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VERBATIM RECORD

of the

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

held on

TUESDAY, 7th JUNE 1966, at 3.00 p.m.

at the

PALAIS DES CONGRES

BRUSSELS

COMPTE RENDU

de la

SEANCE DU CONSEIL

tenue le

MARDI 7 JUIN 1966 à 15 heures

au

PALAIS DES CONGRES

BRUXELLES

OTAN/NATO
Bruxelles

NATO SECRET

Mr. BROSIO

I think we should give a few minutes to the photographers. Gentlemen, we may start, the photographers have all left I believe. Gentlemen, may I make a suggestion, this morning we had a first discussion on the problem of the procedure for the negotiations. We made a little headway but not too much. I think that perhaps if we continue today we won't make very much progress and so we had perhaps better suspend this discussion until first thing tomorrow morning, for instance.

In the meantime we could start on the next Item on the Agenda, that is to say East-West relations and the general discussion, so as to give all Ministers a chance to re-examine this question of procedure and perhaps to come to some solution which might be acceptable to all concerned. Are there any objections to this suggestion?

If there are no objections then it is understood that this subject will be postponed until tomorrow morning and in the meantime we will start with this general discussion about East-West relations connected with the Political Appraisal by the Secretary General and of course also on the state of the Alliance as far as it is linked to East-West relations.

So far I have six speakers on my list, the first is Dr. Schroeder, the second is Mr. Rusk, then Mr. Fanfani, Mr. Nogueira, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Couve de Murville. Does anybody else wish to speak? Mr. Caglayangil and Mr. Toumbas, very good, but everybody has plenty of time, so just let us know when the Minister wants to speak. So may I now ask Dr. Schroeder to start discussion.

Dr. SCHROEDER

Mr. President.

Whether the threat has lessened or not is the crucial one for NATO, for our joint great military efforts have purpose only, if without them neither peace, nor freedom, nor security are ensured. Certainly the picture of the world has changed essentially since the foundation of NATO, due mainly to the new states which have emerged on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations. Europe, too, looks different today from what it looked in 1949, but what has remained is the confrontation of the Free World with the Communist World. It is the demarcation line right through the centre of Germany and Europe which separates those two worlds.

We hear occasionally that the danger of a conflict along the demarcation line is no longer existent. Let me only mention a few of the arguments in favour of this thesis.

Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

The Soviet Union, it is said, is threatened by China. It must keep its back free, and sooner or later come to terms with the West. The truth is, however, that today China does not yet represent a serious military danger to the Soviet Union. One could even say that until China becomes a serious danger the Soviet Union still has a breathing space. It is said that the Soviet leaders have abandoned their world revolutionary aims and are now merely pursuing that of a national interest. However, in Soviet policy, national and worldwide revolutionary objectives have always been inseparably interwoven. One can often read that Soviet society is taking on a more middle-class character and that a middle-class Soviet Union presents no danger. Whether or not this thesis of an increasing bourgeois influence is correct or not, who wants to maintain that a bourgeois social order alone is enough to make war impossible?

It may be likely and probable that the present Soviet leaders do not want a nuclear war since it would destroy their own country. I think that even Khrushchev, unpredictable as his actions may have been, did not want war, and yet with the Cuban adventure he brought the world to the brink of nuclear war and only at the last moment did he realise that he had misjudged the United States determination to resist.

Mr. Chairman, my sober question now is, has there been any objective change since Cuba in the political or military sphere which would categorically exclude a repetition of such a miscalculation? I must admit I see none; or has perhaps Soviet war potential decreased? Is it not true that the Soviets still command the strongest land forces in the world, that they possess a vast arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs, carrier aircraft, missile-carrying submarines, missiles of all ranges of which some thousand MRBMs are always, even at this very moment, targetted at the free part of Europe; is that a threat or is it not?

All countries planning their defences have at all times based such plans on concrete objective facts, on the military strength of the potential enemy, and in our case that strength has, as far as I can see, not decreased. However, our potential enemy today, as in 1949 when NATO was established, is the Soviet Union.

The Expert Report Mr. Chairman, which is before us today, rightly concluded that the USSR has not given up hope of promoting the expansion of world communism nor of winning predominance in Europe. Its goals continue therefore to conflict with those of the West and this fact should be taken into consideration by the members of the Alliance when shaping their policy.

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Dr. SCHROEDER(Contd)

In addition, I would mention another aspect and attitude of Soviet policy which is inconsistent with the policy of our Alliance, namely Moscow's refusal to permit the Germans in the Soviet-occupied Zone to exercise their right of self-determination. In this respect, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin continue the policy pursued by Khrushchev, Malenkov and Stalin. Their intention is to retain at all costs that part of Germany which fell to them as their Zone of occupation at the end of the war and to maintain in power the regime installed at that time by Stalin. Hence the policy they pursue has been petrified since 1945. It ignores the changes in Europe and the world and tries to present a situation which can be understandable only as an immediate consequence of the war and as a normal state of affairs which it seeks to force upon the German people for ever.

However, a backward-looking policy of this kind which fails to take account of the will of the population and the changes in Europe is hard to enforce. It does not only necessitate the presence in the Soviet Zone of a very strong Soviet occupation army in order to support the regime, but it also requires permanent political pressure from the Eastern bloc and incessant efforts to present the Soviet Zone to the world as a normal phenomenon and to upgrade its standing.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, we witnessed today the beginning of a new diplomatic offensive by the Soviet Zone which has obviously been agreed with Moscow in each and every detail. To quote only a few examples; at the beginning of February a Soviet Zone disarmament memorandum was circulated at the Geneva disarmament conference and at the end of February the Soviet Zone applied for admission to the United Nations and, finally, there is the request by the Socialist Unity Party that a public exchange of speakers be effected with the Social Democratic Party of Germany. There were various motives and objectives behind these activities; some of these efforts I have mentioned were designed exclusively to make the Pankow regime a respectable partner in foreign affairs and to improve its standing. The intention underlying the exchange of speakers with the Social Democratic Party of Germany is to exercise an influence on the West German working class and to provoke controversies among the big political parties in the free part of Germany.

On closer examination, a third motive takes on importance, namely the necessity of turning the attention of the Soviet Zone of occupation away from domestic difficulties, for the situation in the Soviet-occupied Zone is undoubtedly unbalanced.

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Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

The most conspicuous sign of this was the suicide of Herr Apel, the Soviet Zone planning chief shortly before the conclusion of the long-term trade agreement between Moscow and Pankow at the beginning of last December.

I might also mention in this connection the measures decided a few weeks later by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin to tighten up the party and the economic machinery and at the same time to counteract the influence of the West and of the more progressive Eastern bloc countries on Soviet Zone cultural activities.

Finally, the uncertainty in the Zone became evident in the measures taken against exponents of the opposition within the party, such as Professor Havermann, but also of leading functionaries of the party. Although the opponents were strongly reprimanded the regime did not dare to deal with them all too severely or even wipe out their political and economic existence. Why? Certainly not because Ulbricht has suddenly taken on a generous attitude or because his regime has gained greater self-confidence. The truth is that some of the reprimanded critics of the regime had pleaded for a more national policy as they interpreted it, and obviously the regime wants to avoid the reproach that it is pursuing a non-national, that is, a Soviet policy. But in this the regime has been unsuccessful. True, the population in the Soviet Zone has in many respects become more critical of the West. Since the erection of the Berlin Wall they have tried to come to terms with the regime in some way or other. They are proud, and rightly so, of the achievements to which they can point in spite of the inadequate system, but nobody can say seriously that people in the Soviet Zone believe that they have become a nation and that they have developed a national feeling and patriotism of their own. The overwhelming majority of the population, both adults and young people, reject any policy leading to permanent division of Germany. Some isolated representatives of the regime now seem to realise that the position of the Socialist Unity Party becomes shaky as soon as the policy of division which the people feel to be a non-national one becomes too obvious. To me this is an important motive for the proposed exchange of speakers with the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany made by Pankow.

Whether the calculations of the Soviet Zone rulers are correct is another question. So far they have had no idea how hard it would be to rid themselves again of the ghost which they invoked, for the people in the Zone need but a tiny glimmer of hope to muster fresh courage.

Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

They no longer feel, as they did before, that they are in a helpless position. It is obvious that this should be unpleasant and embarrassing for the Pankow regime.

Naturally, Mr. Chairman, it is out of the question that the forthcoming exchange of speakers could directly promote the re-unification of Germany. The German question cannot be settled in bilateral polemic talks held in public and detached from the many problems of the East-West conflict, and certainly it cannot be settled in a discussion with Soviet Zone functionaries. To me the chief value of the exchange of speakers lies in the fact that the voice of freedom can be raised in the Soviet Zone itself, if only on one day and in one place.

Occasionally I am asked whether the more flexible tactics in the confrontation with Communism such as are evident here do not indicate a change in the Federal Government regarding the basic principles of its policy, for example, in regard to the general question such as the question of its right to be the sole representative of the German people or the right of self-determination. The fact is that we have not changed our attitude. We continue to uphold the principles which have so far governed our policy.

This, Mr. Chairman, is the unanimous view of all political parties in Germany, but we are ready to prove that in the intellectual and political spheres we are not afraid of a direct confrontation with Communism.

We are aware that only Moscow can speak the decisive word. There will be no right of self-determination in the Soviet Zone without Moscow's consent. However, all this should not prevent us from using every promising opportunity for relaxation, that is, for an improvement of the present situation. Even in this field, where illusions prosper particularly well but fade away just as fast, it is necessary to keep a clear vision and sober judgement.

The Federal Government has, for many years, been endeavouring to win confidence in its policy in Eastern Europe too, to establish and renew cultural contacts, to forge economic links and, generally speaking, to confront the distorted picture which Communist propaganda gives us with the truth. By and large we are fairly satisfied with the results although our policy has not met with the same success everywhere. Although all Eastern bloc countries have shown an interest in livelier trade with us, their readiness to establish contacts, which are confined not only to economic interests but also affect intellectual and political spheres, vary from country to country.

Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

Although we have made special efforts to win the confidence of the Polish people who suffered most of all among the Eastern European nations during the last war, these efforts have been crowned with the least success. Unfortunately the Polish Government shows itself irreconcilable towards us and the German people. I think it is necessary to say this here on this occasion. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, we do not permit ourselves to be discouraged, for we do know that in our East European policy we shall have to reckon on long periods of time.

Mr. Chairman, in our Peace Note of 25th March, which is known to all of you, we made proposals concerning disarmament and security, some of which were addressed exclusively to the countries of the Warsaw Pact. We made up our mind to take that step because we felt we should take the initiative for an exchange of views on questions of disarmament and security, and because we were prepared to acquaint the Government of the Warsaw Pact with our point of view on the question of disarmament and security, to make concrete proposals to them and to consider Communist propaganda which constantly describes us as war-mongers. Up to now, as far as the Eastern bloc is concerned, answers have come from the Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments only. It is worthy of note that the attempt of the Warsaw Pact Governments to agree on an identical text has either been abortive or has not even been made, and this has seemed hopeless from the very outset. Unfortunately, the three of the answers I have mentioned are negative although variations in degree are distinctly discernible. However, final judgement will not be possible until the still outstanding comments from the South Eastern European countries have been received.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, it can already be said today that the effect of our initiative in Eastern Europe has been considerable and, at any rate, greater than has been revealed in the official comments. Communist propaganda never ceases to oppose and reject the importance of our proposals which do not fit in with the official picture which is being painted of us in Eastern Europe. Moreover, most of the replies which we have received so far to our Note indicate that there have obviously been difficulties in rejecting some of our proposals. This particularly applies to our offer to exchange declarations of renunciation of the use of force and also to our invitation to the non-nuclear members of the Warsaw Pact to follow our example, to renounce the production of nuclear weapons and to submit to corresponding controls. We have found that the indications of the limitations which Germany has accepted voluntarily are best understood by those who have received a request to assume similar limitations themselves.

Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

Although the official replies from Eastern Europe have been negative we shall, nevertheless, endeavour to continue the dialogue. In doing so, we shall maintain close contacts with all the governments represented here; we consider that to be quite self-understood.

On this occasion I should like to thank the governments represented here for the support which they have given to our initiative. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we might refer to this Note in the final communique of this Conference. I agree with the Secretary General when he says in his Annual Political Appraisal that today more than ever no initiative should be excluded provided it has the considered support of all the Allied countries. On the other hand, we should always carefully examine whether NATO as an organization should take such an initiative itself. In my opinion, NATO's main function in this context should consist in preparing and harmonising a flexible policy, especially a policy towards the East, adapted to present-day possibilities. It is my impression that NATO is not equipped to play a role in direct political action. At any rate, we should prevent NATO appearing, as it were, as the opposite number of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Mr. Chairman, in recent weeks petitions have been made from amongst this group to hold the European Security Conference. The idea as such is no doubt highly appropriate to the basic problem which all of us are incessantly endeavouring to solve. However, we should first carefully co-ordinate the methods by which we intend to accomplish this objective.

The policentrism in Eastern Europe has, among other things, its origin in the revival of the national idea, in the national differences in the development of Communism. We would obstruct this trend if we were to accord to the Warsaw Pact an important role, if we were to conduct a dialogue with it from one organization to another, because in doing so we would consolidate the Warsaw Pact, since Moscow could point out to its allies which are independently looking for an opening towards the West that there is a simpler way towards relaxation and towards an arrangement with the West, a way which would not interfere with Communist solidarity, namely the way which lies directly through the Warsaw Pact. We are, it seems to me, all agreed that NATO should not indulge in any immobilism. I also feel that we are agreed that initiatives towards Communist countries should not be undertaken by NATO itself but rather by the individual members of this Alliance provided always that these initiatives keep within the framework of our common policy and are co-ordinated.

The difficulties, Mr. Chairman, begin as soon as we wish to translate the general thought into practical action, what is to be done, what can be done, where should we start our action

Dr. SCHROEDER (Contd)

and which Communist country should we approach first, the Soviet Union, the other countries of Eastern Europe, and which of them first and predominantly. You will agree with me that general statements in which we assure the Communist countries as a whole of our will to contribute to a relaxation of tension will not gain us anything. We know that we are today no longer faced with a monolithic block and that the differences in the various Eastern European countries also require different approaches and different methods. It would be a political mistake to attempt initiatives which would ignore this fact, one cannot treat the countries of Eastern Europe as if they were all alike. Rather we should employ our energies and the means at our disposal purposefully and primarily where we are most likely to be successful. The co-ordination, Mr. Chairman, of our opinions and views and an agreed course of action in NATO are today more necessary than ever, since the Soviet Union is increasing its efforts to split our Alliance and to exclude the United States from dealing with the most important political questions in Europe. It would, of course, be unrealistic to exclude the United States from having a say in the political problem of our continent after they have stationed large forces for our protection in Europe and are thus making a decisive contribution towards European security. I think we should on this particular occasion clearly emphasise the European responsibilities of the United States and their merits for our freedom. Practically speaking it appears to me particularly necessary to intensify within NATO the exchange of views and experience in our Eastern policy to harmonise more than in the past our policy towards the Eastern European countries and perhaps to work out priorities and points of main effort and perhaps also to arrive at a division of labour. I suggest, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the Allies should put forward here in NATO their ideas on questions of detente and that we discuss these ideas at a restricted conference perhaps at the level of Foreign Ministers' deputies. In this way NATO could, even if it does not become politically active to the outside world, serve as some sort of a clearing house for our ideas and actions in this field of the Eastern policy function which, incidentally, it has already performed for many years.

Mr. Chairman, our policy must not be guided by illusions and it must not stop at general phrases about relaxation, it must be realistic, it must be concrete. Relaxation must never be a matter of general proclamatic declarations of intent, it must be a purposeful, concrete and well-considered policy. Each and every step we take today in the field of East-West relations should be examined as to whether it meets this requirement.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. May I re-read the list, because there was some omission in the list I read before and also it has now been completed by the addition of some of the names, but not all of them are yet included. There will now be Mr. Rusk, Mr. Fanfani, Mr. Nogueira, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Couve, Mr. Toumbas, Mr. Caglayangil, Mr. Haekkerup, and Mr. Lyng. Thank you very much, and may I ask Mr. Rusk to speak now.

Mr. RUSK

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, fellow Ministers. The Secretary General once again has provided us with a concise review of the events of the past year and a perceptive analysis of their implications for the Alliance. As the appraisal states, all the Allies accept the Alliance; fourteen of them consider the military organization to be indispensable and one member no longer wishes to participate in it. This morning we have taken some important first steps in making the necessary adjustments arising from this situation, the problems are immense, complex and expensive and will require continuing effort over a long period of time. I would join the Secretary General in underlining the need to maintain in this lengthy process an atmosphere of understanding and mutual confidence. Our deliberations must continue to be characterised by patience and reflection, for we are concerned with much more than merely responding appropriately to the recent French decision. We are charged with the responsibility for maintaining and strengthening an Alliance which has before it tasks affecting the vital security interests of all of its members. And when we say "Alliance" we mean this Alliance, not some ancient Alliance, not some Alliance yet unborn. We are talking about the North Atlantic Alliance, which declares that the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. And an Alliance that declares that the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

The Secretary General has given some attention in his appraisal to the significance of 1969 for the Alliance. I would hope that having successfully met the present crisis we shall not be faced again in 1969 and the years thereafter with an instability undermining our mutual interests. The first objective of this Alliance is the security of its members. In our view this objective remains as valid and essential as ever before. The North Atlantic Community has brilliantly succeeded in the great tasks of rebuilding the war-devastated areas of Europe and in providing and maintaining our security west of what Mr. Churchill called the Iron Curtain.

MR. RUSK (Contd)

Twenty-two years ago yesterday was D-day. The United States would make unlimited sacrifices to ensure that no such D-day will ever occur again. For our common determination must be to deter the kind of aggression which can bring forward such a threat or, if the deterrents fail, successfully to defend the NATO area.

When we think about the atmosphere of reduced tensions, I think we must not forget that 5 years ago this month we were threatened with war if Allied forces were not withdrawn from Berlin, and 3½ years ago a large battery of missiles was introduced into Cuba, and that today substantial quantities of Soviet arms are appearing in North Vietnam and South Vietnam as a part of an effort to seize South Vietnam by force. We do not see the end of an era in the policies and attitudes of the Soviet Union - at least not yet, and I would suppose that our memories should not be too short on these matters. But our central objective requires a most effective ordering of defence resources on the part of the members of NATO.

It requires that we remain strong and alert. We must not repeat the tragic error that free nations have made in the past. We ourselves in 1945 and 1946, we sitting round this table, made the error of one-sided reduction in arms that tempt adversaries to resort again to threats and aggressions. It would be tragic if fissures within the North Atlantic Community were to impair the security which the members of NATO have achieved for themselves and other free nations by their collective efforts, including the investment of more than a trillion dollars in defences since 1947.

A strong NATO also provides a solid base for efforts to improve East-West relations. We all realise we have a common interest in agreements, or arrangements, that settle or reduce disputes and differences between East and West and a common interest in doing what we can to encourage evolutionary trends within the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe, trends toward more open societies and more normal relations between the peoples of those countries and the peoples of the West, trends that will help the world to build a more orderly and reliable peace.

The assessment by the Secretary General of the situation with regard to events in the Soviet Union and their significance for us and, I would add, the assessments of the two Groups of Experts which have met since our last meeting make it clear that there will be no easy and quick solutions to the main East-West problems. I will come back to that very briefly later.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

For now I would like only to say that a deep sense of responsibility and solidarity, as he put it, is an essential ingredient of success. As we act to make the necessary adjustments in the structure of the Alliance, to take account of the position of the Government of France, we must not lose sight of our important regular business. Some promising prospects open up before us. The Chairman of the Special Committee of Defence Ministers will, later on in the meeting, be giving us a report on this activity which has already demonstrated its great usefulness. We will hear later of the new approach in NATO to organizing co-operation in weapons research, development and production. We are moving ahead to institute new programmes or strengthen existing ones. An important aspect we must always consider is the need to broaden support for, and understanding of, the principles and objectives of the Alliance.

Among the institutions which are important to this effort is the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. I recognise that the Parliamentarians Conference is not a matter for executive government as such, but the United States has long recognised the importance of this NATO Parliamentarians' Conference as a forum for the exchange of ideas between United States and European Parliamentarians. It serves also as a means for organizing parliamentary participation in formulating policies of the Alliance nations. And the issues facing us are steadily increasing in their complexity and scope. The pace at which they will be considered will reflect refined techniques of consultation and communication. We ought to try to be sure that the Parliamentarians' Conference is equipped to move ahead with us. This will undoubtedly require a strengthened Conference Secretariat to provide continuity between annual sessions and more effective liaison between the Council, the Delegations, the International Staff and our Parliamentarians. I must report there is a growing sentiment in the United States Congress that such strengthening is needed and our own parliamentarians are prepared to play their part in making this possible.

We should also address ourselves to the solution of certain problems that have been with us for some time. For example, for a long time now this Council has agreed that something ought to be done to assist the defence efforts of Greece and Turkey. NATO country action to follow up this decision has, with very few exceptions, not been forthcoming. I hope that all of those countries that are not active will look very hard at what they might do and even today, at this meeting, commit themselves to specific efforts to provide aid and support for a rational defence programme for our two Allies on the South-East flank, and a combined aid which will not only be adequate in substance but will be dignified in manner.

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Mr. RUSK (Contd)

As to the ACE mobile force, I think it is regrettable, after all the discussion we have had in the past, that we have not been able to put the financing of the ACE mobile force on a permanently sound footing. Here is another area in which we ought to be showing forward movement, a tangible way of expressing our belief in the need for material measures to give our Alliance meaning.

In economic terms the strength of the Alliance depends on the willingness of each member to divert substantial resources from civilian use to military preparedness. This is the fundamental condition of our security. We must constantly be sure that the sum total of our defence efforts meets the common and agreed need. This is a heavy burden on all of us, but as our economies grow we shall find it easy to provide responsible shares. We must try to avoid the appearance of anything like a double standard under which some feel that their defence requirements can be dealt with on the basis of a detente, while the United States and others are required to meet their defence commitments on the basis of danger, threat and confrontation. Moreover, the resources which each of us devotes to the Alliance should be used economically both in the area of procurement and for the support of our forces. Balance of payments constraints threaten to make us less efficient than we should be in using available defence resources. Force requirements which should be determined by the demands of strategy are today confronted by the needs of each country to keep its external accounts under reasonable control. We must find a way to prevent balance of payments considerations from intruding on military decisions and to this end we should seek means of neutralising the balance of payments effects of defence expenditures within the Alliance.

Up to this point I have spoken mainly about NATO's first objective: collective security. Let us turn briefly now to East-West relations, for the two are, of course, intimately inter-related. Both seek to preserve both our free societies and peace. Our collective defence pact has been and remains essential but we all want to work towards a world order, free of aggression and from the burden and dangers of modern armaments, in which all nations large and small live together in peace under institutions of their own choice.

I do not believe that any of us would take the view that the fundamental problem remaining unresolved after World War II, the division of Europe and the division of Germany, can be settled on a basis acceptable to the West in the absence of continuing Atlantic strength and unity.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

I certainly do not believe that we can resolve the problems of the division of Europe if Europe is to be broken up once more into thirty national, separate, non-co-operating states, each vying with the other in the historical fashion. If the point has now been reached at which we can address ourselves more actively to the improvement of East-West relations in the hope of an eventual settlement of fundamental outstanding problems, we have the Atlantic Alliance to thank. If there is a substantial degree of prudence in Moscow, we have the Atlantic Alliance to thank.

Given then the necessity to preserve the effectiveness of our present security system as the foundation, how do we achieve a more favourable East-West environment? We have in this Council a mechanism ready to hand for consultation and for exchanging ideas and experience, for harmonising national actions and for evolving an agreed view on what kind of an ultimate European settlement, including an end to the division of Germany, would be acceptable from the viewpoint of Western security.

Meanwhile, each of us can examine what national initiatives we might undertake. I have in mind such concrete actions as the development of mutual trade and cultural and other exchanges and political initiatives as well, such as the Note sent by the Federal Republic of Germany to a large number of countries on 25th March after consultation in NATO, to which Dr. Schroeder has already referred. These can do much to create that more favourable atmosphere in which it may be possible to consider the larger East-West problems.

Our consultations on disarmament within NATO are another useful activity with a direct bearing on East-West relations. NATO has been kept fully informed of the course of events at the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva and has been given an opportunity to express views on this activity. Moreover, since our last meeting a useful effort has been made to provide all NATO countries with a kind of technical background required for sound judgements on disarmament questions. We ought to continue and intensify such consultation. The fact that the NATO Council should be the primary arena for continuing consultation on improvement of East-West relations in no way requires that NATO be the exclusive instrument for executing policies in this area. As well as this consultation, a close examination of the situation of the East will suggest steps that should be taken in the cultural, political, security and economic fields.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

In short, what we do should be highly pragmatic; but pragmatic within an assessment and closely co-ordinated policy among the NATO countries. I mention the OECD because it seems to us that this may be an ideal institution for dealing with economic matters. Perhaps we can devise a policy which would invite the Eastern states to work out with us ad hoc arrangements with those largely technical activities of the OECD which have a low political volatility, but are of high importance to the Eastern nations. We have the precedent of Yugoslavia and Finland which suggests this approach might have real potential.

We are grateful, Mr. Secretary General, that you circulated a paper in the last few days in which you reminded us of the substantial number of contacts, agreements, exchanges, between the members of NATO and countries of Eastern Europe. We feel that it would be very important that the general public knows of the extent, the variety, of such activity because somehow I think the mass and the significance of this total activity, has been under-appreciated.

It is sometimes said, and probably more often thought, that United States participation in the defence of South Vietnam ^{ee}prevents a detente in Europe. There may be an element of truth in this. The Soviet leaders are sensitive to accusations by Peking that they are not zealously supporting North Vietnam and militant Communists elsewhere. Indeed, Peking accuses Moscow of assisting Hanoi in order to betray Hanoi to the United States.

But quite apart from Vietnam, there has been no indication that the Soviets are willing to accept reliable international inspection on Soviet territory, and without that little progress in reducing armaments is feasible. And there has been no indication that they are ready to consider the reunification of Germany on any terms except their own. I have no doubt that there would be, at least temporarily, friendly feelings in Moscow if we were to abandon Vietnam. I have no doubt that there would be, at least temporarily, friendly feelings toward us in Moscow if we should abandon Berlin. But that is not the basis upon which detente can occur. We must look at genuine interests, vital interests, elementary principles, standing commitments and find answers which take into account the genuine and legitimate interests of both sides.

So my Government will continue to press for measures to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and we do not believe that these need be excluded by the situation in Vietnam. Now the public atmosphere surrounding Vietnam does not make this easy.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

At a recent Press Conference I once again urged our Congress to ratify a consular convention with the Soviet Union, and to pass legislation looking toward expansion of our trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR. But it will be difficult for me to predict today that those two pieces of legislation would succeed in the present session. We are determined to continue to seek ways that will ease tension and improve relations without injury to the interests of our Allies and to their security and ours.

My colleagues are doubtless aware of the reports of considerable activity within the Warsaw Pact Organization. It is reported that Warsaw Pact Defence Ministers have recently met in Moscow and that the Foreign Ministers are now meeting in Moscow in preparation for a Warsaw Pact summit meeting to be held in the near future. We do not believe that we know the exact purpose of all this activity, although there are many rumours that the Rumanian Government is dissatisfied with present arrangements. It is to be hoped that General de Gaulle's forthcoming visit to Moscow will throw further light on Soviet policies and whether new initiatives on the part of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty are opportune.

I shall not go over again the ground which the Secretary General has covered in his usual thorough manner in his report on recent developments in East-West relations. I would merely note that despite some evolution in the Soviet Union, and perhaps even more among the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, the basic policies of the members of the Warsaw Pact appear to be unchanged. At the same time, I would emphasise our deep desire that the West play an active part in trying to improve East-West relations.

NATO has, of course, been actively concerned over the years with an improvement in East-West relations and with creating an atmosphere more conducive to ultimate resolution of the fundamental European issues left over from World War II. But my Government believes that even if the immediate outlook for new concrete agreements or arrangements is not altogether encouraging, the West should make it evident beyond any question that it earnestly desires improved relationships and our hope is that unremitting efforts on our side may evoke eventually favourable responses from the East. We are finally convinced that if there is to be genuine progress toward the eventual settlement of the tragic division of East from West, and particularly, the tragic division of Germany, the countries represented here today must stand together. I would express a certain caution about the idea that a major conference should be called between Eastern Europe and Western Europe or between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries.

Mr. RUSK (Contd)

I would comment very simply on a conference for the consideration of European security questions without the United States, by saying that the United States has a deep and vital interest in the problems which arose in connection with, as a result of, World War II, and we do not expect to yield our interests in those questions. We did not fight World War II for nothing.

As far as another type of conference is concerned, we have to bear in mind that a conference can be an avenue to agreement - if so, well and good - or a conference can be an avenue to a crisis, and it is of basic importance to know in advance what the prospect is about the outcome of such a conference on whatever subject is involved. So we believe that quiet and effective preparation is required, and if the United States feels somewhat sensitive on this matter it is because we are perhaps in a special sense the heirs of a crisis and we can take our crises, if we had the choice, one at a time, and not add others to the ones we have already.

So in these circumstances I would suggest that we instruct the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council to continue to examine closely the prospects for healthy developments in East-West relations and to consider further initiatives which might be usefully undertaken by members of the North Atlantic Pact, in addition to the numerous activities that are already being carried on.

We would hope that member governments would be forthcoming in consulting intimately and frequently on these matters. We would hope that there could be further consultation about the nature of the threat from the East, its implications for the West, the nature of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and their implications for the West and the points upon which further points of agreement can be found in the process of trying to build a peace. We would hope that the Permanent Representatives would not defer these matters until the time comes to prepare a report for submission to the December Ministerial meeting but would take this up as a matter of continuing business, making periodic reports if necessary before December, and then in our December or later meeting we can have another broad review of the progress that has been made. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The following speaker is Mr. Fanfani, please.

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M. FANFANI

Monsieur le Président, le moment dans lequel se déroule ce Conseil nous impose un examen attentif de la situation. Notre Alliance souffre aujourd'hui de conséquences de son succès. Il est vrai que, si le succès qui a été réalisé modifie certaines des conditions dans lesquelles notre initiative est née, il peut devenir utile de procéder aux transformations qui sont capables de conserver à l'initiative toutes les possibilités d'opérer dans un cadre nouveau.

Le problème de la mise à jour de l'Alliance n'est du reste pas nouveau. En nous obligeant à résoudre certains problèmes à brève échéance, la récente initiative française du mois dernier nous offre une autre occasion de diriger à nouveau notre attention vers les problèmes de la mise à jour de notre Organisation, et de l'amélioration de son action. De nombreuses occasions de réfléchir se sont donc présentées. Peut-être la volonté de choisir une procédure propre à réunir les contributions d'idées des différents pays nous a-t-elle fait défaut pour en résumer les résultats dans un document qui, en faisant état des expériences des dernières années, aurait pu permettre de présenter un projet de renouvellement et de développement de l'Alliance.

Ceci dit, on pourrait souhaiter que ce Conseil décide aujourd'hui d'établir dans ce but une procédure appropriée. Selon les propositions du document canadien, par exemple, on pourrait envisager la constitution d'un groupe restreint ad hoc chargé de recueillir les opinions des quinze alliés avant d'élaborer sur cette base des propositions concrètes qui pourront mettre le Conseil Atlantique de décembre prochain à même de prendre des décisions opportunes. Il est certainement trop tôt pour examiner aujourd'hui tous les problèmes concernant la mise à jour de l'OTAN. L'essentiel toutefois, il me semble, pourrait être de décider la mise en marche d'un mécanisme qui examinerait ces problèmes et proposerait, pour chacun d'eux, des solutions appropriées.

M. le Président, les problèmes relatifs à l'état de l'Alliance ont une telle importance dans nos travaux qu'il me semble de notre devoir de limiter aujourd'hui le temps que d'habitude nous consacrons aux problèmes de politique générale. Il y a toutefois certains sujets qui nous ont déjà occupé à l'occasion d'autres réunions. Le premier concerne des Alliés dont l'effort de défense mérite d'être soutenu, comme vient de le souligner M. Rusk. Compte tenu des motifs qui ont amené notre Secrétaire général à nous recommander de prendre en considération les demandes de la Grèce et de la Turquie, visant à obtenir une aide destinée au renforcement des systèmes respectifs de défense, le Gouvernement italien se déclare favorable à y contribuer dans la forme qui sera décidée avec les pays intéressés. Et, comme M. Rusk, nous souhaitons que le plus grand nombre possible de pays de l'Alliance participent à cette aide.

M. FANFANI (suite)

Le deuxième sujet de cette partie de mon intervention se réfère à certains peuples auxquels nous sommes liés par solidarité morale et par des sentiments d'amitié.

A l'occasion de contacts avec les représentants qualifiés du monde latino-américain qui sont venus récemment à Rome, j'ai eu une preuve ultérieure de la nécessité, de l'importance, et de l'urgence de sauvegarder et d'encourager tous les rapports possibles avec ces pays, et surtout de multiplier les rapports économiques avec un monde qui traverse une période délicate de son évolution politique, économique, et sociale.

La politique économique et culturelle actuelle de l'Europe dans ce monde latino-américain constitue un élément d'équilibre qui, sans se substituer à la présence des Etats-Unis ou entrer en concurrence avec elle, peut exercer une fonction d'encouragement et de soutien, en incitant l'Amérique latine à occuper dans le monde la place que les dimensions géographiques, les ressources naturelles, le développement démographique futur, les énergies humaines et l'intelligence politique lui attribuent dans une mesure toujours croissante.

Il serait en vérité très grave pour l'Occident que ce qu'il y a de démocratique dans la pensée, les réalisations et l'inspiration des peuples de l'Amérique latine se laissât perdre, même en partie, à cause de l'insuffisante attention que nous aurions montrée à l'égard de ces peuples, de la nécessité de les aider dans leurs besoins matériels, de coopérer à leur développement politique, économique, et surtout, de comprendre la nature des problèmes dans lesquels ils se débattent.

Le fossé deviendrait vraiment impossible à combler si, à cause de notre incapacité à trouver des voies et des moyens appropriés, l'Amérique Latine devait faire l'objet de soins plus attentifs et plus efficaces de la part de porteurs d'idéologies que nous jugeons funestes et de la part de groupes auxquels nous pensons devoir nous opposer dans l'intérêt de la liberté. Dans ces quatre alternatives possibles, nous devons porter de manière systématique une attention plus grande aux problèmes de l'Amérique Latine, agissant de sorte qu'ils reçoivent leur juste solution avec le concours de notre compréhension intelligente et de notre coopération sincère. Si notre action se révélait compréhensible, et était appréciée de ses destinataires, nous aurions rendu un service inestimable à la cause de la consolidation de la liberté.

M. FANFANI (suite)

Je me propose, M. le Président d'examiner maintenant un troisième sujet: celui de nos relations avec les parties du monde qui ne nous sont pas amies. Le Gouvernement italien partage depuis longtemps l'avis selon lequel il devrait être possible et utile, dans le cadre de la cohésion atlantique, de développer une politique d'ouverture vers l'Est. Nous tous d'ailleurs, avons toujours soutenu que l'Alliance a parmi ses mérites celui d'avoir contribué à déterminer les conditions préalables de la détente.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'il me semble utile de mentionner brièvement les idées qui viennent d'être avancées au sujet d'une conférence européenne. Ces projets de conférence européenne impliquent de nombreux problèmes qui imposent une ample réflexion eu égard aux participants - y compris certainement les Etats-Unis d'Amérique - aux proposants, aux buts et au temps dans lequel une telle initiative pourrait avoir des succès et surtout offrir à l'Occident les garanties nécessaires. Sans entrer dans les détails de ce qui, dans l'initiative précitée, peut être accepté d'ores et déjà et de ce qui, au contraire, devrait être mûrement médité afin de prévenir l'éventuel danger. Demandons-nous, à ce point, comme l'a déjà fait notre collègue Schroeder, afin de ne pas perdre non plus quelque avantage, s'il ne serait pas utile d'examiner l'opportunité de charger le Secrétariat ou un groupe de travail de commencer à étudier les problèmes politiques et d'organisation liés à l'idée d'une conférence européenne que l'on voit toujours plus avancée. Une telle décision éviterait pour l'instant la relance de l'idée d'une conférence européenne alors que l'on n'aurait pas défini toutes ses conséquences. En deuxième lieu, cette décision vous laisserait la porte ouverte pour établir les éléments de l'ordre du jour d'une éventuelle rencontre ; enfin elle vous donnerait la possibilité de tenter un sondage discret des intentions des Soviétiques et de leurs alliés.

J'ai émis jusqu'à présent, M. le Président, quelques considérations sur différents problèmes. Or j'en viens à me demander, pour terminer, si nous ne devrions pas considérer attentivement certaines caractéristiques du progrès vers la recherche scientifique et de l'application technologique qui en dérive, ainsi que de l'emprise toujours plus grande que ces phénomènes ont sur l'esprit des hommes, une emprise qui est en train de transformer un phénomène limité aux élites de chercheurs en phénomène qui donne son empreinte à l'orientation même des masses. Ces problèmes sont évidemment complexes et à longue échéance, mais ils méritent notre attention immédiate.

M. FANFANI (suite)

Si nous considérons notre Alliance non pas comme l'effet d'une coïncidence d'intérêts politiques temporaires, mais comme le moyen de réaliser une communauté solide et équilibrée, nous devons certainement craindre le danger que dans un prochain avenir une différence croissante dans le développement général, en particulier dans le domaine technologique, sépare et divise les membres de l'Alliance. Ces considérations sont renforcées par la constatation que, dans les domaines de la recherche scientifique et du développement technologique, les membres de l'Alliance n'ont pas encore réussi à donner l'exemple d'une convergence d'efforts, ce qui empêche par conséquent de promouvoir un développement équilibré.

Il est grand temps d'étudier les mesures susceptibles d'empêcher cette différence croissante qui très tôt créerait, au sein de notre communauté, des pays exceptionnellement développés et d'autres relégués dans des positions presque artisanales. Ce jour même, tandis que des savants appartenant à un Etat qui est représenté ici ont accompli des exploits astronautiques exceptionnels applaudis par tous, un groupe d'autres pays de l'Alliance, au prix de sacrifices et d'efforts considérables et avec un retard, il faut le dire, de presque dix ans, devait se contenter d'annoncer le lancement d'EUROPA I. Ce succès tardif et limité n'est d'ailleurs pas suffisant pour qu'on puisse espérer d'autres réalisations même en faisant abstraction de la crise qui menace l'ELDO.

C'est donc dans notre intérêt à tous qu'il faut s'efforcer de réaliser une entente sur le plan technologique pour adapter rapidement les structures de tous les pays de l'Alliance aux nécessités nouvelles. Ce plan général ne peut pas être conçu sans le concours de la puissance qui, parmi nous, a le plus d'avance dans le secteur technologique, à savoir les Etats-Unis, et ce plan ne peut non plus créer l'équilibre souhaité sans la participation de tous les membres de l'Alliance.

Nous ne devons certainement pas rééditer le mécanisme du Plan Marshall puisque désormais les champs d'application, les terrains d'entente, et les objectifs sont différents. Mais nous pouvons tout de même reprendre l'idée de coopération du Plan Marshall et retrouver le grand attrait psychologique que ce plan représentait à l'époque.

Il ne s'agit pas de demander à l'un d'entre nous de faire pour les autres, à ses propres frais, ce que les autres ne sont pas à même de faire. Il s'agit plutôt de faire en sorte que les échanges de connaissances technologiques et la coordination des expériences puissent assurer dans toute la zone de l'Alliance Atlantique des développements dans les domaines scientifique, technique et de la production. Ceci serait aussi un moyen pour réamorcer le dialogue et la compétition entre l'Est et l'Ouest, non seulement dans le domaine nécessaire du désarmement militaire, mais encore dans celui de la mobilisation des ressources scientifiques et productives.

M. FANFANI (suite)

Nous pourrions ainsi offrir aux peuples qui ne sont pas à l'avant garde du progrès un exemple des réalisations pouvant résulter d'une généreuse et clairvoyante mise en commun des conquêtes de la science. Cela serait enfin le moyen de donner aux jeunes, encore incertains sur le choix à faire entre deux camps opposés, la certitude que le camp qui se vante d'être le camp de la liberté est en fait celui qui sait employer le résultat de la liberté pour assurer l'élévation de tous. Il y a deux jours, en discutant de ces problèmes, notre collègue le Ministre Schroeder m'a rappelé les considérations exprimées il y a plusieurs mois par M. Giscard d'Estaing sur la possibilité que les écarts de développement conduisent dans dix ans les six pays du Marché Commun à ne produire que les deux-tiers de la production de l'URSS, telle qu'elle sera à l'époque, et à peine un tiers de la production des Etats-Unis. Cette perspective nous indique que si l'on continuait ainsi, l'apport de l'Europe à la Communauté Atlantique ne pourrait pas augmenter en proportion de l'augmentation de la production de la Communauté tout entière et il en résulterait un déséquilibre et un préjugé pour la Communauté dans son ensemble. Les Etats-Unis devraient de plus en plus assumer nos charges. En dehors de l'Alliance, le monde entier serait exposé à de graves dommages et l'équilibre des forces sur lequel s'appuie la paix serait mis en danger. Ce n'est pas dans ces formes simplement, M. Le Président, qu'il convient d'ajouter des considérations pratiques sur la façon de réaliser ces idées. Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères italien a émis à ce sujet quelques considérations qu'il pourra mettre à la disposition des Alliés. Aujourd'hui, le représentant italien se borne à souligner un très grave problème et à lancer à nouveau un appel solennel afin que cette question soit étudiée et résolue en commun. Par là aussi notre réunion de Bruxelles représentera une base importante vers un avenir de progrès dans la liberté et la coopération. Une remarque faite sur nos relations avec l'Amérique latine et les relations est-ouest indique que nous n'avons pas l'intention d'être le seul bénéficiaire de ce progrès que nous souhaitons. En adressant une invitation cordiale à s'engager dans cette voie, j'ai donc pensé, non seulement, aux pays de l'Alliance mais aussi à tous les pays qui, amis ou non, partagent avec nous le bon ou le mauvais sort de toute l'humanité. Merci, Monsieur le Président.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le Président. Je pense que ce document italien que vous avez mentionné tout à l'heure en conclusion de votre discours est déjà disponible. Non, pas encore! Et bien, j'espère qu'il le sera le plus tôt possible. Je suis sûr que tous les pays de l'Alliance désireront l'examiner et l'étudier. Il est naturellement du plus haut intérêt pour tout le monde. Maintenant, après M. Fanfani, c'est M. Nogueira.

Mr. NOGUEIRA

Mr. Chairman, I shall be making a few very brief, very short and rather abstract remarks called for, I believe, by the discussion which we have had. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the discussion, the debate we have had both this morning and yesterday is a further indication if one were needed of a serious crisis within the Alliance. No one questions the gravity of the situation with which we were, and are, confronted. We all realise, Mr. Chairman, and we are also aware of the implications which such a situation has for some other members of our Alliance. There is no question, therefore, as to the seriousness of the crisis, but in my view, Mr. Chairman, this is not the whole question.

The question in the view of the Portuguese Delegation is the following: was the French decision the single and only cause of the crisis in the Alliance? Is that decision the very crisis itself, or is it the result or the outcome of the consequence of a prior crisis of another type? We believe that it is of the utmost importance to find the right answer to this difficult question which I regret to say I have not yet seen raised around this table. If the decision which we debated and the crisis of the Alliance are one and the same thing, then we may believe, and we may say that, after having solved all the problems which have arisen we have also solved the crisis of the Alliance. But if the French decision is an outcome or is one of the results of a crisis of a different nature and type, then, by solving the problems arising from it, we have merely touched on some of the aspects of such a crisis. But we have not, by doing that, solved the very crisis itself, we have not tackled the real problems which we have to have the courage to face.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the second alternative is the real and valid one, and therefore whatever remarks I make should be taken on their own merits and not in connection with the subject we have been debating.

I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that on many occasions, on very many occasions indeed, my Delegation has seriously called the attention of the North Atlantic Council to the growing tension within the Alliance.

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

It seems that, with very few exceptions, the members of the Alliance are not entirely pleased with the state of affairs which has been prevailing for quite some time. I do not mention any specific countries but certainly that is the case for my own country.

Now, Mr. Chairman, no country can expect all its policies to be fully endorsed and approved by the Alliance as a whole. This is an extreme position and obviously not acceptable to the Alliance, and quite rightly so. The other extreme position will be one in which a country's policy is consistently, systematically, openly and, most of the time, unnecessarily opposed by the very allies of that country. Between these two extreme positions there are many possibilities, and the exploration of those possibilities is the crucial point at this stage of our Alliance.

As I have indicated, Mr. Chairman, we in Portugal hold with you, and we have held that view for quite some time, that the Alliance has been facing a crisis for a long time, a crisis which becomes more and more serious as time goes on. It is important therefore to be very clear in our minds that by solving some aspects of the present serious crisis we have not solved the crucial and essential problems of the Alliance itself. Let us not be lured, Mr. Chairman, into a belief that all the problems are over and that we can all rest assured that no more problems will be arising in the future.

We hear quite often, Mr. Chairman, and we Portuguese are certainly told many times, that times change, that we cannot stop history, that we have to keep abreast of the times and that we must adapt ourselves to such changes. But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that this doctrine is rather one-sided and works only to the advantage of some, because the threat seems to be that some believe or act as though they believe that conditions in 1966 are precisely the same as in 1949, which they are not. We face different threats, and far wider threats at that; different tactics are resorted to by the enemy and the whole political and strategic context is certainly very different from what it was in 1949.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to support what Foreign Minister Schroeder said a while ago when he stated that the situation today is entirely different from what it was in 1949. This is quite true, as Dr. Schroeder also pointed out, and it is also true that the confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc as a whole is still in being. I certainly agree with his view and there is no reason to believe that the Soviet threats against Western Europe have in any way diminished.

Mr. NOGUEIRA (Contd)

However, as the power of the Soviet Union has increased and is increasing, Soviet threats have extended to much larger areas and such a confrontation has therefore assumed a world-wide aspect; according to a passage in the remarkable report which you yourself, Mr. Secretary General, have prepared for the Council, we are to reach quite similar conclusions.

These facts and these conclusions the Council refuses to admit, much less to consider, and seems to continue with an inward-looking position, thereby closing its eyes to the outside world or to the fact that the nature of the forces of the enemy is practically the same everywhere. When, in very special cases, or in regard to very special areas, the North Atlantic Council is called upon to discuss and deliberate on some special problems in outlying areas, then the Council is told that such problems are of its concern because they appear to engage the responsibility of one or other or various of our Allies. We, Mr. Chairman, certainly do not for a single second dispute that view, but all this raises very serious issues, and in making the brief remarks I am making I merely wish to suggest that we should perhaps take advantage of our present problems and seize the opportunity to reconsider and reappraise the basic philosophy behind NATO and to examine the whole political conception of NATO, in order to bring about a renovation of the Alliance so as to prevent further crises. I even wonder whether we should not appoint a committee or a small group to study the whole range of such problems confronting us.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, to have taken these few minutes of the Council's time to make these short remarks, whose usefulness and wisdom I even doubt myself.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much, Mr. Nogueira.

Mr. NOGUEIRA

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to have the opportunity to make further remarks tomorrow on specific problems concerning specific areas. Thank you.

Mr. BROSIO

I see that incidentally some of the speakers who have already expressed their ideas have touched upon questions about outside areas which generally come into what we call the general review of the international situation, that is to say they are anticipating questions concerning Point III of the Agenda. I am not against that. I suppose that it will just make

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Mr. BROSIO (Contd)

the burden of work for this Point III lighter for tomorrow, or for tonight, and so I would say that those who think that in the context of their general statement now such subjects may fit in are free to do so, and those on the contrary who have special interests and wish to single them out and to reserve them for Point III later can also do so, because the two things are not incompatible, are not inconsistent.

I say this because I know that there are some other speakers who might want to include in their general statements subjects of a more extended character. This will just shorten the next debate on Point III.

Thank you Mr. Nogueira. Now the next speaker is Mr. Stewart. Please Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART

Mr. Chairman, whatever view we take of East-West relations or of the extent to which the situation today is different from that of 1949, I still think we all come to the conclusion that our Alliance is still not only necessary but is vital not only to our defence from any outside enemy but as an instrument, a forum within which we can to our mutual advantage see that any problems that arise between ourselves are the more easily settled. It is certainly my view and I believe that of many others, Mr. Chairman, that not only is the Alliance necessary but that it is equally necessary to make certain as we have argued in earlier discussions that it is a credible Alliance, one which could work speedily and efficiently if it were put to the test.

We are now faced with a need to make certain reorganizations inside the Alliance following from the declarations of policy of the French Government. The distinguished Minister from Portugal, who spoke just now, raised the question whether the problem we now have to tackle, the problem between France and the rest of her Allies, is in itself the crisis within NATO or whether there is some crisis of which this is only a part or a symptom. Well I would put it like this: we must be certain that we keep NATO up-to-date in two respects. Up-to-date in its military organization, making sure that it is at any time efficient and economical, and up-to-date also in its political outlook. Now we are required as a result of our immediate problem to look closely at our organization. I would say we have to take that opportunity not only to make such alterations as may be directly necessary as a result of the views of the French Government but to make this an opportunity for seeing that we are keeping our Organization up-to-date and economical, because this Alliance - and I think this is perhaps the answer to the question raised by the distinguished Minister from Portugal - will always run itself into periodic crises if it does not keep itself up-to-date. If it does not keep the

Mr. STEWART (Contd)

efficiency and the economy of its organization under permanent review and if it does not make sure that it is at any given time making a correct and not an out-of-date appraisal of the political situation with which it is faced.

That is to say that in the task we are now engaged on of reorganizing the machinery of our Organization we must make sure that the Alliance is not inward looking or backward looking. We don't want to see reorganization as an end in itself. A mechanic can tune his engine to perfection but his work will still be wasted if the driver does not know where he is going. Now in our case the objective must not be a world organized into two perfectly running military machines, but of ultimately a world in which those machines have served their purpose.

The division of Europe that we have today into two armed camps, is an unhappy and unnatural division. It is certainly true that while political tensions remain we must see to it that our Treaty and its organization provide an effective deterrent against aggression in Europe and in the North Atlantic area, and the means to ensure that if aggression came it would be swiftly countered by sure defence responsive to the needs of modern warfare. But while it is essential in this way to ensure the security of the members of our Alliance while any potential threat remains, there is still the wider objective of removing the political factors which give rise to the tension and which are responsible for the present high level of armaments on both sides of the dividing line in Europe.

Now there is a widespread feeling, and I share it myself, that new prospects may be opening out for the development of our relations with Eastern Europe and the people of our own countries are very naturally impatient for progress in that direction. I should say at once that I don't believe that a complete revolution in East-West relations is just around the corner or that we are immediately in sight of a solution of the great problems of Europe. Progress along this path, although it must be made, is going to be slow, and if our policy is well judged it will probably be an undramatic policy.

I think part of this new situation is the new economic measures of Eastern Europe to which the recent reports of our Working Groups of Experts have drawn our attention. These measures represent a political change of attitude, more radical in some Eastern countries than in others and more radical in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union. But in nearly all these countries, including the Soviet Union, the change of attitude on economic questions which had previously been decided by conventional Communist doctrine is potentially of very great importance.

Mr. STEWART (Contd)

Let me give two examples that came to my attention. While I was visiting Eastern European countries I was discussing with a member of the government of one smaller Eastern European country the tenure of ownership of land and the proportions in which it was co-operatively owned, state-owned or privately owned, and when he had told me the figures I remarked that they had not proceeded with collectivisation at the speed with which it had been proceeded with earlier in the Soviet Union, and he said impatiently that that was because it was done by theoreticians who did not study the facts. Another experience which has come to my attention is that if you visit large capital cities anywhere many of the problems that face them, problems of housing and traffic are substantially the same despite differences of ideology on one side of the Iron Curtain or the other. That will mean that statesmen in those countries are being increasingly brought up against problems which they find cannot be solved by turning up the Marxist book and getting a doctrinal solution, problems on which they may want to have, indeed will want to have, the experience of their opposite numbers on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

These, I think, are some of the symptoms of the changes coming in Eastern Europe at the present time and ultimately this sort of thing must influence the view of life of people and governments in Eastern Europe about their role in the world. And this, of course, is why in the Soviet Union there does appear to be some hesitation about the new measures and understandable reluctance to take the plunge, as well perhaps as deep cleavages of opinion and interests.

In some of the East European countries developments may move faster with a correspondingly greater effect on the attitude of those countries towards their relations with the rest of the world. But despite this, there is not so far much sign of a new approach to the major problems, international problems, between East and West. After eighteen months of the new leadership in Moscow, we find them still pursuing a foreign policy which though cautious, is certainly not co-operative or constructive. No doubt, the struggle with China for influence in the communist world does impose limitations on Soviet foreign policy, because the Russians are competing with China to be recognised as the leaders in the task of spreading Communism.

Now in Europe itself, it is important, if we are to assess correctly the possibility of making progress with the Russians, to recognise that the policy is both offensive and defensive. If they were given the opportunity of spreading their influence in Europe, the Russians would no doubt take it.

Mr. STEWART (Contd)

I do not think we can avoid that conclusion, that their policy is potentially offensive in that sense and the only reason it is not actually offensive is that NATO is there and that the Russians are realists where power is concerned. At the same time, they need a defensive strategy perhaps to defend their existing position in Eastern Europe and they see East Germany as the key of that. If they were to take any action which released East Germany from its present Colonial servitude, the web of Soviet power in East Europe would be broken and it would, therefore, be unrealistic to suppose that with their present view of their role in the world the Russians will be disposed to co-operate easily and readily in a radical settlement in central Europe. Now, we have to keep this in mind when we consider what our response should be to Soviet suggestions for a European security conference and we have to keep it in mind too when we consider possible initiatives of our own because the Russian objective will be much more to consolidate their position and to give status to the regime in East Germany than to seek the reunification of Germany. So when the Russians talk about a European security conference we cannot, I fear, begin by taking it for granted that this is a real proposal. That, in fact, is the question we have to put to the test. It is quite a familiar technique for them to launch slogans which they hope the rest of the world will take at their face value. I would say, therefore, that we should make it clear to the Russians that we are interested in anything that will lead to greater security in Europe and that we expect them to tell us in some detail what they mean by a European security conference, so that we may decide whether or not it is a real proposal.

Now, there is the other possibility that we should take the initiative in putting to the Russians and their Allies our suggestions for European security, and I am very willing to consider this. I think if we should decide to do it we must make quite clear the points that are essential for us because they are essential to a truly stable settlement. They must include the participation of the United States in any discussions and decisions and the recognition that European security does involve political as well as military issues. In particular, any conference will have to be concerned with the problem of German reunification just as much as with the question of arms control in Europe, and there could not be any question of including East Germany as a member of such a conference.

Now, I said I don't think we can expect an early solution of the central problem of reunification, and linked with that, a comprehensive arrangement on European security.

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Mr. STEWART (Contd)

In fact, I doubt whether the Russians are ready for it. We must go on trying and we must maintain strongly and publicly our view of what is necessary for a settlement. But while we are doing that I suggest we also need to have a long-term policy aimed at developing our relations with the East European countries and with the Soviet Union and thus creating a relationship which will not only be useful in itself but may lead over the course of years to a climate more favourable to the solution of our larger problems. That has been the thought which has informed our policies in recent years.

I have referred to the economic and social changes in the East. They are taking place under the compulsion of economic necessity and the growing demands of the population for a more lively and a more vigorous society. They are likely to increase the diversity of outlook among the countries of the area and this in its turn should open the door to new ideas within those countries about what their real interests as members of the European community are.

These countries of Eastern Europe have been showing a growing desire to develop their relations with the West. To some extent the Soviet Union is still able to conduct the orchestra, but I don't believe that every idea that comes out of the East does so on the inspiration or instructions of Moscow. It's in our interests that we should respond individually and collectively to this growing desire for contacts and that we should take initiatives when we judge these are likely to meet with a favourable response. The cumulative effect of the establishment of good relations between one of us and each of the East European countries will be a powerful stimulus to change and in this context I welcomed the approach of the German Government in their note of 25th March. But I think it would now be timely to consider whether we might take a new collective step in this direction. This might begin with an attempt to work out a statement of principles and purposes to which many of us and many of those in Eastern Europe could subscribe.

On the political side such a statement would, of course, have to be very broad since it would have to be limited to what was acceptable to both sides.

On the cultural, social, scientific and economic fronts it might be possible to explore the way in rather more detail. This idea would, of course, present difficulties even if we didn't set our sights very high. We might find it impossible to reach sufficient agreement on the content of a statement to make it worth while. Then there would be the question of its form, who would be entitled to subscribe to it and how they should subscribe.

Mr. STEWART (Contd)

There would be the question of how and when to discuss the idea with the East Europeans and the Russians if they were interested, once we had agreed among ourselves what we wanted to include in such a statement.

But although those difficulties are there I do not think they need be overwhelming. A good deal would depend on how the East viewed the idea, but I have the impression that there would be some interest there.

On the Western side there would need to be careful preparation and in this present short meeting there is not the time to go into any detail. But we ourselves have been giving a good deal of thought to this and I am asking our Permanent Representative to raise this subject at an early meeting of the Council where he will set out in more detail what we have in mind. I hope this can be the basis of a constructive discussion in the Council.

Now, besides maintaining our defensive strength and improving East-West relations we must not lose sight of the uncommitted countries and their view of us. We are sometimes inclined, I think, when we meet together and are absorbed in our own problems to realise that we act out this drama in front of a very large number of critical and uncommitted spectators.

As regards participation, one gets an example of this in the participation of neutrals in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, one of the most important aspects of which is that it does bring the uncommitted countries to a position where they can sit and appraise the policies of those in the two committed camps.

Now, often these new countries have distorted views of our Alliance and its purposes and have been inclined to accept too readily the propaganda of the Soviet Union which depicts NATO as an aggressive, military machine. We must do all we can to correct this impression and must pledge ourselves increasingly to consult together in developing our policies toward the uncommitted nations of the world. There have been developments in recent months which are not unfavourable to the interests and security of Western Europe and North America.

I wish to refer to one such development, Mr. Chairman, in Indonesia and this will, as you have pointed out some speakers have already done, treads a little on the subject-matter of a later discussion, but I put it in here because I think it is relevant to what I have just been immediately saying as an example of developments in the uncommitted world which are by no means unfavourable to the interests and security of the members of this Alliance.

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Mr. STEWART (Contd)

It is well known that the policy which Indonesia pursued, which she called confrontation, the policy of harassing her Malaysian neighbour has been a heavy drain on Britain's military and financial resources and I have been obliged to refer to this burden at earlier Ministerial meetings.

Now, at present, things appear to be going very much better, not only from the point of view of our interests, but those of all the peoples of the area. The new Indonesian Government are busy trying to restore good relations with the Western countries whose help they need and in consequence are making a determined effort to get themselves out of the cleft stick of confrontation and at their recent meeting in Bangkok Indonesian and Malaysian ministers reached agreement on proposals for ending confrontation, though these have to be ratified by the two Governments and there may still be setbacks, possibly a divergence of opinion in Indonesia where the domestic political situation has not yet been finally stabilised. But meanwhile we are working out with our Commonwealth partners a plan to bring about an early military disengagement in order to prevent progress towards the political settlement from being impeded by minor military activity. Until the position is clearer we cannot plan any substantial force reductions, and we must maintain our controls over the supply to Indonesia of equipment which might be used against the Commonwealth forces. But we hope it will not be long before we can relax those precautionary measures, though we trust that our Allies will continue, as they have done in the past, to consult us about military and paramilitary exports to Indonesia for the time being.

Now I have mentioned that example, Mr. Chairman, as an example of events in the uncommitted world moving in a way favourable to the interests of all of us here, and it is not the only example. There have been a number of events in Asia and Africa which have indicated that governments or peoples that previously had taken a somewhat rosy view of Communism have come to change their minds possibly on rather nearer acquaintance. I mention it also because although certainly we in Britain have had good fortune recently in dealing with this problem, I think we may claim that the promising result now achieved is connected with the way in which we have handled it as a matter of policy and that that has some lessons, though on a small scale, for NATO as a whole.

On the one hand, we were extremely careful never to provoke the conflict, and although we had to take military measures in response to those taken against us we were careful not to spread or inflame the conflict unnecessarily and we combined with that degree of pacification a very firm determination to be resolutely in support of whatever was necessary for our fellow partner in the Commonwealth, Malaysia.

Mr. STEWART (Contd)

The result, I think, is in part a recommendation of the policy of making quite sure that your defences are well organized and credible and at the same time making it clear that they are defences and are not intended to be used and will not be used offensively against anyone. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Thank you very much. M. Couve de Murville.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE

M. le Président, je voudrais parler, comme vous nous y avez invités, d'une manière générale, du problème des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, c'est-à-dire en fait de notre politique en Europe, et aussi, en réalité, du problème qui est à la base même de l'Alliance Atlantique, puisque celle-ci a été conclue précisément pour réaliser la défense de l'Occident; et particulièrement de l'Europe occidentale face à une menace qui viendrait de l'Est.

Si vous le permettez, je voudrais très brièvement remonter un peu en arrière - les Français aiment toujours faire de l'histoire - c'est-à-dire à l'époque où notre Alliance est née, en 1948-49. Elle est née de la situation qui existait en Europe à cette époque ; c'était la fin de la guerre, il ne restait en réalité, comme puissances effectives, que deux très grandes puissances : les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Les pays européens étaient à l'époque plutôt des virtualités que des réalités; il n'y avait pas de Tiers-Monde, car les empires coloniaux subsistaient encore, même s'ils étaient branlants ; enfin, la Chine ne comptait pas parmi les puissances politiques de quelque importance.

C'est dans ces circonstances que chacun s'est regroupé autour des deux grandes puissances. A l'Est, cela s'est fait, je crois qu'on peut le dire, par la conquête et par la contrainte, puisque les régimes communistes ont été établis dans les pays au fur et à mesure qu'ils étaient occupés par l'armée soviétique. A l'Ouest, cela s'est fait spontanément et en quelque sorte par un réflexe de défense contre les menaces ou les craintes d'une continuation de l'expansion soviétique vers l'Ouest. C'est dans ces conditions qu'est née la guerre froide, que s'est produite la coupure de l'Europe, et je note en passant que ceci n'avait rien à faire avec l'Allemagne, dont la division est la conséquence et non la cause de la division de l'Europe.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Maintenant, tout est bien changé, c'est un lieu commun que de le dire, puisque l'Europe a réapparu, puisque le Tiers Monde existe maintenant, que sa constitution est presque terminée avec l'achèvement de la décolonisation et enfin (et peut-être surtout) puisque la Chine est réapparue comme une grande puissance et même virtuellement comme une très grande puissance.

En même temps, parallèlement et peut-être en conséquence, la situation sur le continent européen est devenue très différente. L'expansion russe s'est arrêtée, on peut dire aussi qu'elle a été arrêtée ; en tous les cas elle n'est plus, à l'heure actuelle, une réalité en tant que menace. Depuis les dernières crises, c'est-à-dire depuis la crise de Berlin de 1958-1961, et depuis la crise de Cuba de 1962 - c'est aussi un lieu commun - on sait dans le monde, et en Europe en particulier, que la dissuasion nucléaire est une réalité, qu'elle joue effectivement, et que par conséquent, c'est devenu - ce l'était déjà avant, mais on en est conscient maintenant - une réalité politique fondamentale. C'est la raison pour laquelle les choses ont beaucoup changé, non seulement dans la réalité, mais dans l'opinion publique, dans l'état d'esprit des hommes, et je n'en veux pour preuve que ce que l'on nous dit maintenant, à savoir que le danger n'est plus ce que nous craignons naguère, mais la continuation du statu quo, ce qui est une façon de dire que le statu quo est établi.

Du fait de ces changements, tout le reste a tendance à changer aussi. Et sans doute sommes-nous entrés maintenant dans une ère que l'on pourrait qualifier d'une ère de mouvement. Autrement dit, peut-être des possibilités qui n'existaient pas jadis ou naguère, peuvent-elles se manifester et peut-être y a-t-il là des éléments qui permettraient d'entrevoir, sinon la solution, du moins la discussion des problèmes essentiels auxquels nous avons à faire face. Nous ne croyons pas, pour ce qui nous concerne, que ceci soit forcément mauvais ; nous pensons même le contraire car nous n'imaginons pas qu'il soit de l'intérêt de personne de maintenir la situation qui a prévalu au cours des quinze ou vingt dernières années et nous ne pensons non plus que la guerre froide puisse être considérée comme un objectif. L'objectif, en réalité, c'est la solution des problèmes et, dans le cercle qui est celui-ci, la solution des problèmes européens. Les problèmes européens, c'est essentiellement la division de l'Europe - qui a entraîné la division de l'Allemagne - et, dans ce contexte, le problème général de la sécurité c'est-à-dire la nécessité, lorsqu'un règlement sera possible, d'établir à l'intérieur de notre continent un certain équilibre qui puisse nous donner à tous égards quelque garantie de stabilité.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Pour atteindre cet objectif, il nous paraît indispensable, à titre en quelque sorte préalable, de changer les conditions en Europe ; c'est ce que nous appelons la normalisation des rapports ou la détente. Ceci nous paraît nécessaire pour créer précisément les conditions d'une discussion entre tous les pays - entre les pays européens d'abord bien entendu mais aussi entre tous les pays - pour aborder les problèmes essentiels qui se posent et que j'ai précisés à l'instant : normaliser et développer les rapports dans tous les domaines, car tout se tient, tout ce qui est important est de nature politique, qu'il s'agisse de l'économie, de la culture, de la technique ou de la politique proprement dite. Cela paraît désirable et peut-être cela devient-il possible avec les changements qui se produisent, aussi bien à l'Ouest qu'à l'Est. Je n'en veux pour preuve que les mouvements nouveaux, qui auraient paru bien inattendus il y a quelques années et qui semblent se développer dans les pays d'Europe orientale, dans le sens de l'émancipation, dans celui d'une certaine indépendance, en même temps que de la disparition du bloc communiste en tant que bloc homogène et fermé tel que nous l'avions connu à la grande époque. La conséquence de cette évolution c'est qu'en réalité les pays d'Europe orientale eux-mêmes commencent à faire les ouvertures sans attendre que nous les y poussions.

Voilà M. le Président, d'une manière très générale, comment, en France, nous concevons la possibilité d'une évolution favorable de la situation en Europe, pouvant conduire un jour à la solution des problèmes qui nous affrontent. Créer un climat, promouvoir la détente, développer les rapports, dans l'idée que peut-être un peu de confiance pourra s'établir qui permettrait de commencer les discussions, c'est là notre politique et, à vrai dire, nous ne voyons pas très bien quelle est l'alternative. Dans ce monde qui bouge, l'alternative serait d'essayer de maintenir le statu quo, l'état de tension en quelque sorte, avec l'espoir qu'un jour l'adversaire potentiel, c'est-à-dire l'Union Soviétique, pourrait venir à Canossa, qu'ayant à faire face à des difficultés, convaincue de son infériorité dans le domaine militaire, et ayant peut-être des problèmes intérieurs ou extérieurs particuliers, elle accepterait le règlement des problèmes exclusivement selon nos vues. Cela ne nous paraît pas réaliste, si ce que nous avons en vue est bien clair, à savoir un règlement des problèmes par la voie pacifique, c'est-à-dire par accord.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

L'expérience de ces quinze ou vingt dernières années tend à montrer que le maintien de ce que nous connaissons depuis longtemps n'est pas en réalité une politique constructive et ne peut mener à aucun résultat positif. Au surplus, est-il vraiment possible à nos gouvernements et aux gouvernements du monde en général, d'aller délibérément contre le courant? Si la détente est possible, - encore une fois je ne dis pas qu'elle le soit, je dis qu'il y a des symptômes qui donnent à penser que l'on pourrait s'orienter dans cette direction - je ne pense pas que quiconque puisse prendre la responsabilité de la refuser. J'ajoute immédiatement que nous essayons de nous garder des illusions. Tout n'ira pas vite, tout ne sera pas facile, il faut prendre des précautions, il faut faire attention et c'est dans cet esprit que je rejoins assez volontiers ce que disait notre collègue le Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, lorsqu'il nous mettait tout à l'heure en garde contre des actions un peu trop hâtives telles que l'idée d'une conférence prochaine entre les pays de l'Est et les pays de l'Ouest. En d'autres termes nous pensons qu'il faut être à la fois positif et prudent. Etre positif, cela veut dire, puisque je parle dans ce cénacle où une certaine terminologie est depuis bien longtemps en usage, cela veut dire qu'il ne faut pas trop se figer dans la terminologie, surtout quand celle-ci devient peut-être un peu périmée. Je ne crois pas que la question de l'évolution de la situation en Europe, que la question d'une certaine amélioration des rapports entre les pays de l'Est et les pays de l'Ouest, que le problème de la détente et ainsi de suite, je ne crois pas que ceci soit par essence, par définition, un problème de l'Alliance Atlantique, pas plus, je dois le dire, que je ne crois à la conséquence logique qui en résulterait, à savoir que les mêmes choses sont de la compétence du pacte de Varsovie. Je crois que c'est de la compétence de tous nos pays, à commencer bien entendu par les pays européens qui sont les plus directement intéressés et que c'est à eux qu'il appartient de chercher à avoir, à reprendre ou à développer des rapports et à faire en définitive ce que l'on peut dans la bonne direction. Je dis tout ceci M. le Président pour expliquer au Conseil quelle est, à l'heure actuelle, notre politique depuis quelque temps, je dirais quelques années. C'est naturellement une politique à long terme et, pour reprendre une expression qu'employait à l'instant notre collègue britannique, ce n'est pas une politique dramatique. Nous n'en attendons pas de résultats spectaculaires, même si parfois certains s'émeuvent. C'est notre politique et c'est la raison pour laquelle, depuis quelque temps, en fait depuis deux ans, se sont développés entre la France d'une part et les pays de l'Est d'autre part, y compris l'Union soviétique, des rapports qui sont certainement beaucoup plus nourris, beaucoup plus importants et peut-être plus positifs que par le passé.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Depuis 1964, nous avons reçu en France les représentants de tous les pays de l'Est, y compris encore une fois de la Russie, et cette année il se trouve que nous rendons ces visites. C'est la raison pour laquelle je me suis moi-même rendu, il n'y a pas très longtemps, successivement en Roumanie, en Bulgarie, en Pologne et je me rendrai encore le mois prochain en Tchécoslovaquie et en Hongrie ; je note d'ailleurs que la plupart de mes collègues européens, peut-être à une exception près, font exactement la même chose. C'est aussi la raison pour laquelle, à la fin de ce mois, notre Président de la République, le Général de Gaulle, va rendre à Moscou et en Russie la visite que jadis, en des temps très différents - c'était en 1960 - M. Khrouchtchev nous avait faite en France.

Des pays de l'Europe orientale, en dehors de la Russie, je dirai de la courte expérience que j'ai pu y développer, que ce qui m'a frappé d'abord c'est la grande diversité et le fait que ces pays ont des situations et des problèmes très différents. Etant entendu -et c'est évidemment du point de vue politique la remarque essentielle - que leurs situations et leurs problèmes se marquent, comme il est inévitable, par rapport à leurs deux grands voisins, c'est-à-dire à la Russie et à l'Allemagne. Et, à ce point de vue, il est clair que nous trouvons à des pôles opposés des pays comme la Pologne d'une part, ou la Roumanie d'autre part. Voilà une première observation.

Une seconde observation que je pourrais faire, c'est qu'il y a certainement dans ces pays, par rapport à ce que nous avons vu, à ce que certains ont pu avoir d'expérience, et à ce que d'autres ont pu imaginer du passé, il y a certainement une reprise de la vie nationale. Ils se rendent compte de l'évolution des choses, ils cherchent naturellement à en tirer parti et il y a un désir de regagner très largement l'indépendance qui, jadis, dans des circonstances dramatiques pour eux, avait été plus ou moins largement perdue.

Une troisième observation, c'est qu'il y a à coup sûr dans tous ces pays un grand désir d'avoir des rapports avec l'Occident. D'abord c'est leur tradition. Ils sont tous en réalité je crois, sans exception, imbus de notre civilisation occidentale, le régime sous lequel ils vivent est un régime qui a été importé et qui par conséquent n'est pas un régime proprement national et enfin, des rapports avec l'Occident sont un pas dans la voie de l'émancipation.

Tout ceci nous conduit à penser qu'il est normal que chacun d'entre nous trouve opportun d'aller à leur rencontre, c'est-à-dire de chercher encore une fois à développer les rapports et à avoir, politiquement et autrement, des relations plus importantes.

M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Ceci doit se faire avec précaution à mon avis, avec précaution d'abord quant au respect de leur propre indépendance, avec précaution quant à leurs relations avec l'Union soviétique qu'il ne peut pas être de notre prétention de modifier, et avec précaution aussi d'une façon générale pour ne pas donner l'impression de chercher à les influencer. Mieux vaut laisser la nature opérer et les évolutions, si elles sont possibles, se faire spontanément.

La Russie naturellement, c'est tout à fait une autre affaire. Nous allons y aller entre le 20 juin et le 1er juillet. Comme je vous le disais, le Général de Gaulle va rendre à Moscou la visite de jadis de M. Khrouchtchev et nous considérons que cette visite, que ce voyage est une étape, une étape certainement importante, dans le développement de la politique que j'ai essayé de décrire. Nous n'en attendons pas, tout le monde le sait, des conclusions sensationnelles ; ce qui est important c'est le fait même du voyage et peut-être aussi, ajouterai-je, sans modestie, le fait d'avoir une politique. Nous aurons des conversations, nous aurons des conversations sur toutes les questions, bien entendu, et bien entendu aussi, d'abord sur les questions européennes, c'est-à-dire sur ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler le problème allemand et la sécurité européenne. Nous connaissons les appréhensions de nos amis allemands en ce qui concerne les positions soviétiques à l'égard de leurs problèmes, et nous savons qu'ils sont dans une situation qui est de ce point de vue naturellement beaucoup plus difficile et très différente de la nôtre ; mais enfin, nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher de croire en même temps que, s'il y a quelque espoir de résoudre ces problèmes - et je ne doute pas pour ma part qu'il y ait des espoirs - c'est dans cette voie que nous pourrions trouver la possibilité de les réaliser, c'est-à-dire, encore une fois, par la discussion et par l'entente finale. Peut-être est-ce un peu naïf, mais je ne vois vraiment pas quelle autre voie pacifique pourrait s'offrir à nous. En tous les cas, nous verrons.

De toute manière, et ce sera ma conclusion. M. le Président, je répéterai que, dans notre conception des choses, le monde est entré progressivement, depuis quelques années, dans une nouvelle phase où, sans doute les choses, progressivement aussi, naturellement, vont changer un peu partout. Pour nous autres, pour les Français, pour leurs Alliés, il y a naturellement ce fait essentiel qu'il reste des principes et des intérêts. Les intérêts étant - et ils rejoignent d'ailleurs les principes - la liberté, ce qui veut dire pour les pays l'indépendance et d'autre part la sécurité. Dans un monde qui change, la question est de savoir, en réalité, comment on doit s'adapter et si de nouvelles conditions ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives.

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M. COUVE de MURVILLE (suite)

Encore une fois, l'avenir nous le montrera; pour ce qui nous concerne, nous ne sommes pas sans espoir.

M. BROSIO

Merci beaucoup, M. le Ministre.

Gentlemen, it is now 5.35 and I wonder if we should continue this debate tonight or at least for long. We have still about five speakers on the list. The Greek Foreign Minister, the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Danish Foreign Minister, the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the Dutch Foreign Minister. I presume you would like to speak tomorrow; or do you particularly desire to speak tonight ?

Le Ministre M. Toumbas voudrait parler ce soir. Bien Peut-être M. Caglayangil voudrait encore parler ce soir.

Would Mr. Haekkerup and Mr. Lyng like to speak tomorrow morning ? We shall just let Mr. Toumbas speak and then Mr. Caglayangil will tell us if he thinks he should speak after Mr. Toumbas or tomorrow morning.

Pardon, vous aviez dit que peut-être vous parleriez demain mais ...

M. CAGLAYANGIL

Je veux parler demain.

M. BROSIO

Ah, je n'avais pas bien compris ; vous préférez parler demain. Alors c'est très bien. Alors on finira avec M. Toumbas. S'il vous plaît M. Toumbas.

Mr TOUMBAS

Mr. Chairman, in considering this state of the Alliance, which is the first item on our Agenda, I do not intend to elaborate on the conditions created by the with-drawal of the French from the NATO military organization. Such conditions are well known to all and will be dealt with in the most appropriate manner. But I have to state and put on record the position of my country in the present situation.

I have to explain the reasons which in our view account for our attitude. Our main quest is for peace and freedom; Such a fundamental option is founded on security.

Security, in an insecure world, is not an abstract notion but a reality in the practical field. If you cannot rely on your own forces (and who can ?) to ensure your own security, then security necessarily become a common enterprise.

Mr. TOUMBAS (Contd)

We thus see no alternative to the necessity of joining our efforts to the efforts of all those who are standing for the same ideals and purposes. This has been the case with the Atlantic Alliance.

We for our part cannot make any distinction between the Atlantic Treaty and NATO, as we cannot separate the Gospel from the Church. In terms of common security the Treaty means well but it contains no practical guarantees. As a political document it offers serious reasons for doubts and disquiet. I wonder whether any of us would have a feeling of real security had it not been for the military organization which translates into facts the language of the Treaty. There the Alliance comes into real life. There you see its presence. Our peoples see its presence. Facts mean much more than words. A common strategy, the pooling of allied resources, co-operation translated into factual solidarity, all these mean security to us and deterrence to our opponents.

But there is another crucial question which has to be answered: does a Communist threat still exist? Or has it vanished with the passing of time and the changes in the international situation?

As regards European security, I submit that the matter covers three fronts: our frontiers, diplomacy and the domestic front.

On the first of these, that of our frontiers, we have been witnessing since 1950 an exercise in equilibrium conducted between the two great nuclear powers of this world. If ever, for one reason or another, this equilibrium were disrupted, if ever the Americans were to decide to withdraw or were to weaken or become uninterested, Western Europe would inevitably partake the fate of Central and Eastern Europe. The premature withdrawal of the American forces on the morrow of the Second World War, a withdrawal which followed the diplomatic recession of Yalta, plunged into serfdom over one hundred million Europeans.

On the diplomatic front, the great European problems, sequels of the last World War, still remain unsolved. On the other hand, the Soviets are continuing their efforts to split the Western powers and shake their resistance. Nothing indicates that the Soviets are ready to make concessions in order to reach a reasonable solution of these problems. The question of Berlin is still open, and the problem of German reunification - a problem of vital importance not only to the Germans but for us all - does not seem to be any closer to an acceptable solution.

Mr. TOUMBAS (Contd)

Progress towards disarmament stumbles against the same negative attitude.

We are still confronted with the Warsaw Pact military forces, which are not integrated but literally fused into a unified military bloc with nearly half a million Soviet troops stationed in Poland, the Soviet Zone of Germany and Hungary.

As for the de-satellisation of the satellites, and tendencies towards independence, such tendencies cannot be denied. But we have reason to believe that the slackening of the discipline imposed by Moscow on the satellites is due much more to the appearance of Peking as a second centre of attraction, than to any Western influence. The example of Albania is eloquent in this context.

As long as the existing defence equilibrium continues to guarantee the security of Western Europe, we foresee that the main effort of the Soviet Union will be exerted on the domestic front of the liberal world. This front has sensitive points, more sensitive in some countries, less in others. But, in all real democracies, the domestic front has vulnerable areas. Soviet policy has gained a right of residence in our countries. There is no counterpart for us.

Mr. Chairman, I consider it my duty to lay particular stress on the importance of the internal front. My country and my people have very great, but also very bad, experience of this. It determines and orients the course of events in the international field. This is true not only as far as a possible reinforcement of Communist subversion goes but also as regards the resurgence of nationalism, and as we all know, nationalism in the United States can assume the form of isolationism.

At this moment we have a striking example of the importance of the domestic front in the struggle against Communism in South Vietnam. A war, as we know, can be won on the frontiers and lost on the internal front. Within the framework of our total solidarity with our American friends and Allies who fight aggression, we are preoccupied by the danger threatening the domestic front in South Vietnam, for if this front collapses, Communist subversion in the world would be dangerously encouraged. In full consciousness of what this means, we believe that this is not the time to dismantle NATO. It will not be reasonable to put aside the shield until we have made sure that it no longer serves a useful purpose.

We are living in a changing world. The international situation has certainly evolved. The Iron Curtain is no longer an insuperable barrier. Communism, as a monolithic entity, has split into more than one centre of attraction.

Mr. TOUMBAS (Contd)

National Communism is a new discipline compelling the Soviet Union to become less dogmatic and more pragmatic in its relations with the other Communist countries. On the internal front the Soviet regime and those of its satellites are confronted with the growing resistance of the individual to arbitrary and oppressive rule.

All these facts should be duly registered and valued. They are due in great measure to the stability imposed by NATO. They could continue if NATO continues.

In response to such developments, our policies could be diversified in order to strengthen the process of evolution. It is only natural for our free nations to follow possible different ways in their aim to serve the same purpose, which is the search for peace in freedom.

I wish to make a distinction as regards the pursuance of detente and the projected idea of a conference between East and West on European security. We are ready to co-operate in any appropriate approach which will lessen the international tension. We, on our part, have done our best to improve our relations with Bulgaria and Rumania. We have achieved, in this field, appreciable results. We also consider it useful to reiterate these intentions of ours in the communique. But we consider it premature to endorse a suggestion aiming at the convening of a conference for European security. This is the reason why at this moment I would not be prepared to discuss such an item. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROSIO

Now, Gentlemen, as agreed, at what time should we meet tomorrow morning - 10.30, or should it be half-past nine, because it might happen, as I have already told the French Foreign Minister privately, that Fourteen Member Countries might wish to exchange views about this matter of negotiations, so we must give them time to do so. If that happens, it should, of course, happen with the full knowledge of the French Delegation, so if we could leave a little time for that it would not be a bad thing since it could help to ease the way to an arrangement on these matters of procedure for negotiations. That's why I would suggest, quite frankly, a time a little later than 9.30. However, I am as usual entirely at your disposal. What would you suggest? Half-past ten would be alright? Would that be all right? Half-past ten it is then. Thank you very much.

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