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LIST OF ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST

Report by the Chairman of the Political Committee  
at Senior Level.

The attached List of Issues for Possible Negotiation with the East is forwarded to the Council by the Senior Political Committee under the responsibility of its Chairman, within the framework of the follow-up to paragraph 5 of the Washington Ministerial Communiqué of 11th April, 1969.

(Signed) F.E. MAESTRONE

OTAN/NATO,  
Brussels, 39.

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par D.

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LIST OF ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION WITH THE EAST

INTRODUCTION

A list of issues for possible negotiation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries has been prepared by the Senior Political Committee in response to Council's request of 22nd July, 1969. This list has been the subject of extensive discussion by the Committee and is submitted to the Council on the responsibility of its Chairman. However, the list reflects, to the greatest extent possible, the views expressed by the members of the Committee and the degree of consensus reached on the various issues discussed.

2. It will be clear from the text that this list in the form presented to the Council is not suitable to be made public. It is hoped, however, that Ministers may find it useful material to draw on for any public statement or declaration which they may make on the meeting of 3rd to 5th December.

Organization

3. The issues which are contained in this list have been selected from the list of issues presented in C-M(69)34 of 14th July, 1969, which, together with the contribution of discussion papers by a number of Delegations, has served as the basis for the preparation of the present list. The issues which were selected by the Committee have been grouped under the three following Categories:

- A. Issues which appear to warrant consideration for early negotiation.
- B. Issues which appear to require further examination prior to being considered for negotiation.
- C. Issues already under negotiation.

4. The assignment of these issues to the different categories bears no relation to their intrinsic importance to the Alliance, but rather relates to their status with regard to possible negotiation.

5. The issues under Category A have been listed there because, in the Committee's opinion, these are concrete measures which offer the most likely opportunity for fruitful negotiation and early resolution. Their presence in Category A does not mean in every case that negotiations could be undertaken immediately, but that they may be suitable for early Allied initiatives.

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6. Those issues in Category B are placed there solely because it was felt that they would need further development in terms of examination and study, in order to qualify for consideration for negotiation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. Their listing under Category B does not pre-suppose favourable results from any study or examination that might be conducted by the Alliance.

7. The issues listed under Category C are of a different nature in that they are already under negotiation or about to be negotiated in other fora, either bilateral or multilateral. Their placement in Category C implies no lessor degree of priority or importance but rather indicates that they enjoy a special status in so far as they are already objects of negotiation with countries which include the Soviet Union and certain of its Eastern European allies. In this connection, the Committee also wished to note the anticipated bilateral discussion between the United States and the USSR on strategic arms limitation, which is a subject of consultation in NATO, as well as the possibility that some NATO and Warsaw Pact members might consider discussing problems related to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. In determining the issues to be included in this list, the Committee considered a variety of factors relating to their negotiability. A reflection of the Committee's discussion of each issue is represented by an individual explanatory comment which, in general, presents the historical background of the issue, lists the points of political attraction for the West and the East, presents an estimate of the potential negotiability of the issue and indicates, where appropriate, how the process of negotiation might be undertaken. Throughout its studies, the Committee has sought to take account of the importance of factors bearing on NATO security interests. In estimating the political attractiveness of the various issues, an effort was made to present the main advantages as viewed from each side. While in many cases the advantages to one side can be considered as disadvantages for the other, there are some which could offer a common advantage to both sides. These factors should, of course, be considered in further Allied review of this list of issues where relevant.

#### Strengthening East-West Co-operation

9. Bearing in mind that the establishment of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between the East and the West is one of the principal objectives of the Alliance, the Committee has sought to select those issues which could best promote this aim. The issues which offer the most concrete possibilities for possible negotiation are listed under the categories mentioned above. It was determined that a number of other issues could not be translated into such concrete measures, but the Committee, nevertheless, felt that the

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recommendations for general policy attitudes and approaches suggested in these broader issues could be of value in strengthening East-West co-operation.

10. One of the issues which was considered to be of particular importance, in so far as it would undoubtedly be an element in the consideration and negotiation of any arms control and disarmament measures, is verification. It was noted that East-West disagreement concerning what constitutes adequate verification has been one of the principal impediments to progress in the disarmament field. The tensions and suspicions surrounding this aspect of arms control have been most acute in the context of the related issues which are listed later in this paper. While the Committee considered that verification was not a specific issue in itself, it was recognised as a critical element which warranted special attention on the part of the Allies. It was felt that the need to overcome psychological suspicion of verification procedures should encourage members of the Alliance to promote a better understanding of Western intentions in this regard and of the importance verification assumes in the furthering of mutual confidence, so vital to any progress in reducing tensions.

11. Most of these broader issues, which were considered as offering possible opportunities for strengthening East-West co-operation, related to either the economic sector or to exchanges in the scientific, technological and cultural fields.


12. The Committee felt that the Alliance might play a useful rôle in the strengthening of East-West economic co-operation as a forum for the exchange of views on matters which could then be pursued and developed by relevant international organizations such as the Economic Commission for Europe, where Eastern European countries are represented. It was believed that a review of the possibility and desirability of improving East-West co-operation in bilateral fields and in international organizations could help to create a climate of confidence and understanding. Agreements for economic and technical co-operation in a bilateral framework have already proved useful in this respect. This general objective can be achieved either by making full use of the existing machinery or by developing new forms of co-operation, such as in the relatively new field of industrial co-operation. Keeping in mind requirements imposed by NATO security interests, it was suggested that developments of this co-operation should be gradual and also reciprocal, where appropriate.

13. Consideration was also given to the development of East-West co-operation in the aid field, both on a bilateral basis or among small groups of countries from East and West. Such co-operation could include planning and implementation of aid programmes and collaborating on joint aid projects for less developed countries.

14. Discussion in the Committee in this context also centred on the exchange of scientific and technical information and on scientific, technical and cultural exchanges. In the general scientific field, the problem of health was one of common concern in which there well might be Soviet and Eastern European co-operation with the West. Studies of diseases, the development of public health services, and also a variety of epidemiological studies, for example, might be pursued in the multilateral framework of the World Health Organization.

15. It was noted that technical exchanges, except for the temporary suspension of certain governmental programmes, were little affected during the Czechoslovak crisis and were continuing their development. Cultural and educational exchanges, however, were encountering a Soviet reaction which indicated anxiety about the attraction of the Soviet public, particularly young people, to "infectious" outside influences. This anxiety also reflected a certain concern over the "bridge-building" possibilities of such exchanges which could undermine the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The Committee felt that the objective should be to expose the people of the USSR and Eastern Europe to Western ideas, cultural and technological achievement, in the hope of contributing to the liberalisation of Eastern Europe.

16. Cultural contacts also can serve to improve the general political atmosphere in East-West relations. Nevertheless, the West should be careful to minimise suspicion on the part of Soviet and Eastern European leaders over the possible effect of such programmes. It was believed that this could best be accomplished by flexible balanced programmes of exchanges on the part of members of the Alliance which would provide - with appropriate controls and safeguards - increased opportunities for Soviet and Eastern European scholars and scientists to visit and study in the West and comparable opportunities for Western scholars and scientists in the East. In this connection, the Committee also gave some attention to the possible value of visits to NATO countries on an unofficial basis of senior Soviet and Eastern European officials who rank below the top levels of Government. The thought was to offer to such senior members of governments an opportunity, similar to that available to certain persons in the commercial, scientific and cultural fields for direct exposure to Western thinking and way of life. It was also pointed out that contacts between higher ranking government officials could be useful in the Alliance's efforts to explore all appropriate openings for negotiation.



CATEGORY A

Issues which Appear to Warrant Consideration  
for Early Negotiation

Section I - Measures to Reduce Tension and Promote Confidence

1. Renunciation of the Use of Force or the Threat of Force

Genesis

The most recent initiative on the Western side is that taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in its renewal in December 1966 of the suggestion for, inter alia, an exchange of declarations on renunciation of the use of force between that country and East European countries. The only definite reaction came from the Soviet Union which made its agreement subject to the acceptance of a series of conditions without any direct bearing on the point of issue, such as, that the Federal Republic should agree to exchange such statements, couched in the same terms, with the other countries of the East and in particular with the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. The Federal Republic attempted to counter this Soviet move by urging that the proposed negotiations should be conducted with each of the countries concerned on a strictly bilateral basis and that moreover they should not constitute a pretext for imposing a unilateral solution of other problems. The German Government did not exclude the possibility that during its discussions with the members of the Warsaw Pact, it might be agreed, by common accord, to examine other questions. As regards the problem of the inclusion of the "GDR" which has constituted the main stumbling block from the outset, the German Authorities declared their willingness, in accordance with a Soviet suggestion, to specify that renunciation of force would apply "to the USSR and its allies".

Present Status(1). After a pause, following the events in Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic renewed its suggestions in a memorandum handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on 3rd July, 1969. In his speech on 10th July, 1969, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to continue the exchanges of views on this subject. A Soviet memorandum was received in Bonn towards the middle of September.

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(1) To be reviewed later in the light of developments.

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Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) Signature by the Federal Republic of Germany might mitigate the almost pathological feelings of suspicion towards it harboured by the USSR and the other countries of the East or at least expressed in their propaganda;
- (ii) the exchange of declarations of this kind would seem to constitute an appropriate response to the Soviet bloc's repeated call for the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which is not in the interests of the Alliance. An agreement in this sphere might clear the ground for progress on disarmament; it might contribute to reducing mutual distrust while at the same time providing the means of sounding out Soviet intentions and testing Soviet sincerity;
- (iii) the Eastern countries might feel encouraged in their desire to take up a somewhat independent attitude vis-à-vis the USSR.
- (iv) the inclusion in such declarations of a reaffirmation of the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of states and respect for sovereignty would conflict with the Brezhnev doctrine and might therefore make such declarations more attractive to Rumania, Yugoslavia and perhaps other Eastern European states.

(b) For the East:

- (i) The Communist bloc might contemplate such negotiation as a means of pressing the recognition of the "GDR";
- (ii) such an exchange of declarations might be regarded by certain Eastern countries as a means of furthering a solution of their differences with the Federal Republic of Germany;
- (iii) the exchange of such declarations might lull public opinion in the West into a sense of false security which could lend fuel to pressures for unilateral reduction of our military potential.

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### Negotiability

The Committee agreed that this was a matter for the Federal Republic whose efforts, which were fully supported by the Allied governments, should be continued on a bilateral basis. Any clause which could lead to the indirect recognition of the "GDR" must be rejected. It may be presumed, judging from the attitude adopted by the USSR, that the latter has striven to put itself in the strongest possible negotiating position in order to enforce its well-known views on the German question. The relatively conciliatory attitude which it has shown lately has undoubtedly been adopted for tactical reasons linked with the present situation. However, in recent visits to a number of western countries, Czech and Polish statesmen indicated that their respective governments were interested in this question. Although the prospects of success should not be regarded with much optimism, it nevertheless seems desirable that the Federal Republic should press on with the bilateral approaches it has made towards the Eastern countries(1).

### Process of Negotiation

The Committee also reached the conclusion that this question might be negotiated at three different levels:

- (a) bilaterally between the Federal Republic and the different Eastern countries including the USSR;
- (b) between the Federal Republic and the "GDR" in the context of inter-German relations. Progress in this direction could be regarded as likely to favour a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany(2);
- (c) in the light of the German experience it is not entirely impossible that other countries may, in the future and in the light of such political developments as may occur, wish to associate themselves with exchanges of declarations of this kind.

The wording and political pre-requisites for such declarations should take into account:

- (i) the distinction between the use of force and the threat of force (the latter of which would not invoke a casus foederis) and the difficulty of establishing a definition of force;

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- (1) To be reviewed later in the light of developments.
  - (2) In view of this two-fold aspect of the question, the Committee agreed that it would be advisable to deal with each one of them separately under Sections I.1 and III.1.3 respectively.

- (ii) the distinction that the United Nations Charter draws between the use of force for individual and collective self-defence, which is legitimate, and for aggression, which is not;
- (iii) their application to all types of weapons and not merely to the non-use of nuclear weapons, as suggested by Soviet proposals to ban the use of nuclear weapons;
- (iv) their relationship with disarmament; and
- (v) the undesirability of direct arrangements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

## 2. Exchanges of Observers at Military Manoeuvres

### Genesis

On the proposal of the USSR, military observers were exchanged at military attaché level at manoeuvres held in 1965 in the Moscow area, in the United States and in several other NATO countries. Shortly after, the Soviet Authorities proposed that these exchanges should be extended to cover either NATO and Warsaw Pact manoeuvres or Soviet and United States manoeuvres, adding that it was essential that the two sides be fully aware of each other's military potential. The Alliance examined this proposal in 1966 and decided that it was interesting in some respects but on the other hand noted the dangers involved in the participation of the Soviet Zone of Germany and the treatment of the Warsaw Pact on an equal footing. It was nevertheless agreed that these drawbacks could be avoided if the bilateral exchanges were limited to the Soviet Union and the United States at exercises held outside Germany, on their respective territories and on a basis of strict reciprocity. The United States Authorities then submitted a proposal to the USSR along these lines, but this was rejected by the Soviet Union, which nevertheless hinted at the possibilities of attendance at multi-national manoeuvres (this possibility had also been contemplated by the Council in 1966). The USSR also turned down suggestions of the same kind put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany in its 1966 Peace Note and relating to such exchanges with the USSR and other East European countries.

Present Status. No further moves have been made since the Soviet rejection of the United States proposals in April 1966.

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Political Attractiveness

(a) For the west:

- (i) Agreement on this question could help to lessen the distrust between East and West, since it would show that some form of military-related co-operation between them can be devised;
- (ii) in so far as information is concerned, such an agreement would doubtless give relatively greater advantages to the West;
- (iii) certain Eastern European countries might privately welcome the opportunity of direct contact with Western military authorities.

(b) For the East:

- (i) The East might believe that it could gain somewhat greater status for the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as the Warsaw Pact, if exchange arrangements were formalised;
- (ii) the Soviets may seek an advantage in exchanges of observers at the national manoeuvres by insisting that the principle of reciprocity would entitle them to attend several manoeuvres for every one they hold.

Negotiability

Although the exchange of observers is not of major importance, the Committee nevertheless agreed that the prospects of negotiation on this issue were worth exploring further. It is essential to obtain the prior agreement of the East on a number of practical points, namely: authorised field of action for observers, number and composition of the teams, nature of the military exercises covered. This measure would be useful in promoting confidence between the two sides. It is a technical problem and does not involve major concessions either by one side or the other. There is no reason why it should not be negotiated separately and on these grounds it could be given a fairly high priority. It should also be remembered that the Soviet Union in its last response, did not close the door to further contacts. While it is true that this question has only a marginal bearing on the settlement of the major problems of European security, it could nevertheless be of interest as a lead-off in as much as it could provide useful information on the Soviet frame of mind and on the likelihood of success in the examination of more important questions. It could be one of the items considered to be raised at an early stage in any process of negotiation.

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### Process of Negotiation

This question could be taken up again on the basis of a proposal to develop a regular programme of observer exchanges or on the more limited basis of a proposal to invite observers to announced exercises. Another point to be established is whether it would be more advantageous for observers to participate in national or multinational manoeuvres.

As for the method of negotiation, arrangements could be made on a formal basis or even, if appropriate, on an ad hoc basis, either bilaterally or multilaterally between various members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

### 3. Observation Posts

#### Genesis

The proposal for ground control posts originated in 1955. It was contained, as a first stage, in the Soviet disarmament plan of 10th May, 1955, and the Open Skies Plan advanced by the United States at the Geneva summit meeting in July 1955, and was also part of a number of subsequent disarmament or arms control schemes advanced by the West or the Soviet Union. In 1957, the Norstad Plan envisaged a combination of (i) mobile ground inspection, (ii) aerial inspection, and (iii) overlapping radar surveillance. In 1960 Denmark offered to consider opening up Greenland for inspection as a part of a mutual and balanced inspection arrangement. The Western and Soviet programmes for general and complete disarmament tabled at the ENDC in Geneva in 1962 also provided for the establishment of a system of observation posts. The separability of observation posts from other arms control or disarmament measures was suggested by the United States in its working paper of 12th December, 1962, and the United Kingdom subsequently tabled at the ENDC a paper on the modalities of an observation post system in March 1964.

The repeated attempts of the Allies to separate the negotiation of this issue from other arms control or disarmament measures without pre-judging the respective positions of the two parties on other disarmament problems, have met with refusal by the Soviet Union which has argued that observation posts installed without the simultaneous introduction of substantial disarmament measures could be used for purposes of espionage and would not reduce the risk of war.

Present Status. There has been no change in the Soviet position since the submission of the United Kingdom paper in 1964.

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Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) The establishment of observation posts at key points on the territory of Warsaw Pact countries could be of help towards ascertaining whether preparations for a surprise attack were being made; (this point is one which obviously applies in reverse to the Warsaw Pact as well);
- (ii) in so far as information is concerned, the establishment of observation posts would doubtless give relatively greater advantages to the West;
- (iii) the establishment of posts at points of lesser military importance, for example in large urban areas, could nevertheless bring political advantages;
- (iv) observation posts might in themselves have a deterrent effect on possible offensive action by the Soviet Union;
- (v) were the Soviet Union to accept an arrangement of this kind, it might provide the West with a means of stepping up the pressures so as to secure progress on the discussion of other disarmament problems closely linked with inspection;
- (vi) reports by the posts could provide a justification for requests made to the USSR by the West through the diplomatic channel for explanations of the military preparations noted.

(b) For the East:

- (i) The USSR, if it were to seek to pursue a disruptive policy, could deliberately start a controversy over the operation of these posts or the interpretation of intelligence obtained by them in order to sharpen tension; (this would, of course, be a disadvantage to the West);

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- (ii) in a period of crisis, the USSR could obtain valuable information on certain Western military activities;
- (iii) the establishment of such posts might lull public opinion in the West into a sense of false security which could lend fuel to pressures for the unilateral reduction of our military potential.

#### Negotiability

The Committee agreed that in view of the technical progress made in the field of aerial and other forms of reconnaissance, this issue has lost a great deal of its importance from the military standpoint. There might be a greater chance of successful negotiation if rather than being regarded as one of the measures capable of preventing a surprise attack, it was linked with the arms control measures considered to be politically acceptable by the Alliance, particularly mutual and balanced force reductions, the application of which it could then help to ensure. In this connection, the Committee also discussed the possibility of linking this question with other problems reviewed in this report since the measures would mutually supplement each other. It was recalled in particular that a network of observation posts deployed before any mutual and balanced reduction in forces could be of paramount importance(1). To prevent the USSR from using the observation posts as a political means of stirring up controversies (see (b)(i) above), consideration might also be given to a system of advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres prior to the establishment of the observation posts. In view of Soviet immobility on the issue of on-site inspection, it seems unlikely that much progress could be made in negotiations on this question in isolation.

#### Process of Negotiation

In any negotiation, the question of reciprocity and of guarantees of the freedom of movement of observers must be regarded as essential.

It would be preferable for the preparation of such negotiations to be preceded by informal contacts designed to establish the degree of Soviet interest in this matter, either alone or in combination with certain other measures.

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(1) See POLADS(69)60, page 36, paragraph 30.

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4. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres

Genesis

The advance notification of military movements was presented in a United States working paper on the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications, submitted to the ENCC in 1962, in conjunction with the United States treaty outline for general and complete disarmament. The purpose would be to ensure that advance warning is given of any military activities which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause for alarm. That American proposal was rejected by the USSR on the same ground as observation posts (absence of linkage with substantial disarmament measures). Furthermore, the Soviets even argued that the proposed steps could be used as a means to deceive the other side.

Present Status. The question has been hardly mentioned since 1963.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) an arrangement of this kind could present the USSR with an additional inhibiting factor it would have to take into account before exerting political pressure on other countries, including its allies, through manoeuvres;
- (ii) for the same reasons as those given in connection with "Observation Posts", the advantages gained by the Allies would more than offset the drawbacks, given the disparity between the two blocs as regards access to military intelligence;
- (iii) measures of this kind would be privately welcome to the Eastern countries which are particularly exposed to political and military pressure from the USSR;
- (iv) the measure would in time provide a channel of mutual communication regarding military activity, thus counteracting misunderstandings and possibly inhibiting escalation of military activity.



(b) For the East:

- (i) The advance notification of major military movements might run counter to the aims sought if the other side reached erroneous conclusions. This measure would then lead to heightened tension rather than contributing to reducing it;
- (ii) the East might deliberately increase tension by using these measures either to mislead the Alliance or to exert pressures on it or on its members;
- (iii) it would provide a permanent channel through which the East could help ensure that the West knows the timing and significance of military activity, thus avoiding misinterpretation.

Negotiability

The West is not in a strong position to negotiate since, in contrast with the absolute secrecy which is the hallmark of Soviet military movements, Allied manoeuvres are normally fairly widely publicised. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the USSR would agree to relinquish, at least psychologically, any of its freedom of movement and that it would allow its troop movements in Eastern Europe to attract public attention.

In fact, this measure would not affect the freedom of NATO member countries to deploy their forces as required since it would be restricted to requiring advance notification of their movements without, however, banning them. Nevertheless, a formal requirement for notification of Allied movements might in certain circumstances cause difficulties for the Allied side. Be that as it may, it is essential to define the field of geographical application of these measures as well as the type of military movements covered. The arrangements made by the Alliance for periods of crisis and regional differences would have to be taken into account. In as much as the balance of advantages and disadvantages is in favour of the Alliance, acceptance by the USSR of this proposal could represent a significant concession. Since fundamental Soviet security criteria would remain unaffected, this measure would not go beyond what can reasonably be requested. It would be of considerable interest to test Soviet sincerity on this issue which, if settled in a satisfactory manner, could help to improve the political climate in Europe by creating encouraging prospects for the discussion of the more complex disarmament problems.

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### Process of Negotiation

Great care should nevertheless be taken in formulating this proposal. Should preliminary feelers reveal strong opposition, it would be preferable, in order not to jeopardise the chances of raising this issue again at a later stage, not to submit it in isolation but to link it with other measures. Formal agreement is desirable in order to permit methods of application to be worked out in detail. The problem of verification could also be raised, but it does not seem absolutely necessary because of the Allies' unilateral capabilities.

### 5. East-West Study on the Techniques and Methods of Inspection

#### Genesis

Disarmament Inspection Field Test Exercise "First Look" was a joint United Kingdom/United States field test which took place in Southern England from March to October 1968. The Warsaw Pact members of the Geneva ENDC declined the invitation to send observers. The testing of inspection methods is of importance for the verification of arms limitations agreed upon with the East on the basis of reciprocity, and must therefore be acceptable to both sides. The West has always maintained that disarmament measures must be accompanied by adequate verification.

Present Status. The conclusions to be drawn from Exercise "First Look" are presently being dealt with by an open-ended ad hoc working group set up by the Political Committee. Should this group recommend holding a NATO multi-national field test exercise, further consideration should be given to the possibility of inviting the Warsaw Pact countries to send observers, suggesting that they might participate in studies on the results of the exercise.

#### Political Attractiveness

##### (a) For the West:

- (i) If the East accepted, this could be a step towards a mutually acceptable system of control. There might then be an opportunity of convincing the USSR that there are no grounds for its deep-seated reluctance to accept any form of verification for fear that it might concede intelligence benefits to the West. At the same time, an offer on these lines would demonstrate NATO's desire to enter into constructive co-operation with the East. The reactions of the Soviet bloc would be an indication of their intentions

regarding possible negotiations with the West on other issues. In the event of a refusal, the Eastern countries would have to face the disapproval of public opinion;

- (ii) it would provide some of the Soviet Union's allies with flexibility in contacts with the West on a subject related to a variety of arms control issues.

(b) For the East:

- (i) The East might believe that it could gain somewhat greater status for the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as the Warsaw Pact, by formal participation in such an exercise;
- (ii) the military establishment in the East may have an interest in gaining an opportunity to observe Western methods of inspection.

Negotiability

The Committee considers it best not to seek to do more at first than to invite the Soviet Union and East European countries to send observers to a second exercise of the same type as "First Look". Shortly afterwards, consideration might be given to the feasibility, in the light of the reactions of the other side, of inviting the Eastern countries to participate in a joint study of methods of inspection and even, eventually, of holding a combined East-West field test exercise. It does not seem likely that these arrangements could be turned by the East to its own advantage so as to harm the Alliance. However, the prospect of wider co-operation with the East in these fields merits careful attention; in this area, it would be essential to observe the principle of reciprocity. The first step, which would consist simply in extending an invitation to send observers concerns co-operation in a purely technical, although highly important, field.

Process of Negotiation

This first step, at least in its preparatory stage, would not necessarily require a formal agreement. The process of negotiation for subsequent steps would have to be decided in the light of the measures envisaged.

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Section II - Arms Limitation and Disarmament

1. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (1)(2)

This subject, which encompasses manpower and both conventional and nuclear equipment, is under active study in NATO, and the Washington Communiqué confirms that the Allies will pursue their consideration of the question. In the past, reduction of force proposals of various types have been put forth by the Soviet and Western sides, usually in connection with other measures related to general disarmament or European security arrangements, without any concrete results. At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968, the Allies proposed that consideration be given by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to the possibility of carrying out mutual and balanced force reductions. There has been no response to this appeal.

A review of the factors relating to the negotiability of this issue is contained in Part VI of C-M(69) , the Council Report on the Study of Balanced Force Reductions, dated October, 1969.

Section III - Germany and Berlin

The following list of issues relating to Germany and Berlin (as well as the list shown under Section I Category B) is presented with a view to possible exchanges which the Three Powers might conduct with the USSR within the framework of their responsibilities, and to intra-German contacts on the questions appearing under Section I of this category. This list has been drawn up with a view to making possible a rapprochement which would facilitate the peaceful unification of the two parts of Germany.

1. Intra-German Relations

The Federal Republic is endeavouring to prepare the way for a modus vivendi between both parts of Germany, pending a negotiated peace settlement. The aim of these efforts is the rapprochement and the peaceful unification of both parts of Germany. Bilateral talks between the Federal Government and the "GDR", supported as necessary by Three-Power talks with the USSR, would appear to be the appropriate and most promising way to proceed. The Three Powers have expressed their readiness to support the endeavours of the Federal Government with suitable steps. Within the framework of the intra-German relationship, the following steps will be considered:

- (1) It is noted that the relationship between this issue and the issue of Mutual Freeze of Nuclear Weapons and Existing Force Levels should be borne in mind.
- (2) The French Delegation was not able to subscribe to the inclusion of this item in Category A.

- (a) Improvement in the Atmosphere:
  - (i) Reduction of the propaganda war:
  - (ii) Declarations by both sides that they wish to collaborate in dealing with the German question so as to contribute to contribute towards progress in the field of European security.
- (b) Practical Steps towards the Reduction of Tensions and Hardships arising out of Partition:
  - (i) Improvement of travel facilities:
  - (ii) Reunion of families:
  - (iii) Improvement of transportation links:
  - (iv) Improvements in post and telegraphs:
  - (v) Collaboration in the field of energy:
  - (vi) Intensification of contacts between scientific schools and bodies:
  - (vii) Intensification of cultural exchanges:
  - (viii) Exchange of books, journals, and newspapers:
  - (ix) Freer sports exchanges:
- (c) Exchange of Declarations on the Renunciation of the Use of Force:

As the Federal Foreign Minister stated in the NATO Council on 24th June, 1968, the Federal Government is ready to affirm the renunciation of the use of force also with regard to the relationship between the two parts of Germany and to link it with the specific problems of this relationship. Both sides should bind themselves in reciprocal declarations to strive for the resolution of the German question, and of all disputes arising from intra-German relationships, by peaceful means only, and to make no attempt to change by force the social structure in the other part of Germany. Such a renunciation of the use of force could facilitate considerably the rapprochement of the two parts of Germany.

2. Four-Power Responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a Whole

(a) Guarantee of free Access to Berlin:

Violations by Soviet and East-German authorities of the right of free access to Berlin have in the past often created dangerous tensions. It would be

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conducive to détente if the Four Powers could agree on the principle - and if the Soviet Union could get the East-German authorities to associate themselves with that principle - that access to Berlin must not be interfered with by physical, financial, or administrative measures, or otherwise.

(b) Improvement of the Situation in Berlin:

Important steps would be:

- a long-term arrangement facilitating the movement of persons and re-establishing telephone communications between the Western sectors and the Eastern sector of Berlin;
- agreement to end the discrimination to which the population and economy of the Western sectors of Berlin are subjected by the Soviet Union and its allies.

(c) Support for Efforts to remove Restrictions on Traffic and Communications between the two Parts of Germany

Talks between the Three Western Powers and the USSR would appear to be the appropriate and most promising way to proceed. On 5th August, the Council received a message regarding Tripartite approaches to the Soviet Government which could promote the possibility of ordered and negotiated progress on questions affecting Berlin and Germany as a whole. The approaches were made on 6th and 7th August. On 17th September, the Council received a report regarding the Soviet Union's response.

3. Open Questions between Germany and her Eastern Neighbours

(a) Germany's Eastern Frontiers

Pending a peace settlement for Germany, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to meet the concern of Germany's Eastern neighbours about the integrity of their boundaries by including the frontier issue and other open bilateral questions in mutual agreements on the renunciation of the use (or threat of the use) of force.

(b) Munich Agreement

While there is, in fact, no dispute about the present frontier between Germany and Czechoslovakia nor on the fact that the Munich Agreement is no longer valid, opinions remain divided on whether this agreement was

originally valid or whether it was null and void ab initio. Besides its general importance, this issue has a number of special legal implications affecting bilateral German-Czechoslovak relations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is prepared to talk with the Government of the CSSR with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

Section IV - Measures for Economic, Technological and Cultural Co-operation(1)

1. Oceanography

Genesis

There already exists some basis for East-West co-operation in oceanography. The United States has had informal talks with the Soviets on this and most NATO powers have participated in the development of policies regarding co-operative research with the Soviets in the Sea Bed Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and in the inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union, whose co-operation is very important since between them they possess a large share of the world's capability in this field, have had contacts within the IOC framework. A further point to bear in mind in this context is that large reserves of raw materials lie hidden within the continental shelf whose demarcation, however, is still under discussion.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

Science stands to gain from co-operation in this field which, moreover, would cut down the cost of research.

(b) For the East:

Oceanography is an especially attractive issue for the Soviet Union which, like Poland and Rumania, has recently displayed its interest in this field. The USSR, in particular, has more to gain from oceanographical research than most of the other leading countries, since only a small proportion of its coast-line is ice-free.

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- (1) The Italian Delegation proposed that the issues contained in Section IV of Category A, as well as in Section IV of Category B, should be listed in Category C, because they belong among issues already under negotiation bilaterally or in force other than NATO.

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Negotiability

The quality and extent of East West co-operation in this field should be governed by scientific criteria. There would be good prospects for such co-operation, because there is a wide area where no military considerations are involved. The programme for co-operation in this field, which would also benefit the rest of the international community might be directed into the following channels: collaboration under the auspices of the United Nations, including the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, co-operation in regional programmes and between groups of Eastern and Western countries. As regards co-operation relating to the continental shelf, it should be noted, however, that the USSR has not made a very large contribution of its own and has merely drawn unilateral benefits from this work.

Process of Negotiation

The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission is clearly the best forum for pursuing such East-West co-operation. The Soviet bloc, in particular, is in favour of strengthening this Commission. Even if multilateral negotiation was necessary to achieve co-operation on this issue, bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union would still be desirable in order to buttress multilateral co-operative endeavours.

2. Environment

Genesis

East-West co-operation on various aspects of the problems of environment has been for a number of years a regular feature of programmes and activities carried on within the general framework of the United Nations, its Regional Commissions and Specialised Agencies. Continuing efforts in this field have been the subject of a series of multilateral conventions. In addition a number of bilateral agreements have been concluded. Finally, a study of environmental problems has been included in US-USSR exchange agreements. The principal objective of these conventions and agreements has been the improvement of national and international capabilities to assure the protection of natural resources against contamination by harmful agents and their enrichment for human use.

Present Status

A noticeable increase in world interest has been shown recently with a view to reducing the irrational use of natural resources. President Nixon, in his remarks to the North Atlantic Council on 24th February, 1969, and again in his Washington address of 10th April, 1969, at the NATO Ministerial Conference, referred to the need for co-operation in dealing with the problems of modern environment. The

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Warsaw Pact referred to this possibility in its Budapest Appeal of 17th March, 1969. The topic has also been mentioned in the speech delivered by Mr. Gromyko on 10th July, 1969. There is also preparatory work currently under way for the convocation of a congress to be held in Prague in 1971 under the auspices of the ECE, where particular attention is to be given to the problems of air and water pollution. Additional topics which might be studied could include pesticides research, urban technology, mass transportation systems, health and many others. In the same context might be mentioned other major manifestations of this trend at international level: the creation of the International Biological Programme (IBP); the UNESCO Conference on the Biosphere of 1968; the UN Conference on Human Environment scheduled for 1972; and the impending establishment of a Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). Many of these initiatives have been supported by Western as well as Eastern members including the USSR.

The problems of environment have currently been the subject of active study in NATO. A preparatory Committee has formulated proposals for the organization, venue of reference and working procedure of a Committee on Challenge of Modern Society. The recommendations of the preparatory Committee are presently being considered by the Council.

#### Political Attractiveness

It can be said that both East and West have a common interest in recognising the global character of the threat against the increasing spread of environmental hazards to human life, health and well being. As for the East, some problems are known to be of special interest to them.

There is a definite advantage in trying to promote an increased East-West, including US-USSR, co-operation in relatively non-controversial fields. Both camps would normally consider it beneficial to exchange reciprocal know-how and expertise on the various items which fall into the scope of environment.

#### Negotiability

To avoid possible ideological difficulties it should be foreseen that East-West co-operation, for the time being, should concentrate on technological problems.

Possible objectives of such co-operation would be to reduce threats to natural resources, improve technical know-how to deal with these threats, to regularise contact between scientists and to stimulate work being done in international organizations. An illustrative and tentative list of items might embrace:

- Water pollution, watershed and river basins management.
- Air pollution and pollution control.
- Pesticides and herbicides.
- Joint atmospheric research projects.
- East-West studies of problems of advanced industrial societies.

### Process of Negotiation

Considering the universal character of environmental problems the UN, the Specialised Agencies, e.g. UNESCO, and regional organizations (e.g. ECE), as well as non-governmental organizations (ICSU) and their affiliates would appear to offer the most convenient and most acceptable forum for the continuation and development of present contacts and for the initiation of new ones. This does not and should not, however, exclude additional country-by-country approaches through regular diplomatic channels. In special cases, where US-USSR special capabilities are involved, an invitation to direct co-operation in a highly specialised area, e.g. use of Satellites for joint atmospheric research, could be extended through a Presidential message. The form of agreements would have to depend on the nature of each case. They may range from informal arrangements to conventions.

### 3. Expansion of Tourism

#### Genesis

Whether and how to expand tourism and thereby help improve the understanding between East and West might be considered in detail. The Western countries already allow their citizens to visit the East very much at the tourists' discretion.

#### Political Attractiveness

##### (a) For the West:

- (i) It would be a suitable field in which to indicate Western desire for co-operation with the East;
- (ii) increased exposure of citizens from the USSR and Eastern European countries to the West, in terms of its way of life, could have a beneficial effect.

(b) For the East:


Such an expansion would provide an increased source of badly needed hard currency for the Eastern European nations, which, in turn, would enable them to expand their purchases in the West.

Negotiability

It might be worthwhile to discuss the possibility of selective removal of the requirement for tourist visas for the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries on the basis of reciprocity in an effort to increase tourism between East and West. Such action has already taken place in the case of some countries. Some relaxation of geographic restraint on tourist travel in particular countries might be considered also on a reciprocal basis. If this is not possible, consideration could be given to a simplification of visa procedures affecting the people of these countries. Security implications of such steps would naturally have to be considered.

Process of Negotiation

Discussion in this field might be best carried out on a bilateral basis.



CATEGORY B

Issues which Appear to Require Further Examination  
Prior to being considered for Negotiation

Section I - Measures to Reduce Tension and Promote Confidence

1. A Code of Good Conduct

Genesis

In 1966, the United Kingdom held exchanges of views in this connection with Czechoslovakia and other East European countries; these came to nothing. At the appropriate time, and in the context of overall negotiations, it might be useful to consider proposing to the Soviet Union and East European countries certain rules of good conduct, the observance of which would help to improve the climate of relations between European countries. Such a code should define more precisely the principles of (a) respect for national sovereignty and the independence and equality of States, and (b) non-interference in other States' internal affairs.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) In the same way as an exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of force, a Code of this kind could be used to counter possible Eastern bloc proposals for a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It would enable the West to parry a move of this kind with suggestions which, in its view, were likely to contribute more effectively to the relaxation of tension and to put a stop to the discussion of Soviet arguments detrimental to the Alliance.
- (ii) One of the advantages of the Code would be to broaden the concept of détente to cover relations within the blocs as well as between them.
- (iii) Soviet acceptance of the Code would carry with it a moral commitment, in so far as world public opinion is concerned, to restrict the implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
- (iv) At the same time, a number of Eastern bloc countries might regard this proposal as offering a measure of protection in their relations with the Soviet Union.

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(b) For the East:

- (i) By accepting the Code, the Soviet Union could try to gain credence for the idea that it was henceforth prepared to comply with the principles of international morality. Another advantage of taking this line would be that it would promote undue optimism which might make Western public opinion less vigilant.
- (ii) The Soviet Union might be interested to take this opportunity to enhance its prestige, which was severely damaged by the Czechoslovak affair.

Negotiability

It was felt that the following considerations should be kept in mind. The Code should make it clear that it is applicable to international relations within each alliance as well as between members of the two alliances. The Code should avoid the use of Communist phraseology and be free of language which might lend itself to propagandistic exploitation against the North Atlantic Alliance or its individual members. It should also make it clear that it cannot be substituted for a settlement of European problems or constitute a hindrance to such a settlement.

Process of Negotiation

If the dialogue between European countries is to be continued during the years to come, the Code may serve a useful purpose, although it is not yet possible to forecast at what specific stage of the talks this would be. It is not suggested that this question should be dealt with in isolation; on the contrary, it should be approached in the context of overall negotiations and an attempt should be made to ensure its implementation. Finally, the Alliance would be well-advised to suspend action on this proposal with a view to bringing it up should this appear to be warranted by the progress achieved in other areas of the overall negotiations. An atmosphere of genuine détente will have to be established between the two blocs before these suggestions can be considered with reasonable prospects of success. The exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of force could, in appropriate circumstances, be treated as one of the elements in this Code of Good Conduct.

2. Prohibition of Manoeuvres on Borders

Genesis

So far, this question has not been proposed by either side.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) This measure would have the same advantages as were described under Item Category A.I.4 (Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres), but to a greater degree. The constraints imposed on Soviet military movements would be physical as well as psychological, for the Soviet Union would, to some extent, be deprived of an opportunity to exert military pressure on another country. Since Warsaw Pact manoeuvres could provide a cover for offensive action, this could result in some advantage to the Alliance.
- (ii) An arrangement of this kind would reduce the risk of war through accident and help to create a climate of confidence in Europe. (This could also apply to the East in the same sense.)

(b) For the East:

It might be in the Eastern bloc's interest to try to counter the Alliance's effort to achieve military preparedness by an arrangement of this kind. A number of NATO manoeuvre areas are in close proximity to the Iron Curtain; there would be serious financial and strategic implications should they be moved further back; in particular, it would be dangerous to restrict the space required for manoeuvres. More specifically, NATO forces would be denied the opportunity of training in the areas in which they would have to fight at the outset of a conflict. (Assuming the Warsaw Pact to be the aggressor, this point would not apply in parallel to them.)

Negotiability

While this measure could make an impact on public opinion, it is felt that negotiations on this question would most probably involve disadvantages which would outweigh its possible advantages. It is also doubtful whether the Forward Strategy concept adopted by the Alliance would be compatible with restrictions on exercise activity or the deployment of forces close to the border. Consideration should likewise be given to NATO security requirements.

Process of Negotiation

The geographical areas involved and the type of military movements subject to the prohibition should be specifically described. In this connection, it might be possible to exclude some NATO manoeuvre areas and some military activities in the context of routine operations. If need be, this issue could be raised later, along with other control measures, should the progress made with the overall negotiations on arms control and disarmament so warrant.

3. Study of Measures to Prevent the Outbreak of a Nuclear Attack through Surprise or Error

This question, which once aroused much interest and was even the major issue at a 1955 summit conference, can still be considered current, since the fear of such an attack is essentially linked with the actual existence of nuclear weapons. Mutual deterrence does not constitute in its own right a sufficient guarantee since it is perpetually threatened by a disruption of the balance, which could develop especially as a result of a technological break-through.

The advanced development and mobility of nuclear weapons has rendered their control more difficult since the period (1959-60) when the French Government proposed the control of their delivery systems. New ideas and methods must therefore be sought in this field.

4. Limitations on Arms Shipments to Sensitive Areas

Genesis

It might also be appropriate to consider East-West co-operation in limiting the shipment of arms to areas of the world where the inflow of such armaments would tend:

- to heighten the possibility of conflict;
- to increase the scope of existing conflicts and associated civilian suffering;
- to provoke the direct involvement of outside countries.

The most effective way of limiting arms shipments to sensitive areas would be to impose an international embargo; however, the prospects of achieving this are not encouraging. In the past, limited embargo measures in certain areas and efforts to establish a registration system for arms deliveries under the aegis of the United Nations have proved unsuccessful.

In June 1967, for example, the three Western Powers were unable to secure Soviet backing for an embargo on arms deliveries to the belligerents in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. At all events, consideration could be given to the feasibility of drawing up arms registration agreements for specific areas since this is the only way to cater for the problems created by the geo-political situation in each area.

### Present Status

The recent Danish and United States initiatives at the United Nations, the latter of which were designed especially for the Middle East, have not so far produced any positive results.

### Political Attractiveness

#### Implications for both West and East

- (i) Regional registration agreements for arms deliveries are in a different category from the other issues for negotiation considered in this Report since they would have to be the subject of a joint proposal by the two camps for submission to the purchasing countries. These agreements would apply outside the geographical area of the two Alliances. It is especially in the Middle East that they would be likely to prove most advantageous to the Allies, although the latter are equally intent on restoring stability in other parts of the world. Arrangements of this kind might, for example, help to reduce the danger of war in the Middle East and, given certain conditions, that of a direct confrontation between the two Alliances. While the Soviet Union may appreciate these dangers, it may well decline to sponsor such agreements in the belief that, should a degree of stability be restored in critical areas, such as the Middle East, it would lose the political influence it has acquired with the recipient countries;
- (ii) Both camps would lay themselves open to the same criticisms from the purchasing countries, which could complain that they were being subjected to discrimination, particularly if these agreements appeared to be imposed by the countries providing arms.

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Negotiability

An impressive number of difficulties will have to be faced in considering this proposal. According to a Soviet Memorandum on disarmament, dated 1st July, 1968, the Soviet Government is not prepared to consider the introduction of a system of this kind in the Middle East unless the other factors of the Arab-Israeli confrontation are also dealt with at the same time. From a more general standpoint, there is a danger that the Soviet Union would quickly dissociate itself from an initiative of this kind and claim that it was entirely Western-inspired. In this way, it might manage to turn the purchasing countries - and especially those of the Third World - against the Alliance by accusing the West of trying to keep them in a state of military weakness. Any solution must be acceptable to the main suppliers and the purchasing countries. It will not be an easy matter to define the type of arms involved or what is meant by the transfer of these arms or the term "sensitive areas". The problem of verification is also likely to present many difficulties. Finally, any solution of this kind will have to cater for each country's defence and internal security requirements.

Process of Negotiation

Although there is little prospect that this proposal will be favourably received by the Soviet Union, consideration might be given to a registration system for arms deliveries which would apply in specific areas and might, perhaps, be administered by the United Nations Secretary General. The Middle East is one of the areas on which tentative approaches might be made to the Soviet Union by one or more member countries of the Alliance. Notwithstanding the lack of progress up to the present time, it is suggested that this question should not be submitted to the United Nations unless these soundings indicate that there are some prospects of success.

Section II - Arms Limitation and Disarmament

1. Mutual Freeze of Nuclear Weapons and Existing Force Levels(1)

Genesis

Various combinations of proposals to freeze nuclear weapons and conventional force levels in Central Europe in the past have been envisaged as a first stage in a more

comprehensive disarmament programme(1). For example, the Gomulka Plan put forward by the Poles in 1964 called for a freeze on nuclear warheads and the prohibition of the production, import or transfer of nuclear warheads within the area.

During Alliance discussions in this connection, the general feeling was that these proposals were unacceptable to NATO for the following reasons:

- (a) a freeze of this kind would apply to NATO's tactical nuclear forces but would leave unaffected medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles deployed in the Western USSR;
- (b) it would represent the first step towards a de-nuclearised zone, which could involve serious drawbacks for the Alliance;
- (c) its implementation would give rise to extremely difficult verification problems;
- (d) it would provide an argument for the recognition of the "GDR";
- (e) it did not carry with it sufficient prospects of progress towards an overall political settlement, and especially the resolution of the German problem, despite the fact that arms control measures could not be dissociated from major political questions. These objections were amplified in a United States Note to the Polish Government in April 1964, as a result of which this ceased to be a pressing issue. At the same time, the Soviet Union does not appear to have given these Polish proposals extensive support.

#### Present Status

Since the Budapest Appeal, Polish diplomats have again called for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe in connection with the Conference on European Security; they have also expressed the view that, prior to the freeze, the Federal Republic should sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

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- (1) Khrushchev Plan for the de-nuclearisation of Scandinavia and Baltic - 11.6.59
  - Soviet Plan for the de-nuclearisation of the Mediterranean 20.5.63
  - Rapacki Plans 1-2.10.57 (Nuclear); 2-4.10.58 (conventional/nuclear)
  - Gomulka Plan 29.2.64

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) An arrangement of this kind would consolidate the West's current nuclear weapon superiority in Central Europe;
- (ii) The USSR would be deprived of any pretended justification for propaganda attack on the current nuclear deployment of NATO forces.

(b) For the East:

- (i) The Eastern Bloc countries could try to use this measure as a stepping stone to other measures, such as a nuclear free zone, which the Allies have found much more objectionable;
- (ii) An agreement to a mutual freeze arrangement as an issue in itself rather than as a stage in an arms reduction process could contribute to the consolidation of the political status quo in Europe;
- (iii) The Soviet might find this proposal useful for propaganda reasons and as a possible response to an initiative on balanced force reductions.

Negotiability

In view of the need to preserve a military balance as a result of the forward deployment of Soviet forces since the developments in Czechoslovakia, any proposal for a freeze on nuclear deployment should be examined in relation to an overall freeze on force levels. It will not be an easy matter to develop a verification system meeting the required standards of efficiency which does not impose undue constraints on the activities of NATO forces.

Process of Negotiation

This question could well be raised in the course of discussions on mutual balanced force reductions. Whether or not this question could be considered for negotiations with the Eastern Bloc will depend very largely on the decisions which are taken by the Alliance as a result of the studies regarding the possibility of negotiations on balanced force reductions and if need be, other items(1) could be added; should these

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- (1) Category A I.2 (Exchanges of Observers at Military Manoeuvres) and  
Category A I.4 (Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres)

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meet with a favourable Soviet reception, this would clear the air and pave the way for a discussion on the more difficult problems of a freeze and balanced reductions. Attention should also be given to the possibilities of applying the freeze to personnel and equipment and to the effect it would have on routine modernisation and on qualitative improvements involving no increases in personnel or equipment.

2. Study of Conditions Needed for Nuclear Disarmament under Effective Control

The Soviet memorandum on disarmament, published on 1st July, 1968, on the occasion of the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, states that the Government of the USSR is ready to undertake negotiations on the matter of nuclear disarmament "at any time, with all the other nuclear powers".

It may be worth taking up this proposal and putting the intentions of the USSR to the test. Such an undertaking would, of course, pre-suppose that Communist China would participate at some point, but this would be a difficulty which should not hinder the four other nuclear powers in their study of the problem.

Another dialogue is hopefully about to be started bilaterally between Americans and Soviets, but this initiative, which relates to arms control, is not incompatible with the search for real nuclear disarmament, which could continue at the same time.

Section III - Germany and Berlin

Relationship between "GDR" and foreign Countries

This question is provisionally set aside from the list of issues for possible negotiations with the East. In reality, there exists a link between the development of intra-German contacts and the relations of the "GDR" with other countries, especially countries of the West. Any initiatives by the latter with a view to normalization of their relations with East Germany, in the absence of similar progress in the contacts between the two parts of Germany, could only end in further hardening the division of the country. On the other hand, if some progress were forthcoming in the course of implementing the proposals listed, Category A, Section III, greater flexibility in the position of the Western countries could be envisaged. This could affect particularly the following two points:(1)

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(1) The Danish and Norwegian Delegations suggested the addition of the following as point (c):

(c) Improvement of travel possibilities.

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- (a) Regional economic co-operation involving East Germany, e.g. ECE activities;
- (b) Participation of East Germany in non-governmental organizations and technical governmental contacts, e.g. railroad traffic, road traffic, postal matters.

More concrete proposals will be submitted in the light of time and circumstances to the member countries of the Alliance.

Section IV - Measures for Economic, Technological and Cultural Co-operation

1. Extension of GATT Membership to Eastern European States(1)

Genesis

At present, among the Warsaw Pact Countries only, Czechoslovakia and Poland are members of GATT. Bulgaria has observer status and Rumania and Hungary have applied to join. There are no signs that the Soviet Union intends to seek membership.

The main difficulties stem from the fact that in the East European countries, trade with other countries is channelled through State trading bodies set up by the Governments with little consideration for the normal cost and price relationship which governs Western market economies.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

- (i) In so far as this is possible under the State trade structure in the Eastern Bloc countries, member countries of the Alliance may find new industrial outlets on these markets;
- (ii) If the Eastern Bloc countries became members of GATT, their freedom of action in the trade field might be somewhat enhanced.

(b) For the East:

- (i) Poland is the only Warsaw Pact country receiving "most favoured nation" treatment from the United States. The other candidates would

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(1) The "Liberalisation of imports from Eastern European countries" has been considered under the present heading in view of the relationship between the two questions.

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no doubt welcome the same treatment during the negotiations for their admission to GATT, as well as the interesting concessions granted to Poland. It is noted that the United States cannot grant "most favoured nation" treatment without specific legislative authority.

- (ii) The quantitative restrictions on imports to member countries of the Alliance now apply to only a small number of "sensitive" commodities (oil, agricultural products, etc.). The East European countries are especially interested in the withdrawal of these restrictions since they can easily provide these commodities.
- (iii) Most of the East European countries wish to obtain equipment and techniques; it has thus become more urgent for them to secure better access to the hard currency countries and this would be easier if they were members of GATT.

#### Negotiability

It may be felt that this problem should be the subject of consultations rather than negotiations and that, in any case, it is for the Communist countries concerned to express interest in joining GATT. The Western countries should decide whether to seize the benefits they would derive from the Communist countries' admission to GATT or to try to secure political advantages or economic concessions from the Communist countries in the immediate future by taking liberalisation measures in favour of these countries independently of GATT. The second of these two options appears to be the only possible solution. However, either option would cause serious problems to some less-developed countries, including those which are members of the Alliance, particularly as regards their exports of agricultural commodities. As was the case for the admission of Poland, the value of the political gesture should be measured against the economic advantages, which are not of decisive importance for the Alliance.

In view of the different situations in the member countries of the Alliance, it has not been possible to arrive at a joint policy. The NATO countries are therefore unlikely to make a collective proposal for liberalisation. Individual measures are more likely to be considered, but no doubt these will not have any immediate political repercussions.

An assessment of the "pros and cons" for the Alliance shows that only a small number of concessions could be offered to the Eastern bloc.

2. Extension of Credit Facilities

Genesis

The purpose of this measure would be to expand economic relations with East European countries by extending facilities for the supply of capital equipment as a means of assisting their industrial development. This problem has already been considered on several occasions by the Committee of Economic Advisers(1). These studies did not produce a common policy on the part of the NATO member countries. The main European trading nations which are members of the Alliance make no distinction between Communist and other countries in so far as the granting of credits is concerned. As a rule, they have granted requests by the East European countries for long-term credits, although the United States has not taken the same attitude. The volume of credits to the Communist countries has increased tenfold during the decade from 1959 to 1968.

Political Attractiveness

(a) For the West:

(i) Advantages

Generally speaking, Western Governments wish to promote the export of their industrial commodities. The granting of credits would help to open up new markets in the East European countries.

(ii) Drawbacks

Should Western credit policy vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc be made more flexible, these arrangements would also have to apply to the rest of the world, so as to avoid establishing a preferential system for the Communist countries, which would be hard to justify;

this measure could lead to rivalry between the NATO countries, since the East European countries might play one of them off against another;

the easing of the current provisions might be tantamount to granting the East European countries aid rather than trade credits, for credits allocated by one government to another would thus take the place of publicly guaranteed credit assurance on private credits;

it is highly dubious whether it would be wise to extend credits on political grounds.

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(1) C-M(64)38 and C-M(68)6

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par D<sup>N</sup> NATO SECRET  
C-M(69)46

(b) For the East:

Advantages

In view of the East European countries' chronic shortage of hard currencies, any easing of Western credit policy should be of considerable interest to them. Owing to the bilateralism which characterizes those countries' domestic trade in the provinces and their rigorous production programmes, it is difficult to adapt their economies to changes in the situation and virtually impossible to invest Western capital to modernise their economic structure. Most of the Communist countries have difficulty in obtaining as much modern equipment from the West as they might desire, because the supply of credits on terms they wish is insufficient to meet their demand.

Negotiability

The East European countries have already secured such concessions that further facilities are unlikely to be granted. In view of the difficulties which have previously been encountered in hammering out a joint policy for the Western countries, it is felt that this is not an easily negotiable question for the present.

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CATEGORY C

Issues Already Under Negotiation

Section II - Arms Limitation and Disarmament

1. Cut-Off of Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons Purposes(1)

The USSR is particularly vulnerable in its obdurate opposition to the most recent United States proposals in the ENDC(2) and in its unwillingness to consider IAEA verification of a cut-off. Some Warsaw Pact countries have accepted or expressed willingness to accept IAEA safeguards.

2. Organic Disarmament Programme

A proposal for the development of an organic disarmament programme has been put forward in the ENDC based on an approach to arms control and disarmament problems as a whole, but distinct from general and complete disarmament.

The approach of this proposal is a flexible one. In particular, it is not a question of abandoning or interrupting the work already in progress in the various fields of collateral measures, but on the contrary of making the most of it and of taking it into consideration within the framework of an overall plan. Nor is this plan one for general and complete disarmament. It rather foresees:

- (i) a preparatory phase for the various stages of effective disarmament, which should relate essentially to the achievement of the following aims:
  - (a) the halting of the nuclear arms race; (b) the creation of a climate of political confidence (by measures such as agreements for reducing the risk of surprise attack, for establishing regional security systems and especially agreements giving effect to Articles I and V of the NPT concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy);
- (ii) a methodology to be valid for the whole of the disarmament process, for which it would establish the guidelines; the determination of these guidelines could be based on the joint statement of principles adopted by the USA and the USSR in September 1961, which should be brought up to date and supplemented as much as possible.

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- (1) The French Delegation did not associate itself with the inclusion of this issue.
  - (2) Re-named the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in August 1969.

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3. Measures to Deal with Biological and Chemical Warfare

An area of major interest in the field of arms control is biological and chemical warfare. The use of such weapons, but not their manufacture, is prohibited by a protocol signed in Geneva in 1925 (though some States have reserved the right to use them for retaliation in kind). In December 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted with no dissenting vote a resolution calling for strict observance of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva protocol.

The Soviet Government proposed, in a memorandum dated 1st July, 1968, that the ENDC consider ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the 1925 Geneva protocol. This was followed by a Soviet sponsored draft resolution at the 24th United Nations General Assembly proposing the total ban of chemical and biological weapons.

In August 1968 the British Government called for the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting biological methods of warfare, to reinforce the 1925 Geneva protocol, as a first step towards effective further measures in this area. They tabled the draft of such a convention at the ENDC on 10th July, 1969. Also in the summer of 1968, the British Government suggested that the United Nations Secretary General be asked to prepare a report on the effects of chemical weapons, to facilitate future consideration of measures to deal with these weapons. This idea was taken up by the United Nations General Assembly, where, in December 1968, the overwhelming majority of members requested the United Nations Secretary General to prepare a report on the effects of both chemical and biological warfare. This report was published on 1st July, 1969.

4. A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban(1)

The ENDC has devoted considerable efforts to negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which would extend the prohibitions contained in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to underground tests. The main obstacle to progress remains verification and on-site inspection, the Russians maintaining that national means of detection are adequate and the West that some measure of on-site inspection is necessary to check up on suspicious events. In present circumstances neither side is likely to change its position on these basic points. It would be worthwhile to explore the possibilities concerning further co-operation with the East in the field of exchanges of seismological data. But success in the talks on strategic arms limitation might also improve prospects for agreement.

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(1) The French Delegation did not associate itself with the inclusion of this issue.

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5. Arms Control on the Sea bed

At its current session, the CCD paid considerable attention to the question of arms control on the sea bed. The Soviet and American delegations each put forward several draft treaties for consideration by the CCD. These were discussed exhaustively. On 7th October, 1969, the United States and Soviet Co-Chairmen tabled a joint draft treaty. The CCD, which would ordinarily have adjourned at the end of August in order to participate in the work of the United Nations General Assembly, is remaining in session through October to discuss the joint Co-Chairmen draft. Arms control on the sea bed has emerged as one of the most hopeful prospects for fruitful negotiations with the East in the arms control field in present circumstances. This question, including earlier United States draft treaties, the joint Co-Chairmen draft and various proposals put forward by Canada and the United Kingdom, has been the subject of consultation in NATO.

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