



ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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To: Permanent Representatives
From: Secretary General

WARSAW PACT BILATERAL DEFENCE TREATIES

In a private meeting of Council on 22nd March, 1967, the Greek Representative suggested an exchange of views on the implications of the series of bilateral treaties of "Friendship, Peaceful Co-operation and Mutual Assistance" signed recently among Warsaw Pact members.

2. It was also suggested that the Council might consider directing this exchange toward formulating policy questions to be posed to the NATO Expert Working Group on Eastern Europe, which meets from 9th to 12th May, 1967.

3. In accordance with these suggestions, I propose including this item on the Council Agenda for 3rd May, 1967.

4. To assist the Council's discussion, I have had prepared the attached papers, comprising comments on the initial three treaties (Polish-Czech, Polish-"GDR" and Czech-"GDR"), a chronology of Eastern European diplomacy in 1967, and the texts of these treaties.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

WARSAW PACT BILATERAL FRIENDSHIP TREATIES

During 1967, diplomatic activity among the Warsaw Pact member countries has been unusually intense. Party and governmental leaders have exchanged visits between Communist capitals; public and private commitments have been made, declarations released through the radio and the press, and friendship pacts solemnly signed.

2. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and the causes of this spate of activity and to examine the scope of the treaties concluded and their consequences not only for the countries immediately concerned but also for other countries, and particularly those of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Facts

3. Mention of the main visits made or planned by Communist statesmen to capitals in the Socialist camp and of the treaties signed at the end of certain of these meetings will provide a brief idea of this activity: Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting, Warsaw, 8th to 10th February; visit of Czech Party Leader NOVOTNY and Premier LENART to Warsaw, 1st March; Polish Party Leader GOMULKA and Premier CYRANKIEWICZ to Hungary, 8th and 9th March; Bulgarian Party Leader and Premier ZHIVKOV to Moscow, 13th to 15th March; visit of Pankow Party Leader ULBRICHT and Premier STOPH to Warsaw, 14th and 15th March; ULBRICHT and STOPH to Prague, 17th March; Rumanian Party Leader CEAUSESCU and Premier MAURER to Moscow, 17th and 18th March; ULBRICHT and STOPH to Moscow, 21st March; GOMULKA and CYRANKIEWICZ to Bulgaria, 3rd April.

4. An extensive chronology of 1967 Warsaw Pact visits and meetings, both those that have already been held and those scheduled or rumoured, is attached as Annex A.

5. Four "Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance" have recently been signed: a Polish-Czech Treaty on 1st March; a Polish-"GDR" Treaty on 15th March; a Czech-"GDR" Treaty on 17th March; and a Polish-Bulgarian Treaty on 6th April.

6. In addition, on 6th March in Copenhagen, Bulgarian Foreign Minister BASHEV spoke of a Bulgarian-"GDR" Treaty. In March, agreement was reached in Moscow to conclude a Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty sometime this year. An eventual accord between Hungary and the "GDR" has been rumoured.

7. Haste has been an element in this round of treaty signing. For example, the Polish-Bulgarian Treaty and the anticipated Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty replace treaties which still have more than a year to run. While the Polish-Czech Treaty supersedes a 20-year pact signed in March 1947, the

Polish-"GDR" and Czech-"GDR" Treaties are the first of their kind between the respective régimes. Rumania must face the problem of the renewal of its 20-year treaties with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria before they expire in January and February 1968.

Origins and Immediate Causes

8. When Khrushchev, after the Berlin and Cuba crises, initiated the policy of "peaceful coexistence" which was later to develop into what became known as the "détente", a certain loosening of the ties binding together the Warsaw Pact countries soon became evident. The attitude of Rumania provides a good example of this.

9. At the Bucharest Conference of July 1966, this atmosphere was confirmed, but at the same time a Soviet attempt made to contain and limit centrifugal tendencies. Nevertheless, the declaration adopted by the Conference concerning the strengthening of peace and security in Europe was quickly put to account by the Rumanian leadership, particularly as regards the relations of Bucharest with Federal Germany.

10. The German Government was, at this time, making a determined effort to improve its relations with Eastern Europe, one of its primary aims was to establish diplomatic relations with the "people's democracies", as it had done ten years earlier with the Soviet Union.

11. A German-Rumanian communiqué announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Bucharest was released on 31st January, 1966. It is important to note that this diplomatic agreement was reached without the Federal Government having to subscribe to any sort of conditions regarding the existence of the "GDR", and that, on the contrary, it was accompanied by a restatement of the Federal Government's claim that West Germany alone has the right and duty to speak for the German people as a whole.

12. At that moment there seemed good reason to believe that first Hungary, then in a relatively short time Bulgaria, and perhaps finally Czechoslovakia might follow Rumania's example.

13. Significantly, it was Pankow and Warsaw, not Moscow(1), which reacted most strongly to the Federal Republic's success. From their somewhat different perspectives, however, all three régimes saw the Federal Republic of Germany's "Eastern offensive" as a Western attempt to isolate the Soviet Zone - an attempt

(1) However, mention should be made of the Soviet statement on Germany of 28th January, 1967, which was made when the German-Rumanian Agreement was already a foregone conclusion although it had not yet been signed.

which if successful, they reasoned, could, over the long term, affect European stability as they conceive it.

14. At the Warsaw Conference, the Rumanian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Minister himself made a point of not attending the meeting) emphasised that, far from weakening the principle of two German states, the establishment of two German Embassies in Bucharest actually strengthened it. This line of argument did not succeed in convincing his colleagues, at least not Mr. Ulbricht and Mr. Gomulka. With the full backing of Moscow, the latter then took the initiative in closing the ranks of the East European capitals against the German diplomatic offensive. However, while the East German and Polish Leaders were mainly concerned with the German aspect of the problem, the Kremlin, in a wider context, saw in it an opportunity to keep Pact members in hand.

The Substance of the Treaties

15. The initial three bilateral treaties concluded between Poland, the "GDR" and Czechoslovakia, which were at first seen as the establishment of an "Iron Triangle", contain common provisions, as regards foreign policy, partly taken from the Polish-Soviet Treaty of 1965. (Three treaty texts are attached as Annex B; the text of the subsequent Polish-Bulgarian Treaty has not been received.)

16. The Polish-"GDR" Treaty pledges mutual assistance against any armed aggression on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, and makes a conventional reassertion of Allied responsibility for supporting the terms stipulated by the Potsdam agreement until a peace settlement can be reached. Valid for twenty years and renewable for another ten, the Treaty provides for its "re-examination" before the twentieth year "in the eventuality of a united, peace-loving and democratic German state being created". This clause, as in the Soviet-"GDR" Treaty of 1964, at least considers the possibility that the status quo might not last forever, despite its standard Communist description of a possible future German state. The Treaty refers to the "inviolability of the frontier of the Polish People's Republic along the Oder and the Iusatia Neisse as well as the frontier between the "GDR" and the West German Federal Republic", emphasising the importance of the status quo for European security. As in the Soviet-"GDR" Treaty of 1964, the Treaty stipulates that "West Berlin is a special political entity", thus supporting the "three-German-states" theory and in contrast to the trade agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, among others, which include West Berlin in the Federal Republic of Germany currency area. The Treaty pledges that efforts will continue "to bring about on the basis of the recognition of the existence of two German states a German peace settlement", thus paying lip-service to the virtually abandoned campaign with which Khrushchev once threatened Europe.

17. The Polish-Czech and Czech-"GDR" Treaties, for their part, are similarly oriented against the Federal Republic. One difference is, however, that both instruments stipulate that the Munich Agreement was invalid from the outset, while the Polish-"GDR" Treaty does not mention Munich.

18. The Polish-"GDR" preamble declares that the "GDR's" existence is an "important factor for guaranteeing peace" and speaks of "creating a lasting system of European security", whereas the Czech-"GDR" text states that both signatories "are contributing to the safeguarding of peace"; while the Polish-Czech text merely says that the "GDR" is "pursuing a policy of peace and contributing effectively to European security".

19. The Polish-Czech Treaty, unlike the other two, makes no mention of the "GDR" in referring to existing frontiers, but uses the phrase "inviolability of state borders now existing in Europe".

20. As regards general references to peaceful relations in Europe, none of the three Treaties uses the phrase of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of 1965: "to aim at the peaceful development of relations in Europe". Instead, the references in the three recent Treaties focus on the more limited concept of "European security".

21. In a transparent effort to gain acceptance of the "GDR" as a state, the Polish-"GDR" and Czech-"GDR" Treaties, but not the Polish-Czech pact, declare that they will be registered with the United Nations Secretariat as international agreements.

22. As compared with the original cycle of Eastern European treaties signed in the immediate post-war period, the new treaties make use of a formulation which is more precise in that they identify the Federal Republic of Germany as the source of German "militarism" and "revanche" and specify inviolability of existing European demarcations.

Conclusions

23. What conclusions are to be drawn from this precipitate diplomatic campaign which has been conducted by the Polish, East German and Soviet leaders? It is clear, at least, that they considered the danger sufficiently serious to require the mobilisation of considerable energy. Once again, the motives of the prime movers were not identical. While Poland's main concern is that there should be no calling into question of frontiers, for Pankow much more is at stake, viz. the very existence of the "GDR" as a State. The Kremlin, for its part, is doubtless

pursuing more subtle and varied ends; "Le Figaro" had this to say:

"Mobilisation of the 'diehards' may prove an asset to the Kremlin at a time when it is putting pressure on Germany to sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. However, it is also possible that the USSR, fearful of increasing the splits in the already badly cracked Soviet bloc, is leaving its partners to find a common denominator on the German question, in exchange, perhaps, for greater support in the more preoccupying problem of the Sino-Soviet dispute".

24. Can it be said that the "Iron Triangle" policy (which is much more a rectangle where Moscow plays the main rôle and to which Ulbricht hopes to add other corners) has scored a success? The least that can be said is that Ulbricht has won one round in a campaign aimed at preventing a crumbling of common East European positions on the German problem.

25. In West Berlin, for instance, it is thought that Pankow has obtained undertakings from Warsaw and Prague - pending similar commitments from the other Communist capitals - not to accept in future the inclusion of West Berlin even in cultural or economic agreements with the Federal Republic.

26. When the "Southern tier" capitals resume contact with the Federal Republic of Germany after these consultations and treaties, the emphasis of the treaties on the "recognition of at least two German states" signals the probability of difficulties in the way of the Federal Republic of Germany's formulation of its right to represent all of Germany.

27. There are also reasons for believing that these agreements may provide the USSR with greater freedom of movement with regard especially to "the dissolution of military and political blocs in Europe". The possible loosening of traditional Continental links henceforth entails less risk for the Soviet Union, because of the strengthening of the multilateral agreements among its clients, and, above all, because of the upgrading of the "GDR". The Pankow régime can now point to direct defence agreements with a number of Eastern European countries, whereas its sole former bilateral link was with Moscow through the Soviet East German Treaty of 1964.

28. Within the Eastern Communist camp itself, the establishment of a "front" of northern industrialised states may increase the suspicion felt towards them by the Balkan countries. The signatories of the treaties of co-operation must have been aware of the danger, since they have pointed out that they were acting within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, Gomulka, in

comments at Katovice, took pains to concede the theoretical desirability of "normalisation" of relations with Bonn, while commending, presumably to his Warsaw Pact partners, his pre-conditions for the establishment of those relations (Federal Republic of Germany recognition of two German states and the Oder-Neisse line, and renunciation of nuclear weapons).

29. In the West too, this hardening of the Warsaw Pact's anti-German policy can have effects unfavourable to Soviet interests: it could, for example, increase scepticism about the USSR's real objectives in promoting détente and thereby somewhat reduce Soviet political momentum in Western Europe.

30. Whether or not these opinions are justified, it is difficult to visualise Moscow being able to do more than delay the trend among European countries towards the establishment of ties in all fields, and especially the economic field. Rather, the Soviet leaders would appear to be using the German problem as an excellent opportunity for restoring order in the Eastern European ranks.

CHRONOLOGY OF EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

- January 6-17 : Working-level negotiations between an FRG diplomatic delegation and the Rumanians in Bucharest about establishment of diplomatic relations.
- 9-13 : Negotiations between working-level FRG diplomatic delegation and Czech officials in Prague about possibilities for improving mutual relations.
- 11 : Talks in East Berlin between Ulbricht and Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence Marshall GRECHKO. Grechko not identified in his capacity of Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief; length of stay in the Soviet Zone not revealed. HONECKER (Ulbricht's heir apparent) and Defence Minister HOFFMAN participate.
- 11-13 : Talks between Soviet Zone Foreign Minister Otto WINZER and Polish Foreign Minister Adam RAPACKI and Premier Josef CYRANKIEWICZ in Poland. Discussed European security matters and "possible new initiatives to insure and safeguard European peace and co-operation".
- January 16 to early February : "Vacation" of Soviet Zone Premier Willi STOPH in Czechoslovakia.
- January 17-18 : Visit of the three top Soviet leaders (BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, PODGORNYY) to Poland for talks with GOMULKA, CYRANKIEWICZ and Polish State Council President Edward OCHAB.
- January 18 to February 24 : Five-week "vacation" of Soviet Zone Foreign Minister WINZER. Winzer signs Outer Space Treaty January 27, appears at Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting in Warsaw February 8-10, but returns to Moscow, not to East Berlin.
- January 18-21 : Meeting of acting Soviet Zone Foreign Minister G. KOHRT and Czech Foreign Minister V. DAVID in Prague.

- January 23-26 : Good-will mission of FRG State Secretary LAHR to Hungary.
- 28-31 : Private visit of Yugoslav President TITO to the Soviet Union. Talks with BREZHNEV and other leaders.
- 31 : Announcement of establishment of diplomatic relations between FRG and Rumania.
- February 2-4 : Visit of Yugoslav President TITO with Hungarian leaders en route home from private visit to Soviet Union.
- 4-6 : Previously unannounced visit of Soviet Party leader BREZHNEV to Czechoslovakia. Talks with Czech leaders.
- 8-10 : Meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Warsaw. Rumania represented by a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Change of venue from East Berlin, several days delay apparently due to Rumanian pique over Soviet Zone polemics on FRG-Rumanian diplomatic ties. Review of "developments on the European scene since the adoption of the Bucharest declaration".
- 15-26 : Official visit of Czech Foreign Minister V. DAVID to the Soviet Union. Talks with BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, PODGORNYY and Foreign Minister GROMYKO.
- 22 : Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO sees Soviet Zone Foreign Minister WINZER on "questions of mutual interest".
- 22-23 : Visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister NIKEZIC and Tito's Secretary General to Rumania. Discussions with Rumanian Foreign Minister MANESCU of bilateral and international issues.
- 22-26 : Meeting of "Editorial Commission" of representatives of European Communist Parties to prepare for an All-European Communist Conference on European security. Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg do not attend. Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad), Czechoslovakia, designated as site for conference April 24-27.

- February 24 : Soviet Premier KOSYGIN sees Hungarian Deputy Premier APRO in Moscow. APRO, in Moscow for periodic CEMA Executive Committee meeting, was only East European Deputy Premier Kosygin received.
- 25-27 : Previously unannounced visit to Soviet Union of Polish Minister of Defence SPYCHALSKI. Talks with BREZHNEV and host, Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief GRECHKO, on "several questions of mutual interest".
- 25 : "Unofficial friendly visit" of Hungarian Party leader, Janos KADAR, Politburo member BISZKU, and Central Committee member and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs ERDELYI to the Soviet Union at CPSU invitation.
- February 28 to March 1 : Official visit of Czechoslovak Party leader NOVOTNY to Poland. Czechoslovak-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed March 1 in Warsaw.
- March 7 : "Friendly talks" between Bulgarian Foreign Minister BASHEV (en route Copenhagen-Sofia) and Hungarian Party leader KADAR in Budapest.
- March 8-9 : "Friendly and unofficial" visit of Polish Party leader GOMULKA and Premier CYRANKIEWICZ to Hungary. Talks with Hungarian Party leader KADAR, Premier Gyula KALLAI, and Party Secretary KOMOCSIN on "the current international situation and the tasks of the common struggle for peace and security in Europe".
- March 13-15 : "Unofficial friendly visit" of Bulgarian Party leader and Premier Todor ZHIVKOV, First Deputy Premier Zhivko ZHIVKOV (economic chief), and Deputy Premier Tano TSOLOV (permanent Bulgarian COMECON representative) to the Soviet Union. Talks with BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, and other officials. "European security" discussed. Agreed to conclude new Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance this year replacing 20-year Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty of 1948. (ZHIVKOV visit to Moscow had been twice postponed since beginning of March.)

- March 14-15 : Official visit of Soviet Zone Party leader ULBRICHT, Premier Willi STOPH, Politburo member HONECKER, and Foreign Minister WINZER to Poland. Talks with GOMULKA, OCHAB, CYRANKIEWICZ, and others. Polish-"GDR" Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed March 15 in Warsaw.
- March 17 : Official visit of Soviet Zone Party leader ULBRICHT, Premier Willi STOPH, Politburo member HONECKER, and Foreign Minister WINZER to Czechoslovakia. Czech-"GDR" Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed March 17 in Prague.
- March 17-18 : "Friendly" visit of Rumanian Party leader CEAUSESCU, Premier MAURER, and Party Secretary NICULESCU-MIZIL to the Soviet Union. Discussed "European security" with BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, and Party Secretary ANDROPOV (in charge of Central Committee relations with foreign parties).
- March 21 : Visit of Soviet Zone Party leader ULBRICHT and Premier STOPH to the Soviet Union. Talks with BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, PODGORNY, and others on "European security".
- March 27-28 : Visit of Italian Party leader Luigi LONGO to the Soviet Union. Talks with BREZHNEV.
- March 29 : Visit of LONGO to Paris. Talks with French Communist Party leader Waldeck ROCHET on "European security".
- March 29-30 : Visit of Yugoslavian Party Central Committee officials MIJATOVIC and SOLDIC to Rumania for talks with CEAUSESCU on "the international situation".
- March 29-30 : Visit of Soviet Zone Foreign Minister WINZER to Hungary. Talks with Hungarian Foreign Minister PETER on "European security".
- March 30 : Talks in Moscow between BREZHNEV and Czech Party Central Committee Secretary KOUCKY.
- March 31 : Visit of Luigi LONGO to Rumania. Talks with Rumanian Party leader CEAUSESCU.

- April 3-7 : Visit of Polish Party leader GOMULKA and Premier CYRANKIEWICZ to Bulgaria. Bulgarian-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed April 6, renewing the 20-year Treaty signed in 1948.
- April 6 : Meeting of Yugoslav and French Party officials in Paris. French Politbureau member Raymond GUYOT (Communist conference matters) and Yugoslav Central Committee members Krste CRVENHOVSKI and Gavriilo VUCINIC, discussed "European security" and relations between the two Parties.

SCHEDULED:

- Early April (?) : Preparatory meeting of European Communist Parties at Prague (?) as preliminary to full conference.
- April 17 : Soviet Party leader BREZHNEV and other East European leaders to attend the Soviet Zone's Seventh SED Party Congress.
- Last half of April : Visit of Bulgarian Party leader and Premier ZHIVKOV to Rumania.
- April 24-27 : Conference of European Communist Parties at Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary), Czechoslovakia.
- May (?) : Rumoured visit of Hungarian Party leader KADAR to Bulgaria.
- May (?) : Rumoured BREZHNEV visit to Rumania.

I. POLISH-"GDR" TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Text of report of the Treaty between Poland and the "GDR" signed in Warsaw on 15th March:

Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the German Democratic Republic and the Polish People's Republic:

The "GDR" and the Polish People's Republic,

declaring that both States have established good-neighbourly relations of lasting friendship, all-round co-operation and mutual aid;

guided by the endeavour further to develop and strengthen these relations on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism, in the conviction that such a development is in keeping with the vital interests of both States and serves the strengthening of the unity of the socialist community;

realising that their friendship is an essential factor designed to call a halt to the aggressive machinations of the forces of West German militarism and revanchism, and,

firmly determined to counter, on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14th May, 1955, the threat to peace emanating from these forces and to ensure the inviolability of the frontiers of both States and their territorial integrity;

in reaffirmation of their view that the implementation of the principles of the Potsdam Agreement by the "GDR" and the conclusion of the agreement on the demarcation of the established and existing German-Polish State frontier of July 1950 have become a historic turning point in the relations between the peoples of the two States;

in the jointly held view that the existence of the "GDR" constitutes an important factor for safeguarding peace and that her active peace policy and her participation in international co-operation are of essential significance for the creation of a lasting system of European security;

stating that to overcome militarism and neo-nazism is the precondition for the peaceful settlement of the German problem, and reaffirming that the future creation of a united, peace-loving and democratic German State is possible only by way of normalising relations between the two German States following agreements between the "GDR" and the West German Federal Republic under conditions which would safeguard the security of their neighbour States;

in pursuance of their efforts to develop relations between States with different social orders on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence as well as to safeguard peace and security in Europe and in the world decided to conclude this Treaty and agreed as follows:

Article 1: The high contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, mutual aid and mutual advantage and on the basis of equality of rights, respect for the sovereignty and non-interference with internal affairs of the other side, will further develop and strengthen friendship and co-operation in all spheres.

Article 2: The high contracting Parties will pursue in the future the policy of peaceful coexistence between States with different social orders, and will continue, in accordance with the aims and principles of the UN Charter, their efforts to safeguard peace and security, to reduce international tensions, to end the armaments race and to bring about disarmament, and they will counter all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Article 3: The high contracting Parties declare that the territorial integrity of both States, the inviolability of the frontier of the Polish People's Republic along the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse as well as the frontier between the "GDR" and the West German Federal Republic are of fundamental importance for European security.

Article 4: In accordance with the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14th May, 1955 the high contracting Parties will use all the means required to render impossible an aggression by the forces of West German militarism and revanchism or those of any other State or grouping of States which enter into alliance with these forces.

Article 5: In the eventuality of an armed attack by any State or grouping of States, mentioned in Article 4, or one of the high contracting Parties, the other high contracting Party, in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14th May, 1955, will render immediate assistance. In doing so the high contracting Party will act in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and will inform the Security Council immediately of the measures taken.

Article 6: The high contracting Parties regard West Berlin as a special political entity.

Article 7: The high contracting Parties proceed from the fact that a normalisation of relations between the two sovereign German States accords with the requirements of European security. The high contracting Parties will continue their efforts to bring about on the basis of the recognition of the existence of two sovereign German States a German peace settlement to serve the safeguarding of peace and security in Europe.

Article 8: On the basis of friendly co-operation and mutual advantage, in accordance with the principles of CMEA the high contracting Parties will develop and strengthen in every respect the economic and scientific-technological relations between the two States; implement in accordance with the principles of international socialist division of labour the co-ordination of the national economic plans and the co-operation of production and in this way ensure the mutual drawing-together of the national economies of the two States.

Article 9: The high contracting Parties will develop and strengthen their relations in the spheres of culture and science, particularly in education, the arts, the press, radio, television, films as well as in physical education and tourism.

Article 10: The high contracting Parties will consult each other on all important international issues which touch upon the interests of both States.

Article 11: This Treaty is being concluded for a period of 20 years. Unless one or the other of the high contracting Parties gives notice of termination 12 months prior to the ending of this period, the Treaty will remain in force for another 10 years. In the eventuality of a united peace-loving and democratic German State being created this Treaty will be re-examined.

Article 12: This Treaty requires ratification and will come into force with the exchange of the ratification instruments which will take place in Berlin in the near future. In accordance with Article 102, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations this Treaty will be registered with the UN Secretariat.

Given in Warsaw on 15th March, 1967, in two copies, in German and in Polish, both texts being equally valid.

Signed for the "GDR" by

Walter ULBRICHT
Willi STOPH

Signed for the Polish
People's Republic by

Wladyslaw GOMULKA
Edward OCHAB
Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ

II. CZECHOSLOVAK-"GDR" TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Text of report of Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the "GDR" signed in Prague on 17th March:

Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

in affirmation of the aims and principles laid down in the declaration of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Provisional Government of the "GDR" of 23rd June, 1950;

noting that the enmity fanned by German militarism and Nazism having been overcome, a lasting friendship has come into being between the peoples of both States;

guided by the endeavour to strengthen further the good-neighbourly relations and the all-round co-operation between the two States on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism, and to contribute to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist community;

in the conviction that the friendship between the "GDR", which has implemented the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the policy of the two States are contributing to the safeguarding of peace and the creation of an effective system of collective security in Europe;

firmly resolved to counter effectively the threat to peace and international security emanating from the forces of West German militarism and revanchism, and - based on the Warsaw Treaty on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance of 14th May, 1955 - to safeguard the security of both States and the inviolability of their frontiers against any attack;

noting that the overcoming of militarism and neo-Nazism is the prerequisite for the peaceful settlement of the German question and affirming that the future achievement of a unified, peace-loving and democratic German State is possible only by way of the normalisation of relations between the two German States as the result of agreements between the "GDR" and the German Federal Republic, as well as under conditions which would safeguard the security of their neighbour States;

guided by the aims and principles of the UN Charter;

have decided to conclude this Treaty and agreed for this purpose as follows:

Article 1: The high contracting Parties, in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, will deepen their friendship, develop co-operation in all spheres and render each other mutual assistance on the basis of equality of rights, respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other side.

Article 2: The high contracting Parties will, on the basis of friendly co-operation and mutual advantage, develop and strengthen the economic and scientific-technical relations, implement, in accordance with the principles of the CMEA, the co-ordination of their economic plans and co-operation in research, development and production and thereby safeguard the development and mutual drawing together of the national economies of the two States.

Article 3: The high contracting Parties will develop their relations in the sphere of culture, the arts, science, education and public health, the press, radio, film and television, physical culture and tourism.

Article 4: The high contracting Parties will encourage all-round co-operation between their social organizations with a view to promoting better mutual knowledge and to bringing the people of the two States closer to one another.

Article 5: The high contracting Parties, in accordance with the UN Charter, will furthermore contribute to the safeguarding of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world. They will continue the policy of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems and take a stand for disarmament as well as the final liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism in every shape or form.

Article 6: The high contracting Parties will consult with one another on all important international questions which touch upon the interests of the two States.

Article 7: The high contracting Parties place on record that the Munich Agreement of 29th September, 1938 came into being under threat of a war of aggression and the use of force against Czechoslovakia, that it constituted an integral part of the conspiracy of Nazi Germany against peace and a gross violation of the rules of international law as they were valid even at that time, and that this Agreement was continually invalid from the outset, with all consequences flowing therefrom.

Article 8: The high contracting Parties regard West Berlin as a special political entity.

Article 9: The high contracting Parties are of the opinion that the bringing about of a German peace settlement on the basis of the recognition of the existence of two sovereign German States and the normalisation of the relations between them corresponds to the requirements of European security.

Article 10: The high contracting Parties, in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14th May, 1955, will effectively defend the inviolability of the State frontiers of both States including the State frontiers between the two German States, and take all requisite measures to prevent an act of aggression by the forces of West German militarism and revanchism which seek to revise the results of the second world war.

In the event of an armed attack by any State or any group of States on one of the high contracting Parties, the other contracting Party will immediately render it military and other assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 14th May, 1955. At the same time, the high contracting Parties will act in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the UN Charter and immediately inform the Security Council of the measures taken by them.

Article 11: This Treaty is concluded for the duration of 20 years. Unless one of the high contracting Parties gives notice of termination 12 months prior to the expiry of this period, the Treaty will remain in force for another 10 years. In the event of a unified, peace-loving and democratic German State being brought about, the continued validity of the Treaty will be re-examined.

Article 12: This Treaty requires ratification and will come into force with the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will take place in Berlin as soon as possible. This Treaty will be registered with the Secretariat of the UN in accordance with Article 102, Section One, of the UN Charter.

Given in Prague on 17th March, 1967, in two copies, each in German and Czech, both texts being equally valid.

Signed for the "GDR" by

Walter ULBRICHT
Willi STOPH

Signed for the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic by

Antonin NOVOTNY
Jozef LENART

III. POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

Provisions of the Treaty

Text of report of Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty signed in Warsaw on 1st March.

The preamble of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between Poland and Czechoslovakia, stresses that both countries suffered aggression on the part of Nazi Germany. It said: While the German Democratic Republic has implemented the principles of the Potsdam declaration and is pursuing a policy of peace, contributing effectively to European security, the forces of West German militarism and revanchism are endangering peace. The preamble also emphasises that the Friendship Treaty of 10th March, 1947, played an important part in the development of friendly relations between the two States and that the co-operation between Czechoslovakia and Poland over the past 20 years has had good results. The Treaty itself, which is subject to ratification and which becomes valid after the exchange of the documents of ratification in Prague, has 11 Articles.

Under Article 1, the two countries pledge to strengthen their friendship, develop co-operation and mutually assist each other.

Under Article 2, 3 and 4, the two countries will co-ordinate their national economic plans, co-operate in production, culture, the arts and sciences, education, health service, press, radio, television, physical education, tourism and social organizations.

Article 5 calls for the policy of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, for continuation of efforts to ensure peace and security, for lessening international tension, halting the armaments race and concluding an agreement on disarmament.

In Article 6 the two Parties to the Treaty declare that the Munich Agreement of 29th September, 1938, was executed under the threat of aggressive war and by the use of force against Czechoslovakia, and was a part of Nazi Germany's criminal conspiracy against peace and a brutal violation of the basic principles of international law then valid, and therefore the Munich Agreement was null and void ab initio with all ensuring consequences.

Article 7 declares the inviolability of State borders now existing in Europe.

Article 8 states that both Parties to the Treaty - in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty of 14th May, 1955 - will use all necessary measures in order to prevent aggression on the part of West German militarism and revanchism, or of any country or group of countries which may join forces with them.

Article 9 says that in the event of a military attack against either Poland or Czechoslovakia by any country or group of countries mentioned in Article 8, the other Party to the Treaty will immediately provide all assistance - including military - and all support by all means at its disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Article 10 provides for mutual consultations on all major international problems affecting the two countries.

Article 11 states that the Treaty is valid for 20 years and will be prolonged for additional five-year periods, unless terminated by either part 12 months before expiration date.

The Treaty was signed by Wladyslaw GOMULKA, Edward OCHAB and Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ on behalf of Poland, and by Antonin NOVOTNY and Jozef LENART on behalf of Czechoslovakia.