


CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL



l.b.

1444



EXEMPLAIRE N° 290
COPY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
7th November, 1973

WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(73)38

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

THIRD REPORT ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS, POST-REDUCTIONS

Note by the Chairman of the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints

Attached is the Third Report on Movement Constraints for the MBFR Working Group's consideration.

2. The paper contains a technical examination of the movement constraints and non-circumvention measures as listed in paragraphs 29 and 30 of "The Alliance Approach to Negotiations on MBFR", C-M(73)83(Final).

3. This document will not be downgraded without a specific downgrading notice from the originator.

(Signed) W.M. GOOSSENS
Captain, RNLN

NATO,
1110 Brussels.

This document consists of: 8 pages

DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIEE - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

N A T O S E C R E T

-2-

AC/276-WP(73)38THIRD REPORT ON MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS, POST-REDUCTIONSINTRODUCTION

1. Starting in early 1970, a number of MBFR models on the scale and scope of reductions were developed. Hitherto, the Sub-Group on Movement Constraints has limited its studies to a pre-MBFR situation on the grounds that the conclusion of those studies were needed earlier and secondly that the Sub-Group did not possess the authority to approach the various possible reduction models.

TASK OF THE SUB-GROUP

2. On 14th August, 1973, the MBFR Working Group instructed(1) the SGMC to prepare a Working Paper to examine the technical aspects of the constraints and non-circumvention measures for the specific reduction options outlined in the Belgian(2), United Kingdom(2) and United States(3) papers, against the contingency that these options are adopted by the Council.

3. In view of the fact that these three papers have been superseded by the "Alliance Approach to Negotiations on MBFR"(4), we have decided to limit our examination to the movement constraint measures listed in that document(4).

4. This study examines only the movement constraints measures and non-circumvention measures contained in paragraphs 29 and 30 of that document(4), which the Alliance is to propose should accompany reductions applicable to United States and Soviet ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area.

5. The Pre-Reduction Stabilizing Measures listed in paragraph 23 of that document(4) has been the subject of a separate paper(5).

MOVEMENT CONSTRAINT OBJECTIVES

6. Movement Constraint Objectives in both pre- and post-reduction period were listed in the Second Report on Movement Constraints(6) and for ease of reference are listed below:

-
- (1) AC/276-WP(73)21(Revised), 17th August, 1973
 - (2) IMSWM-148-73, 1st August, 1973
 - (3) IMSM-337-73, 7th August, 1973
 - (4) C-M(73)83(Final), 18th October, 1973
 - (5) DCMCM-17-73, 31st October, 1973
 - (6) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), Chapter VII, 9th August, 1973

N A T O S E C R E T

-2-

N A T O S E C R E TAC/276-WP(73)38

-3-

- (a) Political Objectives: Pre-MBFR. AC/276-WP(72)27 listed the following as possible political objectives for movement constraints enforced prior to MBFR:
- (i) They could serve as a test for the readiness of the Warsaw Pact to discuss seriously force reductions and other security problems.
 - (ii) They could be instrumental in building confidence and could contribute to the improvement of relations and the spirit of détente.
 - (iii) They would be a means of making certain that basic problems related to MBFR, such as re-deployment capabilities, would be addressed prior to or together with reductions.
- (b) Military Objectives: Pre-MBFR. The following possible military objectives for movement constraints enforced prior to MBFR are listed in AC/276-WP(72)27:
- (i) They could be a deterrent to covert reinforcement and redeployment.
 - (ii) They could provide a means of receiving at an earlier stage more information of intended aggression.
 - (iii) They could act as a yardstick for correct and timely interpretation by NATO of military measures taken by the Warsaw Pact.
 - (iv) They could help to mitigate the effects of the Warsaw Pact geographic advantage.
 - (v) They could provide a means of reducing to a certain degree the military advantage of the Warsaw Pact with regards to the flanks.
- (c) Political and Military Objectives: Post-MBFR. The political and military objectives for movement constraints for a pre-MBFR situation, outlined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above, would remain valid post-MBFR. However, the following additional objectives(1) would apply in such a period:
- (i) They should facilitate verification of agreements on reductions in and withdrawals from the Reductions Area.

(1) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised), Chapter VII

N A T O S E C R E T

-3-

N A T O S E C R E T

-4-

AC/276-WP(73)38

- (ii) They should provide an effective political deterrent to military movement, into the Reductions Area.
- (iii) They should help to confirm the observance of any de facto or de jure force limitation agreement instituted as a result of an MBFR convention.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

7. In carrying out this study on post-MBFR movement constraints, the Sub-Group will take into account the contents of the following documents:

- (a) The First Report on Movement Constraints(1).
- (b) The Second Report on Movement Constraints(2).
- (c) The SHAPE's Assessment of the "United States Approach to MBFR"(3) and the MBFR Working Group Report on this Assessment(4).

FACTORS

8. In proposing movement constraints pre-MBFR(5), the Sub-Group aimed not only to fulfil the objectives listed in paragraphs 6(a) and (b) above, but also to ensure that NATO's security was not jeopardised. The latter was relatively easy to ensure since NATO's movement requirements were known both for normal peacetime conditions and for periods of increased tension short of an emergency.

9. In a post-MBFR situation, however, NATO's movement requirements are not yet clear since they are subject to the following considerations which are not yet agreed:

- (a) The scale of reductions and consequently the scale of residual forces.
- (b) The composition of reductions in the two phases proposed in the "Alliance Approach to Negotiations in MBFR"(6).

-
- (1) AC/276-D(72)4
 - (2) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised) and AC/276-WP(73)16/1
 - (3) AC/276-WP(73)18
 - (4) AC/276-D(73)3
 - (5) AC/276-D(72)4; AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised); AC/276-WP(73)16/1
 - (6) C-M(73)83(Final)

N A T O S E C R E T

-4-

N A T O S E C R E TAC/276-WP(73)38

-5-

- (c) The method by which reduction agreements are to be implemented, e.g. by thin-out, withdrawal of complete units, pre-positioning of equipment or disbandment.
- (d) The deployment of the residual forces.
- (e) The reinforcement capabilities and mobilisation rates of the two sides.

10. Furthermore, full account must be taken of SHAPE's stated requirement(1), paragraph 26(b) that "it follows that reciprocal movement constraints will be advantageous to NATO if the constraints for movements from outside the NATO Guidelines Area are made as tight as possible and within the NGA they are made as loose as possible".

POST-MBFR MOVEMENT CONSTRAINT MEASURES LISTED IN
C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 29

General

11. As only Phase 1 reductions are precise (see paragraph 27 of C-M(73)83(Final)) as applicable to both sides, we limit our study for the time being to this Phase alone though we will take into account that a Phase 2 will follow in which reductions will be applicable to the forces of all eleven direct participants in MBFR.

12. The Phase 1 reductions proposed are:

- (a) On NATO's side - 29,000 United States soldiers, whose composition is not yet known, to be withdrawn to the United States.
- (b) On the Warsaw Pact side - 68,000 Soviet soldiers, which must include one tank army of five divisions, plus army troops, complete with their equipment, to be withdrawn to the USSR.

13. The three post-reduction movement constraints proposed in paragraph 29 of the "Alliance Negotiations" document(2) are:

- (a) Limitations on movements of forces into the area.
- (b) Limitations on movements of forces across national boundaries within the area (proposals by the East for application of these constraints to other NATO forces or for formulations which would imply automatic application of such constraints in second phase reductions should be rejected).

(1) AC/276-WP(73)18
(2) C-M(73)83(Final)

N A T O S E C R E T

-6-

AC/276-WP(73)38

- (c) Notification, without advance warning, of major movements of forces within the area.

We examine each of these measures in turn.

Limitations on Movements of Forces into the Area

14. The "Area" concerned is the NATO Guidelines Area. The only forces which could be affected are on the NATO side, the United States, Canada, United Kingdom (and Denmark and France) and on the Warsaw Pact side, the USSR (and Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania). Phase 1 reductions, however, are to be confined to the United States and USSR forces alone so we assume that this movement constraints measure is to be confined only to these two forces.

15. The movement requirements of United States forces into the NATO Guidelines Area are:

- (a) Up to a level of 3 brigades at one time for participation in exercises(1).
- (b) In a pre-MBFR situation in times of tension the movement of 2 dual-based Category A brigades(1).
- (c) In a post-MBFR situation in times of tension these 2 dual-based brigades PLUS any additional brigades withdrawn to the United States as a result of an MBFR agreement (we assume this will not amount to more than 4 United States brigades). This amounts to a maximum total of 6 brigades.

16. Theoretically, therefore, a figure of 6 brigades could without disadvantage to NATO be substituted for the 11 brigades which under the movement constraint measures set out in paragraph 10(b) of our First Report(1) represents the maximum permitted to enter the Guidelines Area on a temporary reinforcement basis. There could, however, be advantages for NATO to retain the figure of 11 brigades(1) for reasons of negotiability and of possible impact on Phase 2. Indeed there is a case on these lines for increasing the figure from this pre-MBFR figure of 11 brigades to the post-Phase 1 of MBFR figure of 15 brigades, i.e. the previous 11 brigades, plus up to 4 United States brigades withdrawn in Phase 1.

(1) AC/276-D(72)4

N A T O S E C R E T

-6-

N A T O S E C R E TAC/276-WP(73)38

-7-

17. The above figures deal only with the brigaded elements of reinforcements due to enter the Guidelines Area. They do not put any constraints on either unit reinforcements which do not form part of a brigade (or Warsaw Pact regiment) or on the very large number of individual reinforcements (whose movements it might be impracticable to observe or verify(1)). Further study of this issue, incorporating political guidance, is urgently required.

Limitations on Movements across National Boundaries within the Area

18. The bulk of the United States ground forces are located within the FRG and are unlikely to need to cross national boundaries in the Guidelines Area (whether by air or land) except for purposes of training or rotation. The Soviet forces, on the other hand, are deployed throughout the Guidelines Area with a large proportion in the GDR. There may be political reasons for constraining the use of these Soviet forces from taking part in internal security operations in those NSWP countries in which they are not now deployed. There would also be considerable military advantage(2) in constraining the movement of Soviet forces from Poland to the GDR or from Eastern Czechoslovakia to the GDR, or of superimposing on the measure proposed in paragraph 13(a) above further constraints on the entry into the GDR of Soviet forces from the USSR.

19. However, although there could be military advantages to NATO for proposing this measure for application as a post-Phase 1 MBFR movement constraint, this would not be the case for Phase 2, for the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 89-90 of Chapter V of the Second Report(2).

Notification, Without Advance Warning, of Major Movements within the Area

20. It has already been agreed that there would be no technical disadvantage to NATO(3) in notification without advance warning of all major movements (one brigade or more) within the Guidelines Area. This assessment was approved by the Military Committee(4). There should, therefore, be no military disadvantage to NATO from confining this measure to United States and USSR forces only in Phase 1. However, our first report(3) has never received political study, let alone endorsement, and there could be some political disadvantage to the adoption of this measure to accompany or follow Phase 1 or Phase 2 reductions.

-
- (1) AC/276-WP(70)35(Revised), paragraph 29(b) of Annex, and paragraph 18 of Appendix D to Annex
(2) AC/276-WP(73)16/1
(3) AC/276-D(72)4
(4) MC-45-72

N A T O S E C R E T

-7-

N A T O S E C R E T

-8-

AC/276-WP(73)38Other Stabilizing Measures Post-MBFR

21. Paragraph 30 of the Allied Negotiations document(1) sets out four additional measures in the movement constraint or non-circumvention field which we have discussed before.

22. Provision to Prevent Soviet Withdrawn Forces from being relocated in the 3 WMDs or Near the Flanks. We suggested methods by which such relocation could be prevented in our Second Report(2) as follows:

- (a) 3 WMDs - Chapter VI, Section 3.
- (b) Northern Flank - Chapter II.
- (c) Southern Flank - Chapter III.

23. Pre-reductions Stabilizing Measures in Southern Flank Area. This was discussed in Chapter VI, Section 2.

24. Stabilizing Measures for Parts of the Leningrad MD. See Chapter VI, Section 1.

25. Other Stabilizing Measures to accompany Reduction. The MBFR Working Group examined the implications of applying constraints, including non-circumvention provisions, in the case of Hungary, in their paper(3) which was later agreed by the Military Committee(4). The SGMC discussed one type of non-circumvention agreement for the 3 WMDs in Chapter VI, Section 3.

-
- (1) C-M(73)83(Final)
 - (2) AC/276-WP(73)16(Revised) and AC/276-WP(73)16/1
 - (3) AC/276-D(73)2
 - (4) IMSWM-158-73

N A T O S E C R E T