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ISD/134(Revised)

To:           Members of the Political Committee

From:          Acting Chairman

Subject:       Report on Implementation of the Final Act of the  
                  CSCE: Review of Implementation

Attached is a revised draft of ISD/134, to be considered by the Committee on the afternoon of 24th November (and if necessary on the 25th).

2. The paragraphs which contain no substantive changes from the original ISD/134 are marked with an asterisk.

(Signed) E.L. KILLHAM

This document includes: 1 Annex

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE

DRAFT

Third report by the Political Committee:  
10th May, 1976 to 25 November, 1976

REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction, summary and recommendation

\* 1. At its meeting on 1st October, 1975, the Council agreed that a report on those aspects of the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE which have a particular importance for the members of the Alliance could be prepared by the Political Committee. This should be done, in collaboration with other relevant committees, for the Council on the eve of each Ministerial Meeting, within the larger framework of the examination of East-West relations and the general problem of détente. This is the third such report and it covers the period from 10th May, 1976.

\* 2. The most important points to draw to the attention of the Council regarding developments during the period of this report are the following:

- (i) the Warsaw Pact countries have maintained the more coherent and self-confident stance towards implementation of the Final Act evident since early 1976, and are likely to persist in this approach up to the Belgrade meetings in 1977 (paragraphs 4-9);
- (ii) they have made a few additional proposals for implementation in areas of special interest to them (e.g. Hungarian bilateral approaches) though not on the scale of the Brezhnev proposals (paragraphs 5-7);
- (iii) they have continued to take a <sup>limited</sup> number of small steps in areas of importance for Western countries (CBMs, Basket III) (paragraphs 5-6);

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- \* (iv) they have strengthened their criticisms of Western countries for alleged inadequate compliance with the Final Act (paragraph 8);
- \* (v) these developments indicate that the Eastern countries are attempting to build up an implementation record in all sectors of the Final Act, including some real, if mainly very limited, improvements in human contacts and working conditions for journalists;
- (vi) this performance is far from satisfactory. Nevertheless a process of implementation has begun, and there is ground for hope that continuing Western encouragement might lead to further improvements in the performance of the Soviet Union and East European countries.

Recommendation

- \* 3. It is recommended that the Council should take note of this report.

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Main Trends

4. During the last six months, the Eastern countries have continued steadily along the course which they apparently set themselves at the turn of the year, and which was described in the Political Committee's Second Report (C-M(76)26(Final) of 13th May, 1976). The self-confident and assertive stance towards implementation of the Final Act which they then adopted has been maintained. They have continued to <sup>try to</sup> use the Final Act as an instrument to pursue

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their established foreign policy aims (the legitimization of the status quo in Europe, the "irreversible" process of détente, "military détente", pan-European inter-state co-operation). They have emphasized those elements of the Final Act of particular interest to them, and tried to re-interpret and minimise the significance of those they dislike. They have claimed to be implementing all the provisions of the Final Act, and have continued to <sup>attempt to</sup> build up a record of implementation in all Baskets.

So far the Eastern approach does not seem to have had any effect on Soviet policy towards Berlin.

5. Early in 1976 the Eastern countries embarked upon a concerted programme of a few large-scale initiatives in areas of special interest to them (the Brezhnev proposals), together with a series of small steps in areas of special interest to Western countries (CBMs, Basket III). These were described in the Second Report. Since then, there has been some decline in the number of new steps by the Soviet Union, though certain of the East Europeans have maintained a modest level of momentum. It is possible that the Soviet Union has been assessing the likely course of East-West relations up to Belgrade before undertaking new steps. It may also be a tactic designed to lessen Western expectations by periods of inactivity. Moreover, Eastern countries might be saving some measures for the weeks preceeding Belgrade, in the hope of having maximum beneficial effect on those meetings.

6. Nevertheless, the past few months have featured some examples of implementation by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. They have also given Western countries the first opportunity to assess the general performance of Eastern countries a reasonable length of time after the signature of the

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Final Act. This assessment shows that Eastern governments have made a concerted effort to establish some record of implementation in all Baskets of the Final Act, including those areas of particular importance to Western countries, notably human contacts (except for Romania), working conditions for journalists and CBMs. In the case of two Western countries there has been marked improvement in movement of people from the Soviet Union, though extraneous circumstances have played a part. Otherwise, the general picture is of some very limited progress.

7. A new feature has been <sup>extensive consultations and</sup> ~~the/bilateral/agreements~~ purporting to cover all the Final Act which Hungary has proposed to several Western countries. This activity could well be an indication of the role of front-runner for the Warsaw Pact which Hungary seems to have assumed (though in fact since Helsinki Hungary has done very little by way of real improvements to its already comparatively liberal standards). It is reported that Poland intends to propose similar agreements. (Czechoslovak proposals for bilateral declarations have been more general in nature and seem less serious.) Such moves seem partly designed to emphasize bilateral implementation rather than unilateral; to build up an implementation record; and perhaps partly to establish a <sup>alleged Western</sup> record of ~~non-compliance~~ since it would be difficult for <sup>certain</sup> Western governments to accept some of the Hungarian ideas. However, <sup>certain</sup> Western governments consider that the Hungarian proposals can be used to open up new possibilities for progress.

8. Eastern governments are keeping up their campaign of criticisms of Western countries <sup>alleged</sup> for ~~inadequate~~ implementation. In particular, they allege Western non-compliance with certain principles (especially that of "non-intervention in internal affairs") and with Basket II (non-extension of Most Favoured Nation

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treatment), as well as poor Western performance on such Basket III matters as visas, the translation and distribution of books/<sup>and films,</sup> and language training. Certain "Western sources" are accused of trying to slow down implementation and to undermine the Final Act. These attacks seem to be intended to divert attention from Eastern shortcomings, to counter Western attempts to secure Eastern implementation and to put the West on the defensive generally.

9. The main trends described in the preceding paragraphs were reflected in Eastern statements on the first anniversary of the Final Act, as well as in the proceedings and document of the Conference of the European Communist Parties in June. These provide further evidence of the care with which their approach is co-ordinated. Eastern policies were discussed again by the Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting in Sofia in June, and were presumably also considered at the recent Summit of Warsaw Pact leaders in Bucharest.

Declaration of Principles

10. The Declaration of Principles continues to be presented by the Warsaw Pact countries as the key section of the Final Act. It is cited by the Soviet Union to justify its foreign policy activities and to attack those Western activities which it dislikes. The Declaration is also used by Warsaw Pact countries as a means of defence against Western pressure for implementation of the other Baskets, principally Basket III. Eastern governments

stress certain principles, such as the "inviolability of frontiers" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", while others, such as "respect for human rights" and the language permitting peaceful changes in frontiers, are quickly passed over. The Soviet Union is carefully propagating a re-interpretation of certain principles, especially those just mentioned. Moscow continues to

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imply that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" overrides the application of the Declaration of Principles to relations between socialist countries.

Human Rights

\* 11. Within the Declaration of Principles, that on Human Rights is of major importance to public opinion in Western countries. Eastern governments, however, continue to deny that this principle and related language in the Final Act, permit other countries to concern themselves with what they regard as their internal affairs.

\* 12. There is no evidence that respect for human rights has improved since Helsinki in either the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, although standards continue to vary. The "Helsinki Group" of Soviet dissidents has drawn attention to the continued repressive state of affairs in the Soviet Union, and has claimed that the situation since July has worsened with regard to the number of arrests. They have also drawn attention to governmental interference with their postal and telephone communications.

Confidence Building Measures

**13.** Allied countries have continued their practice of applying the provisions of the Final Act on Confidence-Building Measures in a liberal way, both by notifying, in addition to all manoeuvres involving 25,000 troops or more, a number of smaller manoeuvres and by inviting observers of other CSCE participants to some of these manoeuvres. The neutral and non-aligned countries, on the whole, have adopted a similarly liberal attitude. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact countries, although complying with the minimum requirement to notify major manoeuvres, tended to implement other CBM provisions of the Final Act restrictively and selectively. Observers were in fact invited

to attend the three major WP manoeuvres notified, but invitations were addressed only to a small group of countries in geographic proximity and observation opportunities were limited. Warsaw Pact countries have so far not accepted any Western invitation

to send observers. Similarly, the Soviet Union continues to criticise the holding of NATO manoeuvres as being contrary to the spirit of the Final Act. This attitude, however, may be inspired more by embarrassment over the Western liberal practice in the field of CBMs than by any definite policy to hold back on CBM implementation in the future.

### Co-operation in economic and related fields

#### Main trends

14 Only slight progress has been made in certain areas by the Warsaw Pact countries in carrying out their undertakings to foster economic relations in accordance with the provisions of Basket II of the Final Act. There is also growing evidence that some Eastern European governments are focussing more on the bilateral approach to the implementation of the Final Act than on the unilateral or multilateral approaches. In some cases they have been attempting to link implementation to the conclusion of agreements.

15 Allied governments' views on the Brezhnev proposals for pan-European Congresses on energy, transport and the environment have not changed in any significant manner since the last report to the Council on the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE (C-M(76)26(Final)). The Allied governments continue to consider that the subjects which the Soviets propose for such Congresses should be dealt with solely within the framework of the ECE (Geneva) or any other existing international organization of which all CSCE Final Act signatories are members. The Warsaw Pact countries, and more especially the Soviet Union, are pressing for positive reactions and are raising the matter of the Brezhnev proposals with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE-Geneva) principal subsidiary bodies and bilaterally, during meetings between their own and Western high officials. However, the Soviet government has so far failed to provide full details and rationale for such proposals, neither have the Soviets clarified their position as regards the framework for these Congresses. The matter will come up again at the 32nd Plenary session of the ECE-Geneva next spring; the Soviet Union and its allies are obviously preparing to make the Brezhnev proposals one of the major topics during the Belgrade 1977 CSCE follow-up meetings. Consequently there is now need for the West to come to grips with the proposals and for working out in advance the kind of response that will be required.

Human Contacts and Information

**16** With regard to the human contacts and information provisions of the Final Act, Eastern countries have continued to develop the more assertive and self-confident approach apparent since the beginning of 1976. While attempting to downplay the importance of these provisions and to make their implementation conditional on a number of factors (improvement in the state of détente, pre-eminence of the principle of "non-intervention in internal affairs", <sup>in certain cases</sup> need /for bilateral agreements), the Warsaw Pact countries have tried to build up their own implementation record.

17 . They argue that for the most part Basket III provisions are already being implemented in their countries as a result of the "advanced" nature of socialist law<sup>and their political system.</sup> At the same time they continue to undertake some limited steps of implementation in areas of Western interest and of least difficulty to them, and attribute an importance to these steps out of proportion to their real significance. In addition Eastern countries are attacking the West both for over-emphasising Basket III and for alleged examples of non-implementation. This campaign is accompanied by <sup>(e.g. on visas)</sup> proposals /for reciprocal implementation which raise difficulties for Western governments.

(a) Human Contacts

\* **18.** The position as regards human contacts is mixed and

less easy to interpret than in the case of the Second Report.

The overall situation is one of some real but mainly very limited improvement.

**19**. Most Allies have experienced very little change in the Soviet performance. All the Allies have continued to have great difficulty with unresolved personal cases. There is no indication that the small procedural changes mentioned in the Second Report are having a general ameliorating effect, and the increased taxes and limitations on gifts from abroad will cause further hardship to aspiring emigrants. Moreover, it seems that Soviet officials are being more restrictive in the criteria of family relationships demanded of applicants. There has been no overall change in the pace with which the Soviet Union is solving family reunification cases or in their attitude to bi-national marriages.

**20**. However, a new development is the appearance of

a substantial increase in emigration from the Soviet Union to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the United States, as well as an increase in <sup>family</sup> visits from the Soviet Union to the United States. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, this seems to be attributable to a significant extent to the Final Act, though continued bilateral efforts also played a part. In the case of the United States, the increase in emigration consists largely of Armenians and may be due in part to extraneous factors (e.g. the unsettled situation in the Lebanon), while the rise in numbers of visits is part of a trend over several years. Nevertheless, despite all the necessary qualifications, these increases do constitute a real improvement and <sup>may be</sup> partly attributable, though to differing degrees, to the Final Act. They are, however, exceptions to the overall restrictive picture in the Soviet Union.

**21**. In East European countries there has been only limited

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change related to the Final Act. In general, family visits and travel seem to have been the fields in which some East European countries have found it easiest to make small improvements relevant to the Final Act, while family reunification has been the area of most difficulty. On family visits, minor increases have been noted by some Allies on the part of Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent Bulgaria, with a general decline in visits from Romania. There has been some improvement in certain countries as regards family visits to "illegal" emigrants. As regards travel, Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia have made modest improvements in costs of exit documents and foreign currency allowances. On family reunification, the International Red Cross has observed no improvements since Helsinki in actual reunification, and most Western assessments generally concur. Romania has become more difficult since Helsinki, though recently some Western countries have solved a varying proportion of cases. Exceptions due to special causes are the increase to the Federal Republic of Germany from the GDR and Poland (special bilateral agreements) and to the US from Romania (Most Favoured Nation linkage). As for bi-national marriages, slight improvements have been reported with regard to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Romania's attitude is the same as for family reunifications.

~~2221~~. Taking the human contacts provisions as a whole, small but real improvements have been noted by some Allies in the still bad Czechoslovakian record. Conversely, the general Romanian attitude has hardened since Helsinki, except for the recent movement noted above which was achieved largely after sustained and high-level efforts by the Western countries concerned. Otherwise, apart from the special cases concerning the FRG/GDR and FRG/Poland, the other East European countries have shown only minimal improvements. However, as before Helsinki, their practices vary considerably from country to country, with Poland and Hungary being relatively liberal in all three categories of contact.

\* **132.** Eastern countries are continuing to criticize Western visa procedures and to highlight cases of visa refusals. Since May 1976, the Soviet Union and some East European countries have made proposals to Western countries for reductions in visa processing times and for waivers of visa requirements altogether. Western countries are studying these proposals carefully in the light of their very different security procedures. In the other direction one Ally has already made proposals to certain Eastern countries for the abolition of visa fees.

(b) Information

**2425.** With regard to the information provisions of Basket III, Eastern performance since Helsinki has remained highly restrictive towards the dissemination of Western political and other information in Eastern countries. There have been virtually no improvements. Despite evidence of small additional imports of Western newspapers into the Soviet Union and Poland, and claims on the part of other Eastern countries that they are doing the same, there has been no apparent improvement in access to these sources on the part of the Eastern public. The situation in Romania appears to have worsened.

**2527.** The same virtual lack of change is found in the fields of films and broadcasting (apart from the much publicised Hungarian television debate on East-West relations, and the Franco-Soviet week organized at the initiative of the French television network).

**2625.** Eastern countries remain hypersensitive to the content of Western news media generally, and to that of international American radio broadcasts in particular. Jamming of three / radio stations continues, though to a lesser extent. / Using an argument rejected during the Helsinki/Geneva negotiations, they contend that governments are responsible for the content of their national news media, which should be put at the service of/détente and the "mutual acquaintanceship" of nations. This

campaign on the part of Eastern countries contradicts the language committing CSCE participating states to facilitate of the Final Act / the "freer and wider dissemination of information".

\* ~~27~~ <sup>29</sup>. In contrast to their negative attitude towards the Western dissemination of information within their own countries, Warsaw Pact governments have shown willingness to make some minor improvements in the working conditions for Western journalists.

~~28~~ <sup>29</sup>. The USSR has followed up the earlier small improvements described in the Second Report by allowing foreign journalists in Moscow to have direct access to officials. It remains to be seen what effect this measure will have in practice. Moreover, the general position remains highly restrictive.

\* ~~29~~ <sup>29</sup>. In the East European countries the situation continues to vary from country to country but, in general, is less restrictive than in the Soviet Union. The worst problem is access to sources, but even in this respect some slight improvements have been noted. The German Democratic Republic has allowed direct access on similar lines to the Soviet Union, together with some minor customs and frontier improvements, but there have also been refusals of visas and an expulsion of a journalist. To a still lesser extent, small improvements have also taken place in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and even in Romania. Poland and Hungary have continued with their relatively liberal approaches.

Culture and Education

~~30~~ <sup>30</sup>. Eastern countries remain most interested in this part of Basket III. They try to <sup>use its</sup> / provisions to disseminate Eastern social and political values in the West, while retaining a large measure of control, for example through the use of bilateral arrangements, on the selection and availability of Western culture. It also gives the East a fertile area wherein

to assert a favourable implementation record. Moreover, Eastern countries can claim a statistically superior level of implementation of certain provisions (thanks to their state control over such matters and their comparatively higher interest in Western films, books and languages than vice-versa), and demand a better performance from the West. In so doing they call for statistical reciprocity, a concept not found in the Final Act, which on the contrary upholds /freedom of access. Eastern statistics are in any case unreliable.

**31**. Implementation is proceeding on the basis of a wide range of arrangements and agreements that pre-date Helsinki and that have continued to develop since. The Final Act has brought <sup>virtually</sup> no marked improvement in <sup>overall</sup> relations in the cultural/educational spheres, although in some cases new arrangements are being signed and negotiated, and programmes within existing agreements being developed, with slightly increased momentum. / West, there has been only little progress in getting Eastern countries to lower existing barriers to the entry of Western cultural information and to accept more individual contacts. The Soviet Union remains in firm control of activity in these fields.

Neutrals and Non-aligned

**32**. Neutral and Non-aligned countries continue to exhibit a strong interest in CSCE implementation. The Neutral governments appear to be following policies similar to those of Western countries in pressing Eastern governments discreetly to implement the Final Act, especially as regards the human contacts provisions, and have had some minor success. In a common assessment, the Neutral governments have concluded that the Eastern countries have become somewhat more flexible. Yugoslavia has been positive towards implementation of the CBMs provisions. Western countries have no special problems with Yugoslavia: its approach to Basket III

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is liberal, though its position on human rights<sup>is</sup> in general rather less good. Allied countries have a strong interest in continuing close contacts and exchange of views on implementation with both Neutral and Non-aligned states.

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BASKET I - DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

1. In most respects, the approach by the Warsaw Pact countries to the Declaration of Principles in the Final Act remains unchanged from that described in the Committee's two previous reports (paragraphs 15 to 21 of C-M(75)72(Final); paragraphs 1 to 8 of Annex to C-M(76)26(Final)). The period marking the first anniversary of the signature of the Final Act of Helsinki witnessed a number of statements and articles elaborating and emphasizing this approach. The document coming out of the Conference of European Communist Parties (CECP) <sup>in late June,</sup> also contained relevant material (paragraph 4).

\* 2. The Declaration of Principles is still emphasised by Eastern Governments over other portions of the Final Act. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Final Act, an editorial in Pravda concentrated solely on the Principles and Soviet adherence to them, and while referring quickly to other parts of the Final Act, made no mention whatsoever of Basket III. This imbalance runs counter to Eastern protests that Western emphasis on Basket III implementation is inconsistent with the "unity" of the Final Act, and that one part of the Final Act should not be stressed over another. One Soviet official has recently tried to explain that the USSR accepts the equality of the different parts of the Final Act, but nonetheless sees the principles as the "decisive" element.

\* 3. The Warsaw Pact countries have also continued to stress the importance of certain principles, especially "inviolability of frontiers" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", and to claim that they are decisive factors for further progress in détente and co-operation (Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy, Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). Meanwhile other principles, such as "the respect of human rights", are downplayed.

4. Certain parts of the Declaration of Principles

have recently been subjected to attempts at re-interpretation.

Although the document of the CECP contended that its participating Parties would work to implement all the Final Act, its human rights section makes reference only to the <sup>International (which contain "escape clauses")</sup> Covenants on Human Rights/ and <sup>Universal</sup> Declaration of Human Rights <sup>(with</sup> which the CSCE participants stated in the Basket I principle they would act in conformity).

Furthermore, an article in Pravda on 13th July, while giving rare attention to the possibility of peaceful changes in frontiers, nonetheless wrongly contended that this CSCE language was not linked to the principle on the inviolability of frontiers, and that it applied only to minor adjustments and rectifications and not to the major post-World War Two borders of Europe.

\* 5. Eastern criticism of the West for alleged failure to implement the Declaration of Principles has continued. Their basic supposition is simple: any act which meets their approval and is in accordance with their foreign policy objectives is seen as consistent with the principles; any act which they do not approve is not.

6. The principle which the West is most constantly accused of violating remains that of <sup>"non-</sup>intervention in internal affairs" of states. This criticism has increased of late and includes the charge that Western states have interfered in the internal affairs of each other, as well as of the states of Eastern Europe. Western attempts to secure Eastern implementation of the Final Act's provisions, particularly those in Basket III, continue to be challenged by the East as being inconsistent with this principle, and to a lesser extent, the principle of "sovereign equality". This theme was taken up in Eastern articles and statements on the occasion of the first anniversary of Helsinki.

At the Conference of European Communist Parties, Mr. Brezhnev specifically attacked the West for "interfering" in internal Eastern affairs through the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The USSR has objected to the United

States' CSCE Commission, established by Congress, on the grounds that undue emphasis is being placed on Basket III to the point of "interfering" in Soviet affairs. The Soviet Union and the other Eastern states have recently refused visas to members of this Commission wishing to visit these countries as part of an initial tour of CSCE participants.

7. At the same time, the Basket I principles do not restrain the East in its own conduct of the ideological struggle on non-Communist soil.

\* 8. In the past few months there has been some development in the earlier implication that the Declaration of Principles does not apply to relations between the states of Eastern Europe. Contending that the Soviet Union still sees the Declaration of Principles primarily in the context of "peaceful co-existence" between states of different social systems, one Soviet official has elaborated that there were cases when certain specific principles would apply to relations between states with the same social system. Another Soviet official has said that since relations between the states of Eastern Europe are more profound than those existing elsewhere, the Declaration of Principles could not be the sole guideline to their relations. Nonetheless, in practice , Western countries have

seen some evidence of improved manoeuvrability on the part of some Warsaw Pact members in their dealings with the West since the signature of the Final Act.

\* 9. As noted in previous reports, Romania does not agree with all the interpretations placed on the Declaration of Principles by other Eastern countries. In the past months a Romanian official

has confirmed that Romania continues to give all principles equal weight. The same official also said the principles applied to relationships between all CSCE states irrespective of their social systems, and strongly implied <sup>that</sup> / the GDR/USSR Treaty of Friendship, of October, 1975, was incompatible with the Final Act. While the period since the last report has witnessed some rapprochement between Moscow and Bucharest, there is no indication that Romania's special view in these respects has changed.

\* 10. Western countries for their part have maintained their own interpretation of the Declaration of Principles and tried to counter Eastern misinterpretations where possible. In particular, they have stressed both that all parts of the Final Act are of equal status, and that within the Declaration all principles are of equal importance. They have also emphasised that the Declaration of Principles applies to relations between all participating states.

Human Rights

\* 11. Eastern countries, continue to claim that the Final Act does not give Western countries a "droit de regard" / <sup>over general</sup> the/question of human rights in their countries. This ignores <sup>the principle on human rights in the Declaration as well as preambular</sup> language in Basket III. The East

has, nonetheless, tacitly recognized their vulnerability on this matter by making further attempts to confuse the exact meaning of the language on human rights in the Final Act. The example of <sup>the</sup> /final document of the Conference of European Communist Parties has been noted above (paragraph 4). Another example is the proposed UNESCO

symposium on "The Effects of the Coming into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights, in Light of <sup>in which Western countries have declined to participate.</sup> the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference" / Emphasis in both these instances was placed on the <sup>(with their escape clauses)</sup> Covenants /in an attempt to

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lessen the significance in the CSCE context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Eastern commentators have also stressed economic rights, and laid less emphasis on political and legal rights of individuals.

12. There is no indication that the Soviet Union has changed its repressive approach to human rights since the signing of the Final

Act. Public attention was drawn to Soviet treatment of political offenders and detainees in a report by Amnesty International in November, 1975, and in August, 1976, a study prepared for the World Council of Churches highlighted the continued restrictions placed on religious liberty in the Soviet Union. A number of dissidents have cited the provisions of the Final

Act in appealing to the Soviet authorities but to no avail. Marking the first anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, a new "Helsinki" group of Soviet dissidents contended that there had been no improvement/<sup>so far,</sup> and that the USSR did not intend to honour its human rights commitments under the Final Act. Nonetheless, the group believed that the CSCE document was still a valuable tool in pushing authorities towards a better performance in the human rights field. Other dissidents have concluded that respect for human rights in the USSR has deteriorated since Helsinki.

occupation with Citing pre-  
/in the United States / the recent Presidential elections/ as a possible factor, the

"Helsinki" group of dissidents has recently reported a new campaign of repression in the Soviet Union: 80% of the known arrests of dissidents since Helsinki/<sup>are said to</sup> have occurred since the start of July.

Eastern  
• There has been no improvement in the situations in other/countries, although conditions vary. In Romania there were press reports in June of increased repression of minority and dissident groups. In Poland, on the other hand, the government and courts lessened some penalties and released a few individuals as a consequence of a public outcry over the repressive measures which were taken against participants in the anti-government price demonstrations in June.

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14 . It has been constant Allied policy to comply liberally with the CBM provisions of the Final Act and to encourage a satisfactory implementation by the Warsaw Pact. Since 1st August, 1975, Allied countries have notified a total of 13 national and several multinational military manoeuvres, involving a number of personnel well below the minimum required in the provisions. Notifications to other CSCE participants were made within the prescribed time-frame and the notification texts contained an adequate amount of information. On five occasions Allied countries have also invited observers from some or all CSCE countries to attend the manoeuvres, granting those observers the necessary facilities to assist them in carrying out their task. They endeavoured to give observers a worthwhile insight into the manoeuvres.

15 . As for the WP countries, their practice - both with regard to notification and invitation of observers - tended to be restrictive and selective in character, though they have responded to the strict minimum required in the Final Act provisions. Since 1st August, 1975, the WP countries have given notification of three military manoeuvres, namely, two Soviet national exercises each of about 25,000 men held in the Soviet Union and one multinational WP manoeuvre of about 35,000 Hungary informed embassies in Budapest in April, 1975, men conducted in Poland. In addition, orally, and

in October 1976, in writing,

of two small-scale manoeuvres of 10,000 and 15,000 men respectively. However these latter notifications cannot be considered to be a meaningful implementation of the Final Act in view of the paucity of information and shortness

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of notice. There were no other notifications of small-scale manoeuvres by Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet Union and Poland invited observers to the three major manoeuvres they notified, but invitations were extended only to a small group of countries in geographic proximity (among them NATO countries). The possibilities granted to observers to perform their task were very limited in the case of the two manoeuvres on Soviet territory; <sup>but</sup> they were somewhat <sup>satisfactory</sup> more / in the case of the manoeuvre in Poland. In no case have Warsaw Pact countries so far accepted Western invitations to send observers to Allied manoeuvres.

16. Although the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries in recent months have made efforts to avoid criticism of non-implementation of CBMs by complying with at least some provisions of the Final Act in this field, they still seem to be somewhat uncertain as to their future policies. Their refusal to send observers to Western manoeuvres may reflect a concern not to "endorse" such manoeuvres as legitimate or normal which would deprive them of the possibility to criticise these manoeuvres as directed against the "climate of détente". Such criticism has indeed continued applying a double standard in judging NATO manoeuvres on the one hand and WP manoeuvres on the other. This attitude, however, may be inspired more by embarrassment over the Western liberal practice in the field of CBMs than by any definite policy to hold back on CBM implementation in the future.

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BASKET II - ECONOMIC QUESTIONS (1)

17. Although Allied countries are generally resigned to the fact that for political, bureaucratic and institutional reasons only slow progress can be expected from Warsaw Pact countries' unilateral implementation of Basket II, the headway so far made as regards economic and commercial information, promotion of business contacts and right of establishment of foreign firms has been generally disappointing.

18. Situations may, of course, vary from one Eastern country to another and some positive results have been recorded in specific cases by certain Western countries. But the performance is very patchy. The Czechoslovak Authorities have only recently begun implementation of their new law permitting foreign companies to open offices in the CSSR. This attitude has not yet been reflected by the Bulgarian Authorities. On the other hand, additional Western firms have opened offices in Poland, and the Polish Authorities are encouraging others to do so.

19. On this matter of the right of establishment, the East European countries and the Soviet Union are becoming particularly insistent about obtaining permission to expand the size of their official and business communities in Western countries. The Soviet Union in particular is endeavouring to build up a network of Soviet controlled import-export companies in certain Western countries. Such a development is prima facie covered by the provisions of Basket II but it should be noted that Western companies do not enjoy similar facilities in the Eastern countries as those afforded to Eastern firms in the West. Should the need arise, the absence of reciprocal arrangements with the Eastern countries could be invoked as an argument for preventing the establishment of this kind of company in a Western country.

20. There has been very little progress in the distribution of economic, technical and commercial data by the Warsaw Pact countries, whether by design or because of bureaucratic incompetence. There has even been a deterioration in available East German trade data: recently published statistics on GDR foreign trade in 1975 provide no figures on imports and exports by country, but show only total turnover for each trading partner. The "Nine" of the Common Market are making representations in Moscow to obtain more comprehensive information of a technical and commercial nature.

(1) In the evaluation of East-West economic relations, the evolution of trade should be borne in mind. To this end, attached/  
to this a table/ Annex gives the value of trade exchanges from 1973 to 1975 and for the first half of 1976.

21. Regarding tourism, the US has established a "Visit the USA" Committee at its embassy in Moscow to encourage tourism by private Soviet citizens to the United States; co-operation by the Soviet counterpart organization "Intourist" has so far been minimal. On the other hand, the GDR reportedly suggested that the World Tourist Organization in Vienna organize seminars to further multilateral co-operation in the field of tourism.

22 A sign of a more positive approach has been the recent introduction by Poland of regulations authorizing foreign investments of up to 100% in certain sectors of the services industry; their main purpose would seem to be to encourage investments by persons of Polish ethnic origin living abroad. Mixed enterprises with participation of foreign capital were already entitled to operate in all sectors of the economy. During the September 1976 meeting of the US-Polish joint Trade Commission, Poland announced a liberalization of regulations governing the use of locally earned zlotys. This should make it easier for Western firms, which earn zlotys through sales and services, to use them to meet local operating costs. The new Polish regulations could be a fillip for industrial co-operation with Western countries.

23 . In the field of scientific and technical co-operation it is difficult to determine the extent to which the provisions of Basket II have been instrumental in bringing about progress. It would appear that advances made are mainly at the bilateral level and mostly result from agreements reached prior to the Final Act. The United States, for example, is pursuing co-operation with the USSR on magneto-hydrodynamics technology within the framework of their bilateral energy agreement. Canada, for its part, has noted some progress in co-operation with the Soviet Union in the medical sciences field; no progress however has been made this year in developing the full range of programmes of Arctic co-operation with the USSR envisaged a number of years ago.

24 . In the context of a recommendation of the CSCE on environmental matters - e.g. to develop through international co-operation an extensive programme for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transport of air pollutants - the Norwegian Authorities will present a report on the implementation of this scientific measurement programme to the follow-up conference in Belgrade in 1977. This report could be followed by the convening of a special meeting, in the framework of the ECE-Geneva, for the purpose of considering a harmonization of emission control policies. The Norwegian Authorities will be pursuing this matter in bilateral talks and through the ECE-Geneva with a view to reaching a consensus on their proposal.

25. The chief focus of Communist countries attention continues to be Brezhnev's call for pan-European congresses on energy, transport and the environment. On this question a decision adopted at the ECE-Geneva 31st Plenary session invited member governments to transmit their views to the ECE Executive Secretary for dissemination at the 32nd session next spring. While most of the Eastern European countries have vocally supported the Soviet initiative, only Hungary has so far actually notified the ECE Secretariat in writing of its agreement with the congresses idea. On the other hand, Finland has intimated that it would be prepared to take part in a conference on the environment and to host it.

26 . The Allied countries, which continue to consider that these issues may be examined within the framework of existing organizations, are still in the process of determining their respective positions, upon which will have a bearing, inter alia, any supplementary information which the USSR may supply, clarification of Eastern views on the ECE's rôle in any such activity, and reactions of neutrals.

27 . Allied countries are particularly aware of the need for a careful appraisal of the Brezhnev ideas well ahead of the 32nd Plenary session of the ECE, one objective being to avoid giving to the USSR any ground for using a "grievance" of "lack of Western co-operation" at Belgrade to obscure and obstruct other issues of much greater positive interest to the Western countries.

28 . The general Western view continues to be that the best hope for meaningful Basket II implementation in the multilateral context lies in concrete projects of limited scope. For that reason Western countries put forward the "special attention projects" proposal that was adopted as a Decision, together with the one concerning the Soviet pan-European Congresses initiative, at the ECE 31st session. Eastern countries response to the "special attention projects" decision to date has not been encouraging. For example, the Eastern countries resisted Western attempts at the June ECE meeting of senior Science and Technology advisers to reach agreement on a proposal for conferences of younger scientists from East and West. Likewise, there was Eastern opposition to the idea of including market research as a topic for the upcoming ECE fourth seminar on East-West trade promotion, marketing and business contacts. Both of these are Basket II projects to which the ECE should legitimately be devoting special attention.

BASKET III - CO-OPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER AREAS

\* ~~29~~ 26. The implementation of the provisions of Basket III on co-operation in humanitarian and other fields is of major importance to Western countries and to Western public opinion. Since the main burden of implementation lies with the East, Western governments have continued since May 1976 to encourage full Eastern implementation of these provisions.

~~30~~ 30. Western countries have also continued to bear in mind their own responsibilities for implementation. For instance, the United States has opened up additional areas to travel by Soviet diplomats, and has signed an accord with Czechoslovakia ending restrictions on ports of entry for Czech diplomats. Some Western countries have agreed to Soviet proposals to make visas of each others' resident diplomats valid for full tours rather than specified renewable periods. Other Western governments have made this a practice for some time. The United States has proposed the abolition of visa fees to several Warsaw Pact countries,

has inaugurated a plan to promote tourism in the USSR, and <sup>has</sup> proposed to the USSR consultations on journalists'

working conditions in each country. Many Western countries are pursuing consular, cultural and educational agreements with Eastern countries, promoting the full use of existing agreements and encouraging the private sector to seek co-operation with opposite numbers in the East in a variety of fields. A number of Western states continue to "facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds" through radio broadcasts to Eastern states, despite a campaign from the East against them.

~~31~~ 31. As for Eastern countries, their general approach to Basket III

provisions remains largely as described in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the last report (C-M(76)26(Final)). They recognise Western interests in Basket III implementation and continue to be sensitive to Western pressure. At the same time they have continued to adopt an

assertive and self-confident stance. This approach is likely to persist up to and during Belgrade; it contains the following general elements.

**32** To begin with, Eastern <sup>countries</sup> /claim that they are implementing the provisions of Basket III. They stress the already compliant nature of socialist laws and society with these provisions (see Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy writing in Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). They have taken a number of limited steps which give them the least difficulty in areas of importance to the West and have sought to achieve maximum propaganda value from them. (These measures are described in previous reports and, for the period since May 1976, below).

**33** The Eastern countries have also attempted to exaggerate the significance of

minor examples of implementation (e.g. cultural agreements) and to claim as implementation activity only marginally related to Basket III (e.g. the implementation of the Brezhnev proposals would also be in accord with Basket III provisions on human contacts and information, Pravda, 7th May, 1976).

**34** <sup>In</sup> addition, the Eastern countries are attacking the West for alleged non-implementation of certain Basket III provisions. They point to refusals by certain Western countries to admit Eastern "labour representatives" and others. They have criticised the West over the length of visa-processing times, and the USSR and others have made proposals to some Western countries to reduce processing times or eliminate visa requirements altogether -

proposals which they know at least in some respects will give

the West difficulties because Western countries do not have the pervasive internal security systems which the Communist countries possess. There has been criticism of the limited

teaching of Eastern languages in Western countries.

36 ~~21~~. One aspect of Eastern criticisms has been their attempts to resurrect the principle of <sup>statistical</sup> reciprocity as a factor in implementation, asserting for example that the West is obliged to match for its part the high Eastern figures on imports of Western books and films. This is inconsistent with the concept embodied in the Final Act of a "freer and wider dissemination of information", which implies the <sup>criteria and availability</sup> of public demand/unfettered by artificial barriers.

This "revisionist" tendency is especially evident in Eastern attacks on Western broadcasts to Eastern countries, which, they contend, are contrary to the Final Act in spite of its call for "freer and wider dissemination" and its expression of hope for a continued expansion of radio broadcasts. Moreover, the final declaration of the Conference of European Communist Parties in June, distorted the approach of the Final Act by calling for the mass media generally to be placed "in the service of mutual acquaintanceship, and the dissemination of ideas for better understanding and the strengthening of an atmosphere of trust and co-operation among peoples". In UNESCO, the Soviet Union has failed in its attempt to gain wider international support and acceptance of this position.

36 ~~21~~. Finally, the Eastern countries continue to maintain, as they have from August 1975, that the implementation of Basket III provisions is limited by certain so-called legitimate considerations.

In accordance with their claim that the Declaration of Principles has a predominant position in the Final Act, they insist that Basket III provisions can only be implemented in a manner subordinate to the Declaration, particularly with regard to the principle of "non-intervention", often loosely interpreted by the East to mean "non-interference in internal affairs". Furthermore, the East has regularly resurrected its Helsinki/Geneva argument that progress in Basket III depends on improvements in the political atmosphere (Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy writing in Tarsadalmi Szemle, July, 1976). Implementation of Basket III must proceed bit by bit without departing from the "spirit of realism" in a manner "fully compatible with the actual state of détente", and even on the condition that there be "universal guarantees against eventual inimical acts in the political and ideological domains" (Tass, 13th May, 1976). The need for implementation on the basis of bilateral agreements rather than by unilateral action, as implied by the Final Act, has also been reiterated.

(a) Human contacts

39 - The position as regards human contacts is mixed and less easy to interpret than in the case of the second Report. Trends, even within individual countries, are contradictory, and the linkage with the Final Act is sometimes uncertain. The evidence does suggest

a conscious attempt by every Warsaw Pact country to go some way towards meeting Western pressure and to establish an implementation record in all sections of the Final Act. However, the results are patchy and often lacking in real effect. There are also some instances in which practices have become more, rather than less, restrictive. In general, the overall situation is one of some very limited real improvement.

**38** ~~26~~. In the Soviet Union most Allies have experienced very little change in the Soviet performance. There have been no additional improvements in exit procedures to those noted in the last report (list attached to Annex of C-M(87)26(Final)); in fact, effective 15th June, 1976, a new regulation increases the duties from 100% to 600% on gifts from abroad and limits the number of articles per package, which will make existence more difficult for

the many aspiring emigrants who lose their means of livelihood. There have also been reports that Soviet authorities are being more restrictive in assessing individual emigrant applications, specifying that a prospective emigrant can be sponsored only by an immediate relative (parent, spouse, sibling or child) in order to qualify. In addition there is no indication that the previous small

improvements are having a general ameliorating effect across the board in increasing the numbers of departures from the USSR for family meetings, reunification, emigration and travel. There has been no change in the Soviet Union's "reluctantly tolerant" attitude towards bi-national marriages. All the Allies have continued to have great difficulty with unresolved personal cases. For example, over the past six months the United Kingdom has obtained satisfaction with respect to only six out of 50 such cases. The United States has solved the cases of about one third of 109 families between August 1975 and August 1976, just less than for the previous period.

**39 -** Nonetheless, while most Western countries have experienced little if any improvement in Soviet performance, the Federal Republic of Germany has reported a <sup>significant</sup> increase in the number of Soviet Germans emigrating to the Federal Republic of Germany (monthly average: 1975 - 450; since August, 1975 - 750) 1974 - 530; January/July, which the German Authorities believe to be largely attributable to the Final Act, though continued bilateral efforts have played a part.

They also have noted a slight improvement in travel for family meetings.

**40 -** The United States reports similar positive developments in some areas, though they are less clearly attributable to Helsinki. Soviet emigration to the United States is over twice 1975 levels (1162 in 1975 : 1303 in first half of 1976), but / <sup>this</sup> increase

consists largely of Armenians, and may be due in part to extraneous factors (e.g. the unsettled situation in the Lebanon). In the first six months of 1976, visas for private travel to visit relatives in the United States increased 46% (from 510 to 743) over the same period in 1975. This is, however, consistent with a trend over a number of years, and coincided with a decline in the number of visas issued to tourists in the same periods.

\* **41 -** The Netherlands has also seen a considerable increase in visas for family meetings.

\* **42 -** Some Western countries have noticed a general rise in the number of tourist groups from the Soviet Union. For its part, the USSR claims to have made travel to the Soviet Union easier through relaxed foreign currency controls and to have extended technical co-operation with the West (N.S. Nitkin, "International tourism in the post-Helsinki period", date unknown).

\* **43 -** In Bulgaria the situation remains basically unchanged, although one Allied country has observed that humanitarian cases

generally receive "a certain amount of understanding". The United States reports some improvement since late 1975 in the number of Bulgarians permitted to visit relatives in the United States who are not recognized by Bulgaria as "legal" emigrants. The United States has also had its first successful reunification case of the same order, although American Authorities are inclined to think that both these developments are related more to bilateral factors than to the CSCE. On the negative side, Canadian Authorities have experienced an apparent hardening of Bulgarian procedures in family reunification cases. The Embassy's access to prospective emigrants for interviews is more difficult, and Bulgaria is now asking for a Canadian Government "guarantee" of the authenticity of invitations from Canadian relatives. (US has also noticed stricter attitude re marriages - i.e. assurances of marriagability of non-Bulgarian). It has also been reported that, as of 1st January, 1976, Bulgaria dropped the visa waiver for non-Warsaw Pact tourists.

**44.** There are a number of assessments that the attitude of Czechoslovakia since Helsinki seems to have improved slightly with respect to family visits, including visits to "illegal" emigrants, and in travel abroad generally. This is partly balanced by little evidence of improvement in its tough position on family reunification. Canada was recently told that, in overall implementation of Final Act and to remove a negative element in bilateral relations, Czechoslovak authorities had taken an important policy decision for future handling of family reunification cases which would, in the first instance, help resolve several outstanding reunification cases involving children. The United States has observed a similar approach with regard to its reunification cases involving children.

Only the Federal Republic of Germany has experienced a significant rising trend in family reunification. One country has seen a mild improvement since 1975 in the speed with which Czechoslovakia has handled its bi-national marriage cases. The foreign currency

allotment for travellers abroad was increased in 1976 from \$180 to \$220. The Czech Authorities have claimed to have opened two new frontier posts with Austria and to be considering further such moves.

**45** In the case of the German Democratic Republic, there have been significant improvements in human contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany, but these are mainly the result of bilateral agreements and contacts. The Federal Republic of Germany has experienced a marked increase in family visits and travel to the GDR, but only a slight increase in family visits to the FRG. **Very often one or more family members are held back as hostages.** There has also been a significant rise in family reunification, and procedures for processing such cases have somewhat improved; but, nevertheless, great difficulty is still experienced and there are **and discriminatory measures against those who wish to leave the GDR.** large numbers of unresolved applications, A new development has been the recent large increase in the numbers of East Germans applying to leave for the Federal Republic of Germany, many of whom have referred explicitly to the Final Act.

\* **46** Other Allies have found the GDR much less co-operative, though the picture is mixed. The Netherlands has reported an increase in the number of visas issued, but otherwise little or no improvement is evident in family visits or travel. The GDR attitude towards bi-national marriages remains very restrictive. Austria and the Netherlands have had considerable success in solving outstanding personal cases since Helsinki, but others have noticed no improvement. A small positive step has been the reduction in March of the cost of an exit visa from Mark 16.50 to Mark 15.-

**47** While Hungary continues to be the least restrictive of Eastern countries in its approach to human contacts, most assessments are that Helsinki has so far brought no significant improvement other

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than some increase in the numbers of visas to the United States. Figures for family visits, emigration and travel remain at earlier levels, and Canada has reported a number of cases of Hungarians who returned home after earlier emigration to Canada and who now find they are having difficulty in re-emigrating.

**48**. One country has concluded, however, that there is a slow trend to more liberal behaviour, and cites as evidence the reduced cost of an emigrant passport (\$72 to \$48) and the increased allotment of foreign currency now given to travellers (\$173 from \$156).


**49**. In Poland too, there have been no significant changes since Helsinki, though once again, it has proved to be among the least restrictive of Warsaw Pact countries. Family visits continue to be relatively easy to make, although the United States noted a less flexible approach in late 1975 and early 1976 both to family visits and family reunifications, with a subsequent upturn later in 1976.

Canada has continued to have problems with the re-unification of families of "illegal" emigrants in Canada. On the positive side, the Federal Republic has been able to report large increases in emigration of German Poles to the Federal Republic of Germany, but this is the result of the bilateral agreement worked out between the Federal Republic and Poland at the Helsinki Summit. There has been no change in the number of Poles travelling abroad.

**50**. The situation in Romania has hardened since Helsinki, though very recently several Western countries (France, Luxembourg, Norway and Belgium) have solved a proportion of cases, largely after sustained and high-level pressure. For example, out of 430 cases in all categories of human contacts, France has had 371 solved or assured of solution by Romanian authorities. Luxembourg was able to solve 4 of 5 marriage and 1 of 2 family visits cases during Prime Minister Thorn's visit to Romania in October, 1976.

Nevertheless, the general Romanian attitude remains highly restrictive. Several Western countries have reported a decline in family visits and family reunification. A periodic propaganda campaign has been continued along with tighter controls and social pressures to discourage emigration.

President Ceausescu speaking to the Party Congress in June decried emigration as inhuman and an act of "family disintegration". In a special case, the United States has seen an increase in the numbers of family visits and family reunifications; but, particularly for reunifications, this seems a result of the conditions imposed by the US Congress on the Most Favoured Nation treatment given to Romania. After Helsinki, all countries experienced a marked decline in the number of bi-national marriages and, despite the recent solution of some personal cases, a large number of cases are still outstanding. Ceausescu has explained that Romania will not approve marriages with foreigners without taking into account the wishes of relatives and without appropriate guarantees from the other country involved that persons leaving Romania will enjoy adequate living and working conditions. Some countries have seen a decline in tourist travel from Romania, but one has noted a slight improvement in group travel as a result of bilateral efforts between tourist organizations.



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51. While there has yet to be a significant <sup>general improvement</sup> / in Eastern practices on travel abroad by their nationals, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent Hungary and some other Eastern countries, have continued to press for improvements in Western visa procedures. (See paragraph 31 of <sup>the Annex to</sup> C-M(76)26(Final)). In recent months the Soviet Union has made two separate proposals to a number of Allied and neutral countries, one calling for a series of set, short processing times for all kinds of visas, the other suggesting that visas for resident diplomats be made valid for the full length of tour rather than renewable at set periods. Hungary has included some visa proposals in its bilateral implementation "suggestion lists" to some Western countries. Both Bulgaria and Romania have shown interest in abolishing visa requirements.

52. This seems to be a co-ordinated effort among Eastern countries to build a record of compliance in Basket III in an area which is easy for them but difficult for the West because Western countries do not have the persuasive internal security systems which the Eastern <sup>possess.</sup> countries/ Nonetheless, Western Governments are examining the Eastern proposals to see if some might be acceptable. Some have already agreed to the Soviet proposal on the validity period of diplomatic visas. As for the first Soviet proposal, some Western countries have noted that their own visa procedures are in some respects at least as good if not better than those suggested by Moscow. Consideration is also being given to making counter proposals to the East, such as suggesting a reduction or elimination of visa fees. In fact, the United States has already made this proposal to some Warsaw Pact countries and has

negative indications  
to date received / from the German Democratic Republic and  
Hungary, presumably because they need the foreign currency such  
fees bring in.

53. The human contacts provisions of the Final Act did not deter the GDR from preventing the road transit to Berlin of 13 busloads of young people and others on 13th August, 1976. GDR authorities have also adopted a generally harsher attitude over the past few months to the movements of peoples around and through the Demarcation Line, resulting in a number of serious incidents including the killing of an Italian truck driver.

54. In other aspects of human contacts, one country has reported success in arranging reciprocal pre-Olympic team visits with the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR, Poland and Hungary

permitted representatives from their countries to attend the international Eucharistic Conference in the United States in August. On the negative side, however, Eastern organizers of the "European Youth Security Conference" did not include representatives from the two main American youth groups in their preparatory work, and eventually invited them to the Conference only as observers even though the meeting was supposed to be inspired by the CSCE Final Act. The US and some other Western groups refused to attend.

(b) Information

\* 55. Over the past few months there has been little in the way of meaningful implementation on the part of Eastern countries in the information field. Small steps have been taken here and there, principally in the area of working conditions for journalists, by certain Eastern European countries. Combined with performances over the previous periods, the overall view is one of little or no meaningful implementation in the way of improving access to Western information by Eastern publics, but a slightly better performance in working conditions for journalists, which is less troublesome and gets more attention in the West. As before, Eastern efforts seem to be directed more to self-justification, promoting reinterpretations of the Final Act (see para. above) and attacks on Western performances and news media, than to implementation of the Final Act.

\* 56. In the Soviet Union there appears to be no greater access by Soviet citizens to Western printed information, despite evidence

that there has been a <sup>small</sup> increase, as promised, in the number of titles of foreign newspapers imported. Most of the new material remains confined to places frequented only by tourists and privileged Russians, and the possible admission of further news-institutions papers has been termed a "social" and foreign exchange problem. Subscriptions to Western publications are still confined to certain. The Federal Republic continues with negotiations now nine years old to gain approval from Soviet authorities to publish an embassy bulletin.

574. Elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact, although conditions vary from country to country, there has been no discernable improvement either since May 1976 or since Helsinki. Bulgaria remains particularly isolated to outside printed information, as does Czechoslovakia where it has been reported that resident foreign businessmen were no longer able to receive subscriptions to "bourgeois" newspapers after Helsinki. Italy reports that GDR authorities have excluded the idea of an increase in the importation of printed information. Hungary has not increased its dissemination of Western information, but the United States has had a <sup>minor</sup> long-standing restriction lifted on its <sup>official</sup> information activities. While the situation in Poland is probably the best of all Warsaw Pact countries, there has been no improvement in Polish performance other than a small increase in the importation of <sup>copies of</sup> the Newsweek and Herald Tribune. As in the field of human contacts, Romania's performance is the most disappointing. Some countries have seen a worsening in the situation, including reductions in subscriptions even for "official" use, and legal action has been taken against persons selling Western newspapers, normally available only in tourist hotels, to Romanians. The only positive note, but of bilateral significance, has been the local publication of articles by members of the American Embassy on the occasion of the US bicentenary.

**58** 5. In the field of filmed and broadcast information there is even less of significance to report. Eastern countries continue to contend that they <sup>are</sup> implementing the Final Act better than the West by importing more films from Western countries than vice-versa, and to demand reciprocity in numbers from the West. This not only ignores the unrepresentative nature of films imported by Eastern countries (usually those showing the West in a bad light) and the use of censorship, but also the principle, implicit in the Final Act, <sup>that public demand,</sup> / not reciprocity, should determine the flow of information between East and West. In fact, one country has found the Soviet Union to be more restrictive in the kinds of films imported. Generally, however, there has been no change in Eastern performance except in the GDR, where more American films critical of the West are being shown, and in Poland, which has shown some greater interest in USIA films.

**59** 6. The attitude of Eastern countries towards access by their citizens to the spoken word continues to be highly restrictive, although, as regards the use of their own broadcasting media, there have been a few successful "television exchange days" between certain Eastern and Western countries. Canada has noted a decided improvement in relations between its broadcasting authorities and their Soviet counterparts. The most notable events in the past months have been the open debate on CSCE and other East-West issues broadcast by Hungarian television in August in which media

representatives from both East and West participated, and the Franco-Soviet television week which enabled the French President to address the Soviet people.

**60** 7. With regard to the content of foreign broadcasts, Eastern attitudes are tough and uncompromising, and remain <sup>largely as</sup> / as described in <sup>in the Annex</sup> paragraph 38/ of the last report. Soviet attacks on broadcasts of Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL) and other Western radio stations have continued. Mr. Brezhnev even felt compelled to carry

(Revised)

these attacks to the floor of the Conference of European Communist Parties .. The Eastern campaign is unremitting in its efforts to charge Western governments with the responsibility for the content of these broadcasts as well as the content of Western news media generally. The Eastern claim that news media should be put at the service of/ détente and "mutual acquaintanceship" has already been noted above (paragraph 35 ).

**61.** . In spite of this campaign however, over the past few months there has been a lessening of jamming of RFE and RL broadcasts by the Soviet Union and of RFE broadcasts by Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Jamming appears limited to programmes beamed to these countries in national languages only (e.g. Russian broadcasts to Bulgaria are not jammed) and <sup>to those</sup> containing highly sensitive material of a political nature. (The GDR continues partially to jam Radio in the American Sector.) In addition, Western efforts have succeeded in regaining some ground lost earlier this year. The RFE and RL won the right to send their journalists to the Montreal Olympics after failure to get accreditation at Munich because of Eastern pressures. Western reaction to the expulsion of three FRG radio journalists to the Spring Leipzig Fair apparently prompted the GDR to approve accreditation for the same three journalists to the Fall Fair.

\* **62.** Since Helsinki, the Soviet Union has recognised the importance of improving to some extent working conditions for Western journalists. At the beginning of 1976 it took a number of steps in this direction (paragraph 34, C-M(76)26(Final)). These have now been followed by an additional procedural improvement in access to sources. Repealing a 1947 Law on contacts with foreigners, a decree of the Supreme Soviet, 29th June, 1976 permits government ministries and departments to have direct contact with foreign journalists without the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting as intermediary. The practical effects of this new decree are still uncertain, though at the present time it has brought no improvement and journalists themselves have expressed doubts whether it will improve access markedly. Apparently some ministries still

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consult the MFA, and there is the danger that the MFA can frustrate access simply by telling journalists to find their own contacts within the huge government bureaucracy.

63. Apart from this development, the Soviet Union also has allowed FRG and US television teams to use their own cameramen. In addition, permission from the MFA is no longer required to send out films and tapes. One country sees a more forthcoming attitude on visiting journalists' visas. On the other hand, entry permission for a Canadian film TV crew was only given in one instance, and another country has noted that, with the recent takeover of the NOVOSTI film/TV service by the State Radio/TV, project requests for film crews are getting more ideological scrutiny, and there has been a sharp rise in fees. The Soviet press has undertaken a

campaign during the past few months against three American journalists for having alleged links with the CIA. This aside, the overall situation in the Soviet Union for journalists has undoubtedly improved to some small degree since Helsinki, although it is still highly restrictive.

**64** 64. A similar approach from the other Eastern countries has been somewhat slower in coming, but recent assessments now point to some very limited steps in the direction of better working conditions, though access seems to be generally regarded as still far from satisfactory. Bulgaria's performance seems to have been rather good for a number of years. One country has noted some improvement in access, albeit on the rather limited experience of journalists attending the Bulgarian C.P. Congress. In Czechoslovakia some minor improvements seem to have taken place: a German correspondent now has his own camera team, a press centre was set up at the Czech C.P. Congress, government ministries have recently established press spokesmen, and the number of journalists' visas are up, including one to a previously expelled US journalist. On the negative side, Czechoslovakia remains the only Eastern country consistently to refuse entry to journalists for alleged "hostile reporting".

\* **65** ✓. The German Democratic Republic has been the most active Eastern country during the past few months in bringing some small improvements for journalists. These steps were taken after international criticism of the expulsion of a Western journalist from East Berlin and of the refusal of visas for several visiting journalists. Effective June 1, 1976, journalists, technical staff and dependents are able to travel to West Berlin and to the Federal Republic of Germany, press cards are issued to wives and children (over 18), customs facilities, especially for technical equipment, are easier, and there has been more rapid handling of journalistic projects. Along similar lines to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic has also made it possible, since July, for journalists to approach government ministries directly for information and interviews. In contrast, Hungary has not instituted any obvious improvements in its already liberal approach to journalists, although one country has discerned an improvement in "atmospherics" in that senior officials seem more available for interviews and are willing to discuss controversial subjects. Poland too has not brought any improvement to what many Western countries term a basically satisfactory situation. One country has noted that telex facilities were reduced during the food price crisis in late June. Romania has made some attempts at small improvements. Officials have told the Federal Republic of Germany that they are prepared to cross-accredit German journalists resident in Vienna and Belgrade. One country has reported less difficulty in the import of equipment, another in freedom of movement, and another in access to basic information. Despite the above improvements, one country reports Romania to be less helpful in facilitating contacts with persons other than those specifically named in requests. Access, in Romania as elsewhere in the East, is still the main problem area for journalists.

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(c) Culture and education

\* **66** - The development of relations in the cultural and educational fields between countries of the East and West, and the rôle played by the CSCE Final Act, continue generally along the lines described in the last report (paragraphs 16-17 and paragraphs 39 to 44 of the Annex). In many cases, co-operation in these fields was well underway before Helsinki. The CSCE Final Act has not had a significant effect on a wide scale, although some countries believe it has been a positive influence in the pace and direction that cultural/educational arrangements have taken. Portugal's cultural relations with Eastern countries are the only ones to have improved considerably since Helsinki, but this is not CSCE-related.

\* **67** - Eastern countries plainly see the provisions on culture and education as areas where they can establish a good implementation record with a minimum of difficulty. They are especially keen to conclude cultural agreements in the context of the Final Act, and to work out additional exchange within existing agreements. They favour, however, confining these exchanges to such agreements; they prefer group activity and have been more resistant to the idea of individual contacts. They are also quick to use openings for dissemination of Eastern cultures in the West, while being restrictive to similar Western activities in their countries. The Soviet Union has also made it clear that unlimited exchanges are out of the question for the reason that Western mass culture is "spiritually bankrupt" (Pravda, May 15) and contaminating to Socialist society. The East must seek co-operation with the "democratic revolutionary" elements of Western culture. At the same time, Eastern countries place restrictions on contacts by non-conformist intellectuals with the West. The recent refusal of Czech authorities to permit the

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dissident writer Kohout to visit the West, is an example of this.

**68** - Specific experience with Eastern countries over the past few months has reflected these general approaches. Canada's cultural agreement with the USSR continues to function properly, while other Eastern countries have suggested similar agreements. The Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement with Poland in June, 1976, and

is presently working out agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and has initialled an agreement with Hungary. The United States is also negotiating with / While the United States has seen some new developments with the East in the educational field particularly, they are on long established lines. Ideological differences, national interests and the availability of funds (for the West) continue to set limits on what might otherwise be possible. Treatment of activities connected with the US Bicentennial celebrations in the East was generally favourable.

\* **69** - The situation with respect to the USSR seems unchanged from that described in the last report. Among Eastern countries, Hungary and Poland remain the most liberal in the cultural field, though in neither have there been any striking improvements related to Helsinki. In fact, Hungarian officials have said they need consider no new steps since they have already been making a greater effort than the Western countries. Nonetheless, Hungary has placed some cultural proposals (in the translation and publication of books) in its bilateral implementation on "suggestion lists" given recently to a number of Western governments. In Poland there has been a more liberal approach to cultural exchanges, dissemination and visits with the Federal Republic, but German authorities see it more an indirect outcome of the Polish-German agreement on the emigration of

German Poles. In Romania, the situation seems a bit better than was noted previously. One country has experienced some positive developments. A Romanian official has claimed that the distribution of Western films, books and periodicals has been improved.

70 ✓. An important part of the Eastern approach to the cultural/educational provisions of Basket III continues to be their use of statistics to criticize the West for not importing Eastern films, books and periodicals, for not translating and publishing Eastern books and for not teaching Eastern languages, on the same scale as the East vis-à-vis the West. The virtual demand for reciprocity ignores the rôle played by free choice in the flow of cultural and other information. This and related efforts on the part of the East to put the West in a defensive position, along with certain Western activities in response, were noted in the previous report (paragraphs 42, 43 and 44 of the Annex).

71 ✓. In the multilateral field, UNESCO remains active in furthering cultural/educational co-operation in the context of the CSCE.

#### NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED

\* 72 ✓. Neutral and Non-Aligned countries generally share a similar position to the Allied countries in their interpretations of the Final Act and their views on how it should be implemented. Yugoslavia has expressed some concern, however, about the apparent decline in overall implementation in mid-1976, which it has blamed on the alleged "bloc to bloc" approach being taken by some countries.

\* 73. The Declaration of Principles as a whole is seen as strengthening their security and independence. Yugoslavia has been especially careful to stress all the principles and not to neglect those on "sovereign equality" and "non-intervention in internal affairs", though it has also been less than consistent in its approach to human rights, supporting an Eastern approach attractive to many of the Third World. The Trieste Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia is viewed as an important example of implementation of the Declaration of Principles.

\* 74. All members of the Non-Aligned and Neutral groups attach importance to the CBMs provisions, and have been conscientious in their application. During the period since the last report Switzerland and Sweden have each notified one manoeuvre and Yugoslavia notified two. The Swiss also invited observers to attend its manoeuvre, and the Yugoslavs invited observers to one of theirs.

\* 75. The approaches of the Neutral countries to Basket III implementation closely resemble those of Allied states. They have enjoyed some limited success in realizing progress vis-à-vis Eastern states. At a meeting in Helsinki in April, they collectively concluded that, after an uncertain start in late 1975, Warsaw Pact countries have become somewhat more flexible, though differing in specific approaches from country to country. Yugoslavia's assessment of Eastern implementation is not known, but its own performance is considerably better, especially on human contacts and culture.

\* 76. Western countries have no special problems with Yugoslavia, but citing the Final Act, Yugoslavia has begun seriously questioning the Austrian policy towards the Slovene minority in Austria.

(In a lower key it has also referred to the relevance of the Final Act to its minority problem with Bulgaria.) This development between Yugoslavia and Austria could have a bearing on the possibility of co-operation between Neutral and Non-Aligned groups in the lead-up to Belgrade.

N A T O    C O N F I D E N T I A L  
N A T O    C O N F I D E N T I E L

ATTACHMENT to  
ANNEX to  
ISD/134(Revised)

RECENT EVOLUTION OF EAST-WEST TRADE (1)  
EVOLUTION RECENTE DU COMMERCE EST-OUEST (1)

(In million US \$ )  
(Millions de US \$ )

	Western Exports Exportations occidentales				Western Imports Importations occidentales				Western balance of trade Balance commerciale occidentale			
	1973	1974	1975	1976(3)	1973	1974	1975	1976(3)	1973	1974	1975	1976(3)
USSR URSS	5785,9	7522,3	12532,1	7060,2	5329,8	8380,0	8843,3	4946,1	+456,1	-857,7	+3688,8	+2114,1
GDR (2) RDA	1871,5	2418,2	2724,4	1347,3	1652,4	2211,7	2397,4	1242,6	+219,1	+206,5	+327,0	+104,7
Poland Pologne	3193,1	4590,8	5498,8	2693,4	2130,0	2877,7	3172,3	1703,7	+1063,1	+1713,1	+2326,5	+989,7
CSSR RSSC	1351,4	1745,5	1880,2	931,2	1277,5	1538,0	1639,3	814,5	+73,9	+207,5	+240,9	+116,7
Hungary Hongrie	1112,0	1792,0	1836,1	839,4	1105,7	1345,4	1248,0	640,2	+6,3	+446,6	+588,1	+199,2
Romania Roumanie	1353,6	2054,3	2005,2	914,7	1101,1	1580,5	1665,7	935,1	+252,5	+473,8	+339,5	-20,4
Bulgaria Bulgarie	491,2	847,8	1101,4	489,0	368,5	415,7	392,4	238,8	+122,7	+432,1	+709,0	+250,2
TOTAL	15158,7	20970,9	27578,2	14275,2	12965,0	18349,0	19358,4	10521,0	+2197,7	+2621,9	+8219,8	+3754,2

(1) "East" in this case refers only to the Warsaw Pact countries and the term "West" includes all the member countries of the OECD.  
L'expression "Est" se réfère dans ce cas aux seuls pays du Pacte de Varsovie et le terme "Ouest" s'applique à tous les pays membres de l'OCDE.

(2) Includes intra-german trade  
Y compris le commerce intra-allemand

(3) First half of the year only / Premier semestre seulement

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