

ENGLISH ONLY
3rd July, 1959

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
WORKING PAPER
AC/119-WP(59)81

COMMITTEE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS

SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR ATOM-FREE "ZONES OF PEACE"

Note by the Political Division

Since the publication in February of the Political Division's note on "Soviet Proposals to Ban Nuclear Weapons from Limitrophe Areas" (RDC/59/43), the Soviet authorities have elaborated these proposals somewhat, fitting them into a larger context. As the campaign would seem to be developing the Soviet Union is proposing to surround itself with a series of regional collective security pacts or "peace zones". They apparently hope, with these proposals, if not to induce non-Communist limitrophe states to forego rearmament, and ultimately even membership in Western military blocs, at least to generate dissatisfaction with current policies among their people by offering a seemingly reasonable alternative.

2. The various "peace zone" proposals, which are not identical for all areas, have contained thus far some or all of the following elements:

- regional conferences of the interested states would be called;
- these regional conferences would negotiate collective security agreements, to be supplemented by bilateral non-aggression treaties;
- the collective security agreements would include a pledge not to permit rockets, nuclear weapons or foreign bases in the "peace zone";
- in some areas, at least, these pledges would be accompanied by control measures to ensure implementation;
- the Great Powers would agree not to use nuclear weapons against states in the zone;
- the Great Powers would pledge themselves not to deploy, or to hand over to states in the "peace zone" rocket or nuclear weapons;

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- the states in the zone would take steps to settle outstanding differences and to promote co-operation in all possible ways (e.g. trade, etc.).

3. In their efforts to block Western defence measures, and to weaken the ties of limitrophe states to the other NATO members, the Soviets are employing familiar tactics of intimidation and lure. They are threatening to establish rocket bases in adjoining areas, though whether they will actually do so will doubtless depend on essentially military considerations.

4. At its present sketchy stage of development, this world-wide "collective security" system raises more questions than it answers. The following are some questions which have a bearing on future Soviet tactics and the popular appeal which Moscow's proposals might have:

- Are these "peace zone" proposals directly linked to East-West negotiations? It is at least significant that they have been pushed in 1958 and 1959, parallel with agitation for Summit talks. The issues of European collective security and of nuclear disarmament will need to be discussed in connection with broader talks on the "German problem". Agitation for an "atom-free zone" dividing the Warsaw and NATO forces in Europe would be a logical Soviet move. These "peace zone" proposals would also have their place in the world-wide "peace" campaign called for by Moscow in May on the theme of a "Summit Conference to end the cold war". People in every country in the world are to be urged to submit their "peace demands" to this Summit conference.
- The establishment of atom-and rocket-free zones has been linked in Soviet propoganda to the general issues of total nuclear disarmament, and to defence against surprise attack. In this general connection, Moscow stresses that an agreement to ban nuclear tests will be a "first step" towards a total ban on nuclear weapons and the removal of stocks. Are these "peace zone" proposals to be elements in a new broad-gauged Soviet disarmament scheme to be put forward in the United Nations General Assembly, perhaps as part of a move to renew disarmament negotiations in the United Nations?
- In its plans for zones in the Baltic Area, and the Middle and Far East, does the Soviet Union exclude its own territory from the atom and rocket-free zone, and therefore from inspection?
- Will the extension of the Rapacki Plan concept to other areas outside Central Europe provide also for regional reductions in conventional forces?

- How far will the Soviet Union go in promoting the idea of a "neutralist belt" dividing the two military blocs? Already, it has described Central Europe as "partially neutralised" in the event of acceptance of the Rapacki Plan. It will probably be afraid, however, of encouraging the idea of a fully neutral Eastern Europe. Complete neutrality is proposed only for non-Communist states along the periphery of the bloc like Germany, Greece and Japan.

Central Europe

5. The revised "Rapacki Plan" may be due for increased attention during Mr. Khrushchev's scheduled twelve day visit to Poland beginning on 12th July, which will coincide with the Foreign Ministers Conference. The propaganda stress is as much on disengagement as it is on establishing a de-atomised zone. The proposal to "separate the armed forces in those regions where there is a threat to peace, and in particular in Central Europe" is currently a "front organization" demand.

6. An article on the Rapacki Plan in the May issue of International Affairs is the fullest exposition to date. According to the article:

- During Phase I, states in the control zone (Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) would be forbidden to produce or receive nuclear weapons, and the level of atomic armament would be frozen. But forces possessing atomic weapons would be permitted to retain them.
- Negotiations would then begin concerning reductions in conventional weapons. As a minimum, in Stage II, the states in the zone would need to reduce their national defence forces and a part of the foreign forces should be withdrawn, parallel with the total removal of nuclear weapons and rocket sites from the zone.
- During the negotiations following Phase I, it would also be possible, the article said, for agreement to be reached on the "full withdrawal" of foreign forces from the control zone resulting in a separation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. There was no mention of any other preconditions, but Mr. Khrushchev presumably outlined Moscow's fuller position in his interview with a group of SPD editors on 5th May. He noted then that there were no Soviet troops in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania or Bulgaria, and declared that Soviet troops would also leave Eastern Germany if foreign troops withdrew from the Federal Republic, but he cautioned that they would not leave Poland and Hungary until all the members of NATO withdrew their forces within their own borders. Moscow is committed in its propaganda to some "separation of forces", but as formulated its position lacks appeal.

- Ground and air control measures would be established to ensure the implementation of both stages of the agreement. The point is made that negotiations to establish Stage II should not be "endless", i.e. permitting the West to retain nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic and a control system in Eastern Europe indefinitely. It is envisaged that these control measures should constitute a model for a "control mechanism which was broader in geographic relationship".

7. It is also envisaged that the zone in Central Europe could be extended to cover neutral states like Sweden or Switzerland, or states in NATO like Norway or Denmark - an alternative way of creating a "peace zone" in Scandinavia and the Baltic. A radio broadcast to Greece in May envisaged extending the Rapacki Plan concept South into the Balkans as well as North to Scandinavia.

8. The zone would be considered "partially neutralised" and states would not be permitted to use nuclear weapons against it. On the other hand, states in the zone would not be obliged to leave the military blocs to which they belonged.

9. The USSR has invoked a new argument to deter the West from proceeding with the arming of the Federal Republic, and thereby changing the assumption that only the Four Powers would have nuclear weapons during Phase I of the proposed Rapacki Plan. The Soviet notes to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany on 1st April charged that the arming of the Federal Republic with nuclear weapons would violate the Military Surrender Act and the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany (1), which, according to Moscow, "proscribed the arming and remilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security". Having, at a press conference on 19th March, acknowledged that the West has "lawful rights following from the fact of German surrender" to remain in Berlin, Khrushchev may be preparing a case for disavowing this legal foundation. Moscow would seem to argue that if the West either equips Bonn with nuclear weapons or refuses to sign a peace treaty depriving Bonn forever of such weapons, it will be responsible for destroying the legal basis of its position in Berlin.

The Balkan "Zone of Peace"

10. An important element in Khrushchev's decision to visit Albania would seem to have been concern over the Western decision to establish rocket bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey, combined

1) Article 13 of the "Declaration of the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers" declares inter alia that: "... the Four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security".

with an apparent uneasy feeling that the West was plotting some new form of Mediterranean Pact embracing Spain and even the littoral states of Africa. To counter these developments, Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a "zone of peace" in an area which he described sometimes as the "Balkans and the Mediterranean", but more often as "the Balkans and the Adriatic" or simply the "Balkans". The first formula would, of course, exclude rocket-firing submarines from the Mediterranean and rocket bases from North Africa; the second would encompass Italy, and the least ambitious formula Greece and perhaps Turkey. All three members of NATO have been sharply attacked, with the brunt of the current campaign being directed against Greece. (Turkey has been treated more often as a member of the Middle Eastern Bagdad Pact than in the Balkans). According to Radio Tirana, Khrushchev called for a neutral Greece outside of NATO - a statement which Moscow did not reprint.

11. Khrushchev's visit was preceded and followed by pressure against Italy, marked by an official Bulgarian statement (17th April), Soviet notes 28th April and 10th June), an Albanian note (2nd May) and a Rumanian note (rejected 16th May). The campaign against Greece began on 12th May with a statement by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister. It was followed by a Soviet Aide Memoire (13th May), Bulgarian notes (20th May and 9th June) and an Albanian Government Declaration (22nd May).

12. A Rumanian Government Declaration of 6th June set forth the general basis on which the Balkans could be made "a zone of peace and good neighbourliness". Presumably, similar programmes will be outlined for the Baltic and other regions. The following are the main elements and arguments:

- In accordance with the proposal of Rumanian Premier Chivu Stoica of September, 1957, it is proposed that a meeting of Balkan Heads of Governments take place to draw up an agreement to promote co-operation in the Balkans. A Bulgarian note to Greece of 9th June indicated that a meeting of the "representatives" of the Balkan leaders would also be satisfactory. [The Bulgarian note also called for bilateral negotiations to settle outstanding economic issues and to include a non-aggression treaty]
- A Balkan agreement would serve to promote co-operation "on a general European plane and the establishment of a general European security system".
- A Balkan Summit Conference would "discuss and take appropriate decision on problems involving multilateral collaboration and the development of good neighbour relations..".

- It would also draw up a "Treaty of understanding and Collective Security" whereby the Balkan States would (i) agree to solve all disputes peacefully and to refrain from aggression or threats of war; (ii) "not permit the stocking of atomic and nuclear weapons, the stationing of military units of States alien to the Balkan region and equipped with atomic and nuclear weapons" [it is not clear if all alien units are to be excluded, or only those with nuclear weapons], and the installation of rocket and guided missile launching ramps on their territory;
- The Balkan states might ask the Great Powers to respect the region as a "zone of peace" and to pledge "neither together nor alone" to secure the emplacement or stationing of military units equipped with nuclear weapons or the emplacement of launching ramps.

13. Khrushchev added two important elements to the campaign. In addition to reiterating the offer of "all-out assistance" in establishing an atom and rocket-free zone in the Balkans, he indicated on 6th June that the zone should be set up under "mutual control" - an ambiguous extension for the first time of the Rapacki Plan concept to this region (see above under Central Europe). He also warned, in the most extreme official statement of this kind, that if Greece and Turkey proceeded to set up rocket bases: "the Soviet Union, together with Albania, Bulgaria and all the countries of the Warsaw Pact would be forced to place rocket bases closer to the bases of the aggressors". He acknowledged that the USSR could fire from its own territory, but said that there was no need to waste IRBMs when small, shorter-range rockets could be located in Albania and Bulgaria - where conditions were particularly suitable for rocket sites. Bulgaria announced officially on 4th June that it has no plans for or existing rocket sites - presumably to undercut any arguments in the West that sites were necessary in Greece because they already existed next-door.

14. The Soviet note of 25th June to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, Rumania and Yugoslavia proposed that the Four Powers "guarantee" the establishment of an atom and rocket-free zone in the "Balkans and Adriatic area". It did not say precisely that atom weapons should not be used against the countries in this zone. It also proposed a Four Power guarantee of the "security and independence of the countries participating in the ... zone", without saying how "independence" in the Western sense was to be guaranteed to, for example, Bulgaria, or in the Soviet sense to Turkey. The "countries concerned" are urged to reach agreement first "on this question" and then presumably to request Four Power guarantee of their agreement. In effect, Moscow asks that the Four Powers give their blessing to a regional conference of Balkan and Adriatic states, which it probably regards as a useful divisive approach.

15. Moscow would seem to be angling for Yugoslav support for its proposal. Soviet propaganda has underscored the positive Yugoslav attitude toward the proposal. At the very least, Yugoslav would be manoeuvred into opposition to an ally in the Balkan Pact; at most, a step would be taken to improve its relations with the bloc as part of a longer-term programme of neutralising Tito's anti-Soviet activities and bringing Yugoslavia back into the fold. (The final communiqué on Khrushchev's visit to Albania spoke of a normalisation of "state relations" between Albania and Yugoslavia, and some steps would seem to have been taken in this direction).

16. The issue of rocket flight over neutral air space has been raised again by both Moscow and Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav commentary in April stated that this question involving a violation of international law "will have to be examined in due course". The May issue of Moscow's International Affairs warned of the danger that rockets based in Italy might fall on Austria, short of their target.

The Baltic "Zone of Peace"

17. For some months, Moscow has exerted pressure against the Scandinavian countries, notably Norway and Finland parallel with revived propaganda attention to the need for making the Baltic a "sea of peace". The campaign was given new impetus when the speeches of Khrushchev and Grotewohl in Riga on 11th June and the Soviet-East Zone Communiqué of 19th June discussed the proposal at some length. On 29th June, trade unionists, reportedly from all the countries on the Baltic, met in connection with the "week of peace in the Baltic" to urge that it be made a "sea of peace and friendship". In these statements by Soviet bloc officials:

- Considerable effort was made to stimulate suspicion and fear in Scandinavia of West German intentions, in particular regarding Bonn's naval forces in the Baltic.
- Khrushchev supported the idea of making the "Scandinavian Peninsula and the Baltic Basin" a "zone of peace" free from atomic weapons, rockets and foreign bases. The Communiqué used the more common Pankow terminology of making the "Baltic Sea a sea of peace". It will be recalled that Moscow did not answer a query by the Danish Prime Minister in February, 1958, concerning Moscow's intention of including its own territory in the proposed zone free from nuclear weapons in "the whole of Northern Europe". Khrushchev would seem to have deliberately excluded the USSR from such a zone in his present formula. He also made no mention of "mutual control" as he did in the case of the atom-free zone in the Balkans. The absence of rocket sites or nuclear weapons in Scandinavia reduces, of course, the need for any Soviet "concession".

- Grotewohl recalled the Pankow initiative of September, 1957 in which it was proposed that the states on the Baltic negotiate economic, cultural and transport agreements and conclude non-aggression treaties between each other. Khrushchev, in turn, stressed the importance of developing co-operation among the states located on the Baltic.

18. During his trip to Scandinavia this summer, Khrushchev will doubtless expand on various ideas for closer co-operation in Northern Europe. He was quite frank in expressing his wish to see Norway and Denmark withdraw from NATO, and a weakening of their links with NATO will be the objective behind, even if not the stated purpose, of his proposals. Moscow would probably be reluctant, however, to promote a substitute regional Nordic defence organization (see AC/119-WP(59)62) unless it were a member itself. It would fear otherwise that Finland would be strengthened vis-à-vis the USSR, and attracted out of the Soviet orbit.

Asian "Peace Zone"

19. The main target of Communist agitation concerning the establishment of a "peace zone" in the "Far East and Pacific region" remains quite clearly Japan. In a written reply of 20th April to questions submitted by the Japan Press Service, Khrushchev developed the proposal to guarantee Japanese neutrality, put forward in the Soviet Government statement of 3rd December, 1958. The arguments were reiterated in a note to Japan of 4th May, and further elaborated, inter alia, in an article on "Japan and neutrality" in the May issue, and an article on "the peace zone in the Far East" in the June issue of International Affairs. The following main arguments are directed to Japan to reinforce neutralist and pacifist trends there:

- The USSR is prepared to guarantee the permanent neutrality of Japan on the Austrian and Swiss model in several ways: by appropriate bilateral treaty, by tri-lateral treaty including Communist China, by multilateral collective treaty involving in addition the "United States of America and other interested countries of Asia and the Pacific area", or by United Nations guarantee. Khrushchev described the idea of a multilateral treaty between the USSR, Communist China, Japan and the United States and other states as "friendship treaty".
- "If foreign military bases are removed from Japan and Japan follows a policy of neutrality, the military clauses of the Sino-Soviet treaty [14th February, 1950] may be adjusted", to appease "unfounded" fears in Japan of direct

or indirect aggression. Reference is presumably to Article I of the treaty which states that the two countries will take "all the necessary measures at their disposal" to prevent "aggression or violation of the peace on the part of Japan or any State uniting with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression".

- The equipping of Japan with nuclear weapons and the establishment of foreign atomic and rocket bases on its territory will start an arms race in the Far East and "compel the Soviet Government to take measures dictated by the security interests of the Soviet Far East". In familiar fashion, Moscow drew attention in its 4th May note to Japanese vulnerability given its "relatively small territory and great population density".
- "Peace in the Far East and Pacific region will greatly depend on Japan's policy". In this connection, much attention is paid to agitation in Japan against the Security Accord with the United States.

20. Khrushchev declared that the "participants in, the contents of, and the actual form of a Far Eastern and Pacific peace area will be decided among the countries concerned at some proper time". It will be noted that he speaks now of "area" rather than the "basin" of the Pacific - the phrase he used at the 21st Party Congress. Emphasis is placed on the contribution which the peace zone would make to friendship and expanded economic and cultural relations between states of the area. The Communists are naturally trying to exploit local feeling against nuclear tests in the Pacific to generate support for the establishment of an atom-free zone.

21. Khrushchev implied in his interview that he would consider calling an international conference to "discuss peace and security in the Far East and Pacific region". He also stated that the USSR was prepared to sign either bilateral or collective treaties of friendship and neutrality with all countries in the Far East and South-East Asia "as in the rest of the world". It is interesting to note that the North Vietnamese "peace partisans" credit the USSR with the proposal to establish an atom-free zone in Asia but Communist China with the proposal to establish a "collective security treaty in the Asian and Pacific area" - reference perhaps to a comment of Chou En-lai at the 21st Soviet Party Congress.

22. The tone of Soviet statements suggests that the Communists might resort to scare tactics in Asia to build up pressure for both a Far Eastern conference and the establishment of a "peace zone". The June issue of International Affairs played up the dangerous situation in Korea, Vietnam, Formosa and Laos, and the fact that the major powers would almost inevitably be involved

in the event of war in these areas. United States measures in these countries were said to create a real danger of atomic war.

The Middle East

23. Moscow was apparently planning in December, 1958 to focus on Iran its campaign to make the Middle East a neutral "zone of peace" free from foreign bases and nuclear and rocket weapons. (See RDC/59/43). Its hopes were doubtless raised by the early course of bilateral negotiations with Iran in January, 1959, which included discussion of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. The sharp deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations which followed the rupture of negotiations in February has apparently stalled this campaign.

24. The Soviet Government statement of 25th March on the subject of the bilateral military agreements which the United States concluded on 5th March with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and subsequent official statements have omitted reference to the "peace zone" proposal. Moscow contented itself in its note to Turkey of 28th with warning that the siting of United States nuclear and rocket weapons on Turkish territory would force the USSR to "take proper steps to ensure reliably the security of its southern frontiers". Bulgaria, in a note of 3rd April to Turkey, recalled the Stoica proposal for a Balkan conference and earlier offers to conclude bilateral "agreements for goodneighbourly co-operation". A Soviet broadcast in Arabic of 21st June indicated that, if the campaign was not being pressed in the Middle East, it was not forgotten; the commentary urged the establishment of atom-free zones "in all places threatened with the atomic danger" adding that this would also remove "the main peril threatening the world ... of surprise attack".

25. Moscow would seem to have muted temporarily its efforts to make the Middle East an area of "friendship and co-operation" in favour of efforts either to overthrow the Iranian Shah, or at least to frighten him off of close collaboration with the United States. In April, Moscow reinstated for the first time since August 1953 a clandestine transmitter, the "National Voice of Iran", ostensibly broadcasting from within Iran. Since that time, Soviet radio broadcasts have continued to pour out vitriolic attacks, exaggerating the extent of United States military penetration, attacking the Shah and speaking of his inevitable overthrow. Moscow's insistence on the continued validity of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty, which provide for Soviet intervention, constitutes another form of pressure.

Other Areas

26. Soviet agitation in favour of atom-free "peace zones" would seem to date from the statement issued by the Afro-Asian

Peoples Solidarity Council at its meeting in January, 1958, that "Asia and Africa must be a peace zone where there will be no nuclear or rocket weapons". Moscow will doubtless extend the campaign to Africa in the not very distant future. Already, it has drawn attention to demands that nuclear tests be banned in the Sahara, and to warnings of the consequences of nuclear warfare on Africa. Latin America will follow.

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Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.