

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(65)6

Summary record of a meeting of the Council, held
at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIIe.,
on Wednesday, 10th February, 1965, at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio

<u>BELGIUM</u> Mr. A. de Staercke	<u>GREECE</u> Mr. Christian X. Palamas	<u>NORWAY</u> Mr. G. Kristiansen
<u>CANADA</u> Mr. R.H. Jay	<u>ICELAND</u> Mr. P. Thorsteinsson	<u>PORTUGAL</u> Mr. V. da Cunha
<u>DENMARK</u> Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	<u>ITALY</u> Mr. C. Orlandi Contucci	<u>TURKEY</u> Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u> Mr. François Seydoux	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u> Mr. P. Reuter	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u> Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
<u>GERMANY</u> Mr. W.G. Grewe	<u>NETHERLANDS</u> Mr. H. Scheltema	<u>UNITED STATES</u> Mr. T.K. Finletter

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Mr. J.A. Roberts
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:	Mr. F.D. Gregh
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs	Mr. R.W.J. Hooper
Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure	Mr. Johnson Garrett
Acting Executive Secretary:	Mr. F.C. Menne

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative: Major General W.W. Stromberg

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DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DECLASSIFIED - MISE EN L'ÉTAT DE DÉCLASSIFICATION - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

I. 1964 ANNUAL REVIEW OF REMUNERATION OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF SERVING IN THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, NORWAY, ITALY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, MALTA AND TURKEY - REPORT BY THE RESTRICTED GROUP OF THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE OF GOVERNMENT BUDGET EXPERTS

Document: PO/65/65

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Council had before it a Report by the Restricted Group of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts recommending cost-of-living allowances for staff serving in nine countries of the Alliance, to take effect from 1st January, 1965 and applicable to basic salary and certain allowances. This was in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex IX of the Interim Report of the Restricted Group of the Co-ordinating Committee of 5th October, 1962.

2. He invited the Council to approve the recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee contained in this Report and to take note of the remark he had made in PO/65/65 that this increase would in no way prejudice the outcome of a general salary review for these countries. He recalled that he had made a similar comment when the Council had been invited to approve the recommendations in the 30th Report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts(1).

3. In the meantime, the general review of salaries was continuing. The Co-ordinating Committee had at first run into great difficulties, but recently some progress had been made. The staff associations of the four Co-ordinated Organizations had shown strong feelings on this subject and yesterday a representative of the OECD Staff Association had been given the opportunity to make a statement to the Council of that Organization. He hoped that a satisfactory solution could be reached at an early date as a result of the studies now under way. As he had said on another occasion, the NATO Staff were showing great moderation and discretion but they had a deep and legitimate concern in the matter. He was anxious that their justified claims should be satisfied. Together with his Deputy, he was keeping this matter under his close personal attention, and he would do his best to be fair and helpful in studying the question. He hoped that it would not be necessary to have a discussion in the Council, but if he considered it necessary he would refer the matter to the Council with a view to obtaining a satisfactory conclusion for all concerned. Since it was probable that there would be further developments in this matter, he was making this statement in order that the Council would not be taken unawares.

(1) Reference C-R(65)3, Item III.

4. He asked whether the Council could approve the Report by the Restricted Group.

5. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve the recommendations by the Restricted Group. He also thanked the Chairman for drawing the attention of the Council to the general review of salaries. He had the day before, in the Council of the OECD, heard the statement by the OECD Staff Representative on the Staff Association's views. Mr. Brosio had now said that some progress had been made recently, but on the other hand, there seemed to be little hope of a speedy solution. He wished to stress the increasing concern of the Norwegian Delegation regarding developments in this field. The fact was that, for some time, not only had relations between the organizations and the personnel been unsatisfactory for both sides, but the situation had become almost untenable in some of the organizations where, frankly, open conflict existed. The situation was perhaps not quite so acute in NATO. However, the Norwegian Delegation felt that unless a solution was now sought urgently, NATO might really suffer serious damage and find itself in a position unworthy of an international organization.

6. The Norwegian Delegation had expressed its views in the Co-ordinating Committee, and supported the proposals by the Secretaries General as a minimum towards a solution. So far, there was no agreement on these proposals. They were not regarded by the staff as fully satisfactory, but he thought that their acceptance by the organizations would be regarded as a step in the right direction and the beginning of a real improvement in the relations between the Organization and the personnel.

7. The NETHERLANDS and TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES, who were without instructions on the Report, reserved their positions.

8. The COUNCIL, subject to confirmation by the Netherlands and Turkish Representatives(1):

- (1) agreed to grant cost-of-living allowances, as indicated in paragraph 9 of CCG/RG(65)1, and in addition to the cost-of-living allowances laid down in CCG/RG(63)1, CCG/RG(63)2, CCG/RG(64)1 and CCG/RG(64)2 applying to the basic salary, expatriation allowance (except for fixed and minimum parts), and family allowances (head of household allowances and children's allowances and other dependents' allowances) as established at 1st January, 1962(2);

(1) Confirmation subsequently received from both delegations.

(2) In the Netherlands, established at 1st January, 1963.

- (2) approved these measures with effect from 1st January, 1965;
- (3) noted the statements by the Chairman and the Norwegian Representative.

II. SITUATION IN THE CONGO

9. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, in line with the current continuing consultation in the Council on the Congo, he was instructed to inform the Council that the recent negotiations in Brussels with Mr. Tshombe had been long drawn out but had finally given complete satisfaction. It was difficult to comment at this stage on possible future political developments in the Congo, but Mr. Spaak or Vicomte Davignon proposed to attend a meeting of the Council in about three weeks' time in order to discuss the results of the negotiations and the outlook for the future.

10. The CHAIRMAN noted that this would be a welcome visit.

III. CYPRUS

11. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had recently circulated to the Secretary General and the members of the Council a note on some significant military preparations by the Makarios administration in Cyprus. He had received, immediately before this meeting, a telegram from Ankara instructing him to inform the Council that his Authorities had learned, from a reliable source, that there might be an early armed attack by the forces of the Makarios administration on the Turkish Cypriots with a view to bringing about a fait accompli achieving the situation desired by Makarios. The Turkish Government had instructed its representative to the United Nations to inform the Secretary General and ask him to ensure that immediate action was taken by the United Nations force to prevent any such attack. If an attack was not prevented, Turkey would have to carry out its duty, which was both based on humanitarian reasons and required by treaty obligations.

12. The Turkish chargé d'affaires in Athens had also, under instructions, informed the Greek Government of the situation and asked it to remember its obligation as a guaranteeing power. Now he, the Turkish Representative, wished to urge all NATO governments, and the Secretary General by virtue of his watching brief, to do all in their power to prevent an attack.

13. He emphasised that his Government's statement of intention to do its duty meant purely and simply that his Government was inviting the United Nations and the guaranteeing powers to do whatever was possible to prevent an attack, and that only if this failed would the Turkish Government carry out its obligations. He stressed that this clarification was aimed at preventing any new propaganda attempt of distortion presenting Turkey as preparing the invasion of Cyprus.

14. The CHAIRMAN asked whether this information had been received from Turkish sources or from the United Nations force also.

15. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the information he had already circulated in writing was factual information. All that he had in his instructions about the present information on the imminent danger of attack was that it was from a reliable source.

16. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he had had no information on which to confirm the reply to the letter by the Turkish Representative and had asked his Authorities to obtain information from the Cypriot Authorities. He had, on the contrary, the day before, received from New York a copy of a letter by the Cypriot Representative to the United Nations drawing attention to military preparations being carried out by the Turkish Cypriots and to certain facts, attested by the United Nations force, proving that it was not the Turkish but the Greek community which was threatened. He thought that the Council should study this conflicting information available from the different sides.

17. He had no information which would confirm the statement now made by the Turkish Representative. On the contrary, the Cypriot Government had stated that it desired peace and would continue its present peaceful policy until a final solution could be obtained. It feared, however, that the Turkish Cypriots were preparing a new threat of intervention.

18. As regards the statement that the Turkish Government would intervene if the United Nations and the Allies did not satisfy the Turkish request, he recalled that it was the threat of Turkish intervention which had caused grave dangers in the past. He hoped that the rumours of which he had been informed were false, and that a Turkish intervention would not take place. As regards a duty to intervene, if Turkey had such a duty, so also had other powers for defence reasons. He thought this argument led to a slippery slope which it was in the interest of all the Allies to avoid.

19. The CHAIRMAN said that, by virtue of his watching brief, he thought that the information now given to the Council might have been given to him directly, since it was his task to follow developments in Cyprus. He would take the necessary steps to verify the information and would report to the Council thereon as soon as possible. He thought that the situation at present did not call for exceptional steps.

20. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE emphasised that he was not merely informing the Council, but was making an appeal, not on his own initiative but under precise and urgent instructions from his Government, to all concerned, to do whatever they could to avoid a new tragedy. He recalled that just before the attack against Kokkina, in the summer of 1964, Turkey had equally warned its Allies without any result and that, at that time also, Makarios had given all sorts of peaceful assurances. Referring to what Mr. Palamas had said about the slippery slope of interventions, he added that, of course, all guarantor powers had the obligation to intervene and such an intervention should have but one aim, that is to say, to impede a new slaughter on the part of the Makarios administration and to restore the respect for human life and order.

21. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he would circulate to Permanent Representatives the letter from the Cypriot Representative to the United Nations.

22. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

agreed that, in pursuance of his watching brief, the Chairman should study the situation and report to the Council thereon.

IV. APPOINTMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER TO SUCCEED
ADMIRAL HAROLD P. SMITH AS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

23. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received a letter addressed to him by President Johnson, copies of which he would now circulate (Annex A). This letter asked for the release of Admiral Harold P. Smith from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic as from the end of April.

24. The Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (MC 58(Revised)) laid down that SACLANT shall be a United States Naval Officer, and the President's letter stated that he was prepared to nominate to the Council a well-qualified successor to Admiral Smith.

25. The next step, in accordance with the normal procedures, would be for the Council to agree to the release of Admiral Smith, and to ask the President of the United States to nominate a United States Naval Officer to succeed him.

26. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, agreeing, said that he wished to take the opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the French Naval Authorities for the excellent relations they had always had with Admiral Smith.

27. The COUNCIL:

approved a resolution releasing Admiral Smith and requesting the President of the United States to nominate a successor for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Annex B).

28. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE then read a message from the President of the United States nominating Admiral Thomas H. Moorer to succeed Admiral Smith as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Annex C).

29. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities associated themselves with the tributes paid to Admiral Smith and had pleasure in approving the appointment of Admiral Moorer.

30. The COUNCIL then:

adopted a resolution appointing Admiral Thomas H. Moorer as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic as from 1st May, 1965 in succession to Admiral Smith (Annex D).

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31. The COUNCIL also:

approved the text of a press communiqué to be released that day simultaneously in Paris and in Washington at a time to be agreed between the Chairman and the United States Representative (Annex E).

32. The CHAIRMAN said that he welcomed the appointment of Admiral Moorer to this important post. He personally regretted the departure of Admiral Smith, with whom he had had a pleasant and valuable discussion in Norfolk, and who had made an outstanding contribution to NATO. He thought he spoke for the Council in confirming sincerely the terms of the resolution accepting his release and recording appreciation for the services which had concluded a brilliant career. The good wishes and the gratitude of the Council accompanied Admiral Smith in his retirement.

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V. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Document: PO/65/56

33. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, as he had said at the private meeting of the Council on 27th January, he had for some time thought it essential to re-examine the whole field of East-West relations in the Council. There were two sets of reasons for this, one deriving from changes in the Communist world, and the other from the reactions in the Alliance to these changes.

34. In his view, the consequences of destalinisation and the Sino-Soviet crisis had profoundly altered the nature of the threat from the East. The divisions between Moscow and Peking had put an end to the myth of a monolithic Communist world; but just as the Reformation obviously did not signify the end of Christianity, the diversification of the Communist world did not mean that Communism was withering away. On the contrary, the split of the Bloc built up by Lenin and Stalin threatened, in the short term, to encourage Communist expansion in Europe as in the uncommitted world. The leaders of the various Communist parties, who had obtained a certain freedom of action and manoeuvre thanks to the schism, were still as intolerant and aggressive towards the West as the leadership in Moscow itself. It accordingly seemed necessary for the Council to attempt to co-ordinate the individual initiatives taken during recent weeks by the various member states. It was for the Council to see that individual approaches to the new problems with which Communism had been confronting the West did not give the adversary the opportunity to divide the West.

35. A number of indications over and above those mentioned in PO/65/56 suggested that one was now approaching a new and particularly important phase in the dialogue with the East.

- (i) The Italian Authorities had held conversations on 23rd January in Rome with Mr. Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister; a report had been made to the Committee of Political Advisers;
- (ii) the British Authorities had had similar conversations with Mr. Rapacki during his visit to London;
- (iii) on 15th December, 1964, the Greek Government had received in Athens a Soviet Parliamentary Delegation of which the Chairman was Mr. Grishchin, an alternate member of the Praesidium and President of the Soviet Trade Unions;
- (iv) the recent conversations between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko should also be mentioned in the context of bilateral United States/Soviet relations;
- (v) the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR had agreed to go to Vienna on 15th May, 1965 for the ceremonies commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty.

36. He would be grateful to Permanent Representatives for any information they might be able to give on these various bilateral talks. Whatever the underlying motives might have been, Mr. Kosygin's recent visit to Hanoi showed that Khrushchev's successors were more anxious than he had been to preserve Communist unity now that the dialogue between the United States and the Soviets was starting up again.

37. It was for the Council to draw the necessary conclusions, bearing in mind that a united Western front must, of course, be maintained in the face of Communist world strategy, however diversified it might have become.

38. Referring to the recent developments in Vietnam, he said that he welcomed the meeting of the Council on 9th February which had been chaired in his absence by his Deputy. He thought that the United States reaction to Viet Cong aggression had been entirely appropriate. The Council might wish to resume discussion on this subject either now or at a later date. Events of this nature had a direct effect on East-West relations and, in particular, on the possibility of a new round of serious negotiations.

39. He invited comments.

40. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he considered PO/65/56 to be an excellent document. To complete the information on Western initiatives, he informed the Council that Mr. Rapacki would visit Brussels at the end of the week to meet Mr. Spaak. He, the speaker, had given PO/65/56 to Mr. Spaak as background guidance and he would report on the discussion now to take place. He agreed with the view expressed in PO/65/56 that the omissions in the Warsaw Pact communiqué deserved study. However, he thought it also worth noting that reference was made in the communiqué to a list of proposals which had been put forward to date by members of the Soviet Bloc. He asked whether he was right in thinking that this was the first time that the Gomulka plan, or something similar, had been officially endorsed by the USSR.

41. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE informed the Council that Mr. Gromyko was due to visit London on 16th to 20th March. A visit had been planned by Mr. Kosygin, but no date had yet been arranged and it seemed probable that it would not be arranged until after Mr. Gromyko's visit. The visit of Mr. Gromyko had been arranged partly in return for the visit by Mr. Butler to Moscow in 1964 and partly in pursuit of NATO's agreed policy to promote contacts with the Soviet Union in order to see where, if anywhere, progress could be made in improving East-West relations. The United Kingdom was fully aware of the danger that the Soviets might try to play off one member of the Alliance against another, but there was no reason why this should succeed, providing all the Allies kept NATO informed and consulted where necessary on any significant developments.

42. The Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Todorov, would visit the United Kingdom on 16th to 21st February, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peter, on 30th June to 5th July. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would go to Yugoslavia on 18th to 22nd April and to Poland some time in September.

43. At the December Ministerial Meeting, Mr. Gordon Walker had said that the United Kingdom agreed that Western policy should be to encourage the evolutionary trends in Eastern Europe by establishing commercial, cultural and other new relations. What the Allies should not do was to be seen to be trying to split Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union or, in particular, to try to wean them from the Warsaw Pact. This would scare them off, create unprofitable tension and set back the present encouraging trend.

44. As regards Soviet policy on East-West relations, the United Kingdom agreed with the conclusion in PO/65/56 that there had been no major change of substance in Soviet policy towards the West and no major Soviet initiatives since December. There had been no sign of flexibility in the Soviet approach to various main questions. There had been no new proposals on European security or disarmament. The Soviet response to the proposed Four-Power discussion on German reunification was not very favourable. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom continued to consider that it was within the Four-Power responsibility to pursue the question. President Johnson had reaffirmed this on 9th February, in conversation with the German Ambassador in Washington, and this was also the United Kingdom position.

45. He thought that the Soviet Union had been much preoccupied with its own affairs and the affairs of the Bloc. The Warsaw meeting had taken place at a time when the Soviet Union needed a general talk with its East European Allies, both because they had not had one since the fall of Khrushchev, and because they wanted to talk to those of their Allies who doubted the wisdom of Soviet tactics for the preparatory meeting of the World Communist Conference, which the Russians had called for 1st March. From the latest press reports it seemed that the Russians had now been obliged, in deference to the doubts of their Allies, to change the nature and agenda of the Conference.

46. The one striking change of emphasis in Soviet policy had been their reassertion of interest in Vietnam. He did not think that Mr. Kosygin's visit to Hanoi was intended as an action hostile to the United States, but rather with a view to seeing whether the struggle in Vietnam could be won with Russian as well as Chinese support.

47. As regards the East European countries, the fall of Khrushchev appeared to have made little difference to the trends towards greater (though still limited) independence of Moscow. The spontaneous and public reaction of shock on the part of most European leaders at the news of his dismissal was itself a clear indication of the distance they had been able to travel as a result of destalinisation and the freedom of manoeuvre afforded by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

48. There had recently been important signs that the economic facts of life had led some of the Eastern European countries to depart from the rigidities of Marxist economic doctrine. For example, the solutions recently proposed in Czechoslovakia for reorganizing the economy showed the changing nature of the Communist attitude towards planning in that country. Rumania had been flamboyant in demonstrating her independence of COMECON.

49. One should further note the continued desire in Eastern Europe to increase trade with, and acquire technological know-how from the West. The countries of the area had been active in promoting tourism as a source of foreign currency, and jamming of United Kingdom broadcasts had stopped.

50. In foreign affairs, only Rumania had been known to take an independent line in the United Nations and in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

51. As regards bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom was negotiating a consular agreement and hoped to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion reasonably soon. Negotiations on a new cultural agreement were now in progress in Moscow, and Mr. George Thompson would probably visit Moscow to sign the agreement. The negotiations on post-1939 (mainly Baltic) claims showed every sign of being long drawn out.

52. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, with other speakers, expressed his appreciation of the initiative of the Secretary General in promoting increased consultation on a subject of vital interest to the Alliance: East-West relations. He thought this consultation even more desirable in that important events, though of varied nature, had taken place since December, showing that a rapid evolution was under way. He referred to the whole series of contacts indicated by the Secretary General in his statement.

53. The Council had already discussed the general situation at its Ministerial Meeting in December. Accordingly, the task now was to bring up to date and analyse subsequent events; and since in December the long-term objectives of the Alliance in the context of East-West relations had been recognised, one should now consider the short-term objectives, i.e. keep each other informed of the initiatives which each Ally had undertaken or proposed to take.

54. This, he thought, was the object of the Council's consultation. On this subject he would begin by saying that as regards the assessment of the situation, his Authorities shared the conclusions reached in the excellent report by the Secretariat and in particular its analysis of the present guiding lines of Soviet policy. In the view of his Authorities one might perhaps add a fourth fundamental objective to the three objectives of Soviet policy listed in paragraph 6 of PO/65/56: on the one hand, the weakening of the internal cohesion of NATO (especially on the flanks) and in any case the exploitation of all possible sources of internal tension in the Alliance and, on the other hand, an attempt to consolidate the cohesion of the countries of Eastern Europe by playing on their preoccupations as regards German rearmament.

55. Since he had said that he looked on this consultation as an exchange of information on initiatives and contacts since December, he thought that he owed it to the Council to inform it that in the period in question the Italian Government had not undertaken any initiatives in its relations with Eastern Europe worth mentioning. He would only point out that the Polish Prime Minister, Mr. Rapacki, had stopped in Rome on his way to Teheran and that he had had somewhat general conversations with the Italian Authorities. This visit, during which nothing exciting had happened, had nevertheless resulted in a fruitful exchange of views which had allowed each side to understand the position of the other. He recalled that a full report on this subject had been made to the Allies in the Committee of Political Advisers.

56. To this he would add some reflections on the repercussions of recent events in Vietnam, since it was obvious that in discussing East-West relations one could not at present avoid raising this subject. While the situation in Vietnam was still very fluid and it was not possible at present to draw precise conclusions, it was nevertheless certain that these events would introduce an element of instability and uncertainty into the policy of Moscow, notwithstanding the probable continuity in the substantive aims of this policy. It should be recognised that if the policy of Moscow was aimed at reconciling peaceful coexistence with an effort of rapprochement with Peking and above all with an effort to promote a greater revolutionary dynamism in the third world, this latter objective might have fairly far-reaching consequences.

57. If this was the case, he thought that the task of Atlantic policy should be to seek to reduce as far as possible the influence of this new factor of instability in Soviet policy. To this end Italy considered the continuation of the East-West dialogue to be of great importance. In this spirit his Authorities had noted with satisfaction the possibility of a United States and USSR summit meeting and of contacts between United Kingdom and Soviet leaders, as also of other exchanges of visits and contacts planned between the leaders of Western and Eastern Europe.

58. At the same time, his Authorities thought that one should not be blind to the fact that in the strategy of Moscow these contacts might represent an important element of manoeuvre to the extent that they were aimed at discriminating among the Allies, exploiting their possible differences and attempting to isolate Germany. However, he thought that the very fact of being conscious of this danger and of the central political and military interests of the Alliance should be adequate to cancel out this possibility of Soviet manoeuvre, while safeguarding the politically positive aspects of interest to the West, i.e. the consolidation of the present dialogue and the exploitation of the independence of the countries of Eastern Europe.

59. The interest of the USSR in avoiding an excessive increase in tension in the third world seemed obvious, since a deterioration would make impossible the present dual Soviet policy aimed at both a dialogue with the West and a resumption of revolutionary dynamism in the third world. His Authorities thought that the interest of the USSR could therefore possibly provide the Atlantic powers more directly concerned in the sector of South-East Asia with a useful instrument for influencing the Soviet Union to remain in its present attitude of relative moderation.

60. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government on the whole shared the views expressed in PO/65/56 on Soviet policy and the assessment of the Warsaw meeting communiqué. His Authorities had been particularly struck by the aggressive anti-German tone of the communiqué, which recalled the cold war atmosphere, especially in the reference to the MLF and to the dangers of German access to atomic weapons. He thought that a partial explanation might be that there still existed in the Soviet Bloc a genuine fear of a revival of German militarism. In this light the communiqué might be regarded as another firm warning to the West regarding any plans which the Soviet Bloc might think were under way for the accession of Germany to atomic weapons.

61. He thought it important to assess the Warsaw meeting, as was done in PO/65/56, not only against the background of the MLF or relations between the Soviet Union and China, but in a broader framework taking account also of developments in Eastern Europe. He agreed that the meeting was no doubt intended as a demonstration of the unity of the Soviet Bloc. One should, however, perhaps consider it as even more than a demonstration, and as a real effort by the Soviet Union to strengthen unity between the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe as a political necessity for not only the Soviet Government but also the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviets looked on developments in East Europe with mixed feelings, especially certain growing trade contacts with the rest of the world. It was difficult to arrest these contacts, but obviously the Soviets wished to check them; this might have been one purpose of the Warsaw meeting.

62. As Mr. Lange had explained at the December Ministerial Meeting, Norway agreed that the Allies should try to respond positively and appropriately to any openings in the field of contacts with the East. Here he agreed with the comments of the United Kingdom Representative. There were certain limitations on the possibility of Western action, for example the risk of creating apprehensions in the Eastern countries and Moscow which might lead to countermeasures. It was important that the Allies should pursue a flexible policy in such a way as to avoid giving the impression of being directed by the Alliance or by any major power. Initiatives and contacts should be as diversified as possible. He agreed that, as suggested in PO/65/56, Allied policies should be co-ordinated. He thought, however, that all the Allies, small as well as large, should use their own means for activating their relations with the Eastern Bloc.

63. He informed the Council that the Norwegian Prime Minister would visit Moscow in the spring at the invitation of the Soviet Government, and that the Minister of Education would shortly visit Poland. As part of Norwegian policy toward East European countries, Norway had recently agreed with a number of governments to change its representation with them from a legation to an embassy.

64. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that, generally speaking, his Government shared the main thesis of PO/65/56 that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the essentials had remained unchanged by the shift in Soviet leadership. It was their impression that the present leaders had been primarily concerned up till now with domestic problems of a twofold character, i.e. to continue the transformation of the Soviet Union into a modern society, adapted to the demands of the twentieth century, and the concern of whether such a transformation was possible within the framework of traditional Communist ideology.

65. As to the second section of PO/65/56, the Danish Government had followed with close interest and sympathy the various initiatives taken by the West with respect to the Soviet Union and the various East European countries. It believed, as did the Secretary General, in the importance of intensifying contact with the Eastern European countries. As the Danish Foreign Minister had said during the December Ministerial Meeting, the tendency of East European countries towards a greater independence of the Soviet Union was just as marked today as before the fall of Khrushchev. Western policy should encourage this development without, however, over-estimating possible achievements, because no matter how much the Eastern European countries longed for a greater measure of independence they still remained faithful to the same basic Communist philosophy as Moscow. He had noted with interest that in PO/65/56 the Chairman appeared to share this viewpoint.

66. Denmark thus had a most open and positive attitude to the usefulness of establishing contact with the East.

67. Finally, however, he wished to mention the importance Denmark attached to avoiding steps that would go beyond what the political situation could bear. Denmark believed it important not to forget the adverse effect which Western steps that appeared to the East as a concerted NATO effort to hasten the process so well under way, might have in jeopardising further progress.

68. He agreed with what was said in PO/65/56 about the necessity of the Allies keeping each other as fully informed as possible of what they were doing individually in this field. The Danish Prime Minister was planning to visit Moscow, though no date had yet been arranged. He understood that the Swedish Foreign Minister also intended to visit Moscow.

69. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that the question of East-West relations was of vital interest to all the countries of the Alliance and it was for this reason that he wished to make some general comments which he thought valid independently of the special situation of any particular country.

70. In reading the Warsaw Pact communiqué and considering the events of the last few days, he thought one was forced to note an obvious point, which was that it would be dangerous to analyse East-West relations almost exclusively in the light of European problems. One should not think that if European questions and differences of view on the subject of nuclear weapons were settled, the Communist threat would be on the way to disappear. In reading the Warsaw Pact communiqué it could be seen that events taking place outside Europe were given a place of honour. Cuba, the Congo, Vietnam and Malaysia were all presented as examples of the efforts of the imperialist powers to worsen the international situation.

71. In his view it would therefore be dangerous to assess the extent of the détente in Europe without taking account of the persistent and even increased hostility of the Communist powers towards the countries of the Alliance in the rest of the world. The bilateral détente - if one could call it so - between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was more than counterbalanced by the struggle waged by the Communist world as a whole, with growing ferocity and unfortunately with Allies constantly growing in number, against the interests of the Free World outside Europe.

72. It was often affirmed, and rightly so, that it was the very success of NATO which in checking the threat of Russian aggression in Europe had modified the nature of this threat and transferred it towards the third world. One should however go right to the end of this reasoning and draw the conclusions from this affirmation. One should recognise that the threat in the third world, if not so immediate, was just as dangerous in the long term. As a result one could not say that there was any real détente in East-West relations as long as this fierce struggle of Communism and its Allies against the Free World continued outside Europe.

73. While he agreed with the statement contained in paragraph 3 of Section II of PO/65/56, he wished to emphasise that in the world context the erosion of the Western defensive posture and an alteration in the balance of forces to Western disadvantage were processes which unfortunately were well under way. He thought that the first condition to be fulfilled in order to destroy these processes was to note this fact and, in the Council's studies on East-West relations, not to lose sight of the indivisibility of the Communist offensive in Europe and the other continents.

74. To complete what he had just said, he would simply add that one should also not lose sight of the fact that even in Europe the Communist threat, though less direct, was still present today. The work of the Special Committee showed the importance attached by the Communist leaders to the disruptive activities of the Soviet services, whose systematic aim was to extend Communist influence and weaken the will to resist in Western countries. Further, an American intelligence memorandum had recently been circulated drawing attention to the increased effectiveness of the armies of the satellite countries thanks to Soviet aid within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Whatever the interpretation to be given to this development, it was clear that it was not aimed at a détente.

75. He thought that the above were the factors which should be taken into account in the Council's studies of East-West relations. In the same way, as he had appealed that the threats in the different parts of the world be looked at as a whole, he also appealed to the Council to bear in mind all the aspects of the Communist offensive. The work of the different government experts should not remain in separate compartments. On the contrary, at the political level the Council should aim at profiting from all these specialised studies and drawing the necessary conclusions.

76. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought his Authorities would agree with the analysis in PO/65/56. He thought that there were both constant and variable elements in Soviet policy, and that the constant element, which was the pursuit of a form of peaceful existence, remained unchanged. Here, he agreed with the Portuguese Representative one must remain aware of the indivisibility of Soviet policy on the world scale. As regards the variable elements of Soviet policy, these depended on events, which should therefore be studied closely by the Council. In this connection, the repercussions for the Free World of developments in Vietnam should also be studied.

77. Commenting on the Warsaw meeting, he said that he was informed from an official Yugoslav source that it was the Yugoslav view that Moscoov had decided on the meeting as a manifestation against the MLF. It had been planned for the beginning of December, but since the plans for the MLF and the Atlantic Nuclear Force had not advanced, less reference had been made to them and Russia had taken advantage of the meeting to consolidate the cohesion of the Eastern Bloc.

78. With reference to Section II of PO/65/56 concerning Western initiatives, he said that the political climate in the Balkans had improved. Greece had contributed as far as possible and reasonable to this improvement. Greek relations with Bulgaria had been normalised and following on Mr. Costopoulos's visit to Sofia in November 1964, Greek-Bulgarian relations were developing favourably.

79. The recent visit of the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Belgrade contained no substantial new elements. It constituted a stage on the road of the good relations which had existed for years between Yugoslavia and Greece. It was, however, a constructive stage aimed at even closer co-operation between the two countries. It was unnecessary for him to note the different points contained in the final communiqué published after the Belgrade conversations, which were known and open to the evaluation of all. The Greek Government had been particularly satisfied with the results obtained and with the atmosphere of understanding and friendship in which Greek-Yugoslav relations were developing. These constituted a factor of stability and of peace in this area, not only bilaterally but also in the context of East-West relations. As all knew, Yugoslavia occupied a key position on the border between the Soviet world, the non-aligned countries and the Free World. In this connection, the impressions received by the Greek Delegation were that Yugoslavia remained firm on her position, that she would not change her political orientation, and that she would continue to play a moderating rôle in the defence of peace.

80. Nevertheless, as a corollary to this diplomatic action of Greece in a restricted regional framework, he would emphasise the constant priority preoccupation of his Government to define its position clearly and to refuse any bargaining which might cast the shadow of ambiguity on its policy or, even more, of its intentions.

81. Both in Sofia and Belgrade, Greece had clearly insisted on its membership of the Atlantic Alliance. In Sofia, the Bulgarian leaders, aware of Greek preoccupations concerning the defence of the norther frontiers, had tried the ground with a view to concluding a Greek-Bulgarian non-aggression arrangement. In refusing to lend himself to this gambit, Mr. Costopoulos had made it clear that questions of defence were a matter for the collective responsibility of the Atlantic Alliance.

82. In Belgrade, Mr. Papandreou repeated to the Yugoslav leaders that Greece was a faithful member of the Atlantic Alliance, whose defensive character he underlined. He went even further. In a statement to the press he said that Greece was linked as an ally with the Atlantic world, but that this did not prevent friendly relations with other countries.

83. As regards Greek-Soviet relations, there had been no noticeable change and they remained as they had been.

84. He had nothing sensational to tell or reveal to the Council. A Soviet parliamentary delegation had visited Athens in return for the visit by Greek parliamentarians to Russia. This was an event without political interest, which in any case had not drawn the particular attention of the international press. The Council might perhaps note repercussions from other sectors, for example, in the change which had taken place in Turko-Soviet relations. However, on this point he was sure that his Turkish colleague would have much more interesting information to provide for the reason that, since the Foreign Minister, Mr. Erkin, had come to Paris to speak to the Council, and later on the occasion of the Ministerial Meeting, an important evolution had been noted which was marked by the visit to Ankara of Mr. Podgorny, heading a Soviet parliamentary delegation, and by echoes in the Turkish, Soviet and international press. Subsequently, there had been the notorious interview of Mr. Gromyko with Izvestia on the subject of the Cyprus question. Quite apart from its subtle language on certain points, this interview constituted a particularly significant gesture in the development of Turko-Soviet relations.

85. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that this was not a suitable time to outline the future policy of the Federal Republic regarding the problem of Germany and Berlin, since there were many uncertain factors, for example, the outcome of the visit of President Nasser to Bonn.

86. His Authorities were in agreement with the general lines of PO/65/56, with the following qualifications. Firstly, as regards the assessment in paragraph 6 of Part I that present Soviet policy was based on the maintenance of reasonably friendly relations and the development of economic and cultural contacts with the West, he pointed out that this policy did not at present apply to the Federal Republic. Since the fall of Khrushchev, Soviet anti-German propaganda had become stronger, and there was no progress in economic and cultural contacts, at least between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. This was an important limitation to the policy of détente which he hoped the Allies would bear in mind in their dealings with Moscow. He noted that the Italian and Norwegian Representatives had, in fact, drawn attention to it. He could not, however, agree with the Norwegian Representative on Soviet motives regarding the Warsaw meeting. He was not convinced that the Soviets had a genuine fear of German militarism, and thought that this propaganda theme was merely a pretext to solidify the cohesion of the Eastern Bloc. He thought that the comment by the Greek Representative regarding the constant and variable elements in Soviet policy was true also in respect of Germany. It was precisely these variations in Soviet policy which made his Authorities doubt whether there was any genuine Soviet fear of German militarism. He thought it would be valuable if the Allied could agree on the real motives of Soviet policy towards Germany.

87. Secondly, he considered that the maintenance of the status quo and the division of Germany and Europe did not sufficiently describe Soviet aims. The status quo was a de facto state of affairs, whereas the Soviets aimed at legal confirmation of the division of Germany and a political acquiescence therein. With regard to Berlin, it was the Soviet aim seriously to modify the status quo to the disadvantage of Germany and the West on the lines of the "free city" proposal, the restrictions of free access to Berlin, and the loosening of the ties between West Berlin and Bonn. Could one be sure that this policy had been abandoned since the events in Cuba? There were for the time being no indications that the Soviets wished to provoke a vigorous crisis in the near future. But this policy had never been given up expressis verbis and no-one could say that there might not be a sudden and unexpected revival at any time. It was true that there had been no reference to Berlin in the Warsaw communiqué. This might be due to differences of view within the Bloc, some countries accepting that the trade agreements with the Federal Republic applied also to Berlin, whereas the Soviet Union stood by the Treaty of 12th June, 1964 with the so-called GDR describing Berlin as a separate political entity.

88. Thirdly, it was stated in paragraph 3 of PO/65/56 that there had been no recent references to a peace treaty with Germany and the "free city" of West Berlin. However, he drew attention to the communiqué issued after the visit to Moscow in December 1964 of the Czechoslovak Minister, Mr. Novotny, stating that reunification was only conceivable on the basis of a peace treaty with both sovereign German states and an agreement on the status of West Berlin as an independent political entity.

89. As regards the Western initiatives referred to in Section II of PO/65/56, he thought that the list in paragraph 4 thereof could be misleading, since it covered both plans in accordance with long-standing Western policy and mere reactions to Soviet initiatives. It was difficult to see why the continuation of the Federal Government's policy for the establishment of contacts with Eastern Europe was mentioned as heading the list. This policy was not a new initiative but had been pursued since 1963, and the invitation to the head of the Soviet Government to visit Bonn was a renewal of the invitation which had been made to Khrushchev and not a new initiative like, for example, the United Kingdom and United States invitations to Mr. Kosygin.

90. There had been numerous East-West contacts since the new Soviet leaders had taken office. He thought that it was inappropriate to describe them by the word "initiatives", which should be reserved for important diplomatic moves.

91. The above remarks did not constitute any criticism of the document but were only an effort to make clear that, for the time being, the Federal Republic, for well-considered reasons, had no initiatives in view. This did not exclude the possibility of an initiative in the future.

92. The Federal Republic would continue to follow the lines laid down at the December Ministerial Meeting regarding contacts with the East, and agreed that "this process should not be carried to the point at which vital Western interests might be endangered". In the light of the common policy agreed upon in the Paris Treaties of 1954, the freedom of Berlin and the reunification of Germany certainly belonged to these vital interests. The Federal Republic would therefore appreciate it if the Allies in their contacts with the East would see to it that this policy would not be questioned by the other side.

93. He thought it useful to add a comment on the policy of the Federal Republic with regard to countries which might be described as drifting between East and West. President Nasser's invitation to Mr. Ulbricht constituted a serious blow to the policy of the Federal Republic regarding German unity; it would also certainly lead to a further advance of Communist influence in the Middle East. It was clear that this visit would take place. At the present stage, the Federal Republic continued to desist from stating publicly what consequences it would draw from it. His Authorities were determined not to see this visit take place without drawing the consequences for German-Egyptian relations, and had made this quite clear to Cairo. They considered it a possibility that these warnings would at least cause Nasser not to recognise the Soviet Zone of Germany. He took this opportunity of appealing to all the Allies to impress their own warning on the UAR Authorities. A rupture between the Federal Republic and the UAR could mean the complete elimination of Germany from the Middle East and other parts of Africa and Asia, which would harm Western interests in general.

94. In conclusion, he agreed with the statement in paragraph 4 of Section III of PO/65/56 that the Allies should avoid a situation in which their efforts towards relations with the countries of Eastern Europe might become competitive rather than complementary. Here, close consultation in the Council was desirable.

95. The CHAIRMAN said that he would bear in mind the comments by the German Representative on his paper.

96. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that he did not think there was any divergence of views between the German and Norwegian Governments regarding the real motives behind the Warsaw meeting and the Soviet exploitation of the theme of German militarism. His comments earlier in the discussion had been an attempt to analyse the Warsaw communiqué, which must be considered as having mainly propaganda value. What really happened at the meeting was not revealed.

97. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he agreed with the analysis of Soviet policy in PO/65/56 and with certain of the conclusions drawn for Allied policy. It seemed that a basic characteristic of present Soviet policy was the conflict of interests between conciliating the dogmatists and the Chinese with a show of toughness, while maintaining good relations with the West and permitting a greater diversification in the Eastern Bloc. As a result, there were a number of uncertain elements, which meant that Soviet policy was possibly in an interim stage and might develop in one direction or another, depending on events. It seemed that the Soviet Union was looking for new elements of cohesion in Eastern Europe and the Far East. To this end, the Warsaw meeting had not been unsuccessful, as witness Rumania's attendance. The picture in the Far East was confusing; Russia's attitude to China was as important as Russia's anti-United States activities.

98. There was no reverse in the general trend towards greater diversification and independence in the Soviet Bloc. He agreed that the Allies should try to encourage this trend discreetly, and welcomed the opportunity to consult in the Council on new contacts and exchanges. In this connection, he would be glad to have the views of the United States on possible future contacts between United States and Soviet leaders and the possibilities for Soviet or Western initiatives in this connection.

99. He welcomed the exchanges taking place in the Committee of Economic Advisers on trade relations with the Eastern Bloc, and hoped that they would continue.

100. It was probable that Mr. Gromyko would visit the Netherlands in the spring in return for Mr. Luns's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1964. It was the intention of the Netherlands Government, if the political situation made it possible, to improve relations with the Soviet Government, in particular by a modest increase in cultural contacts. He would report his Government's plans to the Council in due course.

101. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities agreed with the Secretary General that the purpose of this discussion was to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formation of policies through exchanging information, and that this required each nation to be as specific as possible in explaining what it was doing in its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and East European satellites. He considered that PO/65/56, submitted as a basis for discussion, accurately described the existing situation in the Soviet Union and also correctly set forth the policy of the Western nations to take advantage of trends toward the assertion of national independence and national interests by Eastern European countries. His presentation, therefore, would continue where the International Staff assessment of the situation ended.

102. Many items he would cite were already known to the Council members in one context or another, but he would repeat them to convey the overall picture. Taken individually, these points did not suggest any startling new elements in United States-USSR relations, particularly as some matters cited had been a long time in brewing. However, taken together, the initiatives did entail forward motion, bridging fluctuating ups and downs in political relations. Illustrative of fluctuation was the engagement of United States and Soviet prestige in current events in Vietnam. It would be premature to gauge the effect of these events on United States-USSR bilateral initiatives which he would now cite:

103. The United States-USSR Consular Convention, signed in Moscow on 1st June, 1964, was now awaiting ratification by the Senate. The Civil Air Agreement had been initialled in the summer of 1961, but signature and implementation had been delayed by technical problems as well as political considerations. While there was no link between the air agreement and the consular convention, it was logical that the consular convention would open the way for increase in travel as a result of the air agreement.

104. The United States and the USSR had signed agreements in December which regularised fishing activities in the area south of Alaska. On 5th February another agreement had been signed controlling the catch of King crab in the Bering Sea.

105. As regards scientific co-operation, subsequent to the signing of an agreement to exchange information on de-salting of the sea in November 1964, the United States had held conversations with the USSR in several other scientific fields. Soviet representatives had been invited to come to Washington to discuss the results of the Aleutian experiments last summer. This in no way constituted negotiation on the test ban. As a separate matter, there had been informal discussions between the United States and the USSR on a telegraphic exchange of seismic data. Either of these matters might lead to a more formal proposal for co-operation. The exchange of meteorological data over the Washington-Moscow link, begun last October, was proceeding satisfactorily.

106. From Soviet publications and from discussions with Soviet officials at all levels, it was apparent that the Soviets were acutely sensitive over the low level of United States-USSR trade. Recognising that United States trade with the USSR was conducted by private business, President Johnson had advised Congress in his State of the Union message of 4th January, that the United States Government, assisted by leaders in labour and business, was now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European countries. Several days later, he had followed up by telling a group of United States businessmen who had just visited the USSR that "the most competent talent available to us in the Government, in business, and in labour will be recruited and their recommendations considered" in helping to determine what would be a wise and proper policy for the United States Government in expanding peaceful trade with the USSR and Eastern European countries.

107. A two-year agreement on cultural exchanges between the United States and the USSR signed on 22nd February, 1964, had been routinely reviewed in talks in Washington which were completed on 30th January. This mid-agreement review centred on familiar problems which had arisen in the course of implementing the exchange programme. While these talks did not produce any new element in the exchange programme, they did confirm the intention of the new Soviet régime to continue with the exchange programme as an important element in United States-Soviet relations.

108. Document PO/65/56 noted President Johnson's reference in the State of the Union message to Soviet leaders visiting the United States. Subsequently, a Pravda article signed "Observer" had revealed a degree of Soviet receptivity to an exchange of visits. In his 3rd February speech, the President further stated that he had reason to believe that the Soviet leadership would welcome his trip to their country and that he was hopeful that before the end of the year an exchange of visits might occur. The Council would, of course, be informed if and when the general prospect of an exchange of visits at the head of state level came under specific consideration.

109. As regards United States-Eastern European initiatives, the United States sought to take advantage of opportunities to encourage processes of constructive change by applying a policy of differentiation and flexibility employing available means according to particular conditions and developments in each Bloc country. United States relations with Rumania had shown a faster rate of improvement than relations with any other Bloc country over the past four years. Negotiations were in progress in Washington for a new consular convention. A Rumanian Delegation had recently arrived in the United States to discuss a possible export/import bank credit guarantee for synthetic rubber and catalytic cracking plants. Such guarantees of private credits would be within the Bern union limits. Recently, on 23rd December, the United States had extended arrangements on cultural and other exchanges with Rumania.

110. Although there had been some occasional irritants, United States relations with Poland were maintained on a broad and active basis. United States-Polish trade increased in 1964 by an estimated 20% over 1963. The United States was currently negotiating a consular convention with Poland and had an active and expanding programme of cultural exchanges. The Chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission, Mr. Jedrychowski, would visit the United States in the spring to discuss a broad range of bilateral economic topics.

111. In a much-improved atmosphere which had developed over the past several years, United States-Hungarian talks were proceeding gradually and steadily in Budapest on various outstanding bilateral problems, including financial claims, consular problems, and cultural exchanges. They were likely to go on for some time, and no sudden or dramatic progress was expected.

112. While United States-Czechoslovakia relations had improved over the past two or three years and there had been modest growth in cultural exchanges, a long-pending economic and financial agreement, including settlement of United States claims, had not yet been concluded.

113. There had been little movement in United States-Bulgarian relations since the mob attack on the United States Legation in Sofia in December 1963. The United States had been seeking to regain lost ground and create a better atmosphere, and hoped it might be possible soon to restore more effective communication with the Bulgarians, undertake discussion of various bilateral problems of limited scope, and impart a more positive direction to United States-Bulgaria relations.

114. He agreed with the Norwegian Representative that the Warsaw Pact communiqué was essentially a propaganda document.

115. The CHAIRMAN said that he still had three speakers who wished to take the floor, but that in view of the late hour it might be preferable to adjourn discussion. He suggested the discussion might resume in a fortnight's time on the basis of a paper by the International Staff analysing what had been said today. He thought that it would be useful for the Council to hold periodic exchanges of views on this subject, possibly attended by Foreign Ministers.

116. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he would have been glad to have the occasion to speak today, possibly at a meeting in the afternoon, since questions had been addressed to him. However, he would not insist if it was against the wish of the Council.

117. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Ambassador regretted that he had not been able to be present today, and would no doubt agree to resuming discussion in a fortnight's time.

118. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statements made;
- (2) agreed to resume discussion on Wednesday, 24th February.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO.

February, 1965

My dear Mr. Brosio,

I am addressing you as Chairman of the Permanent Council with the request that appropriate action be taken at an early date to secure the release of Admiral Harold P. Smith, United States Navy, from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Admiral Smith will be placed on the retired list of the United States Navy on 1st May, 1965. In making this request through you to the member nations who appointed him, I ask that they give favorable consideration to his release.

The full trust and confidence extended by all nations to Admiral Smith during his tenure as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, will, I am certain, continue with the assumption of these responsibilities by another Commander.

If the Council approves the release of Admiral Smith, the United States is prepared to nominate to the Council a well qualified successor.

Sincerely,

(Signed) LYNDON B. JOHNSON

His Excellency,
Mr. Manlio Brosio,
Secretary General,
NATO.

RESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE RELEASE OF
ADMIRAL HAROLD P. SMITH AND
REQUESTING NOMINATION OF A UNITED
STATES OFFICER TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

Having noted with regret a communication by the President of the United States to the Secretary General and Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate appropriate action to secure the early release of Admiral Harold P. Smith from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic:

ACCEPTS with regret the necessity of the release of Admiral Harold P. Smith from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, effective on 1st May, 1965, as requested by the President of the United States;

RECOGNISES that Admiral Harold P. Smith has fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council when in March 1963 the Council appointed him Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic;

EXPRESSES to Admiral Harold P. Smith in the name of the Governments represented on the Council lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him;

REQUESTS the President of the United States to nominate a United States Naval Officer for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Harold P. Smith.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

10th February, 1965

Pursuant to the request of the North Atlantic Council that I nominate an officer of the United States Navy for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Harold P. Smith, I hereby nominate Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. I believe Admiral Moorer to be extremely well qualified to perform the duties of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. He has had an outstanding naval career and has commanded some of our foremost naval forces. He is an officer of exceptional character and ability. Admiral Moorer is currently serving as Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. He is thoroughly cognizant of the duties and responsibilities of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

I have every confidence that Admiral Moorer will make an outstanding contribution to furthering the fine traditions and worthy objectives sought by all of the NATO nations in strengthening our common defense efforts.

If the Council concurs in the foregoing, I will arrange for Admiral Moorer to relieve Admiral Smith as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, on 1st May, 1965.

RESOLUTION APPOINTING ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER
AS SUCCESSOR TO ADMIRAL HAROLD PAGE SMITH AS
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,

Having requested the President of the United States to nominate a Naval Officer of the United States to fill the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and the President of the United States having nominated Admiral Thomas H. Moorer,

THE COUNCIL:

DECLARES that it reposes the greatest faith in Admiral Moorer; and

APPOINTS him Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, as successor to Admiral Harold P. Smith with the powers and functions as set out in MC-58(Revised), this appointment to become effective on 1st May, 1965.

PRESS RELEASE

APPOINTMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER TO SUCCEED
ADMIRAL HAROLD P. SMITH AS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ATLANTIC

The North Atlantic Council, acting on the nomination of the President of the United States, today appointed Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, United States Navy, as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Harold P. Smith, United States Navy.

2. The appointment becomes effective 1st May, 1965. Admiral Moorer is currently serving as Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

3. The Council had been informed of the contents of a letter from the President of the United States of America to the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Chairman of the Permanent Council, in which the President asked the member governments to agree to release Admiral Smith who will be placed on the retired list of the United States Navy on 1st May, 1965.

4. The Council agreed with great regret to release Admiral Smith from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, a position which he has held since being appointed by the Council on the 30th April, 1963.

5. They expressed to Admiral Smith, in the name of the governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him.

6. The Council requested the President of the United States of America to nominate an officer of the United States Navy for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Smith. This request was immediately transmitted to the President of the United States, who today informed the Council of his nomination of Admiral Moorer for consideration by the Council as successor to Admiral Smith.

7. At its meeting today, the Council adopted a resolution appointing Admiral Moorer as the next Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, with the same powers and functions.