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WORKING PAPER
AC/276-WP(71)15/7

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS WORKING GROUP

DRAFT COMPENDIUM OF MBFR MATERIAL

(1.5.1967 - 1.8.1971)

Note by the Staff Group

1. Attached is a new addendum to the draft Compendium of MBFR material, covering the period 1.6.1971 - 1.8.1971.
2. The following amendments are to be made:

<u>Old pages to be removed</u>	<u>New pages to be inserted</u>
-	I.7-2, I.7-3
-	II.1-14
II.3-4	II.3-4
II.4-8	II.4-8, II.4-9
II.5-1	II.5-1, II.5-2
III.2-3	III.2-3
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This document consists
of 2 pages and an
Enclosure of 30 pages

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Old pages to
be removed

New pages to
be inserted

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XVIII-24, XVIII-25, XVIII-26

3. Pen and ink correction:

At page I.6-1 in Para 3 amend last word of second line from "pledged" to "pledged".

4. This document is automatically downgraded to NATO RESTRICTED upon removal of the enclosure.

(Signed) E. L. ROWNY
Lieutenant General, USAR

NATO,
1110 Brussels

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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND (contd)

7. The Communiqué of Lisbon (1971) (contd)

4.6.1971 MI-(71)1/7 Final Communiqué of the N.A. Council meeting in Ministerial Session in Lisbon on 3rd and 4th June, 1971.

Para 9. Ministers, having reviewed etc. In this spirit they invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue, in the framework of its normal consultations on the international situation, its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to security and co-operation in Europe so that it could without delay take a position on the opening of multilateral talks.

Para 10. In anticipation of these multilateral contacts, the Council in Permanent Session actively pursued preparations for discussions on the substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations, and submitted a report to this effect to Ministers.etc.

Para 11. Ministers noted these studies and instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue them, pending the initiation of multilateral contacts between East and West. Ministers stressed that they would press on with their bilateral exploratory conversations with all interested states.

Para 13. The Allied Governments which issued the declarations at Reykjavik in 1968 and Rome in 1970 and which subscribed to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Brussels Communiqué of 1970 have consistently urged the Soviet Union and other European countries to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions. They reaffirmed that the reduction of the military confrontation in Europe - at which MBFR is aiming - is essential for increased security and stability.

Para 15. In an effort to determine whether common ground exists on which to base negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, these Ministers expressed the agreement of their Governments to continue and intensify explorations with the Soviet Union and also with other interested Governments on the basis of the considerations outlined in paragraph 3 of the Rome Declaration. They expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations. To this end these Ministers agreed that Deputy Foreign Ministers or High Officials should meet at Brussels at an early date to review the results of the exploratory contacts and to consult on substantive and

CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND (cont'd)

7. The Communiqué of Lisbon (1971) (cont'd)

procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions.

Para 16. These Ministers further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives, who would be responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and the other interested Governments and eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations on MBFR.

14.6.1971

PO/71/281. Note by Secretary General.

Follow-up to the Ministerial Meeting.

In the wake of the Lisbon meeting, the International Staff has reviewed the Communiqué and records, and in the light of this review, the Secretary General puts forward a programme for the Council's future studies and consultation as follows:

- East-West negotiations: conform paras 9 and 11 of the Communiqué;
- MBFR: conform para 15 of the Communiqué.
The SPC and the MBFR WG were to be instructed to address themselves to those elements in the Progress Report C-M(71)33(Revised) which are relevant to para 15 of the Communiqué. In particular Chapter VI of C-M(71)33(Revised) contains a wide range of subjects for further MBFR studies. Mention was made by some Ministers, of the need to pursue the Alliance's internal work programme, to define the principles to be applied in any MBFR negotiation, and to work out an integral MBFR negotiating programme
- The Mediterranean: conform para 12 of the Communiqué.

19.7.1971

C-M(71)49. (A revised version appeared 10.9.1971.
See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

1. Related Studies (contd)

- 9.6.1971 AC/276-WP(71)15 Draft Compendium of MBFR Material, compiled by the Staff Group, on the basis of the draft outline in AC/276-WP(71)12
- 14.6.1971 PO/71/281 Note by Secretary General. Follow-up to the Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon.
Para 8: Chapter VI of C-M(71)33(Revised), in particular, contains a wide range of subjects for further MBFR studies. No guidance specifically related to this paper was given in Lisbon, but mention was made by some Ministers, in the course of the debates, of the need to pursue the Alliance's internal work programme, to define the principles to be applied in any MBFR negotiation, and to work out an integral MBFR negotiating programme.
- 30.6.1971 AC/276-R(71)7 Action sheet after MBFR.WG meeting on 23 June 1971.
III. Draft Compendium of MBFR Material.
The Working Group: (2) requested the Staff Group to continue to compile the compendium along the lines of AC/276-WP(71)15; (3) invited delegations to notify any omission to the Staff Group.
- 15.7.1971 AC/276-WP(71)15 (Revised) Revised Draft Compendium of MBFR Material.
- 23.7.1971 Nr — — United States study.
MBFR: Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.

This "synopsis" of general MBFR studies addresses the following subjects:

- I. Framework for the analysis
- II. Methodology
- III. The effects of MBFR on the Ground Forces Balance in the Central Region
- IV. Illustrative Ground Forces Models
- V. The effects of MBFR on Tactical Air Capabilities
- VI. Tactical Nuclear Weapons
- VII. Selective or "Mixed Package" Models
- VIII. Collateral Constraints
- IX. Implications of MBFR for NATO's ability to deter Pact attacks
- X. Monitoring and Verifying MBFR.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

3. Relative Force Capabilities (RFC) (contd)

- (5) agreed that the requirement for work on the RFC study, including Phase III as originally conceived, should be concluded with this present report, except for revision of statistical tables and maintenance of the Data Base (see this Compendium, Ch. II.4)

29.7.1971

DRC/N(71)18. Note by Chairman Defence Review Committee RFC(WG)N(71)1. and Working Group on RFC.

Data requirements of RFC and MBFR studies and of Defence Review Committee's designated tasks in the follow-on work on the AD-70 study.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

4. The Data Base (contd)

- 4.5.1971 1775/71/APA/KB Note by Norwegian Delegation. Comments on AC/276-WP(71)3, Data on NATO and WP Ground and Air forces.
- 9.6.1971 IMSM-275-71 Memorandum by Director, IMS. Build-up model for the Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite ACE. (See also this Compendium, Chapter XI).
- 11.6.1971 AC/276-WP(71)16 Note by Staff Group (MBFR.WG). Strengths of NATO National forces in Europe.

So far MBFR studies used NATO strength figures, excluding certain elements of national forces (e.g. recruits and certain other trainees) and taking no account of reserves. This could prove embarrassing for NATO in any negotiations on MBFR and could excite distrust.

Para 5: It is considered that it might be appropriate:

- (a) to retain the existing arrangements for production and maintenance of the NATO MBFR data base, restricting it to forces declared to NATO;
- (b) to seek national agreement to provide to HQ NATO, separately and at regular intervals, statements of embodied strengths of national forces in the European theatre excluded from DPQ answers, and indicating the nature of their employment or commitment;
- (c) to seek national views on the feasibility of providing figures of reserve, territorial or local defence reserve forces excluded from both (a) and (b) above.

- 30.6.1971 AC/276-R(71)7 MBFR.WG action sheet ref. meeting on 23 June 1971

II. The Data Base: The Working Group (1) had before it a note by the Staff Group AC/276-WP(71)16 on strengths of NATO national Forces in Europe; (2) agreed that the Data Base maintained by the Defence Planning and Policy Division of the International Secretariat was adequate for further MBFR studies and that any specific questions in connection with the Data Base should be addressed to the DFP Div/IS rather than to the Staff Group.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

4. The Data Base (contd)

29.7.1971 DRC/N(71)18 Note by Chairman Defence Review
 RFC(WG)N(71)1 Committee and Working Group on Relative
 Force Capabilities of NATO and WP.
Data requirements of RFC and MBFR studies and of Defence
Review Committee's designated tasks in the follow-on work
on the AD 70 study.

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

5. Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact

22.3.1971 AC/276-WP(71)9 Note by United States member MBFR.WG.
Elements of possible MBFR agreements.

Chapter D. Provisions regarding mobilisation and Reinforcement capabilities.

Para 21. The relative NATO/Pact mobilisation and reinforcement capabilities are the most important determinants of military capabilities over time in the Center Region. In general, both sides have a substantial capability to mobilise while the USSR has a clear advantage in reinforcement.

- The Pact can build a force in the Center Region of 80-85 divisions in about 10 days but would probably take three weeks for full mobilisation and integration, etc.
- Most of the manpower and almost all of the equipment the West Europeans plan to contribute to NATO could be mobilised within 15 days after the appropriate NATO countries have made the necessary political decisions, etc.

23.7.1971 Nr. — — . United States study on MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.

I.3, page 4. Mobilisation and Reinforcement.
This analysis of MBFR in the Central Region reveals the over-riding significance of mobilisation and reinforcement capability. Although NATO plans to mobilise military manpower as rapidly as the Warsaw Pact, the Pact has an advantage over NATO in the mobilisation/reinforcement assessment used in the analysis because the Pact is credited with reinforcing with men in combat formations and equipment (especially tanks but excluding medium and heavy anti-tank weapons) more rapidly and in larger numbers than NATO is credited with doing in the first 30 days. Also, it is estimated that in certain circumstances, NATO mobilisation might lag 7 to 14 days behind a Pact mobilisation.

The Pact could prepare low strength (Category II) and cadre (Category III) units for movement to the forward area within days despite the fact that these

CHAPTER II: STUDIES SINCE 1 JANUARY 1968 (contd)

5. Mobilisation of NATO and Warsaw Pact (contd)

units normally lack a sizeable amount of men and trucks. In the first 21 days of mobilisation, the Pact can increase its combat-ready forces in the Central Region from 45 divisions with 11.813 tanks to 81 divisions (83 if two small Polish divisions - one amphibious, one airborne - are counted) with 19.901 tanks. Equally there is a substantial increase in the number of aircraft in the same period.

This study elaborates on Mobilisation in more detail in Chapter III, section 1.

CHAPTER III: GUIDANCE (contd)

2. Guidelines and Principles (contd)

- Qualitative and quantitative criteria for measuring force capabilities (yardsticks).
- The nature and scope of reductions.
- Symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions.
 - Unequal percentages.
 - Asymmetrical mixes of forces.
 - Nuclear vs conventional forces.
 - Verification

Annex I - Preliminary military views on the draft Council report on the Study of BFR - [MCM-90-69].

Annex II - The Soviet attitude to the idea of BFR.

19.7.1971 C-M(71)49

(A revised version appeared 10.9.1971
See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).

CHAPTER IV: MODELS (contd)

- 14.7.1970 PO/70/334 Note by the Secretary General.
Revised Technical Studies on MBFR.
4.8.1970 Summarising SPC's discussions on a set of points outlined
in POLADS(70)27 and two unofficial U.K. working papers,
and putting forward proposals for a Council decision.
- 17.8.1970 C-R(70)43 Summary record Council meeting
12.8.70, para 18. The Council, noting
the points made in discussion and subject to a reservation
by the United States, approved the proposals contained in
PO/70/334(Revised) for further studies on MBFR.
- 10.9.1970 AC/276-WP(70)22 Note by UK member of MBFR.WG.
MBFR: Model Analysis.
I. Introduction. II. Main assessment.
III. Possible modifications.
- 10.9.1970 AC/276-WP(70)23 Note by UK member of MBFR.WG.
MBFR: NATO Security Criteria.
Para 6 the main question to be asked in respect
of the security implications of a given MBFR scheme
would be whether, following its implementation, NATO
would be likely in the face of a major WP conventional
attack to need to have recourse to the use of nuclear
weapons earlier in time, or later in terms of NATO
territory conceded, than at present.
- 23.7.1971 Nr. --- United States study on MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and
Implications (Synopsis).
IV. Illustrative Ground Forces Models.
There are 3 basic questions which must be answered when
evaluating MBFR options:
1. How do reductions affect the military balance of the
residual forces prior to reinforcement?
2. How do reductions affect the mobilisation and
reinforcement capability of both sides?
3. What effect do resultant changes in mobilisation
and reinforcement capability have on the military
balance after reinforcement?

(See next page)

CHAPTER IV: MODELS (contd)

This section attempts to answer these questions through examination of changes in static force ratio comparisons of total manpower, divisional manpower and tanks. For illustrative purposes this analysis will examine both symmetrical and asymmetrical comprehensive reduction models applied in the "NATO Guidelines Area".

a. Static Force Ratio Analysis, Symmetrical Reduction Models.

- Case A: a 10% reduction of all ground forces.
- Case B: a 10% reduction of stationed forces only.
- Case C: a 30% reduction of all forces.
- Case D: a 30% reduction of stationed forces only.

b. Asymmetrical Models.

- Case E: a 10% NATO - 30% Pact asymmetrical reduction of all forces
- Case F: a common ceiling
- Case G: a fixed ratio ceiling.

CHAPTER V: THE RISK ASSESSMENT (contd)

- 8.4.1971 IMSWM-80-71 Memorandum by Director IMS.
IMS Report on SACEUR's Risk Assessment
- 4.5.1971 AZ.03-11-15-11 Note by German MILREP.
German comments on SACEUR's Risk
Assessment of Selected Models.
- 5.5.1971 UKM-54-71 Memorandum by United Kingdom MILREP.
UK comments on SACEUR's Risk Assessment.
- 2.6.1971 UKM-64-71 Memorandum by United Kingdom MILREP.
UK comments on SACEUR's Risk Assessment.
- 17.6.1971 IMSWM-135-71 Memorandum by Director IMS.
Revised draft MC comments on SACEUR's
Risk Assessment. (Supersedes IMSWM-80-71)
- 22.6.1971 IMSWM-135-71 Memorandum by Director IMS.
(Revised) Revised draft MC comments on SACEUR's
Risk Assessment. (Supersedes IMSWM-80-71)
- 2.7.1971 MCM-43-71 Report by the Military Committee.
Examination of SACEUR's Risk Assessment.
The MC has examined report SHAPE 23/71, dated 28 Feb 70, on
the technical analysis and assessment of risk in respect of
symmetrical reductions at 10% and, for the asymmetrical
model, of a 5% reduction in NATO forces and 10% reduction
in Warsaw Pact forces.
Para 5. We have considered, in consultation with SHAPE,
the implications of the lessons learned in the analysis of
the 5% NATO - 10% WP phase of the asymmetrical model to the
higher phases of that model. Extrapolation of the analysis
to Phase III (10% v. 30%) and calculation of the effects in
numerical terms show that a 30% reduction for WP and 10% for
NATO would have the result of reducing the available Warsaw
Pact ground forces at the onset of hostilities to 41.½
Divisions opposed to 18.½ NATO Divisions.
Conclusions.
Para 10. It emerges clearly from SHAPE's report that mutual
and balanced force reductions on the narrow pattern of the
models studied can only operate to the detriment of NATO's
military security and, if effected, may require a re-
examination of the current strategy as defined in NC 14/3.

(See next page)

CHAPTER V: THE RISK ASSESSMENT (contd)

If reductions are to be militarily tolerable, means must be found of neutralising or reducing the military advantages accorded to the Warsaw Pact by their geographic situation and their possession of the initiative.

Para 11. We further conclude that, to preserve NATO's security post-MBFR, it would be prudent to seek a solution along the following lines:

- a. The balance and scale of forces in the area of reduction should be such as to cast serious doubts on the possible success of conventional armed attacks by either Warsaw Pact or NATO, and hence inhibit resort to such attack.
- b. Effective restraints or other means should be examined to offset the geographic advantages which the Warsaw Pact now possesses.
- c. The advantage of the initiative held by the Warsaw Pact should be minimised. The negotiation of adequate verification measures and other possible constraints could be of some advantage to this end.

Para 12. We recognise that the assessments of military risk associated with MBFR could change substantially with variations in warning times. In any foreseeable post-MBFR situation, the measures listed in para 11 could have an important influence on the warning time available to NATO preceding a Warsaw Pact attack.

CHAPTER VI: VERIFICATION (contd)

23.7.1971

Nr. — — . United States study on MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and
Implications.

This document is a synopsis of general MBFR studies.
Section X: Monitoring and verifying MBFR.

Verification of an MBFR agreement requires collection of information on the location, characteristics and activities of Warsaw Pact forces in the area covered by the agreement in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency to allow political judgements about the adherence of the other side to the agreement.

The intelligence agencies of the NATO member states are constantly engaged in collecting such information in order to satisfy their requirements for warning and order-of-battle intelligence.

Thus two central verification issues posed by MBFR are the following:

- what, if any, additional requirements for information would be imposed by any agreement? and
- what are the capabilities of the present, programmed and feasible collection systems available to NATO or its member states to satisfy these additional requirements?

These problems are elaborated in the following sections:

- A. The verification process.
- B. Current capability to monitor Warsaw Pact forces.
- C. Capability to verify detailed MBFR agreements.
- D. The effect of MBFR on warning intelligence.
- E. Possible features of an MBFR agreement which could enhance warning.

CHAPTER VIII: THE STATIONED FORCES CONCEPT (contd)

Annex B: Part I. Actual strengths of Forces in the Centre before MBFR.
Parts II and III. Remaining Actual Forces in the Centre after MBFR and a comparison of ratio pre- and post-MBFR.

- 17.5.1971 AC/276-WP(71)14 Note by Staff Group to MBFR.WG. The implications of reductions in foreign stationed forces.
See revised version, dated 1.6.1971.
- 1.6.1971 AC/276-WP(71)14 Note by Staff Group to MBFR.WG. Implications of reductions in foreign stationed forces.
(Revised)
See second revise, dated 7.7.1971.
- 30.6.1971 AC/276-R(71)7 Action sheet MBFR.WG meeting on 23 June 1971.
I. The Foreign Forces Concept: The Working Group (1) reviewed AC/276-WP(71)14(Revised) and (2) requested the Staff Group to prepare a second revision of this paper, taking account of the modifications agreed in discussion.
- 7.7.1971 AC/276-WP(71)14 Note by Staff Group to MBFR.WG. Implications of reductions in foreign stationed forces.
(2nd Revise)
With a Belgian Addendum of 3.8.1971.
See final paper AC/276-D(71)3, dated 7.9.1971.

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

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AG/276-WP(71)15/7

CHAPTER IX: THE PHASED INTEGRAL APPROACH (cont'd)
(Building Blocks)

19.7.1971

C-M(71)49

(A revised version appeared 10.9.1971.
See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).

N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

IX-2

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

- 14.6.1971 PO/71/281 Note by Secretary General.
Follow-up to the Ministerial Lisbon meeting.
On the subject of East-West negotiations, the Council in Permanent Session has to follow the instructions in paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Lisbon Communiqué.
- 16.6.1971 Nr. --- Note by Canadian Delegation.
A Soviet view on CES and Force Reductions.
Conversation between Mr. R. Ford, Canadian Ambassador in Moscow and Deputy Foreign Minister Rodionov.
Rodionov favoured the Helsinki formula and could not understand why the West was reluctant to use it. But it was time to start multilateral talks on at least procedural matters, preferably not on a bloc to bloc basis. The Soviet Government would be happy to see greater stress laid on a CES and cultural and economic questions, rather than such complicated matters as Berlin. We (the Soviets) are willing to talk; show us some concrete proposals. Contacts are good in any form and he personally saw no particular objection to receiving an (NATO) emissary. But he added that neither side must rush into something which was not properly prepared.
- 16.6.1971 Nr. 4108 Note by Belgian Delegation.
Instructions for the Belgian Ambassador in Moscow concerning Force Reductions.
In view of the various NATO statements, in particular in Rome on 27 May 1970 (para 3) and Mr. Brezhnev's statement at the 24th USSR Communist Party Congress on 30 March 1971, it would be advisable to put the following questions to the Soviet authorities:
- I. Questions of substance
1. Would the reductions apply to all forces, national as well as foreign?
 2. What does the term "foreign forces" mean? Does it refer exclusively to forces that do not belong to the country in which they are present?
 3. Would the reductions apply to the forces of all three services or only to some of them?
 4. Would the reductions apply to conventional and nuclear weapons alike?

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

5. Has the USSR a method in mind for determining the details of the reductions?
6. Once agreement has been reached, will it be necessary for the replacement of the weapons that remain, to take account of any qualitative improvement that might ensue?
7. Does the USSR envisage any collateral arrangements that might be linked with the agreement when it is reached (e.g. prior notification of manoeuvres and any major military movements)?
8. As the USSR has mentioned Central Europe, what countries or parts of countries would make up this area?
9. Assuming the reduction agreement covered only Central Europe, what arrangements has the USSR in mind so that the consequences of the reductions shall not be compromised by force increases elsewhere in Europe?
10. Since this is a disarmament measure, is it duly understood that the execution of undertakings must be verified?
11. Has the USSR already any ideas concerning the manner of verifying the undertakings given?
12. Could a first step be to set ceilings for personnel and armaments at their present levels?

II. Procedural questions

1. How does the USSR, knowing that the fourteen signatory countries to the Rome Declaration, and a number of neutral countries have already shown interest in force reductions, envisage the question of participation in negotiations, and in what form?
2. If preparations for negotiations on force reductions followed a different procedure from that for the preparations for the European Security Conference, would it not be necessary to ensure that at the final stage those questions should be dealt with in a single forum?
3. In view of the complexity of the problems, would it not be desirable that the negotiations should first be concerned with the examination of general principles and only subsequently extend to concrete details of reductions?

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

- 24.6.1971 Nr. — — — Letter from US Delegation to Ass.Sec.Gen. Pol. Affairs.
Conversation between the US Chargé d' Affaires, B. Klosson and the USA Division Chief Korniyenko of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow on 23 June 1971.
Korniyenko took a negative view of negotiations being conducted on a bloc.-to-bloc basis by representatives or a group of representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Instead he took the position that talks should be between states concerned in the area under discussion.
- 29.6.1971 POLADS(71)42 Memorandum by Chairman SPC.
Follow-up to the Lisbon Meeting.
Possible East-West negotiations.
Referring to paragraph 11 of the Lisbon Communiqué and expressing the desirability of arriving at a solution to the outstanding problems in connection with the substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations, this memorandum gives a list of questions along the lines of C-M(71)40(Revised) - see page X-13 of this Compendium - and advises the SPC to make arrangements for the drafting of the four Declarations/Agreements envisaged in C-M(71)40(Revised) as follows:
- a. Principles governing relations between States: to be drafted by the Political Committee at Senior Level.
 - b. Freer movement of people, ideas and information and cultural relations: by the Pol. Committee at ordinary level; special attention should be given to practical measures for the implementation of the Declaration/Agreement.
 - c. Economic co-operation: drafting to be undertaken by the Economic Committee.
 - d. Environment: by the Pol. Committee with the assistance of the CCMS, meeting at the level of members of delegations who are qualified in this field.

CHAPTER X: EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO MBFR (contd)

- 2.7.1971 Nr. 10-00-1 Note by German Delegation.
Conversation between Germany Deputy
Ambassador in Sofia and the Head of
Planning Division of the Bulgarian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Minchev, about the Lisbon
Communiqué.
- Bulgaria distinguishes between the following three groups:
- countries opposed to a CES, such as the United States and the United Kingdom;
 - countries which strongly advocated a CES, such as France, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries;
 - countries who had not yet taken any clear position.
- Mr. Minchev outlined the Eastern concept of a successful and realistic sequence of events at a CES:
- At first, the conclusion of agreements about which a consensus could be achieved within a short time, such as force renunciation;
 - in addition, agreements on economic, industrial, scientific-technical and cultural co-operation among the European countries;
 - creation of a permanent body which would be able to prepare substantive and procedural questions so that they could be decided at later conferences.
- 19.7.1971 C-M(71)49 (A revised version appeared 10.9.1971.
See 2nd revise, dated 24.9.1971).
- 20.7.1971 POLADS(71)45 Memorandum by Chairman Pol. Committee.
MBFR: Diplomatic talks during the
period from 30/3 to 30/6/1971.

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Movement Constraints, Collateral Constraints, etc.

- 5.12.1969 M.4(69)2 Final Communiqué of the N.A. Council in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 4 and 5 December 1969.
Declaration of the N.A. Council:
Para 7: Ministers also envisaged the possibility of other measures which could accompany or follow agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions. Such measures could include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres and possibly the establishment of observation posts.
- 27.2.1970 MCM-11-70 MILCOM Memorandum for Secretary General.
Preliminary Military Committee views on list of issues for possible negotiation with the East.
The following four issues are discussed:
a. Exchanges of observers at military manoeuvres.
b. Observation posts.
c. Advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres.
d. Prohibition of manoeuvres on borders.
(See also this Compendium, page VI-6).
- 22.3.1971 AC/276-WP(71)9 Note by United States member MBFR.WG.
Elements of possible MBFR agreements.
Chapter C.6. Collateral Constraints.
Para 17. Collateral constraints can be classified conceptually as to their intended effect:
- Measures which enhance our ability to verify an MBFR agreement (e.g. special observers to monitor reductions, aerial observation provisions).
- Measures which enable us to receive earlier, less ambiguous indications of Pact mobilisation and reinforcement (e.g. restrictions on troop movements across geographic areas, prior notification of exercises).
- Measures which actually impede/constrain mobilisation and reinforcement (e.g. requirements that reduced forces be disbanded and associated equipment destroyed).
Para 18 (some examples).
Para 19 (limiting the redeployment of forces).
Para 22 (constrain mobilisation and reinforcement capabilities of each side).
Paras 38/39 (collateral constraints on tactical aircraft).

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (cont'd)

Movement Constraints, Collateral Constraints, etc.

- 9.6.1971 IMSM-275-71. Memorandum by Director IMS.
Build-up model for the Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite ACE.
1. MOD Germany has been assigned the task of preparing a build-up model for the WP ground forces opposite ACE.
 2. The study was to be based on the MC.161 series.
 3. The study was to provide information on:
 - a. the estimated time in hours or days to bring WP ground forces to movement readiness in a condition to fight;
 - b. the estimated area to which these forces could be sent, if possible by country;
 - c. the movement time in hours or days it would take these forces to reach the front in combat ready form;
 - d. any alternative front or destination where forces might go.
 5.
 - a. The model constitutes the extreme case of a large-scale build-up.
 - b. For the purpose of this study, the term "build-up" is defined as the movement of forces from their permanent peacetime stations to concentration areas for the purpose of an attack.
- 2.7.1971 MCM-43-71. Report by the Military Committee.
Examination of SACEUR's Risk Assessment.
Para 11.b: Effective restraints or other means should be examined to offset the geographic advantages which the Warsaw Pact now possesses.
Para 11.g: The advantage of the initiative held by the Warsaw Pact should be minimised. The negotiation of adequate verification measures and other possible constraints could be of some advantage to this end.
- 23.7.1971. Nr. — —. United States study of MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.
This report is a synopsis of general MBFR studies.
Section VIII is devoted to "collateral constraints":
Collateral constraints can be classified conceptually as

CHAPTER XI: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (contd)

Movement Constraints, Collateral Constraints, etc.

to their intended effect:

- Measures which actually impede/constrain Pact mobilisation and reinforcement.
- Measures which enhance our ability to verify an MBFR agreement.
- Measures which enable us to receive earlier, less ambiguous indications of Pact mobilisation and reinforcement.

Selection of a constraint or set of constraints from these classifications to accompany an MBFR agreement would be made on the basis of what NATO is likely to gain in relation to its attendant cost and disadvantages vis-à-vis the current NATO/Pact force balance. Further, it is possible that the greater the number of restrictions placed on residual forces, the greater the possibility of inadvertent or minor "frictional" violations leading to increases in tension or worsening of relations.

In the following sections the above mentioned subjects are elaborated:

1. Measures which constrain mobilisation and reinforcement.
2. Measures which enhance verification capability and warning.

CHAPTER XIII: MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

22.3.1971 AC/276-WP(71)9. Note by United States member MBFR WG.
Elements of possible MBFR agreements.

Chapter H. Tactical aircraft as an element in an MBFR agreement.

1. The Base for aircraft reductions.
2. Arguments for and against reducing tactical aircraft in MBFR.
3. Methods of reducing tactical aircraft.
4. Collateral constraints.

23.7.1971 Nr. — United States study on MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.

This report is a synopsis of general MBFR studies. Section V is devoted to "The effects of MBFR reductions on Tactical Air capabilities".

Three illustrative reductions packages are examined:

1. A 10% reduction of numbers of stationed aircraft with supporting units, but not including airbases and other fixed facilities; such a reduction would be compatible with either a ground force reduction of 10% or a proportional cut of 30%.
2. A 30% reduction in stationed aircraft, with associated supporting units which would be compatible with a 30% ground forces cut.
3. A reduction of 20% of stationed NATO aircraft and 10% of stationed Pact aircraft; this might form part of a "quid pro quo" involving, for instance, extra tank reductions by the Pact.

CHAPTER XIV: NUCLEAR ASPECTS

15.7.1971

POLADS(71)48. Memorandum by Chairman Pol. Committee.
Soviet Government's call for conference of
the five nuclear Powers.

Attached to the Memo is an official announcement of the Government of the USSR which appeared in "Izvestiya" on 23 June 1971, drawing the attention of the governments of all the nuclear powers to the fact, that although the struggle for limiting the nuclear arms race has resulted in certain positive steps, efforts to reverse the process of the accumulation of more and more formidable weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of nuclear powers have so far been of no avail. Consequently, even more persistent efforts are necessary for effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament to be adopted. After elaborating on this subject, the paper concludes by proposing a conference of the five powers possessing nuclear weapons, to be called in the near future.

23.7.1971

Nr. — — . United States study on MBFR.
Some Assumptions, Models and Implications.

This report is a synopsis of general MBFR studies. Section VI is devoted to "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" and elaborates on:

1. The tactical nuclear balance.
2. Characteristics of weapon systems on each side.
3. Tactical nuclear weapons and MBFR.

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24.11.1969	C-R(69)49	NS	N.A. Council	Summary record of Council meeting 5-6 Nov 69.	X
5.12.1969	M4(69)2	NU	N.A. Council	Final Communiqué Brussels	III.1 I.4 IV, XI-1
10.12.1969	No. ---	NC	UK Dele- gation	A force limitation as a first step.	II.1 III.3 III.4
11.12.1969	PO/69/604	NC	Secr. Gen.	Further procedure for the Alliance Study on MBFR	I.4 II.1 III.1 IV
19.12.1969	PO/69/634	NC	Secr. Gen.	Decision of the Council on further procedure for the Alliance Study on BFR	I.4 II.1 III.1 IV

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27.2.1970	MCM-11-70	NS	MILCOM	Preliminary MC views on list of issues for possible negotiations with the East	VI X XI-1
28.2.1970	No. — — —	?	Italian Delegation	An approach to an additional Asymmetrical Model	IV
4.3.1970	AC/276-WP(70)8 (Revised)	NC	MBFR.WG.	Definitions and abbreviations	III.4
10.3.1970	AC/276-WP(70)9 ↓ (See Final Report, AC/276-D(70)4)	NS	Chairman MBFR.WG.	Draft Report by the MBFR.WG.	IV
10.3.1970	AC/276-WP(70)10 (See Final Report, AC/276-D(70)5)	NS	Chairman MBFR.WG.	Report by the Chairman MBFR.WG.	IV
12.3.1970	PO/70/137	NS	Sec.Gen.	Interim Progress Report on the study on MBFR	II.1
16.3.1970	AC/276-D(70)4 Annex H	NS CTS	MBFR.WG.	Report on the Study of MBFR	II.1 IV,II.3 II.4 III.4.
16.3.1970	AC/276-D(70)5	NS	Chairman MBFR.WG.	Report by the Chairman MBFR	II.1 II.4 IV
17.3.1970	PO/70/117	NC	Sec.Gen.	Soviet and East European statements on European security	X
19.3.1970	SH.22735/20 DTGR.191503Z Mar 1970	NC	SACEUR	Report on study of MBFR	II.4 IV
25.3.1970	POLADS(70)23	NC	Chairman SPC	Possible procedures for negotiation	X

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24.5.71	C-M(71)33 (Revised)	NC	NA Council	Progress Report on further studies on MBFR	I.7-II.1
24.5.71	C-M(71)40 (Revised)	NC	NA Council	Substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations	I.7-X
27.5.71	AC/276-R(71)6	NR	MBFR.WG	Action sheet ref. meeting 24.5.71 (Compiling of a Compendium)	II.1
1.6.71	AC/276-WP(71)14 (Revised)	NC	MBFR.WG	Implications of reductions in foreign stationed forces	VIII
2.6.71	UKM-64-71	NR	UK MILREP	UK MILREP's comments on SACEUR's Risk Assessment	V
4.6.71	MI-(71)1/7	NU	NA Council	Final Communiqué Lisbon	I.7
9.6.71	AC/276-WP(71)15	NC	MBFR.WG	Draft Compendium MBFR material.	II.1
9.6.71	IMS-275-71	NS	HILCOM	Warsaw Pact ground forces build-up model	II.4 XI
11.6.71	AC/276-WP(71)16	NR	MBFR.WG	Strengths of NATO national forces in Europe	II.4
14.6.71	PO/71/281	NC	Secretary General	Follow-up to the Lisbon meeting	I.7 II.1-X
16.6.71	Nr. ---	NC	Canadian Delegation	Soviet view on CES and MBFR	X
16.6.71	4108	NC	Belgian Delegation	Instructions for Belgian Ambassador in Moscow	X

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17.6.71	IMSWM-135-71	NS	DIR. IMS	Draft MC comments on SACEUR Risk Assessment	V
22.6.71	IMSWM-135-71 (Revised)	NS	DIR. IMS	Draft MC comments on SACEUR Risk Assessment (Revised)	V
24.6.71	Nr. ---	NS	US Del	Conversation between B. Klosson, US Charge D'Affaires and Korniyenko of Soviet Foreign Affairs.	X
29.6.71	POLADS(71)42	NC	SPC	Follow-up to the Lisbon meeting/Possible East-West negotiations	X
30.6.71	AC/276-R(71)7	NR	MBFR.WG.	Action sheet ref. meeting 23 June 71	II.1- II.4 VIII
2.7.71	10-00-1	-	German Del	Conversation between German Ambassador and Bulgarian Ambassador.	X
2.7.71	MCM-43-71	NS	MILCOM	MC comments on SACEUR Risk Assessment	V- XI
7.7.71	AC/276-WP(71)14 (2nd Revise)	NS	MBFR.WG.	Implications of reductions in foreign stationed forces	VIII
15.7.71	AC/276-WP(71)15 (Revised)	NC	MBFR.WG.	Compendium MBFR material	II.1
15.7.71	POLADS(71)48	NU	Pol. Committee	Soviet Government's call for conference of the five nuclear powers	XIV
19.7.71	C-M(71)49	NC	SPC	Preparation for the High Level meeting on MBFR	I.7- III.2 IX-X
20.7.71	POLADS(71)45	NC	Pol. Committee	MBFR: Diplomatic talks during period 30/3-30/6/71	X
23.7.71	Nr. ---	NS	US Delegation	MBFR: A synopsis of some assumptions, models and implications.	II.1- II.5 IV-VI XI-XIII -XIV

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29.7.71	DRC/N(71)18 RFC(WG)N(7)1	NC	Def.Rev.Comm. RFC.WG	Data requirements of RFC and MBFR studies	II.3 II.4

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