

AC/31(54)-WP/I

20 MARCH 1954

NATO SECRETMEMORANDUM

To : Members of the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy

From : Working Group Secretary

On 17th March 1954⁺, the Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a Draft Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy.

As Ministers will be meeting on April 23rd, the attached draft of the Report is being circulated as quickly as possible with the French text to follow shortly, so as to make it available to governments well in advance of the meeting of the Working Group on 7th April. For the same reason it is hoped that the texts of any proposed amendments will be sent as quickly as possible to the Secretary for distribution before the meeting.

The Final Report should be distributed not later than 13th April; members of the Working Group are therefore asked to make appropriate arrangements for expediting the work of the Group.

(Signed) LUCILLE M. PEART

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.

⁺ C-R(54)8, Item IV

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
26th March, 1954

NATO SECRET
WORKING PAPER
AC/34-WP(54)1

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY
(December 1953 to April 1954)

Draft Report by the Working Group

P A R T I

SUMMARY

A. Soviet Foreign Policy

1. It was the general conclusion of the Working Group's last report^{*} that "... while the Soviet leaders have made a number of moves designed to reduce international tension and to give the appearance of conforming more nearly to international norms, [there is] no hint that there has been any basic change of attitude ... on matters of major interest to them ... They still aim at dividing the North Atlantic Powers, and in the long run at the overthrow of democratic governments". This conclusion has been borne out by the Berlin Conference.

2. The Berlin Conference showed that:

- (a) The Soviet Government are still pursuing their constant objective of disrupting the

* C-M(53)164, dated 5th December, 1953

Western alliance;

(b) they are not prepared to surrender the strategic positions which they at present hold in East Germany and Austria, and,

a fortiori, in the Satellite States; and

(c) at the same time, they seem interested in pursuing (a) and (b) in such a way as to prevent any increase in international tension.

3. In Europe, the Soviet Government are likely to continue on this course, though they will no doubt try out different variations on the theme of (a) above. For the moment, Molotov seems particularly concerned to weaken support for the EDC by making his proposals for European security palatable to a wider circle of opinion in Western Europe. He may propose a further conference on this subject. The Soviet leaders believe that they are more likely at present to further their foreign policy aims by coming to, rather than staying away from the conference table.

4. For this reason, and because he particularly wanted a conference with China included, Molotov was prepared at Berlin to meet the Western viewpoint on participation in, and the agenda for, the Geneva Conference. This Soviet

eagerness may arise from a desire to advance the international position of China and to use the lure of a détente in the Far East as a means of retarding Western rearmament and EDC.

At the same time they may hope to exacerbate Western differences over China. The West, on the other hand, may find it possible to probe some of the imponderables that underlie the Soviet-Chinese relationship, and the extent to which their aims and intentions coincide.

B. Soviet Internal Policy

5. There does not appear to be any serious internal threat to the stability of the Soviet régime. Despite the final disposal in December of the Beria case, reshuffles of leading personnel, especially in the non-Russian republics, suggest that there is still much manoeuvring for position. The campaign on plans to achieve a "sharp rise" in the standard of living during the next two to three years continues as before. Compulsion, as well as monetary and consumer-goods incentives is now being used in the attempt to achieve the goals. The situation in Soviet agriculture appears to be much more serious than was first announced. The grain problem, which at the XIXth Party Congress in 1952 was said to be finally solved, is now the object of emergency measures.

The conclusion of C-M(53)164 remains valid, that "... there has been no change in basic ideology or in the totalitarian structure of Soviet life; and Soviet preparedness for war is being maintained at a high level".

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P A R T II

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

6. "There has been no sign that the Soviet Union's basic hostility to the Western world has been modified." This statement, which was made in C-M(53)164, is obviously as valid now as it was last December. There has been no evidence in the interim of any Soviet "softening" on substantive matters affecting the international position of the USSR.

A. The Berlin Conference: The Soviet Position

7. Germany. The Soviet position on Germany remained as uncompromising as it had appeared in the exchange of notes preceding the Conference. Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government was not prepared to accept reunification of Germany, unless the East German Communist régime were safeguarded, and the West-German, or a possible all-German government, paralysed by Communist participation. Since the Soviet leadership must have been aware that no fruitful discussion was possible on this basis, it is clear that their primary objective in Germany was, and remains, to consolidate their strategic position in the Soviet zone of occupation.

8. Soviet hostility towards the inclusion of the German Federal Republic in Western defence found expression in continued

violent attacks by Molotov on the European Defence Community. His "European security plan" was presented as a substitute for the EDC and was at the same time aimed at excluding the United States from Europe.

9. Austria. The discussion of Austria provided an even clearer indication of Soviet intransigence. Molotov's introduction, at the outset, of a series of entirely new and unacceptable conditions for a settlement, excluded any possibility of agreement on the peace treaty. Not even Western acceptance of the Soviet version of the five disputed articles of the draft treaty affected the Soviet attitude. Again, as in the case of Germany, the Soviet aim was clearly the preservation and consolidation of the status quo, including the indefinite retention of Soviet troops on Austrian soil.

10. The Far East. Soviet intransigence on Germany and Austria was equalled by Molotov's insistence on convening a Five-Power Conference, including Communist China. The original Soviet demand for such a Conference envisaged a general discussion on "measures for the reduction of international tension". However, the Soviet Union ended by accepting a conference not restricted to the "Big Five", and an agenda limited to Korea and Indo-China.

B. The Berlin Conference: Implications for Future Soviet Policy

11. Europe. It is thus evident that the Soviet Union intends to retain and strengthen its hold on Eastern Germany and maintain its present position in Austria. For the moment, the status quo appears to suit them, for so long as they are not under strong pressure from the West, they have no cause to make concessions, and they no doubt hope that they will be able to profit from Western dissension.

12. In Western Europe, the Soviet régime will undoubtedly continue to pursue its general objective of weakening democratic governments and impeding Western defence. More specifically, it is immediately concerned to prevent the rearmament of the German Federal Republic and its inclusion in the Western defence system. Parallel with the exploitation of its "European security plan", the Soviet Government may be expected to engage in other diplomatic manoeuvres calculated to create disunity among the Western allies and, in particular, to try to prevent French ratification of the EDC. It is also to be expected that as a means of evading the issue of all-German free elections, they will try to build up the position of the Pankow régime and to make full use of the slogan "Germans round one table".

The Soviet Government will also, of course, continue its campaign against NATO and "American bases in Europe", the most recent examples of which are the notes delivered to Turkey, Greece and the Netherlands on March 18th and 20th.

13. Soviet intransigence on Germany and Austria, which was revealed thanks to the unity of the Western Foreign Ministers, has reduced the USSR's potential for successful manoeuvring in Europe. The Berlin Conference has undermined the position of those opponents of EDC, notably in Western Germany, who argued that the Soviet Government might agree to unification of Germany on the basis of free elections in return for the abandonment of EDC.

14. The Far East. When considered in conjunction with these reduced possibilities for manoeuvre in Europe, Molotov's persistent advocacy of a conference to include Communist China, and his readiness for this purpose to limit the conference agenda to Korea and Indo-China, indicate a tactical shift in Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet régime undoubtedly hopes that a conference involving the Western allies in negotiations with Communist China will result in the exacerbation of Western divergences on China,

such as those revolving around her admission to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, and trade.

15. Soviet aims in South-East Asia and the Far East may become clearer at the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Government are likely to continue to press by all means for the formal inclusion of the Chinese Communist Government in the councils of the great powers. In Korea, as in Germany, the aim of the Soviet Government is no doubt to bring about the withdrawal of foreign and particularly of American troops. The optimum solution would be to combine this with unification of the country under conditions which would enable the Communists to obtain control. Failing this, the Soviet Government will presumably acquiesce in the continued division of Korea. There are indications that in Indo-China also they are considering some form of partition as a possible solution. Thus the Soviet Government may be preparing for a limited détente in the Far East, provided that it leaves them in what they judge to be an advantageous position. One advantage they will no doubt seek is a weakening of popular support for EDC by giving the impression that a bargain is possible. To the same end, they may well propose further conferences.

16. The great imponderable is, however, the exact nature of the relationship between the USSR and Communist China. The extent to which their aims and intentions coincide is not yet evident. This, in turn, makes it impossible to determine in advance the degree to which the USSR may be able to commit Communist China in negotiations primarily affecting the latter's interests. In any case, it seems certain that they will continue to act in unison. The respective rôles and stakes of Russia and China in the Viet-Minh rebellion are difficult to assess.

C. Atomic Energy and Atomic Weapons

17. The initially unfavourable Soviet reaction to President Eisenhower's "atomic pool" proposal was quickly succeeded by an apparently more flexible attitude. In accepting the US bid for procedural talks on the proposal, Molotov insisted that substantive action must be preceded by an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons. The preliminary procedural discussions held in Washington were continued at the Berlin Conference. The United States submission on March 19th of a "concrete plan to further the peaceful development and use of atomic energy"

was preceded by Soviet proposals, the content of which has not yet been revealed.

18. Additionally, Malenkov's brief reference in his March 12th speech to the disastrous implications of atomic war for world civilization may indicate a desire to put atomic and related problems to the Soviet people more realistically and in broader terms than has been done hitherto. A few days before Malenkov's speech, Pravda published an article by A.N. Nesmeyanov, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which considerably advanced previous Soviet popular knowledge of atomic developments.

D. Soviet "European Security Plan"

19. It is clear that Molotov's proposal at Berlin of a "General European Security Treaty" represented a considered attempt to advance a scheme which would be attractive to Western Europe as an alternative to EDC, but which in fact would undermine NATO. In spite of the unfavourable reception given the proposal, the Soviet Government evidently does not intend to abandon it. Malenkov specifically endorsed it in his March 12th speech. In face of Western objections that the proposal would exclude the United States from Europe, Molotov had indicated that it might be possible to discuss corresponding

amendments. It may be expected, however, that the Soviet Government, in its effort to divide and weaken the Western Alliance, will continue to emphasise the theme of "Europe for the Europeans". Apart from its possible dividends in Europe, this slogan may find an echo in isolationist sentiment in the USA and lead to demands for a "peripheral" strategy, talk of which offers Communist forces and supporters in Europe a more favourable situation to exploit.

E. East-West Trade

20. The Soviet Government has intensified its campaign for increased East-West trade, and placed substantial orders for certain food products and other consumer goods in non-Communist countries. It seems fairly certain that the Soviet Government genuinely desire to see an increase in East-West trade on economic grounds, especially in view of their declared policy of raising living standards in the USSR. There is thus far, however, no indication that this implies a long-term plan to draw continuously upon Western production in order to help fulfil the economic promises made to the Soviet people. At the same time they use trade propaganda to try to drive a wedge between Western Europe (particularly the

United Kingdom) and the United States while constantly harping on the dangers of an economic recession in the United States and on United States dictation through the security controls.

21. Increased Soviet imports from countries outside the Soviet bloc have led to balance-of-payments difficulties, which have been offset in part by the sale in recent months of substantial quantities of Soviet gold in Western Europe. The deteriorating foreign-trade position of the bloc in 1953, caused in large measure by greatly reduced Soviet exports of grain, has also resulted in an intensified export drive on the part of the Soviet Union and the satellites. It has been estimated, for instance, that the Soviet Union will this year double its 1953 sales of oil to Western countries.

F. The Middle East

22. Soviet concern at the possibility of increasingly close ties between Pakistan and the United States was expressed in a Note to the Government of Pakistan at the beginning of December. The conclusion of the pact between Pakistan and Turkey in the latter part of February has been condemned by the USSR as "an extension of NATO and the system of military bases to the East".

23. It appears that the Soviet intention is to strengthen its position in this area by cultivating close ties with India, and by playing upon Indian differences with Pakistan. Soviet propaganda has attributed great significance to the first trade agreement between the USSR and India, which was concluded on December 2nd, 1953. Malenkov, in his important speech of March 12th, dwelt at greater length on India than on China, and warmly praised Prime Minister Nehru and India's "independent rôle" in world affairs. A noticeable effort is being made by the Soviet Union to increase and strengthen cultural relations between India and the USSR.

G. Political Warfare

24. In pursuing the primary political objectives mentioned above, the Soviet Government have modified the Stalinist pattern of political warfare. They have continued to appeal direct to the peoples but this is no longer to the virtual exclusion of governments; the traditional forms of diplomacy, including social intercourse, are receiving more attention; and the continued activities of the Peace Movement have become more insidious and less spectacular. But the Soviet Government are careful to woo in particular those Governments whose position can be exploited to counter the influence of the United States

(cf. the studied flattery of the Indian Government). Meanwhile, Communist subversive activity continues throughout the world, every encouragement is given to "colonial" struggles, and official Soviet ideology continues to anticipate "the coming victory of the socialist camp over the imperialist forces". Additionally, the Soviet Union apparently hopes to foster a succession of intergovernmental conferences, calculated simultaneously to delay Western European integration and to endow Communist parties in the West with a new semblance of national respectability.

PART III

SOVIET INTERNAL SITUATION

25. The conclusions of C-M(53)164 ("Report on Trends of Soviet Policy - April to December, 1953") remain valid. The events of the period that has intervened since that Report have confirmed its more general findings, and have only slightly modified some of its particular judgements.

A. Old Policies Continued

26. Thus, it is still true that:

- "The totalitarian structure of the Soviet State is unaltered";
- "The Marxist-Leninist ideology remains the guiding creed of the Soviet Leaders, and there has been no sign of any tendency to alter its main tenets";
- "The Soviet Union remains a formidable military and industrial Power, and there is no reason to believe that the consumer drive will lead to a reduction in the size and efficiency of the Soviet armed forces".

(C-M(53)164, pp.4-5).

These judgments have in no way been affected since December, 1953.

27. The known facts about Soviet military preparations are

consistent with the pattern of foreign policy outlined above. Just as no strategic positions in the West or the East are being abandoned, so the Soviet Government are maintaining their high rate of expenditure on the armed forces. Bulganin's election speech suggests strongly that the Soviet budget for 1954, like that for 1953, will contain no significant reduction in the defence vote. His emphasis on the development of Soviet aviation and on Soviet ability to repulse "any enemy, whatever weapon he may command" may be taken as an indication of the high priority allotted to preparations for atomic warfare.

B. Party and Government

28. There has been no evidence since December to indicate the existence of any serious internal threat to the stability of the Soviet régime.

29. The doctrine of collective leadership continues to be presented as a description of the régime's modus operandi, and received renewed emphasis during the election campaign. Meanwhile, Khrushchev's position as de facto No. 2 man of the régime appears to have been confirmed. He was nominated as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet in

more electoral districts than any leader except Malenkov himself. (The top ten ranked as follows, according to this criterion: Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, and Shvernik.) However, in protocol listings Molotov still holds second place.

30. There was no confirmation of the theory held by some Western observers that the Army has acquired an important voice in top-level policy decision. On the contrary, there is some evidence to indicate that the corps of professional military men is now no less the tool of the Party than it was before Stalin's death. One such bit of evidence is provided by the contrast between the celebrations of Army Day in 1953 and in 1954. Thus in 1953 the professional soldiers were in the foreground of the celebrations. 1954 finds the War and Navy Ministries merged into one: that of Defence, which is headed by the political Marshal (and ex-State Bank official) Bulganin. He presided over and delivered the report to the commemorative meeting. Indeed, no professional soldier was mentioned in press reports as having addressed

the meeting or occupied a place in its presidium, except the Civil War veteran and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Voroshilov, who must now be regarded as no less a politician than Bulganin. Additionally, during the pre-electoral campaign, none of the professionals was reported by the press as receiving multiple nominations as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. And of twenty top Soviet leaders who signed the "Open Letter" of February 6th to the district electoral commissions, only two were professional military men: Vasilevsky and Zhukov. Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that, whereas the political generals, Bulganin and Voroshilov, received "recommendations" from the Central Committee of the CPSU to stand as candidates in Moscow and Leningrad respectively, it was "recommended" that Vasilevsky and Zhukov stand in provincial districts: Voronezh and Nizhny Tagil.

31. Changes in the Party and Governmental organs of the constituent republics, particularly in the Caucasus and in Kazakhstan, continue to show that the régime's difficulties in this sphere did not end with the execution

of Beria and his "accomplices" in December. The régime is treading carefully in its nationalities policy (cf. the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukraine), but it is clearly biased more on the side of Great Russian ascendancy than on that of concessions to the non-Russian Republics. The signs are that control by the central Party apparatus is everywhere being tightened.

32. Nevertheless, on nationalities policy there appears to be some evidence of an absence of complete uniformity of view among the top leadership. Thus, while the Russification trend continues strongly, Kaganovich found it possible to provide some slight measure of reassurance to the minorities by citing verbatim, at a pre-election speech in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the provisions of the Soviet (ex-"Stalin") Constitution outlawing national and racial discrimination. On the other hand, Pervukhin, speaking in Tiflis (Georgia), revived the charges, with which anti-Beria Georgian leaders had made great play in 1952, that "Bourgeois nationalists, Mensheviks, and various traitors had more than once tried ... to tear the Georgian republic away from the Soviet Union". Furthermore,

Ignatyev, Minister of State Security before March, 1953, who had been accused of complicity in concocting the anti-Semitic plot of the "doctor-murderers", re-appeared in the post of Party Secretary for the Bashkir Oblast.

33. These apparent divergences however, and others in cultural policy, are too fragmentary and disconnected to allow of any firm conclusions. They suggest the existence of cross-currents within the Party, but provide no basis for believing that a threat to the stability of the régime exists.

C. The Agricultural Programme

34. While the régime continues its intensive propaganda campaign on the theme of a "sharp rise" in the standard of living during the next two-to-three years, there has been some indication that it will, in accordance with its Stalinite traditions, rely at least as heavily on the stick as on the carrot in the attempt to make good on its promises. Thus, following the enforced enlistment last autumn, of "over 173,000" urban-based agricultural and other technicians for service in Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), a series of important conferences of

agricultural workers was held in Moscow in January and February. The conferences stressed the need to raise labour productivity, to develop "socialist competition" (i.e., Stakhanovism) and to improve organizational efficiency in the MTS's, kolkhozes, and sovkhoses. Subsequently, the régime - carefully depicting the action as the response to a demand originating among the youth - began sending drafts of young people from the European republics to the Central Asian and Siberian regions, where they are to participate in the sowing, primarily to grain, of 13 million hectares⁺ of virgin and fallow land. An attempt is being made to engender, on behalf of this project and of the solution of agricultural problems generally, a revival of the sort of spontaneous enthusiasm among young people which provided so much of the impetus for the campaign of intensive industrialisation of the first two Five-Year Plans. It seems evident, however, that a "back to the land" movement of this

+ An area equivalent to that of Greece, or of the State of Alabama.

sort can only be sustained by the application of a rather large dose of compulsion. Moreover, there are signs that it has been adopted as an emergency measure, in the face of considerable opposition within the Party. The agricultural problem, with its repercussions on Khrushchev's position, may well put a strain on the principle of collective leadership.

35. Additionally, the agricultural-worker conferences, the youth draft, and other measures centering around the necessity of solving the food problem, have combined to indicate that the régime is even more deeply disturbed by conditions in this sector, than it had appeared to be last autumn. A new element was introduced into the situation in March, with the announcement of a Central Committee decision, based on a report by Khrushchev, calling for the raising of the amounts of state procurements and purchases of grain by from 35% to 40% "within the next few years", and for the cultivation of the 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow land, mentioned above. The agricultural decisions of last September had concentrated primarily

on the raising of the livestock population and the production of vegetables. The current shift of emphasis to grain - quite literally the staff of life in the Soviet Union - lends itself to the conclusion that the agricultural situation is even graver than last year's announcements had depicted it.

36. The treatment accorded to grain production in the 1953 announcements was limited to a demand for an increase in the yield per hectare of land already under grain crops. The supplementary demand, voiced by Khrushchev this March, for an enormous increase in the total cultivated area, and the sowing of much of this additional farmland to grain, stands in contrast to this. It should be recalled here that Malenkov, in the Report he delivered on behalf of the Central Committee to the XIXth Congress of the Party in 1952, had said "... the grain problem, formerly considered the most acute and serious problem, has been solved, solved definitely and finally", and had continued: "Now that the pre-war level of sown acreage has been reached and surpassed, the only

correct course in increasing farm output is to increase yield comprehensively".

D. The Satellites

37. With some delays and variations, which may be due either to local conditions or to difficulties in divining and applying the line desired by Moscow, the Satellites have gradually adapted their economic policies to that of the Soviet Government. Poland, where the economic plan for 1953 had been drawn up on a relatively cautious basis, has not needed, in making these adjustments, to have recourse to the sweeping changes which have been necessary in Hungary. It seems likely that the Congresses of the national Communist parties which are to be held this year will bring the policies of these countries fully into line. The tendency of recent months to replace career diplomats as Ambassadors to the Satellites with prominent party officials appears designed further to tighten party control over the orbit. In the Soviet zone of Germany, the puppet régime has been consolidated and strengthened, and the opposition and dissent, which manifested themselves in the events of June 17th, 1953, appear to have been effectively suppressed.

SELECTED LIST OF SOVIET MOVES
DECEMBER 1st. 1953 TO MARCH 21st. 1954

A. INTERNAL

DECEMBER

4 Armenian Party officials removed in aftermath of BERIA case.

At Moscow meeting of newspaper editors, KHRUSHCHEV complains of slowness with which Party's September agricultural decisions are being put into practice.

5 Soviet Constitution day. It is no longer called the "STALIN Constitution".

9 Publication of decree of Central Committee of C.P.S.U., Council of Ministers, and Presidium of Supreme Soviet, calling for celebration on January 18th of 300th anniversary of "re-unification" of Ukraine with Russia.

16 Pravda article criticizes Minister of Agriculture BENEDIKTOV for failings in preparation of agricultural cadres.

17 V.N. MERKULOV, removed from office of Minister of State Control for "anti-state activities", replaced by V.G. ZHAVORONKOV.

22 SABUROV, PIRVUKHIN, TEVOSYAN, MALYSHEV, and KOSYGIN named Vice-Chairmen of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

Further Governmental changes in Georgian S.S.R.

23 BERIA, MERKULOV, DEKANOZOV, KOBULOV, GOGLIDZE, MESHYK, and VLADZIMIRSKY shot.

25 Formation of Magadan Oblast in Russian S.F.S. Republic.

Opening of grandiose new department store -- GUM -- on Red Square in Moscow.

26/28 Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions meets, calls T.U. Congress for May 26th; Council Chairman SMVERNIAK criticizes agricultural trade unions.

31 Régime gives unprecedented New Year's reception in Kremlin for Party, Government, Army officials, prominent Moscow workers and intellectuals.

JANUARY

1/10 Unprecedented New Year's parties in Kremlin for Moscow children.

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JANUARY

- 5 Pravda article by U.S.S.R. General Procurator RUDEENKO accents importance of "socialist legality" as weapon against "enemies of state and people".
- 9 BAGIROV, BERIA henchman and former Azerbaidzhanian Party and Government leader, divested of last post: that of member of Central Committee of Azerbaidzhan C.P.
- 11 Decree fixes elections to Supreme Soviet for March 14th.
- 15 Changes in Ukrainian Government make agricultural specialist KALCHENKO Premier.
- 17 I.S. ZODELAVA, pro-BERIA Georgian Party leader, relieved of post of First Vice-Premier of Georgian Government.
- 18 300th anniversary of "re-unification" of Ukraine with Russia commemorated as high-point of propaganda campaign celebrating "indivisible unity of peoples" of U.S.S.R.

 "Old Bolshevik" M.F. SHKIRYATOV, Party Control Commission Chairman, dies.
- 25/28 Conference of Machine-Tractor Station workers in Kremlin.
- 30 S. TITARENKO article in Party theoretical journal Kommunist revives demand for "vigilance" against foreign agents, in terms smacking of "vigilance campaign" which was introduced by announcement in January, 1953, of "doctor-murderers" plot.
- 31 Year-end economic report announces total 1953 industrial output up 12% over 1952, 45% over 1950, but indicates that grain harvest below that of 1952. U.S.S.R. produced 320 million tons of coal, 38 million tons of steel, 52 million tons of crude oil, 133 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, during 1953.

FEBRUARY

- 1 Pravda announces that meeting of directors of local Party agitation-propaganda sections was held "recently"; they are told to use more flexible methods in Party propaganda.
- 3/6 Conference of sovkhos workers in Kremlin.
- 5/6 Central Committee of Kazakhstan C.P. meets; P.K. PONOMARENKO, U.S.S.R. Minister of Culture, becomes Kazakhstan Party First Secretary, replacing SHAYAKHMETOV; L.I. BREZHNEV becomes Second Secretary.
- 7 Z.T. SERDYUK becomes First Secretary of Moldavian C.P.; GLADKY demoted to Second Secretary.
- 8 Ministry of Metallurgical Industry split into Ministries of Ferrous Metallurgy (A.N. KUZMIN names Minister) and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (P.F. LOMAKO -- Minister).

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FEBRUARY

- 11/15 Russian Republic kolkhoz workers meet in Kremlin.
- 12 Five-year plan announced to increase Usbek cotton production by not less than 1.3 million tons.

Three top Azerbaidzhanian Party secretaries replaced after Party Congress finds their work unsatisfactory.
- 16 S.D. IGMLTYEV, Minister of State Security until STALIN's death, and one of Secretaries of C.P.S.U. until reversal of "doctor-murderers" plot in April, 1953, is identified as First Secretary of Bashkir Oblast Party Committee.

Georgian Party Congress (originally scheduled for February 3rd) meets; 3,000 members of Party have been expelled in last 7 months.

Kazakhstan Party Congress (originally scheduled for February 8th) meets.
- 17 Turkmen Party Congress meets; A.I. ANDREYEV, agricultural expert and quodam Politbyuro member, elected member of Turkmen Central Committee.
- 19 Crimean Oblast transferred from Russian Republic to Ukrainian S.S.R.
- 21 In account of M.LENKOV's speech at STALIN's funeral, published in Volume 22 of Great Soviet Encyclopedia, no mention is made of his promise of "further improvement in material welfare of ... all Soviet people".
- 28 Pravda severely criticizes two Machine-Building Ministries for failure to produce spare parts for tractors.

MARCH

- 2 Central Committee censures Ministries of Agriculture and Sovkhozes for failure to implement September agricultural decisions, calls for 35% to 40% increase "within next few years" of Governmental procurements and purchases of grain, and announces campaign to bring under plow 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow land in eastern and south-eastern regions of U.S.S.R.
- 3 Soviet Minister of Health A.F. TRET'YAKOV, who was in charge of medical treatment of STALIN during his last illness, and who has been criticized in January, 1953, for negligence in connection with "doctor-murderers" plot, is replaced by M.D. KOVRIGIN.
- 5 On anniversary of his death, Soviet press hails STALIN as "closest pupil and comrade-in-arms of genius LENIN."

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MARCH

7 Vice-Chairman of Council of Ministers A.N. KOSYGIN is replaced as Minister of Industrial Consumer Goods by N.S. RYZHOV.

9 Pravda article by President of Academy of Sciences NESMEKINOV explains some of implications of atomic energy, but ignores its military potentialities.

Further Governmental changes in Azerbaijan.

11 In pre-election speech in Tiflis, M.G. PERVUKHIN refers to "bourgeois nationalists" who tried to tear Georgia away from U.S.S.R. calls STALIN "leader [vozhd'] of Communist Party".

In pre-election speech in Tashkent, K.G. NOVICH quotes Constitutional provisions against national and racial discrimination.

12 M. LENKOV pre-election speech calls for rise in labour productivity, observance of "Soviet legality", and reiterates principle of collective leadership.

S. IBUROV pre-election speech stresses need to raise labour productivity.

14 Supreme Soviet elections held.

16 All-Union Ministry of Higher Education formed, V.P. YELYUTIN named Minister; G.F. ALEKSANDROV, philosopher who was attacked by ZHDANOV, named Minister of Culture to replace PONOMARENKO.

17 Marshal ROZEV named Commander of Carpathian Military District.

18 Electoral commission announces that 99.79% of those eligible voted, and of these 99.84% voted for bloc of Communist and non-party candidates.

19 XIIth Komsomol Congress opens.

21 KHRUSHCHEV speech, delivered February 23rd, published. He criticized Agriculture Minister BENEDIKTOV, other agricultural officials, for the "sad state of things" in agriculture and explained that agricultural problems in Kazakhstan were too much for SH. Y. KHMETOV, who had to be replaced by PONOMARENKO.

B. EXTERNAL

DECEMBER

2 INDI.: First Soviet-Indian trade agreement signed.

PAKISTAN: U.S.S.R. warns it "cannot be indifferent" to U.S.-Pakistan negotiations allegedly envisaging establishment of American bases in Pakistan.

3 CHINA: Former Deputy Soviet High Commissioner in Germany P.F. YUDIN appointed to replace Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs V.V. KUZNETSOV as Ambassador to China.

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DECEMBER

- 4 ISRAEL: Soviet Ambassador A.N. ABRAMOV presents credentials to President ben ZVI in Jerusalem.
- 5 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Plenary session of Czechoslovak Central Committee sets Party Congress for June, 1954.
- 7 Western notes propose Berlin as site of Big-Four Foreign Ministers' Conference and January 4th as opening date.
- 8 President EISENHOWER's U.N. speech proposes formation of "atomic pool", to which all atomic producers, including U.S.S.R. would contribute.
- 9 On eve of 9th anniversary of Franco-Soviet treaty, Radio Moscow invites France to reject E.D.C., and cooperate with U.S.S.R. against German menace.
- 10 U.N.: VYSHINSKY insists on ban on atomic weapons.
Radio Moscow charges President EISENHOWER "threatened atomic war" in U.N. speech.
- 12 KOREA: U.N. Ambassador DEAN walks out of pre-conference talks following Communist charges of U.S. "perfidy".
- 16 EASTERN GERMANY: M. LENKOV receives GROTEWOHL, who is in U.S.S.R. "on vacation".
AFGHANISTAN: It is learned that Moscow has protested oil explorations by "NATO country" along Soviet-Afghan frontier.
- 17 POLAND: Roman Catholic hierarchy takes "oath of loyalty" to Communist State.
YUGOSLAVIA: Danube Commission adopts Yugoslav proposals, elects head of Yugoslav delegation secretary of Commission.
INDO-CHINA: HO Chi-minh re-affirms his readiness to discuss armistice terms.
- 19 MIDDLE EAST: Communist-sponsored conference on "defence of Middle-Eastern and Arab rights" opens at Beirut.
- 21 U.S.S.R. agrees to "atom pool" procedural talks, insisting that "unconditional pledge" not to use atomic weapons be discussed.
- 22 CHINA: Deputy Premier TEVOSYAN leaves for China to participate in opening of metallurgical works.

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DECEMBER

26 CHINA: Pravda front-pages M.I.O.'s picture, publishes long message of C.P.S.U. Central Committee and U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, congratulating him on his 60th birthday.

U.S.S.R. accepts Berlin as conference site, proposes January 25th as opening date.

29 GREAT BRITAIN: British port authorities reveal arrival in England during past week of "at least \$46,000,000" worth of Soviet gold, bringing British direct receipts during November and December to about \$70,000,000 worth. Another \$30,000,000 appeared in Continental money markets during same period.

30 EASTERN GERMANY: West Berlin authorities announce that 350,000 East Germans, including about 4,500 People's Police, fled West during 1953.

31 U.S.: U.S.S.R. agrees in principle to return 186 lend-lease vessels.

JANUARY

1 Soviet Government receives notes from Western Big Three, accepting Soviet proposals on Berlin Conference.

11 Secretary of State DULLES and Soviet Ambassador ZARUBIN hold first procedural talk on "atom-pool" proposal.

16 AUSTRIA: Soviet note promises that U.S.S.R. will do "everything in its power for final settlement of Austrian question".

20/23 EASTERN GERMANY: Socialist Unity Party Central Committee meeting expels two former Party leaders for "soft attitude" in June, 1953.

23 CHINA: Soviet-Chinese 1954 trade protocol signed; U.S.S.R. to provide machinery, industrial products; China to supply raw materials, agricultural products.

HUNGARY: Premier NAGY strongly re-affirms "new course", saying "We wish to guarantee more room for private initiative and individual interests".

25 Berlin Conference opens.

26 KOREA: Communists walk out of liaison talks looking towards resumption of negotiations on Korean political conference.

27 AFGHANISTAN: U.S.S.R. extends \$3.5 million loan, and technical aid.

JANUARY

- 28 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Maria SVERMOVA, six other SLANSKY "accomplices", convicted of "anti-state activities", sentenced to from life to fifteen years.
- 29 YUGOSLAVIA: Cominform journal article invites Yugoslavia to re-join Soviet bloc.
- 30 DULLES-MOLOTOV procedural talks in Berlin on "atom-pool" plan.
- 31 CHINA: Moscow-Peking direct, eight-day express rail service inaugurated.

FEBRUARY

- 4 GREAT BRITAIN: Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade says U.S.S.R. could place orders in U.K. over next three years to value of £400 million.
- 6/10 CHINA: Chinese C.P. Central Committee holds plenary session; MAO Tse-tung absent, "because he is having his vacation". LIU Shao-chi, in main report, warns against "BERIAS" in Party.
- 7/15 Gunnar MYRDAL, Secretary of U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, visits Moscow.
- 13 CHINA: MAO receives Pakistan Ambassador.
- 14 GREAT BRITAIN: British businessmen in Moscow receive orders from Soviet Government to amount of £15.5 million.
- 18 Berlin Conference ends.

MARCH

- 4 China and North Korea agree to attend Geneva Conference.

BULGARIA: At end of C.P. Congress, Premier CHERVENKOV yields chief Party office - First Secretary - to Todor ZHIVKOV.
- 8 POLAND: Council of Ministers adopts decree to speed up rate of collectivization.
- 9 POLAND: KHRUSHCHEV arrives in Warsaw for C.P. Congress.
- 10 Soviet delegate to E.C.E. KUMYKIN announces that U.S.S.R. will henceforth have permanent delegation at Commission.

POLAND: BIERUT, in report to C.P. Congress, appears to foreshadow intention to speed up collectivization.

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MARCH

10/11/12 Soviet leaders, in pre-election speeches, make following foreign-affairs points:

- MALENKOV condemns cold war, "which is policy of preparing new world war, which, with contemporary means of warfare, means destruction of world civilization"; pays tribute to India and NEHRU, devoting more space to them than to praise of Communist China; support Soviet project of "all-European treaty of collective security";

- MOLOTOV, referring to Western objections that U.S. would be excluded from Europe by Soviet "European security plan", says it is possible to amend it, and calls for further discussion of it;

- BULGANIN says U.S. is openly conducting policy of preparing new war.

11 POLAND: KHRUSHCHEV speech to C.P. Congress calls on Polish Party to "fight mercilessly against any and all enemies of people".

12 HUNGARY: Radio Budapest announces that quondam secret-police chief Gabor PETER and two associates, all Jews, have been arrested, tried and sentenced to from life to nine years for "crimes against state and people".

17 U.S.S.R., with Chinese concurrence, agrees to arrangements suggested by West for Geneva Conference.

POLAND: C.P. Congress ends. BIERUT becomes First Secretary. In subsequent Governmental reshuffle, CYRANKIEWICZ becomes Premier, Hilary MINC and Zenon NOWAK named First Vice-Premiers.

18 E.C.E. adopts joint anglo-Soviet resolution calling for lifting of economic and administrative controls on foreign trade.

BELGIUM: C.P. Secretary-General Edgar LALMAND resigns for reasons of "health".

TURKEY: Soviet note protests Turkish-Pakistan pact, Turkish N.A.T.O membership, visits of British and American warships to Istanbul.

20 THE NETHERLANDS: Soviet note protests establishment of U.S. bases in the Netherlands in peace-time.

GREECE: Soviet note protests U.S. military "bases" in Greece.