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PRECEDENCE ACTION AU BUREAU		PRECEDENCE INFO 1. 24 3	DATE-TIME GROUP	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
PRIORITY	PRIORITY	081500Z		NATO WIDE
FROM: CHAIRMAN, MBFR WORKING GROUP				SECURITY CLASS
TO: ANKARA (MFA)				NATO SECRET
ATHENS (MFA)				ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER
INFO: BRUSSELS (MFA)				SITGEN 0801
BOHN (MFA)				WORK STAMP
COPENHAGEN (MFA)				
LONDON (CABINET OFFICE)				
OSLO (MFA)				
OTTAWA (MFA)				
ROME (MFA)				
THE HAGUE (MFA)				
MOD TURKEY				
MOD GREECE				
MOD BELGIUM				
MOD GERMANY				
MOD DENMARK				
MOD UNITED KINGDOM				
MOD NORWAY				
MOD ROMÉ				
MOD NETHERLANDS				
NDRHQ CANADA				
INFO: SACBUR				
ON 5 MARCH THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REQUESTED THE STAFF GROUP TO CIRCULATE COMMENT FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF THE MEASURES LISTED AT C-M(73)83 PARA 30(iii)-(vi). THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A FIRST ATTEMPT, TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN THE MBFR WG ON TUESDAY 14 MAR. THE DRAFT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO MEET THE WISH, EXPRESSED IN THE WG, THAT IT COULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITH AC/276-WP(74)7 IN ONE DRAFT REPORT COVERING MEASURES IN C-M(73)83(FINAL) PARA 30(i)-(vi).				INTERNAL DISTR.
DRAFT BEGINS: SUBJECT: MBFR - STABILISING MEASURES AT PARA 30(iii)-(vi) OF C-M(73)83(FINAL).				VIA IS/IMS REGISTRIES SEE ATTACHED LIST
ORIGINATED BY		APPROVED FOR TRANSMISSION		
W. SMITH, GROUP CHIEF (RFD)		G.S. NINHAM, VICE ADMIRAL USMA		
CHIEF, MBFR TEAM		STAFFORD, MBFR WG		
				ORIGINATED IN: P&P DIV
				DRAFTER'S NAME: GP. CAPT. W. SMITH (RFD)
				Ext No: 2709

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PARA ONE THIS SECTION OF THE PAPER DEALS WITH THE FOUR REMAINING STABILISING MEASURES LISTED AT PARAGRAPH 30 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL), EXAMINING THEM FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF MILITARY/TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY AND OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE RECIPROCAL APPLICATION. FULL ACCOUNT HAS BEEN TAKEN OF PREVIOUS ALLIED EXAMINATION OF THESE AND SIMILAR MEASURES. THE MEASURES ADDRESSED ARE:

A. PROVISIONS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN, THE LENINGRAD, ODESSA, KIEV, NORTHERN CAUCASIAN, AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS AS WELL AS TO THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

B. PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES IN THE AREA COMPRISING THE SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS OF ODESSA, KIEV AND CARPATHIA AS WELL AS RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND GREECE. THESE MEASURES WOULD APPLY ONLY TO EXTERNAL NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES AND TO SOVIET GROUND FORCES WHICH MAY MOVE INTO THE AFOREMENTIONED SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS.

C. STABILISING MEASURES FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT AND FOR NORWEGIAN TERRITORY.

D. OTHER STABILISING MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS.

MEASURE 1A.

PARA TWO THE OBJECTIVE IN MEASURE 1A. (I.E. THE PREVENTION OF DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO MILITARY DISTRICTS CONTIGUOUS OR ADJACENT TO NATO TERRITORY) COULD BE ACHIEVED BY:

A. DISBANDMENT OR PLACING IN RESERVE THE WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES.

NATO SECRET

B. APPLYING MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT THE PERMANENT INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL COMBAT UNITS INTO THE PRESCRIBED MILITARY DISTRICTS; AND WHICH FOR TEMPORARY INCREASES WOULD LIMIT THE SCALE OF SUCH INCREASE AND WOULD PROVIDE FOR PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORMATION BELOW THE PRESCRIBED SCALE.

C. BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY WITHDRAWN FORCES INTO THE MILITARY DISTRICTS LISTED.

D. BY CONCLUDING A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO RELOCATE OTHER FORCES THAN WITHDRAWN FORCES IN THE MILITARY DISTRICTS LISTED.

THE QUESTION OF DISBANDMENT AND PLACING IN RESERVE IS DISCUSSED IN THE EARLIER SECTION OF THIS PAPER.

ILLUSTRATIVE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED WHICH, IF APPLIED TO THE SOVIET FORCES, WOULD EFFECTIVELY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 2B. THE DETAIL OF SUCH MEASURES IS SUMMARISED IN A WORKING PAPER OF 26 FEB 74(1) AND THOSE DETAILS ARE NOT FURTHER EXAMINED HERE. MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS ON THIS PATTERN, IF APPLIED ~~TO~~ TO SOVIET FORCES, WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONSTRAIN THE SOVIETS FROM INCREASING THE CURRENT LEVEL OF FORCES ON A PERMANENT BASIS WITHIN THE MILITARY DISTRICTS LISTED; THEY WOULD INVOLVE THE REMOVAL OF THE FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE REDUCTION AREA TO CENTRAL RUSSIA AND/OR THE MILITARY DISTRICTS EAST OF THE URALS. THEY WOULD NOT IMPOSE OR IMPLY A

CEILING ON SOVIET FORCES ON SOVIET TERRITORY.

PARA THREE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND IF APPLIED TO SOVIET FORCES ONLY WOULD HAVE A MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR NATO OF BROADLY THE SAME CHARACTER AS DESCRIBED FOR DISBANDMENT OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF AC/276-WP(74)7 AS AMENDED.

VERIFICATION OF SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS UNDER REVIEW WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE TO RELY PRIMARILY ON CLANDESTINE AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. OVERT INSPECTION TO COVER THE VERY WIDE AREA CONCERNED, TO BE EFFECTIVE, WOULD REQUIRE A *VERY* ~~PROBABLY~~ HIGH NUMBER OF INSPECTORS AND ASSOCIATED REPORTING STAFF.

PARA FOUR SOVIET COUNTER PROPOSALS FOR RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS COULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. THE APPLICATION OF SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS ON THE TERRITORY OF NATO NATIONS CONTIGUOUS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND/OR NSWP COUNTRIES.

B. PRESSURE TO APPLY SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS TO THE US, AND POSSIBLY THE CANADIAN AND UK FORCES:

I. IN THEIR OWN TERRITORIES.

II. IN TERRITORIES AND WATERS FROM WHICH THEIR CAPABILITY COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON WP TERRITORY.

III. TO RESTRAIN THEM FROM EFFECTIVE REINFORCEMENT OF ANY PART OF THE AREA OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE.

NATO SECRET

PARA FIVE THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT CERTAIN MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS FOR THEIR OWN FORCES IN NORWEGIAN TERRITORY PROVIDED THAT THESE WERE ALSO APPLIED TO SOVIET FORCES FACING THEM (SEE AC/276-WP(74)8). BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF NORWEGIAN GROUND FORCES IN NORTHERN NORWAY, ANY SUCH MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS - TO BE EFFECTIVE - WOULD HAVE TO BE SET AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN WOULD BE APPLICABLE IN OTHER AREAS OF ACE. WITH REGARD TO THE SOUTHERN FLANKS OF NATO, THE NATIONS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION WILL NOT ACCEPT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES; AND THE OTHER NATIONS OF NATO HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT THEIR DECISION(1). IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING DECISIONS, THE QUESTION OF CONSIDERING THE RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF SUCH MEASURES IN THE TERRITORY OF INDIVIDUAL NATO NATIONS IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS NOTE. THE ISSUE DEVOLVES THEREFORE TO THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT SEEK UNDER PARAGRAPH ~~a~~ b. ~~AND c~~. ABOVE. THE EFFECT OF SUCH EFFORTS BY THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AN EXTENSION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF MBFR INTO FORCES AND AREAS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN EXAMINED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND WHICH WOULD FALL OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF BOTH THE AGREED ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS(1) AND THE FORCES AND AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR.

(1) C-H(73)83(Final)

NATO SECRET

PARA SIX RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS
ENVISAGED COULD:

A. SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF CANADIAN,
UK AND US FORCES AT SEA AND IN AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE IN NORMAL
PEACETIME.

B. PREVENT OR INHIBIT RESPONSE TO ANY EMERGENCY OR
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BOTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE FLANKS.

PARA SEVEN IT IS THE VIEW OF THE STAFF GROUP THAT SUCH
RECIPROCAL APPLICATION WOULD NOT BE TOLERABLE MILITARILY TO
NATO. THE RISK ENTAILLED BY OPENING THESE SUBJECTS FOR
DISCUSSION IS A MATTER FOR POLITICAL JUDGMENT. AGAIN, THE
ARGUMENTS LEADING TO THIS CONCLUSION ARE ESSENTIALLY THOSE
APPLIED IN SECTION 1 OF THIS PAPER.

MEASURE 1B.

PARA EIGHT PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES IN CERTAIN
SOVIET MILITARY DISTRICTS AND IN BULGARIA, RUMANIA, GREECE ETC.
TO EXTERNAL FORCES. THE COMMENTS MADE IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH
IN RELATION TO THE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS OF CANADIAN, UK
AND US FORCES APPLY WITH EQUAL FORCE TO THIS MEASURE.

MEASURE 1C.

PARA NINE STABILISING MEASURES FOR CERTAIN PARTS OF THE
LENINGRAD MD ETC. THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN SUBJECT TO COMMENT IN
PARAGRAPHS 5 ABOVE.

MEASURE 1D.

PARA TEN OTHER STABILISING MEASURES ETC. THE MEASURE AT
PARA 2C. TAKEN ENTIRELY ALONE WOULD NOT LEGALLY NOR MORALLY PREVENT
THE SOVIETS FROM DEPLOYING FORCES, OTHER THAN THOSE WITHDRAWN, TO
THE AREAS FACING THE FLANKS OR TO THE THREE WIDS. IT WOULD NOT BE
VERIFIABLE IN ANY REASONABLE TIME-SCALE.

NATO SECRET

THE MEASURE COULD HOWEVER BE COMBINED WITH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SOVIETS NOT TO DEPLOY ANY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE AREAS FACING THE FLANKS OR TO THE THREE WIDS. TAKEN TOGETHER THESE TWO MEASURES, IF HONOURED, WOULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS THE MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS DISCUSSED ABOVE. THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WOULD BE OF BROADLY THE SAME CHARACTER AS THAT DISCUSSED FOR MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS. THERE WOULD BE NO TECHNICAL NOR MILITARY DIFFICULTY IN NATO'S AGREEMENT TO APPLY THESE MEASURES IN THE ~~WIDE~~ FORM OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT TO NATO FORCES.