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41.00.40  
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TELEX : 23-867

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
11th January, 1972

PO/72/4

To: Permanent Representatives

From: Secretary General

RECENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS ON FORCE  
REDUCTIONS

Attached is a summary prepared by the Political Division of recent Soviet and East European views on force reductions, based on information available as of 31st December, 1971. This report brings up to date the material contained in PO/71/657, dated 1st December, 1971, and previous documents in this series.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

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RECENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS ON FORCE  
REDUCTIONS

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RECENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS ON FORCE  
REDUCTIONS

I. WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE

1. The Communiqué(1) issued after the meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Warsaw, 30th November to 1st December, 1971, made no reference to force reductions. Accordingly, there has been no change in the public position of the Warsaw Pact on this subject since the Budapest Memorandum(2) of June 1970.

II. OTHER COMMUNIQUE

2. German-Soviet Communiqué(3)

The Communiqué issued following the official visit of the German Foreign Minister to Moscow, 25th to 30th November, contained the following paragraph:

"The two sides had an exchange of views on the problem of the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe and agreed that a solution of this question - without leading to disadvantages for those concerned - could make an essential contribution to the consolidation of security in Europe and thus to lasting détente."

3. Danish-Soviet Communiqué(4)

The Communiqué issued following the official visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Denmark, 2nd to 5th December, contained the following paragraphs:

"The Heads of Government agreed that it would be a significant contribution to the further détente in Europe that practical results were achieved - without prejudice to the countries involved - in the solution of a problem of such far-reaching import as a mutual reduction of the armed forces in Europe where a military confrontation is particularly dangerous.

"The Danish side confirmed its previous offer that negotiations concerning force reductions in Europe could be held in Denmark."

4. Norwegian-Soviet Communiqué(5)

The Communiqué issued following the official visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Norway, 5th to 7th December, contained the following paragraph:

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- (1) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 18
  - (2) POLADS(70)50, Annex II
  - (3) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 19
  - (4) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 20
  - (5) Soviet and East European Documentation, No. 21

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"The Prime Ministers agreed that it would be an important contribution to a continued détente in Europe that practical results be achieved in solving the comprehensive problems of carrying out a mutual reduction of the armed forces in Europe, where a military confrontation is particularly dangerous. A solution of this kind must not be to the detriment of any country."

III. SOVIET VIEWS

5. Brezhnev Speech(1)

In his speech before the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on 7th December, 1971, CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev said:

"The positive changes taking place on the continent of Europe naturally do not cause us communists to have any illusions. We know well that reactionary, militarist, revanchist circles are still active in capitalist Europe. They would like, by any means possible, to take up key positions in their countries and to try to cast Europe back to the times of the cold war. All this necessitates a high degree of vigilance and political activity. All this requires consistently pursuing to the end those constructive initiatives and actions that promise to turn Europe into a continent of peace and goodneighbourliness.

"This matter, comrades, is of tremendous historic importance. In its effect on other areas, on the world situation as a whole, it goes far beyond Europe's borders. There is no doubt that a radical improvement in the political climate of Europe and a solution of urgent all-European problems, including a cut in armed forces and armaments, would correspond to the interests of all mankind."

6. Rogers-Dobrynin Conversation(2)

In a conversation involving other subjects, Secretary of State Rogers on 18th November informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington of the United States hope that Ambassador Brosio would soon be received in Moscow. Dobrynin indicated that there was concern on the part of Soviet officials about the bloc-to-bloc character of explorations involving Ambassador Brosio. Secretary Rogers pointed out that Ambassador Brosio would not be representing NATO but rather those states of the Alliance which favour his explorations, and that he would be speaking

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(1) Pravda, 8th December, 1971

(2) Letter of the United States Delegation dated 20th November, 1971.

on behalf of those states and not NATO. Dobrynin said that he would convey this information to his authorities and would seek further information. In the course of the conversation, Dobrynin did not give any indication that an early invitation would be forthcoming, neither did he rule out such a possibility.

7. Comments of Middle-Level Soviet Officials(1)

In a conversation on 23rd November, a Soviet official indicated that MBFR would be the principal topic of discussion at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact which would take place on 30th November (see paragraph 1). The Soviet official doubted whether the meeting would reach any precise decisions or conclusions. He thought that more specific definition of the Warsaw Pact position would come through normal diplomatic contacts after the meeting. The Soviet official believed that his Government took a positive attitude toward the Brosio mission but that the idea of bloc-to-bloc negotiations, a concept not unanimously supported within NATO itself, might have occasioned second thoughts in Moscow about receiving Mr. Brosio. He thought his Government would still receive Mr. Brosio, but did not speculate on timing.

8. In a conversation on 22nd November, another Soviet official took the initiative at a social occasion in Moscow to discuss MBFR and current press rumours of Soviet unilateral reductions. Regarding Western press rumours that a Soviet unilateral initiative on troop reductions might emerge from that week's Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet session, he implied one need expect no surprises along this line. The same official said the Brosio visit was still under study but indicated that his Government had very serious reservations about this way of approaching the question. He suggested that perhaps one way to get talks going on troop reductions would be direct and "confidential" talks between the United States and the USSR. He dismissed earlier bilateral discussions as vague and non-specific. By returning several times to the question of what rôle the United States Embassy might play in talks on force reductions (and specifying that he did not mean the Brosio talks), he seemed to be floating the idea of conducting such talks in Moscow.

9. Deschamps-Doubinine Conversation(2)

Before returning to Brussels for consultations, the Belgian Ambassador in Moscow had a talk with Mr. Doubinine, the head of the First European Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Deschamps regretted the absence of any

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- (1) Letter of the United States Delegation dated 25th November, 1971  
(2) Letter of the Belgian Delegation dated 16th December, 1971

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Soviet reply to the offer of a visit by Ambassador Brosio. In this connection, he referred to rumours, according to which the USSR seemed to prefer to deal with MBFR by means of bilateral, rather than multilateral, contacts.

10. In reply, Mr. Doubinine emphasized that, for his country, the problem of force reductions is "entirely separate" from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and that discussion of it could take place "in parallel or even before" the CSCE. Doubinine asserted that the USSR's interest in and policy towards the subject of force reductions remains the same as indicated in the speech of Mr. Brezhnev in Warsaw (see paragraph 5) and in the Danish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet Communiqués (see paragraphs 3 and 4). Doubinine noted that bilateral contacts had taken place and were still taking place, as in the present conversation. He could add nothing concerning a multilateral examination of the problem of force reductions, since the question was "still under study".

IV. EAST EUROPEAN VIEWS

11. Comments by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Willmann(1)

Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Willmann visited Rome on 9th and 10th November, 1971. He met with Foreign Minister Moro and senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Willmann, while reaffirming Polish interest in force reductions, said that this problem should not be taken up either in the course of preparations for a CSCE or in an initial Conference. He avoided taking any position on the exploratory mission of Ambassador Brosio.

12. Stoessel-Winiewicz Conversation(2)

During the course of a discussion with Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz on 24th November, covering other business, the United States Ambassador asked about reports of a Warsaw Pact meeting in Warsaw on 30th November. Mr. Winiewicz confirmed that the meeting would be held. In response to the Ambassador's question whether MBFR would figure importantly in the agenda and the communiqué, Winiewicz said he doubted that this would be the case. He felt that a Conference on European Security and Co-operation would be the primary subject of discussion and of any public statement.

13. On MBFR, Winiewicz said he thought it was difficult to expect the Warsaw Pact to make any detailed statement in the absence of any more information from the Western side. He said that he could not comment on the prospect of Ambassador Brosio being received in Moscow, or on timing, noting that this was

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(1) Information provided by the Italian Delegation on 30th November, 1971.

(2) Information provided by the United States Delegation on 30th November, 1971.

"a Soviet problem". In general, he felt that Brezhnev's advice(1) had been good and that the best way to proceed was by "tasting the wine" through involvement in negotiation rather than further delay in taking soundings.

14. In response to Ambassador Stoessel's further questions, Winiewicz made the following comments. The Warsaw Pact countries are puzzled by the meaning of "B" in "MBFR". What was the true significance of the word "balanced"? In the past, the Warsaw Pact had thought in terms of "equilibrium of forces"; now their concept was "balance of security". Asked to define the difference, Winiewicz was vague, but said the latter term takes into consideration the "current political situation". Winiewicz continued that the Warsaw Pact countries stressed the reduction or thinning out of foreign forces in Central Europe. A reduction of stationed forces was not excluded but should come at a later stage. (Note: The United States Authorities believe that Winiewicz meant "indigenous" rather than "stationed" in the preceding comment.)

15. Winiewicz said that Poland continued to be interested in the subject of force reductions in Europe, but it was only realistic to recognize that the SALT talks were of over-riding importance, and positive results there, or even an indication of real progress, would have profound influence on the discussion of force reductions in Europe; indeed, the latter could not take place in the absence of progress in SALT.

16. Concerning the area to be covered by arms reduction, Winiewicz said it would be "much larger" than that envisaged for the Rapacki Plan. The Rapacki Plan had been aimed at reducing tensions between the two Germanies and making détente possible. Now the two Germanies were negotiating and détente already existed. Therefore, the area to be embraced by arms reduction plan could be expanded, and its purpose would be different. From his comments, Ambassador Stoessel judged that Winiewicz had the Scandinavian countries primarily in mind in speaking of expansion of the Rapacki area. At one point, Winiewicz noted that there was revived interest in Scandinavia in the Kekonnen Plan for denuclearization of the Scandinavian nations. When Ambassador Stoessel asked if the Western USSR might be included in the area of reduction, Winiewicz said that was for the Soviets to say.

17. Winiewicz said arms reduction talks should not start prior to a CSCE, since the subject was too complicated and inevitably would lead to great delay in convening a CSCE. The best procedure would be to convene a CSCE following careful preparatory steps in Helsinki which would concern organization, agenda, timing and place of a CSCE. The CSCE would then meet and could set up a special security organ to discuss force reductions, or could direct that talks be held in some other way. He observed that the French are now showing more interest in the earlier Polish idea that the CSCE would establish three commissions: one for matters of general legal principle, including non-aggression, a second for economic co-operation and a third for security.

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(1) The reference is to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev's speech at Tbilisi on 14th May, 1971; (see POLADS(71)36, Annex III)

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18. Arms reduction could be handled by the security commission in some fashion. All participants in CSCE should have a connection with the arms reduction talks, although the negotiations themselves could be handled by those states directly interested. Basic understanding would be necessary between the United States and the USSR, but the bloc-to-bloc approach should be avoided. Here Winiewicz mentioned that some neutrals are military powers, such as Sweden and Switzerland, and could be included in negotiations, whereas Austria was not a military force and would not participate. He observed also that if negotiations were between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, then France would refuse to take part.

19. Comments by Polish Embassy Official in Washington(1)

In a conversation on 23rd November, 1971 with an officer of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a Polish Embassy Official said that the forthcoming Warsaw Pact meeting (see paragraph 1) would, among other questions, deal with the Pact position on MBFR. He cited this consideration, as well as the current Soviet Party Plenum, as reasons for the Soviet delay in receiving Ambassador Brosio. When asked for Polish views on major MBFR elements, the Polish Embassy Official replied that he favoured the Rapacki area, although there would be some pressures within the Pact to include Hungary. Poland rejected the bloc-to-bloc approach and thought negotiations should involve only interested parties, i.e. those with forces in the area under discussion. Negotiations "must include" indigenous as well as stationed forces.

20. Comments by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and Deputy(2)

Ambassador Eralp, Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Prague from 29th November to 2nd December, 1971. He met first with Deputy Foreign Minister Ruzek, and subsequently with Foreign Minister Marko after the latter's return from the Warsaw Pact meeting (see paragraph 1). Concerning MBFR, Mr. Ruzek said:

"This question should not be left out of the Conference. However, the subject is very complicated and brings with itself some other related questions. Therefore, MBFR should be discussed in a separate "standing body" to be established and it should be linked with the Conference, irrespective of whether Mr. Brosio may visit Moscow or not."

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- (1) Letter of the United States Delegation dated 24th November, 1971.  
(2) Information provided by the Turkish Delegation on 14th December, 1971.



Mr. Ruzek added that to extend an invitation to Mr. Brosio was up to the Soviet Government, though he left the impression that the Soviet Authorities did not like this mission for the well-known reasons.

21. Foreign Minister Marko, in his turn, associated himself with Ruzek's remarks on MBFR. Marko said that Ambassador Brosio's mission had not been discussed in Warsaw at all, for it only concerned, at present, one member of the Pact, that is the USSR. Marko accused Mr. Brosio of having used in the past, as the Secretary General of NATO, certain words against Czechoslovakia which reminded one of "cold-war" days.

22. Views of Rumanian Government Leaders(1)

Italian Deputy Premier De Martino visited Bucharest during the first half of November. He met with First Deputy Premier Vehdetz, Foreign Minister Manescu, Prime Minister Maurer, and President Ceausescu. The Rumanian leaders were rather reticent concerning MBFR, either because of Rumanian opposition to bloc-to-bloc contacts or simply because of a lack of preparation on their part. They recognized the necessity of achieving important progress in the field of disarmament in order to be able to break out of what Mr. Maurer termed the "vicious circle" in which Europe presently finds itself. In general, however, the Rumanians seemed to have few illusions on this subject.

23. Comments by the Rumanian Ambassador in Bonn(2)

The Rumanian Ambassador in Bonn called on State Secretary Frank of the Foreign Office on 23rd November and explained the Rumanian position on CSCE in considerable detail. In this connection, Ambassador Oancea said the Rumanian Government feels that CSCE should serve as the framework for the discussion of the possibilities for solving the problem of MBFR. However, as proposed in the Budapest Memorandum of June 1970 (see paragraph 1) the details of force reductions should be discussed in a body to be proposed by the Conference or in another framework. The preliminary talks could also extend to various solutions and measures, but what was important was that they not be turned into new conditions or barriers which delayed the work.

24. Views of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister(3)

The late Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bashev, visited Rome on 22nd and 23rd November. He met with the President of the Senate, Mr. Fanfani, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Pertini, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Colombo. On the Bulgarian side, some perplexity was shown with regard to

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- (1) Information provided by the Italian Delegation on 30th November, 1971.
  - (2) Information provided by the German Delegation on 2nd December, 1971.
  - (3) Information provided by the Italian Delegation on 29th November, 1971.

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the Western desire to take up the problem of MBFR in connection with a CSCE. Such a connection, in the Bulgarian view, could impede the work of the Conference inasmuch as the preparations for MBFR are not as far advanced as those for CSCE and, furthermore, the French Government has adopted a particular position. Mr. Bashev expressed the opinion that MBFR should not be the subject of a bloc-to-bloc negotiation. He envisaged the possibility, which he thought would be in the interests of Bulgaria as well as of Italy, that the question of MBFR not be limited to a reduction of forces in Central Europe but be extended to other areas of the Continent.

25. Comments of Yugoslav Ambassador Nincic(1)

The head of the sub-division of the German Foreign Office responsible for CSCE had detailed talks on this subject with Ambassador Nincic, adviser to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in Belgrade on 14th and 15th December. In Yugoslav eyes, a CSCE which did not deal with disarmament measures would lose a good deal of its sense. This applied especially to MBFR, and the Conference should give due expression to the interests of all European states in this subject; it should discuss political principles and collateral measures. The Conference could set up a negotiating body to deal with the more technical aspects of MBFR.

V. CHECK LIST OF OTHER CONTACTS

26. Other contacts, summarized briefly, include the following:

- (a) The Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara(2) said that a CSCE could provide a framework for further discussion of force reductions.
- (b) An official of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs(3) said that his Government was very anxious for a CSCE but was not ready for MBFR; he gave the impression that Warsaw Pact co-ordination on force reductions is not very far advanced.
- (c) The Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw(3) told his Canadian colleague on 29th November that CSCE would be the main agenda item for the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting (see paragraph 1). Force reductions were too complicated, and therefore should be taken up later. The Soviet Ambassador professed to know nothing concerning the status of the Brosio mission.
- (d) A Rumanian source(3) spoke of the danger of a possible bilateral US-USSR accord on force reductions.

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- (1) Information provided by the German Delegation on 23rd December, 1971.
  - (2) Information reported in the Council, 25th November, 1971.
  - (3) Information reported in the Political Committee, 30th November, 1971.

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- (e) A Polish First Secretary in Ankara(1) said he hoped the Brosio mission would take place. He gave the impression that Poland is primarily interested in the withdrawal of foreign forces.
- (f) Rumanian and Polish sources(2) gave contradictory information as to whether force reductions had or had not been discussed at the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Meeting (see paragraph 1). The Polish Ambassador in The Hague(2) said that force reductions had been dealt with but he could give no details.

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- (1) Information reported in the Political Committee, 30th November, 1971.
  - (2) Information reported in the Political Committee, 21st December, 1971.

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