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SUB-COMMITTEE ON SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC TRENDS IN NATO COUNTRIES, IN  
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND IN THE THIRD WORLD

Note by the Chairman

The Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy has several times examined long-term economic trends in NATO countries, in Communist countries and in the developing countries of the free world. The last report on that subject(1) included projections of economic growth up to 1975, based on the trends visible towards the end of the year 1960.

2. The present note is merely a revision of these projections based mainly on the hypothesis that the trends which have become apparent over the last five years (1960-1965) will continue during the ten-year period 1965-1975. However, in the case of Communist China, where the 1960-1965 period suffered from the effects of the failure of the "Great Leap Forward", this hypothesis was highly improbable and therefore a special evaluation has been attempted in the light of the latest known indices.

3. It seems convenient to divide this note as follows:

- I. Economic Development of NATO countries in comparison with that of Communist Countries;
- II. Comparative Positions of the Economies of the Various Communist Countries;
- III. Economic Developments in the Third World;
- IV. Economic Relations with Developing Countries: Aid and Trade;

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(1) C-M(63)49, dated 26th June, 1963.

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V. Summary

4. This note, which will be placed on the Agenda of a future meeting of the Sub-Committee, is primarily circulated for information purposes. However, delegations are invited to furnish any comments or to propose any amendments which might seem appropriate.

(Signed) A. VINCENT

OTAN/NATO,  
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LONG-TERM ECONOMIC TRENDS IN NATO COUNTRIES, IN  
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND IN THE THIRD WORLD

I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NATO COUNTRIES IN COMPARISON WITH THAT  
OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The rhythm of economic growth in the NATO countries taken as a whole during the years 1960-1965 has gone well beyond the working hypotheses retained by the OECD Council at Ministerial level in November 1961. These hypotheses forecast a 50% increase in the GNP over the ten-year period 1960-1970, equal to an annual growth rate of 4.1%. In fact, for the period 1960-1965, the NATO countries achieved an annual rate of 4.5%(1). Already the OECD forecasts that the GNP of its member countries (including Japan) will in 1970 exceed the 1960 level by 60%(2). This forecast takes into account a slight slowing down in the process of expansion: although the average annual growth rate in OECD as a whole was 4.9% between 1961 and 1965, the forecast for 1966-1970 is based on a rate of 4.7%.

2. The economic expansion within the OECD countries from 1960 to 1965 did not, however, follow a uniform pattern. It was particularly noticeable in the case of Canada and the United States. Canada has shown an average annual growth rate of 5.3% over the last five years, while the GNP of the United States only increased at an average annual rate of 2.2% over the years 1956 to 1960, its rate of growth rose to 4.5% during the period 1961 to 1965. By reason of the weight of the GNP of the United States (53.3% of the OECD total and 60.8% of the NATO total in 1963), this acceleration has been one of the decisive factors in surpassing the OECD objectives.

3. The European Economic Community - whose GNP is less than half that of the United States - has also easily surpassed the average growth rate forecast by the OECD. Although it progressed more slowly from 1961 to 1965 than it had done between 1956 and 1960, it still reached 4.9% per year on an average. Amongst these six countries, it was Italy, economically still the least advanced, which progressed the most rapidly (5.1%).

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(1) See table A/3 (Statistical Annex)

(2) See document CPE/WP2(66)1 Paris 10th March, 1966:  
"Economic growth, 1960-70 - A Mid-term review of progress  
towards the OECD growth target", preliminary report.

4. Taken as a whole, the European Free Trade Association countries, whose GNP comes to a little more than half that of the EEC and less than a quarter of that of the United States, have not quite achieved the average aim set up by the OECD (4% instead of 4.1%). In this group of countries the weight of the United Kingdom is predominant, and the slight rate of growth of its economy (3.2%) has not been entirely counterbalanced by the more rapid expansion of countries like Sweden and Switzerland.

5. The least advanced countries of OECD, here defined as those whose GNP per person is less than \$800 (at official exchange rates) have generally shown annual rates of growth between 1960 and 1965 which are well above the OECD average. This was particularly apparent in the case of Japan (9.4%), of Greece (8.2%) and of Portugal (5.8%)(1).

6. If the growth of the economy in the NATO countries has surpassed the forecasts, the annual rate of economic expansion in the Communist countries of Europe(2) taken as a whole has, on the contrary, slowed down more than had been foreseen in 1960. For the period 1960-65, the document C-M(63)49 forecast an annual increase of 5.8% for the USSR and of 5% for the Eastern European countries. In actual fact, during the years 1960-65, according to Western estimates, the GNP of the USSR increased by 4.5% per annum, and that of the Eastern European countries by less than 4%(3).

7. In contrast to the picture drawn by the document C-M(63)49, it now seems unlikely that the overall GNP of the Communist countries of Europe will succeed in catching up with that of the NATO European countries in 1970. Between 1960 and 1965, these countries taken as a whole, maintained their lead over those of the Soviet bloc. In absolute terms, their GNP reached a figure of \$460 billion as against \$404 billion for the Communist countries of Europe(4).

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- (1) For Turkey, the annual rate of growth of GNP from 1961 to 1965 was around 4.2% per year, but for the period 1962 to 1965 it reached 5.8%.
  - (2) For the purposes of this note, the Communist countries of Europe are understood to mean the Eastern European countries, (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany) and the USSR.
  - (3) See table B/3 (in Statistical Annex)
  - (4) Figures based on American estimates calculated to allow for equivalence in purchasing power in the currency: unit utilised ( ). See Chart I (Statistical Annex)

8. The economic growth of the Communist countries of Europe, including the USSR still depends chiefly on the industrial sector, whose rate of development is showing a tendency to slow down. On the other hand, during 1960-65, the growth in industrial production of most of the Western European countries, of Canada and of the United States, speeded up and reached the level of that of the USSR, or even exceeded it (especially in 1964). According to the most usual Western estimates, the indexes of industrial production for 1965 in the Communist countries and in the free world compare as follows, on the basis 1960=100:

<u>Communist countries</u>		<u>Free World</u>	
USSR	: 135	USA	: 132
Rumania	: 172	Japan	: 173
Bulgaria	: 152	Italy	: 139
Poland	: 150	Canada	: 137
Hungary	: 149	France	: 128
Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany	: 124	Germany	: 132
Czechoslovakia	: 117	United Kingdom	: 116
Eastern Europe	: 136	EEC	: 132

9. The results achieved by the Communist countries in the agricultural sector have been disappointing: food production has failed to progress as fast as the population, and available stocks have diminished. The USSR has not renewed its undertakings towards the Eastern European countries to supply them with grain under long-term contract, as she has done traditionally in the past. The imbalance between agriculture and industry in the Communist countries has been brought out by their massive wheat imports from the free world: 17.6 million tons during the 1963/64 campaign (of which 9.4 million tons was for the USSR and 8.2 million tons for the other Communist countries, including China) and a similar total tonnage during the 1965/66 campaign (18.9 million tons)(1).

10. The annual economic growth rate of Communist China during the years 1960-65 was particularly disturbed by the economic chaos which followed the collapse in 1960 of the policy known as the "Great Leap Forward". During the period of the first Five Year Plan

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(1) C-M(65)21 and C-M(66)21.  
See Chart III (Statistical Annex)

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from 1952 to 1957, the annual rate of growth of national income was 8.9%, according to the official Chinese statistics. Corresponding Western estimates for this period varied between 5.5% and 8.5% per year. The average annual rate of expansion of the GNP was estimated in C-M(63)49 at 6.5% for the period from 1953 to 1959, and at 7% for the period 1961-75. In fact, according to Western experts(1), during the years 1960-65 the annual average rate of growth of the Chinese GNP was probably somewhere around 3.8%.

11. In 1964 the Chinese GNP was very approximately estimated at \$60 to \$75 billion at the official exchange rates of the yuan, or \$88 billion(2) in terms of dollars in purchasing power equivalence (this figure was retained for the year 1960 as a basis for the projections used in document C-M(63)49). In 1965, the GNP would seem to have increased by nearly 5%. In the absence of even the most elementary official Chinese statistics since the end of the "Great Leap Forward", the specialists have been reduced to formulating a very wide range of hypotheses(3). The 7% rate indicated by the document C-M(63)49 seems in any case to be excessive. Over the ten-year period 1965-75, it seems improbable that a rate of 4% will be exceeded. This rate has been chosen as a basis for calculating the statistical tables to be found as an Annex to this note.

12. In 1961, Mr. Khrushchev was still claiming that the industrial production per head in the USSR would overtake that of the United States as early as 1970. Since then, his successors have become very much more cautious as far as the future is concerned, and Kosygin is content to stress the economic power of the Soviet system in its competition with capitalism. In the same way, in Communist literature, the theme of the inevitable crisis in the capitalist system has died away. Communist China, who had announced during her period of euphoria her determination to overtake the present industrial power of certain Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, as early as 1970, has since recognised that such an aim cannot be realised before the end of the twentieth century. She now bases her claims to the rôle of an international great power on the size of her population and her military strength, thus diverting attention from the economic sector towards political considerations.

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(1) AC/127-D/208, paragraph 18

(2) AC/127-D/208, paragraph 18. \$1 = 2.35 yuan.

(3) See "Long-term projections of Mainland China's economy 1957-72" by SHIGERU ISHIKAWA in UN Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, September 1965; "The Economic Potential of Communist China, Reappraisal 1962-70", Stanford Research Institute California, May 1964, prepared for the Army Research Office, Washington; and C-M(66)44 Communist China's Potential, paragraph 17.

13. In fact, from 1960 until 1965, the gap between the average standard of living in the communist countries as a whole and the NATO countries widened even further than the growth of the respective GNPs would lead one to suppose.

- (i) In absolute figures, the GNP per head(1) in the United States has risen from about \$3,000 in 1960 to more than \$3,460; that of the Common Market countries on average from nearly \$1,490 to about \$1,780 (in dollars of equivalent purchasing power) and that of the USSR from \$1,100 to \$1,290. Thus, the gap, which in 1960 was of \$1,900 between the United States and the USSR has risen to \$2,170 for 1965. Similarly, the gap between the United States and the Common Market countries has risen from \$1,510 to \$1,680 and that between the Common Market and the USSR from \$390 to \$500. The increase in this gap between the USSR and the United States in absolute terms, despite the fact that the rate of growth of the GNP has been identical in each case (4.5% per year) is explained by the fact that the GNP of the USSR represents only about 45% of that of the United States, while the Soviet population is greater than that of the United States by 35 millions (18%) and both populations are increasing at a very similar rate. The widening gap between the Common Market countries and the USSR is explained by the fact that the Common Market countries have, at one and the same time, a larger rate of growth of GNP and a slower demographic progression than the USSR
- (ii) The rate of growth of the GNP of the industrial countries in NATO (Common Market: 4.9% per year; EFTA: 4% per year) has been more rapid than that of the most economically advanced countries of Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany: both 3% per year).

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- (1) The development of the GNP per head provides only a very unsatisfactory basis for judging the development of a standard of living. It should be recalled that investments account for nearly 32% of the GNP in the USSR, as against 23% in the Common Market and 16% in the United States, which means that the development of consumption is even less favourable in the USSR, and that the advance of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR has increased even more than the figures cited above would lead one to believe.

- (iii) The rate of growth of the developing Western countries (Spain 9.2%, Greece 8.2%, Portugal 5.8%) compares favourably with that of the least advanced Communist countries of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria 5.4%, Rumania 6.2%).

14. The growth of the GNP of Communist China (3.8% per year) has been no faster than the average growth rate of that of the developing countries of the Third World (Africa + Latin America + Middle East + Asia: 4%) but its demographic advance has been less rapid (2%) than in the Third World (2.6%).

- (i) If the rate of growth of the Chinese GNP during the years 1960-65 seems to have been very little less than that of India (4% per year), the GNP per head (1.7%) has increased more rapidly than that of India (1.3%) since the demographic growth of India has overtaken all the forecasts(1). Pakistan and the Philippines have both shown rates of growth of GNP per head comparable to that of Communist China, whereas Thailand, Nationalist China and Malaysia have developed even more rapidly. Communist China, where the GNP per head has only increased from \$112 in 1960 to \$123 in 1965 (in terms of purchasing power), remains one of the least developed countries of the world; in this respect, the gulf which separates her from Japan (GNP per head: \$666 in 1960 and \$1,050 in 1965) has widened considerably during the last five years.

## II. COMPARATIVE POSITIONS OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE VARIOUS COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

15. The Communist countries have reached very different stages of development. China, Mongolia, North Vietnam and North Korea are amongst the least developed nations of the world (Black Africa and the Far East), whose GNP per head is less than \$150 (in terms of equivalent purchasing power). Cuba is at an intermediate stage with a GNP of about \$350 per head. Even in Eastern Europe, which groups the most advanced countries (with the exception of Albania, a special case) the differences are considerable. The GNP per head in Bulgaria and Rumania does not reach half that of Czechoslovakia or of the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany. Hungary and Poland lie between these two extremes: their GNP per head is in the region of \$1,000,

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- (1) The rate of growth of the Indian population has been revised as follows in the demographic yearbooks of the UN: in 1960: 1.3% per year; in 1961: 1.9% per year; in 1963 2.2% per year; in 1964 2.3% per year



the average figure for the Eastern European countries taken as a whole. As for the USSR, with a GNP of \$1,290 per head, she takes third place after Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone. (1)

16. Thus, even within the Communist group, antagonism between rich and poor countries is just as apparent as in the free world; in particular, the tension between the USSR and Communist China could be heightened by a growing gap between the standards of living of the two peoples. In 1960, the GNP per head in the USSR (\$1,100) exceeded by \$988 that of China (\$112). In 1965, this difference had reached the figure of \$1,160, which represents an increase in the gap of 17% in five years. According to the hypotheses followed in this note for the economic development of China (4% per year), this difference would amount to \$1,615 in 1975 (USSR \$1,765, China \$150). The gap in absolute terms between the GNP per head in the USSR and that of China would increase in this case by 40% during the ten years to come.

17. The population of Communist China is more than three times that of the USSR and is increasing much more rapidly. In 1960, the population of the USSR represented 31.5% of the Chinese population; this percentage fell to 30.7% in 1965 and will fall by 28.6% in 1975 if the present trends continue. Even with the progressive application of a policy of birth control, demographic experts estimate that the Chinese population will increase by 150 to 170 million people between 1965 and 1975, in contrast with an increase of 30 million people foreseen in the USSR. The density of the Chinese population in 1975 (95 inhabitants per square kilometre) would, in that case, be about eight times greater than that of the USSR taken as a whole at that time, and more than nineteen times greater than that of Asian Russia (five inhabitants per square kilometre in 1975). In view of the fact that desert and mountainous regions account for 36% of Chinese territory, these figures can only give an imperfect idea of demographic pressure on China.

18. For Communist China, the attempt to find a balance between the increase in population and that in food resources poses a severe problem. In order to attain the level of grain production per head reached in 1957/58, production in 1965/66 should have reached 200 to 210 million tons, whereas it is estimated at 180/185 million tons. To this should be added imports to the order of five or six million tons. Taking into account the demographic advance, and taking 1957/58 as the year of reference, Chinese needs in 1975/76 could reach the figures of 264 million tons (annual average rate of growth 3.6%). However, the growth of agricultural production,

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(1) See table B/2 - Statistical Annex.

the fundamental element in the Chinese GNP (45% as against 20% in industry and 35% for the service sector and handicrafts) will probably not exceed an average rate of 3% per year (that is, 34% in ten years). Even this rate implies that very special attention be paid to agriculture.

19. Conscious of the importance of this challenge, China recognised as early as 1961/62 the need to accord priority to agricultural development in contrast to the traditional Communist pattern, which assumes that heavy industry is the driving power of expansion. However, this policy is not in harmony with the priority which the Chinese leaders have been according to the military effort during the last few years. China may find herself in 1975 with considerable military means quite out of proportion with her economic capabilities at a time when her immense population - more than a quarter of the world population - has one of the lowest standards of living. Such a situation could obviously imply grave dangers.

20. On the other hand, on the basis of the hypotheses cited above, the economic predominance of the USSR would be confirmed in the Communist world (60% of the total GNP of the Communist countries for 1975 in contrast to 57.8% in 1960). Her GNP per head in 1975 (\$1,765) would reach the present level (1965) of the industrial countries of the West. In the eyes of the under-developed countries, the USSR would then appear - even more than now - to enjoy a similar comfortable way of life as the industrialised Western countries(1).

21. In Eastern Europe, the highest rates of growth of GNP during the last five years have been noted in the least developed countries (Rumania and Bulgaria) and conversely the lowest rates for the most industrialised countries (Czechoslovakia and Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany). In comparison with the USSR, those countries having a larger GNP per head than that of the Soviet Union have progressed less rapidly than the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, backward countries have developed faster than the USSR. The rate of growth of the population in the Eastern European countries remains very much lower than that of the Soviet Union and there is, therefore, a certain tendency towards the levelling of the GNP per head between the European Communist countries. However, the effects of this phenomenon will not really be felt during the five to ten years to come.

### III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

22. If a comparison of the trends noted over the last five years in the NATO countries and those of the Communist world show a marked strengthening of the Western position in comparison with the forecasts which could be made at the beginning of 1960, the slowing down of economic progress in the Third World countries throws a shadow across this picture. For these countries, not only has demographic growth exceeded the forecasts: 2.1% per year between 1950 and 1955; 2.3% from 1955 to 1960 and 2.6% from 1960 to 1965; but the yearly average rate of economic expansion has gradually been reduced in the last fifteen years: 4.9% between 1950 and 1955; 4.5% from 1955 to 1960 and approximately 4.3% during the period 1960 to 1965. The latter period should be examined in the light of the aims set out in the report "Ten Years of Development" published in May 1962 by the United Nations: from 1960 to 1970: 5%; from 1970 to 1975: 6.5%. The chances of attaining these objectives are already severely compromised.

23. The United Nations has estimated the future development of world population on four different occasions: in 1951, 1954, 1957 and 1963. The demographic experts used for these estimates three different growth hypotheses, "high", "medium" and "low". In fact, each time they have revised their figures, they have been forced to recognise that even their "high" estimates had been overtaken(1). In 1963, the world population for 1980 was estimated by the "high" hypothesis at 4.6 billion people, or 850-950 million more than were forecast in 1951. For the period 1960-1980, the annual growth rates should reach about 2% for Asia, 2.5% for Africa and 2.9% for Latin America.

24. In the under-developed countries during the years 1960-65, food production grew less rapidly than did the population.(2) This was the case in the Communist countries as well: only in Western Europe and in Australasia did food production increase more rapidly than the population. North America did in fact maintain quite deliberately a rate of increase in food production equal to that of its demographic growth. Many developing countries have been forced to increase their imports of food products considerably in order to avoid too marked a drop in the already critical food consumption levels. Their net imports of grain rose from 4 million tons in 1950 to 25 million tons in 1964.

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(1) United Nations "Provisional Report on World Population Prospects as assessed in 1963". New York 1964, p. 287.

(2) See Chart III in Statistical Annex.

25. Since agriculture plays a major rôle in determining the GNP of the under-developed countries, its weaknesses have had a direct influence on industrial development. Not only has the volume of agricultural raw materials for industrial use been insufficient but saving and the formation of domestic capital have suffered. In addition, growing imports of food products use up foreign exchange and thus slow down the import of industrial machinery. Lastly, the appearance of inflationary tendencies in several under-developed countries are closely connected with the absence of any significant progress in agricultural production in general and food production in particular(1).

26. The prospects in the food sector are still quite disturbing. According to FAO, the growth rate of world agricultural production in 1965/66 has not reached 2% and remains lower than the rate of demographic expansion. Food stocks are diminishing in India and in some countries of Black Africa. Drought has affected the cereal harvest in the USSR, Eastern Europe, Australia and South Africa. Only North America and Western Europe have had a better harvest than in the previous year. Some American experts forecast that in 1980, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America will need 770 million tons of grain per year; i.e., 300 million tons more than in 1960. The Soviet Union's inability to produce a significant surplus of food products for export could then prove a major handicap in the struggle for influence in which she is engaged with the West in the Third World(2).

#### IV. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE

27. The document C-M(63)49 took for granted the fact that an increase in the free world industrial countries' imports of products from developing countries would not be sufficient to finance all the necessary investment in most of these countries. Consequently, the economic development of these countries would depend to a great extent on the aid and trade of the West.

28. The intense economic activity in the industrialised countries of the West has helped the expansion of the under-developed countries' exports, both in volume and in value. The strengthening

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(1) World Economic Survey. 1964. United Nations, Part II, p.248-49.

(2) See C-VR(66)18, p. 12.

of the prices of exported products from under-developed countries(1) was particularly marked during the period 1963/64. Between 1954 and 1962, the average unitary value of under-developed countries' exports fell by 11%. The prices concerned recovered 2% during both 1963 and 1964. However, since the beginning of 1964, the declining trend has set in again and in 1965, the average unitary value has been almost stable at a level which is hardly superior to that reached at the end of 1962. On the other hand, between 1960 and the third quarter of 1965, export prices of products from the industrialised countries taken as a whole have shown a rise of 5%. The index of exchange terms for the under-developed countries has fluctuated as follows:

1955	108
1958 (year of reference)	100
1960	99
1961	97
1962	95
1963	97
1964	98
1965	94 (provisional)

29. Although the total value of the under-developed countries' exports increased more rapidly between 1960 and 1964 (5.6% per year) than during the years 1955-60 (2.9%), this increase was less rapid than that in the exports of the industrialised countries (8.3 per (2) year from 1960-64) or even in the Communist countries (7.5% per year). The proportion of manufactured articles in the overall Third World exports only increased slowly (8% of the total in 1955, 9% in 1959 and 10% in 1964); and even now, this proportion is composed only of a very limited number of articles coming from a limited number of countries. Exports of agricultural raw materials (natural fibres, rubber, leather), have been handicapped by the increasing use of synthetic substitute products; further technical progress in the industrialised countries allows for important savings in raw materials.

30. The economic expansion of the developing areas is closely linked to that of the industrialised countries of the free world, which are still essential to the under-developed countries for the absorption of their exports (to within 72% in 1964), for their imports (72%) and as a source of aid(3). Nevertheless, the rapid economic progress realised in the industrialised countries of the free world during the period 1960-64 was first marked by a swift stepping up of exchanges between these countries themselves. Whereas in 1955, their imports to the extent of 29% came from the under-developed countries, in 1964, despite an increase in the absolute value of these imports, this figure fell to 22%. The

(1) In 1964: food products 30% of exports; fuel 30%; raw materials of agricultural origin 20%; minerals and base metals 9%; manufactured articles 10%.

(2) See Table E/1 (Statistical Annex)

(3) See Chart IV(Statistical Annex)

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degree of dependence of the under-developed countries on the industrialised countries, on the other hand, especially insofar as their imports were concerned, increased steadily from 1955 till 1964. Whereas 74% of their total imports came from the industrialised countries in 1955 (of which 71% was from the free world and 3% from the Communist countries), this percentage rose to 80% in 1964 (72% and 8% respectively). Exchanges between the developing countries have therefore not followed the development of world trade. These countries were less self-sufficient in 1964 than they were in 1955. This means that their economies will be ever more influenced by the future economic expansion of the industrialised countries.

31. The NATO countries' interest in helping "healthy and accelerated development in economically under-developed areas"(1) has been emphasised several times. It has also been stressed that economic assistance from the West should not be considered as a "riposte" to the economic activities of the Communist countries in the Third World. Nevertheless, between 1955 and 1960, the rapid expansion of the volume of credits offered by the Communist countries, particularly by the USSR, was considered by many as a supplementary reason for stepping up efforts of economic aid on the part of the industrialised countries of the free world(2).

32. Since then, several factors seem to have led the Western countries into reconsidering this particular Communist threat. The relaxation of international tension, the vanishing monolithic character of the Communist bloc, and the internal economic difficulties of its component countries have given the impression that this threat was diminishing. It is a fact that the amount of new offers of aid to the Third World countries from Communist countries during the years 1962/63 was considerably reduced (on average \$325 millions a year, as against \$950 millions through the three preceding years, 1959-61)(3). In addition, the application of Communist aid has been slow (only 35% of the total aid promised since 1954 has, in fact, been used up to the present time), which means that the aid actually drawn during the last few years (1963-65) has not exceeded \$500 millions per year on an average. Repayments (\$90 millions in 1963, \$130 millions in 1964 and \$160 millions in 1965) have started to reduce quite considerably the net amount of new financial means effectively put at the disposal of the under-developed countries. In any case, Communist aid actually taken up by the under-developed countries (net amount \$350 millions per year over the last three years) remains well behind aid provided by the West (\$6,000 million a year).

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- (1) C-M(56)127(Revised) - Report of the Committee of Three on "Non-Military Co-operation in NATO", paragraph 70.
  - (2) The undertakings to give aid have reached new heights in 1964-65 (\$1.6 billion and \$0.9 billion respectively, but these new promises are too recent to influence the volume of aid effectively drawn over the past few years, and only compensate for the reduction undergone in the two previous years.
  - (3) C-M(60)4, paragraph 10.



33. To all appearances, the results obtained by the Communist effort in this field have not fulfilled the hopes of the Soviet leaders. In addition, the slowing down of economic expansion in the most industrialised Communist countries has served as an argument for putting a brake on too rapid a development of aid to these countries of the Third World. In particular, Czechoslovakia has mentioned the weight represented by this aid amongst the causes of the stagnation of her own economic expansion. Khrushchev's successors at the head of the Soviet State have shown some hesitation in pursuing an increasingly intense policy of aid to the under-developed countries, although they have not disavowed former practice. Nevertheless, the percentage of the resources devoted to economic aid by the Communist countries remains very much lower than that of the NATO countries(1).

34. The economic spurt in the Western countries as a whole, characteristic of the period 1960-65, has not been accompanied by an increase in the volume of aid accorded to the Third World. Since 1961, the total of financial means annually put at the disposal of the less developed countries both in the form of public funds (about \$2.7 billion) by the industrial countries of OECD, has remained virtually stationary, whereas it increased very rapidly between 1950 and 1960. Public opinion seems disillusioned. There have been numerous criticisms about the efficacy of the aid granted; waste, corruption and the inadequacy of the effort furnished by the aided countries themselves to improve their situation by their own efforts have all been emphasised.

35. In fact, if the total volume of this aid has remained stationary, its value to the under-developed countries in real terms has a tendency to diminish, chiefly for the following reasons:

- the export prices of the industrialised countries have risen by 5%;
- interest payments on the governmental loans granted are not taken into consideration in the "net" totals mentioned above which only accounts for capital repayments. Since the debts of the under-developed countries have risen from \$9 billion in 1955 to \$33 billion in 1964(2) interest payments which have followed this trend no doubt now exceed \$500 million;
- the volume of export of long-term private capital dropped from \$2.5 billion per year between 1956 and 1961 to \$2.2 billion between 1961 and 1965. While re-invested earnings

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(1) See tables F/1, F/2 and Chart V (Statistical Annex).

(2) United Nations "World Economic Survey 1965" mentioned in The Economist, 4th June, 1966, page 1065.

are in principle included in the total, it has been estimated that the developing countries paid in 1962 over \$3 billion as interests and dividends to nationals in industrial countries(1);

- lastly the amount of net private financial means does not take into account capital leaving the under-developed countries. According to the IMF, this problem has only taken on a guise of flight of capital in one or two countries of the extra-metropolitan franc area(2) and in Latin America. In the latter case, the only one where information is available to the IMF, the level of the departure rate of capital during the 1950s had reached an average of about \$300 million. This sum represents one third of new capital entering Latin America as private investment.

36. Several estimates(3) have been attempted on the "requirements" for external aid of the under-developed countries. Those estimates which are based on "the deficit in domestic savings" in relation to the rate of growth aimed at and with a given capital/output ratio, indicated towards the end of the 1950s a "need" of about \$6.5 to \$8.5 billion per year. Other estimates, based on the gap between import needs and export income arrive at a "foreign exchange gap" which varies between \$10 and \$20 billion per year. In many countries growth would indeed seem to be held up less by difficulty in increasing the formation of domestic capital, than by that of increasing sufficiently receipts from exports. The World Bank has estimated that the developing countries could usefully absorb some \$3.4 billion more than the industrialised countries provide(4).

37. The present total of outside capital destined to help the backward countries in their task of development is still far from realising the aim expressed by the United Nations - i.e. 1% of the national income of the economically advanced countries. The application of such a rate would lead to a total volume of economic assistance of \$16 billion for the year 1964 (instead of the 6.5 million effectively accorded from government sources; 9.6 million, if the private sector is included). Out of a total of \$16 billion, \$12 billion would be provided by all the advanced countries of the West and \$4 billion (instead of \$350 million) by the USSR and the European Communist countries. These figures show clearly that the latter are still far from having attained the United Nations objectives.

- 
- (1) Goran OHLIN "Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered" OECD - Paris 1966, p. 68.
  - (2) Unrecorded repatriation of capital by French residents in Algeria and elsewhere has been estimated at \$2 to 3 million (See Goran OHLIN op. cit. p. 68).
  - (3) See in this context Goran OHLIN op. cit. pp. 76-80.
  - (4) The Economist, 4th June, 1966, "Shrinking Will to Help"



SUMMARY

38. During the years 1961 to 1965, the economic growth rate of the industrialised countries was more or less similar (4.5% per year) in both the market economy countries and Communist countries. However, whereas expansion was slowing down in the latter, it speeded up in the market economy countries. Thus, in contrast to what had generally been forecast in the early 1960s the industrial countries of the Free World maintained and even increased their lead over the Communist countries. The United States' economic power exceeds both that of all the other NATO countries put together and - to an even greater extent - that of the Soviet Union: thus their margin of economic superiority is widening in absolute terms, even though the rate of growth of all these countries is the same.

39. Among the industrialised countries, those which are relatively less advanced progressed faster during this period. This is the case of Bulgaria and Rumania in the Communist group, and of Japan, Spain, Greece and Portugal in the Free World. For these countries, which are still in an intermediate stage of development, both systems gave about the same result.

40. On the other hand, it is remarkable that among the under-developed countries during the last five years, the growth of GNP in Communist China was slightly slower than in the Free World. This gives the lie to the Communist countries' claim, so often voiced, that their system allows them to speed up economic development.

41. Between 1960 and 1965, the economic growth of the under-developed countries, both Communist and Free World, slowed down in comparison with previous years; it was considerably less than that of the industrialised countries and has not reached the level of the United Nations' aim for "A Development Decade: 1960-1970". But demographic growth, on the contrary, exceeded the forecasts in these countries. As far as income per head is concerned, therefore, the gap between Communist China and the USSR, on the one hand, and between the Third World countries and those of the West, on the other hand, widened during the period 1960-1965 much more than during the ten preceding years.

42. In view of this demographic thrust, the inadequate development of agriculture, in particular of world food production, presents a problem of an increasingly serious nature: in fact, the situation may well become critical towards the middle of the 1970s. Only North America, Western Europe and, until 1964-65, Australasia have increased their food production at a faster rate than that of their demographic growth. In the Communist countries as in those of the Third World progress in agriculture has not kept pace with population growth.

43. The economic expansion of the Western industrialised countries between 1960 and 1965 favoured above all the development of trade between themselves: trade with the underdeveloped countries only benefited from it to a much smaller degree. The underdeveloped countries' dependence on the industrialised countries for trade therefore increased, whereas the diversification in their exports was slow.

44. The amount of economic aid accorded to the underdeveloped countries by the industrialised countries, having increased rapidly between 1950 and 1960, has remained practically unchanged in real terms since 1961. The acceleration in economic growth in the Western developed countries has not been accompanied by an increase in the amount of economic assistance granted. However, aid provided by the Communist countries still only represents a very small fraction of that given by the Western countries. The underdeveloped countries' debts vis-à-vis the industrialised countries have increased considerably and now attain proportions which pose serious problems for the future.

45. If the present trend continues, the world situation in 1975, compared to that of 1964, would be as follows(1):

	<u>1964</u>		<u>1975</u>	
	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP</u>
<u>World (total) = 100</u>				
Underdeveloped countries	67.7%	18.8%	70.9%	18.0%
Industrialised countries	32.3%	81.2%	29.1%	82.0%
<u>Free World = 100</u>				
Underdeveloped countries	69.5%	18.5%	70.3%	17.7%
Industrialised countries	31.5%	81.5%	29.7%	82.3%
<u>Communist World = 100</u>				
Underdeveloped countries	70.1%	19.6%	72.1%	19.1%
Industrialised countries	29.9%	80.4%	27.9%	80.9%

46. This table shows clearly that the gap in available resources between industrialised countries and underdeveloped countries is most likely to widen even further; this would be true both in the Free World and in the Communist world. The gap in GNP per head between the industrialised countries and the underdeveloped ones would increase by some 48%.

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(1) See Tables G/1, G/2, G/3 and Chart VI (in Statistical Annex).

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STATISTICAL ANNEXTABLE OF CONTENTCHARTS

- Chart I. Growth of GNP (in East and West) (1950-65 with projections till 1975)
- Chart II. Growth of GNP per head (in East and West) (1950-65 with projections till 1975)
- Chart III. Food production per head (1952/53 till 1963/64)
- Chart IV. Direction of International Trade (1950, 1955 and 1964)
- Chart V. The flow of financial resources from OECD and Communist countries to developing countries 1950-1965
- Chart VI. The widening gap between industrialized and underdeveloped countries in East and West - a comparison 1964-1975.

At the time of distribution, owing to technical difficulties in the reproduction, the English texts of the Charts were not available. In order not to delay the distribution of this document, the charts with French headings have been attached. The Charts with English headings will be circulated as soon as possible.

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ANNEX to  
AC/89-WP/193TABLESA. Free World Industrialized Countries

- A/1 - Population - 1964, Industrialized countries - Market Economy.
- A/2 - Gross National Product in 1964  
Industrialized countries - Market Economy
- A/3 - Annual Rates of Increase of GNP  
Industrialized countries - Market Economy

B. Communist Countries

- B/1 - Population - 1964  
Communist Countries
- B/2 - Gross National Product in 1964  
Communist Countries
- B/3 - Annual Rates of Increase of GNP  
Communist countries

C. Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World

- C/1 - Third World (Population - Gross Domestic Product)

D. The World Food Situation

- D/1 - Annual rate of increase in food production
- D/2 - Index of food production per head

E. International Trade

- E/1 - Expansion in the value of exports (f.o.b.) by groups of exporting countries 1955-1960-1964

F. Economic Aid to developing countries

- F/1 - The flow of financial resources to developing countries of the Free World (bilaterally and through multilateral organizations) 1950-65

- F/2 - Aid to developing countries in % of National Revenue

G. World Situation

- G/1 - World Situation - 1964
- G/2 - World Situation 1975
- G/3 - Comparison between underdeveloped countries and industrialized ones in 1964 and in 1975

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NOTE :

In compiling the data for this annex, use was made of material from various sources: U.N., F.A.O., I.M.F., G.A.T.T. and O.E.C.D. Totals mentioned in these publications generally include official data provided by the European Communist countries but no information on Communist China. Wherever needed, for individual communist countries and in particular for Communist China, US Department of State estimates (1) and figures mentioned in earlier NATO documents have been used to the largest extent possible.

All figures in the attached charts and tables are to be considered as rough approximations, subject to revision. They have been considered accurate enough to indicate overall orders of magnitude, to allow some global comparisons and to give an idea of the prevailing trends.

The geographical definitions in the sources of information used are not always identical. The regrouping of countries according to the definitions used for the purpose of this annex has been attempted whenever feasible but proved to be impossible in some cases due to the lack of detailed breakdown of the totals available.

Definitions :


Except where otherwise stated, the geographical definitions used in the annex are as follows :

- All NATO countries, disregarding the stage of their economic development are included under the wording "Industrialized countries".
- "Western Europe" covers all European OECD countries including Yugoslavia and Finland.
- "Free World Industrialized countries" groups "Western Europe", North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
- "Eastern European countries" groups Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany (East Berlin included).
- "Third World" in the context of this paper is equivalent to "developing countries of the Free World outside Europe", the term covers Latin American countries (excluding Cuba), Africa (excluding South Africa), Middle East (excluding Turkey), Asia (excluding Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam).
- "Communist underdeveloped countries" include: Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba and Albania.

(1) Among these: Research Memorandum REU-40 Sept. 28 1965. "Indicators of Comparative East-West Economic Strength-1964" was used for evaluating on a comparable basis, the relative position of each group of countries; calculations for projections have been largely based on the figures given therein. Also Research Memorandum RSB-14, March 11, 1966 "Trends and Problems in World Output" contains valuable global information.

CROISSANCE DU PNB

(PNB EN MILLIARDS DE \$ EQUIVALENTS EN POUVOIR D'ACHAT)



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(Tables related to Chart I - preceding page)

Annual Average Rate of Growth of GNP (in %)				
	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-75
NATO-North America	4.3	2.3	4.6	4.5
United States	4.3	2.2	4.5	4.5
NATO-Europe	5.4	4.7	4.5	4.5
USSR	7.0	6.2	4.5	4.5
Eastern Europe	5.6	5.3	3.9	3.9
Communist China	10.0	2.0	3.8	4.0

Growth of GNP


(GNP in billion US \$ at purchasing power equivalents)

	1950	1955	1960	1964 <sup>*</sup>	1965	1975
NATO-North America	420	519	580	676	726	1,109
United States	394	486	541	629	675	1,030
NATO-Europe	227	295	367	444	464	721
Eastern Europe and USSR	184	251	330	385	404	619
USSR	130	180	238	281	295	458
Eastern Europe	54	71	92	104	109	161
Communist China	39	70	77	88	92	136

\* 1964 used as basis for the projections 1975.

GRAPHIQUE II

**CROISSANCE DU PNB par habitant**  
(EN \$ 1965 EQUIVALENTS EN POUVOIR D'ACHAT)





(Tables related to Chart II)


Total annual average rate of increase of GNP per head				
	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-75
United States	2.6	0.4	2.8	3.0
NATO-Europe	4.4	3.3	3.5	3.6
Third World	2.7	2.1	1.7	1.5
USSR	4.9	3.9	2.8	3.2
Eastern Europe	4.7	4.4	2.4	3.2
Communist China	8.0	0.9	1.7	2.0

GROWTH OF GNP PER HEAD

(in \$ 1965 purchasing power equivalents)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1975
United States	2,587	2,938	2,995	3,462	4,641
Canada	1,933	2,121	2,189	2,602	3,562
NATO-Europe	911	1,132	1,341	1,577	2,257
USSR	728	926	1,121	1,287	1,765
Eastern Europe	610	764	950	1,068	1,465
Third World	159	182	202	220	250
Communist China	74	109	113	123	150

INDICES DE LA PRODUCTION ALIMENTAIRE PAR HABITANT ET PAR REGIONS (1959/60 = 100)



SOURCE : Organisation des Nations-Unies pour l'Agriculture et l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture "La Situation Mondiale de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture en 1964".  
ROME 1964

(Table related to Chart III)

Index of food production per head

(1959/60 = 100)

	West. Europe	Austr- alasia	North Amer.	East. Europe & USSR	Middle- East	Far- East	Latin Amer.	Africa	World
1952/3	87	102	103	74	92	90	97	102	92
53/4	94	100	100	77	96	96	96	104	93
54/5	93	96	97	77	90	95	98	104	93
55/6	93	99	99	83	92	97	97	101	94
56/7	93	93	100	91	97	98	101	104	96
57/8	95	90	96	92	98	95	101	99	95
58/9	97	104	101	99	100	98	103	101	99
1959/60	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
1960/1	104	104	100	99	98	102	99	102	100
61/2	102	103	97	101	95	101	98	97	98
62/3	106	109	99	102	99	100	96	99	100
63/4	106	109	101	98	99	99	95	99	99

Source: FAO "La situation mondiale de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture - 1964".

## GRAPHIQUE IV

## COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (Répartition géographique)

Répartition en pourcentages de la valeur des exportations selon leur destination et des importations selon leur origine  
Comparaison de la situation en 1955, en 1960, en 1964

GROUPE EXPORTATEUR ET PERIODE		EXPORTATIONS (f.o.b) DESTINEES AUX				
		ECONOMIES DE MARCHÉ		PAYS COMMUNISTES	MONDE*	
		Pays développés	Pays sous-développés			
ECONOMIES DE MARCHÉ	Pays développés	1955	69	28	3	100
		1960	70	26	4	100
		1964	74	22	4	100
	Pays sous-développés	1955	72	24	3	100
		1960	72	22	5	100
		1964	72	20	6	100
PAYS COMMUNISTES	1955	19	7	2	100	
	1960	19	9	2	100	
	1964	19	13	6	100	
ENSEMBLE DU MONDE	1955	65	25	10	100	
	1960	64	23	13	100	
	1964	67	20	12	100	

GROUPE IMPORTATEUR ET PERIODE		IMPORTATIONS (f.o.b) EN PROVENANCE DE				
		ECONOMIES DE MARCHÉ		PAYS COMMUNISTES	MONDE*	
		Pays développés	Pays sous-développés			
ECONOMIES DE MARCHÉ	Pays développés	1955	68	29	3	100
		1960	72	24	4	100
		1964	74	22	4	100
	Pays sous-développés	1955	71	26	3	100
		1960	74	21	5	100
		1964	72	20	8	100
PAYS COMMUNISTES	1955	18	7	75	100	
	1960	21	8	71	100	
	1964	24	9	66	100	
ENSEMBLE DU MONDE	1955	64	26	10	100	
	1960	66	22	12	100	
	1964	68	20	12	100	

\* Y compris les exportations dont la destination ne peut être précisée

SOURCE : Secrétariat de l'ONU. Pour une définition des régions géographiques voir verso.

Définitions :

Pays développés à Economie de Marché :

Amérique du Nord, Europe occidentale,  
Australie, Japon, Nouvelle-Zélande et  
Afrique du Sud.

Pays communistes

URSS, Europe de l'Est, Yougoslavie,  
Chine communiste, Mongolie, Corée du Nord,  
Vietnam du Nord.


Pays sous-développés à Economie de Marché :

reste du monde.

Note :

Les totaux ne sont pas toujours égaux à la  
somme de leurs éléments parce que les chiffres  
ont été arrondis.

**AIDE AUX PAYS SOUS-DEVELOPPES**  
(ACCORDEE PAR LES PAYS DE L'OCDE ET LES PAYS COMMUNISTES)



SOURCE : OCDE

(1) URSS + Europe de l'Est + Chine communiste

(2) Opérations à long terme + crédits à l'exportation de plus d'un an

\* La distribution par année pour la période 1951-55 est une estimation approximative basée sur la moyenne annuelle 1950-55 de 1600 millions de \$ pour le secteur privé et de 1900 millions de \$ pour le secteur public  
1965 : Estimations provisoires

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**ECART CROISSANT ENTRE LES PAYS INDUSTRIALISES  
ET LES PAYS SOUS-DEVELOPPES A L'EST ET A L'OUEST (1964-1975)**

		POPULATION Répartition en % du total mondial	PNB Répartition en % du total mondial
TIERS MONDE	1964	43,8	14,4
	1975	47,1	13,8
PAYS INDUSTRIALISES	1964	22,0	63,1
	1975	19,9	64,0
SOUS-DEVELOPPES COMMUNISTES	1964	23,9	4,4
	1975	23,8	4,2
PAYS INDUSTRIALISES COMMUNISTES	1964	10,2	18,1
	1975	9,2	18,0

PAYS SOUS-DEVELOPPES (COMMUNISTES + TIERS MONDE)	1964	67,7	18,8
	1975	70,9	18,0
PAYS INDUSTRIALISES (COMMUNISTES + MONDE LIBRE)	1964	32,3	81,2
	1975	29,1	82,0

**SITUATION AU SEIN DU MONDE LIBRE ET DU MONDE COMMUNISTE**

		POPULATION	PNB	
MONDE LIBRE	1964	Sous-développés	66,5	18,5
		Industrialisés	33,5	81,5
	1975	Sous-développés	70,3	17,7
		Industrialisés	29,7	82,3
MONDE COMMUNISTE	1964	Sous-développés	70,1	19,6
		Industrialisés	29,9	80,4
	1975	Sous-développés	72,1	19,1
		Industrialisés	27,9	80,9

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TABLE A/1

## Population - 1964

Industrialised countries - Market Economy

Country	Population mid-64 (in 1,000)	Rate of increase annual average (in %)	Projections 1975 (in 1,000)
<u>NATO - Europe</u>			
1. Belgium	9,378	0.6	9,815
2. Denmark	4,720	0.7	5,117
3. Federal Republic of Germany *	58,290	1.2	61,300
4. France	48,417	1.2	51,723
5. Greece	8,510	0.7	8,862
6. Iceland	189	2.1	239
7. Italy	51,090	0.6	56,402
8. Luxembourg	328	0.8	335
9. Netherlands	12,127	1.3	14,104
10. Norway	3,694	0.9	4,075
11. Portugal	9,106	0.6	10,110
12. Turkey	30,677	2.8	37,913
13. United Kingdom	54,290	0.6	58,638
Total: 1-13	290,592	0.8	318,633
<u>NATO - America</u>			
14. Canada	19,271	2.3	23,300
15. United States	192,119	1.6	226,000
Total: 14-15	211,390	1.6	249,300
NATO - Total	501,982	1.1	567,953
<u>Other European countries</u>			
16. Austria	7,215	0.6	7,706
17. Finland	4,580	0.8	5,001
18. Ireland	2,849	1.1	3,214
19. Spain	31,339	1.3	36,134
20. Sweden	7,661	0.6	8,182
21. Switzerland	5,874	1.0	6,555
22. Yugoslavia	19,279	1.1	21,747
Total: Western Europe	369,389	1.0	407,172
Common Market	179,630	0.7	193,679
EFTA	96,916	0.8	105,384
<u>Other non-European countries</u>			
23. Australia	11,136	1.3	12,840
24. Japan	96,906	1.1	109,310
25. New Zealand	2,594	1.5	3,056
26. South Africa	17,474	2.4	22,681
Total: 23-26	128,110	1.8	147,887

\* West Berlin included

Sources - see overleaf



Sources:

For population and rates of increase

United Nations: "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics"  
March 1966

For the projections:

- (i) Countries 1 to 15 with the exception of Iceland.  
"Basic Statistics of the Community - 1965"  
Statistical Office of the European Communities -  
Brussels - 6th Edition.
- (ii) Other countries: on the basis of the indicated  
rates of increase.

TABLE A/2

Gross National Product  
in 1964Industrialised countries - Market Economy

Country	In million \$ (market prices current prices and official rate of exchange)	GNP per head in \$
<u>NATO - Europe</u>		
1. Belgium	15,260	1,627
2. Denmark	8,940	1,893
3. Federal Republic of Germany(*)	103,100	1,768
4. France	86,000	1,776
5. Greece	4,970	585
6. Iceland	315	1,676
7. Italy	49,500	969
8. Luxembourg	582	1,769
9. Netherlands	16,600	1,369
10. Norway	6,200	1,678
11. Portugal	3,120	343
12. Turkey	7,250	236
13. United Kingdom	91,370	1,685
Total: 1-13	393,207	1,351
<u>NATO - America</u>		
14. Canada	43,480	2,260
15. United States	628,700	3,272
Total: 14-15	672,180	3,180
NATO - Total: 1-15		
	1,065,387	2,130
<u>Other European countries</u>		
16. Austria	8,460	1,176
17. Finland	6,550	1,430
18. Ireland	2,590	909
19. Spain	17,700	565
20. Sweden	17,200	2,245
21. Switzerland	12,880	2,182
22. Yugoslavia	7,755	402
Total: Western Europe	466,342	1,261
Common Market	267,212	1,507
EFTA	154,720	1,591
<u>Other non-European countries</u>		
23. Australia	19,723	1,771
24. Japan	68,000	702
25. New Zealand	4,882	1,882
26. South Africa	10,384	594

(\*) West Berlin included

Source: GNP - "Indicators of comparative East/West Economic Strength - 1964"

US Department of State Research Memorandum REU-40, 28.9.65

- For countries Nos. 24, 25 and 26: "International Financial  
Statistics" IMF - May 1966.

GNP per head : GNP divided by the population shown in Table A/1.

TABLE A/3

Annual Rates of Increase of GNP  
Industrialised countries - Market Economy

Country	Share of the GNP of each country in the total (%) - 1963 -	Annual average rate of increase		
		1950-55	1955-60	1960-65
<u>NATO - Europe</u>				
1. Belgium	1.3	2.1	2.5	4.5
2. Denmark	0.7	2.1	4.7	5.2
3. Fed. Rep. of Germany	8.6	9.3	6.3	4.8
4. France	7.3	4.4	4.8	4.9
5. Greece	0.4	7.0	5.4	8.2
6. Iceland	0.1	6.5	3.5	5.4
7. Italy	4.1	5.9	5.8	5.1
8. Luxembourg	0.1		3.3	2.4
9. Netherlands	1.3	5.7	4.2	4.6
10. Norway	0.5	3.5	3.2	5.2
11. Portugal	0.3	3.8	4.7	5.8
12. Turkey	0.6	6.3	5.2	4.2
13. United Kingdom	7.7	2.6	2.8	3.2
Total: 1-13	33.0	5.4	4.7	4.5
<u>NATO - America</u>				
14. Canada	3.6	4.6	3.4	5.3
15. Etats-Unis	53.3	4.3	2.2	4.5
Total: 14-15	56.9	4.3	2.3	4.6
NATO - Total	89.9	4.7	3.2	4.5
16. Austria	0.7	6.1	5.2	4.3
17. Ireland	0.2	2.3	1.3	4.0
18. Japan	5.4	9.1	9.6	9.4
19. Spain	1.4		4.3	9.2
20. Sweden	1.4	3.2	3.6	5.1
21. Switzerland	1.0	4.8	4.0	5.5
OECD Total: 1-21	100.0	5.0	3.6	4.9

Source: OECD "Economic Growth 1960-70, a mid-term review of progress towards the OECD growth target" CPE/WP2(66)1 (Preliminary Report) Paris 10/III/66, Table 1, page 3.

Note: The annual average rates of increase 1960-65 (constant prices) for Denmark, Greece, Iceland and Turkey have been completed according to the information available to the Secretariat.

TABLE B/1

Population - 1964  
Communist countries

Country	Population mid-64 (in 1,000)	Rate of increase annual average (in %)	Projections 1975 (in 1,000)
<u>Eastern Europe</u>			
1. Bulgaria	8,144	0.8	9,000
2. Czechoslovakia	14,058	0.7	15,200
3. Hungary	10,120	0.3	10,300
4. Poland	31,161	1.2	35,600
5. Rumania	18,927	0.8	20,400
6. S.O.Z. of Germany (including East Berlin)	17,011	0.4	17,700
Total: 1-6	99,421	0.8	108,200
7. Albania	1,814	3.2	2,600
Total: Eastern Europe	101,235		110,800
8. USSR	227,687	1.5	259,600
Total: European Communist countries	328,922		370,400
<u>Asia</u>			
9. China	735,000	2.0	910,000
10. North Korea	10,500	2.3	13,000
11. North Vietnam	17,200	3.4	22,500
12. Outer Mongolia	1,050	3.1	1,450
Total: Asian Communist countries	763,750		946,950
13. Cuba	7,434	2.0	9,100
GRAND TOTAL	1,100,106		1,326,450

Sources: Columns 1 and 2, United Nations' "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics" March 1966.

Communist China: AC/127-D/208 + rate of increase 2%.

Other Asian countries: estimates based on the rates of increase indicated.

Projections: AC/127-D/131, Annex A.

TABLE B/2

Gross National Product  
in 1964  
Communist countries

Country	In million \$ (market prices (converted at purchasing power equivalents))	GNP per head in \$
<u>Eastern Europe</u>		
1. Bulgaria	5,700	700
2. Czechoslovakia	21,800	1,551
3. Hungary	10,300	1,018
4. Poland	27,500	883
5. Rumania	13,500	713
6. S.O.Z. of Germany	25,200	1,481
Total: 1-6	104,000	1,027
7. Albania	0,300	150
8. USSR	281,000	1,234
Total: 1-8	385,300	
<u>Asian Communist Countries</u>		
9. China	88,000	120
10. North Korea		
11. North Vietnam		
12. Outer Mongolia	3,700	129
Total: 9-12	91,700	120
13. Cuba	2,700	363

Source: GNP "Indicators of comparative East/West Economic Strength - 1964" - US Department of State - Research Memorandum REU-40, 28.9.65.

The figures for each Eastern European country have been calculated according to the weight in the total, indicated in Table B/3.

GNP per head: GNP divided by the population shown in Table B/1.

TABLE B/3

Annual Rates of Increase of GNP  
Communist countries  
 (Western estimates: Gross National Product)

Country	Weight in total GNP of each country and % of total (1963)	Annual average		
		1950-55	1955-60	1960-65
<u>Eastern Europe</u>				
1. Bulgaria	1.1	6.9	6.9	5.4
2. Czechoslovakia	4.6	4.2	4.8	2.6
3. Hungary	2.2	3.4	5.1	3.8
4. Poland	5.8	4.5	4.7	4.0
5. Rumania	2.8	7.9	6.6	6.2
6. S.O.Z. of Germany	5.2	7.1	5.5	3.4
Total: 1-6	21.7	5.6	5.3	3.9
7. USSR	58.7	7.0	6.2	4.5
Total: European Communist countries	80.4			4.4
8. Communist China	19.2	10.0	2.0	3.8
9. Other Communist countries	0.4			
Total: Communist countries	100			

Official Communist Data  
 Net Material Product (% of increase)

Country	Annual average		
	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65
<u>Eastern Europe</u>			
1. Bulgaria	13.0	9.8	7.4
2. Czechoslovakia	8.0	6.8	2.0
3. Hungary	6.5	7.2	4.6
4. Poland	8.5	6.6	6.0
5. Rumania	15.0	9.4	9.0
6. S.O.Z. of Germany	13.5	7.8	3.0
Eastern Europe	10.6	7.5	4.8
7. USSR	11.7	9.2	6.3

TABLE C/1  
Third WorldA. Population

Country	(in millions)			(Rate of increase in %)		
	1955	1960	1963	1955-60	1960-63	Difference between 55/60-60/63
1. Africa	230	257	279	2.2	2.8	+ 0.6
2. Far-East	716	801	861	2.3	2.4	+ 0.1
3. Latin America	172	196	213	2.8	2.7	- 0.1
4. Middle-East	46	51	55	2.0	2.7	+ 0.7
5. Other countries	5	6	6	2.1	2.4	+ 0.3
Total: Third World	1,170	1,311	1,414	2.3	2.6	+ 0.3

B. Gross Domestic Product

Country	(In billion US \$ 1960)			(Annual rate of increase in %)		
	1955	1960	1962	1955-60	1960-63	Difference between 55/60-60/63
1. Africa	22	27	29	4.1	3.5(a)	- 0.6
2. Far-East	57	70	75	4.1	4.1	5.9
3. Latin America	49	62	67	4.7	3.5	- 0.8
4. Middle-East	9	12	14	6.2	7.6(a)	+ 1.4
5. Other countries	2	2	3	6.3	4.3(a)	- 2.0
Total: Third World	139	173	188(b)	4.5	4.0	- 0.5

C. Gross Domestic Product per head

Country	(in US dollars 1960)			(Annual rate of increase in %)		
	1955	1960	1962	1955-60	1960-63	Difference between 55/60-60/63
1. Africa	96	105	107	1.8	0.9(a)	- 1.2
2. Far-East	79	87	89	2.0	1.5	- 0.5
3. Latin America	285	313	322	1.9	0.7	- 1.2
4. Middle-East	201	245	272	4.0	5.4(a)	+ 1.4
5. Other countries	338	413	430	4.1	2.0(a)	- 2.1
Total: Third World	119	132	136	2.1	1.5	- 0.6

(a) 1960-62. (b) Preliminary estimates B.I.R.D. for 1964 : \$200 billion.

Source: "Progrès économiques réalisés dans les pays en voie de développement". Documentation française: Notes et Etudes Documentaires - 3 mars 1966, based on UN Secretariat information.

For a definition of the geographical regions - see overleaf.

Geographical definitions:

Africa - (all countries except South Africa)

Far-East - (Asia except the Middle-East, Japan and  
the Communist countries)

Latin America - (all countries except Cuba)

Middle-East - (plus Cyprus and Israel, except Turkey and  
the UAR)

Other countries - (West Indies, developing countries and  
territories not mentioned elsewhere).



TABLE D/1

Annual rate of increase in food productionfor the periods: campaign 1954/55 to 1959/60  
campaign 1959/60 to 1963/64

(percentages)

REGIONS	Rate of increase in PRODUCTION		Variation in the rate of PRODUCTION PER HEAD	
	1954/55-1959/60	1959/60-1963/64	1954/55-1959/60	1959/60-1963/64
<u>Developing countries</u>				
1. Africa	1.5	2.0	- 0.8	- 0.3
2. Far-East(a)	3.2	1.9	+ 1.0	- 0.2
3. Latin America	3.2	1.5	+ 0.4	- 1.3
4. Middle-East	4.4	2.4	+ 2.0	- 0.2
<u>Free-World Industrialised countries</u>				
5. Australasia (Australia and New Zealand)	3.3	4.2	+ 0.8	+ 2.1
6. North America	2.6	4.0	+ 0.6	+ 0.3
7. Western Europe	2.3	2.5	+ 1.5	+ 1.6
<u>European Communist countries</u>				
8. Eastern Europe and USSR	6.7	1.1	+ 5.2	- 0.4
WORLD TOTAL(a)	3.4	1.9	+ 1.5	- 0.3

(a) Excluding Communist China

Source: FAO "La Situation Mondiale de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture - 1964" - Rome 1965.

TABLE D/2

Index of food production per head  
(Average figures for the last three years)

(average 1952-53 to 1956-57 = 100)

REGIONS	1952/3- 1954/5	1953/4- 1955/6	1954/5- 1956/7	1955/6- 1957/8	1956/7- 1958/9	1957/8- 1959/60	1958/9- 1960/1	1959/60- 1961/2	1960/1- 1962/3	1961/2- 1963/4
<u>Industrialised countries</u>										
1. Australasia	101	100	98	96	98	100	105	104	107	<u>109</u>
2. Eastern Europe	95	98	104	110	117	120	123	124	<u>125</u>	<u>124</u>
3. North America and USSR	100	99	99	98	99	99	<u>100</u>	99	99	99
4. Western Europe	99	101	101	102	103	106	<u>109</u>	111	113	114
<u>Developing countries</u>										
5. Africa(a)	<u>100</u>	100	100	98	98	98	98	97	96	95
6. Far-East(b)	99	101	102	102	102	103	105	<u>106</u>	<u>106</u>	105
7. Latin America	99	99	101	102	<u>104</u>	103	102	<u>101</u>	<u>100</u>	98
8. Middle-East	99	99	100	102	<u>105</u>	106	<u>106</u>	105	104	105
WORLD TOTAL(b)	99	100	101	102	104	105	107	106	106	106

(a) Including South Africa.

(b) Excluding Communist China.

Source: FAO "La Situation mondiale de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture - 1964".

For geographical definitions - see overleaf

Geographical definitions:

Western Europe

North-Western Europe:

Austria  
Belgium - Luxembourg  
Denmark  
Federal Republic of Germany  
Finland  
France  
Ireland  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
United Kingdom

Southern Europe:

Greece  
Italy  
Portugal  
Spain  
Yugoslavia

Eastern Europe and USSR

North America:

Canada  
United States

Australasia:

Australia  
New Zealand

Latin America

Central America:

Cuba  
Guatemala  
Honduras  
Mexico  
Panama

South America:

Argentina  
Brasil  
Chile  
Colombia  
Peru  
Uruguay  
Venezuela

Africa:

Algeria  
Morocco  
Tunisia  
Ethiopia  
South Africa

Far-East:

Burma  
Ceylon  
China (Taiwan)  
India  
Indonesia  
Japan  
Korea  
Malasia  
Pakistan  
Philippines  
Thailand

Middle-East:

Iran  
Iraq  
Israel  
Syria  
Turkey  
United Arab Republic

TABLE E/1  
International Trade  
Expansion in the value of exports (f.o.b.) by groups  
of exporting countries  
 1955-1960-1964

Groups of exporting countries	Value in billion \$			Annual rate of increase		Distribution of world total in %		
	1955	1960	1964	from 1955 to 1960	from 1960 to 1964	1955	1960	1964
<u>Free World</u>								
Developing countries - Market economy(1)	58.0	82.8	113.8	7.4%	8.3%	64	66	68
Under-developed countries - Market economy(2)	23.7	27.4	34.0	2.9%	5.6%	26	22	20
<u>Communist countries(3)</u>	9.6	15.6	20.8	10.1%	7.5%	10	12	12
<u>World Total</u>	91.3	125.7	168.6	6.6%	7.6%	100	100	100

- (1) North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
- (2) Rest of the world.
- (3) USSR, Eastern Europe, Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

Source: Documentation française "Progrès économiques réalisés dans les pays en voie de développement" - 3 mars 1966, based on data set up by the Statistics Office of UN.

TABLE F/1

The flow of financial resources to developing countries of the Free World (bilaterally and through multilateral organizations) 1960-65(a)

	Annual average (in billion \$)			Annual figures in million \$					
	1951- 1955	1956- 1960	1961- 1965	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965 (c)
<b>A. <u>OECD countries</u></b>									
Public Sector	1.9	4.2	6.0	4,974	6,176	6,114	6,068	5,896	6,000
Private Sector	1.6	3.0	2.8	3,021	3,083	2,480	2,366	3,206	3,000
<u>of which:</u>									
long-term operations			2.2	2,559	2,590	1,932	1,810	2,390	..
Export credits(b)			0.6	0,462	0,493	0,548	0,556	0,816	..
TOTAL:	3.5	7.2	8.8	7,996	9,259	8,595	8,434	9,102	9,000
<b>B. <u>Communist countries</u></b>									
Total actual drawings by developing countries	0	0.1	0.4	150	239	258	262	528	454
<u>of which:</u>									
extended by Eastern European countries & the Soviet Union	0.0	0.1	0.4	140	231	346	441	494	430
by Communist China				10	8	12	21	35	25
Total aid commitments by all Communist countries	0	0.6	0.9	(790)	(1,103)	(290)	(364)	(1,680)	(1,000)

(a) Source: OECD: doc CPE/WP2(66)1.

(b) for more than one year.

(c) Provisional estimates based on partial information.

TABLE F/2

Aid to developing countries in % of  
National Revenue

Aid origin	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
<u>OECD countries(a)</u>						
Governmental aid	0.70	0.82	0.75	0.70	0.63	0.61
Private financial resources(b)	0.42	0.41	0.31	0.27	0.34	0.30
TOTAL:	1.12	1.23	1.06	0.97	0.97	0.91
<u>Communist countries(c)</u>						
Governmental aid	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.12

- (a) Source: OECD (CPE/WP2(66)1)
- (b) Long-term capital and export credits for more than one year.
- (c) USSR and Eastern European countries: % of GNP.

TABLE G/1  
World situation - 1964

	Population (in millions)	GNP (in billion \$)		Share of developed and underdeveloped countries			
		at the official rate of exchange	in purchasing power equivalents	As % of World Total		As % of Free World and Communist countries totals	
				Population	GNP	Population	GNP
<b>FREE WORLD</b>							
-Underdeveloped	1,410	200	306	43.79%	14.37%	66.51%	18.53%
Africa	286	32	52	8.88	2.44	13.49	3.15
Latin America	230	72	100	7.14	4.69	10.85	6.05
Middle-East	(891)	15	21	(27.68)	(7.11)	(42.03)	(9.27)
Far-East		80	132				
Australasia	3	1	1	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.06
-Industrialised countries	710	1,244	1,345	22.05%	63.14%	33.49%	81.47%
North America	211	672	676	6.55	31.74	9.95	40.94
NATO+Europe	292	393	444	9.07	20.85	13.77	26.89
Other Europeans	79	76	88	2.45	4.13	3.73	5.33
Japan	97	68	97	3.02	4.55	4.58	5.88
Australia/ New Zealand	31	35	40	0.96	1.87	1.46	2.43
South Africa							
<b>FREE WORLD TOTAL</b>	<u>2,120</u>		<u>1,651</u>	<u>65.84%</u>	<u>77.51%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>190%</u>
<b>COMMUNIST COUNTRIES</b>							
-Underdeveloped	773		95	23.94%	4.41%	70.09%	19.62%
Communist China	735	n.a.	88	22.83	4.13	66.82	18.35
Other Asians	29	n.a.	3.7	(1.11)	(0.28)	2.64	0.75
Cuba	7	n.a.	2.7				
Albania	2	n.a.	0.3			0.63	0.52
-Industrialised countries	327		385	10.22%	18.08%	29.91%	80.38%
Eastern Europe	99	n.a.	104	3.14	4.88	9.18	21.71
USSR	228	n.a.	281	7.08	13.20	20.73	58.66
<b>Total: Communist countries</b>	<u>1,100</u>		<u>480</u>	<u>34.16%</u>	<u>22.49%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<b>WORLD TOTAL:</b>	<u>3,220</u>		<u>2,131</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		

Source: (see overleaf)

Sources:

- A. Population: For the mid-1964 population of the "underdeveloped countries of the Free World", see: United Nations "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics" - March 1966.

For the other countries and groups of countries, see Tables A/1 and B/1.

- B. GNP (in billion US \$ at the official rate of exchange)

For the "Underdeveloped countries of the Free World", the 1964 total is the BIRD estimate mentioned in the footnote on Table C/1. The breakdown per area within this group of countries has been estimated by applying the distribution prevailing in 1962 as indicated in Table C/1.

For the other countries, see Table A/2.

- C. GNP (in billion US \$ in purchasing power equivalents)

The conversion from \$ at the official rate of exchange into "purchasing power equivalents" is based on the figures indicated in the US Department of State - Research Memorandum REU-40, Sept. 28, 1965 "Indicators of Comparative East/West Economic Strength - 1964". In the case of Japan, the conversion into "purchasing power equivalents" in this document represents an increase of 42.6% over the figure obtained by applying the official rate of exchange; and in the case of Communist China this increase represents some 50 to 75% over the GNP at the official rate of exchange, as occasionally estimated by some Western Specialists. By analogy, the following rates of conversion to reach a roughly comparable set of figures in "purchasing power equivalents" has been used:

Africa : + 65%  
Latin America : + 40%  
Middle-East : + 40%  
Far-East : + 65%.



TABLE G/2  
World situation - 1975

	Population (in millions)	GNP (in billion \$) in purchasing power equivalents	Share of developed and underdeveloped countries			
			As % of World Total		As % of Free World and Communist countries totals	
			Population	GNP	Population	GNP
<u>FREE WORLD</u>						
- <u>Underdeveloped</u>	<u>1,892</u>	<u>473</u>	<u>47.1%</u>	<u>13.8%</u>	<u>70.3%</u>	<u>17.7%</u>
Africa	387	76	9.6	2.2	14.4	2.8
Latin America	308	146	7.7	4.2	11.4	5.5
Middle-East	60	44	1.5	1.3	2.2	1.6
Far-East	1,133	205	28.2	6.0	42.1	7.7
Australasia	4	2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
- <u>Industrialised countries</u>	<u>801</u>	<u>2,203</u>	<u>19.9%</u>	<u>64.0%</u>	<u>29.7%</u>	<u>82.5%</u>
North America	249	1,109	6.2	32.3	9.2	41.4
NATO-Europe	319	721	7.9	20.9	11.8	26.9
Other Europeans	86	143	2.1	4.2	3.2	5.3
Japan	107	165	2.7	4.8	4.0	6.2
Australia/New Zealand South Africa	40	65	1.0	1.9	1.5	2.4
FREE WORLD TOTAL:	<u>2,693</u>	<u>2,676</u>	<u>67.0%</u>	<u>77.8%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
<u>COMMUNIST COUNTRIES</u>						
- <u>Underdeveloped</u>	<u>958</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>23.8%</u>	<u>4.2%</u>	<u>72.1%</u>	<u>19.1%</u>
Communist China	910	136	22.6	3.9	68.6	17.8
Other Asians	37	6	0.9	0.2	2.8	0.8
Cuba	9	4	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.5
Albania	2	0.5	-	-	-	-
- <u>Industrialised countries</u>	<u>368</u>	<u>619</u>	<u>9.2%</u>	<u>18.0%</u>	<u>27.9%</u>	<u>80.9%</u>
Eastern Europe	108	161	2.8	4.7	8.4	21.0
USSR	260	458	6.4	13.3	19.5	59.9
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TOTAL:	<u>1,326</u>	<u>765</u>	<u>33.0%</u>	<u>22.2%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
WORLD TOTAL:	<u>4,019</u>	<u>3,441</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		

Rates of increase used: see overleaf.

Rates of increase (in %)  
 applied on the 1964 figures.

	Pop.	GNP
<u>Free World:</u>		
A. Underdeveloped countries	2.6	4.0
Africa	2.8	3.5
Latin America	2.7	3.5
Middle-East	2.7	7.0
Far-East	2.4	4.1
Australasia	2.4	4.3
B. Industrialised countries		
North America	1.5	4.5
NATO-Europe	0.8	4.5
Other Europeans	0.8	4.5
Japan	0.9	7.4
Australia/New Zealand	2.3	4.5
South Africa		
<u>Communist World:</u>		
A. Underdeveloped countries		
China	2.0	4.0
Other Asians	2.0	4.0
Cuba	1.9	3.5
Albania	3.3	4.0
B. Industrialised countries		
Eastern Europe	0.9	3.9
USSR	1.3	4.5

TABLE G/3

Comparison between underdeveloped countries  
and industrialised ones

in 1964 and in 1975

	Population (millions)	GNP (in billion \$)	GNP per head (\$)
<u>Underdeveloped countries</u>			
in 1964	2,181	400	183
in 1975	2,850	619	217
<u>of which:</u>			
A. Underdeveloped Communist countries			
in 1964	771	94	122
in 1975	958	146	152
B. Underdeveloped countries of the Free World			
in 1964	1,410	306	217
in 1975	1,892	473	250
<u>Industrialised countries</u>			
in 1964	1,039	1,730	1,665
in 1975	1,169	2,822	2,414
<u>of which:</u>			
A. Eastern Europe and USSR			
in 1964	329	385	1,170
in 1975	368	619	1,682
B. North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa			
in 1964	710	1,345	1,894
in 1975	801	2,203	2,750
<u>WORLD TOTAL</u>			
in 1964	3,220	2,130	661
in 1975	4,019	3,441	856

Source: See Tables G/1 and G/2.