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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
21st August, 1970

NATO CONFIDENTIAL  
PO/70/388

To: Permanent Representatives

From: Acting Secretary General

COMMENTS ON THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF  
WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES

Attached is a summary prepared by the Political Division of comments concerning the Budapest Documents made by representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states.

2. For analysis of the Budapest Documents themselves, please see C-M(70)33 dated 27th July 1970.

(Signed) Osman OLCAY

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

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I. THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS(1)

1. Description of Documents

The so-called "Budapest Documents" (not to be confused with the "Budapest Appeal" issued on March 17, 1969) were adopted at a conference of Foreign Ministers of member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, held in Budapest on June 21-22, 1970. The documents consist of three items:

- (a) the Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting;
- (b) a "Memorandum" on questions concerning the holding of an all-European conference; and
- (c) a paper - in effect a draft resolution - entitled "Essential Contents of the Document on the Expansion of Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical and Cultural Relations, Based on the Principles of Equality, Aimed at a Promotion of Political Cooperation Among the States of Europe".

2. Distribution of Documents

The Budapest Documents were transmitted through diplomatic channels to all the member governments of NATO. It is presumed that they were similarly distributed to all other states deemed to be concerned with the holding of an all-European conference. The Communiqué and the Memorandum, but not the draft resolution, were published by the Soviet and other official news services.

3. Content of Documents

Following discussion in the Senior Political Committee, and drawing upon national contributions and a draft analysis prepared by the International Secretariat, the Chairman of the Senior Political Committee prepared a report, C-M(70)33, entitled "Analysis and Questions Relating to the 1970 Budapest Documents of the Warsaw Pact". The Council took note of this report at its meeting of July 29, 1970.

Briefly, the report concluded that certain aspects of the Budapest Documents require clarification, and suggested that this might usefully be sought by representatives of member

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- (1) Working texts of the Budapest Documents, revised and corrected where necessary, have been distributed to the members of the Political Committee by the Chairman.

countries in their continuing exploratory conversations with officials of Warsaw Pact countries. The ensuing sections of this paper summarize the results of these conversations, insofar as they have been made known to the International Secretariat, through 13 August, 1970.

## II. SOVIET VIEWS

### 1. Basic Soviet Presentation

The Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Dobrynin, called at his initiative on Secretary of State Rogers on July 14 and made a presentation on instructions from his Government(1). At almost exactly the same time, the Soviet Ambassador in Reykjavik was making a nearly identical presentation(2). Indeed, apart from some minor omissions and discrepancies in translation, the two statements are so similar as to make it seem almost certain that they were excerpted from the same circular instruction from Moscow. This seems likewise to have been the case with respect to the presentations made by Ambassador Yegorichev in Copenhagen on July 13 (3); the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels on July 16 (4); Ambassador Ryzhov in Rome on July 17 (5); Ambassador Tsarapkin in Bonn on July 22 (6); and the Soviet Ambassador in London on July 23 (7).

The standard Soviet presentation, as delivered by the above-named ambassadors, is quite lengthy. For the most part, the language is hortative or merely repetitive of the material contained in the Warsaw Pact Memorandum itself. However, there are some significant emphases, indicative of points which the Soviet Government evidently feels need to be stressed.

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- (1) A copy of Ambassador Dobrynin's statement was circulated as an enclosure to a letter of the US Permanent Representative dated July 17, 1970.
  - (2) A copy of the Soviet Ambassador's presentation was made available by the Icelandic Delegation on 14 July, 1970.
  - (3) See letter of the Danish Acting Permanent Representative dated July 16, 1970.
  - (4) Information provided by the Belgian Delegation on 23 July 1970.
  - (5) See letter of the Italian Permanent Representative dated 30 July 1970.
  - (6) SITCEN Document SM(70)118, dated 31 July, 1970.
  - (7) See letter of the UK Acting Permanent Representative dated 28 July 1970.

(a) Preparations

The Soviet presentation expresses a distinct preference for having the preparatory work for the Conference organized through ambassadors of interested states in a neutral capital, probably Helsinki. It urges that these preparations should start as soon as possible, and several ambassadors added that it would be desirable if the Conference could take place in the first half of 1971.

(b) No Connection with Negotiations Underway

Whereas the Memorandum says merely that an "understanding" exists that the holding of the conference should not be made dependent on any preliminary conditions, several of the Soviet Ambassadors were rather more explicit. As they put it, the Socialist countries, now as before, oppose any preconditions for the convening of a conference as well as connecting it with progress at other negotiations now underway.

(c) Nature of the Proposed "Body"

Another point emphasized in the Soviet presentation is the fact that the "body" suggested in the Memorandum would be created not before the all-European Conference and not in lieu thereof, but at the Conference itself, as a result of its work. Otherwise, the Soviet presentation sheds little light on the composition of the proposed body, its role, or method of operation. However, the statement that decisions in such a body would be adopted "as is customary in international practice, i.e., by agreement of its participants" could be interpreted to mean that the Soviets have in mind only unanimous decisions, thus giving themselves an automatic veto over all actions contemplated by the proposed body.

(d) Forum for Discussion of Force Reductions

The Soviet presentation is careful to point out that the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states is one which could be discussed not only in a body proposed for creation at the All-European Conference, but also in any other manner acceptable to interested states, for example, outside of the framework of the Conference. To this Ambassador Dobrynin added: "Such an approach opens wide possibilities in selecting appropriate methods of discussing this question and takes into account the experience that has already been accumulated in considering outstanding problems of this kind, including experience gained between the USSR and the US." From the above formulation, and particularly the allusion (also made by Ambassador Tsarapkin) to the "experience" already gained, it could be inferred that the USSR, while wishing to seem responsive to those countries which have insisted that

force reductions be discussed in connection with a European conference, is nevertheless resolved to keep open, at least for the time being, its other options. These include the option of negotiating bilaterally with the United States, as in SALT, as well as the option of referring the entire question to the CCD in Geneva.

2. Other Soviet Comments

In addition to the basic presentation made on instructions by the Soviet Ambassadors, a number of additional comments were recorded which illustrate certain aspects of Soviet thinking concerning the subject matter of the Budapest Documents. Since these comments have a less formal character, and may in some cases be in the nature of personal observations, they have been summarized here under a separate heading.

(a) Procedure for Discussing Force Reductions

In a conversation(1) with the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow on June 22, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev asked a number of probing questions concerning Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). He acknowledged that the Soviet attitude toward MBFR was cool, and said that he simply wanted to clarify the NATO view. Were the NATO countries making progress in talks on MBFR an additional condition for holding an ESC? The conversation did not touch on the Budapest Documents, since these had not yet been released, but Kozyrev must certainly have been aware of the forthcoming Warsaw Pact proposal to discuss reduction of foreign armed forces separately from an all-European Conference.

In a conversation(1) between the Soviet Ambassador in a NATO country and the Canadian Ambassador, the Soviet Ambassador said that the Warsaw Pact had suspected the MBFR proposal of being a tactical manoeuvre to put another obstacle in the path of progress toward an eventual ESC. Unlike Kozyrev however, the Soviet Ambassador professed to regard it as an advance that the NATO countries were now presenting MBFR as a separate initiative related to ESC only in the very general sense that a positive response to the proposal would help improve the atmosphere for the holding of an eventual conference.

(b) Meaning of "Foreign Armed Forces"

In his conversation with the Canadian Ambassador (see previous paragraph), the Soviet Ambassador equated "foreign" forces with "stationed" forces. He said it was unrealistic to think NATO countries were afraid of Polish or Czech or East German forces. What they were afraid of were Soviet forces deployed in central Europe. The same was true of US forces as far as the Warsaw Pact was concerned. That is why the Warsaw Pact countries had opted for discussing reduction of foreign (i.e. stationed) forces only, as a first step.

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(1) Attachment to letter dated July 9, 1970, from the Canadian Delegation.

In a conversation(1) with the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Novikov, on his initiative, made clear that the question of the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territories of European states should be dealt with in a comprehensive way, including all the existing cases. In this connection, Mr. Novikov mentioned the US-Spanish agreements and the presence of British forces in Cyprus. Mr. Novikov did not specify whether reductions should include both conventional and nuclear forces, although he stressed that the United States has 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe.

(c) Preoccupation with the Question of Balance

In the conversation previously cited, the Soviet Ambassador in a NATO country told the Canadian Ambassador that the Soviets still have very great difficulty with the concept of balance. It was difficult even to balance divisions against divisions because divisions were of varying size and their armament and equipment could be very different. The Soviet Ambassador argued that defining balance in any MBFR talks might well turn out to be more difficult than what the Soviets were currently discussing with the Americans in Vienna.

Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Novikov explained to the Italian Ambassador that the Budapest Documents do not include the word "balanced" with regard to the reduction of forces, since, he said, it would be impossible to establish agreed parameters in order to define the respective forces and that "a discussion on this subject might last indefinitely." Mr. Novikov then pointed out another aspect of the problem of balance by saying that the question of balanced force reductions in Europe could not be discussed in a European conference where, as he put it, the capitalistic countries would have the majority.

In Bonn, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin raised the question of balance in still another dimension. He said that, with respect to the reduction of foreign forces, the preservation of the balance was, of course, important, but no exxagerated demands should be put forward in this context. Thus, one could not expect that the Soviet Government would take seriously an offer for a reduction of her own forces by 100,000 men while NATO only reduced theirs by 20,000 men. The "organ" proposed in the Budapest Documents would offer the possibility to all sides for an open explanation of their views. However, said Mr. Tsarapkin, this question was not yet ripe for solution.

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(1) Attachment to letter from the Italian Delegation dated July 6, 1970

(d) Exchanges of Information and Ideas

At least two Soviet Ambassadors reacted with reserve to the suggestion, contained in paragraph 16(b) of the NATO Rome Communiqué, for freer movement of people, ideas and information in the context of security and cooperation in Europe.

In Brussels, the Soviet Ambassador noted his government's willingness to deal at an eventual European Conference with cultural relations and, under the same heading, with problems of the human environment. At the same time, he said, the USSR does not see very clearly what "certain states" refer to in suggesting the free circulation of people, ideas and information. According to the Soviet view, continued the Ambassador, such exchanges are conducted within the framework of economic, scientific and cultural relations in a form acceptable to each state.

Ambassador Tsarapkin in Bonn expressed the same thought. As far as the exchange of information and ideas was concerned, he said, the Soviet view was that the forms and the framework which each state had created should be respected. He could not imagine any other approach. Time would show whether changes would be possible later through an intensification of relations.

III. OTHER WARSAW PACT COMMENTS

1. Polish Views

The Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw called on Deputy Foreign Minister Wolniak on June 25, 1970(1). Wolniak severely criticized the MBFR proposal contained in the NATO Rome Communiqué and Declaration, but did not comment on the Budapest Documents issued by the Warsaw Pact.

On June 29, the Norwegian Ambassador in Warsaw had a talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Willman(2). When asked why the Budapest Documents spoke only about reductions in foreign armed forces, Willman said that this was so because France had not signed the Rome Declaration and therefore one could not discuss reductions of both national and foreign forces

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- (1) Attachment to letter of the Canadian Delegation dated July 9, 1970.
- (2) Statement by the Norwegian Representative in the Political Committee on July 14, 1970.



as proposed by the countries participating in NATO's integrated defense programme. Mr. Willman said the words "mutual" and "balanced" had been omitted on purpose because they touched upon a controversial problem. From certain NATO quarters there had been advanced proposals concerning force reductions that were far from being balanced, weighing heavily in favour of NATO. The Rome Declaration therefore lacked in realism. Discussions of the withdrawal of foreign forces could, however, constitute an opening in this field.

Mr. Willman further said that the NATO proposal to include the question of freer movement of persons, ideas and information was unrealistic. He did not in principle exclude the possibility of intensifying such exchanges, but meant one had to go by the way of further cultural, economic, technical and scientific cooperation.

Mr. Willman said that, while the ongoing bilateral talks would be helpful, he did not feel that progress in these talks should be a condition either to calling a conference or to proceeding with the multilateral preparatory work. In this connection, he said that the "troika" idea had been abandoned, and that the Polish Government now favoured the Belgian idea of a "salon d'Ambassadeurs", preferably in Helsinki.

During the visit of Foreign Minister Harmel, 27-29 July(1) Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski indicated that he hoped the informal meeting of ambassadors could take place in October or November, preferably in Helsinki. The Polish side strongly criticized the terms of the Rome Communiqué according to which a CES could only take place if progress were apparent in the various bilateral talks being conducted by the FRG as well as in the four-power talks on Berlin. Privately, however, the Poles hinted that the USSR was prepared to be flexible and might even make some gesture concerning Berlin.

The Polish side maintained that only the Warsaw Pact proposals for withdrawal of foreign forces are practical and feasible at the present time. Moreover, Poland feels that the resolution of the SALT negotiations and the full realisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be needed to remove the remaining obstacles to further progress in disarmament.

Poland continues to work on a draft treaty for European security and will make it public at the opportune moment.

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(1) Attachment to letter of the Belgian Delegation dated 12 August, 1970.

2. Czechoslovak Views

Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Busniak visited Oslo, 2-4 July 1970(1). Mr. Busniak acknowledged that the idea of a "troika" was "practically out", as were the various ideas of a preparatory group of from five to ten states. Mr. Busniak therefore favoured a meeting of diplomatic representatives of the interested states in a neutral European city, e.g. Helsinki or Geneva, hopefully within two or three months.

Mr. Busniak's comments on the substance of the Budapest Documents, including the question of force reductions, were consistent with those made by Soviet and Polish spokesmen. Likewise, when asked why the NATO proposal regarding free movement of people and information was not picked up by the Warsaw Pact countries, Mr. Busniak said that these questions could be considered within the framework of cultural relations, broadly conceived. One had to take into account, however, that some countries had used cultural relations to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Busniak confirmed that the confidential draft document on the renunciation of force, circulated after the Prague meeting, was still retained as part of the Prague proposals. According to his explanation, no new version had been presented because the Warsaw Pact had not discerned any wish on the part of NATO countries to extend or modify it, as had been the case with the other draft document, on cooperation among European states.

3. Hungarian Views

The Hungarian Ambassador in London called at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 26 June to hand over the Budapest documents(2). His presentation was along the same lines as that of the Soviet Ambassador.

East European representatives at the CCD in Geneva mentioned privately to a representative of a NATO country(3) that the suggestion concerning reductions of foreign forces was inserted into the Budapest Documents upon an initiative of the Hungarians. Allegedly, the Soviets had at first been

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- (1) Statement by the Norwegian Representative in the Senior Political Committee on 6 July, 1970.
  - (2) Letter of the UK Permanent Representative dated 29 June, 1970.
  - (3) International Staff Memorandum (DS/70/137) to the ASG(PA) dated 10 July, 1970.

very reluctant on this point but had finally accepted the Hungarian proposal. Polish and Rumanian officials told the NATO representative that they were glad the Hungarians had taken the lead and that they had supported them.

Another indication of a particular Hungarian interest in this aspect was provided by Mr. Bartha, head of the Political Division in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(1). In a conversation with the Head of the FRG Trade Mission on July 22, Mr. Bartha said that Hungary was convinced that force reductions would have to be a major subject of the Conference. The Hungarian Government thought it would be important and useful for the first Conference to proceed at once to establish sub-committees and technical groups as had been the case during the SALT talks in Vienna. These sub-committees and technical groups would have to work out initial disarmament proposals and submit them to the conference for decision. In this way, an acceleration and favourable development of the discussions at the main conference itself could be achieved.

In conversations with Ambassador Forthomme of Belgium(2), Hungarian officials indicated considerable flexibility with regard to MBFR. They hoped the West would insist on the disarmament aspect, since their own scope for initiative was limited.

#### 4. Rumanian Views

The Rumanian Ambassador in London(3) called on the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 14 July to commend the Warsaw Pact documents to the British Government. The Ambassador took care not to stray outside his terms of reference in a way which might reveal differences between the Rumanians and their allies. He emphasized, however, the desirability of East-West exchanges not being "bloc to bloc", and the desirability of continuous Anglo-Rumanian discussion of the subject. He said that the Rumanian Government believed that the time was ripe to go soon to a conference.

In reply to questions, the Ambassador said:

- (a) Force reduction in Europe would best be discussed in the organ to be set up at a conference, not in the preparatory exchanges before a conference.

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- (1) Statement by the German Permanent Representative in the Council 29 July, 1970.
  - (2) Attachment to letter of the Belgian Delegation dated 12 August, 1970.
  - (3) Attachment to letter of the Acting UK Permanent Rep. dated 28 July, 1970.

- (b) He did not know why the Budapest Memorandum did not refer to the reduction of indigenous troops.
- (c) The Warsaw Pact powers had not thought it necessary to transmit a draft document on the non-use of force this time, as they had after the meeting in Prague last Autumn. This was because the documents then prepared concerning the renunciation of force remained valid.
- (d) The Rumanians favoured discussion of the free movement of people, ideas and information, even though this was not mentioned in the Budapest Memorandum.

Aversion to the "bloc to bloc" approach was stressed by other Rumanian representatives, including the Rumanian Ambassador at The Hague(1). On the other hand, the Rumanian Ambassador in Washington(2) seemed in his approach to be emphasizing Rumania's solidarity with its Warsaw Pact allies.

Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer(3), on an official visit to the FRG from 22 to 26 June, 1970, said, concerning the Budapest meeting, that it was the intention of the Soviet Union to charge a special organism within the European security conference with the problem of MBFR, thus relegating it to a secondary position. Rumania, on the other hand, wanted to keep the agenda completely open, and had insisted that language concerning an "open" agenda be inserted into the Budapest Communiqué. Rumania had been opposed by all other delegations but had obtained acceptance of its views, Mr. Maurer said. Otherwise, his delegation would not have signed.

The Rumanian Ambassador at The Hague(1) in his presentation on July 10, said that the Soviet Union during the Budapest meeting had originally opposed the idea of inserting a third item in the Conference Agenda, (that is, the establishment of a security organ for the discussion inter alia of a reduction of armed forces). However, other Warsaw Pact countries had strongly insisted on this point.

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- (1) Statement by the Netherlands Representative in the Political Committee July 14, 1970.
  - (2) Statement by the US Representative in the Political Committee on July 14, 1970.
  - (3) Information circulated by the German Delegation on 3rd July 1970.

5. Bulgarian Views

After visiting Sofia, Ambassador Forthomme of Belgium(1) concluded that the attitude of Bulgaria was identical to that of the USSR as presented by Soviet Ambassadors in different capitals.

IV. COMMUNIQUEES

1. Soviet-Rumanian Communiqué

Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Bucharest from 6th to 8th July, 1970, for the signing of a new bilateral treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. At the conclusion of the visit, a communiqué was issued which contained the following passages concerning European security:

"It was noted that the Soviet Union and Rumania consistently come out for the holding of a conference on security and cooperation in Europe and consider that the well-known proposals of the socialist states, set out in the Budapest Memorandum, create the necessary preconditions for switching the preparation of the conference on to practical rails.

"The success of an all-European conference, in the preparation, organization and holding of which all interested states should take part, will promote a climate of confidence between European countries and will create more favourable conditions for a settlement of outstanding problems in Europe."

2. Belgian-Polish Communiqué

Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium paid an official visit to Poland on 27-29 July, 1970. The Communiqué contained the following paragraphs on European security:

"The talks of the ministers concerned mainly problems pertaining to security and cooperation in Europe. The Belgian and Polish ministers have stated that the dialogue which developed in a deepened manner owing to bilateral contacts between interested states has made it possible to achieve considerable progress towards a détente.

"The two ministers emphasized the interest in convening, at an appropriate time, a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. This conference should be prepared by way of both bilateral and multi-lateral talks and should make a concrete contribution to the cause of peace in Europe. Poland and

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(1) Attachment to letter of the Belgian Delegation dated 12 August, 1970.

Belgium will not abate their efforts in its preparation.

"The ministers have examined the purposefulness of creating an organ of European security and discussed other initiatives aimed at creating a lasting system of security in Europe, among other things, in the domain of disarmament.

"Among problems concerning European security, the ministers have recognized the importance of the frontier on the Odra and Nysa (Oder and Neisse) for European peace.

"The ministers have expressed the conviction that a broad multi-lateral discussion on the subject of all-European problems, and particularly cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural domains, as well as of the protection of man's environment, will make it possible to diminish tension in Europe and facilitate cooperation between all the states concerned."