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WORKING GROUP ON TRENDS OF SOVIET POLICY

MOLOTOV'S SPEECH OF 8th FEBRUARY 1955
TO THE SUPREME SOVIET

Note by the Secretary

The attached study prepared by the Political Division on Molotov's speech of 8th February, 1955, to the Supreme Soviet has already been distributed to Delegations. However, for the convenience of members of the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy it is now reproduced in the Working Group series of documents.

2. As previously notified, a meeting of the Working Group will be held on Wednesday, 9th March, 1955, at 3.30 p.m., to examine this paper.

(Signed) LUCILLE M. PEART

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

16th February, 1955

1. There are attached: (1) an interpretation of the recent change in Soviet foreign policy, as evidenced by Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet of 8th February, 1955, and (2) a detailed summary of that speech.

2. The interpretation comes to the following conclusions:

I. The change in Soviet foreign policy means:

- (a) that the Soviet leadership has, to all intents and purposes, relegated "peaceful co-existence" to the status of a peripheral propaganda theme;
- (b) that the Soviet leadership is re-casting the tactics of its international-political strategy in terms of the rigid "two camps" thesis of the years 1948-1952;
- (c) that it is now unlikely that the Soviet Union will engage in negotiations with the West on outstanding unsettled questions (German re-unification, Austria). The USSR, of course, has a price for its agreement to enter such negotiations: abandonment of the Paris Agreements and of Western European Union, and conclusion of a Soviet-style "collective-security" pact: but the Soviet leaders probably mean it when they say that they will not enter four-power talks if the Paris Agreements are ratified;
- (d) that the new "hard" policy is being introduced primarily for domestic Soviet politico-economic reasons.

II. The change in Soviet foreign policy does not mean:

- (a) that the Soviet leadership now regards the danger of the outbreak of general war as more imminent than it was during the "powerful co-existence" period of 1953-1954;
- (b) that the Soviet leadership will now engage in a more aggressive international-political policy, of the "forward" type of 1947-1948;
- (c) that the Soviet leadership will take any steps which it would regard as likely to lead to the outbreak of general war;
- (d) that the current switch in foreign policy was dictated by the failure of Western governments to "grasp the outstretched hand" of G.M. Malenkov.

III. As yet, it is not possible to say:

- (a) how far the Soviet leadership will go in re-creating the "deep freeze" relationship which obtained between the Soviet bloc and the Free World during 1948-1952. This will depend to a great extent upon the development of the Soviet internal situation, and, to a lesser extent, upon developments in the international arena;

- (b) how far, and in what ways, the Soviet leadership has committed itself to support the Chinese Communists in the first practical application of the new "hard" line: the Formosa campaign;
- (c) how far the Chinese Communists intend to go in the Formosa campaign (although the presumption is justified that they will, if they can, go the limit);
- (d) to what extent the Chinese Communists are capable of bringing the Soviet leadership to lend greater support to their Formosa effort.

15th February, 1955

MOLOTOV'S REPORT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF 8th FEBRUARY, 1955:

AN INTERPRETATION

1. There will be found at annex a detailed summary of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's report to the Supreme Soviet of 8th February, 1955. The summary provides an outline of the speech, together with comments on its more important points.

2. In this speech, Molotov lays down a new Soviet foreign-policy line. This new line is one of transition from the policy of "peaceful co-existence" to a "hard" line reminiscent of Stalin's last years. It is a logical continuation of the policy introduced by the Soviet note of 13th November, 1954, and developed at the Moscow Conference of 29th November-2nd December, 1954⁽¹⁾. In certain of its essential points, this new line harks back to the speech delivered at Prague on 15th June, 1954, by First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union N.S. Khrushchev⁽²⁾. It is apparent that the basic concepts of the new "hard" line derive from Stalin's treatment of the international situation, contained in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", of October, 1952.

3. The "hard" line in Soviet foreign policy, as it has developed since the end of World War II, has two variants:

(a) The first and more extreme, is a "forward" policy, such as was practised under the leadership of A.A. Zhdanov from the founding of the Cominform in September, 1947, to his death in August, 1948. It is based upon an evaluation which holds that the international situation is "revolutionary", i.e. that the "revolutionary wave" is rising in the non-Communist world. Under these circumstances, the USSR, in order to fulfil its rôle of leader of the "international proletariat" in the latter's march towards "socialism" and "communism", must pursue a "forward" policy vis-à-vis the non-Communist world. This "forward" tactic consists in doing everything possible to facilitate the acceleration of the tempo of the "rising tide of revolution", through organizing and carrying out political strikes in "capitalist" countries; through subversive action in their state apparatuses; through the encouragement of insurrection and "civil war"; even, under the proper conditions, through sending the Soviet Army to the aid of embattled Communist-led insurrections. The Zhdanov policy, however, failed and back-fired, producing the reaction in the West which led to the Marshall Plan and NATO.

(b) The second variant of the "hard" line has some of the outward trappings of the "forward" tactic. While its fundamental assumptions are the same as those which underlie the "forward" variant, its basic premise, however, is that the "revolutionary wave"

(1) Cf. Political Division Note of 14th December, 1954, especially Part III, paragraphs 14 and 16.

(2) See excerpts from this speech in Appendix to Political Division Note on Khrushchev of 9th February, 1955.

has subsided, and that a period of "consolidation" has set in, during which the "correlation of forces" of the "two camps" - the Soviet bloc and the Free World - is that of approximate equality and balance. It shares with the "forward" tactic, of course, an evaluation of the international situation in terms of the unchanging Bolshevik tenets of the "two camps", of the ineradicable enmity between them, and of the inevitability of the final victory of one of them - the "socialist" - over the other - the "capitalist". During a non-"forward" "hard" period, however, Soviet foreign policy and international-political action is calculated, not to foster and encourage "revolutionary" action in the non-Communist world, but to maintain and intensify the existing tension between the "two camps" at a level below that of general war. The non-"forward" "hard" line consists in the active waging of "cold war", while refraining from openly provocative and catalytic moves against non-Communist states, both on the international-political level, and within these states.

The difference between the non-"forward" "hard" policy and that of "peaceful co-existence", which rests on the same unchanging basic articles of faith as both variants of the "hard" line, consists in the fact that, during a period of "peaceful co-existence", the Soviet leadership carefully refrains from overt application of the logical consequences of these doctrines to the relations of the USSR with the non-Communist world.

Under the conditions of a "consolidation" of the power positions of the two opposed blocs, the Soviet leadership can apply either this second, non-"forward", variant of the "hard" line, or the "peaceful co-existence" tactic. What are the characteristics of a non-"forward" "hard" line? Its essence is the establishment, and rigid maintenance, of a strict definition of the limits of the two blocs. The Soviet world seals itself off hermetically from the non-Communist world. In its relations with the non-Communist world, Soviet foreign policy tends to treat as implacable enemies all those states which are not "with it", without bothering to differentiate between them according to degree of hostility or amenability to Soviet blandishments (e.g., see Molotov's treatment of Britain and France, Summary, paragraph 14; he appears to write them off as targets for Soviet approaches, in contrast to the Soviet attitude toward these countries during "peaceful co-existence"; see also his revival of the term "Anglo-American bloc", Summary, paragraph 11). Relations with the outside world may be conducted upon a certain level of Soviet-style "correctness", but that level is, by Western standards, a very low one, and it is frozen by Soviet initiative, so that an "improvement" of Western relations with the USSR becomes virtually impossible.

The basic rationale of the non-"forward" "hard" policy is domestic. It enables the Soviet leadership to maintain at full blast a propaganda campaign, directed to the Soviet and other subject peoples, based upon the bogey of the "capitalist encirclement". There is a considerable range in such propaganda. It is being put forward now in its milder form. It can go as far as the "germ warfare" and atrocities campaign of 1951-1952.

This second variant of the "hard" policy also has an international-political rationale. This was contained in Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". It consists in the contention that, under the conditions of the sealing-off and absolute division of the world into "two camps", the "contradictions" within the Western camp are intensified (through loss of markets in the Soviet world; through the problems posed by the rising "national-liberational wave" in the colonial and semi-dependent areas; through increased economic competition among the Western powers, etc.; (cf.

Molotov's revival of this theme in Summary, paragraph 1). The end-result of this intensification, according to Stalin, should be war among the "capitalist" powers, rather than between the "two camps". During the early stages of this war, of course, the USSR would stand aside (following the tactics applied during the Second World War), and would enter it only at a later stage, or would if possible, remain altogether out of it, and pick up the pieces at leisure once it was over.

4. The tactic of "peaceful co-existence" is only applied during a period when the USSR feels itself weak vis-à-vis the outside world. Its application during 1953-1954 was the result of the fears raised within the leadership by Stalin's death, and of the necessity for a period of relative tranquillity, during which the power struggle within the hierarchy could be fought out. But "peaceful co-existence" is a dangerous tactic, in the eyes of the leadership. It has the advantage that it allows the leadership to differentiate the states of the Western world, and to make individual approaches to those which it deems most amenable. But its domestic effects are negative, from the régime's standpoint, since it creates an impression among the Soviet people of relaxation of tension, and, by that very token, in fact encourages internal relaxation. Consequently, the domestic analogue of "peaceful co-existence" must be a "soft" policy, viz., the propaganda promises of the Soviet "new course" of Autumn, 1953. Since the leadership is probably more apprehensive than it need be of the possibility of popular opposition - for it cannot forget that it came to power as the result of the coup de main of a handful of men, and has not forgotten how much a few can do in such matters - it tends always to go to extremes in such propaganda campaigns. When, as a result, the propaganda takes hold, and large numbers of the populations come vaguely to expect a pay-off on the promises, the régime takes fright and hastens to reverse itself. It cannot, however, do this domestically, without doing it first on the international front, for the bogey of the "capitalist encirclement" is an indispensable prerequisite to the reintroduction of a "hard" domestic line.

5. Molotov's speech, together with the interviews granted by himself, Khrushchev, Zhukov, and Bulganin, and the propaganda campaign which has now been launched in the Soviet press, show clearly that the régime is moving rapidly back to the "hard" position in international relations, which it took during the years 1948-1952.

This is not to say that the régime will go the whole way in reviving the excesses of those years ("germ warfare", atrocities), for some of these were undoubtedly the result of a too doctrinaire application by Stalin of the political principles underlying this tactic. There will still be talk of "peaceful co-existence" (cf. Summary, paragraph 18). The régime definitely does not want a general war, and there are signs that it is anxious, while re-assuming the "hard" position, to allay Western fears on this score. What it does want is to re-create the hard and rigid definition between the "two camps" which existed in 1948-1952. This done, it can proceed, behind its Chinese wall, with a vast domestic programme of the "construction of Communism", with all that this entails in the way of privations for the Soviet and other subject peoples. To this end, the régime must now rehabilitate the theme of the "capitalist encirclement" to the degree which it deems essential in order to "convince" the subject peoples of the necessity for self-sacrifice and continued short commons.

While the régime does not want general war - far from it - we have no way yet of knowing whether or not it wants a limited, peripheral war à la Korea or Indo-China. Obviously, such a war is

the ideal way of bringing home to the subject peoples the threat of the "capitalist encirclement". There can be no doubt that the Chinese People's Republic's campaign against Formosa was undertaken with Soviet approval (although, here again, we do not yet know to what extent, and in what specific ways, the USSR has promised to back the CPR). This action has two aims: (a) the immediate one of embroiling the United States in the Far East, thereby distracting the attention of the rest of the world from more important things (Western Germany's inclusion in NATO and WEU, and its rearmament; the crisis in the Bolshevik hierarchy); and (b) the more general one of creating a clear-cut dividing line between the two blocs in the Far East.

The extent to which the USSR will support the CPR's effort depends upon the degree of importance which the Soviet leadership attaches to this latter aim, (b). There can be no doubt that the Chinese Communists believe it the more important of the two goals. We do not yet know to what extent the Soviet leadership shares this view, nor have we as yet any clear idea of how much leverage the CPR can exercise upon the USSR in order to bring the Soviet leadership fully into line with Chinese Communist views (see, however, Summary, paragraph 8, for what may be an indication of the present nature of Sino-Soviet relations).

6. If these considerations are correct, the implications of Molotov's speech, and of the accompanying materials which illustrate the change in Soviet foreign policy, may be summarised as follows.

I. The change in Soviet foreign policy means:

- (a) that the Soviet leadership has, to all intents and purposes, relegated "peaceful co-existence" to the status of a peripheral propaganda theme;
- (b) that the Soviet leadership is re-casting the tactics of its international-political strategy in terms of the rigid "two camps" thesis of the years 1948-1952;
- (c) that it is now unlikely that the Soviet Union will engage in negotiations with the West on outstanding unsettled questions (German re-unification, Austria). The USSR, of course, has a price for its agreement to enter such negotiations: abandonment of the Paris Agreements and of Western European Union, and conclusion of a Soviet-style "collective security" pact; but the Soviet leaders probably mean it when they say that they will not enter four-power talks if the Paris Agreements are ratified;
- (d) that the new "hard" policy is being introduced primarily for domestic Soviet politico-economic reasons.

II. The change in Soviet foreign policy does not mean:

- (a) that the Soviet leadership now regards the danger of the outbreak of general war as more imminent than it was during the "peaceful co-existence" period of 1953-1954;
- (b) that the Soviet leadership will now engage in a more aggressive international-political policy,

of the "forward" type of 1947-1948;

- (c) that the Soviet leadership will take any steps which it would regard as likely to lead to the outbreak of general war;
- (d) that the current switch in foreign policy was dictated by the failure of Western governments to "grasp the outstretched hand" of G.M. Malenkov.*

III. We do not yet know:

- (a) how far the Soviet leadership will go in re-creating the "deep freeze" relationship which obtained between the Soviet bloc and the Free World during 1948-1952. This will depend to a great extent upon the development of the Soviet internal situation, and, to a lesser extent, upon developments in the international arena;
- (b) how far, and in what ways, the Soviet leadership has committed itself to support the Chinese Communists in the first practical application of the new "hard" line: the Formosa campaign;
- (c) how far the Chinese Communists intend to go in the Formosa campaign (although the presumption is justified that they will, if they can, go the limit);
- (d) to what extent the Chinese Communists are capable of bringing the Soviet leadership to lend greater support to their Formosa effort.

RD/em

* It is rather difficult to see on just which points Malenkov's hand was "outstretched".

MOLOTOV'S REPORT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF 8th FEBRUARY, 1955

A SUMMARY

Molotov's foreign policy report of 8th February to the Supreme Soviet may be summarised as follows.

1. The report takes the form of an analysis of the international situation in terms of the "correlation of forces" between the "capitalist encirclement" (i.e., the Free World) and the "camp of socialism, democracy, and peace...headed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic". Molotov finds that this correlation has changed over the past ten years to the advantage of the latter. The "capitalist encirclement" has been correspondingly weakened. This analysis is strengthened by a revival of the theme of "the general crisis of capitalism".

The weakening of the "capitalist encirclement" constitutes both a symptom and an aggravation of a new phase in this "general crisis". It is a symptom of the "crisis" in that, since the end of World War II, the "capitalist" world has lost significant component parts (China, India, Indonesia, Burma, etc.), while, in the remaining dependent and semi-colonial areas, unrest is growing and the peoples are engaging increasingly in "national-liberational struggles". Simultaneously, the weakening of the "capitalist encirclement" aggravates the "general crisis of capitalism" in that the "capitalists" are, as a result of the weakening, forced to undertake frantic efforts to restore their authority over the dependent and semi-colonial peoples, and, simultaneously, to attempt to go over to the offensive against the "socialist [i.e., Communist] camp".

Molotov cites as an example of this latter type of effort the Berlin riots of June, 1953, which, he says, were organized by the United States and West-German "ruling circles".

Opposing these frantic attempts of the "capitalists" are the USSR and the "camp of peace", which endeavour to reduce international tension. An example of this sort of reduction is the Geneva Conference, which resulted in the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as one of the five great powers, and in the ending of hostilities in Indo-China.

But every effort by the "peace camp" to reduce international tension is immediately countered by the "imperialists", led by the United States. Thus, the US called the Manila Conference and set up the South-East Asian Treaty Organization, which is an aggressive pact directed against the CPR, in order to overcome the reduction in tension achieved at Geneva, and to restore the strained situation which had prevailed before Geneva.

Molotov then proceeds (a) to sum up the world "correlation of forces" in a global tour d'horizon, which shows the great strength of the "camp of peace" and its allies, and (b) to demonstrate the aggressive nature of United States foreign policy.

He lays out the steps which the USSR proposes to take in order to make "the aggressive circles...behave themselves more calmly".

Molotov declares that "contradictions" exist among, and within, the countries of the "capitalist" world, and says: "Our task is to make use of these contradictions, in the interests of supporting

and strengthening peace in the interests of weakening the aggressive anti-democratic forces".

This statement of Molotov and the analysis which precedes it in his speech represent a revival of the analysis provided by Stalin in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". According to Stalin, it was the goal of the "peace" movement to prevent the outbreak of war between the "capitalist" and "socialist" camps, and thus to provide time for the "ripening" of "contradictions" within the capitalist world. The end-result of this process should be wars between the capitalist countries.

Molotov concludes by re-affirming, although somewhat perfunctorily, the Soviet desire for "peaceful co-existence...over an entire historical period".

In the course of his analysis, Molotov makes the following specific points:

2. Formosa: Molotov formally brings the position of the USSR into line with that of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). The Formosa question is an internal Chinese affair. The UN must unconditionally condemn US aggression against the CPR, and the US must withdraw from Formosa and the Straits. These are the conditions for peace in the Far East.

3. Germany: Following the line developed by the USSR since the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in October, 1954, Molotov says that ratification of the Agreements "would render impossible for a long period the re-establishment of German unity". Only the abandonment of the Paris Agreements, and the achievement of agreement among the four occupying powers would make it possible to hold free all-German elections for the purpose of restoring German unity.

4. Austria: Molotov dwells at some length on the conditions for conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. His treatment of the question, however, comes down simply to the dependence of the Austrian question upon solution of the German question. Since solution of the latter has already been made dependent upon abandonment of the Paris Agreements, solution of the Austrian question, in turn, depends upon rejection of the Paris Agreements.

However, Molotov's treatment of the Austrian question obviously is consciously designed to confuse Western, and, no doubt, particularly Austrian, opinion. Thus, he begins by saying that it would be possible to withdraw the occupation forces from Austria before definitive settlement of the German question, provided that any possibility of an Austro-German Anschluss were precluded (which, however, as Molotov also makes clear, means: provided that the Paris Agreements are abandoned). Secondly, Austria must obligate itself - and the occupying powers must guarantee this obligation - not to form military alliances against the Soviet Union and/or those satellites which participated in the war against Germany, or in the liberation of Austria, with their armed forces. Thirdly, a four-power conference on Germany, which would also consider the Austrian problem, should immediately be convoked. But this, as we have seen, is the Soviet alternative to the Paris Agreements, and presumes their abandonment by the West. Ergo, any action on Austria by the Soviet Union is conditional upon Western abandonment of the Paris Agreements.

5. "COMTO": For the first time, Molotov specifically declares that if the Paris Agreements are ratified, the USSR and its seven European satellites (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary,

Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania) will conclude a multilateral mutual-defence treaty, and will establish a unified military command (Supreme Commander: Marshal Zhukov?). The threat developed by the Moscow Conference (29th November-2nd December, 1954), that a "Communist Treaty Organization" ("COMTO") would be set up in answer to ratification of the Paris Agreements, is thus made explicit. It is still not clear whether "COMTO" would make the projected "Eastern European Union" of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany superfluous, or whether "EEU" would be a component part of "COMTO". In any event, Molotov says that, in order not to waste time, conversations on the establishment of "COMTO" are now in progress.

Behind this threat of "COMTO" lies, less clearly defined (as was the case with the threat of "COMTO" between the Moscow Conference and Molotov's Supreme Soviet report), the further threat of the creation of a twelve-state military alliance, to consist of the USSR, the seven European satellites, the CPR, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam (i.e., Viet-minh), and the Mongolian People's Republic. On this point, Molotov says only that the twelve "will be compelled to unite their forces to safeguard their security if the aggressive plans, which are intended to assist the restoration of German militarism and to prepare an attack on peace-loving countries, are pursued".

6. India, Indonesia and Burma: Molotov pays particular attention to India, whose "international authority is rising ever more greatly", and associates Indonesia and Burma with India as a group of countries whose interests coincide with those of the "great camp of peace, socialism and democracy". In this connection, he describes the Conference of thirty Afro-Asian countries, which is to be held at Bandoeng, Indonesia, in April next, as a proof of "the positive changes which have taken place of late in Asia".

7. United Nations: In two references to the UN, Molotov adopts a strongly admonitory tone. In his treatment of the Formosan question, he says that the UN, "if it values its authority ... must unconditionally condemn" the "aggressive actions" of the United States, and that "The position that the Chinese People's Republic's lawful rights have not yet been restored in the UN, because of the resistance of the USA, can no longer be tolerated". In his treatment of the Soviet collective-security plan, Molotov says that members of NATO show, by the very fact of their membership of the "aggressive North Atlantic bloc", "how unprincipled is their attitude towards their participation in the UN, which was set up on the basis of the recognition of the principle of equal rights in this organization of all states, irrespective of their social order". This statement is obviously a mere pretext for an indirect attack upon the UN itself. It revives a theme of Soviet propaganda which has not been prominent during the "peaceful co-existence" interlude.

8. Mongolian People's Republic: It is interesting that Molotov, in his statement on the possibility of the formation of a twelve-state military alliance (cf. paragraph 5 above), mentions the Mongolian People's Republic by name. The MPR, or Outer Mongolia, which has been a tightly controlled Soviet satellite for some thirty years, has, in the past, received little, or no, specific attention in statements of Soviet leaders on foreign policy. The MPR has been passed over in silence, since it was, in effect, a closed Soviet preserve. Molotov now mentions it in the same breath as the Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam, thus giving it the status of a fully sovereign state. This could

possibly suggest the emergence of the MPR from unilateral Soviet control, and its assumption of the position of a buffer between the USSR and Communist China.

9. Reliability of the Soviet Army: Referring to the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, Molotov says: "If the aggressor received his deserts before, then he must not now forget the immeasurably increased might of the Soviet Union, and the fact that our Army has, for every one hundred men, seventy-seven Communists and Komsomols; and the Communists and Komsomols know particularly well how to defend the victories of Communism from aggressors".

This statement is interesting, in that Molotov seems to be referring by indirection to the situation of panic that developed in the Soviet Army following the Nazi attack in 1941, and to be warning the rest of the world that that sort of thing is no longer possible. Molotov's statement on the reliability of the Soviet Army need not be taken at face value.

10. The Hydrogen Bomb and Atomic War: On these points, Molotov says: "US aggressive circles have miscalculated once again. Only recently they supposed that they possessed an undoubted monopoly of the atomic weapon. Even the most far-sighted of them, in the first years after the war, considered that the Soviet Union would need at least ten to fifteen years to produce the atomic weapon, while the majority considered that much more time would be needed.....The matter has progressed so far that in the production of the hydrogen weapon, the Soviet people have achieved such a success that it is not the Soviet Union, but the USA, which is in the position of laggard".

Molotov's boast of Soviet superiority in hydrogen-bomb production harks back to the 15th June, 1954, speech, at Prague, of N.S. Khrushchev, who said: "We have given our country atomic energy, we have given it the atomic bomb. We even beat the capitalist camp to it, and created the hydrogen bomb before they had it".

On atomic war, Molotov says: "Any adventure connected with the unleashing of a new world war will inevitably end badly for the aggressor. What will perish will not be world civilization, however much it may suffer from a new aggression, but it will be that rotten social system with its imperialist basis soaked in blood, which is moribund and is being denounced for its aggressiveness and rejected because of the exploitation of the working people and of the oppressed peoples, that will perish".

This statement of Molotov represents a reversal of the line adopted by Malenkov in his election speech in Moscow on 12th March, 1954, in which he said: "There can be no doubt that the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons in war would mean incalculable misfortune for the peoples, the mass extermination of civilian populations, and the destruction of great cities: the centres of modern industry, culture and science, including the ancient centres of civilization, which are the great capitals of the states of the world", and "The Soviet Government stands for the further relaxation of international tension, for a firm and lasting peace, and decisively opposes the policy of cold war, for this policy is a policy of the preparation of a new world slaughter, which, given contemporary means of warfare, means the destruction of world civilization".

In his report to the Supreme Soviet, Molotov also says: "...the Soviet Union is not weaker than the United States of

America". This statement was followed by "stormy, prolonged applause".

11. NATO: Molotov describes NATO as "the North Atlantic grouping created by the Anglo-American bloc under the aegis of the US". He refers to the December Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council as an example of the way in which "war hysteria" is being whipped up in the West. "On 18th December, 1954, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spaak, during a press conference in Paris, while boasting slightly, made a statement that the decisions approved the day before by the Council of the North Atlantic bloc, gave the military just what they wanted. They asked for permission to prepare for atomic war. Permission was granted".

Molotov's reference to "the Anglo-American bloc" is somewhat at variance with the line used during the "peaceful co-existence" period, when Soviet propaganda was careful to separate the US and Britain.

12. The Balkan Pact and Yugoslavia: Molotov distinguishes the Balkan Pact from "military groupings" such as NATO. "In a position quite apart is the treaty between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, inasmuch as only two of its participants are members of NATO, and the third, Yugoslavia, is not a member of this bloc. However, the Balkan people cannot fail to show appropriate caution and care in this respect".

The basis for Molotov's distinction between NATO and the Balkan Pact is obvious. The USSR still regards Yugoslavia as a stray from the fold. Military alliances which contain a member not wholly committed to the Free World are, in Soviet eyes, quite different from "aggressive" NATO. By the same token, it will be remembered that the Soviet proposal to join NATO was presented as a means of transforming it from an "aggressive" into a "peace-loving" alliance.

Additionally, Molotov re-affirms the Soviet Union's policy of "normalisation of relations" with Yugoslavia, although he says that success in this effort depends upon Yugoslavia as much as upon the USSR.

13. Collective Security: Molotov re-affirms the Soviet position on the desirability of a European collective-security treaty. But this topic does not receive the prominence in his speech which it had in Soviet diplomatic efforts during November and December, 1954. While the USSR would, no doubt, still like to achieve the conclusion of such a treaty, Molotov's treatment of "collective security" appears to indicate that this proposal is no longer viewed by the Soviet leadership with the urgency of late 1954.

14. United Kingdom, France and Turkey: With regard to Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet relations, Molotov says: "The development of not bad relations with Britain and France, which began recently, struck a submerged rock, or, to be more precise, the Paris Agreements, with their plans for the restoration of aggressive German militarism". He then repeats the threats of the Soviet notes of 16th and 20th December, 1954, to France and Britain, that ratification of the Paris Agreements will mean the nullification of the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties.

Molotov adopts a somewhat analogous attitude towards Turkey, which, it will be remembered, had been the object of

friendlier Soviet gestures in late October, 1950. While maintaining that the Soviet aim remains the development of "good-neighbourly" relations, Molotov in effect writes Turkey off as an "arena of military manoeuvres and demonstrations of foreign, and especially of American, armed forces".

15. Norway and Finland: Finnish-Soviet relations are held up as a shining example of good relations between the USSR and neighbouring, non-Communist-bloc countries. Norway, on the contrary, is reproached for "having become one of the members of the aggressive NATO treaty".

16. Trade: Molotov deals with the problem of East-West trade in terms strongly reminiscent of the "International Economic Conference", organized by the USSR in Moscow on 3rd-12th April, 1952. The emphasis in his speech is on the necessity for opposing and breaking down the restrictive controls which have been imposed on trade between the two "world markets" by US "ruling circles". This contrasts with the line on trade developed during the "peaceful co-existence" interlude, when the emphasis was on development by the USSR of "businesslike trade relations" with individual non-Communist countries, and when the controls in force in the West were not a particular object of Soviet propaganda.

17. "Peaceful Co-existence": Molotov closes with a cursory reference to "peaceful co-existence...for a whole historical period" between the two opposed "camps". He had earlier given an equally casual nod to "honest economic competition between the capitalist and socialist systems". "After all", he remarked, "I should say nothing better could be imagined in the middle of the twentieth century".

In sum, the amount of space devoted to "peaceful co-existence" and allied themes is extremely small by comparison with the rest of Molotov's report, and his references to these subjects are off-hand and perfunctory.