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PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING

Report by the Acting Chairman of the Political Committee

I attach a report written as Acting Chairman of the Political Committee on preparations for the Main Belgrade Meeting discussed by the Political Committee with CSCE experts from capitals on 7th September, 1977.

(Signed) T.A. H. SOLESBY

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PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING

Report by the Acting Chairman of the Political Committee

1. The Political Committee met with CSCE experts from capitals on 7th September, 1977 to discuss preparations for the Main Belgrade Meeting. This discussion amplified the consultations held in the regular Political Committee during and after the Preparatory Meeting.

2. The discussion of the Committee on general strategy and tactics is covered in this report. In addition the exchange of views on more detailed questions relating to the Final Act as a whole, the Declaration of Principles and Basket III is covered in three annexes on

- (A) Suggested Main Themes and Points for Belgrade,
- (B) Suggested proposals to Improve Implementation,
- (C) Possible Western Answers to Criticisms by Warsaw Pact Countries.

GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING

3. The discussion took as its starting point the considerations in the report of the Political Committee endorsed by Ministers in May (C-M(77)29(Final)), in particular that "The Allies should firmly speak out for Western ideals, but a careful balance is required in order to ensure that this is done in a manner most likely to prove effective". Speakers emphasized that events since the Ministerial Council, including the experience gained at the Preparatory Belgrade Meeting, had reaffirmed the validity of those considerations. It was pointed out that the Preparatory Meeting had confirmed that it was possible to press firmly and successfully points of importance to the Allies, as long as this was done in a carefully calculated manner within the limit of pressure which the Soviet Union could be expected to tolerate. The Preparatory Meeting had also shown that their real limit of tolerance, at least as regards the procedural issues under discussion there, was more flexible than suggested by their initial reactions to Western positions.

4. The Committee considered how the "careful balance" referred to in the report to Ministers might be applied to tactics at the Main Meeting, subject to the general proviso that a final decision on tactics could only be taken during the meeting itself in the light of all the circumstances at the time. A general consideration stressed by several speakers was that the Belgrade

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meeting was likely to be the first of a series of such meetings and that it should be viewed as part of a continuing process. How the proceedings at Belgrade developed would be important not only for that meeting, but as establishing the CSCE as a forum for discussing the range of subjects covered in the Final Act and as setting precedents for future meetings.

5. The first aspect of the "careful balance" to be examined by the Committee was the relative importance of various means available to the Allies at Belgrade of using the meeting to achieve the goal defined in the report to Ministers as "to encourage Eastern countries to a more effective implementation of the Final Act in the interest of developing East-West relations in the directions the Allies desire". The main means considered were:

- (a) pressures on the East inherent in the discussions;
- (b) the passages in the Concluding Document on the review of implementation and on the deepening of mutual relations;
- (c) agreement on proposals to improve implementation.

6. All who spoke underlined that all these means were important. At the same time they reaffirmed the view in the report to Ministers that "The review of implementation should be the central task of the Main Belgrade Meeting". The review provided a powerful means of bringing public pressure to bear on Eastern countries for better implementation.

7. There was some difference of emphasis regarding the degree to which the other two means could be used as effective levers for better implementation. Some speakers thought that only modest achievements would prove possible as regards reaching agreement on proposals to improve implementation, and still more modest achievements as regards the contents of the Concluding Document. Others were more optimistic in evaluating the opportunities offered to the Allies by these means, particularly in the area of proposals. One speaker made the additional point that whether or not Western draft proposals would obtain the necessary consensus for adoption, the discussion on them would enable the Allies to maintain the same sort of public pressure on Eastern countries as would be inherent in the review of implementation.

8. The Committee then examined the appropriate levels of criticism and encouragement which Allied Delegations might use in the review of implementation, especially as regards the treatment to be given to human rights and Basket III. The discussion had as its basis the consideration endorsed in the report to Ministers

that the review "should be full, frank and objective, recognising both the achievements and gaps". The following possible levels were considered:

- (a) broad themes setting out the general Western approach to the relevant Final Act provisions and their implementation;
- (b) description of the general standard of compliance in Western countries as a point of comparison (avoiding a statistical approach);
- (c) references to general areas in which gaps to implementation by Eastern countries remain;
- (d) specifying the obstacles in greater detail;
- (e) naming Eastern countries which are the worst offenders as regards specific gaps in implementation;
- (f) naming groups or categories of people affected by gaps in implementation (e.g. ethnic and religious groups, Helsinki monitoring groups, other categories of people experiencing shared difficulties);
- (g) naming individual outstanding cases (i.e. the case of Mrs. X).

9. All speakers accepted that all these levels had their full value and should be kept open as options. The main emphasis was placed on options (a)-(d), especially for the opening public plenary statements. Several speakers stated that it was desirable that the discussion should also be kept at this level later in the meeting as far as the circumstances warranted. All speakers, with varying degrees of emphasis, kept open the possibility of naming individual Eastern countries as being the worst offenders (as well as providing positive examples of implementation) and of naming groups and categories of people (options (e)-(f)), especially at the stage of the Subsidiary Working Bodies and if the Eastern countries adopted an aggressive stance or if it was necessary in order to illustrate a pattern to which Delegations wished to call attention. Some speakers saw advantage in such a controlled and restrained use of options (e)-(f): mentioning specific problems would make the CSCE process more credible. The possibility of naming individual outstanding cases (option (g)) was also not ruled out, but several speakers stressed the need to weigh carefully the effect this might have on the individuals concerned.

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10. It was strongly stressed that if options (e)-(g) were used it would be important to keep the tone of presentation non-polemical. How an argument was presented could be as significant as what it contained. It was also widely recognised that events outside the meeting could affect the level of criticism, especially should there be further large-scale arrests of dissidents or trials of dissident leaders.

11. The German Delegate asked that if other Allied Delegations at Belgrade intended to refer to situations concerning German nationals they should consult his Delegation first.

12. The importance of the opening statements in plenary were stressed, both in setting the tone of the meeting as a whole, and in view of their public information role. The appropriate level of criticism and encouragement for opening statements is discussed in paragraph 9. It was recognised that the opening statements would give Allied Delegations the opportunity for a broad-brush assessment of all aspects of the CSCE experience since Helsinki and a description of their expectations for the Belgrade Meeting. Several Allies had suggested appropriate themes for these statements: these are to be found in the paper on main themes at Annex A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING

13. It was widely agreed that the organizational structure in the Decisions adopted by the Preparatory Meeting represented as satisfactory an outcome for the Allies as could reasonably have been expected. The Decisions contained all the main points desired by the Allies, though in some instances with an element of ambiguity which could lead to procedural arguments at the Main Meeting.

14. The Decisions reflected the Allied position in stating that the Subsidiary Working Bodies (SWBs) would conduct the "thorough exchange of views" on implementation and on the deepening of mutual relations, including proposals, "in a sequential and structured way according to the Final Act". Speakers considered that this passage should help the Allies to ensure that a SWB completed its progress through the various sub-chapters of the Final Act within its competence before drafting passages for the Concluding Document; to counter efforts to jumble together several unrelated sections of a Basket; and to keep the SWBs to the examination of the implementation record before getting deeply into negotiation of new proposals. It was emphasized that the organizational approach should allow some variation in treatment of the different subject areas.

15. Two tactical problems were identified as needing further consultation. Over how large an area of provisions should the review of implementation be completed before moving on to the discussion of forward-looking aspects (e.g. a single provision, sub-chapter, chapter, Basket)? To what degree, if at all, should the Allies attempt to give a flexible interpretation to the ambiguous wording of the early deadline for submission of proposals?

CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

16. The discussion on the Concluding Document was of a preliminary nature as the views of the Allies were still only partly formulated.

17. All speakers considered that the Concluding Document should be of a lesser status than the Final Act, and should not modify Final Act provisions. Its main thrust should be to re-focus attention on the need for full implementation of the Final Act. While some speakers wished to emphasize the lower status of the Final Act, e.g. by keeping it short and having no signatures, others preferred this to be decided only when it became clearer how favourable the content would be to the West. The importance of the Concluding Document for public opinion in both Western and Eastern countries was widely stressed.

18. The main sections of the document were seen as: a factual description of the meeting; political conclusions of the meeting on the review of implementation and on the deepening of mutual relations; and decisions of the meeting on proposals to improve implementation, on any requests addressed to international organizations, on experts meetings and on the next Belgrade-type meeting.

19. It was suggested that the opening passages of the document might contain a statement of the common desire of all participating states that the CSCE process should contribute to the advancement of détente.

20. Several speakers thought that the passage on the review of implementation should be short. It might state that the meeting had carried out a thorough and comprehensive review. The main point to stress might be that some progress had been achieved in certain fields but much still remained to be done. One speaker suggested adding that progress had been achieved in certain cases only after considerable effort and hardship on the part of individuals and governments concerned, and that there could be no guarantee that the progress would prove permanent while the underlying obstacles to implementation remained.

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21. Some speakers thought that in order to reflect Western views fully, the text of closing or specially drafted statements by all Delegations should be attached as Annexes, with an undertaking that these would be treated as integral parts of the document for the purposes of publication. Others were sceptical about the likelihood of obtaining such an undertaking and therefore of the value of appending statements. They stressed that all the points of importance to the West should be inserted into the main document rather than in Annexes, because of the danger that Eastern governments would omit any Annexes they disliked when publishing the document.

22. Several speakers emphasized that the passage on the deepening of mutual relations should contain a clear reaffirmation by participating states of the importance they attached to the full and early implementation of all parts of the Final Act, and their determination to continue to work, unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally, to achieve this objective both in their international and domestic policies. It would be essential to obtain a statement on these lines. Equal emphasis should be placed on all the Baskets of the Final Act.

23. A passage on the Mediterranean could be included in the section on deepening of mutual relations. Speakers emphasized that this passage should not be negotiated with non-participating Mediterranean countries, though it should take their views into account.

24. As regards proposals to improve implementation, all speakers considered that at least a basic description of agreed proposals should be included in the main document. However there were differing views on whether detailed texts should be appended in an Annex. The point was again made that such an Annex might not be published in the Eastern countries. It was suggested that detailed mandates of the experts meetings might be put in an Annex.

25. There was widespread agreement that public opinion needed to be given realistic expectations of the likely content of the Concluding Document, and should realise that the value of the Belgrade meeting should not be judged solely by its text.

26. The French Delegate said that her authorities were preparing an outline schema for the Concluding Document. This was welcomed by other Delegations. The Acting Chairman suggested that all Delegations who had ideas to contribute should circulate them as soon as possible.

MAIN THEMES FOR BELGRADE

27. The Committee considered the main themes and points relating to the Final Act as a whole, the Declaration of Principles and Basket III which various Allies had suggested for possible use at the Belgrade meeting as individual Delegations considered appropriate. These suggestions seemed to be broadly complementary.

28. A list of these themes and points is attached at Annex A.

PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION

29. The Committee examined possible proposals relating to the Final Act as a whole, the Declaration of Principles and Basket III which individual Allied Delegations might wish to present at the Belgrade Meeting. The tactical circumstances in which Allied Delegations might present these proposals were considered, and three categories were identified:

- (a) proposals to be pursued positively, either by formal tabling or orally;
- (b) proposals which might be used as informal ideas;
- (c) proposals to be reserved for tactical use only, e.g. in response to undesirable Eastern proposals.

A number of the proposals in category (b) could, if necessary for tactical purposes, be presented formally in addition to being referred to as informal ideas. In addition certain proposals were identified as not now being pursued by an Ally.

30. One speaker suggested that it would be preferable for the Allies not to link any proposal solely to a Principle: the relevant proposals now under consideration by the Allies should be linked to the Final Act as a whole.

31. A paper containing the list of possible proposals, grouped according to the categories described above, is attached at Annex B. The paper incorporates comments put forward inter alia during the Committee's meeting on 7th September. The whole question of proposals remains under consideration and the list is therefore still tentative.

32. There was some discussion of what the Allies might use as bargaining counters in attempting to obtain Eastern agreement to proposals tabled by the Allies. It was widely considered that the Allies could make some use both of the Eastern wish for an early conclusion to the meeting and of their wish for the Concluding Document to contain an agreed statement on the favourable

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prospects for further progress in détente. The Allies might also make some play of the possibility of tabling other proposals inimicable to the East, or, conversely, of their readiness to withdraw certain proposals already tabled in return for Eastern agreement on others.

33. There was some difference of view on how far the Allies were likely to be able to accept Eastern proposals. Some speakers argued that there was a need for some openness by the Allies in order to obtain Eastern agreement to worthwhile Allied proposals, to avoid the possibly harmful effect on Western public opinion if most Allied proposals were known to have been rejected, and to make the outcome reasonably acceptable to those Soviet leaders who were sceptical about the advantages of détente. Other speakers however did not accept the need to make substantial concessions. They argued that the main goal of the Allies was better implementation of the existing provisions of the Final Act and that Western proposals would merely be aimed at improving implementation of those provisions; that the Final Act already represented a compromise between Western and Eastern wishes; and that it would not be suitable or a wise precedent for the future to make concessions to the East in order to achieve implementation. They also argued that the main means of encouraging fuller implementation was the pressure inherent in the discussions at Belgrade, and that they did not attach sufficient priority to the new proposals aspect of the meeting to be ready to make substantial concessions.

POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS MEETINGS

34. The discussion took as its starting point the consideration endorsed in the report to Ministers that some experts meetings "may be worthwhile, but careful control over numbers, subject-matter, balance and mandate is required".

35. Some speakers stressed the risk of creeping proliferation and the need to arrive soon at a considered judgement on whether experts meetings were desirable and which might be in Allied interests and which would not. Other speakers thought that it would be premature to attempt to form such a judgement, and that decisions on experts meetings should be taken in the light of the degree of progress made during the meeting on proposals of interest to the Allies.

WESTERN ANSWERS TO EASTERN CRITICISMS

36. Several speakers expressed appreciation for the paper presented by the Italian Delegation on "Possible Western answers to criticisms by Warsaw Pact countries", and said that they were

in general agreement with its contents. This paper, which incorporates contributions made by several Allies, is attached as Annex C.

FRG QUESTIONNAIRE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECRETARIAT COUNTRY PAPERS ON HUMAN CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

37. Several speakers underlined the usefulness of the paper on human rights being prepared by the Federal Republic of Germany and of the country papers on human contacts and information being prepared by the International Secretariat, in both cases with the collaboration of Embassies in Eastern capitals of those Allies who wished to take part. Several speakers said that these papers would play a valuable part in briefing their Delegations to the Main Meeting.

SUGGESTED MAIN THEMES AND POINTS FOR BELGRADE

ON THE FINAL ACT AS A WHOLE, THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND BASKET III

The following is a catalogue of main themes and points relating to the Final Act as a whole, to the Declaration on Principles and to Basket III, which have been suggested by various Allies for possible use at the Belgrade meeting as individual Delegations consider appropriate. The suggestions have attracted significant support among the Allies and/or have aroused no significant objections.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS AND ANY GENERAL DISCUSSION

- (a) The desire of the Allies to continue the multilateral CSCE process during and after Belgrade. Their wish that the Belgrade meeting should contribute to the advancement of détente.
- (b) The considerable political significance the Allies attach to the Final Act, despite the fact that it is not legally binding. Its importance not only in East-West relations but also in relations between all participating states.
- (c) The Final Act represents a commitment by signatories to work for improvements in all areas taken up at the Conference. The Allies attach the highest importance to full and rapid implementation of all its provisions.
- (d) The Declaration of Principles sets a standard for relations between states. In Baskets II and III the signatories undertake to make specific improvements in a number of areas. There should be a thorough exchange of views on all parts of the Final Act, specific undertakings and relations between States alike.
- (e) The CSCE process is a long term affair which will take time to make its full mark. Belgrade is a first checkpoint down a long road. However, even after two years, significant progress should already have been made.
- (f) The approach to the Belgrade follow-up meeting adopted by Western countries is constructive and forward-looking. It is based on the central importance of the Final Act to the CSCE process and on our belief that if the process is to continue we must be aware

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of areas where improvement is needed. The Final Act should be the centre of discussions at Belgrade, a review of implementation of its provisions the key theme. This naturally includes considering ways and means to facilitate and improve implementation.

- (g) An important area where progress should be made concerns the right of individual citizens to partake of the advantages proposed in the Final Act. It is essential both for the CSCE process and for détente as a whole that the benefits of the Final Act are seen in tangible improvements for the lives of individuals.
- (h) CSCE requires co-operation between governments and peoples. Individuals and non-governmental organizations have a vital rôle in ensuring its success. A proper balance must be struck between the interests of governments, and the interests of peoples and individuals.
- (i) There is room for improvement in implementation by all signatories, including those in the West. We are willing to listen to all comments about our own implementation and to attempt to improve our record. Nevertheless, the West starts from a high level of implementation. The Final Act reflects a standard of conduct which we have largely followed for many years. We are determined to ensure that our implementation is as full as possible, and have taken a number of steps, where we needed to, to bring our practices further into line with the Final Act. Certain countries, which started from a low threshold, have made some progress in a number of areas, but movement has been limited and much remains to be done. Willingness by all participants to improve implementation is a touchstone of their sincerity and belief in the process of détente.
- (j) The support the Allies have given to multilateral follow-up in the ECE and UNESCO.
- (k) The importance we attach to allowing the individual citizen freely to express his views on the implementation of the Final Act.
- (l) The importance we attach to governments encouraging a freer flow of information, freer movement and contacts between persons, leading to the lowering of barriers.
- (m) The importance we attach to participating states conducting their relations with all other states in accordance with the Declaration of Principles,

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reflecting the view that détente is indivisible and cannot be confined to Europe.

- (n) We should stress our concept of détente including the concept of human rights as an essential element in détente, the global and total nature of détente, and the need for restraint and a stable balance in the military field. Détente cannot be applied selectively either as to subject matter or to geographical area.
- (o) The essential connection between détente in Europe and the situation of Berlin.
- (p) The West should focus on specific actions to promote détente since Helsinki, the misgivings about certain developments (e.g. Soviet military build-up, lack of progress in SALT and MBFR), and actions necessary for the future.
- (q) The value of the activities of the Council of Europe. The Allies welcome the contribution to the improvement of East-West relations made by the neutral countries of Europe.
- (r) The need for all participating governments to co-operate more effectively in the fight against terrorism.
- (s) The Allies welcome the various positive developments in the field of European security that have taken place since Helsinki (e.g. the Osimo Treaty of November, 1975, the FRG-Polish Agreement of October, 1975, the movement towards closer co-operation in the Balkans, the development of the EEC's relations with the non-participating Mediterranean states, and the co-operation of the Mediterranean states on environmental problems).

BASKET I: PRINCIPLES

In general discussion of the Declaration on Principles and its preamble we should point out:

- (a) That all the principles apply fully to relations between all participating states, and not just between those with different economic and social systems.
- (b) The interdependence and primary significance of all the principles (as defined in the first final clause of the Declaration on Principles).

Particular references to which we shall wish to lay stress are:

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I. Sovereign Equality

The right to an independent internal and foreign policy.
The right to change frontiers peacefully.

II. Refraining from the Use of Force

The connection with Inviolability of Frontiers.
Application of this principle in the first place to relations between all participating states, but also to "their international relations in general".
The first two sentences of paragraph 2 contain useful formulae against the Brezhnev Doctrine.

III. Inviolability of Frontiers

We should make a clear restatement of the West's interpretation of this principle including: the principle is defined with a clear connotation of violence and illegality; it is a corollary of the non-use of force principle (Principle II) which immediately precedes it; and it has to be read together with the statement on the admissibility of peaceful change of frontiers (Principle I).

IV. Territorial Integrity of States

The link might be emphasized between respect for territorial integrity and the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force or from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations' Charter. It might also be stressed that the principle reaffirms that the occupation or acquisition of territory by forceful means in contravention of international law will not be recognized as legal.

V. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

In this context we should take note of the proposed meeting of experts to which we are already committed under the Final Act.

VI. Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs

We should restate our view that it prohibits interventions in affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of participating states, particularly those involving the use of force or coercion or the threat of using them. In no way does it lessen the extent to which those states are committed to putting into effect

all the provisions of the Final Act, which have become proper matters for discussion between the signatory states and thus no longer fall exclusively within domestic competence. Nor does it detract from the right of participating states to comment on, or express concern about, the implementation of the Final Act provisions. This will mean retracing some very well-trodden ground; but it will be an essential feature of the Belgrade exercise.

We should, if necessary, strongly contest the Warsaw Pact states' interpretation of this principle and their attempt to use it to negate the application of provisions of the Final Act which they find awkward.

VII. Respect for Human Rights

- (a) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential both for the free and full development of the human person and for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among states. This two-fold importance of human rights is recognized by the participating states in the Final Act. There is a vital link between the maintenance of, and further progress in, the détente process and the way in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is ensured in all participating countries.
- (b) Our duty to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms is stated in the Final Act as a principle both in regard to the activities of states in their own territory and also in regard to international co-operation, i.e. it applies unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally. Governments should be prepared to meet criticisms by other governments about deficiencies in their human rights performance which are made seriously in the context of the provisions of the Final Act.
- (c) The need not only to respect in a general sense human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also to guarantee their actual exercise. The real test of a participating state's serious intention to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms lies not only in its adoption of legislation but in the practices its authorities follow.
- (d) The right of each individual to know his rights and to act upon them. An unimpeded dialogue on human rights between individuals and their government should be a primary concern of governments. Individuals should be able, without penalty, to collect and transmit information about implementation of the Final Act by their own and other governments.

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- (e) We should draw specific attention to the clauses of this principle relating to religious freedom, and to the rights of national minorities. In this context it may be worth pointing out that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which must be regarded as one of the obligations referred to in the final sub-section of the Article) states inter alia that "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law"; and enjoins that ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities "shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language".
- (f) There has been little identifiable fundamental improvement in the situation regarding human rights since the Final Act was signed. In some instances, there would appear to have been a net deterioration in the treatment accorded persons who have insisted on observance of their countries' constitutions and international commitments.

VIII. Equal Rights and Self Determination of Peoples

As with the reference to the right to an independent internal and foreign policy set out in Principle I this also provides useful ammunition against the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" and we should stress the principle as necessary to permit peaceful change.

IX. Co-operation

We should emphasize the significance of this principle in contributing to the development of co-operation between participating states and, in particular the elements in it which support the wider rôle of co-operation as a means of broadening contacts and better understanding among peoples. The reference in the third sub-paragraph to the implicitly independent rôle of "persons" in developing co-operation is particularly important in this connection.

X. Fulfilment in Good Faith of Obligations under International Law

The second sentence says that states should, in exercising their sovereign rights, conform with their international legal obligations and pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act. It should be stressed to counter

Soviet arguments based on the supremacy of their internal laws and regulations and the Soviet line on Principle VI.

MATTERS RELATED TO GIVING EFFECT TO CERTAIN OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES

We should demonstrate that we attach some importance to the non-use of force text which was a Romanian initiative. The references to the Declaration on Principles and the repetition of certain phrases from various principles in a text referring to the implementation of one principle underline the Western position that the principles, in their interpretation and their application, are interdependent, each being interpreted in the context of the other principles. The text might also be said to emphasize the need for participating states to put fully into practice all the principles in the Declaration in their day-to-day relations with all other participating states.

On the peaceful settlement of disputes text, see Principle V above.

BASKET III: HUMAN CONTACTS

Main theme

The need for "freer movement and contacts" among people.

General themes

(i) The importance we attach to freer movement and contacts, especially among individuals, as an integral part of our concept of détente. Basket III recognizes "the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of relations and trust among peoples".

(ii) Apart from the intrinsic importance for détente of freer movement and contact, progress in this field is essential in order to ensure public support for other aspects of détente.

(iii) As signatories of the Final Act, governments have given clear undertakings to facilitate freer movement and contacts and to contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems that arise in this connection (Preamble Human Contacts).

(iv) These undertakings should be fully implemented. In some respects full implementation will take some time, but the Preamble to the Human Contacts section makes clear that its specific provisions are meant to be implemented "now". After two years we consider that significant progress should already have been made.

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(v) Some progress has been made by Eastern countries and this is to be welcomed. But there is still a need for considerable improvement in Eastern implementation. We trust that the Belgrade meeting will lead to accelerated progress in removing obstacles to freer movement and contacts. In particular we hope that outstanding and future applications will be given positive and non-discriminatory consideration. The main requirement is for unilateral implementation.

(vi) The continuing discrimination against Eastern citizens wishing to travel to the West is contrary to Basket III which makes clear that its provisions apply equally to all signatory states. Chances of success are generally far less, procedures are more complicated and time-consuming and administrative costs are generally much higher than for travel to Eastern countries.

(vii) The demand to travel for family meetings and reunification and binational marriages arises from the wish, inherent in human nature, to be with one's family. It is primarily a humanitarian matter, as Basket III recognizes. Applications should be treated in this light.

Detailed points

It should be recognized that the arguments below do not apply to the same degree to all Eastern countries, and in some cases are not found at all in certain countries.

(1) Contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, reunification of families, marriage between citizens of different states

(a) Implementation of the undertakings in the Final Act to consider applications "favourably" (family meetings), "in a positive and humanitarian spirit" (family reunification) and "favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations" (binational marriages) has been only imperfectly and unevenly undertaken. The basic difficulty is that many applications to leave East European countries are still subject to refusal, often repeated over many months or years.

(b) Even urgent cases (e.g. illness, death) are frequently still refused or not given priority treatment.

(c) There is considerable discrimination in the treatment of applicants, e.g. against specialists and male spouses.

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(d) Some cases involving the reunification of children (including minors) with their parents are among those which are still refused or subject to long delays; though relatively few in number, the humanitarian arguments for their early solution are strong.

(e) Cases of discrimination against, and actual harassment of individuals applying for family meetings, reunification or binational marriage continue to occur.

(f) Application procedures are difficult and involve long delay: information on these procedures is not easily available to applicants: the refusal is not always notified to the applicant.

(g) Aspiring applicants face financial difficulties: high cost of some exit documents; insufficient allotment of foreign exchange and demands for affidavit of support from family member to be visited abroad; in some cases confiscation of property of family reunification emigrants and undue limitation on amount of household and personal effects they may take with them; reimbursement of educational costs.

(h) A maximum duration and frequency is placed on visits abroad including for family meetings.

(i) The practice of ensuring that one member of the family remains behind makes it difficult for families to travel together for family meetings.

(j) Difficulty of access to Western Embassies for purposes of seeking information on procedures to be followed.

(k) While the obstacles to the entry of Western visitors to Eastern countries for family visits are fewer than those to the exit of would-be Eastern visitors, applications are still sometimes refused or subject to long delays (and in a few cases Western visitors have subsequent difficulty in leaving the Eastern country) and compulsory currency conversion requirements can cause hardship in some cases.

(2) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons, Improvement of Conditions for Tourism

(a) There has been only imperfect and uneven implementation of the undertakings in the Final Act to "facilitate wider travel" and "promote the development of tourism". In particular many applications to leave Eastern countries for travel and tourism are refused or subject to long delay. The difficulties are particularly great for private individuals (as opposed to travel on official business and group tourism).

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(b) Applicants for travel and tourism from Eastern countries meet some of the same difficulties as applicants for family meetings, reunification and binational marriage:- discrimination in considering applications, long and difficult procedures, reason for refusals not given, maximum frequency and duration of visits, high cost of exit documents, need to leave behind a member of the family, difficulty of access to foreign Embassies.

(c) Currency restrictions on Eastern travellers greatly restrict opportunities for travel abroad (especially private tourists): these partly reflect economic difficulties but also the low priority given to making currency available for this purpose.

(d) There are far fewer obstacles to the entry of Western visitors to the East than to exit from those countries. However, there are still difficulties in a number of Eastern countries, such as the need for prior approval of itinerary and restrictions on movement, minimum currency exchange requirements, various requirements as regards hotel accommodation, discriminatory charges for foreigners in hotels.

(e) The contrast between the difficulties experienced by Eastern citizens wishing to leave their country to travel to the West and lack of restrictions on Western citizens wishing to leave their country to travel to the East is reflected in the fact that the number of Western tourists visiting Warsaw Pact countries is far higher than the number of tourists from the latter visiting the West.

(f) The fact that the Final Act's provision confirming that religious faiths etc. .. can "have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information" has not been uniformly observed in all East European countries (e.g. the Soviet Union).

(3) Other aspects

There are other difficulties whose removal would seem required by the general undertakings in the Final Act to facilitate contacts as well as to facilitate freer movement:-

(a) imposition of unduly high duties on gifts and monies provided by persons in other states;

(b) difficulties sometimes apparently experienced in telephone and letter communication with individuals in foreign countries.

INFORMATION

Main theme

The need for freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds. The importance of freer access:- by the general public to information, by journalists to their sources.

General themes

(i) The importance we attach to freer and wider dissemination of all kinds of information as an integral part of the process of distribution. Basket III (e.g. main preamble) recognizes the contribution made by the broader dissemination of information to the strengthening of peace and understanding.

(ii) As signatories of the Final Act, governments have given their undertakings to facilitate freer and wider dissemination of information (Information mini-preamble).

(iii) Some progress has been made, but our disappointment that it has not been more rapid and substantial.

(iv) The "ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating states" (Information mini-preamble), depends on the freer circulation of a variety of views rather than of views which are strictly controlled by state authorities.

(v) The flow of information should be determined by the choice of the individual as to what he wishes to read, see and hear.

Detailed points

(1) Improvement of the Circulation of Access to and Exchange of Information

(a) The East's disappointing record in increasing the number of Western newspapers and periodicals imported, especially as regards the number of copies of the various titles.

(b) General failure to improve the severely restricted access by the public to Western newspapers and periodicals (sales points are mainly for tourists and a few nationals rather than the general public, restricted library access) and to develop possibilities for taking out subscriptions to Western publications.

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(c) Our disappointment at continuing jamming of some Western radio stations.

(2) Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists

(a) Continuing difficulties for journalists in travelling freely around USSR.

(b) Continuing difficulty in communicating personally with their sources in Eastern countries.

(c) The need for Eastern governments to avoid the discriminatory treatment of journalists, e.g. by denying them visas or expelling them for views expressed by them or their newspapers or TV or radio media they represent.

(d) Some continuing difficulties in obtaining approval of projects (especially film projects) and in bringing in technical personnel (especially TV).

CO-OPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATIONMain theme

Freedom of access and choice by the individual.

General themes

We should restate our philosophy of freedom of choice for the individual to read, see, learn and meet what or whom he pleases, and emphasize the independence and diversity of cultural life in the West. We should use these points to counter the barrage of statistics which the East have prepared.

Detailed points

(a) Difficulties of arranging exchanges outside the cultural agreements and programmes (e.g. East Europeans seldom get permission to travel if invited directly by individuals or non-official organizations in Western countries).

(b) The fact that Western books (as distinct from translations of selected Western literature published in the Soviet Union and other East European countries) are rarely available for purchase by the general public. This contrasts sharply with practice in Western Europe where Russian and East European books are freely available.

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(c) Practical and financial problems which West European nationals meet when staying in the main East European centres if travelling outside the official agreements and programmes.

(d) Access to and information about archives is still not given as readily as it should be.

(e) Problems about access to colleagues (except with official sponsorship).

(f) Unwillingness of the East Europeans formally to recognize the need for direct contact between institutions (e.g. universities) in arranging exchanges without the mediation of state authorities.

(g) The obstacles to communication between scholars, e.g. non-arrival of letters, difficulties in making arrangements at a distance. Complaints are often received that foreign visitors are unable to make contact with the experts they wish to see in their field. Similarly, East Europeans invited to Western European countries are often said to be unable to take up invitations, without any good reason being given.

(h) Freedom to travel is still not available to students and scholars visiting the Soviet Union. Western visitors complain that they are denied on spurious grounds access to towns where the material they need is situated.

(i) The importance of facilitating the contribution which national minorities and regional cultures can make towards co-operation in various fields of culture and education, taking into account the legitimate interests of their members. The Soviet Union and Romania are not implementing this provision with regard to certain of the minorities existing within their territories.

MEDITERRANEAN

(a) We continue to attach importance to our relationship with the non-participating Mediterranean states.

(b) Believing that the strengthening of security and the intensification of co-operation in Europe would also benefit the Mediterranean region, we intend to contribute towards the achievement of peace, security and justice in the area.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING
SUGGESTED PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION
(THE FINAL ACT AS A WHOLE/THE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES AND BASKET III)

The proposals listed in the attached Appendix relating to the Final Act as a whole/the Declaration of Principles and to Basket III have been suggested by various Allies as being possibly suitable for presentation by individual Allies at the main Belgrade Meeting. The whole question of proposals is still under consideration by Allied authorities, and the list is tentative.

The list is divided into four sections:-

- (A) proposals to be pursued positively, either by formal tabling or orally;
- (B) proposals which might be used as informal ideas;
- (C) proposals to be reserved for tactical use only (e.g. in response to undesirable Eastern proposals);
- (D) proposals which are not now being pursued by an Ally.

A number of the proposals contained in category (B) could, if necessary for tactical purposes, be presented formally, in addition to being referred to informally.

The proposals listed have attracted significant support among the Allies and/or have aroused no significant objections, except in those cases where it is otherwise indicated. Proposals or parts of proposals on which one or more Allies have voiced reservations are indicated by square brackets ([]). Parts of proposals which one or more Allies have suggested might be added to a proposal and which are still being considered by other Allies are indicated by underlining. Where alternatives "EITHER" "OR" are given, some Allies prefer one alternative and some the other, but, unless otherwise indicated, could live with either alternative.

In most cases it is not yet clear which Delegation will sponsor what proposal. The source of the latest text of each proposal is given in the comments column with the following abbreviations:-

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- Belgium (1) - latest text in Belgian paper of
2nd September, 1977, "Proposals for
Improved Implementation" (GT(77)45).
- Belgium (2) - Belgian paper "Les Droits de l'Homme"
- Canada - Canadian papers of 7th July and
16th August, 1977
- CM - Annex to C-M(77)29(Final)
- IS - ISD/158, LSD/162, oral ISD suggestion.

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
A. <u>PROPOSALS TO BE PURSUED POSITIVELY,</u> <u>EITHER BY FORMAL TABLING OR ORALLY</u>	
<u>GENERAL/DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES/</u>	
<u>Rights of individuals to pursue</u> <u>implementation of the Final Act</u>	One Ally dis-likes any link to Principles
<u>EITHER</u>	
"Recognize the right of the individual both to impart information on these rights to others and also freely to express his views on the implementation of the Final Act."	Belgium (1)
"Also recognize the right of the individual to full protection against any measures being directed against him for pursuing such activities".	Belgium (1)
<u>OR</u>	
"Right of the individual to know and act upon his rights implies his rights to divulge information on these rights to others".	CM
"Recognize the rôle played by individuals, institutions and non-governmental bodies in the process of securing the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act, and their corresponding right /to assist signatory governments/ to this end, including where necessary to point out instances of non-implementation".	Belgium (1) One Ally has reservations on "to assist"
<u>Human Rights</u>	
"Les Etats participants décident de convoquer une réunion d'experts dont l'ordre du jour sera:	Belgium (2)

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PROPOSALSCOMMENTS

(a) étudier la manière dont le principe des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales est respecté et mis en oeuvre dans les pays participants, en prenant pour base tant l'Acte Final lui-même que les documents internationaux cités dans son texte;

This proposal is still under consideration

(b) étudier les moyens propres à assurer une meilleure mise en oeuvre de ce principe, en particulier:

- l'étude des règles administratives qui, par des interprétations trop restrictives, peuvent faire obstacle à une application pleine et entière des droits inscrits dans la loi;
- l'adaptation des règlements et, si nécessaire, les lois elles-mêmes, en vue de mettre la pratique en harmonie avec les principes généraux des documents internationaux pertinents, etc.

(c) établir une liste des moyens précités que les Etats seraient disposés à utiliser pour promouvoir un meilleur respect et une meilleure mise en oeuvre du principe".

Human Rights

["Resolve that, where this has not already been done, they will ratify or accede to and fully comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to its Optional Protocol and to make a declaration under Article 41 of the Covenant so that the Human Rights Committee may receive and deal with communications relating to violations of human rights from both individuals and governments".]

Canada
Several Allies have reservations about this proposal

<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>Ideological Détente</u>	Canada Several Allies have reservations about this proposal
<p>∟ⁿ(A) They will respect each other's right freely to choose and live under its own political, social and economic systems.</p>	
<p>(B) They will refrain from interfering or intervening in the affairs of other states in the name of the 'ideological struggle'".</p>	
<p>(C) They will respect the right of peoples freely to choose their political, social and economic systems.</p>	
<p>(D) They will encourage the free competition of ideas and to this end they will not impede large-scale dissemination within their jurisdiction of information concerning various political, social and economic systems".<u>7</u></p>	
<u>BASKET III</u>	
<u>Elimination of currency exchange requirements</u>	
<u>EITHER</u>	
<p>"Endeavour to reduce and eliminate requirements on visitors to convert specified amounts of foreign currency."</p>	CM Some Allies attach importance to "elimination" and "travel"
<p>(Family visits, travel)</p>	

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>"To alleviate the cost of visits by citizens of other participating states on the basis of family ties by reducing minimum exchange requirements [and waive any requirements for advance hotel reservations".]</p> <p>(Family visits)</p>	<p>Belgium (1) Some Allies have reservations about the last phrase when linked only to family visits</p>
<p><u>Information for applicants</u></p> <p>"Applicants should be provided with full information on the procedures to be followed". (Family visits, reunification and marriage)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">-----</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>EITHER</u></p> <p>Add to previous proposal:- "and, when applications are refused, applicants should be fully and promptly informed of the refusal so that the applications may be renewed if desired by the applicants".</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>["Provide applicants whose applications are refused with full reasons for the refusal".]</p> <p>(Family visits, reunification and marriage)</p>	<p>Belgium (1)</p> <p>IS This suggested addition is under consideration</p> <p>CM Several Allies have reservations about this proposal.</p>

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p><u>Fees</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>EITHER</u></p> <p>["They will aim to make fees for entry or exit visas, in cases where these are required, the same for visits to and from all participating States. They will interpret an 'acceptable' or 'moderate' level of fees for travel documents as meaning not more than the equivalent of one week's average wage as expressed in their respective official statistics".</p> <p>(Family visits, reunification, marriage, travel)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>"Abolish fees for exit permits where they exist. Abolish fees for entry and exit visas for tourism. Minimise the level of fees charged for the issue or renewal of a passport".</p> <p>(Family visits, reunification, marriage, travel, tourism)</p>	<p>Belgium (1) Some Allies have reservations about the first sentence</p> <p>CM</p>
<p><u>Acceptance of applications</u></p> <p>"They will give <u>positive</u>, rapid and non-discriminatory consideration to outstanding and future individual cases of <u>family visits</u>, family reunification and marriage involving citizens of other participating States and will make every effort to <u>grant such applications</u>".</p> <p>(<u>Family visits</u>, reunification and marriage)</p>	<p>Belgium (1) FRG might co-sponsor. Consideration is being given to strengthening text e.g. on lines indicated</p>

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p><u>Rights of applicants</u></p> <p>"Applicants and their families will in no way suffer any form of discrimination in employment, housing, access to social services or other benefits normally available to them as a direct or indirect consequence of making such applications".</p> <p>(<u>Family visits</u>, reunification and marriage)</p>	<p>Belgium (1) Extension to family visits under consideration</p>
<p><u>Multiple entry visas for family visits</u></p> <p>"To facilitate family visits on a regular basis, the participating States will upon application endeavour to provide multiple entry visas valid for up to one year to citizens of other participating States for the purpose of such visits".</p> <p>(Family visits)</p>	<p>Belgium (1) Tentative suggestion only still under consideration</p>
<p><u>Validity of passports</u></p> <p>"To reduce requirements for exit visas to leave their countries, when these are currently required, and to issue passports which are valid for not less than 5 years, for an unlimited number of journeys, and for travel in all the participating States".</p> <p>(All human contacts areas)</p>	<p>Belgium (1)</p>

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p data-bbox="419 524 775 560"><u>Access to archives</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 591 1110 790">"To encourage libraries, research institutes and similar bodies in their territories to make available catalogues and lists of archival material open to scholars of other participating States".</p>	<p data-bbox="1251 591 1465 627">Belgium (1)</p>
<p data-bbox="323 864 1054 931">B. <u>PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE USED AS INFORMAL IDEAS</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 960 560 996"><u>GENERAL</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 1028 919 1064"><u>Availability of Final Act</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 1095 1070 1189">"Recognize the need to continue to make the Final Act easily available to all their citizens".</p>	<p data-bbox="1251 1095 1465 1131">Belgium (1)</p>
<p data-bbox="419 1270 624 1305"><u>BASKET III</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 1337 523 1373"><u>Gifts</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 1404 1094 1561">"Unduly high taxes or other duties on gifts or money provided by persons in other States [to applicants] will be reduced or eliminated".</p>	<p data-bbox="1251 1404 1513 1592">Belgium (1) Some Allies have reservations about "to applicants"</p>
<p data-bbox="419 1662 802 1697"><u>Access to Embassies</u></p> <p data-bbox="419 1729 1177 2054">"Not to discourage, restrict or hinder any person in their territory from meeting or communicating with officials of missions of other participating States in the premises of those missions or from using the facilities of cultural establishments of such States, provided the diplomatic and cultural officials concerned have no objections</p>	<p data-bbox="1251 1729 1465 1765">Belgium (1)</p>

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p>To confirm that the rights and obligations of their citizens concerned will not be modified as a direct or indirect result of such action".</p>	
<p><u>Journalists' reference material</u></p> <p>"To grant to journalists of the participating States the right to import, subject only to it being taken out again, personal reference material necessary for the exercise of their profession".</p>	Belgium (1)
<p><u>Foreign Press Associations</u></p> <p>"To encourage the establishment, in those participating States where they do not already exist, of foreign press associations".</p>	Belgium (1)
<p>C. <u>PROPOSALS TO BE RESERVED FOR TACTICAL USE ONLY</u></p> <p><u>BASKET III</u></p> <p><u>Radio jamming</u></p> <p>"To resolve that all artificial obstacles to the reception of radio broadcasts should be eliminated in the near future".</p>	Belgium (1)
<p>D. <u>PROPOSALS WHICH ARE NOT NOW BEING PURSUED BY AN ALLY</u></p> <p><u>GENERAL/DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES</u></p> <p><u>Human Rights Court</u></p> <p>∟"Participating States should consider ways of establishing among the 35 human rights machinery similar to</p>	CM

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p>that envisaged in the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights".<u>7</u></p>	
<p><u>BASKET III</u></p> <p><u>Acceptance of applications</u></p> <p><u>Either:</u> "Consideration of applications for the purpose of family meetings 'favourably', for the purpose of family reunification 'in a positive and humanitarian spirit', and for the purpose of marriage between citizens of different states 'favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations' should be interpreted as meaning that such applications shall normally be granted. When in exceptional cases such applications are not granted, the applicant shall be fully and promptly informed of the refusal so that he may renew the application if he so desires".<u>7</u></p> <p><u>Or:</u> "Reaffirming their undertaking to consider applications for the purpose of family meetings 'favourably', for the purpose of family reunification 'in a positive and humanitarian spirit' and for the purpose of marriage between citizens of different states 'favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations', participating States declare their intention to make every effort to grant such applications. In the few cases where such applications are not granted, the applicant shall be fully and promptly informed of the refusal so that he may renew the application if he so desires".</p>	<p>IS Two alternative proposals to those on same subject under Category A</p>

<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<u>Internal movement</u> "Participating States should endeavour to reduce and eliminate restrictions on movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory".	CM
<u>Affidavit of support</u> / "Not to render the granting of exit visas for travel to visit friends and relatives dependent on officially certified statements obliging the receiving party to pay all costs incurred by the visit".	CM
<u>Tourism information</u> "Measures to increase information relating to tourism".	CM
<u>Books and records</u> / (i) permit the establishment by the appropriate organizations and firms from other participating States of book and record shops on their territory; (ii) encourage their appropriate firms and organizations to ease administrative restrictions on the dissemination of imported books and records available to the public;	CM

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<u>PROPOSALS</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
<p>(iii) work to facilitate a situation in which foreign firms and organizations may offer recorded and printed material for sale directly to the public;</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>or</u></p> <p>(iv) facilitate the establishment of 'Helsinki Information Centres' that would stock material from all 35 countries, including newspapers, periodicals, books, records, etc".<u>7</u></p>	
<p><u>Authors</u></p> <p>Measures to increase contacts and communications between authors and publishing houses as well as other cultural institutions.</p>	<p>CM</p>

In addition to the suggestions listed above, certain Allies expect to contribute further suggested proposals on: religious groups and national minority cultures, working conditions for journalists, emigration and the Mediterranean.

ITALIAN DELEGATION TO NATO

PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING

POSSIBLE WESTERN ANSWERS TO CRITICISMS BY WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

(THE FINAL ACT AS A WHOLE, THE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES AND BASKET III)

I. GENERAL

1. Status of Final Act

The East have often claimed a quasi-juridical status for the Final Act and, more specifically, for the Declaration of Principles and certain favoured principles. It is sometimes presented as a quasi-peace treaty. They have also criticised the West for minimising the status of the Final Act.

Answer

(i) The text of the Final Act itself (final paragraphs) makes clear that it is not a treaty and not suitable for registration under Article 102 of the UN Charter.

(ii) Western countries have remained fully mindful "of the high political significance which they attach to the results of the Conference" (final paragraphs). They consider that all signatories have a political and moral obligation to comply with all the provisions of the Final Act.

(iii) Those who wrongly claim that the Final Act has a juridical status sometimes seem to wish to confer that status to only a limited number of provisions of the Final Act but not to others (e.g. Basket III). As all parts of the Final Act have equal status, such a selective approach is untenable.

2. General lack of Western implementation

In as much as they cannot avoid a review of implementation, the East will wish to take as a basis lists of implementation measures taken since Helsinki, and will argue that because the Eastern lists are generally longer than those of the West it follows that Eastern implementation is better than that of the West.

Answer

(i) The Allies should focus attention rather on the actual state of compliance with the Final Act in each sector. This will place comparative performances in the correct perspective.

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(ii) The practice of Allied governments in most respects has long been in conformity with the Final Act. The Allies have therefore started from a higher level of implementation. They are determined to ensure that their implementation is as full as possible. Where necessary, they have taken a number of steps to bring their practices into line with the Final Act (e.g. CBMs) and to take the already high level of implementation even higher (e.g. visas).

3. Publication of the Final Act

The East are bound to contrast their own wide publication of the Final Act text with the more restricted publication in Western countries.

Answer

(i) The Allies should welcome the wide circulation given to the Final Act in at least many of the Eastern countries as an instance of good implementation of the relevant provision in the Final Act.

(ii) However, the Allies might note that the degree of circulation and the completeness of the text published differed from country to country in the East (e.g. USSR, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Romania - good; others less good especially Bulgaria where the full text seems not to have been readily available to the public and only abridged versions widely disseminated).

(iii) Unlike Eastern countries, Western countries cannot instruct their independent news media to publish the Final Act text. However Western governments have used to the full the possibilities open to them through official channels to circulate the full unabridged text. Western citizens have as easy access to the full text as they have to the texts of national legislation. Western governments also translated the full text into national languages where necessary.

(iv) Moreover, although the Final Act was widely published in the press of several Eastern countries in 1975, it is not now easily accessible to private individuals in the Soviet Union and certain East European countries, whereas in the West copies can be obtained at any time by any member of the public.

4. Balance of the Final Act

The East will claim that the West are distorting the Final Act by laying undue emphasis on Principle VII and Basket III and insufficient emphasis on the fundamental questions of security and co-operation.

Answer

(i) The Allies could point to their consistent emphasis on the equal status of all parts of the Final Act and on the need for all provisions to be implemented. No part should be given a status either above or below others. The Declaration of Principles is as important as say Basket III and vice versa.

(ii) Progress on human rights and humanitarian problems is a necessary part of progress in inter-state relations: the two aspects cannot be separated. The Final Act recognises this, e.g. the opening preamble states the importance not only of "peace, security and co-operation" but also of "justice". Similarly Principle VII states that respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is "an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as well as all states"; and Basket III states "Considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of relations and trust among peoples".

(iii) It is essential, in order to ensure public support for other aspects of détente, that the benefits of the Final Act are felt not only in inter-state relations but also in the lives of individuals.

(iv) We welcome the emphasis by Eastern delegations on the equal importance of all parts of the Final Act, as there had been a tendency in the past to claim a special importance for e.g. certain principles (inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention) and to treat certain other parts of the Final Act (Basket III) as being subordinate.

(See I.5)

5. Détente

The East are likely to be at pains to show that they are taking the initiative in carrying the détente process forward in accordance with the Final Act; and that certain governments and circles in the West are endangering détente in contravention of the Final Act. This accusation will for example be used to counter Western criticism of the Eastern record in any field, especially as regards Principle VII and Basket III; and also to attack certain Western foreign and defence policies.

Answer

(i) The Allies should make clear their strong commitment to détente. They should emphasize their own concept of that process; and focus on specific actions which illustrate efforts

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made by the Allies to promote détente since Helsinki, the misgivings they have about the Eastern performance (e.g. Angola) and the actions they consider necessary for the future.

(ii) The Final Act sets out certain important guidelines for furthering the process of détente, and Western countries attach high importance to the full implementation of all its provisions in order to ensure that the process of détente continues to move forward.

(iii) Progress in human rights and in human contacts and information is an essential element in détente.

(iv) To press for implementation of a provision of the Final Act can hardly be said to be contrary to either the Final Act or détente.

(See I.4)

II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

The East will be highly selective in their discussion of principles; reasserting their inflated interpretation of the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and non-intervention principles; and attempting to avoid a detailed discussion of the human rights principle. They will be armed with material to counter-attack in the areas described below.

The Romanian position will be somewhat different. While sharing the wish to limit discussion of the human rights principle, they will emphasize the equal status of the ten principles and their applicability to all the participating States. During discussion of Principle II on "refraining from the threat or use of force", they may draw particular attention to the supplementary text on "matters related to giving effect to certain of the above principles", of which they were the original authors. They may also emphasize that Principle II applies both in the nuclear and conventional fields.

1. Sovereign equality (Principle I)

The East may accuse the West of violation of this principle, especially the "right to determine its laws and regulations", in support of its appeal to the principle on non-intervention.

(See II.4)

Answer

(i) This text has to be read together with the second paragraph of Principle X, which was drafted as part of the same package deal as Principle I, and which constitutes a

reaffirmation of the primacy of international law and a declaration of intent to implement the provisions of the Final Act.

(ii) It seems difficult for a state to plead its sovereignty when faced with requests to keep its own political promises.

(iii) (See II.4 (iv))

2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
(Principle II)

The Warsaw Pact countries may criticise the Allies on various grounds including the level of military forces, increases in defence budgets, new weapons. They may also criticise the rejection by NATO countries of the Soviet proposal on the Non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Answer

The Allies should respond on standard lines including that in the Communiqué of the Ministerial Council in December 1976 on the Nofun proposal.

3. Inviolability of frontiers (Principle III)

The East may claim that certain Allies are trying to undermine the significance of this principle and may well attempt to misinterpret the principle by ignoring or denying the link with the "peaceful change" sentence in Principle I.

Answer

The Allies should emphasize the correct interpretation of "inviolability" i.e. the connotation of violence and illegality and the importance of the "peaceful change" sentence.

4. Non-intervention in internal affairs (Principle VI)

The East will accuse the West of violating this principle, in order to counter pressure for improved implementation and criticisms of their record, especially as regards areas covered by Principle VII and Basket III. They will also use the principle to attack the treatment in Western media of Eastern affairs and the failure of Western governments to control their media.

Answer

(i) The Allies should avoid being diverted into a long legal debate, but they could draw on the following points:

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- a close look at the text of the non-intervention principle shows that its structure, seen as a whole, supports the Western interpretation that it pertains to illegal interventions, exercised by coercion, in the affairs falling within other participants' domestic jurisdiction, viz. those which do not involve international obligations or responsibilities; not to legitimate interferences such as requests for the implementation of the Final Act;
- the first paragraph sets out the principle. Then follow three paragraphs all introduced by "accordingly" (second and fourth paragraphs) or by "likewise" (third paragraph). Thus it is made clear that the contents of these paragraphs are concrete applications of the principle as set out in the first paragraph. The substance of these concrete applications in each case points to the classical meaning of "intervention" as unlawful attempts by a given State to subordinate to its own interests the exercise by another State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty or to foment the violent overthrow of the régime of another State. These concrete examples are to be taken into account in interpreting the principle. If there was any room for doubt as to the meaning of the first paragraph these doubts would therefore be removed by the text as a whole.

(ii) It follows that requests by Western governments or media or individuals for the implementation of any provision of the Final Act cannot be said to be contrary to the principle of non-intervention.

(iii) Eastern references to the principle as being on "non-interference" should be corrected.

(iv) Eastern countries appear to have a one-sided interpretation of this principle. It does not stop them or their media from pressing Western governments to implement certain Final Act provisions, nor from criticising those governments for alleged non-implementation.

(See also II.5 and III.1 and 2(1))

5. Human rights (Principle VII)

As well as accusing the West of violating the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality (see II.1 and 4), of endangering détente (see I.5) and of distorting the balance of the Final Act (see I.4), the East will criticise the Western performance both as regards political and civil rights,

and, more especially, economic and social rights.

Answer

(i) The Allies should not be deterred by Eastern criticisms in the economic field from discussing the whole spectrum of human rights, both political and economic.

(ii) The Allies should avoid being diverted into too long a defence of their own performance. They might make the following general points:

- (a) no country is perfect: each government and society has constantly to strive to improve its performance and constructive criticism is to be welcomed;
- (b) despite imperfections, the practices of Western countries have long been to a high degree in conformity with Principle VII;
- (c) where imperfections exist the free democratic institutions of the West encourage self-cleansing and reform. The Allies might wish to exemplify the free institutions referred to by pointing out that few of the alleged Western human rights abuses likely to be raised by the East will not have been discussed previously in the Western media.

(iii) In as far as they wish to counter specific criticisms, the following points might be drawn on as regards criticisms of violations of economic and social rights:

- (a) the Allies should make clear that human rights form an integral whole. The Eastern claim that economic and social rights are more important than and separate from political and civil rights, is clearly contrary to Principle VII itself as well as to the other international documents cited in it. The right to work for example cannot be given a higher status than, or separated from, freedom of association based on free trade unions, the liberty of expression which enables workers to press their claims, political rights. This approach is clearly recognised not only in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but also in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (relevant text in Appendix). Article 5 of the Covenant rules out all "restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights ... on the pretext that the ... Covenant does not recognise such rights ...". The Eastern attempt to distinguish between different categories of human rights cannot therefore be justified by reference to

that Covenant. Article 6 of that Covenant states that the measures to be taken to achieve the right to work shall be "under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual". Judged in this wider context the practice of Western countries is much superior to that of the East;

- (b) Article 6 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also states that the right to work "includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts". In this respect Western practice is superior to that in the East;
- (c) Article 6 of the Covenant lays down obligations concerning means not results. It describes various steps including vocational training, which are to be taken to achieve the right to work. It does not however in any way make unemployment illegal or oblige governments to put all the unemployed to work. Moreover, the reference in Article 6 to "productive employment" should be noted (on which again the Western record is better than that of the East);
- (d) certain of these rights, such as the right to work, are recognised in the constitutions of certain Western countries, and Western governments attempt to put them fully into practice;
- the majority of Western states use a series of mechanisms to counter economic crises and unemployment and to assure a minimum standard of living for the unemployed;
 - all the Western developed countries possess social security systems, often very advanced;
 - if economic and social inequalities remain, it is no less true that in Western countries a constant transfer of wealth is achieved by fiscal means from the individual to society, and that there is an accelerated injection of new blood into the leading elements of society;
- (e) the Allies should not accept the claim that Eastern countries are the true guarantors of economic and social rights. In addition to the arguments noted above, the Allies might counter-attack by pointing to Eastern imperfections in the economic and social areas. In particular the threat of the loss of employment and sometimes shelter is one of the chief tools with which Eastern countries today discourage

emigration and dissent. Such threats are commonly carried out, the out-of-work victims then sometimes being charged with parasitism. Other imperfections include: absence of the right not to work, restrictions on free choice of work, under-employment (which replaces the Western use of the social security system to mitigate the effects of unemployment), absence of the right to strike, refusal of higher education to children whose views, or those of their parents, offend the authorities, severe overcrowding in housing - and why are there so few top level women political leaders, especially in the Soviet Union, in lands of so-called complete equality?

(iv) It should be noted that if the Eastern countries criticise the West for human rights violations, they will have weakened their position on non-intervention: the Allies might wish to point this out.

6. Co-operation between States (Principle IX)

The East may use this principle to itemise the various bilateral agreements signed with other CSCE States since August 1975 and to criticise those States which have declined to negotiate agreements, e.g. on tourism, consular provisions.

Answer

The Allies might respond by emphasizing the right of each State to determine the extent to which such agreements are necessary or appropriate for implementing the Final Act provisions. They might also point to the barriers which exist on the Soviet side to co-operation between "persons" and non-governmental "institutions" and "organizations", despite the "confirmation" given in Principle IX by the signatory States to the rôle that such co-operation has in contributing towards the achievement of their aims.

III. BASKET III

The East will want to concentrate on those sections of Basket III relating to culture, science and education. They will try to show that their implementation record is statistically superior to that of the West. As regards human contacts and information, when the East are subjected to criticism they may accuse the West of violating the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality (see II.1 and 4) and of jeopardising détente (see I.5) and of disturbing the balance of the Final Act (see I.4), though at the same time they will criticise the Western record where they can in these areas also.

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1. HUMAN CONTACTS

(1) In addition to the general criticisms mentioned above, Eastern delegations will probably attempt to use the mini-preamble to Basket III, in particular the third sub-paragraph which refers to "with the continuance of détente" and the fourth sub-paragraph which refers to "under mutually acceptable conditions", in order to limit criticism of their performance in this area.

Answer

As regards "with the continuance of détente", the reference to détente refers only to the following words "further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field" i.e. to efforts subsequent to those improvements agreed at the Helsinki Conference. There is nothing in the Final Act to suggest that progress in implementing Basket III is dependent on prior improvements in inter-State relations. On the contrary, the Basket III mini-preamble (first sub-paragraph) recognises that the development of contacts is "an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples". (See also I.4.)

As regards "under mutually acceptable conditions", this phrase only applies to the earlier words "the questions relative hereto", which in turn refer to the "further efforts to achieve continuing progress in this field" i.e. to efforts subsequent to those improvements agreed at the Helsinki Conference. This is made explicit by the omission, at the end of the third sub-paragraph, of the comma or semi-colon which appears at the end of all other sub-paragraphs in the preambular text of the Final Act. This interpretation is further supported by the word "now" in the last sub-paragraph of the mini-preamble, which shows that implementation is to be undertaken unilaterally without further negotiations or agreements to be reached "under mutually acceptable conditions".

(2) The East are likely to emphasize their claim that in granting entry visas Western countries are more dilatory, charge higher fees, have more cumbersome procedures (e.g. interviews, more complex application forms, "waivers") than Eastern countries.

Answer

(i) Western countries should not be diverted into too long a discussion of such aspects as comparative processing periods.

(ii) The Allies should rather emphasize the quality of Western entry visas and call for improvements of a similar kind by the East:

- Western visas are valid for longer periods than Eastern visas (except when they are based primarily on bilateral reciprocity);
- the choice of frontier crossing points is free on the Western side (with the exception of certain categories of official visitors to some Western countries) while Soviet visas, for example, lay down the place at which the frontier has to be crossed;
- Western visas do not contain any travel or residence restrictions on their territory: there is no compulsion to use specific hotels and specific itineraries, and no rules concerning the compulsory exchange of foreign money.

(iii) The main thrust of the human contacts provisions is not on visas as such but on facilitating applications for travel. The question of visas is only one factor: there are other important factors and progress is needed in all these aspects, not just entry visas. These other factors include:

- passport applications to national authorities;
- length of delay in obtaining this passport;
- length of validity of passport;
- geographic validity of passport (one country, several countries, all countries);
- number of journeys allowed by passport;
- cost of obtaining passport;
- exit visa;
- cost of exit visa;
- allocation of foreign currency;
- the ability to pay, in the applicant's own country, for the return travel ticket.

In the respects listed above, the Allied performance is excellent, and that of the Eastern countries, to varying degrees, very restrictive.

(iv) In the case of the GDR and Soviet Union the entry visa processing period is counted from the time applications with complete itineraries are received which in itself can take weeks to arrange: such information is not required with application for Western entry visas. Moreover, GDR procedures are cumbersome and the delay longer than in the case of the Allies. The superiority of other Eastern countries as regards delay, procedures and cost of entry visas is minimal, where it exists at all.

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(v) Western levels of performance as regards entry visas do not in any way constitute an obstacle to freer movement of persons. The Allies might also refer to improvements they have made since Helsinki, including proposals made to Eastern countries (mostly not accepted) for reciprocal agreements as regards issuance time, visa fees and multiple entry visas for certain categories.

(vi) See II.5(iv).

(3) The East could conceivably carry the counter-attack to the extent of proposing the abolition of entry visas or even all visas.

Answer

(i) This would need careful handling as differences in Western and Eastern systems would make it very difficult for Western countries to agree to such a proposal. The Allies might draw on some of the answers under III.1 (2) in order to show the importance of obstacles other than entry visas to freer movement (especially the reluctance of Eastern governments to issue exit passports) and the futility of abolishing visas without progress in removing the other obstacles; Western good performance in facilitating freer movements as a whole; and the need for the East to bring their overall performance up to Western standards. The Allies might wish to add that Western states, by their organization and nature, generally exert less control over foreign visitors who have entered their frontiers than Eastern states and thus require some measure of pre-entry control. This is particularly true of societies whose social systems as well as economic and employment opportunities tend to attract many from abroad who wish to partake of them.

(ii) In addition the Allies might make certain new proposals aimed at facilitating freer movement.

(4) A further possible line of Eastern attack is that certain Western circles are encouraging emigration from Socialist countries, under the guise of human contacts, partly in order to obtain highly qualified specialists.

Answer

(i) All that Western countries are doing is to ask Eastern governments to put into practice the standards to which they have pledged themselves in various international documents. The right to leave one's country is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and thus indirectly in Principle VII of the Final Act. Basket III recognises that the development of contacts is an important element

in strengthening friendly relations, and emphasizes the need to view family reunification in a positive and humanitarian spirit. These considerations apply to all individuals irrespective of such irrelevant factors as their technical qualifications.

(ii) The demand for family reunification arises from the wish, inherent in human nature, to be with one's family. It does not arise as a result of any encouragement from Allied governments.

(iii) The practice of Eastern countries of discriminating, often harshly, against specialists (even against non-specialist men of working age) in considering applications for family reunification, other forms of human contact and emigration might be criticised as being contrary to the human rights and humanitarian aspects mentioned in (i).

(5) Eastern countries may claim that Western countries do not do enough to promote and facilitate tourism.

Answer

(i) Western statistics show that in general many more Western tourists visit Eastern countries than vice versa. (Eastern statistics produced to show a different balance usually include outward travel to other Socialist countries). This imbalance is mainly caused by the reluctance of Eastern governments to grant either exit documents or foreign currency to their nationals for visits to the West, and the lack of restrictions by Western governments on their nationals to travel to Eastern countries.

(ii) Tourism facilities in Western countries are excellent and are available to Eastern travel organizations and travellers on the same basis as for any other travellers.

(iii) The difficulties facing Western travellers to the East might also be emphasized including the currency conversion requirement.

2. INFORMATION

(1) The main Eastern argument will be that Western media activity is in conflict with the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality (see II.1 and 4), and is failing to serve the cause of "the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples" (Preamble Basket III) (see I.5); and that Western governments are failing in their duty to make their media behave in a more responsible manner. Specific attacks will be levelled against Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and probably against

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other Western radio stations, and there may be accusations against journalists alleged to be agents of Western intelligence organizations.

Answer

(i) The Allies should firmly refute Eastern demands for governmental control of the media in the interests of peace, etc. Western governments attach the highest importance to freedom of the press. Western governments do not and cannot control their media.

(ii) Basket III envisages a "freer flow of information" which will "meet the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating states". This can only be achieved if the media are able to report freely on all aspects, whether good or bad, in any country.

(iii) This freedom of reporting exists in Western countries and Western media have shown themselves just as ready to criticise their own governments and societies robustly as they do those of other countries.

(iv) Contributing to the freer flow of information cannot be said to be a violation of the principle of non-intervention (see Western interpretation of this principle at II.4). On the contrary the reporting by Western media constitutes an important act of implementation of the Basket III provisions and is in the service of détente.

(v) Eastern countries rightly expect freedom of access in Western countries for their own press and radio, and do not hesitate to criticise Western governments and societies through their own officially controlled media.

(vi) The Allies should not be distracted by Eastern criticism from laying their main emphasis on the obstacles to the freer flow of information in Eastern countries and on the need for Eastern governments to implement the Final Act provisions.

(2) Eastern countries may claim that they import a larger amount of Western newspapers and periodicals than vice versa.

Answer

(i) The Allies should not accept arguments based on the criterion of statistical reciprocity which has no foundation in Basket III (the only reference in Basket III to reciprocity concerns working conditions for journalists). The Allies should stress the criterion of freedom of access for all individuals.

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(ii) Allied countries open their markets to all foreign publications. Demand is governed solely by public choice. No obstacles are placed by Western authorities in the way of any individual buying whatever foreign publications he wishes from the East.

(iii) The same is not true in the East. In most Eastern countries a large proportion of Western newspapers, political periodicals and, in some countries, even non-political periodicals, are restricted to a small privileged circle (and Western tourists).

(iv) The low sales figures of most Eastern newspapers in the West are due to their contents being generally indigestible to the Western reader. Experience has shown that as soon as the contents become more interesting, the sales figures increase (e.g. Polen in FRG).

(v) Eastern supplies are kept artificially low by other factors e.g. the Soviet Union only allows a very small part of its own newspapers and periodicals to be exported; regional papers are excluded.

(vi) A considerable proportion of Eastern imports of Western printed information consists of specialised scientific/technical periodicals or general (fashion, sport) periodicals. In as much as Western newspapers are available to the general public - which is very little in most Eastern countries - Western Communist papers are more available than non-Communist (Polish book clubs are an exception). The amount of information on different aspects of Western life is therefore unbalanced.

(vii) In any case, some Allies as a rule import a larger number of titles of Eastern printed periodical information than the Eastern countries purchase from them.

(viii) Eastern Embassies enjoy much wider freedom to distribute information bulletins and other material than Western Embassies in the East.

3. CULTURE AND EDUCATION

(1) Eastern countries are likely to produce evidence that they have shown more Western films and plays, translated more Western books and taught Western languages more widely than vice versa.

Answer

(i) Here again the Allies should not accept the criterion of statistical reciprocity, but should insist on freedom of

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access (see III.2(2)(1)). Freedom of access to all cultural works and to the sources and means of information has more value than the purely quantitative increase in the dissemination of officially selected works.

(ii) Western markets are open to films, plays and books from all countries. Public taste dictates demand. In a pluralist society there is little that central authorities can - or should - do to influence taste.

(iii) It is up to the Eastern countries to produce cultural material attractive to Western taste and to take the necessary steps to make them available in the free market.

(iv) Some Eastern policies keep sales low, e.g. artificially high price of Eastern books in the West (e.g. Romania, Soviet Union) poor response to orders for books and other inefficient marketing (e.g. Soviet Union).

(v) In Western countries films/plays/books are not offered to the public or excluded from the public on political grounds nor are they subject to censorship on political grounds. We would wish that all Eastern countries would follow a similarly open policy. The treatment of Western publishers at the International Book Fair in Moscow in early September, 1977 could be cited, e.g. banning of certain books and catalogues, initial refusal of visa to expert.

(vi) Eastern translations of Western works are sometimes incomplete or censored.

(vii) It is not practical for Western authorities to keep detailed statistics for cultural and educational exchanges which to a large degree concern the private sector. Russian statistics on books are misleading as they do not include the sale in the West of authors out of favour with their authorities.

(viii) The degree to which a language is learnt reflects both the relative importance of that language in the cultural/economic/traditional relations of the country concerned and the wishes of individuals.

(2) Eastern countries may claim that Western governments make available too few resources to encourage Western artists to perform in the East.

Answer

(i) In Western countries cultural life is predominantly in the private sector and functions without state interference. Within the limitations of what is feasible, Western governments

do their best to encourage Western artists to perform in the East. But it must rest mainly with Eastern authorities to create conditions which attract Western artists to the East.

(ii) At present, the conditions in the West attract more Eastern artists to perform there than vice versa. Thus Eastern artists and ensembles work in the West on a commercial basis and can freely transfer the money they earn. Western artists do not have the same possibilities: they face in Eastern countries bureaucratic obstacles and the problem of foreign exchange transfer. It is this difference in treatment which has created certain imbalances in cultural exchanges.

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UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 23

- Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
- Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
- Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Article 5

- No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.

Part III - Article 6

- The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
- The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

Article 8

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
 - The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade

union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

- The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations;

- The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

- The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State.

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organization Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.