both sides, making provision for no additional NATO foreign stationed ground forces to be located permanently in Greece, provided the Warsaw Pact agrees to deploy permanently no Soviet forces in either Bulgaria or Rumania, and no additional Soviet forces to be located permanently in the military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia.
- (b) A Movement Constraints Agreement(3) in which on the Warsaw Pact side Rumania and Bulgaria are regarded as separate areas and the military districts of Odessa, Kiev and Carpathia as another (combined) area.

These constraints measures could be:

- (i) Movements of external forces within Odessa MD, Kiev MD and Carpathian MD, within Rumania, within Bulgaria and within Greece

No limitations for movements within each area.

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- (1) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), 9th August, 1973, and AC/276-WP(73)16/1, 9th October, 1973
 (2) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), paragraph 32
 (3) AC/276-WP(73)16/1, paragraph 132

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- (ii) Movements of external and Soviet forces into Odessa MD, Kiev MD and Carpathian MD, and of external forces into Rumania, into Bulgaria and into Greece

Units entering any Constraints Area from the outside should remain there only temporarily(1) or must be counterbalanced by a notified and verified withdrawal of an equivalent force.

Temporary reinforcement of:

Up to 1 Brigade/Regiment(2) - Notification at start of movement.

More than 1 up to 6 Brigades/Regiments - Notification 3 days in advance(3)

More than 6 Brigades/Regiments - Prohibited.

This means that when 1 brigade/regiment has already been introduced into the constraints area, each unit entering subsequently from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 1 brigade/regiment and ought to be notified 3 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement has already reached the amount of 6 brigades/regiments, no more units are allowed to enter the proposed areas.

- (iii) Movement of Soviet forces from Odessa MD, Kiev MD and Carpathian MD into Rumania and/or into Bulgaria. All movements prohibited

9. Comments: The measures in paragraph 8(a) and (b) above have both useful assets. The measure at paragraph 8(b) will give more guarantees for NATO's security, but will undoubtedly give more verification difficulties. There is no ascertainable advantage in seeking to apply both measures in combination in this context.

10. Measure paragraph 1(c): Stabilizing measures for certain parts of the Leningrad military district and for Norwegian territory.

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- (1) temporarily should be interpreted in this context to mean for the transitory purpose of taking part in a specific short-term training requirement, pre-planned and limited in duration, the length of which still has to be decided
- (2) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks
- (3) The number of days before entering the constraints area

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Norway, the only NATO country in the Northern Region whose territory borders the USSR, faces potential invasion from Soviet ground forces via Murmansk Oblast, Finland or Sweden. All such Soviet land forces would have to emanate from or transit through the Leningrad Military District.

Again this problem has already been studied and we will draw on the recommendations proposed in the relevant papers(1).

The measures proposed are:

- (a) A Force Limitation Agreement(2), for practical reasons limited to the Murmansk Oblast on Soviet side and the County of Finnmark on the Norwegian side.
- (b) A Movement Constraints Agreement(3) applied to the territories of the Murmansk Oblast and the County of Finnmark.

These constraints measures could be:

(i) Movements of forces within Murmansk Oblast and Finnmark

1 Brigade/Regiment(4) or more - Notification at start of movement.

(ii) Movements of forces into Murmansk Oblast and Finnmark

Units entering the Constraints Area from the outside should remain there only temporarily(5) or must be counterbalanced by a notified and verified withdrawal of an equivalent force.

Temporary reinforcement of:

Up to 1 Brigade/Regiment - Notification at start of movement.

More than 1 up to 2 Bdes/Regts - Notification 6 days in advance(6).

More than 2 Bdes/Regts - Prohibited.

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- (1) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised); AC/276-WP(73)16/1; AC/276-WP(73)38
 - (2) AC/276-WP(73)16, Chapter II, paragraph 17
 - (3) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), Chapter VI, Section 1, paragraph 117
 - (4) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks.
 - (5) Temporarily should be interpreted in this context to mean for the transitory purpose of taking part in a specific short-term training requirement, preplanned and limited in duration, the length of which still has to be decided.
 - (6) The number of days before entering the Constraints Area.

This means, than when 1 Brigade/Regiment has already been introduced into the Constraints Area, each unit entering from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 1 Brigade/Regiment and ought to be notified 6 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement has already reached the amount of 2 Brigades/Regiments, each unit entering subsequently will be regarded as a violation of the Agreement.

- (iii) Alternatively it should be possible to construe a system of more stringent movement constraints in an area approximately 100 km deep on both sides of the Norwegian-Soviet border, and to adopt the measures outlined above for the remainder of Murmansk Oblast and the County of Finnmark.

11. Comments: Either of the measures 10(a) and (b) are in no way restraining the Norwegian forces. The measure at 10(a) will cause less verification troubles.

12. Measure paragraph 1(d): Other stabilizing measures to accompany reductions, including non-circumvention provisions.

Measures proposed:

Along with any reduction agreement, other stabilizing measures could be taken to be increasing the security and diminishing the danger of misunderstanding. Such measures could be:

- (a) a calendar year schedule of preplanned exercises, with prior notification of changes to the schedule;
- (b) the exchange of observers at major exercises;
- (c) the providing of a list of transportation links and junctions;
- (d) an agreement on the locations and establishment of observation posts and check-points;
- (e) the pre-announcement of planned replacement of worn out or obsolete material and equipment;
- (f) an agreed limitation on the concentration of forces within a certain area.

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

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AC/276-WP(74)8PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS IN FIRST REPORT

1. As a guidance for the continued study and for reasons of comparison, the constraints as proposed for the NATO Guidelines Area(1) are listed below.

2. In the first report we are confronted with two sets of constraints, based on the minimum movement requirements of NATO forces in times of tension.

3. In the first set of proposed constraints, no limitation is placed on the duration of stay at their destination of units moving within the constraints area, or entering that area from outside. These constraints would deter sudden force movements by the Warsaw Pact, and could facilitate a more up-to-date and timely interpretation by NATO of Warsaw Pact movements into the constraints area. These constraints are:

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area

1 Brigade/Regiment(2) or more - notification at start of movement(3).

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area

1 up to 3 Brigades/Regiments - notification at start of movement;

More than 3 up to 7 Brigades/Regiments - notification 3 days in advance(4);

More than 7 up to 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification 8 days in advance(4);

More than 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification 30 days in advance(4);

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- (1) AC/276-D(72)4
(2) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks
(3) SACEUR had indicated that notification without advance warning (i.e. simultaneous with movement) is essential to enable him to move forces, available in the constraints area, without delay to GDP positions
(4) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area

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This means that when 3 brigades/regiments have already been introduced into the constraints area, each brigade/regiment entering subsequently from the outside will bring the total reinforcement above 3 brigades/regiments and ought to be notified 3 days in advance. Similarly, when the total reinforcement amounts to 7 brigades/regiments, each brigade/regiment entering subsequently must be notified 8 days in advance; and from 11 brigades/regiments, 30 days in advance.

4. The second set of constraints would produce the same results as the first set (paragraph 3) - in that a more current and timely interpretation by NATO of Warsaw Pact movements into the constraints area could be facilitated, and the Warsaw Pact would be deterred from sudden force movements. In addition, however, this second set of constraints would render illegal the introduction on a permanent basis of additional combat units from outside the area.

(a) Movements within the Constraints Area

1 Brigade/Regiment(1) or more - notification at start of movement(2);

(b) Movements into the Constraints Area

Units entering the constraints area from the outside should remain there only temporarily(3), or must be counterbalanced by a notified and verified withdrawal of an equivalent force.

Temporary Reinforcement of:

1 up to 3 Brigades/Regiments - notification at start of movement;

More than 3 up to 7 Brigades/Regiments - notification 3 days in advance(4);

-
- (1) Illustratively, the minimum size of a brigade or regiment is taken to be 1,500 men and/or 70 tanks
 - (2) SACEUR had indicated that notification without advance warning (i.e. simultaneous with movement) is essential to enable him to move forces, available in the constraints area, without delay to GDP positions
 - (3) Temporarily should be interpreted in this context to mean for the transitory purpose of taking part in a specific short-term training requirement, pre-planned and limited in duration. A reasonable duration would not exceed 90 days
 - (4) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area

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More than 7 up to 11 Brigades/Regiments - notification
8 days in advance(1);


More than 11 Brigades/Regiments - prohibited

The explanation at sub-paragraph 3(b) about the introduction of units into the constraints area applies equally to paragraph 4(b).

5. Constraints in which the number of brigades/regiments was increased and/or the times of advance notice were decreased would be acceptable to NATO, but not conversely. This is important if NATO is to remain capable of reinforcing the constraints area, should an increased threat develop.

(1) i.e. the number of days before entering the constraints area

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