



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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ORIGINAL: FRENCH/ENGLISH

~~NAFO SECRET~~  
PC/57/873

TO: Permanent Representatives  
FROM: Secretary General

DISARMAMENT - SIXTH TELEGRAM FROM THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL

I attach hereto the text of the telegram which was sent to the representatives of the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, following the discussion in the Council yesterday, 16th July.

(Signed) P.-H. SPAAK

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17th July, 1957

~~NAFO SECRET~~

SIXTH TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, FRANCE,  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. The Council has continued its discussion on possible zones of inspection in Europe with the Standing Group and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

2. You will have already received two documents: one from the Standing Group, SGM-475-57, the other a letter from the Supreme Commander dated 10th July.

3. The Council based its discussion with the Standing Group on document SGM-475-57. The views expressed hereunder define the position of the Standing Group with respect to certain points raised during discussion. It should be emphasised that these, like the document itself, represent the Standing Group's own views, given from the military standpoint, and have not been the subject of consultations with their national military authorities. These views do not represent a position taken up by the Council.

It is appropriate to mention that the views of the Standing Group are directed principally to the effect upon the overall security of NATO of the creation of a zone of inspection.

SACEUR has principally directed his examination to the possibility of minimising the danger of a surprise attack upon NATO by the creation of an inspection zone.

4. From the point of view of the security of NATO the Standing Group considers that the European inspection zone should be as wide as possible and that air inspection should be accompanied by ground inspection carried out with static and mobile units.

5. After discussing the restricted assumption in respect of a surprise attack, the Standing Group reached the conclusion that air inspection alone would confer an advantage on the Soviets because of the opportunities afforded them by espionage to check, on the spot, evidence revealed by aerial photography. Air inspection alone can no doubt supply the NATO military authorities with additional information but does not necessarily increase security and, from this standpoint, poses a number of problems.

6. With respect to paragraph 3 of SGM-475-57, the Standing Group, for the reasons given in SACEUR's letter, has explained that meridian 35 EAST represents the minimum which could be regarded as militarily acceptable.

7. With respect to paragraph 4 of SGM-475-57, the Standing Group has explained in connection with the northern limits, that if a Polar inspection zone were established, identical inspection methods should be used in both zones. As regards the southern limits, the Standing Group has stressed the military interest in covering certain Soviet Black Sea ports. If Turkish territory were included, the zone should extend sufficiently to the east to include the land mass situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian.

8. The Standing Group indicated that it would be preferable for the final delimitation of the zone to be expressed, not in meridians of longitude and parallels of latitude, but by well-defined landmarks (rivers, mountain ranges).

9. The Standing Group considers that if the best results are to be obtained from air inspection of Soviet territory, the system should be operated entirely by Western teams except for personnel who might be required to ensure compliance with agreements pertaining to such inspections. If air inspection were carried out by joint teams, it would be impossible, for security reasons, to employ our best photographic and electronic equipment which the Standing Group believes to be in advance of that available to the Soviets.

10. At the Council meeting on 11th July, the Representative of the Federal Republic announced that his Government, although not against linking air and ground inspection, was firmly opposed to the establishment of mobile ground inspection teams during the initial phase, and was also opposed to the creation of a system of overlapping radars since it considered that both of them might result in a state of affairs akin to demilitarisation.

11. At the same meeting, the Italian Representative stressed the advantage to the Atlantic Alliance of a zone of inspection encompassing the Balkan Peninsular, a potential base for a surprise attack. The Italian Government is prepared to accept air inspection of the Italian Peninsular provided that the inspection zone also includes the territory of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Northern part of Albania.

12. This telegram was drafted before the receipt of your two documents of today's date.

16th July, 1957