



50- NATO UNCLASSIFIED
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SUMMIT CONFERENCE

SOVIET AND WESTERN POSITIONS

Note by the Political Division

TO: Secretaries of Delegations

FROM: Executive Secretary

I. SOVIET POSITION

A Heads of Government conference should convene in two or three months. The Foreign Ministers should meet later when they can implement agreements reached at the Summit Conference, but can not prevent such a conference being held.

(1) Preferably: All members of NATO
All members of Warsaw Pact
Uncommitted states such as Sweden, Austria, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Egypt, India
(leaving way open for additions or substitutions)

(2) or Some members of NATO
Some members of Warsaw Pact
Unstated number of uncommitted states

(3) or "At least in the first stage" of a Summit Conference:
2 NATO; 2 Warsaw Pact; 2 Uncommitted or
3 NATO; 3 Warsaw Pact; 3 Uncommitted

(4) or "At least in the first stage" of a Summit Conference:
1 NATO; 1 Warsaw Pact; 1 Uncommitted

II. WESTERN POSITION

A Heads of Government Conference could be useful but only if preliminary soundings through diplomatic channels or meetings of Foreign Ministers indicate that such a conference is warranted, France proposes preparatory talks on the Foreign Ministers level.

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On both the preparatory level and at a Heads of Government conference, those states should attend having recognised responsibilities in relation to the subjects under discussion.

III. PERTINENT QUESTIONS

(1) Do we accept the basic Soviet contention that the first step should be a conference at Heads of Government level?

(2) If we insist that any such conference must have adequate preparation to be acceptable, how is this to be done? In particular, do we insist that the procedure for adequate preparation must involve a lower-level meeting (Foreign Ministers or their deputies) before any summit conference?

(3) Whether at "Summit" level, or at Foreign Ministers' level, do we insist that:

- all NATO governments,
- only some NATO governments,
- only three or two or one NATO Government(s)

should participate?

(4) In respect of the answers to (3), in each case are we prepared to accept the participation of all, or (if numbers are restricted) of an equivalent number of members of the Warsaw Pact?

In this connection, would participation by members of the Warsaw Pact involve possibly:

- (a) the question of the recognition of the Pankow régime by members of NATO?
- (b) participation by Kadar?
- (c) difficulties relating to diplomatic relations in certain cases (e.g. US with respect to Bulgaria)?

(5) Again in respect of the answers to question (3) above, are we prepared to admit the participation of either:

- (an unspecified number of) "such states as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria, for instance"
- or an equivalent number of such states, if NATO participants are restricted to three, or two, or one?

(6) How are negotiations to be handled concerning (a) the composition, (b) the agenda and (c) the preparation of any conference? What negotiating tactics offer reduced possibilities of exploitation by the USSR for propagan~~da~~ purposes?

(Signed) A. CASARDI

24th January, 1958