



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

149

Place du Maréchal
de Lattre de Tassigny
(Porte Dauphine)
PARIS-XVI

Tél. : KLEber 50-20

Adresse télégraphique :
OTAN PARIS ou
NATO PARIS

Gruken

ORIGINAL: FRENCH
23rd December, 1965

NATO SECRET
PO/65/636

To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

Memorandum by the Greek Ministry of Defence

Reference: C-VR(65)52, page 37

Attached is a memorandum by the Greek Ministry of Defence containing information on Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, to which the Greek Minister of Defence, Mr. Costopoulos, referred in the course of his statement on 15th December, 1965, and which the Greek Delegation has requested me to have circulated to all delegations and to the NATO Military Authorities.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

NATO SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE - GREECE

1. The Greek Authorities consider that, despite its break with the Soviet Union, Albania will side with the Communist bloc in the event of a conflict, since there can be no doubt that it subscribes to the bloc's ideology. It should be remembered that Albania is still an ex officio member of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the Eastern countries' Common Market, and that even if it does not participate in the Pact's manoeuvres and COMECON meetings, it has never abandoned the Communist camp. Albania's political position has been further reinforced by the fact that, after Soviet-Albanian relations were broken off, Moscow strove to keep in touch with Tirana through a number of satellite countries, under cover of various commercial transactions.

Greece therefore believes that Albania is still ill-disposed to NATO, and that the threat represented by this country should be kept under continuing review.

2. As regards the political position of Yugoslavia, the Greek Authorities consider that the improvement of Yugoslav relations with the Eastern bloc countries was prompted by Moscow, in an effort to retain its hold on the Soviet satellites so as to meet the challenge of Communist China. This rapprochement was, moreover, achieved by means of bilateral agreements.

Moscow's efforts to attract Yugoslavia into its sphere of influence, and to develop relations with the satellite countries while glossing over its ideological differences with them, precisely at a time when extensive economic reforms are being introduced in the Soviet Union, suggest that Yugoslavia is by no means willing to give up its independence, and that there is no need to modify the Greek appraisal of Yugoslav policy. This appraisal is as follows: "Greece believes that in the event of a conflict, Yugoslavia will attempt to remain neutral. Should its territory be violated, Yugoslavia will defend its independence and territorial integrity". Greece therefore considers that Yugoslavia should not be included in the Standing Group's appraisals since, in the Greek Government's opinion, it might be a mistake to classify this country now among the Soviet bloc nations.

3. The Greek Military Authorities estimate that, altogether, eleven Bulgarian divisions could participate in a surprise attack against Greece without any preparatory measures, and that, depending on the scale of operations, this force could subsequently be provided with Soviet aid and logistical support. The Bulgarian divisions' capability derives from the fact that they are at 75-80% of full strength, are deployed near the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, undergo intensive training, are extremely mobile and have a high strike capability and can use manoeuvres as a pretext for moving up to the Greek frontier.

14th December, 1965.

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