

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
and
PUBLIC DISCLOSED

EXEMPLAIRE
COPY

N°

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
17th December, 1957

~~NATO SECRET~~
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(57)83

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council
held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIIe.,
17th December, 1957 at 10.30 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman and Secretary General: M. P.-H. SPAAK

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. V. Larock (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative)

CANADA

The Hon. S.E. Smith (Secretary of State for External
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Permanent Representative)

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. H.C. Hansen (Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Wassard (Permanent Representative)

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. C. Pineau (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Mr. M. Faure (Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs)

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. H. von Brentano (Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. W. Hallstein (Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs)
H.E. Mr. H. Blankenhorn (Permanent Representative)

~~NATO SECRET~~

GREECE

H.E. Mr. G. Cassimatis (Representing Minister of
Co-ordination)
H.E. Mr. M. Melas (Permanent Representative)

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. H. Jonasson (Prime Minister)
Mr. H.G. Andersen (Permanent Representative)

ITALY

H.E. Mr. G. Pella (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Alessandrini (Permanent Representative)

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. J. Bech (Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. N. Hommel (Permanent Representative)

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. E.N. van Kleffens (Permanent Representative)

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. H. Lange (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. A. Skaug (Minister of Commerce)

PORTUGAL

H.E. Prof. Dr. P. Cunha (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. the Count de Tovar (Permanent Representative)

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. F.A. Zorlu (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
H.E. Mr. S. Sarper (Permanent Representative)

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs)
H.E. Sir Frank Roberts (Permanent Representative)

UNITED STATES

H.E. Mr. J. Foster Dulles (Secretary of State)
H.E. Mr. W.R. Burgess (Permanent Representative)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Baron A. Bentinck (Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. A. Casardi (Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs)
Mr. F.D. Gregh (Assistant Secretary General for
Economics and Finance)
The Lord Coleridge (Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

Major General T.W. Parker (Standing Group Representative)

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONTENTS

<u>Item</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Paragraph Nos.</u>
I.	Publicity to be given to the present meeting	1 - 3
II.	Agenda	4
III.	Reunification of Germany (including Berlin)	5 - 9
IV.	Disarmament	10 - 52
V.	The Middle East	53 - 72

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

I. PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN TO THE PRESENT MEETING

1. The CHAIRMAN said that in no circumstances did he propose to communicate to the press the statements made in the course of the present meeting. If Ministers wished to do so, in whole or in part, it would be left to their discretion.

2. Mr. CUNHA (Portugal) then proposed that no report be made to the press on this restricted meeting. This would allow the Ministers to discuss more freely and would thus enhance the value of the meeting.

3. The COUNCIL:

agreed that no communication would be made to the press, and proceedings would be regarded as secret.

NATO SECRET

II. AGENDA

4. The CHAIRMAN suggested, and the COUNCIL agreed, to adopt the following order of discussion:

- (a) reunification of Germany (including Berlin);
- (b) disarmament and the Bulganin letters;
- (c) the Middle East;
- (d) relations with other international defence organizations;
- (e) Africa;
- (f) political consultations within NATO.

NATO SECRET

III. REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY (INCLUDING BERLIN)

5. The CHAIRMAN expressed the view that this was not a controversial issue. It seemed to him that, if NATO's position on German reunification remained unchanged, the meeting need simply decide whether or not this problem should be mentioned in the final communiqué.

6. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) first thanked President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan for their statements at yesterday's meeting on the problem of German reunification and of Berlin. He supported the Chairman's suggestion that these problems be referred to in the communiqué and he proposed that this be done on the lines of the statement made by the Council in 1954. He stressed the importance of mentioning the particular problem of Berlin in view of the fact that its situation had become increasingly precarious in the course of the last few months.

7. The CHAIRMAN then suggested that the German Delegation be invited to prepare a draft for inclusion in the final communiqué.

8. Mr. DULLES (United States) suggested that the draft statement on the German problem should recall the agreement on reunification at the summit meeting which had been reached with the USSR, with a view to reaffirming Soviet responsibility for the present situation, owing to the fact that they had not yet lived up to their agreement.

9. The COUNCIL:

invited the German Delegation to prepare a draft statement on the problem of German reunification for inclusion in the final communiqué.

NATO SECRET

IV. DISARMAMENT

10. Mr. PINEAU (France) underlining the fact that, while NATO strongly needed the reinforcement of its military defence in order to face recent progress achieved by the Soviet Union in the field of military power, it was equally essential that, having come to this decision, NATO should make a gesture to express its determination to do all in its power to promote the relaxation of the present international tension and, possibly, to arrive at some measure of conciliation.

11. To this end, he submitted a proposal which he had had the opportunity of discussing with the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This proposal was to charge the four Ministers who were members of NATO and had been members of the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament to invite the USSR to meet with them in order to discuss disarmament problems on the basis of the resolution recently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. This action, taken on an international level, would place the Soviets in an embarrassing position if they were to reject it.

12. Mr. PELLA (Italy) agreed that, for psychological reasons, it was necessary to correlate the reinforcement of NATO's defence effort with the problem of disarmament. He therefore believed that it would be opportune to draw once again public attention to the fact that it was because of Soviet obstruction in the field of disarmament that NATO was now compelled to strengthen its military defence. He therefore agreed that a gesture be made by NATO in the field of disarmament. However, he preferred that this action be in the form of a resolution to the newly set up United Nations Disarmament Commission, urging them to resume as soon as possible the United Nations efforts towards disarmament. This would meet the object of the French proposal while at the same time allowing NATO to support the action of the Disarmament Commission.

13. Mr. LANGE (Norway) expressed full support for the French proposal. He could understand the position of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs but, at the same time, he could not forget that the Soviets had repeatedly taken the stand that they could not accept the present machinery of negotiations set up by the United Nations. They were bound to continue doing so and any change in their attitude would entail a loss of prestige. Any action which did not take into account this aspect of the Soviet position would be unrealistic.

14. If the French proposal were adopted, and if the Soviet Union accepted the invitation, the attitude of the four Western Ministers should be that, while they supported the proposals recently endorsed by the United Nations Assembly, they would be prepared to review the problem of disarmament in the light of developments which had occurred since these proposals were made, with a view to examining any modification which would not be contrary to the interests of the West.

15. Mr. SMITH (Canada) expressed the opinion that, while adopting the French proposal, the NATO countries should, when replying to the letters from Bulganin, explore the possibility of Soviet agreement to such aspects of disarmament as inspection and control.

16. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that it would be regrettable to give the impression that NATO's main reaction to recent developments in the international situation was limited to military measures without further initiative in the political field. On the other hand, if the gesture proposed by the French Foreign Minister was to be made within the context of the replies to the letters from Mr. Bulganin, he feared that, since these replies could not be sent immediately, this method would prevent a simultaneous announcement of NATO's decisions in the military field and of the political gesture proposed by the French Delegation. As, moreover, he was unwilling to concede the possibility of a summit conference arising out of the present meeting - a course of action which was exactly what the Russians wanted - there remained only the possibility of following the French proposal. The Council should therefore state its regret that the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It should then express its willingness to meet with the Soviet Government as proposed by the French Delegation in the hope that something might be done to break the present deadlock. If this position was presented to public opinion, the military aspect of the Council's decisions would assume its proper proportion. It would however be necessary that, in order to understand the need for reinforced defence, public opinion should be informed of NATO's desire that a fresh attempt be made towards disarmament.

17. Mr. LAROCK (Belgium) supported the French proposal, which in his view would be the best reply to all the letters recently sent by Mr. Bulganin. He added, in passing, that he did not think it necessary to mention these letters in the final communiqué.

It was, however, necessary to give a positive answer to the Soviets in a manner not to exclude any acceptable means of negotiation. This was the value of the French proposal.

18. He then suggested that the communiqué should briefly recall that the responsibility for the present deadlock on disarmament lay upon the Soviet Union. The communiqué should also recall the various proposals put forward by the Western countries for putting a stop to experiments in nuclear warfare, to prohibit under control the production of fissile materials, to reduce under control conventional forces and armaments, and to establish efficient control of disarmament as a whole, which proposals had all been rejected by the Soviets. NATO should assert its full adherence to the principle of efficient control of disarmament as being the only real evidence of Soviet Russia's desire for peace. The fact that the Soviets had rejected this principle and had refused to take part in the work of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations should establish their full responsibility for the present breakdown on the disarmament talks.

19. He then referred to the Polish proposal recently put to the United Nations, which had led to certain hesitations in public opinion in the West. There was no need for NATO to reply to this proposal but it might be wise to point out that any measures to establish atomic disarmament in a limited area in Europe should be subject to strict and efficient control. The Polish Government would be able neither to object to this proposal, nor to accept it.

20. In conclusion, he thought it essential that NATO should assert the necessity of effective control of atomic disarmament for this was a principle on which public opinion agreed with the position of the West.

21. Mr. DULLES (United States) said that he had no objection in principle to the proposal made by the French Delegation. He thought however that NATO should be very careful in handling this matter in a way which could not be resented by the United Nations and the recently established Disarmament Commission. This Commission was to meet early in January. Should NATO undermine it before it had even met, its members would certainly feel that NATO had rendered their task impracticable. He recalled that several members of this Commission came from important countries not represented in NATO.

22. He therefore thought it would be wiser to reach the objective proposed by the French Delegation by submitting to the Commission a proposal that, should they consider it useful, NATO would be glad to co-operate on the lines proposed by Mr. Pineau.

23. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) supported the views expressed by Mr. Dulles. The Council had convened to examine the need for increased defence measures in the face of the latest Soviet military progress. On the other hand, public opinion had never doubted NATO's willingness to support the United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament. It would therefore be dangerous to create the impression that, in the face of Soviet threats, the NATO countries were wavering and falling back on a position of inferiority where they could only talk of disarmament in reply to the threats implied in the letters sent by Mr. Bulganin.

24. On the other hand, the value of the United States' suggestion was that it reflected NATO's previous policy to discuss disarmament openly within the forum of the United Nations, whilst a tête-a-tête discussion between NATO and the Soviet Bloc would create a very bad impression on the other countries. He therefore supported the suggestion that NATO should reiterate its willingness to disarm as soon as it was satisfied of the good faith of the Soviet Bloc; to this effect, it should fully support the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission; however, it should not undermine the action of that Commission by negotiating with the USSR outside the United Nations.

25. Mr. HANSEN (Denmark) supported the proposal put by Mr. Pineau and expressed the view that it could be put in a form acceptable to the United Nations Commission, thus allaying the fears expressed by Mr. Dulles.

26. Mr. PINEAU (France) replying to Mr. Zorlu, pointed out that, in his proposal, there was no conflict between the reinforcement of NATO's military effort and the resumption of talks with the Soviet Bloc. On the contrary, public opinion in the NATO countries would accept more easily the additional defence burden if it were made clear that all was being done to solve the present difficulties in the field of disarmament.

27. If, on the other hand, the proposal to convene the five Foreign Ministers was simply referred to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as suggested by Mr. Dulles, the psychological effect of the proposal would be lost. He felt that his proposal would not hamper the work of the Disarmament Commission but rather that it would pave the way for its forthcoming meeting.

28. Mr. PELLA (Italy) supported the views expressed by Mr. Dulles. He felt that it would be preferable to let the Disarmament Commission meet first, and to take up the French proposal only after it was clear that the Commission was unable to break the present deadlock. This method of proceeding would avoid any criticism that NATO was usurping the responsibilities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

29. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) believed, with Mr. Hansen, that it was possible to find a formula which would allay the concern expressed by Mr. Dulles. On the other hand, it was necessary to consider the problem of disarmament in the light of NATO's present problems and of the fact that, so far, the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. These factors justified NATO in expressing its regret that the Soviet Union had refused to collaborate with the Commission and in stating its willingness to re-open negotiations at the level of Foreign Ministers, as a gesture, and would show the importance attached by NATO to the problem of disarmament. However, to have any value, this statement of NATO's position should be made as a result of the present meeting.

30. Mr. DULLES wondered if it would not be considered strange that, having been appointed members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament set up by the United Nations, the four Foreign Ministers decided, of their own accord, to embark on a fresh initiative after the United Nations had established a new Commission on Disarmament. Whether or not it would be wise for NATO as a whole to initiate disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, it was not competent, in effect, to give a new mandate to the Sub-Committee.

31. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) and Mr. PINEAU (France) then pointed out that the proposal was not for the Western members to refer the matter back to the Sub-Committee. The French proposal was addressed to these four Western Ministers as being those who, within NATO, possessed the widest experience of the problems of disarmament and were the most familiar with the position of the Soviet Union.

32. Mr. PINEAU added that it was essential for NATO to realise that, in its present state, public opinion would find it difficult to understand the decision to reinforce military defence if it were not accompanied by a political gesture such as he proposed. This was the very purpose for which the present meeting of the Council had been convened.

33. Mr. von BRENTANO (Germany) was in favour of the attitude taken by Mr. Dulles. He agreed with the idea of making a new approach to the Soviet Union in order to break the deadlock on disarmament. However, this should not be done in the form of direct negotiations between NATO and the Soviet Union, but rather as an approach by NATO to the United Nations. He felt it was important to avoid doing anything which might weaken the support obtained in the United Nations for the Western position on disarmament.

34. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece) emphasized the need for starting from two clear principles, firstly that there should be a spectacular gesture from NATO, which was a defensive organization and should look forward to disarmament by agreement and secondly

that NATO should not appear to be a rival of the United Nations, but should give protection and support to that body. In this respect, he supported the United States' views that NATO should not negotiate on its own. He, therefore, suggested that the communiqué should show a desire to make progress in disarmament and make it clear that the obstacles came from the side of the USSR.

35. Mr. CUNHA (Portugal) summed up the major points to be borne in mind, as follows: The main outcome of the present meeting of Heads of Government would be a reinforcement of the military strength of the Alliance, but it should be clearly brought out at the same time that NATO members were in no sense warmongers and that they had made a real effort in the direction of disarmament, showing clearly that the USSR was responsible for lack of progress. NATO on its side wished to push ahead in this field and would be willing to make use of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, but could not because of the attitude of the USSR. NATO was therefore disposed to suggest that the four member nations who had taken part in the Sub-Commission should hold a meeting with the USSR at Foreign Minister level. Such a project would not offend the susceptibilities of other nations and would be of assistance to public opinion in NATO countries.

36. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) stressed the need for considering public opinion, which was concerned at the apparent superiority enjoyed by the USSR at the present time. The first essential was to relieve this anxiety. Then consideration could be given to other ways of preserving peace, and particularly to disarmament. He thought the Greek proposal was a happy compromise and supported it. It was necessary to underline that the negative attitude to disarmament was only on the Russian side and had been particularly marked in the United Nations. NATO's desire to reach agreement on disarmament should also be stressed by asking the USSR to come once more to a conference in the place designated for that purpose, that is to say, the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Such an approach by NATO would be evidence of goodwill.

37. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) then put forward the following formula for conclusions. "The meeting of NATO Heads of Government:

- (1) reaffirms its support for the proposals put forward by the Western powers at the meeting of the Sub-Commission of the Disarmament Commission;
- (2) regrets the refusal of the USSR to accept these proposals;
- (3) regrets the refusal of the USSR to participate in meetings of the reconstituted Disarmament Commission;
- (4) notes the offer by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to meet the USSR at Foreign Minister level, if the Disarmament Commission itself agrees."

38. The CHAIRMAN then suggested that the communiqué from the meeting should include the following points:

- The USSR had flatly rejected the proposals of the Western Powers which were approved by all NATO nations and by 57 members of the United Nations.

- Heads of Government agreed to the four conclusions just set out by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd as a means of putting an end to the present stalemate.

39. He pointed out that merely to support proposals which had already been put forward would make very little impact upon public opinion. What was required was to show eagerness to make a fresh advance in the field of disarmament. He also suggested that it was not indispensable that NATO should be represented by the 4 members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee.

40. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) underlined the great importance of showing that it was the USSR and not the Western Powers who were at fault, as all the efforts for real disarmament had come from the Western side. The proposals which they had put forward and which had been accepted by 57 nations of the United Nations were just and should be adhered to. He wondered whether there was any fundamental difference between asking the USSR to meet in the 25 nation Disarmament Commission or in the 5 nation Sub-Commission as, in fact, the proposals to be discussed would be the same in both cases. If the USSR were invited to the Commission itself she would be placed in a difficult position and would almost certainly take the opportunity to persist in her previous refusal to participate. She might, however, find it easier to accept the offer of a meeting of the 5 nations of the Sub-Committee. However that might be, the first thing was to make it clear to world opinion that the Western Powers were putting forward reasonable proposals and the onus of refusal should be clearly on the USSR. He, therefore, continued to support the Greek proposals.

41. Mr. LANGE (Norway) said that the Chairman had set out the psychological position very clearly. Deadlock had been reached on disarmament in the United Nations on account of the intransigence of the USSR. Public opinion wanted NATO to show the way out of the present stalemate. He sympathised with the point made by the United States that NATO should not offend the United Nations, and particularly the uncommitted nations of the world, and agreed that, for this reason, any proposals made should not seem to by-pass the United Nations. The best way of getting support from the uncommitted nations was to show a sincere desire for disarmament and make a constructive effort to break the present deadlock. He, therefore, supported the approach outlined by the Chairman.

42. The CHAIRMAN then suggested that he should prepare a text, for submission to the resumed session in the afternoon, setting out the points of agreement reached and showing the two alternative proposals for future action:

- (1) that the USSR should be invited to participate in the reconstituted United Nations Disarmament Commission and
- (2) that if the Commission was unable to function, some other method of approach should be proposed.

43. Mr. DULLES (United States) suggested that, in framing any proposals, it should be borne in mind that the battle in the United Nations had been fought, by the USSR, on the question of numbers; in other words, the USSR had raised an objection to being in a minority position of one against four. The USSR had wanted to negotiate direct with the United States or, if this were not possible, at least on equal terms as far as the number of nations participating was concerned. Consequently, if a proposal were now to be made to return to the Sub-Committee numbers, i.e. four Western nations against the USSR, this would certainly not be breaking new ground, but putting forward once more a proposal which the USSR had used as their reason for withdrawing from earlier negotiations. He, therefore, suggested it was better merely to offer to help the Disarmament Commission in any way that body wished.

44. Mr. PINEAU (France) supported the Chairman's proposals in the main, but pointed out that their effect on public opinion, in France at least, would be nil. The debates which had taken place in October, for example, had caused scarcely a ripple of interest. For this reason it was necessary to go further than the Chairman had proposed, otherwise the result would be a dangerous anti-climax.

45. The CHAIRMAN said that there seemed to be agreement on the first part of his proposals but there were now three suggestions on the future procedure. These were 1) that there should be a meeting of the Disarmament Commission including the USSR; 2) that if the USSR rejected such a meeting the four NATO members of the Sub-Committee should approach the USSR; and 3) a variation of the second, that if the USSR rejected the meeting of the Commission some new formula should be worked out, either that the four countries should meet the USSR, or some other combination of countries should be attempted, giving the USSR more equality in numbers. In any event, responsibility for lack of progress should be clearly shown as lying with the USSR and an attempt should be made from the NATO side to find a way out of the present stalemate.

46. Mr. PELLA (Italy), supporting the Chairman, suggested that answers to the Bulganin letters should contain an invitation to the USSR to a conference on disarmament and should end by saying that if the USSR was not willing to participate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, NATO was ready to make every effort to find some other suitable forum for such a discussion.

47. Mr. SMITH (Canada) said that if the USSR objected to the odds of four to one, then Canada was ready to withdraw from the four.

48. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece) suggested that if NATO as an Alliance was to make proposals for disarmament, would it not perhaps be better to ask the Soviet bloc to come to discussions or at least to suggest that the USSR might bring some of her associates with her.

49. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that in practice disarmament was a matter solely between NATO and the USSR itself. Countries such as Bulgaria or smaller Eastern powers were of little consequence in this context. He therefore suggested that any negotiation should take place in the first instance between NATO, who might be represented by a small number of members, and the USSR. If the USSR then wished to propose that she brought associates with her, the point could be discussed further.

50. Mr. DULLES (United States) asked the Chairman to bear in mind, when drawing up his proposals, that this was only a psychological exercise. It was unlikely that the USSR would be prepared to resume discussions on a four to one basis as she would lose more face in that way than by going back to a reconstituted Disarmament Commission. It was also important to avoid any risk of alienating the uncommitted nations, some of whom were now represented on the 25 member Commission. If negotiations were to be undertaken by NATO itself, then the USSR would only participate through the Warsaw Pact which would place the United States, at least, in an impossible position. While agreeing that such a psychological approach as had been proposed should be made, it was essential to ensure that the approach was a sound one. In conclusion, he reminded the meeting of a suggestion put forward by the United States for a technical group inside NATO to study the practical side of disarmament. This would be of great value if negotiations were to take place.

51. Mr. SMITH (Canada) emphasised that public opinion in Canada would be extremely sceptical if the proposals only amounted to yet another meeting. The responsibility for the delay so far encountered should be clearly laid at the door of the USSR, which should be invited to put forward its own proposals for making new progress in disarmament.

52. The CHAIRMAN, in closing discussion of this item, agreed to prepare draft proposals to put before the Council after adjournment, indicating in parentheses the points which had not been agreed.

V. THE MIDDLE EAST

NATO SECRET

53. The CHAIRMAN invited countries to make clear what they wished to obtain from the present discussion on Middle East problems.

54. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) recalled that on the previous day a number of Heads of Government had expressed their anxiety with regard to the turn of events in the Middle East and he thought it appropriate, for the information of all present, to elaborate further Turkey's views on the situation. He recalled that for the last two years Russia had been trying by subversive means to gain a foothold in Middle Eastern countries and he outlined the methods by which she was attempting to gain control in Syria. It was worth noting that in that country a facade of democratic government had been preserved but there was, in fact, neither freedom of will nor of expression since all those who were hostile or neutral to Communist ideas had been expelled.

55. Russia was, consequently, now permanently established in Syria and had in addition obtained the co-operation of Egypt by virtue of the latter's ambitious policy which aimed at domination of the Middle East and needed external help in the attainment of its objectives. Russian activities were not limited to Egypt and Syria. Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, North Africa and even Ghana were active or potential theatres of Soviet subversion and it was not difficult to perceive the vast enveloping movement around the NATO powers which aimed at isolating them from the Middle Eastern sources of supply and endangering their Atlantic communications. If the Soviet Union were offered the opportunity of consolidating their gains in Egypt and Syria it would not be long before other Middle Eastern countries fell victim.

56. Public opinion in the Middle East was to a large extent inimical to the West by reason of past history, extreme nationalism and the Western attitude towards Israel. It was widely felt that nothing could be expected from the West and that only Russia was in a position to offer assistance on favourable terms. The social structure of the Middle Eastern countries offered in particular a fruitful field for Soviet propaganda which was able, as an example, to exploit the relative situations of peasant and landowner.

57. All the elements were present which most favoured Communist infiltration and the fact that the Middle East countries were of Moslem faith could not be regarded as any deterrent to Soviet aims inasmuch as religious ideas were seldom equated with the principles of Communism for the purpose of penetration.

58. Turning to the courses open to the Alliance in the face of the Middle Eastern situation Mr. Zorlu thought that the following considerations should be borne in mind.

(a) NATO countries should realise that the menace was general and real. No better illustration of this could be afforded than to recall the difficulties experienced at the time of the Suez crisis which seriously affected Western economies. With Russia astride the pipelines in Syria and the possibility of a rapid spread of the enveloping movement the seriousness of the situation could not be exaggerated.

(b) There was an urgent need for a wholly co-ordinated policy towards the Middle East. The fact that the Soviet Union had established herself so firmly was perhaps less due to her own propaganda than the absence of any concerted action on the part of the West.

(c) The maximum of economic co-operation with the Middle East countries should be the aim without, however, openly revealing the political motives. The economic potential of the West was far in excess of Russia's and it would be possible in the long run to place the latter at a disadvantage.

(d) Every effort should be made to support and encourage the openly pro-Western states in the Middle East so that they could recognise the advantages of Western links and impress public opinion accordingly.

(e) The Bagdad Pact was an alliance of pro-Western countries which effectively covered the southern flank of NATO. The United Kingdom and the United States through their participation and their support of Bagdad Pact countries were endeavouring to strengthen their position but such efforts were not sufficient and it was for other NATO countries in full recognition of the dangers to play their part in developing economic assistance. He stressed that it was not the intention to demand any extension of NATO responsibilities to the defence of Bagdad Pact countries but NATO countries could on the other hand lend strength and support and by so doing help to stem the tide of Soviet subversion.

59. Finally he urged that the question of a modus vivendi between NATO and the Bagdad Pact should form the subject of later consideration.

60. Mr. SELWYN LLOYD (United Kingdom) agreed with the general description given by the Turkish Foreign Minister of the Middle East situation and fully recognised the seriousness of the threat. He hoped that the remarks on the subject by the Heads of Government at the previous days meeting would become the doctrine of the Alliance. It was not his intention that there should be a NATO "plan" for the Middle East but merely a framework within which each individual

Government would seek to work. Regarding the methods of dealing with the problem he stressed that all countries should be equally impressed with the gravity of the situation and that every support should be offered to pro-Western Middle East governments. Other factors were greater co-ordination of economic help and more exchange of information, ideas and principles relating to Middle Eastern affairs together with individual support by governments to Bagdad Pact countries with the full assent of public opinion.

61. The CHAIRMAN then invited Ministers in the light of the foregoing statements to study what elements they thought should be included in the communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the present Ministerial session.

62. Mr. PELLA (Italy) paid tribute to the restraint displayed by Turkey in the course of recent events on her frontiers and associated himself with the proposals for dealing with the Middle Eastern problem put forward by the previous speakers. He stressed that there was a clear need for substantial co-ordination of ideas and action on both the political and economic plane.

63. Turning to the content of the communiqué, he thought that it should emphasise the political interest of NATO in security in the Middle East, which was in turn fundamental to the security of the Western world. Such a formula should not embarrass those countries which were anxious to avoid making declarations implying certain commitments. As regards economic co-operation, action should not only take the form of deciding what was essential to promote the well-being of underdeveloped countries, but also of finding a solution to the problem of marketing staple products in the Middle East which hitherto had been bought up by the Soviet Union at advantageous prices for political reasons.

64. Italy shared the view which favoured alignment between NATO and other organizations in the free world responsible for safeguarding peace; while it was not necessarily advisable to elaborate a rigid formula for this purpose, integration and alignment of ideas and efforts clearly were indicated. This was a factor to which the communiqué might well make allusion.

65. Mr. HALLSTEIN (Germany) cautioned against giving too much publicity to the motives underlying assistance to Middle Eastern countries. He agreed that co-ordination of effort in that direction was needed, but co-ordination was itself part of the general problem of consultation.

66. As regards the wording of the communiqué, he emphasised the need to counteract Russian infiltration and to exploit any desire on the part of the Middle Eastern countries to be economically developed or politically independent. He thought that the communiqué should allude to the fact that the Middle Eastern situation had been discussed by the Council and that peace in the Middle East could only be maintained and specific problems solved if their people remained internally and externally free and independent. The

initiative of any countries which might lead to economic stability and well-being of the population would find the Alliance ready to help such peoples to participate in economic exchange and political life of the world as independent partners with equal rights.

67. Mr. LANGE (Norway) underlined the need for a general awareness of the importance of the Middle Eastern situation to all members of the Alliance. It was quite natural that the situation should be discussed both by the Council in Permanent Session and at Ministerial level. He questioned, however, the wisdom of saying too much about plans for counteracting the obvious dangers. NATO was not popular in the Arab world, and the Soviet Union was at pains to exploit prejudices in large sections of Arab opinion. If it was desired to counteract Soviet influence, the situation was easier as far as those countries were concerned which had taken a firm stand as members of the Bagdad Pact. The position, however, was somewhat more delicate for those countries desiring to remain free of entanglements. It should be the aim of the Alliance to strengthen the desire of such countries to withstand Soviet influence and make it easier for them to maintain their attitude. He warned against providing material for Soviet propaganda to the effect that NATO was making plans to interfere in the Middle East and to mobilise countries to its side.

68. In conclusion, he was of the opinion that the less said about the matter the better, but that everything should be done to ensure concerted action in future.

69. Mr. PINEAU (France) agreed with the remarks of Mr. Lange, but suggested that since mention of the Middle East in the communiqué could not be avoided, it might be desirable to combine the concepts of security and improvement of living standards as the maximum that could be done by the Alliance for the time being in its approach to Middle Eastern problems.

70. Mr. DULLES (United States) also shared the views of the Norwegian Foreign Minister regarding the desirability of reducing remarks about the Middle East to a minimum in the communiqué, unless there was any area in which it could be positively asserted that some good was already being done.

71. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece) drew particular attention to the psychology and susceptibilities of the Arab world and their attitude towards the West in the light of the latter's apparent support of Israel. Everything possible should be done to attract uncommitted nations and great care should be exercised to avoid offending national susceptibilities.

72. After a further exchange of views, the COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statements made in discussion;

