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ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE GDR

Note by the Chairman

The attached paper was prepared by the Economic Directorate following the experts' meeting on 1st and 2nd July, 1976, based on discussions at the meeting and on contributions by the Canadian and German Delegations. The report evaluates the 1971-1975 Plan together with a review of main Plan indicators for 1976-1980.

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RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE GDR

I. THE 1971-1975 RESULTS

A. GENERAL

1 The GDR, the most developed member of COMECON occupying tenth place in world industrial output, managed to fulfill the bulk of its quantitative targets with high growth years in 1972 and 1974. Targets had been revised downwards after the GDR's economic problems of the late 1960s: nevertheless, substantial results were achieved especially in chemicals and the energy sector, where a limited raw material base has encouraged large investments for developing the coal and electrical energy sectors.

2. Per capita consumption is the highest in the Warsaw Pact and the current stability of prices may change if the Authorities fail to contain production costs and hold the growth in demand to the expected increase in output. Nevertheless, despite continuing structural weaknesses, the GDR ended the year overall as the most prosperous East European country, drawing steadily ahead of the other COMECON members and showing little sign of slowing down.

B. SECTORAL OVERVIEW

3. National Income: Over the last five-year period, the Net Material Product increased some 5.4% on average per year (Plan: 4.9%). The per capita National Product of the GDR is the highest in COMECON (approximately $3,000) with no indication that it will decline over the next Plan period.

4. Capital Investment: The GDR Central Statistical Administration reported that overall gross fixed investment increased on average at some 3.6% (Plan: 3%) which compares very unfavourably with the previous Plan period when it averaged some 9.9% annually(1).

5. Industry: Aggregate industrial output rose 6.4% annually (Plan: 6%) with greater attention paid to the electrical engineering, electronics and chemical sectors: a high growth rate was attained in the output of artificial fibres (some 113,000 tons) and in artificial fertilizers (557,000 tons). Higher productivity accounted for 85-90% of the total industrial increase.

(1) This sharp drop was due primarily to problems arising from incomplete large-scale investments

6. The main focus was directed at the development of the country's raw materials industries. Large investments were made in the last Plan period in exploiting both brown coal and potassium resources and new electric power plants with a total capacity of 1,320 MW were completed, including the GDR's largest plant in Boxberg (capacity: 630 MW).

7. The GDR depends almost entirely on imported crude oil, most of which (1975: 15 million tons) is supplied from the USSR. However, it seems to be broadly self-sufficient in refining capacity. Refinery throughput increased from 11.3 million tons in 1970 to 17 million tons in 1975 and work is in hand to further develop the processing capacity of refineries in Schwedt, Leuna and Zeiz.

8. Output of natural gas started on a relatively large scale in the early 1970s, but has proved rather disappointing so far. In 1975, aggregate output exceed 8 billion m^3 (Plan: 11.5-14 billion m^3), and it would appear that there is no chance of a further substantial increase. Supplementary gas supplies are now coming from the USSR and reached some 3 billion m^3 last year.

9. In view of the serious labour shortage in the GDR, higher labour productivity and more efficient allocation of manpower remained the only way for the Authorities to boost industrial output in the last Plan period. The number of people of working age decreased continuously from 1950, until the beginning of the 1970s even relatively more than the total population figure. At present there are 70 persons of non-working age (retired people, children) for every 100 people of working age; in 1970 - at the peak of this development - this number was even 73. Every fifth inhabitant of the GDR today is at the age of retirement - no other country has such a high proportion of retired people. However, there are indications of improvement. While the birth rate will probably remain low, relatively strong age groups are joining the working population. At the same time, age groups relatively low in numbers will reach the age of retirement.

10. Consumer: Wages rose some 27% over the last Plan period and the main problem in this sector for the GDR Authorities was to stem consumer demand and keep it in line with the growth of light industry output and concurrently ensuring the stability of price levels. With its high dependence on imported raw materials and fuels, the East German economy has become increasingly vulnerable to the effects of the steep rise in world prices for consumer items over the last 2-3 years. Nevertheless, despite extensive increases, effective from 1st January 1976, in industrial delivery prices for raw materials and certain raw-material intensive products, these higher costs are not being passed on to the consumer.

11. Official policy in the last Plan period continued to favour massive State subsidies for most categories of consumer goods and services, but not including certain "luxury" items such as petrol, cars, television sets, washing machines, coffee and chocolate. Increased productivity is being demanded from the enterprises in order to help meet the shortages in certain categories of consumer goods, but it remains to be seen how long the government can continue to maintain the stability of consumer price levels via massive subsidies.

12. Agriculture: Agriculture in the GDR accounts for about 10% of the Net Material Product and employs a similar fraction of the labour force. The proportions reflect the high level of industrialization of the economy rather than the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector. East German agriculture has been fully collectivized since 1960 and agricultural policy has been aimed at increasing output through the application of industrial methods and greater intensification. Great advances have been made, but the country is not self-sufficient in food and will not be in the foreseeable future.

13. Due to rising incomes, meat consumption is growing at about 2% per year. The GDR became self-sufficient in livestock products (meat, milk and eggs) during 1966-1970, but it must import a large proportion of the grain and protein meal needed to feed the animals, and over a million tons of wheat annually in most recent years and considerable quantities of other foodstuffs. At the end of 1975 agricultural products made up 28% of the GDR's imports with livestock feed the largest category.

14. Great efforts are being made to increase the production of food from domestic resources, but there are a number of constraints. The area of agricultural land cannot be expanded, thus an increase in the area of any crop must be at the expense of one or more others. The agricultural labour force is declining: GDR officials reckon that in 1974, each agricultural worker had to provide food for 30 people, and will have to feed 34-35 people by 1980, which connotes the highest level of agricultural productivity in COMECON (a US farm worker feeds 46 people, and a Soviet one only seven). The amount of agricultural land per person is low: one hectare for 2.6 persons, compared with fewer than two persons per hectare in other CMEA countries.

15. The GDR's dependence on imported grain is also expected to continue, although the amount imported should stabilize at about present levels. Imports of wheat usually amount to between one and 1.5 million metric tons per year, coming chiefly from the Soviet Union although Australia and the United States have also supplied significant amounts recently.

Since the poor harvest results of 1975 (7.9 million tons, i.e. below previous average of 8.4 million tons for 1971-1974), the GDR has purchased 2.9 million tons of grain (1.7 million tons of fodder grain) mostly in the USA at an estimated value of almost $400 million. Overall grain imports will presumably amount to about 3.5 million tons by October 1976. The relatively high levels of grain purchases reflect the above-mentioned shortfall in the GDR's own harvest resulting from a summer-long drought, but also the need to build up stocks and satisfy greater livestock requirements.

16. Foreign Trade: Foreign trade sector plays a very important role in the GDR's economy, accounting for 30% of national income. This great reliance on foreign trade is due mostly to the GDR's lack of natural resources: the GDR is almost totally dependent on imports of fuel and raw materials.

17. Trade with the West: GDR trade with the industrial West has grown steadily. In 1974 it accounted for about 27% of the GDR's total volume of foreign trade, and about 31% of value. Between 1971-1974 the value of trade increased by 93% while the value of imports grew even faster - by 99%. Exports grew by 67% in that period. The growth rates expressed in value to some extent mask the real growth as increases in prices contribute to higher value of trade. This is particularly true in the case of the GDR's imports where in general increases in prices of imports outstripped those of exports. According to East German sources, in 1975 the trade volume grew by 4%(1), and it developed particularly with France, Sweden, Finland, West Germany and the United States. Imports are predominately high technology goods and quite vital to the GDR's economic growth, which imposes a certain economic dependency on trade with the industrial West.

18. Intra-German Trade: West Germany accounts for about 33% of GDR imports from the industrial West, and about 10% of total imports. Two very important features of intra-German trade provide the GDR with unique advantages. The GDR's exports to West Germany are exempt from Common Market external tariffs, which substantially increases the competitiveness of GDR exports. More important, intra-German trade is conducted by means of a clearing account, on bilateral bases, with provision by West Germany of an overdraft allowance, the so-called "swing" credit. This means that the GDR saves the expenditure of scarce hard-currency and is automatically provided with what amounts to a long-term interest free credit.

(1) Complete statistical data for 1975 are not available

19. The GDR's indebtedness to the industrial West at the year end 1975 amounted to about $4 billion, of which some $900 million is owed to West Germany. This makes the GDR a major debtor, only surpassed by the Soviet Union and Poland. However, this debt is not considered to be beyond the GDR's ability to finance. The debt service ratio (debt service as a percentage of exports) vis-à-vis NATO countries was only 9.6% in 1974, the lowest of all CMEA countries' except Czechoslovakia which also had a 9.6% debt ratio. The debt service ratio for 1975 is estimated to be about 15%, while Poland has almost reached 25% and the USSR and Romania are estimated at around 20%.

20. There was a slowdown in intra-German trade in 1975 (+7.2% as against +22% in 1974), due mainly to considerable reduction of imports from West Germany in the last quarter as compared with the first nine months. The restraint on the GDR's part reflects its reluctance to let the deficit become even larger. So far, the GDR's attempt to close the trade gap has failed. In 1975 the GDR's trade deficit amounted to DM. 638 million - $244 million.

Trade with COMECON

21. The USSR is by far the most important trading partner, accounting for about 32% of the GDR's total foreign trade, 33% of exports and 30% of imports. The favourable balance of trade existing since 1971 was reversed in 1974 (-$53 million as against e.g. +$359 million in 1973). The importance of trade is not confined to its volume; it has also strategic importance. A great volume of the GDR's demand for fuel and raw materials is met by the USSR. The USSR supplies 100% of the GDR's need of natural gas, almost 100% of petroleum and iron ore, more than 70% of rolling steel aluminium, and more than 90% of lumber and cotton. The USSR is also an important market for the GDR's exports as 25% of Soviet imports of machinery and equipment is from the GDR.

22. In principle, GDR foreign trade is first of all a vehicle of foreign policy. This principle is reflected in preponderance of trade with socialist countries, to a greater extent than for other CMEA countries. GDR trade with socialist countries accounts for 70% of total volume. In 1974 the volume increased by 11% and in 1975 by 7% (15% in value).

II. THE 1976-1980 PLAN

C. GENERAL ASSESSMENT

23. Three general themes run through the current Five-Year Plan. They are (i) a more efficient utilization of energy and raw materials, (ii) an improvement in labour productivity, and (iii) a major improvement in the export potential of the GDR.

All three themes are interrelated and reflect the GDR plan for improving its overall economic performance. Data so far available indicate, nevertheless, a slight slowdown in the overall growth rate until 1980.

D. SECTORAL OVERVIEW

24. National Income: National income is to be increased by 27-30% by 1980 compared to the previous Plan, which corresponds to an average growth of 4.9-5.4% per year.

25. Industry: Industrial production is to be increased by 34-36% and the growth rate of industrial productivity for the overall period is given as 30-32%. The highest growth in the industrial sector is scheduled for electrical engineering and electronics, though the 55% increase is less than the target for 1971-1975.

26. A stable raw material supply is especially important to the GDR chemical/petrochemical industry, one of the sectors marked for particular expansion in the Five-Year Plan. The production of plastics is to be increased to 910-930 kilotons by 1980, primarily through increased production of high and low-pressure polyethylene and polyurethanes. The manufacture of synthetic fibre materials is to be raised from 113 kilotons in 1975 to 135-140 in 1980, mainly through optimization of existing capacities of the Premnitz and Guben Synthetic Fibre Works.

27. The Plan also calls for the introduction of the most advanced processes and methods of automation. For example, the metal processing industry stresses development in continuous casting techniques, aluminium die casting, extrusion moulding, cross rolling, powder metallurgy, and new separation procedures. As a result of the development of such technology and processes, the GDR hopes to increase industrial goods production by 36-38% and industrial productivity by 30-32% during the period 1976-1980.

28. Chemicals: The production of chemical fertilizers is also singled out for particular emphasis in the Plan. The production of nitrogen is to be raised from 557 kilotons to 910-925 kilotons by 1980 at the Pieteritz Fertilizer Combine, while phosphate production is to be increased from 461 kilotons to 510 kilotons.

29. To assure the supply of raw materials to the chemical industry, as well as motor fuels and lubricants to the national economy in general, refinery capacity is to increase from 17 million tons to between 22.5 and 23 million tons by 1980. Of

particular mention in the Plan is the planned expansion of the ethylene facility at Boehlen. All this will require further technological advances in the field of oil refining and petrochemical processing.

30. Energy: The more efficient use of energy and raw materials has become crucial to the GDR in the light of the higher prices that it must pay for raw material imports from the Soviet Union, particularly for petroleum, natural gas, hard coal and iron ore. In order to pay these higher prices, the GDR will have to earmark a greater share of both its industrial and consumer goods to the USSR and thus limit the extent of future trade expansion with the industrialised West. In an attempt to counter this problem, the GDR is increasing investments in energy production and transmission facilities.

31. A key to the improvement in energy output by 1980 will be the completion of the investment projects planned for the Hagenwerder and Boxberg brown coal power plants, the Bruno Leuschner nuclear power plant and the Markersbach plant.

32. Similarly, the GDR is calling for the increased utilization of domestic natural resources and the recycling of waste products. The planned goal of increasing the proportion of domestic raw materials in production will necessitate a substantial expansion of the extractive capacities of the GDR. Specifically, the Plan projects that by 1980 the domestic economy will furnish 250-254 million tons of lignite coal, another 45-47 million tons of lignite briquettes, 7.8-8.2 billion cubic metres of natural gas (i.e. natural gas production would seem to be levelling off), and 5.8-6.0 billion metres of town gas.

33. Labour: The GDR is also suffering from the problems associated with a declining birth rate. To solve its labour shortage the GDR is presently employing foreign labour on its farms and in its factories, although still on a small scale, but economists in the country realise this is only a short-term solution. A more permanent solution, as recognized in the Plan, is to increase industrial productivity through the increased utilization of labour-saving processes and technology. Indeed, the Plan states that the utilization of scientific-technological advances must account for 60-70% of the planned increase in productivity and a saving of between 220 and 280 million working hours annually in industry and construction.

34. Consumption is to grow by 21-23% and the retail turnover by 20-22% (1971-1975: 28%). Wages will rise 21-23% (1971-1975: +27%) in line with the growth of consumer goods, and the Party has pledged that prices will remain fixed as they have for the past 20 years.

35. Agriculture: As in the raw materials sector, in agriculture the accent is on economies. The animal population is not to be increased in order to save costly fodder imports; on the other hand, farmers must increase meat and milk yields by large margins over the current period. Most effort will go into growing more grain to reduce imports which have increased substantially.

36. In order to make the best possible use of the available land, the East Germans have concentrated on growing crops with a high feed value. The areas sown to grain and sugarbeets and also to oilseeds, have expanded, principally at the expense of meadow and pasture. Areas of potatoes and legumes have also declined. The expansion of sugarbeet acreage is partly a response to the high price of sugar on world markets in 1974, but the pulp remaining after processing is also a useful animal feed. Among the grain crops there has been a shift away from rye and spring wheat to winter wheat and barley, which give higher yields. The principal oil crop is rapeseed. About 75% of all agricultural land is arable and on the remaining meadow land such high-protein crops as clover and alfalfa are favoured.

37. Grain output per hectare reached 35.9 quintals in 1975, putting the GDR in first place among the socialist countries. The 1976-1980 Plan calls for increasing this output to 48 quintals per hectare in 1980. Although this figure seems high, in view of the rapidly developing mechanization and chemicalization of GDR agriculture, the planned target could well be attained.

38. It is intended eventually to put livestock raising on an industrial footing, with very large units containing 2,000 milking cows or up to 500,000 hens. A few such complexes already exist, although typical units are much smaller. Recently an agricultural official admitted that, even being generous in the definition of "industrialized", only about 20% of steer production, 12% of pig production and the milking of 9% of cows could be so described. This change in methods will become increasingly necessary as the agricultural labour force continues to decline, but is not expected to be achieved before 1980.

39. Foreign Trade: With the recession in the West and the sharp increase in raw material prices, the GDR has witnessed a marked deterioration in its trade balance. As a result, the GDR has become a major borrower in the world money markets. Once again the GDR will seek a solution to this particular problem through introduction of advanced equipment and technology in order to make the cost and quality of GDR goods competitive in the West. In this connection, the current Plan recognizes the need for GDR enterprises to meet international requirements with respect to sales organization, service facilities and spare parts.

40. There is no doubt that the GDR's need for credits will continue and it is believed that like most other COMECON member countries, the emphasis will be more on credits not tied to any particular project. This means a very active participation on Euro-currency market. In 1976 the GDR has already raised a $175 million medium-term loan on the Euromarket. It will carry an interest rate of 1.375 points above LIBOR (London Eurodollar interbank deposit offered rate). This rate is the same that the GDR was charged in 1975, indicating that the GDR's credit rating has not changed. This development appears contrary to predictions of many Western bankers who foresaw an increase in charges on future loans to the GDR.

41. The GDR may also turn to a new source of credit funds. The Arab oil producing countries have begun to extend a few direct credits to some of the COMECON member countries and their participation in the Euromarket may open a new source of credits. It is also expected that the GDR will make an extensive effort to sell heavy industrial goods and technical equipment to the Arab countries. If successful, this may earn hard currency, although most of it probably would be used up in payments for oil.

42. In view of the existence of its sizeable debt there is no doubt that the GDR will make an even greater effort to conduct a balanced trade. This will mean that imports from the industrial West will be made conditional to a greater extent on GDR exports. Curtailment of exports, whether due to pressures of intra-COMECON prices introduced in 1975 or primarily to unreceptive markets in the industrial West, is bound to affect imports. It seems likely that growth of GDR trade with the industrial West will slow down. However, imports from the industrial West of sophisticated technology are crucial to the GDR economy, as without them the GDR cannot hope to maintain its position as the COMECON workshop or to fulfil the relatively ambitious 1976-1980 Plan.

43. The realignment of prices within COMECON has reportedly had a serious adverse effect on the GDR's terms of trade. No precise data have been published by the East German Authorities, but West German experts suggest that the increased revenues from GDR exports - primarily manufactured goods - cover only around two-thirds of the higher cost of Soviet raw materials. This implies that more production will have to be channelled towards the USSR to pay the Soviet fuel bill, which has apparently trebled in the last two years. The real impact of higher energy costs and the high GDR dependence on the Soviet Union for energy raw materials will become much clearer during the current Plan period, and underscores the GDR's dilemma of having to earmark a greater share of its increased production for the USSR, whilst concurrently needing to make more goods available for export to the West.

44. Additionally, the GDR will plough a higher percentage of investments into the USSR in the current Plan period. Compared with the approximate $800 million in the last Plan - less than 1.5% of aggregate GDR investments - it will spend up to 3% of its total investments by 1980. The GDR will profit from this financial input as new raw material resources will thus become available.

E. CONCLUSIONS

45. The GDR faces, consequently, a number of serious problems over the next five years: there will be little growth in the labour force and limited possibility for reducing further the share of manpower needed by agriculture. Therefore, any major increase in output must derive from improved productivity. A second problem remains that of the GDR's capacity to generate the large exports to the West needed to service debts and pay for grain and/or technology imports. Nevertheless, the GDR is the strongest industrial power in Eastern Europe and counts on the high standards of its manufacturing sector plus its special economic relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany to allow it to absorb adverse foreign trade developments without too great a deceleration in growth.

TABLE 1

GDR: SELECTED PLAN INDICATORS

	1966-1970	1971-1975 (Plan)	1971-1975	1976-1980
Net Material Product	5.2	4.9	5.4	4.9-5.4
Gross Industrial Output	6.5	6.0	6.4	6.0-6.4
Industrial Labour Productivity	6.1	6.2	5.3	5.4-5.7
Gross Farm Output	1.9	2.4	2.7	4.7
Capital Investment	8.7	3.0	3.6	5.2-5.8
Retail Turnover	4.6	4.1	5.1	3.7-4.1
Foreign Trade Turn-over	9.9	8.0	13.2	9.7

TABLE 2

PLAN INDICATORS 1975-1976

(% increase)

	1975	1976
National income	5.5	5.3
Industrial goods production	6.3	6.0
Labour productivity in industry	5.6	5.5
Gross fixed investment	4.4	6.5
Gross industrial investment	4.6	8.7
Retail turnover	4.6	4.0
Foreign trade: total	9.1	9.7
Net income of population	4.6	4.0
Agricultural production	2.4	1.4

TABLE 3

IMPORTS OF CEREALS

(1000 m.t.)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Cereals	3339	2816	3820	3175	n.a.
Wheat	2084	1867	2040	1594	1219
Barley	799	187	675	298 F	104
Corn	376	656	1031	1086	1328
Rice	29.8	44.0	43.5	51.4	51.1

F - FAO estimate

Source: GDR Handbook 1975

TABLE 4

GDR: TRADE WITH INDUSTRIAL WEST(1)
(VM millions and US $ millions)

Year	Exports VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change	Imports VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change	Turnover VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change
1971	4,495.0	1,070.2	1,070.2	6.7	5,772.5	1,374.4	1,374.4	6.0	10,267.5	2,444.6	2,444.6	6.3
1972	5,014.0	1,193.8	1,295.6	11.5	7,034.7	1,674.9	1,817.8	21.9	12,048.7	2,868.7	3,113.4	17.3
1973	6,006.1	1,430.0	1,725.9	19.8	8,898.0	2,118.6	2,556.9	26.5	14,904.1	3,548.6	4,282.8	23.7
1974	8,328.1	1,982.9	2,322.8	38.7	11,462.6	2,729.2	3,210.8	28.8	19,790.7	4,712.1	5,543.6	32.8

Trade Balance VM	Trade Balance $(2)	Trade Balance $(3)	% of Total Exports	% of Total Imports	% of Total Turnover
-1,277.5	-304.2	-304.2	21.1	27.6	24.3
-2,020.7	-481.1	-522.1	21.0	30.8	25.8
-2,891.9	-688.5	-831.0	22.9	32.6	27.9
-3,134.5	-746.3	-878.0	27.4	34.2	30.9

Source: 1975 Statistical Yearbook for GDR (Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin 1975)

(1) According to GDR statistics: all capitalist countries of Western Europe, as well as Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand and the United States

(2) Using exchange rate of 4.2 VM = $1 for comparison with other years

(3) Using current exchange rates; 1972: 3.87 VM = $1; 1973: 3.48 VM = $1; 1974: 3.57 VM = $1

TABLE 5

GDR: TRADE WITH WEST GERMANY

(DM millions - US $ millions)

Year	Exports DM	$(1)	% Change	Imports DM	$(1)	% Change	Turnover DM	$(1)	% Change	Trade Balance DM	Trade Balance $(1)
1973	2,656	1,022		3,106	1,160		5,672	2,182		-360	-138
1974	3,240	1,246	22.0	3,679	1,415	22.0	6,919	2,661	22.0	-439	-169
1975	3,400(2)	1,308	4.9	3,900	1,500	6.0	7,300	2,808	5.5	-500	-192
	3,390(3)		4.6	4,028		9.4	7,418		7.2	-638	

Source: West German Chamber for Industry and Commerce

(1) Using exchange rate of 2.6 DM (Deutsche Mark) = $1

(2) Figures announced by West German Statistical Bureau

(3) Figures announced by the GDR Statistical Bureau

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TABLE 6

GDR: TRADE WITH CMEA(1)

(VM millions and US $ millions)

Year	Exports VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change	Imports VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change	Turnover VM	$(2)	$(3)	% Change
1971	14,776.3	3,518.2	3,518.2	11.9	13,625.7	3,244.2	3,244.2	1.3	28,402.0	6,762.4	6,762.4	6.5
1972	17,195.2	4,094.1	4,443.2	16.4	14,547.3	3,463.6	3,759.0	6.8	31,742.5	7,557.7	8,202.2	11.8
1973	18,320.0	4,361.9	5,264.4	6.5	16,969.9	4,040.5	4,876.4	16.7	35,289.9	8,402.4	10,140.8	11.2
1974	19,739.2	4,699.8	5,529.2	7.7	19,323.6	4,600.9	5,412.8	13.9	39,062.8	9,300.7	10,942.0	10.7

Trade Balance			% of Total		
VM	$(2)	$(3)	Exports	Imports	Turnover
+1,150.6	274.0	274.0	69.3	65.1	67.2
+2,647.9	630.5	684.2	71.9	63.7	67.9
+1,350.1	321.5	388.0	70.0	62.1	66.0
+ 415.6	99.0	116.4	64.8	57.6	61.0

Source: 1975 Statistical Yearbook of GDR (Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin 1975)

(1) According to definition of GDR includes: Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Hungary

(2) Using exchange rate of 4.2 VM = $1 for comparison with previous years

(3) Using current exchange rates: 1972: 3.87 VM = $1; 1973: 3.48 VM = $1; 1974: 3.57 VM = $1