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From: Secretary General

RECENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS
ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY

Attached is a summary prepared by the Political Division of recent Soviet and East European views on military aspects of security, based on information available as of 31st August, 1972. This report brings up to date the material contained in PO/72/198, dated 22nd March, 1972, and previous documents in this series.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS
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I. COMMUNIQUES

1. Turkish Soviet Communiqué

The Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit of Soviet President Podgorny to Turkey, 11th to 17th April, 1972 contained the following paragraph:

"Les deux Parties sont tombées d'accord que la réalisation d'un accord sur le problème de la réduction mutuelle des forces armées et des armements en Europe qui ne serait au détriment d'aucun Etat constituerait une étape positive dans la voie de la détente dans la région."

2. US-Soviet Communiqué

The Joint United States-Soviet Communiqué(1) issued in Moscow on 29th May, 1972, contained the following paragraph:

"Both sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum."

3. Soviet-Yugoslav Communiqué

The Joint Soviet-Yugoslav Communiqué(2) issued at the conclusion of President Tito's visit to the Soviet Union, 10th June, 1972, contained the following paragraph:

"Taking into consideration the wishes and aspirations of European peoples, the two sides expressed their conviction that the reduction of armed forces and armaments, as well as other measures in this field, would be an important part of the process of building European security."

4. Yugoslav-Polish Communiqué

The Joint Communiqué(3) issued at the conclusion of President Tito's visit to Poland, 23rd June, 1972, contained the following paragraph:

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- (1) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 43
(2) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 46
(3) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 49

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"Both sides expressed their conviction that the reduction of armed forces and armament on the European continent, as well as other measures in this field, would represent a vital component in the process of building European security."

5. Norwegian-Polish Communiqué

The Communiqué(1) issued at the conclusion of the visit of the Polish Foreign Minister to Norway, 29th June, 1972 contained the following paragraph:

"The Ministers agreed that mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe would constitute an important aspect of the process of détente. They expressed the hope that the States concerned would as soon as possible reach agreement in an appropriate forum as to the procedures of negotiations on this matter."

II. SOVIET VIEWS

Comments by Mr. Proektor(2)

6. In February 1972, a member of the staff of the German Embassy in Moscow had a conversation about MBFR with Mr. Proektor of the Soviet Institute of World Economics and International Relations. In this Institute, Mr. Proektor is in charge of a working group on military-political questions of European security. He said that his working group was intensively engaged in studying the question of force reductions in Europe.

7. The talk was concentrated on the aspect of balance. Mr. Proektor had come to the conclusion that the solution of this problem did not lie in asymmetrical force reductions as they were being discussed in the West. Symmetrical solutions appeared the only realistic ones. If NATO wanted to take into account the different distances in the redeployment of Soviet and American forces, this was not the whole picture. If one spoke of asymmetries, account would also have to be taken

- (a) of the superiority of NATO in nuclear weapons for tactical use, especially as far as the strike aircraft of the Alliance were concerned. It was not correct to equate the Soviet MRBMs with them since the aircraft were a tactically more flexible weapons system and thus had more advantages than MRBM;

(1) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 50
(2) Information provided by the German Delegation on 30th March, 1972

- (b) of the NATO doctrine of the immediate tactical use of nuclear weapons from the beginning of a conflict (sic). In this context, Proektor went on to say that in view of the modern development of the forces and the situation in Europe, one had to assume that a conflict would involve a nuclear exchange. This was where the superiority of NATO played a great part. He was familiar with the model concepts of NATO. In looking at them, he had the impression that the people who had worked them out were still thinking in the categories of the Second World War. In a future nuclear conflict, one or two divisions, more or less, would be unimportant;
- (c) of the fact that both the West and the Soviet Union possessed a modern air transport capability which would allow the West to redeploy American divisions to Europe, for example to the United Kingdom, in time whenever there was a danger of war. Whether the Soviet Union left her forces in the western part of the country or withdrew them behind the Ural was not very important because the Soviet Union also disposed of the necessary airlift capabilities to bring them back in time. However, Proektor showed some understanding when the discussion turned to the details of the political and technical problems of force redeployment;
- (d) of the global situation and the relative military strengths at the global level. The Soviet Union was a world power and also had to take extra-European factors into account. Proektor mentioned the relative number of nuclear submarines and called attention to the fact that the Soviet Union also had an eastern frontier. All this made the question of force reductions very difficult.

8. Mr. Proektor repeatedly emphasised that the development of the political situation in Europe was very important for the question of force reductions. Thus, the ratification of the German treaties was of great significance. One had to be certain that, after force reductions had been carried out, one side did not politically exploit the new situation by changing the political attitude which had made MBFR possible. If the political situation continued to develop satisfactorily, there would be MBFR talks - perhaps in connection with progress towards CSCE. It would be very difficult to set things in motion at an earlier time since the questions involved were extremely difficult and could only be solved politically. If this was left to the military alone, they would start by comparing the length of the cannon tubes on both sides and would never arrive at any result.

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9. Proektor replied evasively to questions concerning the Brosio mission. His reaction permitted the conclusion that a Soviet willingness to receive Mr. Brosio could not be expected in the near future.

10. Proektor shared the view that it would be useful to agree on general MBFR principles on which negotiations could be based.

11. Proektor's explanations conveyed the impression that no further development of the Soviet MBFR attitude could be expected for the time being and that the Soviet side is encountering difficulties in working out a negotiating position. The indications concerning the Soviet reservations vis-à-vis MBFR have been confirmed, and it was shown that there is little willingness to begin serious MBFR talks in the near future or to take any initiatives on the Soviet side.

Comments by Soviet First Secretary in Washington(1)

12. On 7th April, 1972, Soviet First Secretary Sokolov gave an officer of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington the following "personal views" on CSCE and MBFR issues. The Prague Communiqué he said, was an important expression of Warsaw Pact views in contrast to purely Soviet views. The emphasis was clearly on a CSCE, a conference on which there was far more consensus than for one on force reductions. In the Soviet view it was necessary to resolve political questions in Europe before military issues like MBFR could be addressed. A security conference could resolve political questions "such as frontiers and renunciation of force", ecology and similar questions, which would bring about a political climate which made discussion of more difficult military issues such as force reduction possible. In the Soviet view, military issues include not only force reduction but also "other measures like exchanges of observers". When asked whether an invitation to "wine tasting" had, in effect, been put off until after a security conference, Sokolov said that this image generally corresponded to the Soviet conception, adding that the USSR had not lost interest in MBFR.

13. As to the possible area of reduction, Sokolov said that in the Soviet view the area was still Central Europe, "at least for one phase", but did not exclude other areas. This discussion led to the participation question, where Sokolov seemed unable to proceed beyond "principles" that:

- (a) all interested states should participate in some way;
- (b) bloc-to bloc negotiations were undesirable;

(1) Information provided by the United States Delegation on 13th April, 1972

- (c) the CSCE was an unsuitable forum for MBFR; and
- (d) MBFR could be more efficiently negotiated among a smaller number of states, such as "those in Central Europe". He was willing to define Central Europe "speculatively" as Benelux, "Germany", GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, plus "some neutrals".

14. When pressed, Sokolov would not go beyond the Prague formulation about MBFR being discussed by an organ created by a CSCE, except to speculate that since a preparatory phase might be necessary, the future MBFR organ could be discussed in this preparatory phase.

15. On 16th May, Mr. Sokolov had another conversation in Washington, with a State Department official. In reporting(1) Mr. Sokolov's remarks on this occasion, the United States Authorities noted that they were not necessarily consistent in all respects with what other Soviet officials may have been saying elsewhere, and that it is possible that Soviet views on these questions were not yet firm.

16. In still another conversation(2) with a State Department Officer, Mr. Sokolov asked about Allied attitudes with respect to stabilisation measures. The State Department officer responded that the Allies were continuing their study of such measures. If agreed, these measures might be included in a declaration on principles. Sokolov said that, without more complete knowledge of the extent of such measures, it would be difficult for the Soviets to judge whether they would be acceptable or not.

17. In response to Sokolov's query as to the state of Allied preparations, and possible Allied proposals for launching MBFR talks, the State Department Officer indicated that Allied studies were continuing, and that he was not in a position, consequently, to comment.

US-Soviet Conversations in Moscow, 22nd-30th May, 1972(3)

18. President Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from 22nd to 30th May, 1972. The President and his advisers discussed European affairs during a 2½ hour plenary session at which Messrs. Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin were present. The basic presentation was made by Mr. Brezhnev. Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Rogers discussed certain aspects of Europe at some length on a later occasion.

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- (1) In the Political Committee, 23rd May, 1972
 - (2) Information provided by the United States Delegation on 11th July, 1972
 - (3) Information reported in the Council on 30th May, 1972

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19. After initial discussion of MBFR, in which the Soviet leaders suggested that it might not be necessary for discussion of this subject to be conducted in parallel with a conference, they eventually agreed that the two could go forward in parallel so long as this was done in different bodies. President Nixon stressed the importance that the US attached to parallelism, that it felt that a conference was not the proper place to negotiate on mutual and balanced force reductions, and that the US did think it was important that parallel consideration be given to this question of mutual and balanced force reductions. The Russians indicated a willingness to proceed on that or some similar basis.

20. In the joint US-Soviet Communiqué(1) of 29th May, 1972 the Soviets joined in endorsing the principle of reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. While the US welcomed this general statement, it regretted that the Soviets objected to the Brosio mission and asked if some means could not be found to begin exploring the question of force reductions.

21. Mr. Gromyko indicated that the Soviet Union would object, on the usual ground of "bloc-to-bloc" considerations, to any explorer designated by NATO. He asked bluntly whether the United States could not simply designate a representative, and was told no. At that point the discussion seemed to end. Mr. Gromyko was asked if he had any further suggestions if they were not willing to receive Mr. Brosio and he did not seem to have any other suggestions.

22. The US side observed that we can of course all continue to talk about the subject on a bilateral basis, but it is not clear how one is going to proceed from there, and that is the way the matter was left.

Discussion Between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador in Moscow(2)

23. The British Ambassador in Moscow saw Mr. Gromyko on 29th June, 1972. The main subject covered by their conversation was the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In response to a question about the present Soviet attitude to MBFR talks, Mr. Gromyko said that this question should not be mixed up with the CSCE: when it was ripe for examination, the states concerned could consider it separately. The subject of MBFR required much time, attention and energy, and was a very large-scale problem in itself, which would over-load the CSCE.

(1) See paragraph 2

(2) Information provided by the United Kingdom Delegation on 4th July, 1972

Conversation Between the Greek and Soviet Ambassadors
in Prague(1)

24. D'une entrevue entre les Ambassadeurs de Grèce et d'URSS à Prague, il ressort que le stationnement de troupes soviétiques en Tchécoslovaquie se poursuivra, car il est dicté non par les nécessités du maintien de l'ordre, mais par des raisons stratégiques; de ce fait un retrait ne serait concevable qu'en cas de retrait simultané des forces américaines combiné à une réduction des forces de la République Fédérale.

Comments by the Soviet Foreign Minister While in the
Netherlands(2)

25. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, paid an official visit to the Netherlands, 5th to 7th July, 1972. During a discussion of European questions, Mr. Gromyko also touched on mutual reductions of forces and armaments in Europe. He said the Soviet Union recognised that this was an important problem, that had no connection with the European Conference. The USSR wanted to examine further when the time might be right to discuss this matter. Eventual MBFR talks could start after a CSCE and needed thorough preparation. This preparation might be parallel to the Conference, but he repeated again and again that any formal or informal link would be damaging. Therefore, any exploration of force reductions should not take place in Helsinki. The most important aspects of the problem could be prepared bilaterally. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated on his own account that the Soviet Union had not responded to the Western offer of an exploratory mission on MBFR headed by Mr. Brosio because, although Moscow had a high esteem for this gifted diplomat, his mission carried the stigma of the bloc-to-bloc approach.

26. Foreign Minister Schmelzer responded that he could not understand why, at a conference on European security and co-operation, military security matters were taboo. There should be a possibility to discuss the general concept of lessening the military confrontation and the principles to guide force reductions. Mr. Gromyko replied that participants in the Conference would be free to mention this subject, but under no circumstances should one try to reach agreement on force reductions at the Conference. Under repeated pressure to give his views on possible forms of MBFR explorations, the Soviet Foreign Minister replied that bilateral consultations might be an acceptable form. These could, for example, take place between one NATO and one Warsaw Pact member country, who could each consult its own allies. Although he did not say so explicitly, it was clear that Mr. Gromyko was thinking of bilateral negotiations between the US and the USSR, each acting on behalf of its allies.

(1) Information reported in the Political Committee,
11th July, 1972

(2) Information provided by the Netherlands Delegation on
12th July, 1972

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Comments by the Soviet Foreign Minister While in Luxembourg(1)

27. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, paid an official visit to Luxembourg, 7th to 9th July, 1972. In talks with Minister of State Werner and Foreign Minister Thorn, Mr. Gromyko maintained that tout lien entre la CSCE et les réductions des forces, même un parallélisme, risquerait soit de mettre la Conférence en péril, soit d'en distraire l'attention. M. Thorn a proposé la procédure suivante:

- (a) au moment d'aborder la conférence, tous les membres feraient une déclaration reconnaissant que la réduction des forces peut contribuer à la détente et mérite un examen approfondi;
- (b) à la conférence, une déclaration de principes généraux serait faite sur un code de bonne conduite militaire analogue aux déclarations de principes que l'URSS a faites vis-à-vis de certains pays (France, Etats-Unis);
- (c) dans un cadre séparé et sans doute au cours de négociations complexes et longues entre l'URSS, les US et les autres pays concernés en raison de leurs forces ou de leurs territoires, on parlerait des réductions elles mêmes.

Comments by the Soviet Foreign Minister While in Belgium(2)

28. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, paid an official visit to Belgium, 9th to 12th July, 1972. In talks with Foreign Minister Harmel, Mr. Gromyko estima qu'il n'y avait rien à faire pour le moment. Cette question est importante, mais alourdirait inutilement les travaux de la Conférence en la chargeant de ce problème complexe qui se traitera plus facilement après la CSCE, dans le climat de confiance créé par l'adoption des principes régissant les relations entre Etats. Un manque d'accord sur ce point risquerait d'empêcher la Conférence d'avancer dans d'autres domaines.

29. M. Gromyko n'exclut cependant pas un certain parallélisme avec la CSCE, mais pour autant qu'il n'y ait aucun lien entre les deux. L'expérience d'après-guerre montre d'ailleurs combien il est préférable de résoudre les problèmes les uns après les autres. Quant à l'exploration, elle peut commencer à tout moment même sur une base bilatérale. En fait, personne ne peut empêcher un représentant national de soulever la question, même à Helsinki.

(1) Information reported in the Council on 12th July, 1972

(2) Information reported in the Council on 18th July, 1972

Comments of Soviet Ambassador Mendelyevich(1)

30. The roving Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Mendelyevich, came to Ankara on 13th July, and had talks with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Ambassador said it was evident that military and political détente are linked. But because of their complex nature, military issues should be discussed in a separate forum and the discussion should be based on the following principles:

- (a) force reductions should not be detrimental to the security of any country;
- (b) they should include national and foreign forces;
- (c) they should be handled outside the blocs; and
- (d) although directly interested countries would participate in the negotiations, every state should have the possibility of expressing its view.

31. When he was asked how it would be possible to have a discussion which would not be a bloc-to-bloc affair since the participants, although very limited, would all belong to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, Ambassador Mendelyevich had difficulty in answering. He said that this could be avoided by the attitude of the negotiators and that the negotiators could also represent the views of other states not directly participating.

32. It was explained to the Soviet Ambassador that a discussion of MBFR principles at the Conference could secure the multilateral aspect of negotiations. Ambassador Mendelyevich said that this was a very interesting idea and would be studied at the highest level on his return to Moscow.

Comments of Soviet Ambassador Zorin(2)

33. Mr. Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador en mission spéciale, visited Norway from 24th to 26th July, 1972 on a tour which also covered Helsinki and Stockholm. During his talks with Foreign Minister Cappelen and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MBFR was not raised by Mr. Zorin. The importance of starting up, parallel with the drive for a CSCE, soundings and eventually negotiations on force reductions and related matters was stressed by the Norwegian side. These questions should also be discussed in a general way at the CSCE itself. While insisting on drawing a clear distinction between CSCE and MBFR, Mr. Zorin conceded during the discussion that these questions would probably be discussed in a general way at the CSCE, as Ministers would touch upon these problems

(1) Information provided by the Turkish Delegation on 7th August, 1972

(2) Information provided by the Norwegian Delegation on 1st August, 1972

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anyway when discussing the security of Europe. However, the problems connected with MBFR could not be solved at the CSCE, but should be subject of separate negotiations in a special forum.

Comments of Senior Soviet Embassy Official in Washington(1)

34. A conversation took place between Mr. James Leonard, an Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a senior Soviet Embassy official in Washington. Mr. Leonard opened by commenting that the Soviets were making a mistake in their repeated efforts to draw the US into bilateral negotiations on European force levels, and pointed out a number of the reasons why the US would not agree to anything that separated it from its Allies. The Soviet official questioned whether the US really wanted negotiations and any sort of agreement. Mr. Leonard assured him that its intentions were serious, but that the US was determined to protect both its political and its security interests. He pointed to the various asymmetries in the European situation, citing the question of redeployment time as a particularly obvious one which would have to be taken account of in any eventual agreements. This led the Soviet official to lecture on the negative reaction which the word "balanced" in MBFR automatically produced from Moscow. He acknowledged that he did not fully understand the reasons for this reaction, but said it was a "fact" and urged the necessity of eventually finding some other language to cover this concept.

35. The Soviet Embassy official said that it was important that the authorities on his side gain some better understanding of what the US really wanted to achieve through MBFR. He defended the various feelers which they had made for bilateral discussions with the US as based on the need in Moscow to obtain some reassurance about what the US was "really after" in MBFR. He warned that if the US and the USSR did not clarify their respective thinking to each other before actually sitting down at the table in a multilateral conference, they risked a very harmful failure. He recalled the surprise attack conference of 1958 (during which he had himself been in Geneva) as an example of just this sort of situation. The US and the Soviet Union had come to the table then without proper exploration of each other's attitudes and the results had been very unfortunate. "If you tell us", he said, "that you want us to reduce five divisions and you'll reduce three divisions, then we will consider this. If it's not harmful to our interests, we'll accept it and then work out the details; but we have to have some idea of what it is that you're after."

(1) Information provided by the United States Delegation on 2nd August, 1972

36. Mr. Leonard asked if the Soviets had given thought to proceeding with MBFR by rather small steps, pointing to the rather stable situation in Europe which it might be quite unwise to destabilise with abrupt changes in force levels. The Soviet official accepted the concept as possibly having real merit, even though, he agreed, the Soviet Union in the past had tended to put forward proposals for very substantial reductions.

37. Mr. Leonard asked the Soviet Embassy official what he thought Soviet attitudes would be on various types of confidence building measures of the sort that had been discussed in the 1950's and, in particular, at the surprise attack conference. His interlocutor thought the USSR might be willing to consider them.

38. Mr. Leonard asked what sort of meaning the Soviet side attached to the phrase "Central Europe" which both sides had agreed would be area primarily involved in force reduction negotiations. The Embassy official said it should include the two Germanys plus whatever other countries it might prove generally convenient to add. The Soviets were well aware of the French position and would not expect France to be included. Mr. Leonard asked the Soviet Embassy official if he thought the area could include portions of the Western Soviet Union. He said there would be no trouble at all, provided the Eastern US was also included. Mr. Leonard asked if the Soviet side was really serious about pushing "equality" to that extreme. The answer was yes. If part of the Soviet Union was covered, part of the US should also be covered. The official added that he thought air forces in the reduction area should be dealt with in the negotiations. On the relationship to CSCE, he simply reiterated the well-known Soviet position that the CSCE should not take up MBFR.

Conversation Between the British Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Lunkov(1)

39. The British Ambassador in Moscow called on 9th August, on Mr. Lunkov, the Head of the European Department of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to discuss inter alia Soviet views on CSCE and MBFR. Sir J. Killick commented that the Soviet and British viewpoints on the CSCE-MBFR relationship were similar in that both governments agreed that the substance of MBFR was unsuitable for discussion in a CSCE. But the UK's view, as a practical matter, was that those countries who would be participating in a CSCE but not in MBFR talks had some interest in the subject and could not be prevented from raising the general question of military security at a CSCE. Sir J. Killick also pointed out, with reference to paragraph 11 of the Communiqué issued after the NATO Ministerial meeting in Bonn, that there might be scope for discussion at a CSCE of confidence-building measures of a military nature; and that in the UK's

(1) Letter of the United Kingdom Delegation dated 11th August, 1972

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view it would be possible to create a distinction between such questions and MBFR proper. Mr. Lunkov merely commented that of course anyone could express their views at the CSCE on any relevant subject. He stressed the need to separate MBFR from a CSCE, but made no comment on the idea that there might be discussion and agreement at a CSCE on confidence-building measures.

Conversation Between the US Ambassador in Moscow and Acting Foreign Minister Kuznetsov(1)

40. Acting on instructions, the US Ambassador in Moscow on 21st August called on Acting Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and made a presentation concerning MBFR-CSCE parallelism. Although Kuznetsov promised to study the matter, his preliminary comments were entirely negative. He disputed the US interpretation of the May understanding (see paragraph 19) that parallel means "about the same time", and asserted that the US approach can only be interpreted as making preparatory talks on CSCE conditional on beginning exploratory talks on force reductions, a linkage which the Soviet side decisively rejects. After repetition of the positions on both sides, Ambassador Beam pointed out that the US has asked the Soviets their opinion on whether they would like, together with certain other Warsaw Pact countries, to receive a diplomatic note on the subject. Kuznetsov closed by once more stating the Soviet position against making one set of talks conditional on the other.

41. In reporting the foregoing conversation, the United States Authorities commented that, although several elements in Kuznetsov's reply to Ambassador Beam had the tone of flat and decisive statements, they regard the Soviet reaction conveyed by him as preliminary. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets would further study the matter, and conveyed the impression that perhaps it would be possible that exploratory talks on force reductions could take place in parallel with preparatory talks for a CSCE. While he took a strong position on the issue of MBFR-CSCE linkage, and while the general tone of his statement was negative, he did not reject de facto parallelism out of hand. The United States Authorities commented further that, as the matter stands, they expect a response from the Soviets to the presentation made by Ambassador Beam.

(1) Information reported in the Council on 24th August, 1972

III. POLISH VIEWS

Comments of Polish Foreign Ministry Official(1)

42. An official of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had participated in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states held in Prague on 25th and 26th January, 1972, commented as follows concerning the significance of the Declaration(2) adopted at that meeting.

43. The Polish official said that the Warsaw Pact had not yet made much progress in working out its own ideas on MBFR. The brief reference in the Prague Declaration approximately reflected the proportion of time spent on CSCE and MBFR at the meeting.

44. In reply to the question whether the wording "foreign and national forces and armaments in Europe" also represented an order of priorities, the Polish official said that this was not the intention. However, it might, after all, be advisable to begin with foreign forces, although this was not a condition on the part of the Warsaw Pact. When he was asked whether "national forces and armaments" also comprised the territorial defence forces which existed in many countries of the Soviet bloc, he replied that they should also be reduced. This was his personal view. He believed, however, that the Eastern side was not yet thinking about such details.

45. It would now have to be clarified at the bilateral and multilateral level what the interested countries understood by force reductions. When the Polish official was reminded that the Brosio mission served this very purpose, he said that Mr. Brosio had little to offer. His instructions were known. Mr. Brosio was to explore but not to make any proposals. The Soviets had no interest in this.

46. The wording in the Prague Declaration that the states participating in reduction should not suffer any disadvantages meant that any such reduction should be "balanced". Asymmetrical models were, however, out of the question. Generally speaking, détente in Europe concerned military aspects much less than political ones. Force reduction was only one element of détente in Europe. First of all, it was necessary to establish political symmetry in Europe. In his view this included the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties and the entry into force of the Berlin arrangement. This had to be followed by an accommodation with Czechoslovakia and an arrangement between the two German states.

(1) Information provided by the German Delegation on 6th March, 1972

(2) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 24(Revised)

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Comments by Polish Embassy Counsellor in Helsinki(1)

47. The Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Helsinki, Mr. Skowronski, in a conversation with a member of the staff of the Trade Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, made the following comments on multilateral CSCE preparations. He said that although MBFR was relevant in the CSCE context, there were still differences of opinion within NATO as well as within the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to prefer a bilateral approach. The United States, Mr. Skowronski claimed, was not really interested in the Brosio mission. The results of SALT and of Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow would have certain implications on the further form of MBFR considerations.

Remarks by Foreign Minister Olszowski(2)

48. The Danish Foreign Minister, Mr. Anderson, visited Poland on 9th to 12th April, 1972, and had talks with Foreign Minister Olszowski. Concerning "disarmament questions", Mr. Olszowski referred to the Prague Declaration and emphasised that the discussion of such questions at a CSCE might create difficulties. He pointed to the possibility of discussions in a separate forum.

Additional Comments by Polish Embassy Counsellor in Helsinki(3)

49. On 23rd May, a Netherlands Embassy official in Helsinki had a discussion concerning CSCE and MBFR with the counsellor of the Polish Embassy, Mr. Skowronski(4). Mr. Skowronski underlined that, after the signing of the recent SALT agreement the prospects for discussing MBFR problems within the framework of a CSCE would be more favourable. In the light of the developments regarding the SALT negotiations, his Government was taking a greater interest in MBFR; this was also the case in the other Warsaw Pact countries. In answer to a question, Mr. Skowronski stated that Moscow's stand vis-à-vis MBFR (including the stationing of foreign forces) had lately been showing indications of a change. Particularly after the signing of a, be it partial, "SALT" agreement the Soviets would be more inclined to discuss MBFR, he thought.

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- (1) Information provided by the German Delegation on 28th April, 1972
 - (2) Information provided by the Danish Delegation on 5th May, 1972
 - (3) Information provided by the Netherlands Delegation on 7th June, 1972
 - (4) Cf. paragraph 47

50. Mr. Skowronski then mentioned the possibility that during the preparatory multilateral talks in Helsinki on a CSCE, MBFR could also be raised, e.g. in a working group. In this way the participants would have an opportunity to sound each other out and if possible exchange views on substantive aspects of this question.

Additional Remarks by the Polish Foreign Minister(1)

51. The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Olszowski(2), visited Norway from 25th to 29th June, 1972. During his talks with Foreign Minister Cappelen, Mr. Olszowski said it was the Polish view that the CSCE could also discuss "certain military aspects". Poland was interested in negotiations on mutual force reductions in Europe. Such negotiations should take place between the parties concerned, but in such a way that other states would also have an opportunity to express their views. "Initial talks" on force reductions should not be a precondition for the initiation of the multilateral preparations for the CSCE. Poland had a flexible view as to the procedures for such initial talks. If the CSCE takes a constructive course, negotiations on force reductions would follow as a natural continuation of the Conference.

Comments of Deputy Foreign Minister Czyrek(3)

52. Mr. Czyrek, Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Turkey from 29th June to 2nd July, 1972. During talks on international questions, Mr. Czyrek acknowledged that there exists a link between the problems of security and disarmament. Nevertheless, he said, the questions of disarmament, being very complicated, should not be dealt with in a CSCE but in a separate forum outside it. The Turkish Authorities received the impression that, in the minds of Polish officials, MBFR means disarmament while military détente measures correspond to stabilisation and confidence building measures. During the talks, the Polish side seemed to favour the discussion of these aspects of security (i.e. military détente measures) in the permanent organ to be established following the first Conference.

(1) Information provided by the Norwegian Delegation on 4th July, 1972

(2) Cf. paragraph 48

(3) Information provided by the Turkish Delegation on 18th July, 1972

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Comments by Polish Embassy Counsellor in Copenhagen(1)

53. The Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Copenhagen, Mr. Stefanski, called on the Head of the First Political Division of the Danish Foreign Ministry on 9th August for an exchange of views on certain questions concerning the CSCE. Mr. Stefanski said, regarding confidence building measures, that such measures could be discussed either at the Conference proper or separately. Although Mr. Stefanski stressed that his suggestions were of an unofficial character, he was rather explicit in mentioning the following items:

- (a) reduction of foreign or national forces;
- (b) freezing or limitation of certain types of offensive weapons;
- (c) freezing of military budgets;
- (d) limitation of manoeuvres in frontier areas;
- (e) prohibition of transport of nuclear warheads in aircraft;
- (f) prohibition of entry into European ports by warships carrying nuclear weapons.

IV. OTHER WARSAW PACT VIEWS

Comments by Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Ruzek(2)

54. Les 21, 22 et 23 mars 1972, une délégation tchécoslovaque, présidée par M. Miroslav Ruzek, Vice-Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a eu au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, à Bruxelles, des entretiens avec une délégation belge, conduite par le Vicomte DAVIGNON, Directeur-Général de la Politique. M. Ruzek a dit qu'en matière militaire, la Tchécoslovaquie s'inquiète des décisions de l'OTAN, visant à augmenter ses dépenses: il n'est pas rassurant que l'Alliance paraît vouloir négocier d'une position de force. D'autre part, les problèmes relatifs aux MBFR devraient être traités dans un organisme permanent ou dans un autre forum qui reste à déterminer.

Remarks by Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister(3)

55. The Director of the Political Division of the German Foreign Ministry, Herr von Staden, had an exchange of views with Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Nagy in Budapest on 6th and 7th March, 1972. On MBFR, Mr. Nagy referred to the Prague

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- (1) Information provided by the Danish Delegation on 25th August, 1972
 - (2) Information provided by the Belgian Delegation on 2nd May, 1972
 - (3) Information provided by the German Delegation on 10th March, 1972

Declaration. The CSCE should not be burdened with such a difficult question, but this problem would have to be discussed. However, talks should not be confined to bloc-to-bloc contacts. Concerning the Brosio mission, Mr. Nagy said that it was not clear whether Mr. Brosio was merely to find out Soviet views in Moscow or whether he was also able to explain Western ideas.

Additional Remarks by Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister(1)

56. Les 16 et 17 mars 1972, une délégation hongroise, présidée par M. Janos Nagy(2), Vice-Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a eu des entretiens au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères à Bruxelles avec une délégation belge, conduite par le Vicomte DAVIGNON, Directeur-Général de la Politique. M. Nagy était de l'avis qu'une discussion sur les MBFR à la CSCE serait difficile et alourdirait les travaux, risquant même de paralyser ceux-ci; le manque de clarté ayant entouré la proposition d'une mission Brosio a d'ailleurs laissé planer un certain doute sur la sincérité des démarches y relatives.

Comments by Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister(3)

57. The first Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary, Mr. Puja, visited Norway on 10th to 12th April. Mr. Puja said that the NATO proposal to discuss questions of military security at a CSCE would complicate the endeavours to arrive at an agreement on the Agenda. NATO insistence on raising this topic at a first conference could wreck the CSCE. Regarding force reductions, Mr. Puja asked for concrete Western proposals. Such proposals would bear evidence of a more constructive NATO attitude than sending Mr. Brosio on an exploratory mission which, at least as seen through East European eyes, was unclear and futile. Puja agreed, however, that there might be a need for some kind of preparatory talks to agree on the time, venue and a certain common basis for the negotiations proper on reduction of forces.

Comments by Romanian Foreign Minister(4)

58. The Danish Foreign Minister, Mr. Anderson, visited Romania on 12th to 15th April, 1972. During his talks with Foreign Minister Manescu, the latter referred to the political and military implications of the Warsaw Pact and stated that Romania would fulfil its tasks and honour its obligations as a member, as long as the Warsaw Pact and NATO existed. In the Romanian view, the two Alliances were not a guarantee for European security, which was clearly brought out by the

(1) Information provided by the Belgian Delegation on 2nd May, 1972

(2) Cf. preceding paragraph

(3) Information provided by the Norwegian Delegation on 26th April, 1972

(4) Information provided by the Danish Delegation on 5th May, 1972

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historical development, and which had led to the current interest in a security conference. A security based on the blocs could only lead to a kind of non-aggression treaty, i.e. the continued existence of the present structure.

Remarks of Bulgarian Foreign Ministry Official(1)

59. In conversation with a member of the German Trade Mission in Sofia, a responsible authority in the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, regarding the question of the connection (also as far as timing is concerned) between MBFR and CSCE, that the importance of military security was not being underestimated by Bulgaria. However - in contrast to MBFR - the preparation of the CSCE was far advanced owing to the bilateral dialogues and the declarations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Agreement had already been reached in many respects, whereas, in the case of MBFR, no consensus existed either within or between the Alliances concerning some of the most elementary points (such as, for example, the participating countries). For this reason, CSCE should not be burdened by the problem of MBFR. With respect to the synchronisation of multilateral soundings on MBFR and the multilateral preparation of CSCE, the Bulgarian official did not take a position. He merely welcomed the separation of the two problems of CSCE and force reductions as it began to emerge after President Nixon's visit to Moscow and the publication of the Bonn Communiqué.

60. The Bulgarian official objected to the creation of a substantive link between MBFR and CSCE through the examination of confidence building and stabilising measures by pointing out that it would be consistent and advisable to deal with all multilateral measures in one package separate from the CSCE. It would not be appropriate to seize the large number of CSCE participants with military questions which did not concern them directly. The Four-Power Agreement on Berlin as well as the recent partial agreements on SALT had shown that solutions were easier to achieve in a small but competent group.

V. YUGOSLAV VIEWS

Comments by Ambassador Nincic(2)

61. In the framework of regular contacts between the Belgian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministries, Ambassador Forthomme visited Belgrade from 24th to 26th January, 1972. In particular, the roving Ambassador had talks with Ambassador Nincic, the Special Adviser to the Federal Secretary for

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- (1) Information provided by the German Delegation on 23rd June, 1972
(2) Information provided by the Belgian Delegation on 3rd March, 1972

Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for questions connected with European security and détente. The following points were made regarding the Yugoslav position:

- (a) with respect to military aspects, consideration must be given to "collateral measures" (on which it is understood that Yugoslavia has prepared a proposal that is likely to meet with support) and force reductions;
- (b) the requisite discussion on MBFR must be held in the framework of a conference since otherwise the latter's scope will be seriously diminished;
- (c) the proposed reductions should apply first to stationed forces; they should no doubt start in Central Europe, but their possible effect and repercussions in other parts of Europe and the Mediterranean area should also be studied;
- (d) as Belgrade sees it, a CSCE must lay down principles and establish guidelines for disarmament questions; negotiations at the technical level could take place in an ad hoc body open to any European country wishing to participate.

Views of Yugoslav Officials as Expressed in the Hague(1)

62. In discussions held in the Hague on 11th and 12th April, 1972, between Netherlands and Yugoslav officials, the latter gave it as the view of their Government that a CSCE should provide guidelines for the consideration of the military aspects of European security, both as regards collateral measures and as regards the reduction of armaments and armed forces properly speaking. Moreover, the Conference should provide for its own continuity and further institutionalisation by establishing the required number of provisional bodies, in which all countries represented at the Conference could participate and which would be responsible for the implementation of the conclusions of the first and for the preparation of the next conference. These bodies would be established according to the main topics considered at the Conference, including the military aspects of European security.

Additional Comments by Mr. Nincic(2)

63. In conversation with the Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Nincic(3), a senior official in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, maintained that the question of military aspects of

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- (1) Information given to the Political Committee on 26th April, 1972
 - (2) Information provided by the Canadian Delegation on 3rd August, 1972
 - (3) Cf. paragraph 61

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a CSCE as opposed to any MBFR discussion is one of the most contentious issues. He said that ideally there should be some link between the two since whatever was agreed in the MBFR context inevitably had an effect on European security in its broadest sense. According to Nincic, Moscow and "its friends" (excluding Romania) would prefer that no security questions be discussed in a CSCE context -- but he himself argued that developments in the area of MBFR would have important political implications for all European states.