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NATO SECRET
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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held
at the Headquarters, Brussels, on Tuesday 1st and
Wednesday, 2nd October, 1968 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

<u>BELGIUM</u> Mr. A. de Staercke Viscount Davignon	<u>GREECE</u> Mr. P.A. Cavalierato	<u>NORWAY</u> Mr. G. Kristiansen
<u>CANADA</u> Mr. Ross Campbell	<u>ICELAND</u> Mr. N.P. Sigurdsson	<u>PORTUGAL</u> Mr. V. da Cunha
<u>DENMARK</u> Mr. H. Hjorth- Nielsen	<u>ITALY</u> Mr. C. de Ferrariis Salzano	<u>TURKEY</u> Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u> Mr. R. Seydoux	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u> Mr. L. Schaus	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u> Sir Bernard Burrows
<u>GERMANY</u> Mr. W.G. Grewe	<u>NETHERLANDS</u> Mr. H.N. Boon Jonkheer J.A. de Rånitz	<u>UNITED STATES</u> Mr. Harlan Cleveland

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Mr. J.A. Roberts
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:	Mr. J. Jaenicke
Executive Secretary:	The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Supreme Allied Commander in Europe:	General Lemnitzer (1st October)
Chairman, Military Committee:	Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson

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I. EXAMINATION OF EVALUATION REPORTS ON THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

References: O-M(68)43
C-M(68)44
C-M(68)42
DPC/D(68)30

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the present meeting of the Council had been convened to discuss the four reports on the political, military, economic and crisis management implications of the Czechoslovak crisis in accordance with the programme of work set out in PO/68/473 of 29th August, 1968. He pointed out that the four reports differed somewhat in form. The political report had been prepared by the Chairman of the Senior Political Committee on his own responsibility - but in close consultation with the Political Committee - whereas the others were agreed Committee reports which, however, had been prepared to a certain extent without national guidance and were submitted ad referendum to Governments. He proposed that the political, military and economic reports should be discussed jointly, leaving for separate discussion the report of the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group which focussed on the crisis management aspects of the Czechoslovak situation. He hoped that as a result of its discussion the Council would arrive at certain agreed results so that Governments could be presented with either an agreed report or agreed conclusions and, where necessary, appropriate recommendations concerning the future attitudes and activities of the Alliance in the light of developments in Czechoslovakia. Referring to the report by the Political Committee, he said that paragraph 44, dealing with the problem of Berlin, which was a matter of special concern to four member countries, would be reviewed by these countries who would subsequently table a final draft.

2. Turning to the report by the Defence Review Committee, he said that this document contained a general analysis that would be of interest to the Council. However, as was shown by its circulation as a Defence Planning Committee document, it also recommended a number of measures which related principally to the forces integrated within the NATO military structure. In his view, the decisions to be taken on this document should be confined to an endorsement of its conclusions and an invitation to the national authorities concerned to prepare specific action in respect of the various categories recommended. These proposals could subsequently be examined by the Defence Review Committee in preparation for the forthcoming Ministerial meeting. It might well be necessary to convene the Defence Planning Committee for this purpose after

the Council meeting. The report by the Committee of Economic Advisers did not seem to call for immediate policy decisions, although there might be certain general conclusions which the Council would wish to draw from its contents in conjunction with the political ones. He felt that it was most desirable that the results which emerged from the present discussion should be fully agreed by the Council, either by an approval of the reports themselves or by approval of appropriate conclusions and recommendations. However, should this not be possible, he would attempt to summarise the points which had received general support from most Permanent Representatives and indicate areas where views continued to differ.

3. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that in the context of the work programme for the Council and Ministers, the four reports met the requirement member Governments had expressed for a NATO evaluation of the situation so that they could decide what action to take at the political and military levels. He expressed the hope that as broad agreement as possible could be reached on conclusions so that Ministers would have a jointly agreed basis for their informal exchange of views in New York. Subsequently, a more detailed study might be undertaken to pave the way for the formal Ministerial meeting and the public statements which would be made at that time. He added that his Government would prefer this meeting to be held in November rather than December. Subject to a few minor changes, he could agree to the report by the Chairman of the Political Committee. He suggested that a declaration be made on the continuity of the Alliance, laying greater emphasis on the need for increased solidarity, as evidenced by the Czechoslovak affair. Recommending that in order to assist Ministers a summary of the main items in the report should be prepared, he expressed readiness to put forward suggestions in this connection.

4. As far as the military document (DPC/D(68)30) was concerned, while he had a few comments to make on the statistical assessment and on the question of capabilities as opposed to intentions, he agreed that the study should be continued. He acknowledged that the crisis had demonstrated the need for action to be taken at national level so that NATO would be better equipped to deal with any fresh crisis. His Authorities would give favourable consideration to the practical measures suggested in the recommendations and consider the possibility of an additional United Kingdom contribution. He felt it essential that the European members of the Alliance should take the necessary steps to face up to the new situation in Europe. In conclusion, he recommended that the Council should approve C-M(68)43 and DPC/D(68)30 together with a summary of the political and military implications of the crisis, considered either jointly or separately.

5. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that, subject to a few amendments which were not very substantial, he was prepared to approve the report on political implications. He considered it desirable that this report should be discussed with a view to its approval and, if possible, adoption as a Council document. As regards the other suggestions which had been put forward - namely, the summary proposed by the United Kingdom Representative and the suggestion that a shorter document be prepared containing a series of recommendations to assist Ministers during their exchange of views in New York - he pointed out that it would be more difficult to secure agreement on a shorter document. In his view, it was advisable that Ministers should themselves decide on the essential points which should subsequently be set out in a communiqué so as to provide guidance for the Council. Consequently, he considered it preferable to seek agreement on an existing document rather than on a transitional arrangement. Turning to the military report, he said that France was not concerned with this document in so far as it related to the Major Commands and integrated forces. However, since his country was in a position to take part in this discussion it would comment on any questions of general policy raised by the document. In conclusion, he expressed the view that the Economic Committee document was an excellent and comprehensive analysis which would be extremely useful when the Council had to decide how its conclusions were to be brought to the attention of Ministers.

6. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed the view that the discussions to be held by the Council were part of the preparatory work for the advanced Ministerial meeting and that no decisions of substance should be contemplated for the moment. In view of its informal nature and the fact that all member countries would not be represented, he felt that the meeting of Ministers in New York should be considered simply as another stage in this preparatory process. Following the informal meeting, the Council would have an idea of what was expected from the Ministerial meeting and could decide how to pursue its studies. While agreeing that the four reports should not be considered separately, he said that he would confine his remarks to C-M(68)43 and DPG/D(68)30. He had no amendments to suggest in so far as the political report was concerned, but wished to make a point of substance concerning the statement in paragraph 33 that "The situation today in Europe is unquestionably worse than it was formerly". He recalled that during his talks with Mr. Harmel, the Rumanian Prime Minister, Mr. Maurer, had stated that he would expect a Chinese intervention should Rumania be invaded by the Soviet Union. In view of this possibility, he felt that the report should state that the situation had deteriorated throughout the world. On the question of Berlin, he could agree that paragraph 44 should be jointly drafted by the four countries directly concerned, on condition that the wording of this paragraph was acceptable to all. On the overall problem, he said that the Council had to face up to the

difficult task of considering the follow-up to the conclusions sketched out in the political report. He would be prepared to adopt the report as a Council document possibly supplemented by a summary with a view to the meeting of Ministers in New York; alternatively, the Chairman might enlarge upon it in an oral statement to Ministers. At all events, it was essential that in the face of such a severe crisis the Alliance should state its position in firm but moderate language. With a view to the advanced Ministerial meeting, on which no decision could be taken until after the New York meeting, he recommended that Ministers should indicate whether the Council should prepare a joint declaration or a draft communiqué.

7. Turning to the military report, he expressed satisfaction at the comment in paragraph 17 regarding the Belgian effort. In his view, the national measures recommended in paragraph 36 were of great interest. Should agreement be reached on a multilateral basis, his Government would be prepared to ask the Belgian Authorities to contact the Military Authorities of the Alliance so as to establish, not only what had been achieved, but also what remained to be done. In conclusion, he expressed satisfaction that the United Kingdom Representative had stressed the need for a collective response by European member countries and associated himself with these comments.

8. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that in developing a responsible collective response, care must be taken to avoid undue haste or inadequate consideration. He welcomed the fact that the Alliance had waited until a political, military and economic reassessment was available before considering how to strengthen the Western defence system. He felt that discussions in the Council and the Defence Planning Committee and the statements of responsible high-ranking officials in the various countries had brought to light a remarkable identity of views concerning the significance of recent events. His Government took the view that, although the fundamental objectives and political strategy of the Alliance remained basically unchanged, the political and military situation in Europe had altered so radically that it was now essential to consider realistically how to face up to this new situation. In future planning, account would have to be taken of certain new factors affecting East-West relations: the presence of at least 200,000 Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia; their high degree of discipline and mobility, bearing witness to an increased readiness; the willingness of certain Warsaw Pact members to participate in an act of aggression against a fellow member country; the deep concern of countries such as Yugoslavia, Rumania and Austria at the possibility of Soviet intervention and certain clumsy and unwarranted Soviet political action e.g. the Soviet propaganda attacks on Germany and Berlin.

Although there were no serious grounds for thinking that the Soviet Union might take military action against a member of the Alliance or Berlin, recent events had demonstrated that the Soviet Union's intentions were unforeseeable and had enhanced the element of uncertainty in international relations. There could be no doubt that this represented a threat to world security.

9. Turning to defence problems, the United States Representative said that, after considering ways and means of improving the NATO defence posture, his Government had come to the conclusion that the permanent strength of the NATO forces should not be increased but that their capability should be improved from the standpoint of quality, training, equipment, reserves and mobility. This applied especially to the Central Europe region and vulnerable Mediterranean areas. Should NATO fail to take military measures, its inactivity would heighten the danger of an error of judgement by the Soviet leaders and justify current public anxiety. Consequently, it was a matter of urgency to decide what form NATO's military response should take. He would have a number of comments to make on the recommendations in DPC/D(68)30 which, he felt, were lacking in clarity and forcefulness; these would relate, in particular, to the re-deployment of units, the distinction between capabilities and intentions and the lack of a detailed study of the financial and balance of payments repercussions of the measures recommended. On the United States contribution, he wished to point out that, except in the case of NATO-assigned Army and Air Force units which had been re-deployed in the United States, this had not been reduced when compared with the force goals laid down in Lisbon in 1952; in fact, it had been considerably increased during various crises. Furthermore, as certain units had twin bases, duplicate key equipment had had to be procured, with a resultant increase in expenditures, despite the fact that the United States defence budget was being reduced. As for the future, his Government intended to abide by its commitments to the Alliance. He stated that on 9th October, the 22nd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, which had been recalled from France to the United States in 1966, would return to Germany during an Exercise.

10. As regards the tasks to be carried out in the weeks ahead, he expressed the view that the Ministerial meeting was still too far off for the Council to propose firm commitments to Governments or prepare a statement which might be made by Ministers following the meeting. He felt that prior to the informal meeting in New York, the Council should simply agree on a joint assessment of the situation and approve decisions on certain collective measures so that Governments could consider what steps were open to each of them in the light of the political and military situation as described in the various reports. In his view, these were fields in which the Council

and the DPC could take decisions on the basis of instructions from Member Governments. He was unable to comment on the political report C-M(68)43 being without instructions on this subject. He felt that a summary outlining the main points in the political and military analysis and referring to economic implications and the crisis management action would be extremely useful.

11. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, broadly speaking, he agreed with the report by the Chairman of the Political Committee. However, he would have preferred the report to focus more strongly on the significance of the Czech crisis and its implications for the Warsaw Pact. The crisis had shown that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a collective security organization for the legitimate defence of Eastern Europe, but an instrument for maintaining the Soviet hold on a weakened empire. He would also have wished for a more specific distinction to be drawn between the short-term and long-term aspects of the situation. In the short-term, the West, which was faced with a tense and difficult situation, must refrain from any action which would suggest to the Soviet Union that it was free to continue exerting pressure on Czechoslovakia or other countries; this would entail increased vigilance at the political and military levels. In the long-term, the Soviet action would condemn itself; in this connection, he would have preferred the quotation from the Harmel Report in paragraph 36 on the two basic objectives of the Alliance: "defence and détente", to be placed at the beginning of the report as a general principle on which the political evaluation as a whole was based. Subject to a few drafting amendments, he was prepared to adopt the report C-M(68)43 as a Council document expressing the solidarity of the fifteen member countries of the Alliance. It would be more difficult for him to approve the military document, in which there was no clear logical tie between the premises and the conclusions relating to the direct or indirect nature of the threat. He felt, too, that the recommendations did not follow-on from the assessment which preceded them. Nor had he found any answer to the essential question of whether and, if so, in what way, the situation in Czechoslovakia had compromised the security of the Alliance. He also recommended that the political and military assessments, in which he had found a number of discrepancies, should be brought into line. On the question of procedure, he felt that if the Council was agreeable to a preparation of a summary of the political report, it would be preferable to aim at a more comprehensive summary covering the essential points in both the political and military reports, with a view to the New York meeting. Subsequently, the Council could take the appropriate decisions on the political evaluation and the military recommendations so as to pave the way for the Ministerial meeting.

12. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had originally considered that instead of embarking on a lengthy discussion of the documents themselves, the Council should attempt to extract from them a number of conclusions and recommendations for submission to Ministers. In this way, it would have achieved the aim it had set itself in calling for a political and military assessment - namely, to prepare the way for a Ministerial meeting which would close with a public statement. In the light of previous remarks, he appreciated the desirability of approving all the documents, on condition that views did not differ too greatly on their substance. Turning first of all to the political document, he said that in order to assist in reaching an agreement he was prepared to approve the report as a whole, although he had a few points of substance to make. He agreed that a shorter version might later have to be prepared for Ministers, and said that he would be willing to submit a draft. However, he doubted whether this task could be completed before the New York meeting. None the less, he would fall in with any arrangements which seemed workable.

13. Generally speaking, he felt that the political report was well-balanced and realistic. However, referring to the analysis of Soviet motivations, he expressed the view that it was wrong to deal with strategic considerations before ideological, political, economic and other factors. Nor had he found any references to the strict control exercised by Soviet bureaucracy. He agreed with the summary in paragraph 17 to the effect that the central and overriding general motivation for the Soviet move was "a defensive concern about a process of erosion of the political, economic, and military integrity of the Warsaw Pact and socialist bloc.....". However, he pointed out that these defensive requirements did not prevent the Soviet leaders from taking up a belligerent and aggressive attitude, as was demonstrated by certain of their actions with regard to the non-Communist world in recent weeks. He also recalled that since Mr. Brezhnev's speech on 29th March, 1968, following the final ousting of Novotny, the Soviet leaders had taken a more authoritarian line in their domestic policy, resulting in a tightening of ideological discipline, increased censorship, propaganda attacks on Jews and foreigners, etc. He felt that the wording of paragraph 34 was not very satisfactory. In connection with paragraph 35, he commented that there were also important political aspects to the problem of crisis management arrangements, which was considered from the technical standpoint in the report by the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group. NATO's rather passive reaction to the indirect threat levelled against countries near Czechoslovakia as a result of the Soviet intervention had had a very demoralising effect on civil populations, especially in the Federal Republic, and it was important to remedy these shortcomings.

14. His Authorities could approve the military document and the recommendations set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 thereof. His Government considered that the countries taking part in the NATO Defence Programme should take appropriate measures so that the Alliance remained capable - even in the military situation which had changed to its disadvantage - of ensuring the security of the NATO area; this was necessary for political and psychological as well as military reasons. Neither the Soviet Union nor public opinion in the NATO countries must be given the impression that the reserve shown by the Alliance in recent weeks was a sign of weakness and that it was unable to react to a changed military situation. On the other hand, there was a danger that the vociferous announcement of military measures by NATO might make it easier for the Soviet Union to strengthen the Warsaw Pact and place its allies in a position of even greater dependence. It was therefore essential to make it quite clear that any military measures on the part of the Alliance were designed solely to counter the new situation which had arisen and to reaffirm the goals with respect to détente laid down in the Harmel Report, stressing at the same time the continuing readiness of the NATO member countries to consider arms control and disarmament measures and a balanced reduction of forces. In connection with the recommendations to Governments in paragraph 36, he made the following comments:

- as the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr had stated at the 41st meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session on 28th September, 1968, the Federal Republic had continued to improve its military contribution during the present year. During this period, it had assigned seven HAWK batteries to NATO and a further three batteries would be assigned before the end of the year. Germany had also assigned to NATO two F104G attack squadrons and one F104G strike squadron, together with one F104G squadron and one Breguet Atlantic squadron from the Fleet Air Arm. In the naval field, one squadron of ten landing craft and one submarine squadron consisting of six vessels had been assigned to NATO. In addition, the Federal Republic was making great efforts to realise the dual capability of strike squadrons, as required by SACEUR. In the near future, seven F104G strike squadrons with an attack capability would be made available to NATO;
- as a first effect of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Germany had cancelled the conversion of nine army combat battalions to training units. In the near future, 9,000 reservists would be called up for a four-week training period in army combat and communications units;

- if, as a result of their consultations, member countries agreed on the need for increased defence efforts, the Federal Government was prepared to consider increasing the proposed 1969 defence expenditures.

15. In conclusion, he stressed that any increase in the German defence effort would raise special political problems for the Federal Republic and the Alliance. He felt that it would be a pity to complicate the endeavours of the Czechoslovak Government to secure the evacuation of most of the invading forces and help the Soviet Union to strengthen the Warsaw Pact. He therefore stressed the need for joint action so that member countries would improve their military contribution to the common defence and would not, under any circumstances, reduce this contribution unilaterally.

16. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE began by stating that his Delegation had no firm views on how the reports submitted to the Council should be handled. His sole concern was to ensure that adequate preparations were made for the Ministers' discussion in New York and the advanced Ministerial meeting. He wholeheartedly supported the United Kingdom Representative's recommendations that the European countries directly concerned should face up to their responsibilities. Stating that his Authorities were in broad agreement with the political and military reports as a basis for discussion, he reserved the right to make a number of comments when these documents were considered in detail. Generally speaking, he had noted with satisfaction that the documents prepared by the various Committees with a view to an overall assessment of the situation clearly acknowledged that radical changes had occurred and that the most notable feature of the situation was an increased uncertainty about future Soviet actions. This uncertainty, to which the Italian Delegation had drawn attention from the outset, was a basic idea in both the political and military documents. He had also noted that the political report contained a very detailed analysis of the direct and indirect implications for the Alliance of this fluid situation which, in view of the increased capability of the Warsaw Pact forces - together with the absence of strategic warning time - the wider range of initiatives now open to these forces and possible repercussions in the Mediterranean, was a source of lively anxiety which the latest reports were far from allaying. In this connection, he informed the Council of a number of reports which the Italian Government had received from its embassies in Sofia and Tirana. According to these sources, Albanian press and radio attacks on Yugoslavia had been discontinued for over a week; also Yugoslavia appeared to be taking mobilisation measures, directed principally at strengthening defences on the Adriatic. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Sofia reported that during his recent visit to the Bulgarian Government, Marshal Yakubovsky

had asked the Bulgarians to agree to the stationing of a Soviet division in Bulgaria within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Should this be confirmed (for the moment, the Bulgarians denied that any such request had been made) it would suggest that the object of Marshal Yakubovsky's visit to the Warsaw Pact capitals was to ensure a Soviet military presence in all the member countries, including Rumania, so as to establish a more reliable military link between the USSR and Bulgaria via Rumanian territory. Finally, a Communiqué from the official Bulgarian Press Agency denied that Bulgaria had any territorial aspirations in Yugoslavia and accused NATO of trying to stir up trouble in the Balkans. It was also reported that the Bulgarian press was displaying some irritation at what it called a "political idyll" between Yugoslavia and Albania.

17. In the Italian Government's view, the uncertainty characterising the present situation derived from the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia, where it was impossible to forecast future developments, the apparent threat to other Communist countries, and especially Yugoslavia, the repercussions which military action against Rumania and Yugoslavia could have in the Mediterranean and the situation which had arisen in the Mediterranean as a result of the Middle East crisis - the future trend of which could not be foreseen - and the presence of an ever-increasing Soviet naval force which was beginning to give rise to serious political and military problems. Having condemned the action against Czechoslovakia in the strongest language, the Italian Government was determined, on the basis of the present assessment to take whatever action was necessary in order to step up its contribution to the defensive effort of the Alliance. In view of the heightened Soviet threat, his Government considered that the operational capability of the Italian armed forces must be increased so as better to protect - within the NATO framework - the areas for which it was responsible. This was felt to be all the more necessary since, the threat being directed primarily against Europe, it was for the European members of the Alliance to do their utmost to increase their contribution to the common defence effort. On the practical level, the Italian Government had considered a series of measures with a view to:

- achieving the force goals recommended by SACEUR for 1973; this would be done by bringing existing units up to a fully operational level as soon as possible and by taking appropriate steps to convert and modernise a number of units;
- gradually improving the effectiveness of army, naval and air force units until the NATO standards were achieved;

- gradually bringing equipment, weapons and stocks up to the proposed levels.

Consideration would be given to making a special effort in the case of tanks, new naval units, aircraft and army and air force infrastructure;

- meeting the new requirements which had arisen in the field of anti-submarine warfare and equipment for landing operations as a result of the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean; this applied particularly to the Sicilian Channel and the Straits of Otranto and Sardinia.

18. In conclusion, he stressed that in deciding on these measures which, although they were not spectacular or likely to give rise to unwelcome reactions, would underline its determination to strengthen the Alliance, his Government proposed at the same time to reaffirm the peaceful objectives laid down in the Harmel Report, namely, defence and détente. His Government would also continue to work for a gradual improvement in the East-West relations, and for the achievement of the necessary arms control and disarmament agreements and mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

19. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE reported that the Committee of Chiefs of Staff which had examined document DPC/D(68)30 at its meeting on 28th September, had made a number of changes which had been circulated in Corrigendum No. 2 to the document in question. He added that the Military Committee had since received, and was currently considering, specific proposals regarding the measures which countries should take to improve the force posture.

20. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept the political report as a whole although he felt that in certain sections it did not go far enough. As regards the Mediterranean in particular, he thought that the wording of paragraph 46 was not entirely apt and that paragraph 47 was too sketchy. His Government could however accept paragraph 48 which reflected its own thinking. It did not propose to make any amendments. He could support both the military and the economic reports which he had found extremely discerning. Generally speaking, he felt that the four reports adequately cleared the ground for the Ministerial meeting. Of the different forms of follow-up action proposed, he personally would be in favour of a summary. However, the procedure suggested by the Canadian Representative had seemed too intricate. In view of the rapidly approaching date of the New York meeting, he wondered whether the best solution would not be to leave it to the Chairman to list the ideas on which there was a consensus

so that the Ministers could decide whether there was any need to explore them further in preparation for the Ministerial meeting which would be held in December or earlier. Speaking for himself he thought that such a list of points of agreement could provide the basis for a communiqué.

21. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his position was very similar to that of his Turkish colleague. While he thought that it would be necessary to make a summary of the main points in the political and military reports, he did not think that this was an essential prerequisite for an unofficial meeting between Ministers and he was willing to leave it to the Chairman to report on the outcome of the discussions. He was ready to approve the reports as a whole without going into matters of detail. From the standpoint of substance, he thought that the studies submitted to the Council provided a comprehensive picture of the situation and made clear the reasons why the Alliance had adopted a wait-and-see policy which would lend greater weight to its future actions. He had noted with satisfaction that paragraph 36 of the political report referred to the two main goals of "defence" and "détente" which had been defined in the Harmel Report. The situation being what it was, he considered it vital to impress on public opinion that the Alliance was as united as ever particularly on the problem of Berlin and not to make any statement which would involve NATO and the Warsaw Pact as such and which might cause embarrassment to the Czech leaders. By and large, he could support the recommendations set out in the military document, He had noted that these recommendations were designed primarily to remedy shortcomings without calling in question the entire defence posture of the Alliance. He concluded by saying that, as he saw it, the preparatory work for the Ministerial meeting would not really start until after the meeting of Ministers in New York.

22. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that on the whole he could accept the political report and expressed the hope that delegations would keep their amendments to a minimum in order that the Committee's reports might be approved as Council documents. As regards the next step, he would be inclined to accept the Turkish Representative's suggestion in view of the short time available to the Council before the New York meeting to reach agreement on conclusions. Turning to the military report, he said that his Government supported the conclusions and recommendations which that document contained. It agreed in particular with the order of priorities which the situation warranted. It could likewise accept the budgetary implications provided that other countries adopted the same position. It would consider agreement in the Council as evidence of joint determination and would then be prepared to consider the practical measures involved. A conclusion which seemed to emerge from

this evaluation of the situation was that while the quest for détente was still one of the goals sought by the Alliance, the action taken by the Warsaw Pact forces would indubitably entail changes in the order of priorities. On the question of subsequent meetings, it was his Government's hope that the date of the Ministerial meeting would be set as soon as possible. He was aware that there was as yet no agreement on the need for an early meeting. If such agreement were reached however, the decision should be announced as soon as possible in the interests of NATO's prestige.

23. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE felt that document C-M(68)43 was a balanced paper which would provide a sound basis for discussion at the New York meeting to the extent that it was possible to pass judgement on a situation which was constantly changing. He agreed that a summary would have been a help to the Ministers and could have constituted a first step in the establishment of a joint evaluation. However, there was a risk that such a summary might anticipate Ministerial directives and jeopardise the possibility of agreement on the report as it stood. He therefore supported the proposal put forward by the Turkish Representative and would be ready to agree that document C-M(68)43 become a Council document in its present form. He considered the document in question to be important since it contained information which could provide a basis for the decisions to be taken in the political and military spheres. He had been glad to note the reassertion in paragraph 36 that détente remained the political goal of the Alliance and that it was not only a necessity in the nuclear age but also the only political goal consistent with Western values. There was also the question of the political attitude to be adopted after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his view, the aggressors should be condemned on behalf of the world community but not in such a way as to close the door to those who might wish for a rapprochement and care should be taken to avoid any step which might hamper an agreement with the USSR on disarmament or hold up the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. He hoped consultations would continue with a view to the adoption of the course of action in keeping with the situation. As regards security, he felt that the recent events had highlighted the need for a sustained defence effort. His Government could, generally speaking, accept the conclusions of DPC/D(68)30. He recalled that in June 1968, the Norwegian Parliament had approved a long-term military programme covering the period 1969-1973 which would entail a 2.5% increase in the defence budget for five years as well as increased prices. A preliminary study of the measures needed to strengthen the defence posture had also been started.

24. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE agreed on the whole with the assessment given in the political report which in his view was a balanced document. However, he did not believe that the distinction between a direct and indirect threat from the Soviet Union was as clear-cut as the document claimed. He recalled that in his message to Mr. Rusk on 30th August, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington had emphasized that the Soviet Union had a responsibility to defend socialism and, to his mind, it would be difficult to know just how far this responsibility would extend. Desirable though détente might be, he doubted whether this goal could be attained at the present time unless the West were prepared to accept the conditions laid down by the Soviet Union. In this connection, he felt that paragraph 30 should be worded more explicitly and that paragraphs 47 and 48 which dealt with the situation in the Mediterranean were not sufficiently forceful. He went on to add that intelligence reports he had received bore out the information provided by the Italian Representative on the part played by Bulgaria in the Warsaw Pact. Turning to the military report, he said that the Greek General Staff, which was aware of the threat as described in paragraph 12, was examining the possibility of improving home defences in depth and of increasing Greek participation in NATO Commands and the number of Greek forces under NATO command. His Government, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the report, was planning to increase its defence expenditure and to assign to this chapter credits originally earmarked for social and economic programmes. As for procedure, he supported the proposal of the Turkish Representative.

25. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE expressed the view that procedure and substance were closely linked. While the final aim was to reach agreement on the assessment of the situation and the conclusions to be drawn from it, he did not believe that Governments were ready to make an early statement on the measures they intended to take. He therefore felt that procedure must be elaborated in the light of the degree of urgency, the ultimate object being the preparation of the Ministerial meeting and the immediate object the New York meeting. He was, therefore, willing to agree in principle to the documents on the understanding that there would be a subsequent discussion on the conclusions. He would suggest that for the New York meeting, a very brief aide-mémoire be drafted highlighting the main points of the political and military documents.

26. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received no instructions from his Authorities and recalled that his country was not in a position to undertake fresh international commitments at the present time. This being said, however, he thought that the political report should be accepted and would of itself constitute an excellent basis for discussion by Ministers. As regards procedure, he could concur with the proposal of the Turkish Representative.

27. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE, after recalling that his Minister of Foreign Affairs would not be present in New York, agreed that it should be left to the Chairman to sum up the discussion if, as he feared, it proved physically impossible for the Council to agree on a summary before the New York meeting. He could approve the general lines of the political report and added that his Government's position as regards relations with the East was very close to that described by the Norwegian Representative. He remarked in conclusion that since Iceland had no armed force, it could not comment on DPC/D(68)30.

28. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE referred to a suggestion he had made as regards the possibility of agreement on an amended version of the political report. Of the other formulas proposed, the Canadian idea of a summary of the military and political reports would be unacceptable to the French Delegation which had not contributed to the drafting of DPC/D(68)30 in the Defence Planning Committee. He would not be opposed in principle to the idea of the summary or of draft recommendations to the Ministers but, as he had already pointed out, it would be far more difficult to reach agreement on a shorter document. In any case, he would be unable to approve a document which had not been discussed and submitted to the Council for approval before the New York meeting.

29. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE felt that agreement on the political document would not be impossible. He added that a detailed examination would have the advantage of bringing out the points on which there was already agreement. This procedure would not rule out the possibility of a summary which might incorporate the chapter headings of the report or of a verbal report by the Chairman to Ministers.

30. The CHAIRMAN was doubtful about the possibility of making a summary when the Council had done no more than make a superficial study which had revealed a certain measure of agreement on the document as a whole. He was quite prepared to report in New York on the discussions that had just taken place, but did not think that it would be feasible to reach agreement on a summary or on recommendations in the time which was left.

31. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government was concerned primarily with obtaining firm indications of what Governments were prepared to do in terms of defence, its aim being to establish whether the results which could be expected would warrant a special Ministerial meeting. According to the statements just made, it was his impression that a number of Governments were in fact considering measures, and he accordingly hoped that a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee could be held with a view to beginning a joint evaluation of the defence situation and of assembling information on the means of stepping up defence programmes. Although he could understand

the distinction made by the French Representative between the political and military reports, he remarked that they dealt with two inseparable aspects of one and the same problem. However, he was prepared to take part in an examination of the political report although his instructions would not allow him to go beyond an agreement of principle and although he had not yet been briefed on the amendments which his Authorities would like to make.

32. Summing up the discussion, the CHAIRMAN noted that the broad outlines of both the military and political reports had been accepted and that any structural change seemed unlikely. He suggested that the Political Committee at Senior Level should be instructed to examine document C-M(68)43 in detail together with any amendments which might be put forward. To make it easier to reach agreement he would ask delegations to submit only amendments which they felt were essential. The military report would be examined by the Defence Planning Committee.

33. The COUNCIL:

- (1) instructed the Political Committee at Senior Level to prepare a revised version of document C-M(68)43 for the next meeting, it being understood that delegations would endeavour to limit their amendments as far as possible;
- (2) agreed that the Defence Planning Committee would undertake the detailed examination of document DPC/D(68)30.

NATO SECRET

II. DETAILED EXAMINATION OF C-M(68)43

34. The ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL for POLITICAL AFFAIRS introduced the revised version of document C-M(68)43 as drafted by the Political Committee at Senior Level. He reported that discussion had centred in the main on the amendments proposed by the French Delegation. The document had been approved as a whole with the exception, however, of two sentences in paragraph 37 on which the French Delegation had reserved its position, and of paragraphs 43 and 44, which dealt with the German problem and Berlin and which would be discussed later. He wished, however, to call the attention of the Council to the fact that, while one delegation had consented not to submit its amendments provided that other delegations followed suit, a second delegation had been unable to do so. In addition, draft summaries and conclusions and/or recommendations had been submitted by Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and the International Staff. He would be grateful, therefore, for Council guidance on how the work should be continued.

35. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that there were in fact three questions:

- examination of the report proper, with the French reservation which had yet to be dealt with;
- the possibility of new amendments;
- follow-up on the draft conclusions.

36. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would be prepared not to submit amendments to the report and withdraw the draft conclusions prepared by his delegation, provided that the other delegations did likewise and that another procedure could be devised. He acknowledged that it was always difficult to draft an objective summary which faithfully reflected the weight attaching to the different sections of a document. However, he felt that the approach of the International Staff which had simply extracted comments and sentences implying action and recommendations, could be accepted.

37. The CHAIRMAN wondered whether the best solution would not be to adopt the report as it stood and at a later stage consider draft conclusions and recommendations for the Ministerial meeting. If Ministers in New York wished to know more about the discussion, he would be ready to answer their questions.

38. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he would be unable to take part in a detailed examination of the report but he attached considerable importance to the preparation of a summary. He hoped that the Political Committee would be able to examine the four drafts and prepare a compromise document for submission to Ministers in New York.

39. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported by the Turkish and French Representatives, urged that the Council examine the document prepared by the Political Committee on its instructions since it had not yet seen the draft summaries.

40. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE endorsed this suggestion. He would be willing to discuss and approve within certain limits the report as amended by the Political Committee. To make agreement easier, he urged delegations to refrain from tabling fresh amendments so that the Chairman could have a firm basis either for a written report, if it proved possible for the Council to approve it, or, alternatively, for a verbal report.

41. Following this exchange of views, the Council examined the paragraphs amended by the Political Committee.

42. In paragraph 32, last sentence, Albania and Austria were added to the list of countries on which Soviet pressure might be exerted although the French and Danish Representatives pointed out that Austria had a special status.

43. The GREEK and ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES took the opportunity of emphasising the importance of the part played by Albania, given its political attitude and its key-position in terms of the defence of the south-eastern flank.

44. Referring to paragraph 36, the CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would not ask for amendments but would nevertheless have preferred this paragraph to be confined to long-term problems. He recalled that, in his view, the distinction between the long and the short-term and its implications from the standpoint of future policy, was not brought out sufficiently clearly in the document.

45. Paragraph 37. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said he could agree ad referendum to this paragraph provided that the last part of the sentence, which referred to a favourable climate for consolidating the position of the Alliance, were deleted.

46. Paragraph 39. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could not support a text which did not emphasise the conviction that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. He remarked that reiteration of NATO solidarity was particularly important to his country.

47. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE explained that the amendment proposed by his Delegation had been designed to reflect paragraph 7 of the Harmel Report.

48. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported by the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italian Representatives, proposed that the point made by the German Representative should be accepted but that a reference be made to paragraph 7 of the Harmel Report in order to show that this conviction had already been expressed in the past.

49. The ITALIAN and BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVES urged that paragraphs 43 and 44, which had been drafted by the four countries more directly concerned, should be submitted in due course to the other delegations.

50. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE suggested that the paragraphs contained in document C-M(68)43, should be kept in the revised report and that a footnote be added to the effect that a new form of words would be submitted later.

51. Paragraph 45. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE, supported by the Italian Representative, asked that the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean be mentioned in this paragraph as one of the reasons which had contributed to the greater instability of the international situation.

52. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supported by the Danish, French and Turkish Representatives, remarked that this amendment would overlap with paragraph 47 in which the same idea was expressed. He added that the presence of the fleet was only one aspect of Soviet action in the Mediterranean and that the extent of the problem must not be limited.

53. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE agreed to withdraw his amendment provided that emphasis was laid on the fact that there was increasing cause for concern regarding security in the area under review.

54. Paragraph 46. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE requested the deletion of the last sentence since, as he saw it, there was no evidence that the USSR, following the adverse reaction to its intervention in Central Europe "may be more reluctant to restrain its Arab associates".

55. The TURKISH and ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES could not accept this amendment. They remarked that the increased presence of the Soviet fleet, and recent Soviet threats against Israel provided confirmation that the Soviet Union was not seeking to bring about a pacification of the Middle East.

56. Concluding its discussion, the COUNCIL:

- (1) noted that the United States Delegation had not yet received instructions enabling it to accept the document and that paragraphs 43 and 44 would have to be examined later;
- (2) noted that a number of delegations were prepared to approve ad referendum the new version of document C-M(68)43, as drafted by the Political Committee at Senior Level, as well as the amendments agreed during the discussion;
- (3) invited the Political Committee at Senior Level to continue its examination of the draft summaries submitted by Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and the International Staff, with a view to preparing a common draft for the next meeting.

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III. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Document: C-M(68)42

57. The CHAIRMAN introduced the report by the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group on the crisis management aspects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia (C-M(68)42). He recalled that this document had been prepared in accordance with the instructions given in paragraph 7(ii) of PO/68/473. The report contained a frank description of the weaknesses which the crisis had revealed and the measures to be taken to overcome them:

- the need to improve some procedures of the Alliance;
- the importance of improvements to be made to some of the equipment available in the Situation Centre;
- the need to improve arrangements for summarising, collating and disseminating intelligence, information and assessments.

He added that Section IV - General lessons of the crisis - provided a useful guide for the action required, while Section V contained concrete recommendations on which a decision by the Council or the Defence Planning Committee would have to be taken.

58. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had already drawn the Council's attention to the political aspect of the problem of reaction time in periods of crisis. It was essential that NATO and the nations should be able to use the information they received in such a way as to allow them to take the necessary decisions without delay. He thought that the recommendations of the Working Group would help to improve in periods of crisis the possibilities of quick reaction by NATO and member countries in so far as the Council, by a collective exchange of views, and the nations themselves would examine the problem and the concrete solutions to be adopted. In conclusion, he said that he had no objection to the document itself and was able to accept it.

59. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE took the view that the Working Group's report, which suggested the ways and means of improving procedures, should be considered more as a document of a housekeeping nature, which should be brought to the attention of Ministers without having to be approved by them. As he saw it, the basic problem was that of controlling the volume of intelligence material disseminated, and any measure tending to increase this volume should be taken only after careful consideration of its likely effects. Referring to

paragraph 22(11), he pointed out that, if the summary of political and military data and the national assessments were added to the flow of raw material, this would result in an unnecessary increase in the already sizeable amount of disseminated information. He added that national assessments should have priority over the dissemination of raw information. This comment also held good for sub-paragraph 8(a) of the proposed procedures for supporting consultation. In conclusion, he said that he could accept the document and the recommendations contained therein.

60. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE acknowledged that this "self-criticism" document did not carry the same weight as the political and military reports on which decisions had to be based. While agreeing with the recommendations set out in paragraph 23, he thought that the self-criticism should go further and that the lesson should be drawn from the remarks made by SACEUR, in paragraph 5 of his analysis of Soviet action, regarding the detection and reporting of airborne movements in Czechoslovakia. If the Working Group's recommendations were accepted, he would suggest that the Secretary General enquire what measures of vigilance had been taken by Governments, and that regular reports be submitted to the Council.

61. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE informed the Council that his Authorities approved G-M(68)42 and were studying the ways and means of applying at national level the measures described in paragraph 8 of Annex A.

62. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the excellent report at reference, which he could accept, should be applied as recommended by the International Staff. He did not share the Canadian Representative's views regarding the status of the document, since it was the intelligence system that constituted the keystone of all political and military decisions. As far as the amount of data to be disseminated was concerned, he recognised that a certain optimum level should not be exceeded, but he wished to point out that in the course of the last crisis criticism had been directed more at the inadequacy of the information received. The problem did not consist in determining whether the volume of information was too great but whether the screening was carried out properly.

63. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government accepted the report, which provided a very useful set of guidelines for national authorities. He also took the view that during the recent crisis complaints had been made by national services of an inadequate information output from NATO. While acknowledging the excessive amount of raw material in some cases, he nevertheless felt that the Situation Centre, especially if it was capable of some data discrimination, provided

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the best existing source of information. He concluded by expressing the wish that the Council take a speedy decision on the proposed improvements so as to allow the Alliance to be prepared for any contingency.

64. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the Working Group's recommendations which, if applied, would significantly improve crisis management procedures in general. In view of the importance it attached to the implementation of the measures in question, his Government wished the shortcomings and weaknesses revealed by the Czech crisis to be brought to the knowledge of Ministers so that a remedy could be found in the future.

65. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said he had noted that the document at reference was a first report which could be amplified later. He thought that in its present form it showed a practical approach to the various problems. As for the dissemination of information, he said he would be in favour of a certain selection being made of raw data. The question of the assessment of information in the capitals should, he thought, be treated with greater caution since each country had its own views on the situation. He expressed the wish that the procedures contained in Annex A be reviewed, in particular paragraphs 1(5) and 1(6), which were related to paragraph 22(11) of the main document. In conclusion, he wished to obtain more details on the summaries to be circulated to delegations and on the assessments to be transmitted to capitals and Major Commanders.

66. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government had been satisfied with the quality and quantity of the reports speedily and regularly disseminated by the Situation Centre and that it supported all the measures which would allow the Alliance to improve its intelligence mechanism in the event of a new crisis. He went on to say that he wished to propose three amendments. First, he requested that a clearer description of the respective decision-making rôles of the Alliance and Governments be given in paragraph 22(17). To this end, he asked that "collective decision-making" be replaced by "in the process of reaching co-ordinated governmental decisions". With reference to paragraphs 9 and 13, which mentioned that three governments of the Alliance had been given prior notice by the Soviet Ambassadors in their capitals of impending action he wished to point out that Ambassador Dobrynin had been received by President Johnson at 8.15 a.m. and that a translation of his message had been completed by 9.00 a.m. (Washington time), which coincided approximately with the time of AP's report of the invasion. He recommended that this paragraph be made less specific. In conclusion, he requested the deletion of the first sentence of paragraph 13 which criticized the political authorities of the countries which had received notification of the decision.

67. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the first amendment requested by the United States Representative raised a delicate political and constitutional problem. He recalled that the Council was empowered to take decisions upon the instructions of Governments. The only reason he could see to amend the report was if the text might be interpreted as implying that the Council was competent to take decisions independently.

68. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE proposed that reference be made to "the Council's rôle as a focal point in a crisis".

69. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that C-M(68)42 was of only marginal interest to his Delegation since it concerned more the military than the political authorities. Following the remarks made by the United States Representative on paragraphs 9 and 13, he was surprised at the importance given in an essentially military document to political and diplomatic moves. He felt that in such a serious crisis it was not up to the politicians or diplomats to set the military machine in motion. For this reason, he supported the amendment proposed by the United States Representative, as well as the amendment to paragraph 22(17). With regard to Annex A, paragraph 1(8), he accepted the French translation of "demander" for the verb "be invited".

70. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE, referring to paragraph 22(17), pointed out that the United States amendment could be justified only if it was possible that Governments might be unable to take a decision and that the Council took it for them. If the amendment was accepted, he would have to ask his Authorities for instructions.

71. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE, by way of compromise, proposed the following general form of words: "In order to enable the Council fully to discharge its functions in a crisis, it is advisable to review....".

72. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, supported by his Netherlands colleague, said in connection with the remark by the United States Representative on paragraphs 9 and 13, that the United Kingdom Government was prepared to admit that it should have informed NATO of the Soviet Ambassador's notification and to undertake that such an omission would not recur in the future.

73. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE proposed the following two solutions: either delete the first sentence of paragraph 13, on the understanding that he would inform his Authorities of the general feeling that earlier warning should have been given to NATO, and that the other two Governments in question accepted this criticism, or replace the first sentence of paragraph 13 by the following words: "As has been noted, there was some delay in nations' opening up communication contacts within the Alliance after the news of the invasion broke".

74. The CHAIRMAN suggested that both solutions be adopted. Referring to the comment by the French Representative, he pointed out that NATO was a political organization and, as such, it was important that it should receive information from national political authorities.

75. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE expressed a basic reservation on this point. In his view this rôle did not belong to Governments but to the responsible services, i.e. the military organizations and intelligence services. From the practical point of view, he did not think that the conditions of work of most Government services allowed them to inform the military authorities rapidly.

76. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supported by his Turkish colleague, acknowledged that civil channels did not always allow information to be transmitted as speedily as military channels. However, in exceptional crises it was important that Governments should make a special effort to warn their Allies. Referring to the recommended measures, he stressed the advantages of adapting civil procedures to the computer age.

77. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that his comments had been made solely in response to a remark by the United States Representative and that he did not question the need for the Allies to keep one another informed. He added that he could accept the recommendations contained in paragraph 23, in so far as they concerned the French Government.

78. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE approved the report as a whole although he had a few comments to make on the dissemination of raw information.

79. The CHAIRMAN in conclusion, noted that the recommendations contained in document C-M(68)42 could be regarded as approved and that three amendments would have to be made to the text of the report, one to paragraph 9, one to paragraph 13 and the other to paragraph 22(17) - subject to confirmation by the Turkish Delegation(1), and that France supported the recommendations in paragraph 23 only in so far as it was concerned. He thought that the Working Group's attention should be drawn to the important comments made by the Canadian, Danish, Greek and Turkish Representatives on the volume and nature of the information disseminated, and to those made by the German Representative both on this subject and at the meeting held on 1st October on the indirect threat. With regard to paragraph 22(12), he said that the Working Group would review the arrangements for exchanging information.

(1) Confirmation received on 9th October.

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80. The COUNCIL, bearing in mind the comments made by the Chairman in paragraph 79 above:

- (1) took note of the report at reference;
- (2) agreed that, in a developing situation, the Secretary General (or any delegation) should draw the attention of the Council/DPC and the Military Committee to the suggested procedures set out at Annex A for supporting consultation in the NAC/DPC with a view to their implementation by national capitals, the NATO Headquarters and the NATO Military Authorities;
- (3) agreed to invite the NATO Military Authorities to analyse the measures of the NATO Alert System in order to determine which of these could, if necessary, be implemented covertly as distinct from overtly;
- (4) noted that the Council Operations and Exercise Co-ordination Working Group in consultation, as necessary, with the NMAs:
 - (a) was preparing for consideration by the Council/DPC a booklet of agreed emergency procedures which were relevant to crisis management in a period of tension;
 - (b) was arranging for delegations to be briefed on the measures and procedural arrangements in the agreed NATO Alert System;
 - (c) would re-examine procedures for calling the Council at short notice and would arrange periodic tests;
- (5) agreed that the following measures should be implemented:
 - (a) the early provision in the Situation Centre of An Agence France Presse and a Reuters wire service teletype in addition to the existing Associated Press Service;
 - (b) the acquisition of a high speed large volume Xerox machine for use in the Situation Centre;
 - (c) the expedition to the fullest extent possible of the already agreed fully automatic switching equipment for the NATO-wide system at Evère;

- (d) the earliest possible activation of the second (United Kingdom) switching centre for the NATO-wide Communications System and the provision of its related circuits;
- (e) the early provision of sufficient specially trained personnel for the purpose of ensuring continuous watch in the Situation Centre.

OTAN/NATO,
Brussels, 39.