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COMMITTEE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS

TRENDS IN THE SOVIET BLOC SATELLITE STATES

Draft Working Paper by the United States Delegation

A. FACTUAL REVIEW

General

1. The apparent stability of the Soviet bloc satellite states was seriously shaken by developments within the bloc during the course of 1956. The immediate cause was the denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, which undermined the authority and prestige of the satellite régimes, all of which had been installed under Stalin and employed his methods. A second major cause of the flare-up in the satellites was the factionalism and pressure for reform which had gathered strength within the satellite communist parties, especially in Poland and Hungary, and in certain intellectual and governing circles. Tito's apparent success in obtaining Soviet acquiescence to his independent course was another cause. Basic to these immediate factors, however, was the pent-up resentment of the Eastern European peoples themselves against Soviet enslavement and the local Communists who governed in the Soviet interest. Events in Poland and Hungary demonstrated that popular hostility to the régimes is widespread and that young people, who have known little but Communist rule, are the most vehement in their rejection of the system. Economic grievances, particularly among industrial workers and city dwellers, have also kept hostility alive.

2. In dealing with resistance in Poland and Hungary, Moscow has shown that it is not willing to retreat from the fundamental precepts of Communist monopoly dictatorships in the bloc countries and acceptance by these régimes of military alliance with the USSR. Within this framework, Communist policy in the satellites has shown two related trends: an easing in economic matters and a tightening in the political sphere. On the economic side, most of the satellite régimes have indicated that, like the USSR, they are planning to reduce investments and to shift emphasis to a limited extent toward the production of consumer goods. The intention of the satellite planners appears to be to stress a more rapid, even if only modest, improvement in the living standard than originally envisaged in an effort to forestall increased discontent. On the political side, there is no sign of a comparable appeasement policy. Indeed, the satellites are increasingly emphasizing the need for vigilance against anti-régime elements, reaffirming continuation of the class struggle, and showing determination to prevent the growth of what the Czech Communists call a "climate of demands" - criticism and pressure for reforms such as preceded the Polish and Hungarian upheavals.

3. The USSR, in an effort to isolate Yugoslavia ideologically and to restrict the liberalizing influence of the Gomulka régime

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in Poland, has called for a tightening of ideological unity among the satellite states and has fostered renewed acknowledgements of Moscow's supremacy on the part of the satellites (with the exception, of course, of Poland). Several recent Soviet-satellite meetings have been directed at these ends, notably the five-state conclave in Budapest (January 1-14) attended by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria (Poland and Yugoslavia being conspicuously absent). The communiqué on this meeting sanctioned Soviet action in Hungary and called for increased cohesion of the socialist camp and vigilance against the West. Similar resolutions were subsequently adopted by the East Germans and Albanians. Communiqués issued after the visits of the East Germans, the Czechs and the Bulgarians to Moscow also stressed the necessity for unity of the socialist camp. Chou En Lai's mission to Poland and Hungary represented still another attempt to enhance bloc unity, to shore up the Kadar régime and to reduce Gomulka's influence in the bloc.

4. Moscow has continued to emphasize, particularly in its declaration of October 30, the necessity of dealing on the basis of "equality" between states in the Soviet bloc, and while the Soviet attitude toward Tito's deviation and the brutal crushing of Hungary's revolt indicate clearly that this policy has limitations, it appears that the present Soviet leaders intend to avoid, whenever possible, a return to the more blatantly coercive methods of ruling the satellites practised in Stalin's time. Less insistence on adulation of all things Soviet, a more realistic and flexible economic policy and certain concessions to local nationalisms are all factors in the post-Stalin approach to the satellites. At the same time, while Stalinist extremes are avoided, a tactic of firm repression of liberal trends is followed, and pro-Soviet leaders are supported. In the last analysis, Moscow is determined not to relinquish control of these countries, and its demonstrated readiness to intervene with overwhelming military force is its ultimate and most important weapon of control over the region. This is probably the single most significant factor inhibiting moves toward greater independence in the satellite countries, although it is not certain that even this deterrent will be sufficient in all instances to prevent new outbreaks of trouble.

Poland

5. Poland has gone the farthest of all the satellite countries in enunciating and implementing a policy of independence and equality vis-à-vis the USSR. After the dramatic Central Committee Plenum of October 19-21 at which Gomulka, despite Soviet misgivings, was installed as Party First Secretary in order to save the régime, the Poles dropped Marshall Rokossovsky as head of the armed forces and on November 18 signed agreements with Moscow limiting the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, cancelling Polish debts to the USSR, securing large Soviet credits, and providing for repatriation of thousands of Poles still held in the USSR. An extensive release of political prisoners took place, press censorship was relaxed and jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was substantially reduced. Open sympathy was expressed in official media for Tito's side of the ideological dispute with Moscow, and Polish ideologists criticized the dogmatic and "Stalinist" positions of the other satellite régimes. Under Gomulka, major concessions have been made to the Roman Catholic church, a wider rôle has been promised to non-communists, and expanded economic and cultural relations with the West have eagerly been sought.

6. Poland's economic situation continues to be extremely precarious. As outlined by Gomulka, the causes are (a) inadequacy

of the domestic raw materials base, (b) excessive wage scales in relation to available goods, (c) failure to meet production goals, especially in coal, and (d) an unfavourable balance in Poland's foreign trade. Despite the inflationary hazard, the government has granted more wage increases, apparently hoping to stimulate greater productivity. Investment in heavy industries has been cut substantially, while outlays in industries supplying the domestic consumer market have been increased. Broad agricultural reforms have been instituted, including elimination of compulsory grain deliveries from small farms and reductions of deliveries from all others, higher prices for delivered grain, and tax concessions to farmers. Collectivized farms have practically ceased to exist, although the government is now attempting to encourage farmers to engage in some form of "cooperative" but non-compulsory farm organization. While the government hopes that agricultural production will rise through these concessions in time, farm output is down in comparison with previous years. Poland looks to the West for assistance in obtaining such items as grains, cottons, fats, coal mining machinery, but must tread carefully in testing how far the USSR will permit it to go in its association with the West. Although Poland hopes to pay for imports through coal exports, its prospects of being able to do so do not appear bright in view of the fact that its coal production is declining and its goal for 1957 is 93 million tons, or 2.2 million less than achieved in 1956.

7. Despite Gomulka's success in the January elections, when the régime achieved the election - under procedures permitting some slight choice to the voters but which were still heavily rigged in favour of the Communists - or virtually the full slate of its "preferred" candidates, the régime's stability is dubious, particularly in view of the serious economic difficulties with which it is confronted and the fact that most of the Party apparatus remains in the hands of pre-October functionaries. Even some of the most unpromising Stalinists, although no longer in the Politburo, still occupy influential positions in the Party. Gomulka's adherents claim, moreover, that anti-Stalinism has been adopted by these elements as a political instrument in their campaign to regain power. Gomulka, with his strengthened position resulting from the elections, may be able to purge the Party of oppositionists during the course of 1957. Even so, he will remain in a position in which he is caught between popular pressures demanding more and more independence from the USSR and the increasingly strong pressures from the Soviet side in the direction of closer adherence to the "socialist camp" and communist orthodoxy as interpreted in Moscow.

Hungary

8. The Kadar régime has lately displayed increased confidence in its ability to gain a firm grip on the sullen Hungarian population through a broader and more intense application of terror. All demands on which the popular uprising in 1956 was based have been ignored and a systematic removal of focal points for opposition through mass arrests, summary executions, and other repressive acts indicates that the door has been closed to substantive concessions indefinitely. A new police force under the Ministry of the Interior has been organized, revolutionary leaders have been executed, strikes have been forbidden, and all Party formations outside of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) Party have disintegrated.

9. The Hungarian economy operates on a hand-to-mouth basis. The régime's principal concern is with the danger of

inflation, which is an imminent possibility as a result of a drop in consumers' supplies and a rise in money in circulation stemming from wage increases, tax reductions, and abolition of compulsory farm deliveries. Well over 50 percent of the collective farms have been disbanded, despite the régime's active efforts to pursue the goal of collectivization, and the country's agriculture is in a chaotic state. However, the general freedom given to farmers to sell their products in the free market has resulted in a fair supply of food being available in the cities. Coal production, key to Hungary's economy, increased considerably in January owing to the return of many labourers to the mines. Productivity remained low, however. Recovery is extremely slow in other sectors, including oil, aluminum, metallurgical, machine and chemical industries. The lag in chemicals will deprive agriculture of urgently needed artificial fertilizer and will require increased exports. Hungary has stressed the country's dependence on foreign loans and credits for a prolonged period. It has already received about \$150 million in loans and credits from the Soviet bloc (including China) and is seeking more from other countries. It is probable that Hungary will be an economic liability for some time to come to the Soviet bloc. The exodus of significant numbers of expert technicians and skilled workers from Hungary during and immediately after the revolt will also impede Hungarian recovery. The present large-scale repatriation campaign conducted by the régime is probably aimed particularly at securing the return of such people.

10. There is no indication that the Kadar régime is being successful in securing popular acceptance from the Hungarian people. In fact, it appears that a stalemate between the régime and the people exists and the spirit of strong passive resistance shows few signs of abatement. For its part, the régime seems determined to wear the population down and convince it of the danger and futility of further resistance. Although fairly large amounts of arms must still be secretly cached in Hungary and reports of anti-régime partisan activity continue to be received, it is unlikely that another large-scale outbreak against the government (one has been rumored for March 15) will take place in the near future. Popular attitudes of resistance to the régime will persist, however, and the masses will undoubtedly attempt to do everything within their power to hamper the effectiveness of Kadar's rule.

East Germany

11. Although Ulbricht was the first satellite leader to echo the attack made on Stalin at the 20th Congress, he reacted quickly against the demands which arose among intellectuals and Party members for a change in leadership and repudiation of Stalin-like policies. The top leaders were united in resistance to change and liberalization and, unlike Poland and Hungary, there was no living Communist in Eastern Germany of a nationalist coloration around whom oppositionists could rally. Postalinization was kept entirely in the hands of the leadership. There was a limited amnesty of political prisoners, and there were promises of decentralization of the bureaucracy and introduction of workers-councils in state enterprises. However, at the end of the year the Ulbricht régime stood completely with the Soviet Union in condemning the Hungarian uprising, and made it plain to dissatisfied elements in East Germany, notably university students, that no "climate of demands" would be allowed to develop in East Germany. The USSR, in negotiations with East Germany early in January, confirmed its continuing moral and financial support of

the GDR and gave further evidence of its intention to utilize the East German régime as a dike to contain currents of liberalization from Poland. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks also carried an implied threat that Soviet troops would be used to counter either a West German attempt to "reunify" Germany by force or an armed rebellion within the GDR. Further pressures for recognition of the GDR by Western nations were created by Soviet recognition of the principle of GDR sovereignty in its air space and by continuing efforts to exact GDR visas for Western travellers proceeding to East Germany.

12. Like the other satellites, East Germany's economic planning was set awry by the dislocations in the bloc economies caused by the Polish and Hungarian revolts. There have been persistent reports of East German economic difficulties, particularly of raw material shortages, which have been aggravated by the failure of Hungary and Poland to deliver essential items. Poland's inability to fulfil commitments for hard coal and coke has been especially damaging and has resulted in shut-downs in some basic East German industries. Further infusions of Soviet aid, both in terms of money (a credit for 1957 of \$85 million in convertible currency) and in industrial raw materials, have been promised by the USSR. While the economic picture is not bright, and East Germany's ability to play a leading rôle in the Soviet campaign of economic penetration in underdeveloped countries may be compromised to some extent, no immediate crisis appears to be impending which would be likely to cause, in itself, irresistible popular pressures for drastic measures of relief.

13. The East German régime clearly does not enjoy popular support. Opposition to it, particularly from the university youth and the intellectuals, has become more vocal in recent months, but the régime is not disposed to give oppositionist currents satisfaction. It relies primarily on force and the threat of force to prevent all outbreaks of serious resistance, and hopes that this will be sufficient. The Soviet occupation troops, over 20 divisions strong, act as important components of the régime's potential in suppressing revolt. The East Germans, who remember much higher living standards and who tend to look down on Soviet cultural pretensions, chafe under the Soviet yoke and yearn for freedom and unity with West Germany. However, with memories of the dénouement of the Berlin uprising of 1953 and of the crushing of the Hungarian revolt fresh in their minds, the East Germans are unlikely to contemplate revolt as a practical way out of their plight unless dissatisfaction becomes more acute than it appears to be at the present time.

Czechoslovakia

14. The Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership, though it betrayed signs of initial uncertainty and vacillation for a short period after Moscow's initiation of destalinization, has on the whole maintained a firmly conservative course. The Prague leaders have given only lip-service to destalinization, feeling that a serious effort in this direction could bring the régime no practical advantages and was likely to undermine the authority of the Party and of the USSR, as well as to disturb the composition of the Party leadership. Only one isolated change (the dismissal of National Defence Minister Cepicka) has been made in the leadership, and the régime has studiously avoided taking the key destalinization move which would be implicit in the repudiation of the Slansky purge of 1952. The fact that the Slansky trial still stands means that the oppressive police system remains officially undiscredited in Czechoslovakia, which

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has acted as an important brake on dissidence. In general, the régime has failed to make admissions of major errors, has attempted to rebut criticism by asserting its claim to infallibility, its determination not to make political concessions, and its intention not to countenance suggestions for greater independence from the USSR. Beginning in October of 1956, the régime began to mount a spy scare and vigilance campaign, which became much sharper after the Hungarian rebellion.

15. While the Czechoslovak economy is affected by a number of unsettling factors - among them repercussions of events in Poland and Hungary, chronic shortage of key raw materials (coal, electric power, non-ferrous metals) and manpower, and problems of labour discipline - the standard of living remains the highest in Eastern Europe and the overall economic situation is relatively tolerable. Figures on Czechoslovak industrial production for 1956 indicated that on an overall basis the relatively best performance of all the satellites was turned in by Czechoslovakia, where there was evidence of an improving supply of consumer goods, even though the targets for agriculture and investment were not met. In addition to stepping up consumer goods production, the régime made an unusually large price reduction late in November and appeared hopeful of keeping the population placid by meeting at least some of the demands for improvement in living conditions through such limited concessions of a material nature. The USSR also promised increased deliveries of iron ore, grain, aluminum and chrome steel during 1957.

16. The Czechoslovak régime is one of the most stable, in a police state sense, in the satellites. The Communist leadership appears to be united and gives no sign of deviating from absolute subservience to Moscow control. There is no potential Gomułka or Nagy among the present heads of the Czech régime, and since the Hungarian uprising they have shown an even more pronounced adherence to the Soviet propaganda line than previously. As far as the population is concerned, there is no strong reform movement within leading social groups and there are few specific anti-Soviet grievances, such as Soviet troops stationed in the country or numerous Soviet advisers. Another major element of stability for the régime is the certainty that, in case of insurrection, it can count on the prompt and vigorous intervention of Soviet military forces. It is unlikely, however, given the ease with which such forces could be introduced into Czechoslovakia from East Germany, Poland, Hungary or the USSR, and the relatively undisturbed conditions in Czechoslovakia, that Moscow will wish to station its troops permanently in the country. Given these factors promoting stability, plus the traditionally unexcitable nature of the population, the possibility of a sudden outbreak of violent resistance to the régime is remote, although certainly not out of the question.

Rumania

17. The Russian Communist régime made no effort to apply the "lessons" of the 20th Congress, and when a few writers spoke up against Party dictation they were speedily silenced and purged. The First Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, went through the motions of rapprochement with Tito during mid-1956 but, while these surface gestures went farther than in the case of the other Balkan satellites, they did not lead to the introduction of Tito-type "reforms" in Rumania. The régime continued on its course, without major changes in personnel and with no reorganization or significant down-grading of the police apparatus. While the

Hungarian rebellion did have its effect on the numerous Hungarian minority in Rumania and also on university students, the stirrings were met with stern repressive measures and an official re-emphasis on vigilance.

18. Rumania, plagued with a low living standard and hard hit in the agricultural field by drought, made a move to placate the peasantry and stimulate agricultural production by abolishing most compulsory delivery quotas. Bread and flour rationing was reintroduced, and a buying fever subsequent to the events in Hungary pushed retail prices up and depleted government stocks. Moscow granted a certain number of economic concessions to Rumania in late 1956, including a cancellation of a Rumanian debt to the USSR representing the value of German assets in Rumania (2.87 billion rubles), a credit of 270 million rubles over a 10-year period, postponement of past Rumanian indebtednesses, and a loan of 450,000 metric tons of wheat and 60,000 metric tons of fodder. While Rumania was on the receiving end of these moves, it shipped considerable quantities of supplies to the Kadar régime in Hungary and granted Hungary a loan of 60 million rubles for the purchase of goods, presumably in Rumania.

19. Rumanian Communist leaders obviously prefer to remain completely subservient to Moscow as the only secure road that will assure their staying in power. The population, with the possible exception of the students, does not appear to be in a mood to whip up insistent demands against the régime, and the prospects are for the near future that the Communist leadership, relying on its police forces and the continued presence of Soviet troops in the country, will not experience undue difficulty in remaining in power. It is probable, however, that the government will seek to make some concessions of a material nature in order to placate the people.

Bulgaria

20. Little effort was made in Bulgaria in the direction of destalinization except to replace in April 1956 Chervenkov, who had dominated the Bulgarian Party since 1950, and also to rehabilitate the executed Titoist, Traicho Kostov. Both moves seemed to have the ulterior motive of placating Tito, since Chervenkov, who was replaced by Yugov, the Interior Minister, remained an influential member of the Politburo and has given signs recently of increasing his stature within the Party. Incipient criticism has been vigorously suppressed and a definite attitude of reserve toward Tito has been maintained, despite the trip of First Secretary Zhivkov to Belgrade in October. Appeals for vigilance have been intensified and numerous reports have been received of large-scale arrests among university students in Sofia. There have also been reports of purges in the Army and in the Sofia Party organization. In general, however, the régime seemed to be firmly in control and no major splits within the top leadership appeared to be in the making.

21. The 1957 plan for the Bulgarian economy as presented to the National Assembly provided a confusing picture of the direction to be taken by the Bulgarian economy. Investment is to be cut sharply, and modest goals have been set for labour productivity and light industry; but at the same time, large production increases are planned for heavy industry and agriculture. The year 1957 is the last of the Bulgarian Second Five Year Plan, and while the régime anticipates fulfillment of the over-all five year goal for industry, certain key branches in this sector

will undoubtedly be underfulfilled. Like most of the other satellites, Bulgaria has made limited concessions to ease economic discontent by raising wages in many industries and by granting relief to the peasants in the form of cutbacks in compulsory deliveries. As revealed at the Bulgarian-Albanian talks at the end of January, Bulgaria has agreed to give credits of an undisclosed amount to Albania, and there is a possibility that Bulgaria is taking increasing responsibilities in the economic development of Albania, perhaps including those previously borne by Hungary and even Poland. One of the primary aims of the Bulgarian-Albanian talks was probably to demonstrate the solidarity of the two countries with the USSR and against Tito's brand of communism.

22. Although there apparently have been flare-ups of discontent, especially among students, and rumours have circulated concerning dissension within the top leadership over implementation of internal policy, the Bulgarian communist régime gives every indication of being firmly in control of the situation. Its leaders are studiously subservient to the USSR, no weakening of the police apparatus has been permitted, and the vigilance campaign has been invoked with apparent success in the effort to stamp out incipient moves toward liberalization.

Albania

23. The Albanian régime waited until April 1956 to join in the destalinization chorus and then did so only in the most limited and laconic fashion. At the same time, the régime head, Hoxha, cracked down firmly on critics of his rule within the Tirana Party organization. At the Party Congress held May 25 - June 3, Hoxha and Premier Shehu showed themselves in control of the situation. They reaffirmed their established policies, and pointedly refused to yield to Tito by retracting the charges made against Koci Xoxe, executed as a Titoist in 1949. In fact, the purge was given renewed justification in scarcely veiled anti-Tito terms. The personal hostility of Hoxha and Shehu to Tito was the decisive factor, together with their fear of being absorbed by Yugoslavia. Hoxha made his unflinching opposition to Tito clear in an article in the Moscow Pravda in November 1956, and has recently reiterated it in a public speech in February attacking Yugoslav "imperialist designs" in the Kosovo area.

24. Albania gives every sign of being the most determinedly Stalinist of all the satellites. No concessions have been announced to the peasants, alone of all the satellites it scheduled large increases in industrial production and investment, and the repressive activities of the Albanian police have been widened in scope. Situated in an exposed geographic position - with no common frontier with the USSR and next door to the menace of Yugoslavia - the Hoxha régime seems resolved to keep moves toward liberalization firmly in check by traditional methods of police control and intimidation.

B. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET BLOC

25. In considering the situation in the satellite countries, special attention should be given to the position of Yugoslavia and its influence on developments within the Soviet bloc. The ostentatious Soviet declaration of friendship with the formerly "renegade" Tito in the spring of 1955 together with apparent Soviet willingness to accept Yugoslav concepts of "many roads to socialism" and full equality in relations between Communist states, undoubtedly influenced groups both in and out of the

ruling cliques in the satellite states to toy with ideas of a similar nature. The confluence of Tito's precepts with the public revelation of the excesses and evils of "Stalinism" have had a major effect on the communist world and have contributed in considerable measure to the strains which the Soviet leadership is experiencing within its orbit.

26. There have been persistent reports that the USSR in September 1956 circulated a letter to the satellites warning them against following Tito's example, and, as the troubles in Poland and Hungary mounted, the Soviet leaders made clear that they considered Tito's national communism the cause for their difficulties in these countries. Tito, in a speech at Bula on November 11, rebutted these suggestions bluntly, and went on to claim that the Hungarian revolt was a popular movement, that Stalinism was a product not of a "personality cult" but of the Soviet system, and that equality and recognition of equal needs to socialism were essential in dealings between communist states. Early in 1957, Yugoslav ideologists in effect defended revisionism and, with reference to the current Soviet slogan of "Back to Lenin," noted succinctly that Lenin had died 30 years ago and that Leninism should not become "ossified dogma".

27. Both sides in the controversy, while probably desiring to keep the ideological discussions within bounds and to avoid a spectacular break, seem prepared to contemplate a prolonged struggle. For the Kremlin, Tito's ideas can be viewed as undermining the whole fabric of the Soviet system. For Tito, he undoubtedly relishes the importance which his ideological innovations have given him within and without the Soviet orbit, and he must feel as well that his own interest requires him to reject any ideological truce with the Kremlin. If he were to accept such a truce, then his chances for continued existence within the Soviet Bloc would be extremely limited. The Soviet aim at present is to isolate the satellite states from Yugoslav influence, while Tito continues to depend on the Polish communists as his main hope in developing his line in Eastern Europe. So long as this controversy goes on, and the prospects are that it will do so for a long time to come, Soviet efforts to impose total conformity on the bloc will be greatly hampered.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO - COMCLUSIONS

28. As indicated by Soviet actions in Hungary, the Soviet leaders believe that vital Soviet interests demand the preservation of Soviet hegemony in the satellite area. No doubt they are persuaded that the U.S.'s military security requires the forward deployment of Soviet forces there, secure lines of communication to those forces, and utilization of the area for Soviet air defense. Moreover, loss of control over the satellites might find Western power, including a revived Germany, pressing against the Soviet frontiers. The Soviet leaders, therefore, do not seriously consider abandoning their dominant position in Eastern Europe.

29. The foregoing study described two related trends in communist policy in the satellites: an easing in economic matters in satellite countries and a tightening in the political sphere. Determined efforts are being made to seal off the bloc from the dangerous influences emanating from Poland and Yugoslavia, and there are signs that, whereas the USSR may not hope to change Yugoslav ways in the near future, there is a conscious Soviet policy of seeking to brake the precipitous moves toward liberalization in Poland and to lead that country back to a more acceptable orthodox Soviet position. Among the various alternatives open to the USSR in dealing with the satellites, the Soviet leaders seem to be leaning closer to a policy which, while avoiding the extremes of Stalinism, involves firm repression, increasing dependence on the Soviet military and police, and a strengthening of those satellite leaders most subservient to Moscow. This policy will serve in the long run to exacerbate dissident elements in the bloc, will impair productivity, and will not lead to regimes which are truly stable and supported by popular opinion. The prospect, therefore, is for continuing difficulties within the satellite area in the foreseeable future, regardless of the relative degree of stability which various police regimes may have been able to bring about for the moment.

30. The ruthless action of the Soviet troops in Hungary leaves no doubt that similar action would be taken if any other satellite attempted to cut its ties with the USSR. This, coupled with the probability of continuing satellite unrest, highlights the ever-present possibility of the use of Soviet ground forces in the Eastern European area not far removed from NATO territories. Since the exact course and extent of such intervention cannot be predicted exactly, the need for NATO to maintain and increase its own presence in these circumstances becomes even more imperative.

31. The most explosive potentialities for further outbreaks of trouble in Eastern Europe which might affect the NATO countries are to be found in Poland and, to a lesser but somewhat related extent, in East Germany. Flare-ups of violence in Poland could come about as a result of a number of causes, including dissatisfaction on the part of the population with the progress of the Gomulka regime in moving toward greater independence from the USSR, or temporary failure in the slow rate of economy recovery. Such outbreaks might not only force Poland to demand the Soviet forces to intervene openly, which might force the USSR to send an uprising, would undoubtedly be supported by the Soviets, it is possible that Polish Army and air forces, from the start, would be able to put up a very stiff initial resistance. If East Germany became involved in such a struggle, either through a popular uprising sympathetic to the Polish cause or through arrival of Polish or positionist armed units

in East Germany, the possibilities of a broadened conflict would be considerably enhanced and might conceivably bring about the involvement of West German volunteers, as well as endangering the security of the Allied Forces in West Berlin. The serious consequences of such developments to the NATO Powers cannot be underestimated. At the same time, it should be noted that such a conjunction of events is certainly not inevitable, and the possibility that it might occur, while meriting serious consideration, provides no cause for altering NATO's basic strategy or disposition of forces.

52. Based on the foregoing considerations, the following policy lines for NATO members in connection with various problems relating to Eastern Europe would appear to be desirable :

Military

- NATO military commitments, including the fighting strength of ground forces, should not be lessened, but rather improved in effectiveness.
- There should be no evacuation of NATO troops from Central Europe. Apart from other adverse results, such a pull-out would undoubtedly dishearten the forces within the satellite countries which are working for greater independence from the USSR.
- The precise reaction of the NATO powers to widespread uprisings involving Poland and East Germany cannot be determined in advance and must of necessity be based on circumstances at the time. In general, however, it can be foreseen that NATO members in such an eventuality would immediately consult among themselves as to appropriate action, if any, which should be taken. It seems reasonable to suppose that the NATO countries would wish to use their influence to limit the area of armed conflict and to keep their own nationals out of the fighting. The NATO powers undoubtedly would wish to consult at such a time with regard to any steps which might be taken vis-à-vis the USSR which might induce it to give serious consideration to relinquishing control over Poland and East Germany and to permitting the reunification of Germany in freedom.

Economic

- Having in mind the desirability of encouraging the Gomulka regime to move in the direction of greater independence from Moscow, and in view of the serious economic difficulties with which it is confronted, discreet attempts should be made to reorient Polish trade toward the West and to offer economic assistance and trade inducements serving this purpose. Short-term credit arrangements are probably preferable.
- Aid to Hungary should consist only of relief assistance, i.e. the provision directly and without any charge of urgent necessities to individuals in order to preserve life and health. The provision should be avoided of supplies of types and amounts which would meet the

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needs of the economy as a whole or would enable Hungary to meet its own needs by use in connection with local production.

- Trade dealings with the other satellites should be considered on a case by case basis, having in mind the controls on strategic trade and the desirability of contributing as little as possible to the strengthening of the Soviet puppet regime.

Cultural Exchanges

- Increased contacts and exchanges with Poland in the technical and cultural fields should be sought, particularly on the non-governmental level, with a view to expanding Poland's relationships with the West.
- No broad program of exchanges should be undertaken with the other satellites, although in individual cases it may be advantageous to undertake certain contacts in the hope of encouraging pro-Western or liberal elements in those countries. Exchanges of a formal, governmental nature with the satellites should be avoided.

Information

- Informational programs and published materials intended for the satellite countries should be designed to interest and encourage those groups which are pressing for greater liberalization and independence from the USSR. However, the programs should not be provocative or purport to give active direction to such elements. Particularly to Poland, Hungary and East Germany, Western information media should adopt a calm, factual and non-sensational tone.

35. The developments in Poland, as well as in Hungary, despite the savage repression in the latter country, should be encouraging to NATO, although they imply no lessening in the need for Western unity and strength. On the contrary, if further revolutionary trends are to be facilitated in Eastern Europe and the afflictions of the USSR in repressing incipient rebellion made more acute, it is essential that the NATO organization continue steadily and non-provocatively on its course as the primary bulwark against Soviet aggression in Western Europe. As NATO unity is strengthened and its power increased, the revolutionary trends in Eastern Europe leading toward independence for the satellite peoples will be given renewed impetus.

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