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PART I

FOLLOW-UP TO THE REPORT ON FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

Report by the Council in Permanent Session

PART I

REVIEW OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS

OTAN/NATO,  
Brussels, 39.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

REVIEW OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS

Chapter I

COMMENTARY ON THE 1966 REPORT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The 1966 East/West Report (C-M(66)84(Final)) - a reprint of which is attached hereto at Annex B - closely examined the prospects of healthy developments in East/West relations and dealt with many specific suggestions for extending co-operation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Without superseding the 1966 Report, the current report comments on various developments in East/West relations since that date.

2. The general lines of the 1966 paper have stood the test of time. The main trends of events during the last 18 months and the directions of Western efforts identified in the Report have continued, remain relevant, and in some cases have been accentuated.

I.

3. The solidarity and military strength of the Alliance are still fundamental to the maintenance of a relative stability in Europe which permits evolution towards a peaceful settlement to take place. There is thus no contradiction between, on the one hand, the maintenance of the strength of the Alliance, and on the other hand, the search for progress towards a more stable European relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. These two interrelated tasks were well set out in the Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance (paragraph 5) in December 1967, which publicly reaffirmed the Alliance's resolve to further the East/West "détente" by appropriate and realistic measures.

4. The 1966 East/West Report concluded that the Allies should seek a "détente" in which the East would co-operate in fields of common interest and develop the habit of discussion at as many levels and in as many fields as possible. This conclusion continues to be valid, for there are hopeful signs that the tendency towards greater diversity in East Europe in general, and the current changes in Czechoslovakia in particular, will contribute to this end. Pluralism and some loosening of the Soviet Union's authority over East European governments are now facts of life. Differences among Warsaw Pact members on German policy, non-proliferation, the Arab-Israeli war, the international Communist movement, COMECON, and the Third World have now become clearer. Also, the speed and direction of Communist domestic trends now varies more widely.

5. An East Europe consisting of countries free to pursue in an enlightened manner their own individual interests, participating effectively as part of the world market and having constructive ties both eastward and westward, could in time play a useful rôle, as the 1966 Report pointed out, as a bridge to the USSR and as a unifying impulse in Europe. But it would be wrong to plan on the basis of too optimistic an estimate of the rate of progress. If the East European states are not to provoke a counter-action from the Soviet Union, they must move slowly. It must be recognized that reformist leaders, such as those in Czechoslovakia, may have difficulty controlling the more liberal elements in their countries. Despite the intentions of leaders, therefore, events could move to a point where the Soviet Union would see its vital interests threatened and intervene in some form to arrest the course of developments. Although the Allies are deeply interested in seeing the greatest possible liberalization in Eastern Europe, they must at the same time avoid encouraging unrestrained tendencies and actions that could precipitate a tragedy of the Hungarian type. This would set back the progress that it has been possible to make in various facets of East/West relations.

6. Although relations among the East European countries and between them and the USSR are becoming more complex, and other East European countries may follow Rumania in pursuing a more autonomous policy toward the outside world, progress towards a basic reorientation of the foreign policies of the East European states will take time. As the 1966 Report put it, the aspirations of the East European states are held within limits imposed by the weight of Soviet power, as well as by ideological ties and certain interests held in common. Moreover, one result of the current developments in East Europe may be a stiffening of conservative ranks there and a further hardening of the Soviet attitude both towards dissenting movements at home and in Soviet policy towards the West. A similar hardening on the part of the Polish and East German régimes will command Soviet support. The USSR still strives to freeze the status quo in Europe, as shown by her recent efforts to reduce the impact of Rumanian individualism, the Czechoslovak shake-up and the Federal Republic of Germany's eastern policy.

7. Therefore, while the events in East Europe, added to trends such as the Sino-Soviet dispute and the growth of individualism among the parties in the Communist movement, probably will increase the problems of the Soviet Union and may in the end influence Soviet policies for the better, opportunities for rapid progress in the direction of general "détente" should not be exaggerated.

8. When seen in the longer perspective, events in Eastern Europe since 1966 are favourable, and Western countries must be ready to take constructive and carefully considered initiatives. In general they will do best by identifying and

responding as fully as they can to the desires of individual East European states, particularly in the economic sphere. At present - even more than in 1966 - the Allies need to take into account in their policy that the East European countries pursue different lines of evolution. NATO countries must continue to avoid exposing themselves to accusations of splitting tactics in the East. They must be delicate in their approaches and careful in their public pronouncements.

9. In a broader perspective, an important factor in East/West relations which cannot be ignored, is the growth of Soviet maritime power and activities in recent years, mainly in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. In pursuit of its policy objectives, the Soviet Union shows itself more conscious of the possibilities for using military power in support of diplomacy and aid.

II.

Comments on specific sections of the  
1966 East/West Report

Trade

10. Exports of European NATO countries have considerably increased, in large part due to Western credits, and have made a contribution to improving East/West relations. A limiting factor under present conditions is the shortage of hard currency in East European countries and the non-convertibility of their currencies.

11. By resorting to credits, Communist countries have to some extent mortgaged their future hard currency earnings. In the process a certain interdependence has been created between themselves and the West, as their future solvency depends to a considerable degree on their ability to develop their exports to the Western industrialized countries. The need to achieve this aim may provide an impetus to the Communist countries to improve the efficiency of their production system through economic reforms, even if these are considered as potentially dangerous by some of their leaders. For its part the West may find that in the long run, in order to be reimbursed, it will have no alternative but to open increasingly its markets to products from Communist countries. Some NATO countries have liberalized their trading procedures with satisfactory results.

Economic co-operation

12. Economic co-operation is recognized as another element in the long-term political evolution of East Europe. More specifically, joint ventures between Western firms and East European enterprises are a promising new opportunity. This whole subject might, at a propitious time, be studied in NATO.

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)

13. The Economic Commission for Europe provides a valuable means of contact with the Eastern states. Their attitude in the ECE has undergone a considerable evolution; it is now more open and flexible and the individual Eastern countries are no longer speaking with one voice. At a plenary session this year a Franco-Russian resolution re-activating the Trade Committee and asking it to study problems of East/West trade was adopted unanimously. At present the most promising fields of work for the ECE seem to be to explore the possibilities of scientific, technical and industrial co-operation between East and West. Consultations in the NATO Committee of Economic Advisers should aim at finding ways of translating the improved atmosphere into results of a concrete nature.

Other international economic organizations

14. The Allies should continue to examine the possibilities of Eastern association or participation in GATT, IMF, IBRD and OECD. Czechoslovakia has endeavoured to give more substance to her membership in GATT and, since the 1966 Report was drafted, Yugoslavia and Poland have been admitted to full membership, while Bulgaria and Hungary have acquired the observer status which Rumania had earlier obtained. Eastern countries have also evinced a growing interest in and recognition of the IMF's rôle. Previously hostile Communist views on the IBRD as well may be fading into more nuanced judgements.

15. Since 1961 Yugoslavia has had a special status in the OECD whereby she is a full member for the consideration of economic policies, scientific and technical matters, agriculture and fisheries questions, technical assistance, and productivity; and has observer status in other matters.

16. The USSR has shown interest in participating in some of the scientific work of OECD, and it might be possible to associate other East European countries with the Organization's technical sub-committees on such matters as tourism, urban planning, and water and air pollution. Additionally, the OECD has taken up the question of East/West trade, although work has not yet passed the fact-finding stage.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

17. Certain East European countries have begun to realize that they are in the same position as the Western nations in facing the demand by developing lands for economic assistance and more favourable trading arrangements. Eastern attempts "en bloc" to stigmatize the West may be giving way to a more self-interested evaluation of international economic questions by individual Communist governments.

Tourism

18. Tourism has slowly expanded, and visa systems have been considerably simplified in some cases. While making strong publicity to attract tourists from the West, the East European countries have not comparably facilitated travel by their own citizens to the West. Efforts to improve road communications with the countries of East Europe are being continued.

Cultural Exchanges

19. There has been an overall trend toward expansion of cultural exchanges, although experience with the countries of East Europe has been uneven, ranging from highly satisfactory to stagnant. On balance, cultural exchanges, which usually are governed by inter-governmental bilateral agreements, have contributed significantly to improving East/West relations and should be promoted vigorously. Satisfactory progress has been made despite the continued imposition by the Communists especially in the Soviet Union of important restrictions on the free interchange of information and ideas.

Ministerial visits

20. The exchange of Ministerial visits has been intensified to virtually unprecedented levels since 1966 and has proved useful in promoting functional co-operation and maintaining some dialogue at the political level.

Military exchanges and contacts

21. The exchange of East/West military visits can promote the "détente" and so falls within the policy adopted by members of the Alliance to expand East/West contacts at all levels. Military exchanges could help to reduce the chances of miscalculation or incomprehension in potential crisis situations. However, some NATO members have expressed doubts about the usefulness of such exchanges, which, the Allies agree, should be conducted with all due regard for reciprocity, security, and the possibility of political exploitation by the Communist side. The idea of exchanging observers during exercises in Eastern and Western countries, and, at some stage, arms control field tests, might be studied.

Other visits of a less formal character

22. The Allies might consider how to bring larger segments of the Eastern and Western populations, for example groups of like professions and interests, into freer and more direct contact. This would correspond to the widespread thirst of most East Europeans to end their artificial isolation. The European Study Group (sponsored by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London) and other conferences have been steps in this direction.

Council of Europe

23. Since 1966 some of the East European countries have begun to show interest in the Council's technical work. This has provided a valuable opportunity for contacts and could well be developed in technical and cultural fields. It would, however, be a mistake to try to force the pace and in particular to attempt to involve the East European countries in the political work of the Council.

East/West code of behaviour and mixed commissions

24. The suggestions in the 1966 Report for an East/West "code of behaviour" and those for "mixed commissions" have been set aside for the present but are available for later study should this prove promising.

Anglo-Soviet Draft Treaty of Friendship

25. The Council has discussed the draft Treaty of Friendship which the Soviet Union presented to the United Kingdom in January 1968. The draft is an unacceptable propaganda document which refers to European questions in standard Communist terms and goes far beyond the bilateral field. The Soviet Government has been asked to look again at the proposals for a treaty dealing with bilateral questions presented to them earlier by the United Kingdom Government. There has so far been no indication that they are interested in doing so.

"Group of Ten"

26. Consultations among member countries of the "Group of Ten" (1965 United Nations resolution on good neighbourly relations in Europe) about the subject of European co-operation are under way. The Group's potential is limited, for the primary responsibility for European security lies elsewhere. Nevertheless, with the participating NATO member countries acting in close consultation and full agreement with their Allies, the Group could play a useful rôle as an element for furthering "détente" between East and West.

Conference about European Security

27. The Polish-originated and Soviet-supported idea of holding a conference on European security was not mentioned in the 1966 Report. It does not appear likely that such a conference could be held in the near future. It would, however, be advantageous for member countries of the Alliance, with a view to obtaining a clearer idea of the real aim of negotiations, to continue to gather information, either by means of bilateral contacts or multilaterally, and to consult together by holding timely discussions on this topic of common interest.

Renunciation of force declarations

28. The Council has been informed of German initiatives towards an exchange of declarations on renunciation of force between the Federal Republic of Germany and East European countries. An overall NATO appraisal of such proposals or declarations might be a useful point of departure in future Alliance "détente" studies. However, it must be kept in mind that a "détente" policy is possible only if both sides are willing to find a modus vivendi and should not be used by one side to enforce its aims. The meaning and purpose of a renunciation of force is to channel controversial questions towards a solution by peaceful means without, however, prejudicing that solution.

Non-proliferation Treaty

29. Since 1966, movement on the nuclear non-proliferation issue has been conspicuous. The ENDC Co-Chairmen's NPT draft is currently before the United Nations First (Political) Committee awaiting General Assembly consideration. NATO consultation on the NPT might be considered to provide a good example but not necessarily the only pattern for NATO's handling of some future arms control issues.

Disarmament and Arms Control Measures

30. As part of the follow-up to the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, NATO has within the framework of paragraph 13, paid increased attention to problems of disarmament and arms control. In this connection, NATO has as a first step, greatly intensified its study of the possibilities of mutual balanced force reductions, including the development of models to illustrate some possible approaches. These have included various formulae for reductions, as well as for a "freeze" without reductions. The Council has been informed of bilateral talks held between Belgian and Polish disarmament experts on various aspects of a "freeze".

European settlement and the German problem

31. As in 1966, the USSR and certain of her closer allies, particularly the Soviet Zone of Germany and Poland, maintain their rigid attitude and continuously endeavour to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany, thus leaving little room for Western initiatives regarding a comprehensive European settlement. However, the gradual reduction and elimination of misunderstandings between Germany and some East European peoples through small and concrete steps has already begun. This in time could create a favourable climate for the process of reunification and for broadening the basis of future negotiations on Germany - for which the three Western powers, in consultation with the Federal Republic, bear special responsibilities - and European security. It is particularly important now that the Allies continue their efforts to correct the distorted picture of Germany given by Communist propaganda in Eastern Europe.

STATEMENT BY THE GREEK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
ON THE COMMENTARY(1)

The 1968 commentary on the 1966 Report on East/West relations offers the same weak points as the original Report. Thus:

1. The Report tends to assess the causes of the détente policy in the East and in the West, as having identical origins. However, it is a fact that détente in the West's eyes means a policy for a more stable peace and security, although in the eyes of the East it means a preparation for the final conquest of the Western world by Communism.

2. It tends to minimize the weight, scope and continuity of the Communist threat. All available information, however, are to the effect that nothing has changed in international Communism's ultimate and firm goal: world expansion.

3. It tends to interpret the change of tactics of international Communism in pursuing this goal, as an evolutionary process which might bring closer together the two worlds.

4. In the same context it welcomes some changes on the periphery of the Soviet mass of political and military power, as a sign of weakness. Assuming even the improbable, i.e. that some countries of the Soviet periphery will separate themselves from the East and associate with the West, this will in no way affect the mass of real political and military power, which is the Soviet Union itself.

5. Furthermore it is extremely dangerous to give to public opinion in the West the erroneous picture of a weakening Soviet Union. This will add more pressure on the governments by their public opinion to disarm in the physical and moral sense.

6. It supports the view that an unmitigated policy of limitless détente is the best course to achieve peace and security. On the other hand, no mention is made of the very effective policy of infiltration and subversion applied by the Soviet Union and its political organs within our own countries.

Accordingly, the commentary on the 1966 Report gives an unrealistic picture of what our relations with the East are and should be.

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(1) Made in the Permanent Council on 7th June, 1968

In our view, these relations should start primarily from a satisfactory, if not strong, defence position, both physically and morally. From this position and only from it, we can then proceed to a cautious détente policy, which would allow us to exploit the other side's weaknesses, if any, and not allow it to exploit our own increasing weaknesses, a policy which, therefore, will finally result in advantages to us and not to the other side.

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EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Report by the Council in Permanent Session

The attached report has been prepared by the Council in Permanent Session in response to the directive they received from Ministers at their meeting in Brussels in June 1966:

"Ministers directed the Permanent Representatives to continue to examine closely the prospects of healthy developments in East/West relations, and to prepare a full report on these questions for meetings to be attended, as far as is practicable, by the Foreign Ministers of the various countries. This report, which should deal with all possible initiatives in this field, would cover, inter alia, problems connected with European security and German reunification."(1)

2. In a statement made in Council on 3rd November, 1966, the text of which is reproduced at Annex A, the French Permanent Representative said his Delegation was not in a position to approve Part IV of this report. In a statement made the same day, a summary of which is reproduced at Annex B, the Greek Permanent Representative said that his Delegation could not approve Part I of the report.

3. The Council has recognised that the exploration of prospects of healthy development in East/West relations is a continuing task. The preliminary report now provided may be considered a stage in this process. After discussion, Ministers may wish to decide what further steps should be taken.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

OTAN/NATO,  
Paris, (16e).

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(1) Final Communiqué, paragraph 11.

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EAST/WEST RELATIONS

I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. The main task of the Atlantic Alliance is to ensure freedom and security for its members in the face of a continuing threat from the East, as noted in paragraph 6 of the Brussels Communiqué. For this purpose, the primary emphasis must be on Alliance solidarity and military strength. Beyond this, the purpose of the Alliance in East/West relations is to create a political environment in which the existing partition of Europe and of Germany, including its capital - one of the main causes of tension in Europe - can be peacefully resolved and a genuine and stable European settlement achieved. A settlement, when it comes, will be the result of both sides identifying common interest in having one. It is clear that for the time being the Soviet Union is striving to maintain the status quo in Europe, and if possible to consolidate it. Nevertheless, the Alliance should encourage the slow and difficult process of reassociation of East European states and the USSR with the Western world.

2. We should seek a détente in which the East would co-operate in fields of common interest and develop the habit of discussion at as many levels and in as many fields as possible. An Eastern Europe consisting of countries free to pursue in an enlightened manner their own interests, participating efficiently as part of the world market and having constructive ties both eastward and westward, can play a useful rôle as a bridge to the USSR and as a unifying impulse in Europe. We should be mindful that a permanent solution to European problems is unthinkable without the co-operation of the Soviet Union.

3. The Sino-Soviet conflict, added to other trends, such as destalinisation, has resulted in the disappearance of the monolithic solidarity of the stalinist period, and in tendencies towards political and economic autonomy, and indeed "national Communism", as is evidenced by Rumanian policy. A degree of pluralism is beginning to show itself in the Soviet camp. The nuclear strength of the United States and the economic strength of the West (not least as a provider of food), the increasing Communist concern with internal problems especially their economics and their uneven performance in the Third World, have also introduced major quandaries for Communist policy-makers. The Soviet Union and its Allies are faced with a conflict between ultimate Communist objectives and their short and middle-term requirements.

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4. It has become increasingly clear, and this was reflected by the Bucharest Declaration, that there are some differences of approach among the members of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, differences in their political attitudes towards Western countries, in their internal development and in the degree of their economic difficulties, lead to differences in the pace with which they are developing their relations with the West. All of them wish to do so in a certain degree. But in some of these bilateral links, the Eastern government has shown interest only in trade and technological exchanges. The aspirations of the East European states are held within limits imposed by the weight of Soviet power, as well as by ideological ties and by certain interests held in common. It is important in determining Western policy to take full account of these facts.

## II. CONCRETE POSSIBILITIES OF EXTENDING CO-OPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

5. At the present time, the development of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and East European states is likely to be more fruitful than the development of relations on the institutional basis of the two Alliances. There is, however, a further form of co-operation, namely, the association of these countries on an individual basis with international bodies. Such forms of international association, as well as bilateral possibilities, are considered below.

### A. Co-operation of a bilateral nature

#### Trade and economic co-operation

6. An intensification of trading exchanges between individual NATO countries on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and Eastern European states on the other, would serve a useful purpose, both from the political and the economic point of view, and should be promoted as far as possible.

7. Many problems in the field of promotion of trade and economic co-operation would, however, have to be taken into account. The Committee of Economic Advisers should intensify its valuable studies of East/West trade, and examine the possibilities of facilitating such trade. This examination could comprise - so far as it is relevant in this context - the possibility of extending the scope of industrial and technical co-operation with the East.

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Tourism

8. An extension of tourism would be desirable and could promote mutual understanding. Visits, particularly of Eastern Europeans to the West, would represent a significant contribution to the objectives of the West as regards popular attitudes in the East.

9. The main difficulty does not lie in the attitude of the West, but in the fact that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states were in many instances reluctant to permit their citizens to travel freely to the West, for reasons of internal security, fear of defection, and unwillingness to provide foreign currency. Nevertheless, Western countries might usefully consider whether their visa procedures could be improved, even though these may be a marginal factor, since simplified procedures could have a useful political effect.

Cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchanges

10. The entire range of East/West relations in these fields is an important element in the development of more satisfactory overall political relations. Several members of the Alliance have successfully maintained programmes of exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states, thereby keeping open channels of communication and paths to understanding, and favourably influencing attitudes in the East, especially among the managerial class, technical experts, scientists, intellectuals, artists and students.

11. Scientists from Eastern European countries have, during the last few years, attended and contributed to Seminars organized within the NATO Advanced Study Institute Programme. These Seminars have resulted in useful contacts between scientists from East and West and, where such contacts can be justified on scientific grounds, they should be maintained and encouraged.

12. Exchanges with the East should work both ways, and reciprocity should therefore be assured whenever practicable. The Eastern states have a particular interest in the kind of exchanges, especially in the technical field, where they may hope to receive more than they can give. The balance needs to be watched, but there may be some political advantage for the West in accepting a situation in which, for the present, there is not a perfect reciprocity within each field of exchanges.

13. The advantages and disadvantages of inter-governmental agreements with the East on cultural exchanges should be considered on a case-by-case basis.

14. NATO countries should exchange on a more systematic basis, both within the existing NATO machinery and otherwise, the experiences gathered in their cultural relations with the East. Although the conduct of exchanges will remain essentially bilateral, each member of the Alliance would be helped in this task if it knew more about the activities and experiences of the others.

#### Consular relations

15. The promotion of consular relations between NATO countries and the Soviet Union and Eastern European states is equally of interest. The experience gained by member states so far, as well as problems and procedures, relating to the conclusion of consular agreements and arrangements with the East, could usefully be made available to all the Allies. This could be done on a bilateral basis either in capitals or locally in the Eastern countries concerned and should include, where appropriate, the exchange of views and information in the Committee of Political Advisers.

#### Ministerial and other high-level visits

16. Exchanges of Ministerial visits have lately been intensified. These contacts at a high level can be particularly useful, and proper emphasis should be given to exchanges by Ministers in specialist fields where co-operation may take place without the complication of political disagreement.

17. Other high-level visits of a less formal character, involving both civilian and military personalities, might also be developed with advantage, since they can lead to useful exchanges of views and experience, and also expose influential people to life in the West.

#### B. Possibilities of extended East/West co-operation on the multilateral level

18. It is in the interest of the Alliance to promote the association of the Soviet Union and states of Eastern Europe with the West, and to encourage the habit of co-operation. Consideration should therefore be given to making it possible for those who desire it and who are ready to fulfil the necessary conditions, to associate themselves in varying degrees with existing multilateral organizations to which they do not belong. In this respect, the Eastern states should be dealt with individually rather than as a bloc.

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More specifically:

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)

19. The ECE could possibly be particularly useful because these states are already members.

20. Governments might consider the usefulness of putting forward constructive proposals in order to give fresh impulse to the activities of ECE. The 20th anniversary of ECE in April 1967 might be an appropriate time. Particularly rewarding could be the meetings of senior economic policy officials attended by representatives from the East and the West.

21. Consultation should take place as early as possible on such proposals through the existing machinery in NATO and at Geneva.

Other international economic organizations

22. Member countries of the Alliance should undertake as soon as possible studies and consultations on the possibilities of facilitating association, in varying degrees, of European Communist states with international economic organizations, such as GATT, OECD, IMF and IBRD. The Committee of Economic Advisers might be appropriate for some of these studies, but other bodies may have to examine certain other aspects. Such association might be politically helpful, in particular as a means of encouraging the Eastern states in their tendency toward the decentralisation of their economic decision making, though this argument requires further examination. In any case, it is essential to consider most carefully the economic consequences to the present membership of taking any steps which might have the effect of diluting existing organizations.

Council of Europe

23. The Council of Europe might be further developed as a forum for conducting informal and semi-official East/West discussions. Initially, this should probably be centred on technical and cultural aspects of the Council's activities, in which certain Eastern countries have already shown interest.

Other possible forms of co-operation: either bilateral or multilateral

24. (a) The further development of co-operation and joint projects in such fields as communications, space, atomic energy and desalination is desirable both bilaterally and in relevant international bodies.

(b) It would be worth investigating the feasibility of setting up a centre at which students from East and West could pursue joint studies. Programmes might include joint work projects to be carried out in various countries.

Declaration on Europe (or Code of behaviour)

25. The Council has discussed the United Kingdom proposal for a declaration on Europe and has been informed of the United Kingdom's intention to take soundings, bilaterally, with an Eastern European country.

III. PROBLEMS OF A GENERAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

A. Proposals for mixed East/West groups

26. The Belgian proposal for the establishment of a permanent mixed East/West Commission as a means to promote mutual understanding, has been discussed as well as variations of the proposal.

27. The Belgian idea evoked considerable interest, but reservations were expressed and it was agreed that this idea needed further and detailed study. The point was made that some at least of the Eastern states have a preference for informal bilateral contacts, whereas in a context where more than one Eastern state is represented there might be a tendency for them to take well-known and rigid bloc positions.

28. However, it was pointed out that sometimes Eastern states prefer a multilateral but not necessarily Pact-to-Pact approach, and that there might well arise situations in which small ad hoc groups from each side could usefully meet informally to discuss specific questions. Such groups might be composed of either official or non-official representatives.

The group which sponsored the Rumanian United Nations Resolution on good neighbourly relations between European states offered an example of co-operation between members of NATO, members of the Warsaw Pact and European countries belonging to neither Alliance. It was generally agreed that there were major disadvantages to a Pact-to-Pact approach.

B. Various disarmament and arms control measures including collaterals

29. In this field, NATO should continue active consultations, and the various ideas on collateral measures should be kept under review.

30. The proposal made by the Warsaw Pact countries for a non-aggression pact between their organization and NATO was considered to be of no interest, although other forms of non-aggression assurances should remain under consideration.

31. The important question of non-proliferation is under regular discussion in the Council.

32. The question of establishing an observation posts system with the Soviet Union and East European states might be re-examined. The possibilities of reaching bilateral agreements with these states on military exchanges, such as an exchange of military observers at manoeuvres and advanced notification of military movements and manoeuvres, should continue to be discussed in the Alliance and explored on a bilateral basis.

33. In general, NATO countries should continue to indicate their willingness to reach agreement on satisfactory arms control measures which, without prejudice to the solution of the political problems, may contribute to the improvement of European security. At the same time they will have to make it clear that no acceptable permanent solution to the question of European security is possible without agreement on the most critical political questions.

C. Germany

34. The continued division of Germany remains a principal source of tension in Europe and a central issue for the Alliance.

35. The rigid and uncompromising attitude of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact organization leaves little if any room for Western initiatives for a comprehensive settlement. However, the gradual reduction and elimination

of misunderstandings between Germany and the Eastern European peoples through small but concrete steps could constitute an important factor in creating a favourable climate for the process of reunification and for broadening the basis of future negotiations on Germany and European security. The USSR and its Allies should be brought to realise that their desire for a genuine reduction in tension in Europe will be judged not only by the continuing improvement in their relations with most NATO countries, but also with the Federal Republic of Germany.

36. There are some signs of a certain differentiation among the Eastern European states regarding the problem of a divided Germany. Members of the Alliance should therefore continue to correct, on every possible occasion, the distorted picture given of Germany by Communist propaganda and thus help to convince the peoples of the East that Germany and her Allies are interested in a peaceful solution satisfactory to all, and without which no lasting peace is conceivable in Europe. To this end, the way in which members of the Alliance present their views publicly should be kept under constant review.

37. The key question of Germany and European security remains of constant concern to the Alliance, and this and the Western position adopted in 1959 should be studied on a continuing basis. Western co-operation thus continues to be an essential precondition for a satisfactory settlement.

#### IV. THE ROLE OF NATO

38. Over the years, NATO machinery has been developed successfully to harmonise Western policies with respect to East/West relations. No major innovations or new machinery are called for at present, but there is a need to develop and improve the use of existing machinery by member governments. If the development of bilateral relations is to make its maximum contribution to the process of détente it is important that the forum NATO provides for the active discussion of national policies should be used to the fullest practicable extent. The North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies should become a more effective Western clearing house, particularly:

- (a) to consult on NATO member responses to East European initiatives and positions;

- (b) to consult on crucial NATO questions affecting focal points of East/West positions. This is of key importance in order to concert policy;
- (c) to receive reports from members on current and forthcoming bilateral contacts with the East;
- (d) to exchange views on new ideas bearing on East/West relations;
- (e) on the basis of a comprehensive exchange of national information, views and experience, to monitor the course of East/West relations with a view to evaluating the significance of changes and their implications for NATO and the members of the Alliance.

39. Existing NATO institutions are well designed to serve as a clearing house of this description. They should review systematically their own practices and work programmes. In this way the Council and its Committees of Political and Economic Advisers, the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, the relevant expert working groups and other bodies, together with the International Staff directly concerned in the working of these bodies, can make an important contribution to a coherent and comprehensive Western effort to improve the climate of East/West relations.

40. In public statements the Alliance and its members could with advantage stress our endeavour to seek a solution to outstanding problems. A special effort should be made to emphasise NATO's rôle in the improvement and development of East/West relations.

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STATEMENT BY THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

The French Delegation appreciates the usefulness of exchanges of views on East/West relations which make it possible for the Allies to compare the results of their experience and of their contacts with the leaders of the Socialist countries.

The conclusions which each Ally draws are, moreover, similar: the monolithism of the Stalin era has yielded to a kind of pluralism which, coinciding with the Sino/Soviet conflict tends to weaken the Communist movement. Since the Cuba confrontation the Soviet Authorities have shown themselves resolved to play a line of détente and co-existence, from this there might result a real improvement in relations. It is true that divergencies of views in the political field remain considerable, but there are possibilities that the creation of a climate of détente in Europe may bring about the conditions for a discussion of unresolved problems.

To the extent that the report reflects these ideas in its first three sections, there are no grounds for objection on our part.

On the other hand, we consider that to aim at presenting in common a political line to be followed in East/West relations would mean again creating the impression that there exist two opposed blocs. This would be to go against the movement of events of which I have just spoken, and this appears to us most ill-advised. It is for this reason that the French Delegation is not able to approve the fourth part of the report.

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SUMMARY OF STATEMENT BY THE GREEK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

We are well aware that the report on East/West relations represents an attempt to synthesise points of view which have not always been in agreement. We are, however, obliged to point out that the first part of this report contains weaknesses and is reticent or passes over in silence on some points and is thus likely to mask the reality and to lead to false impressions:

- (a) Instead of high-lighting the persistence, scope and weight of the Communist threat, the report only notes them timidly and subsequently drowns them in a militant "détentisme". We believe that for the Alliance - which is taken to be a defensive Alliance - the background to East/West relations still remains the threat and the real potential of the enemy. The NATO Military Authorities confirm that this potential has increased. Why not say so? Would our peoples be prepared to continue their defence effort and to agree to the sacrifices asked of them if they became aware of the content of this report? The day that we disarm our countries psychologically and morally, we shall be ripe for surrender.
- (b) We think that, to a certain extent, this first part of the report is the result of "wishful thinking" rather than an objective assessment of the situation. No mention is made of the fact that the action of international Communism in the domestic affairs of our countries continues to weigh, and weigh heavily, on our fate.
- (c) Taking for granted the fragmentation of the Communist world - which, for the moment, is not at all the case - the report advises a strengthening of the unifying impulse for a re-association of West and East! Apart from all that separates Communism from liberal régimes, what unifying impulse is it possible to speak of while the division of Germany is becoming more and more chrystalised into the permanence of a fait accompli?

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- (d) Although one tactic may be to encourage disagreements which may appear in the Eastern bloc, it must be remembered that any tactic is a two-edged weapon. Instead of dividing the Communist world, it must be recognised that at present it is the Communist world which divides the West, and that to a degree totally unforeseeable.

I think I can summarise our position by saying:

We want to proceed to a détente, taking security as the starting point. This is not in accord with the present tendency of having security conditioned by détente.

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PART I

REVIEW OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS

Chapter II

TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE  
AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Note by the Chairman, Working Group of Experts  
on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

In preparing this report, the Group of Experts concentrated their attention on the questions posed in POLADS(68)24 of 5th April. Many questions which normally figure in the Experts Report have therefore been omitted. For the same reason, and because it seemed to them an unlikely contingency, they did not refer to the possibility of direct military intervention by the Soviet Union to arrest unwelcome developments in any East European country. They would agree that the threshold for such intervention is now much higher than it was in 1956, primarily because the Soviet leaders must calculate that it could easily do them more harm than good. But recent developments underline the very great importance which the Soviet leaders must attach to the maintenance of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.

(Signed) William NEWTON

TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE  
AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Report by the Working Group of Experts  
on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe(I)

I. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. More pronounced divergencies have become apparent within the international Communist movement during the past few months.

2. The Soviet purpose in pressing for a world conference was not only to arrest the fragmentation of the Communist movement and to reassert Moscow's authority, but also to isolate China still further.

3. After the Budapest consultative meeting, the Soviets had some cause for satisfaction on this count, because the meeting decided to convene an International Conference in Moscow.

4. However, the apparent success of the Soviets was gained only by greatly moderating their ambitions. They gave up for the time being the idea of regaining their ascendancy over the world Communist movement, in order to salvage as much as they could before the rot had spread so far that salvage would be impossible. In particular, they accepted with resignation the refusal of half the parties in power to be associated with the convening of the conference.

5. Since the Budapest meeting, the margin of Soviet success has become even narrower. The cohesion of the Communist movement in Eastern Europe has been further weakened by the events in Czechoslovakia, and Moscow's worries concerning the future of the movement as a whole can only have increased.

6. In their reliance on the anti-imperialist theme, the only main issue on which they can drum up general support from the other parties, the Soviets are clearly vulnerable if substantial progress is made towards peace in Vietnam. They probably reckon that the issue will still be an effective one by the time the Conference takes place, but if talks on Vietnam are making progress then this may at least encourage other parties to take an even less submissive line on other matters.

7. Unless the situation changes in some unforeseen ways, the Conference in Moscow is unlikely to show that the parties which oppose the Moscow line, or those which just have reservations about it, have been won over.

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(1) The Working Group completed this report on  
16th May, 1968

II. INTER-COMMUNIST RELATIONS

8. The events in Czechoslovakia represent a further stage in the weakening of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe.

9. The new Czechoslovak régime will nevertheless be careful not to risk conflict with the Soviet Union on major international issues. At the same time, within the framework of the Alliance Prague will try to seek more independence and flexibility in its foreign policy, especially in its relations with the West.

10. The other members of the Warsaw Pact were in varying degrees nervous especially over the potential effects which developments in Prague might have on their populations. Yugoslavia on the other hand welcomed these developments as confirming the rightness of her own policy.

11. The Rumanian Government continues to differ from the USSR not only on certain party issues such as the World Communist Conference, but also on a number of international questions such as the non-proliferation treaty. These differences have had an adverse effect on relations with East Germany, Poland and, to a lesser extent, Hungary.

Warsaw Pact

12. There is at this juncture no evidence that any of the members are prepared to dispense with the Warsaw Pact. Moscow continues to promote measures to strengthen the Pact, but it is very unlikely that it can develop it into an instrument of leadership in foreign policy. Rumania continues to advocate a rotating command but her real interest may be to establish her right to control her own forces. The Czechoslovaks seem to share this interest.

Prospects for CEMA (COMECON)

13. One immediate effect of recent developments in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Czechoslovakia, has been to bring out into the open long simmering dissatisfaction with the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance.

14. CEMA and East European economic development problems were on the agenda of the recent Dresden meeting, but there has been no indication of any resolution of outstanding problems other than the scheduling of an economic summit conference "in the nearest future". Moreover, the present time seems hardly auspicious for an attempted revitalization of CEMA because of the many uncertainties generated by national economic reforms.

15. Key issues are the availability of hard currency and the possible convertibility, at least partial, of East European currencies. These issues may face the Russians with a dilemma.

If despite the economic problems involved, they agreed to consider any move towards convertibility or to provide hard currency loans, they would be facilitating expansion of East European trade with the West, with the long-term political consequences that might follow. If they did not, they might well provoke the Czechoslovaks to tighten their belts and try to go it alone in increasing their trade with the West, and add to the widespread disillusion among its members about the value of CEMA.

### III. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

16. Soviet and East European policy towards the West is likely to be generally less co-ordinated than it used to be. Developments in Eastern Europe, and other pre-occupations, may continue to have a certain inhibiting effect on the Soviet Government's relations with Western countries in the coming period. This, coupled with the Soviet leaders' anxiety about the dangers of an eventual spread of liberal ideas to the Soviet Union, is likely to result, at least for a time, in an even more rigid and unimaginative attitude towards the West.

17. Therefore, although the Soviet Government will continue selective and limited political co-operation with the West in specific fields and will wish to develop further its trading and technological exchanges, there may be some hardening in general. The dangers of Western influence and the need to maintain the ideological struggle are increasingly emphasised by the Soviet leaders; but it should be noted that their warnings are intended primarily for consumption in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

18. Recent developments in Eastern Europe, notably in Czechoslovakia, can be regarded as encouraging for the West. The expression of liberal ideas in East European countries and their desire to increase their freedom of manoeuvre with the Soviet Union arise essentially from within those countries themselves and from their assessment of their own interests and possibilities. But a stable Western Europe pursuing, with its transatlantic allies, policies of goodwill towards the countries of the East and showing willingness to co-operate in matters of common interest, has greatly helped to create a climate in which the East European countries have felt better able to develop the policies they themselves want.

19. It is reasonable to assume that the continuance and indeed the intensification of these Western policies - always subject to the condition that they do not go at a faster speed than the East Europeans themselves would wish - would benefit the East European countries and relations between them and the West. The best prospects for early improvements in East/West relations are likely to be in those fields which do not involve complex co-ordination within the Warsaw Pact.

20. The rigid and uncompromising attitude of the East German régime, which has been marked in recent months in intra-bloc relations, intra-German affairs and Berlin, continues to be a major obstacle to substantial progress especially in the political field. The régime will receive Soviet support in putting forward unacceptable demands as long as its existence and its policies continue to interlock with Soviet interests.

### European Security

21. The Soviet objective of weakening NATO and reducing United States' influence in Western Europe will be maintained and will probably be accompanied by an intensified propaganda campaign.

22. The present Soviet aim of maintaining the status quo in Europe continues to be accepted by the East Europeans. The latter also probably realise that the stability of the West is essential to their own interests, because it helps them to resist the re-imposition of harsher Soviet authority.

23. An immediate effect of the Soviet pre-occupations already noted may be to inhibit Soviet initiatives on European security. They will probably be suspicious of actions which might encourage contacts between East European countries and the West. Conversely, the more independent-minded East European countries will be suspicious of Soviet moves intended to pull them into line. The absence of any statement about European security at the recent Sofia meeting may be taken as an indication of reserve or disagreement on this subject. The Soviet leaders are probably aware that it would now be more difficult to create and maintain a common line on the question of European security. They therefore have increased reservations on the specific question of a European Security Conference.

24. On the propaganda level, however, the Russians will wish to keep alive a picture of themselves as leading in the search for European security and sooner or later they may try to get their allies to agree on some kind of "programme". They are not likely to find this easy.

25. In the long-term, as the East European countries acquire more confidence in their assertions of independence of Soviet direction, they are likely themselves to take another look at ways in which European security might be promoted. A possible indication of this is the Czechoslovaks' declaration of intention to base their foreign policy - within the Alliance with the Soviet Union - on their position as a Central European power.

IV. RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD

26. The Soviet Union will not allow developments in Eastern Europe to distract it from policies of cautious opportunism towards the countries of the Third World. In the past year, it has shown itself more conscious of the possibilities of using elements of its military power as an adjunct to the more familiar tools of diplomacy and aid.

27. The Eastern European countries will tend increasingly to consider actions in the Third World from the vantage-point of their own, rather than Soviet or Communist-world interests, as was shown in the course of the UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi.

Vietnam

28. The Soviet leaders apparently wish on balance to see an end to the fighting, especially because of the wider risks involved. They may expect to exert more influence once peace talks have progressed. Although the war has helped to maintain some measure of unity among the Communist countries and could be used to justify a degree of austerity and the retention of a high military potential, the decision to start talks has undoubtedly been received with relief in the East European capitals.

Middle East

29. Official Soviet policy is to abide by the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November. The aim of the USSR seems to be to avert the danger of another conflagration while helping the Arab countries to make good the losses suffered during the war and at the same time extending Moscow's influence in the area. Soviet military aid has been significant but substantial economic assistance also seems to have been given, particularly to the UAR.

30. Rumania's divergence from Soviet policy in the Middle East may be followed by the adoption of a less rigid policy towards Israel by Czechoslovakia.

V. LONG-TERM INTERNAL EVOLUTION

Soviet Union

31. There are no signs at present that any fundamental change is likely to occur in the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. However, over the longer run, because of the growing complexity of Soviet society only a more liberal and flexible Soviet régime, willing to re-evaluate doctrine and the rôle of the Party, will be able to provide adequate solutions to domestic difficulties. Leadership succession will remain a problem.

32. The economy will continue to develop at a reasonably high rate of growth. But there is reason to expect further economic strains and these will create new and greater political problems as well. The supervision which the Party is trying to strengthen will appear increasingly anachronistic. If the Party persists in this it may prejudice the success of the economic reforms and create increasing friction within the leadership.

33. Innate conservatism within Soviet society is likely to remain a strong factor. The leadership is unlikely to revert to a Stalinist type of repression although it retains the machinery which would enable it to do so in case of increased social unrest. A certain part of the population may have acquired a growing taste for dissent but the great majority are still unlikely to resist the pressures to conform.

34. The orthodoxy of the Soviet Communist Party is likely to contrast increasingly with the evolution of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Pre-occupation with domestic policy may heighten this contrast. But the further spread of liberal tendencies in Eastern Europe might force the Soviet leaders to follow suit.

#### Czechoslovakia

35. The chief problem facing the moderates who are now in power will be to reconcile freedom of speech and liberal expectations with the preservation of Communism and the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union. The régime is also faced with the difficulty of implementing economic reforms without incurring industrial unrest. Moreover, there might be growing obstruction from conservative forces. Relations between Czechs and Slovaks will also remain a problem.

36. If the régime should prove successful, Czechoslovakia may well provide an inspiring example for other East European countries.

#### Poland

37. In Poland, the liberal movement which started in the universities and among writers has found little echo within the Party, but student demonstrations against the government are exploited by the different factions in their struggle for power. Any changes in the top leadership in the nearer future are most unlikely to follow the Czechoslovak model. Liberal intellectuals in Poland cannot be expected to stop defending their views, and the general uneasiness is likely to continue. Economic difficulties may oblige the Poles also to undertake economic reforms. Genuine political reform, however, would not be possible unless a liberal wing ultimately emerged in the Polish Party and there are no signs of this occurring in the near future.

Rumania

38. The situation in Rumania differs fundamentally from that in Czechoslovakia. Despite important changes in the machinery of the régime, the country remains strictly controlled from the centre. The régime seems unlikely for the present to encounter serious domestic opposition, especially if it can maintain the country's economic growth rate and its popular anti-Russian policies.

Hungary

39. In the long run, there are possibilities of wider liberalisation in Hungary. The ambitious economic reforms launched in January 1968 may well hasten political change. In Budapest the day may come when the governing team will be replaced by men who will oust the "conservatives" still in power and undertake political reforms. However, important changes in Hungary's basic internal or external policies seem unlikely in the near future.

Bulgaria

40. As long as Bulgaria remains politically and economically dependent on the Soviet Union, internal developments will continue to be guided by Soviet example.

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41. By virtue of their traditions and generally more highly developed societies, long-term internal political developments in the East European countries will probably lead more rapidly to changes of existing rigid structures than in the case of the Soviet Union. In addition, there is a reawakening nationalism and resentment against Soviet hegemony. The growth of nationalism may also sharpen old quarrels in Eastern Europe.