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To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Attached is a summary, prepared by the Political Division, of selected Soviet and East European statements on European security. This report reflects information available at NATO through 20 February, 1970.

2. Material compiled previously on the same subject included: POLADS(70)14, dated 17 February, 1970; PO/70/42, dated 30 January, 1970; and other references listed in the latter document.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

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I. FURTHER REACTIONS TO NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING (1)1. Reactions received by Italian Representatives while presenting the NATO Declaration in capitals(a) Romania

In conversation with the Italian Charge, the Director for West European Affairs in the Romanian Foreign Office seemed rather objective in his attitude toward the NATO Declaration and less critical than other East European spokesmen. He indicated that his authorities saw in the Declaration a few positive elements susceptible of further discussion and were pleased by Western readiness to respect the principles of international law as well as Western willingness to undertake diplomatic explorations both at the bilateral and multilateral levels in order better to define the various problems for discussion.

The Romanian official pointed out that Berlin is not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany but nevertheless agreed that Berlin might play a more important role in the economic relations between East and West. He agreed with the Italian suggestion that there should be an opportunity to increase cultural relations, and not just economic and technical relations. The Romanian official pointed out that the Prague Declaration is not limitative, and he expressed satisfaction with the new Federal Government's policies toward Eastern Europe and the favourable attitude of NATO toward those policies. On the other hand, he professed a certain disillusionment with the Western tendency to postpone a conference which, according to the view of the Romanian Government, could be held at the same time as the FRG's bilateral conversations with the USSR and GDR.

(b) The Holy See

The Italian Ambassador to the Vatican met with Monsignor Casaroli, Council Secretary for Public Affairs. Speaking personally, Monsignor Casaroli took note of several points:

- (1) the remarkable modification in the positions of many of the East European countries;
- (2) the evident desire of the USSR to have a conference at any price;

(1) See PO/70/42, Section II.

- (3) the more flexible positions of Romania and Poland;
- (4) the difficulty for the Soviets in discussing an improvement of cultural relations; and
- (5) the desire of some of the smaller countries of the Warsaw Pact to intensify their relations with the West in hopes of achieving increased autonomy from Moscow.

Monsignor Casaroli said the Holy See agreed with the responsible position adopted by the NATO Council with regard to the preparation of a conference, in particular, with the need to identify subjects on which agreement would be possible. A conference must be well prepared and the USSR should not be allowed to utilize it for furthering its own particular aims. On the other hand, Monsignor Casaroli insisted on the necessity of convening a conference even if it is not possible to obtain previously all the desired guarantees.

(c) Sweden

The Assistant Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Office, Ambassador Ryding, told the Italian Ambassador that Sweden is in favour of a conference but considers that it must be carefully prepared. In Sweden's view, the Soviet Union is at the moment less interested than in the past in an early convening of a conference, and this has been reflected in recent weeks in the Soviet press. Moreover, it seems to the Swedes that the USSR is also awaiting the further development of Bonn's new Eastern policy, which is regarded in Stockholm with great interest and sympathy.

2. Other Reactions

For additional reactions to the December Ministerial Meeting, please see items 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 16 and 17.

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE - FINNISH VIEWS

3. Information obtained by Italian Authorities

The Italian Ambassador in Helsinki was told by Foreign Minister Karjalainen that Finland was considering three possible steps to relaunch its initiative for an ESC:

- (1) circulate a new memorandum summarizing responses and positions taken by various governments, especially with regard to the agenda and timing of a conference;

- (2) name a roving ambassador(1) to consult with the different governments concerned; and
 - (3) make another approach to the US Government, which seemed to show less enthusiasm than others, in order to obtain a "constructive" response.
4. Information obtained by Canadian Authorities

On the occasion of presenting his credentials on January 22, the new Canadian Ambassador in Helsinki had talks with Foreign Minister Karjalainen and President Kekkonen.

Mr. Karjalainen said that his officials were making a new assessment of the situation in the light of the recent NATO Ministerial Meeting. He thought the President might in the near future send a letter to heads of governments to whom he had addressed his first letter. This second letter would probably include some new suggestions to facilitate progress toward a first meeting.

President Kekkonen gave a somewhat clearer indication of his plans. He said that he saw value in a preliminary meeting which would bring the Ministers of both camps together for discussion. During the conversation, the Finnish President stressed that in launching its initiative, Finland was not merely acting as spokesman for Moscow but had undertaken the initiative on the basis of its own convictions.

III. SOVIET VIEWS

5. Remarks of Soviet Officials in Vienna

Visiting Vienna in January, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev and Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov gave Austrian officials the impression that the Soviet government still wanted an ESC in 1970, even though, as they claimed, the Western powers continued to raise issues which they knew were incapable of solution at the present time, instead of offering specific amendments to the Prague agenda.

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- (1) According to AFP, Mr. Ralph Enckell, representative of Finland at the O.E.C.D. in Paris, has been appointed roving Ambassador to report on progress made with regard to the possible establishment of a European security conference. Mr. Enckell will start his visits to European capitals in a few weeks time.

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6. Visit of M. Alphanand to Moscow

According to the report of the Moscow correspondent of Le Monde, M. Herve Alphanand, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had talks in Moscow during the week ending 16 January with a number of high-ranking Soviet officials. These included Messrs. Gromyko, Kozyrev, Vinogradov, and Firyubin of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, as well as Kirillin, a vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology.

According to Le Monde, the talks were held within the framework of regular Franco-Soviet consultations established by the 1966 accords. They concerned bilateral relations and also major international questions, including Europe, the Near East, Viet-Nam and China. On Europe, the Soviets made clear their desire to consider the preparation of an ESC as a matter entirely separate from other questions (such as Bonn-Moscow talks, eventual FRG-GDR talks, and interallied consultations over Berlin), and their aversion to making the convocation of a conference dependent upon progress being realized in other areas.

The Soviets assured M. Alphanand that the conference, in their conception, would not be a confrontation between blocs, and should be in the nature of a broad exchange of views between independent countries on the questions of non-use of force and European cooperation. As to timing, the Soviets seemed less insistent that the conference be convened in the first half of 1970, as originally suggested.

According to the Soviet news agency TASS, M. Alphanand before departing Moscow received an Izvestiya correspondent and replied to questions concerning his discussions with Soviet officials on the convening of an all-European conference on security and cooperation.

"We said that we welcome such a conference and its agenda", M. Alphanand was quoted as saying. "France hopes that the conference would be more successful if bilateral talks between European countries on topical problems had yielded good results already now. This would create a favourable atmosphere for the success of the conference."

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7. Misasi-Kosygin Conversation

While in Moscow negotiating a new bilateral trade agreement, 16-19 January, Italian Foreign Trade Minister Misasi was received by Premier Kosygin. Kosygin made two points concerning an ESC:

- (a) he emphasised the importance of starting an improvement of economic relations in Europe and, in that context, suggested the possibility of joint ventures of business concerns from capitalist Western states with Soviet state enterprises for the purpose of developing Siberian resources, particularly in the field of oil and energy;
- (b) he suggested the possibility of having not only one but a series of conferences and the eventual creation of some standing group or committee for the study of particular questions between conferences.

8. De Ranitz-Kozyrev Conversation

Discussions took place in Moscow from January 27-30, 1970, between a Netherlands Delegation, headed by Mr. De Ranitz, Director-General for Political Affairs, and a Soviet Delegation, led by Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev.

Kozyrev admitted that there was an interdependence between various international problems, Moscow felt, however, that problems such as disarmament, SALT, Middle East and European security each had their own importance and had to be dealt with as separate problems. This held particularly true for the problem of European security, basically a question of European peoples. (Kozyrev praised the positive attitude of the Netherlands Government vis-a-vis an ESC.) Now the time had come to act. The Warsaw Pact countries had proposed concrete agenda items. About the first agenda item - the renunciation of force - Kozyrev pointed out that one could indeed say that the UN Charter dealt already with this matter: acceptance of this point however would strengthen this obligation in Europe and bring about a sort of prolongation of the UN Charter. Moreover the two German states and Switzerland had never signed the UN Charter.

Mr. De Ranitz made clear that the Netherlands were less in need of a declaration regarding the renunciation of force, to be issued by the Federal Republic. Other countries might have a different opinion on this subject and therefore the Netherlands are in favour of such negotiations between Bonn and Moscow, Warsaw and Pankow.

These negotiations however would have to run parallel with the preparations for an ESC, according to Mr. De Ranitz. Kozyrev, however, could not agree to this and pointed out that there was no connection whatsoever between these two subjects; success on the force renunciation negotiations would be welcome, but if such were not the case, this should not form an obstacle to bringing about a European security conference. Kozyrev continued that one should not, however, put items on the agenda which would go far beyond the limits of an ESC, such as BFR and the German question. BFR could not be treated as an isolated disarmament feature, since it was closely connected with the nuclear weapons problem and should be dealt with in the CCD.

After Mr. De Ranitz on his part had pointed out that the CCD, considering its composition was not suited to deal with BFR, Mr. Kozyrev stated that he did not understand why certain Western countries advocated this issue with such emphasis since from the December NATO Declaration it was clear that not all NATO allies were in favour of it. Mr. De Ranitz reciprocated that there also exist differences of opinion concerning the agenda among the Warsaw Pact countries; Winiewicz had himself proposed in August 1969 the inclusion in the agenda of "a certain control and reduction of armaments in Europe". Why had Warsaw withdrawn her proposal? Kozyrev only replied that various suggestions were made by the Warsaw Pact countries and finally they had all agreed on the 2 well-known agenda items, laid down in the Prague Declaration of October 31.

With respect to the second agenda item proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries, Kozyrev pointed out that this item implies non-discrimination and could as such stimulate economic and political cooperation, promote rapprochement and bring about international division of labour. In reply to this Mr. De Ranitz made clear that the Netherlands had no major objections against this agenda item, provided that one should take into account the existing economic structure in various countries like ours, which imposes certain restrictions on the governments concerned as far as their trade and economic relations with third countries are concerned.

In the course of the discussion Mr. De Ranitz brought up the necessity to first reach agreement on the interpretation of the political nomenclature and asked in this respect for clarification of the final paragraph of the Warsaw Pact document on renunciation of force which says "in no case shall this apply"(1). Kozyrev answered that the treaty obligations, which the various countries

(1) See POLADS(69)80, p.5, paragraph (f)

had entered into either bilaterally or multilaterally, for instance in the framework of NATO or Warsaw Pact, should be safeguarded as long as these treaties were not inconsistent with the UN Charter. Mr. Kozyrev's reaction to the Netherlands formulation of non-intervention was rather categorical: he stated that he was under the impression that Mr. De Ranitz had in this context implicitly referred to the Czech affair, which was a matter of concern between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia only. Kozyrev did not answer Mr. De Ranitz's specific question about the Soviet interpretation of non-interference.

Mr. De Ranitz also called on Gromyko. During this conversation the European security conference was again the main topic. Mr. De Ranitz pointed out that, although we were in favour of an ESC, there still existed differences between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union regarding the agenda. Mr. De Ranitz repeated the Netherlands desiderata, i.e. inclusion of BFR and German question in the agenda. Mr. Gromyko replied that under the present circumstances the two agenda items proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries would guarantee a successful European conference and inclusion of BFR and German question would be inopportune. Perhaps one could decide at a later stage to deal with BFR during a next European security conference, in the event that a second European security conference should take place.

9. Comments of the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Ottawa

On January 28, the Soviet Charge d'affaires called on officials of the Department of External Affairs, at his own request, for a further talk on European security. He began by saying that the Canadian view on an all-European Conference had been examined, and it was understood that Canada took a positive attitude, wishing to continue the exchange which was now underway and to reconcile points of view. The USSR shared the Canadian desire to ensure the success of a conference which would remove tensions in Europe and establish a better atmosphere in general. It appeared to the Soviet authorities, however, that Canada had additional considerations to suggest for the agenda and did not agree to the holding of a conference in the first half of 1970. Furthermore, the Charge d'affaires noted, Canada took the view that the holding of a conference should be dependent upon the progress of negotiations on BFR, Germany and Berlin, and problems of the environment. This only made preparations for a conference more difficult, delayed it and indeed doomed it to failure in advance. Preparations would turn into endless discussions.

The Charge d'affaires recalled that he had already explained why it was impossible "to bind up" a conference with the German question and Berlin; a preliminary discussion of these issues would make the situation more difficult. Both the German problem and West Berlin were special issues involving the special responsibility of the Allied Powers who had met at Potsdam.

As for BFR, the Charge d'affaires said, we had to take into account present realities. A discussion of BFR would involve other more important disarmament problems including the question of nuclear weapons. To discuss BFR as a preliminary matter would complicate the preparation of a conference and would undermine the prospects for a fruitful outcome for a conference. He added that force reductions did not relate directly to European neutrals who should, however, play an active part in the preparation of a conference.

A conference should not depend on a preliminary discussion of environmental questions. These would be covered by the second item in the proposed agenda set forth in the Prague Declaration.

The Soviet Charge d'affaires observed that the various bilateral talks now taking place, e.g. SALT, the Soviet/FRG talks and the FRG/GDR talks, were very delicate negotiations and very important, and had been welcomed as such by Canada. It was impossible to bind up these negotiations, which might go on for a long time, with the holding of a conference.

The Charge d'affaires said that in preparing for a conference the focus of concentration should be on "actual and realistic questions", i.e. those which could be solved and whose resolution would lead to a relaxation of tensions in Europe and to a subsequent consideration of other problems related to security and cooperation. This was in the common interest of all European states, and others. A majority of European states already thought that a conference should tackle matters on which broad understanding could be reached. The proposals made by the socialist states were wide enough for a discussion of the main problem - ensuring European security - and concrete enough to provide for the taking of certain decisions which would contribute to that goal. The Soviet Charge urged Canada to take a practical approach along these lines and said once more that at a conference there would be a free and open discussion of all ideas. Concluding his expose, the Soviet Charge d'affaires emphasised that the socialist states wished to establish foundations for European security and cooperation.

10. Remarks of Soviet Ambassador in Washington

During a discussion with Secretary of State Rogers on 30 January, 1970, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin took the well-known line that the Warsaw Pact proposals were advanced with the thought in mind that an agreement could be reached on them and that this would contribute to an easing of tensions in Europe. It did not seem advisable to take up such subjects as Germany and force reductions since these could not be resolved at one conference. In any event, Germany was a topic which should be discussed under the terms of the Potsdam agreement. He said that the Soviet side would be interested in considering any concrete agenda items the US would care to advance, with the understanding of course that each side would be discussing such items with their respective allies. Dobrynin was handed a copy of the NATO Communique and Declaration.

In a separate conversation with the Belgian Ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin repeated the known objections of the Soviet Union to the subject of MBFR appearing on the agenda of an ESC. Dobrynin expressed doubts concerning the seriousness of this proposal, alleging that, manifestly, the NATO studies on this question are not sufficiently advanced to be usefully discussed.

11. Linkage of ESC to UN Anniversary

Speaking to the Belgian Minister Counsellor, the Soviet Counsellor in London said he hoped an ESC could be held soon and preferably this year. This would be important because 1970 is the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations. (Political Division comment: Of at least equal importance to the Soviet Union is the fact that 1970 is also the centennial of Lenin's birth.)

IV. EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS12. Luns-Bashev Conversation

During the visit of Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns, 18-22 January, 1970, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev said the time is ripe for an ESC. Bulgaria agreed that a conference must be well prepared, but it should not be postponed indefinitely. The Prague proposals offer a sound basis for the agenda. In later conferences, other subjects could be broached. Bashev thought the NATO documents issued at the December Ministerial Meeting were of a declaratory nature and contained little of substance.

Concerning the final paragraph of the Warsaw Pact draft document on non-use of force, Bashev said it was a well-known fact that the Warsaw Pact member states are the strongest defenders of national independence and sovereignty, but they cannot permit the socialist structure to be undermined. Every action in that direction must meet with a reaction from the socialist camp. The Brezhnev Doctrine does not exist, it is a figment of the Western imagination. One might better speak of a "Rusk Doctrine". (Bashev became rather emotional during this part of the conversation.)

Bashev indicated that he saw a clear relationship between the participation of the US in an ESC and the participation of the GDR on a basis of equality. Concerning European economic cooperation, Bashev did not see an expansion of the Common Market as contributing to European security or substituting for the Warsaw Pact proposal on European cooperation. Bulgaria would like to have periodic consultations with high officials of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, similar to those which Bashev said were already taking place with France, Belgium and Austria.

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13. Bulgarian-Dutch Communiqué

The joint communiqué issued following the official visit to Bulgaria of Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns, 18-22 January, 1970, contained the following passages:

... During their talks the two ministers discussed several important international questions and paid special attention to the problem of strengthening peace and security in Europe. Both sides engaged in a detailed exchange of opinions on the possibility of convening a conference devoted to European security, a conference which would play a positive role for an alignment of positions and for coordinating the efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security in Europe and developing cooperation among European states. ...

... Minister Luns informed Minister Bashev on the situation in West Europe, and more specifically on political and economic developments within the Common Market. This information was received with great interest. ...

... The two ministers agreed to organize periodic consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs, at the level of responsible officials.

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14. Stoessel-Winiewicz Conversation

Mr. Winiewicz, the Polish representative at the 26-27 January meeting in Sofia of deputy foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact member states, told the US Ambassador that the meeting was focussed exclusively on the ESC, with emphasis on "comparing notes" regarding Western moves and attitudes on this subject. Winiewicz noted that this concern about analysis of Western positions was a relatively new development in Warsaw Pact consultations, motivated in part by the increasing activity and complexities in the European political scene.

Winiewicz said flatly that "not one word" had been said about Albania at the Sofia meeting. Asked about future developments regarding an ESC, Winiewicz avoided any discussion of a timetable. Perhaps reflecting the deliberations in Sofia, he said there was more work which needed to be done in the direction of institutionalizing political cooperation in Europe as well as in promoting East-West economic coordination. He mentioned the possibility of establishing a permanent secretariat for this purpose. Winiewicz stated several times that the Prague proposals were "too declarative" and needed more precision. The vice minister said Poland had ideas along these lines and would push them. At the same time, he was silent about earlier Polish interest in regional disarmament schemes.

The US Ambassador commented that the net effect of Winiewicz's remarks was to play down the pressures for early convocation of an ESC and highlight the possibility of some form of institutionalizing on-going political consultations.

15. Additional remarks by Winiewicz concerning Sofia Meeting

Mr. Winiewicz expressed satisfaction to the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw over the results of the Sofia meeting of Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers, 26-27 January, 1970. The participants had attempted to coordinate their efforts on behalf of an ESC. Some delegations tried to suggest the possibility of enlarging the agenda, and Winiewicz implied that the Poles had tried to introduce some of their own proposals. He indicated that there might possibly be further meetings of the vice ministers to coordinate preparations for an ESC. He also alluded to the possibility of more than one European conference being held, and the possibility consequently to discuss other items in addition to those proposed by the Warsaw Pact for the agenda of the first conference.

Mr. Winiewicz told French representatives in Warsaw, as he did the US and Italian Ambassadors, that the Sofia meeting of deputy foreign ministers had the principal object of taking stock, among allies, concerning an ESC. It was decided, Winiewicz said, to stick to the two points of the Prague agenda (non-use of force and European cooperation), and there would therefore not be an enlargement of the agenda as "certain" of the participants would have wished. In the view of the French authorities, this indication confirms that, in the present state of affairs, the Polish draft document(1) concerning partial and localised disarmament measures has been put aside.

From other sources, the French authorities have indications that the Poles have received a certain amount of support from the Hungarians for their proposals, and that the Romanians are not indifferent. It is assumed in Warsaw, according to the French Embassy there, that the principal opposition to the Polish proposals has come from the Soviets; the latter do not intend to allow a discussion to begin which could bring into question the presence of their troops on the territory of their allies.

16. Other Accounts of Sofia Meeting

Information gathered by the Greek Charge in Sofia concerning the January meeting there is consistent with the account given by Winiewicz. The Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers engaged in a process of consultation. No decisions were taken concerning either possible next steps or the time and place of further consultations. Albania was not discussed. There was a general discussion of ways of promoting an ESC, taking into account the implications of the Declaration issued by the NATO Ministers in December.

A Czechoslovak official who was present at the Sofia meeting told French representatives in Prague that all the participants in that meeting were agreed to admit that an ESC could not be held in 1970. The source personally was rather pessimistic, noting that the Warsaw Pact deputy foreign ministers had not devised any new initiatives which would serve to give the ESC proposal new impetus. He said that the GDR, without excluding the possibility of a conference, sought to delay its convening as much as possible, being convinced that time was working on the GDR's behalf.

(1) See PO/69/506, items 8, 11 and 12 of Annex I; also Annex II

As for Poland, the Czechoslovak official had the impression that, not only did the bilateral talks with the FRG take first place among Polish priorities, but that also the hope of obtaining economic advantages from Bonn did not lead the Poles to wish to see a conference held which in the course of events could lead to dividing the profit with other socialist countries. On the other hand, it seemed to the Czechoslovak official that the Soviets were really desirous of obtaining the convening of an ESC, the reason being, in his opinion, that in the three-cornered manoeuvring between Moscow, Washington and Peking, it was important for the Soviet Union to be assured of a recognized status quo in Europe.

17. Comments by Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister

In a conversation with the German Ambassador, Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu explained the position of his government by pointing out that it did not believe that one should plan immediately for a main conference, but that there should rather be a number of preliminary conferences first, before a main conference should take place. His government was aware that this required a long time. It also felt that the main conference could later become an institution which should meet permanently similar to the Organization of American States or the Organization of African Unity.

The calling of the conference should not be made dependent on agenda problems, and therefore the preliminary conferences should not already be burdened with the main problems. This is why the socialist countries initially had only suggested two subjects in their Prague Declaration, i.e.

- renunciation of force;
- economic cooperation in Europe.

They hoped that other countries would also make concrete proposals. He thought that the Prague proposals had not been studied closely enough by the Western side. For example, as a counter-proposal, reference had been made to the NATO Declaration of Reykjavik, and talks had been demanded on mutual reduction of forces. They felt, however, that the conditions for this did not yet exist. One could safely expect that the great powers were not in agreement with this. Consequently, why were such proposals made? He said that they suspected that such proposals were being put forward to sabotage the idea of a European security conference. If the proposal for a discussion on force renunciation was accepted, this would mean that the present military strengths could be frozen for the time being. Once this aim had been reached the actual reduction of forces could be envisaged.

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18. Rumanian-Yugoslav Communique

The communique issued following the official visit to Yugoslavia of Rumanian Premier Maurer, 12-16 January, 1970, contained the following passages:

... Appreciating as positive the ever powerful assertion of the process of detente and understanding in Europe, the two heads of government spotlighted the necessity for all European states to more powerfully act toward expanded mutual, bilateral, and multi-lateral cooperation under most varied forms, considering that this represents an efficient path for rapprochement, for strengthening trust, and for establishing conditions favouring a lasting peace in Europe. To this end, an important role is incumbent on the UN Economic Commission for Europe. ...

... Expressing their support for the convening of an all-European conference, the two sides emphasised that the achievement of European security is a process requiring persevering, concrete efforts and systematic and convergent actions of all states on the continent, big and small, and of all responsible factors. The two sides also stressed that European security requires a system of clear commitments from all states, as well as concrete measures, that should provide to each and every state the full guarantee that it is protected against any danger of aggression or other acts using force or threats of force and should ensure its peaceful advancement in a climate of detente, understanding, and cooperation.

... The sides pointed out that the achievement of regional understandings, the creation of denuclearized zones included, would contribute to promoting peace and security both in Europe and throughout the world. They considered that the establishment of good neighbourhood relations and of understanding among states in the Balkan area, following efforts made by all countries of that region, and the expansion of economic, technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation among these states would be conducive to transformation of the Balkan area into a zone of peace and peaceful collaboration that would represent an important contribution to general efforts for strengthening peace and security.

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19. Comments by Yugoslav Officials

The Yugoslav news agency TANYUG carried a despatch on 17 January, setting forth the position adopted by the Yugoslav delegation at the Moscow meeting of 28 European Communist and

Workers' Parties, 14-15 January, 1970. (Please refer to the last item in PO/70/42, dated 30 January. See also letter circulated 29 January by the German Delegation.)

Norwegian diplomats in Moscow were told by a Yugoslav source that the Yugoslavs were invited to the Moscow meeting only one week in advance. They were criticized, though not by name, for the position they adopted. The Yugoslavs are nevertheless willing to participate in such meetings provided the independence of parties is respected.

A Foreign Ministry official in Belgrade confirmed to the Netherlands Ambassador that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was invited to the Moscow meeting on very short notice. The Yugoslav communists decided to attend because they wish to be involved in everything having to do with European security and cooperation. According to the Foreign Ministry official, there was general support at the Moscow meeting for the idea of a "Congress of European Peoples" (CEP) with the participation of non-communist elements. However, no decisions on the time and place of such a congress were adopted. The official reaffirmed the Yugoslav impression that there was now less Soviet interest in an ESC. Propaganda on the subject could be expected to continue, but the Soviets were becoming increasingly preoccupied with their bilateral negotiations, including those with the US and China, according to this Yugoslav source.

V. STATUS OF INDEPENDENT POLISH INITIATIVES

20. Status of Polish Proposals

Early in February, French representatives in Warsaw were told by Polish officials that Poland had had to abandon her idea of a zone with special status, and that this situation would doubtless last for a long time. The explanations given by these officials left no doubt that the objections came from the Soviets. The Poles continue to hold to their conception of a limitation or a freeze on nuclear armaments but there is no longer any question of a Polish proposal to that effect. The same officials indicated that before any new proposal on this subject could be made, one would have to wait until the NPT had entered into force and been ratified in particular by certain countries; a verification agreement had been concluded between the IAEA and EURATOM; and other conditions, which were not specified, had also been fulfilled. The Polish officials made it clear that when all these conditions had been met, their eventual proposal would concern only nuclear weapons and that they were unfavourable toward the examination of any plan dealing with conventional disarmament and reduction of troops, such as MBFR.

21. Outline of New Polish Draft Proposal

To a German representative in Warsaw, Mr. Winiewicz dealt in detail with the question of a European security conference. He emphasized that this idea had originated in Poland and described the developments from 1964 to 1970. His interpretation of the Prague agenda did not produce any new aspects. He stated that if only two subjects - force renunciation and economic-scientific cooperation - had been raised, this was done to avoid any controversial questions. The Polish Government foresaw a series of conferences, perhaps even the institutionalization of such meetings and did not exclude the possibility of creating a permanent secretariat. Moreover, there should be a possibility for regional organizations under Article 52 of the UN Charter to be put forward for discussion as elements of a European order.

In pursuance of Poland's first initiative for a European security conference, the Polish Government was preparing a draft for an all-European organization. The proposed agreement comprised three parts:

First part - General political and legal principles for European security. A conciliation procedure as a means to settle controversies. Respect of the status of neutral and non-committed nations such as Yugoslavia and Spain.

Second part - Declaration on regional disarmament, with particular urgency given to the nuclear field. A condition for this was the coming into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, the provisions of the Rapacki plan which had not been included in the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be brought up in this declaration.

Third part - This was to deal with economic cooperation with the aim to restore the economic unity of Europe which was now divided into three groups: EEC, EFTA and COMECON.

For the drafting of an agreement on an all-European organization, three committees should be established, within the framework of a European security conference; these Committees would have the task to work out the details based on the provisions mentioned before.

Poland's plans went further than the Prague proposals. Poland did not wish to come forward with her draft for the time being. These ideas also still had to be discussed with Poland's allies.