## CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

CHIERRY BUI PRET, A RELEVOYER
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WORKING PAPER AC/276-WP(73)1/2

SUGGESTED MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS ON WP-FORCES IN ORDER
TO AVOID THE IMPLICATIONS OF MBFR ON THE
SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK

Note by the German Member of the Working Group

We welcome the Turkish(1) and the British(2) papers and regard both as useful contributions to the discussion on appropriate measures to be taken at the south-eastern flank of NATO.

- 2. We share the view expressed in the Turkish paper that any agreement on constraints at the flanks must be seen as part of the other MBFR arrangements and that thus the close interrelations between future effects on the centre and at the flanks have to be taken into consideration. The term parallelism between possible arrangements at the flanks and in the centre, elaborated in the Turkish cover note, seems to be especially suitable to us to point out these inter-relations. We think that this parallelism should be understood both in terms of time and contents and we therefore consider it an advantage as does the United Kingdom (paragraph 4 of the British paper) that the structures of the stabilizing measures in the centre and at the flanks should be kept at a comparable level.
- 3. One of the most debatable points in the Turkish paper seems to us the fact that the suggestions and criteria developed for movement constraints at the flanks cover exclusively measures for the constraint of WP forces. In the light of the undiminished Eastern objections to the term "balanced", it must be considered extremely improbable that the WP would agree to such unilateral measures. In our view, the taking into consideration of both sides would guarantee a more realistic judgement of such suggestions. The Turkish Government is therefore asked to reconsider its contribution in this way.
- 4. The individual Turkish suggestions constitute rather drastic constraints in terms of quantity and time (coupled with mobilization constraints) with an extensive scope of application.

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- 5. Although the military usefulness of measures suggested in terms of content and area can hardly be doubted, it seems to be worth considering:
  - because of the lack of reciprocity of measures suggested,
  - because of the fact that extensive parts of the Soviet territory would be affected,
  - and also in view of the recommended uniformity of arrangements in Central Europe and at the flanks,

whether - as a first step - less drastic constraints could be envisaged which would primarily aim at confidence-building obtaining greater transparency and a possibly longer warning time. Such measures would not only be easier to accept by the other side but would also be more compatible with the degree of freedom of movement necessary for NATO forces.

- 6. We share the view of the United Kingdom (paragraphs 3 and 5 of the British paper) that it is too early to discuss force limitation arrangements as well as movement constraints and quantitative and qualitative limitation of the air forces at the flanks (paragraph 3(b) of the Turkish paper). On the other hand, it seems indispensable to us to deal with the verification problems arising in connection with the measures suggested.
- 7. The Turkish paper does not include Rumania and Bulgaria in the area of application of possible constraints. The question of their inclusion should also be studied.
- 8. We would welcome if the Turkish contribution after thorough discussion in the MBFR Working Group would be referred to the Sub-Group on Movement-Constraints for further revision and inclusion in the second Constraints paper being prepared by this Sub-Group. We share the view of the United Kingdom that the paper being so discussed might furnish valuable information for the decision on the terms of reference for the further work of the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints.

NATO, 1110 Brussels.