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N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

6th November, 1973

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REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MBER AD HOC
GROUP IN VIENNA, DATED 29 OCTOBER TO
4 NOVEMBER, 1973

I hereby circulate to Members of the Council a report by the Chairman of the MBER Ad Hoc Group in VIENNA covering the period 29 October to 4 November, 1973. I have directed that the report be forwarded to capitals via the NATO-Wide Communications System under reference SITCEN 0603.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MBER AD HOC
GROUP IN VIENNA FOR THE PERIOD 29 OCT.
TO 4 NOVEMBER, 1973

1. in accordance with paragraph 67 of c-m(73)83(revised), the following report is submitted, following consultations with the other members of the ad hoc group, as the report of the chairman - federal republic of germany - on the proceeding of the ad hoc group for the week ending third november 1973.
2. the week was marked by the holding of the first plenary

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sessions on 30th and 31st october and the work of the group was divided accordingly.

3. during the two meetings held on 29th october, the opening statements of germany, luxembourg, norway and the united states were finalised. the group authorized the belgian representative to proceed to the determination by the drawing of lots of the chairman for the first plenary meeting(the united kingdom in this event). it was agreed that matters concerning the organization and conduct of the first session and of press policy should be discussed during a quadripartite meeting (belguim, the united states, poland and the soviet union). the results, reported to the group by the belgian representative later in the day, included agreement on these arrangements including the initial frequency of plenaries (twice weekly) and the powers of their chairmen.

4. consideration was also given to the data base. it was decided on 31 october that the agreed figures received from brussels could be released to the press upon inquiry.

5. on the basis of an initial assessment by the group of eastern opening statements and of press material agreed in the group, the netherlands representative, as allied press spokesman, held a press conference on 31st october at noon in the press centre of the vienna hofburg.

6. subsequent to the plenary sessions of 30 th and 31st october,

the group considered in detail the opening statements made by the eastern participants. assessments were provided by the united kingdom and the united states delegations. an agreed preliminary analysis of these statements is attached to this report.

7. in preparation of the plenaries of the following week, statements on themes were reviewed and, in the case of that on undiminished security for the flanks(theme 2) finalised. in the

light of the assessment made of the soviet position, it was agreed that for the present, delivering a separate statement on taking into account the interests of others (theme3) would only encourage the other side to pursue the issue of the participation of neutral states in the conference.

8. with respect to internal policy on informing non-participating nations, the consensus reached in the senior political committee was noted and it was agreed accordingly that it would be up to these countries to seek information individually and that what was provided would resemble, in content, the background information which the group would decide from time to time might be given to the press.

9. other matters dealt with by the group during the week included the usual exchange of information on bilateral contacts, a review of mr. brezhnev's speech of 26th october and consideration of the procedure for the presentation of oral reports to the council.

10. finally, as an administrative matter, the group agreed that in view of the need for adequate seating at the conference table in the rennweg building, it would be necessary to demolish an internal wall."

"--warsaw pact opening statements--

--preliminary analysis--

the tone of the eastern statements is serious and reasonably positive. there is a notable absence of polemical statements. most contain references to the need for a "constructive" or "businesslike" approach to the negotiations and an expectation of concrete results. at the same time the eastern statements reveal views on a number of points which are at odds with the western positions and thus indicate some of the topics which may become difficult issues in the negotiations.

1. --general objectives--

--allied position:-- the allies have defined their objectives in terms of a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces with undiminished security. this requires offsetting existing disparities.

--eastern position:-- most eastern opening statements cited as a major goal the supplementing of political detente on the continent by measures of military detente, and referred to peaceful coexistence and peace and security in europe as basic policy objectives.

the ussr, czechoslovakia, poland and romania referred to the undiminished security criterion. the gcr used the term equal security only. only hungary explicitly acknowledged the important concept agreed in the june 28 communique of "contributing to a more stable relationship" as the general objective of the negotiations.

the eastern approach thus appears to be based upon a view of existing correlation of forces as one which should be preserved, albeit at a lower level, rather than altered. the soviet approach apparently is that reductions should preserve the existing force relationship and thus it implies a view of the present military relationship as one of approximate equality rather than disparity. the gcr proposes preserving the historically developed existing correlation of military forces at a lower level.

as to broader implications, several eastern europeans speak of general concepts for european security: hungary refers to the creation of "institutionalized security" in europe while romania mentions a "durable system of security and cooperation." almost all eastern statements refer to the importance of the csce.

2. --associated measures--

--allied position:-- as agreed in the 28 june communique, negotiations are to be about mutual reduction of forces and

armaments and associated measures in central europe. in order to emphasize the intrinsic importance we attach to associated measures, allied opening statements used the full agreed title for the negotiations, but most also referred to "mbfr".

--eastern position:-- most eastern statements emphasized reduction of armed forces and armaments in central europe and generally studiously avoided mention of associated measures. the latter were mentioned only once by the gdr and once by the ussr, as an agreed subject for negotiations at the end of their respective statements. romania consistently used the full title of the conference.

3. --area--

--allied position:-- the allied opening statements referred to central europe as the reduction area without defining it further.

--eastern position:-- the soviet union, czechoslovakia, the gdr and poland used different formulations to argue the proposition that the definition of the direct participants in the negotiations had established an agreed reduction area, i.e. excluding hungary. the hungarian statement for its part referred to hungary as a participant with special status, without elaboration. it should be noted that the gdr did not specify central europe when it referred to "associated measures" (see section 2). it is not yet possible to assess whether this is a significant omission, since the russians use the full title.

4. --forces to be reduced--

--allied position:-- having agreed that negotiations should address reductions of armed forces and armaments, the allies have focused on conventional ground forces. initial reduction would be taken in us' soviet forces.

--eastern position:-- the soviet statement quoted brezhnev's 26 october speech and thus proposed reduction of both foreign and national, land and air forces with reduction also applying to units equipped with nuclear weapons. the gdr statement suggested that the

reductions should comprehend national and foreign forces and armaments including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. the delivery systems would presumably include aircraft, but none of the non-soviet statements spoke of air forces as such.

the polish statement stipulated that reductions would have to comprise both national and foreign "troops" (instead of "forces", though this may not imply a significant difference) as well as armaments, including "the most devastating weapon systems," romania mentioned, illustratively, the withdrawal of foreign forces, thus suggesting a difference with the other pact members who emphasized both foreign and national forces.

5. --method of reduction--

--allied position:-- the allies have proposed as the ultimate objective, bringing about parity in the form of a common ceiling for ground forces of each side in central europe.

--eastern position:-- only the ussr and the gdr expounded on the form and method of reductions. both drew upon brezhnev's speech to say that the method of reduction -- whether it be an equal percentage reduction or by an equal quantity -- remains to be settled. this was in the context of their statements concerning reduction of both foreign and national forces, indicating that such reductions should be applied across the board, and should therefore be read in conjunction with their assertion of a need to preserve the existing relationship of forces at lower level in europe.

6. --phasing--

--allied position:-- the allies have proposed a phased approach beginning with us' soviet reductions.

--eastern position:-- brezhnev's plans for reduction of foreign and national forces would appear to refer to a single phase, but this was nowhere made explicit. the eastern statements refer sometimes to an agreement and sometimes to agreements. the romanian statement by contrast suggests that the vienna negotiations should be only one step in a series of measures for peace in europe.

7. --timing--

--allied position:-- allied opening statements make the point that we are not setting any artificial deadlines, and do not mention dates.

--eastern position:-- brezhnev in the speech quoted in the soviet statement said that in the "very near future" it may be possible to conclude a concrete agreement, and he declared that the soviet union would be ready for "actual steps" (presumably implementation) as early as 1975. none of the other eastern european statements attempted to predict a date.

8. --participation and methods of work-- --allied position:-- the allies stand by the participation arrangements agreed in the exploratory talks.

--eastern position:-- all eastern statements with the exception of the bulgarian spoke with varying degrees of emphasis of the possibility of inviting other interested european countries to participate. czechoslovakia suggested having them as "observers" and others spoke of finding "appropriate" arrangements. the soviet delegation, from its corridor conversations, does not appear to intend to press this point. by contrast, the romanian delegation has emphasized the importance of this subject and can be expected to return to it.

the only eastern statements to refer to methods of work were those of bulgaria which emphasized the value of bilateral and multilateral consultations, and romania which demanded participation in all working groups or other bodies which may be established, and the right of any participating delegation to call a plenary.

9. --romanian position--

the principal points which differ from those made by other warsaw pact delegations are as follows:

(a) the implementation of measures of military disengagement and disarmament in europe is an integral part of european security with a possible implication of a link with csce;

(b) the negotiations should not preclude, but should accelerate,

the implementation of "measures of military disengagement and disarmament on the scale of the entire continent". moreover, they "should not preclude the initiation of negotiations concerning military aspects in the whole of europe or in other zones of europe":

(c) we should aim from the beginning at the "withdrawal within their national borders of foreign troops stationed in the territory of other states":

(d) the negotiations should not be a "bloc-to-bloc dialogue":

(e) romania will contribute to the negotiations "on the basis of full equality": participation in all conference activities "should be guaranteed to each delegation" and "the romanian delegation intends to exercise its right to participate in any conference activities (groups or working bodies)".