

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

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CONFERENCE STATEMENTS II

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NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALS

Mr. Carlos Van Bellingen, Director of Information,
Belgian Foreign Office, Brussels.

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen: It is an honour for me to reply on behalf of Belgium to the questions posed by point 1 of Part B of our Agenda and to explain to you firstly the policy and the organization of the Belgian Information Service concerning publicity in favour of NATO and secondly to put before you some remarks relative to the question of liaison between the NATO Information Service and the National Information Services.

A. Policy and Organization of the Belgian Information Services.
Concerning NATO Publicity,

I shall speak to you first of the policy of the Belgian Information Services on NATO publicity because broadly the carrying out of this policy is the main function of our services.

1. Policy

The policy of our services on NATO publicity is, in short, the following:

No propaganda but information and information mainly concerned with the topical.

Let me explain. No propaganda? No. In Belgium, political propaganda has no success; it is too contrary to the spirit of independence and individualism of our public opinion and press, traditionally reticent in the face of all attempts at official indoctrination. I may add that propaganda about NATO in the sense in which propaganda is generally understood would be largely superfluous as the public is already won over to the idea and necessity of NATO.

But if "propaganda" in Belgium is excluded or is not necessary or is unnecessary this is not true of information. Our people, if they are in favour of NATO, are not perhaps sufficiently enlightened on what this organization is doing or is called upon to do. Information is then desirable and even necessary.

Here, however, we must stress that information in Belgium in order to succeed or even to be acceptable should not take the regular form, for example, of a newspaper article every two days or of ten minute broadcasts every week. In the opinion of our technicians, information in our country in order to "impress" can only be given at the time of unusual and striking events. These principles are valid for NATO information: we can only use it on the occasion of important developments in the life of this organization.

For these exceptional occasions it is possible, however, for us - and we have already done it - to mobilise the most efficient cooperation of our press, our radio and our newsreels. We did this notably on the occasion of the meeting of the sixth session of the Council of the Ministers of the Atlantic Pact in Brussels, for the visit of General Eisenhower to Belgium and for the Second Anniversary of the Signature of the Pact.

We shall do it again for the arrival in Belgium of the arms which are provided for us by the Canadian Government.

2. Organization of the Belgian Information Services concerning NATO Publicity.

In Belgium there exists no "Ministry of Information." A department of this name was created immediately after the last war; it's life was very short, mainly because of that spirit of independence and individualism of our press and public opinion which I mentioned to you a short while ago.

Today all the information which our authorities wish to give to the country is communicated by the intermediary:

by the press service of the "Cabinet" of the Prime Minister, or by the administration of cultural relations and information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or by the services of information and documentation of the Ministry of National Defence.

I would add that the Belgium Minister for Colonies possesses a press service and there is also one for the Belgium economic cooperation administration.

As far as NATO is concerned, information is mainly diffused by the administration of cultural relations and information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the information to be communicated is of a military character, the administration of cultural relations and information circulates it in cooperation with the information and documentation of the Ministry of National Defence. It goes without saying, Gentlemen - but I take this occasion to assure you of it that these two services are entirely at the disposition of NATO for maximum cooperation within the framework of the policy defined above for the circulation in Belgium of news about the activities and achievements of NATO.

B. Liaison between NATO and the Belgium National Information Service.
liaison

That regular and efficient/should be established between the NATO Information Service and the National Information Services is, I believe, the wish both of the NATO Service and of the National Services.

Following this idea I venture to express the hope that the NATO Information Service will on no occasion hesitate to suggest that the National Services take advantage of any occasion which they consider opportune to put into practice the ideas of NATO or to underline its achievements. For these efforts NATO should provide - and in sufficient time - the National Services with the most complete and adequate documentation.

In conclusion, gentlemen. I should like to pay homage to what has been done up to now, with means which we know to be limited, by the NATO Information Service. In Belgium we have had the privilege of seeing this work on two important occasions; the sixth session of the Council of the Ministers of the Atlantic Pact and the visit to Brussels of General Eisenhower. Messieurs Newton, Belliard and Parsons have been able in these circumstances to justify the confidence we placed in their competence and to show rare qualities of patience and geniality.

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NATIONAL INFORMATION STATEMENTS.

Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie, Assistant Undersecretary of State,

Canadian Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you very much for asking me to come to this meeting. We have to consider what we can do to stimulate the inter-change of information about NATO in our respective countries. We think there is a very real job to be done in the field, and it is one of very great importance. I am sure we all agree as to the necessity of informing our peoples of the aims and achievements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the plans. So far as the plans are concerned, in my own country, we have no government controlled information service, and we have no Ministry of Information. There is a small information division within the Department of External Affairs, which has a two-fold function of providing information about Canada abroad, and within Canada of providing information about Canada's foreign relations.

We have a National Film Board which is a Government agency, and which produces documentary films for distribution at home and abroad, and which is now just engaged upon a programme of films related to NATO.

The radio services in Canada are provided both by an independent public corporation (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) and by private stations. The private stations are licensed by the public corporation and are thus, to a certain degree, under its control. We also have an international broadcasting service operated by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, which has been in operation since 1945 and whose European shortwave broadcasts are directed to a number of NATO countries and other countries in Western Europe, and also to some behind the Iron Curtain.

Those are the main agencies which we in Canada possess in this field. And, so far as my government is concerned, we look forward to doing our full part in the work of stimulating NATO information with which we are occupied here today.

We shall, no doubt, as the meeting goes on, be discussing in detail the role of the NATO Information Service, its relationship to the National Information Services, and in these brief opening remarks all I would wish to say would be that we in Canada think that with a combination of imagination and common sense there is a great deal more that can be done to encourage interchanges of information between NATO countries and that the NATO Information Service has a very important part to play in this.

We are very happy that the distinguished Canadian Mr. Newton should be giving his services in this field.

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STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALS

Mr. Ebbe Munck, (Denmark) Information Attaché, London.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: I think we have only two small points to make at the present stage of the discussion. The one is that the Danish Government and we as delegates are wholeheartedly behind you and with you, Mr. Newton, and your staff. We are absolutely convinced that this is a very important field, and you can rely upon us that we will do our very best.

We regard this clearing-house, if we may be permitted to call it so, as a very important one. We are looking forward to get factual news.

We may not know very much about "the other side" but I do believe that we know sufficient to say that the Russian propaganda has had no effect on Denmark. What we do like is to get some more information about this side... factual information about the NATO countries and your comments and guidance, not less the stressing obligations we have to live up to being part of the NATO community.

We have heard this morning from Mr. Spofford, and I fully agree, that the fields of information is a very sensitive one, and we shall have to be rather careful not to push matters because that may lead to repercussions which we do not want.

We have no control of information in Denmark, we have no ministry of information, but we have at the Foreign Office in Copenhagen a Press Department. This is a liaison department. It does not try to sell any views, it is for the free press and for the press men themselves to form their opinions. We are ourselves of that opinion that too much of the official stamp is no good. I would like to draw your attention to a special effort made in Denmark. More than half a year ago a group of men and women mostly ex-members of the resistance, started some work in the information field about the Atlantic Pact. It is done on a voluntary base with privately collected money. News letters and pamphlets are issued and circulated all over the country. It is not very expensive pamphlets, they are rather of the primitive sort, but they have that little personal touch, familiar to the readers from the time of occupation. They are widely distributed, as Denmark is only a small country with not more than 4 million people. For this reason you can cover the field easier than in many other countries. This is only the beginning in a very modest way, but we will carry on on this line, and there can be no doubt about it, that it will help people, and may be many of the indifferent people, to get a clearer conception of their obligations towards the Pact.

Furthermore I would like to mention that other publications have been issued, the ex-minister of defence - the Labour Government was defeated in October last - has written a very fine pamphlet about the NATO organization. This publication was distributed through the trade unions in Denmark and has without doubt already had considerable effect. A well-known officer from the general staff has written a book on the military aspects. The interest in this book is proved by the very high circulation obtained.

I do not think that we have to go any further at the moment. We are looking forward to the discussion during the coming hours, and we will be interested in the many details brought forward. I would like to say once more that we are very grateful for the initiative you have taken, Mr. Chairman.

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Statements by National Information Officials.

M. M. Breal, Consul General, Foreign Office, Paris.

To start with, I wish to apologize, on behalf of M. de Leusse, for his absence. Unfortunately he is ill and has asked me to attend in his place. I have no prepared statement and therefore I will be very brief, especially as my Belgian colleague has already voiced very much the same sort of thing in his preliminary remarks as I would have stated myself.

I wish to stress the fact that I agree with what he said in the desire to cooperate with NATO and to take advantage of liaison with the NATIS. Also that we do require the information which we receive to be factual and not to be propaganda.

We have had during the war, enough propaganda, with which we are --as the English say--somewhat "fed up". In point of fact, the best propaganda is information which does not show that it might conceivably be used as propaganda. What will be most useful is to have information which is objectively advanced, information concerning the Iron Curtain Countries. This information would deal with facts concerning the conditions in those countries. No conclusions will be drawn; these will be left to the reader to draw. He will then see how conditions which exist in those countries are the exact opposite of those which we want in a free country, and he will be able to see for himself, by way of contrast, what living conditions there are like.

Thus, we can, and should, with the help of the NATIS, give information, also concerning the results which have been accomplished by NATO and NATO countries.

Success is, in itself, the best propaganda. In fact, success acts as its own propaganda. If we can state that we have decided to carry out something, and then that it has been done, that, in its turn, will boost our work and we have only to ease it along. We therefore must paint a picture of what NATO is. Many people, as our Belgian Delegate said, are wholeheartedly behind NATO, but their idea of it is very hazy. Our task is to complete that picture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In other words, about other countries, we must give facts, pure and simple; and, as regards the NATO countries, we must underline where success has occurred.

With regard to the various Information Services in each Mr. Newton in his opening remarks has touched upon this. I can assure you that we will do what we can to share the information which we possess, and I think that information should be sent to NATIS, which can then itself pool all the information received on the Iron Curtain Countries, and disseminate that information to the other NATO countries, through their Official Services.

I think that NATIS should be responsible for collating this information from each country, for passing it on, and also for passing on any information with regard to the various NATO countries. The responsibility for disseminating this information should lie with the National Information Services, who should disseminate it to the best of their knowledge with due regard to local conditions.

French Information Services are very similar to those in Belgium. They are not too centralized, as the French are independent of spirit like the Belgians, and would not stand for it. There is, however, in France, a Ministry of Information to which is attached "Radio-Diffusion Francaise". Mr. Clair, who belongs to that Ministry unfortunately was not able to be here this morning. He should arrive sometime this evening and I will leave it to him to enlarge upon this particular aspect.

There is a press service for the Foreign Office about which I will say more, later on. There is also a Permanent Secretariat of the Defence Ministry, which has its own information services. Colonel Besson, who is here, belongs to that service and will answer any questions.

We fully uphold the usefulness of NATIS. I think we can later on discuss how to use the information which we receive from it.

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STATEMENTS OF NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALS

Mr. Gudmundsson (Iceland) Chief of the Press Department.
Foreign Ministry, Reykjavik.

Our system is more or less the same as in the other Scandinavian countries. We have more or less the same facilities and the same limitations. We customarily have the full patience toward those who are of another opinion than ourselves, and feel that we mustn't shoot them for merely saying what we do not agree with. Nevertheless, we have to be quite aware as to what this official propaganda is. I fully support the views expressed by my Belgian colleague, that all that smacks of officialdom, official propaganda, it is best to leave alone. Actually, we have more than four-fifths of the full press solidly lined up behind us and it is only the communists who violently oppose the NATO aims.

Moreover, we have a State radio owned and run by the Government, with only a few there who can be labelled as reds, and our anti-reds can be counted upon to be a great support in our work. To cut a long story short, I should like to draw your attention to a statement made by our Foreign Minister, Mr. Benediksson, which is in the report we have at hand sandwiched between statements of France and Italy. And I should like to draw your attention to the first two paragraphs.

(Reading) : "We Icelanders are so few, our country so big, and conditions so adverse, that we cannot ourselves defend our country; this was explicitly stated when we adhered to the Atlantic Treaty.

"It was definitely stated by Iceland that our adherence showed that with regard to both ourselves and others we wished to organize our country's defences in a similar way as during the last war should a new war break out, which we hope and pray will not happen, namely, that the Anglo-Saxon peoples should undertake Iceland's defence."

That actually here is the story put in short, and this is our position as it stands. All it affords is that the presentation of NATO aims and objectives must of need be based on the facts which mark Iceland's rather special attitude, its absolute character of non-military adherence to the Pact and the fact that we rely on the bigger powers to defend us. But we shall do everything in our power to support the military defence of Iceland by doing as much in the field of ideas as is humanly possible, although we have only a very small information service and have national limitations to our activities, as I have explained:

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STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALS

Mr. Carlo Perrone-Capano, (Italy) Head of the Press Dept.
Rome

The need for brevity suggests that I sum up under three headings the course Italy has laid down for herself in this matter of propaganda on behalf of the principles and the motives underlying the Atlantic Pact: 1) what has already been done; 2) what we plan to do within our national sphere; 3) what joint action we are proposing.

1) Italy's task has been of peculiar difficulty because it was started on at a moment when grievous sacrifices were imposed upon her (such as that of her African interests and other, of an economic nature, that still make themselves felt in Italian life), though an alliance was already under consideration. On the other hand the Communists were launching their offensive against the Atlantic Pact while the general organization of M.A.P. and its very principles were still being discussed. This offensive grew more violent still when Italy was invited to enter the Organization and Parliament debated and then ratified our adhesion. On that occasion the Information Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs exerted itself to the utmost in order to counteract adverse propaganda. Ten million copies of leaflets, bearing various texts, were printed and circulated to enlighten Italian opinion on the falseness of Communist contentions. In agreement with the "Comitati Civici", posters were put up in every Italian city in immediate retort to those put up by the Communists; tens of thousands of pamphlets were printed to divulge the chief speeches in the Chamber or the Senate by Italy's most representative men; a periodical, designed to reach the working masses, was started.

The need for instant reply was kept in mind throughout, that the ideas broadcast by Communist propaganda might be prevented from sinking into the minds of the public. The results of this effort, as demonstrated by the wide swing of Italian opinion and the fact that none of the great Italian dailies has come out on the neutralist side, have been most satisfactory. The Communists are taken by surprise and forced to keep to the defensive. The appended documents give an idea of the intensity and the continuity of the efforts sustained by Italy in this field.

To give adequate press flanking to these complex activities, beside using the ordinary channels of existing news agencies, it was thought expedient to create a special agency with the task of guiding and supplying with copy the principal daily newspapers and political commentators. This agency, named "Agenzia Giornalistica Italia" has acquitted itself well and come up to all expectations.

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It was the first reveal the crisis of the Communist Party and to divulge the "deviationist" movement of Cucchi and Magnani. It contributed, jointly with other organizations, to check Communist propaganda on the occasion of General Eisenhower's visit in Rome. Every non-Communist newspaper welcomed the General and every street-corner of Italy displayed posters while millions of folders were distributed. To quote only a few of the available data, in the restricted field of propaganda through the "Agenzia Italia" in the four initial months, September to December 1950, the Italian press has published 2.420 articles and items of news on the Atlantic Pact, 1.813 on MAP., 1.708 on the problems of Italian rearmament, 1.546 on raw materials supplies etc. There remains to be mentioned what has variously and fruitfully accomplished by means of medium and short wave-length broadcasting, the latter being especially aimed at beating back Soviet propaganda by "beaming" special programmes in various languages to the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

2) So much for the past. In the future it is Italy's intention to progress along these lines and to perfect such methods as have proved practical and effective. That is to say: a) to expand the number of posters. A notable expense, but the placard is the poor man's television and we must reach out to the smallest and remotest villages of the Peninsula. b) To keep the "Agenzia Italia" going and make it into one of the chief means for broadcasting information from N.A.T.O., also supplying it, for the sake of immediacy, with a correspondent's office in London. c) To develop the work over the wireless and to improve the programmes in different languages for the countries behind the Iron Curtain. d) To make the counterpropaganda by means of pamphlets and folders increasingly prompt and to enter into close cooperation with the propaganda services of the democratic parties. e) To intensify relations with the press and better the production of documentary films, by filming the disembarkation of arms, raw materials and foodstuffs, and all morale-building activities. f) To carry out, in agreement with the Ministry of Defence, propaganda in the Army. g) To launch by all the said methods a propaganda campaign in view of the coming municipal elections, which will of necessity be contested over political issues, and therefore preeminently over the Atlantic Pact, in order to eliminate from public opinion all residual doubts that Europe will be defended instead of "liberated". The volume of American aid and of the potential behind it, as safeguards against Soviet aggression, will be particularly stressed.

We now come to the last part, that is, the initiatives to be taken jointly.

3) While it is reasonable to contend that the several information services should remain independent, since it

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is impossible to apply any single yardstick to the differing mentalities of the allied peoples, it must be remarked that certain pressingly needed initiatives must instead be taken jointly, being meant to counteract world-wide and unitary Communist propaganda.

It is beyond dispute that the Kremlin has seized the initiative in propaganda. The Stockholm Appeal, the Peace Congress, the Four-Power Conference, the agitation for a Five-Power Conference, are sufficient evidence. The West does nothing of the sort: it confines itself to attempts at palliating the effects of Communist propaganda. The points to be made in a counteroffensive on a world wide scale are many. We hold better cards than theirs. Why not think out initiatives that could acutely embarrass and effectively hamper the Soviets. For example:

a) Let an International Congress of all associations grouping the relatives of those missing or captive in U.S.S.R. convene in Paris (in conjunction with the Assembly of the U.N.) In Italy alone, for instance 65.000 families mourn or live in anxiety for their dear ones. Let petitions be presented to the U.N., processions assemble, appeals be flung at the "Big Four" etc. The press, the radio, the cinema will take good care to record and publicize universally these events.

b) Let a spectacular convention of refugees from beyond the Iron Curtain be organized to demand, by the same means, justice, liberty and the respect of human rights in their native countries.

c) Let the free Trade Unions do as much, demanding freedom for labour and the abolition of forced-labour camps.

Clearly, these are no more than suggestions, determined by the sensation that internal propaganda, however useful, is not enough unless it is supported by similar action on a world wide scale by the West as a whole.

The gist of the Italian view of the matter is that we must abandon the defensive and take the offensive. We must no longer content ourselves with waiting for the opponent's moves and hastily attempting to block them. We must reverse the trend and force the enemies of peace and freedom to withdraw.

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Statements of National Information Officials- M. G. Heisbourg, Luxembourg Legation, London

An Information and Press Service was set up in Luxembourg immediately after the liberation in September 1944 under the authority of the Ministère d'Etat (Prime Minister's Office). This Service, of which I myself was in charge, was created for purely practical and not for political reasons. After its return from exile the Government was faced with a difficult administrative task, and the duties of the new Information Service were therefore numerous and varied. The Service was responsible for the distribution of official notices etc. to the press, it played a certain part in the allocation of newsprint, it arranged broadcasts for the Home Service and was responsible for press and information liaison with S.H.A.E.F. Since December 1944 the Service has been issuing a monthly information bulletin on all public events that take place in the country and on major national projects (hydro-electric schemes, electrification of railways, etc.).

In view of its continuing usefulness, the Service has been maintained. It gives valuable assistance to the national press as well as to foreign journalists. As there is no Luxembourg news agency all the information used in Luxembourg on events abroad is obtained from foreign agencies and sources. It is therefore obvious that all that is done in the information field in neighbouring countries or in other N.A.T.O. countries or by the N.A.T.O. Information Service affects the Luxembourg public directly. Foreign newspapers are widely read and the general outlook is European and supranational. In short, Luxembourg is dependent in the information field, as in many other respects, on its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty and she will do everything in her power to contribute to the fullest extent her modest share to the common information effort. We fully appreciate the importance of the N.A.T.O. Information Service in London which has already rendered valuable assistance in the short period since its inception.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALSDr. J. M. Landre,Director Netherlands Government Information Service, The Hague

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen. I am very glad that you have given us the opportunity to say a few words first of our organization, as it is very useful to know something more about the different information services. It is a pleasure to me to give you some idea of how our organization works. You told me that I am on the agenda here as Director of the Dutch Government Information Service, and that is true, but that is only one of my functions, and in that function I should be here. The second function is that of information officer of the Prime Minister. And, in fact, in this function I am here. In Holland practically every Ministry has an information officer who entertains contacts with the press in its own field. That is to say, information officers, for example, of the Ministry of Agriculture tell the press and radio whatever they want to know about the price of sugar or other things on that score. I have no idea of all these things. The information officer of the Prime Minister has the task to inform the press about Government policy, so all the things which regard the whole Cabinet. The information officers form an information council of which the information officer of the Prime Minister acts as chairman. The Council decides about everything on information. The Government Information Service is a technical apparatus, it facilitates the production of information material. We may be compared, although on a more modest scale, with the COI, and Sir Robert Frazer has, as far as I know, the same job as I have, with that difference that the two functions in our country are combined in the same person.

We speak in this conference about special campaigns or things for the people in the Netherlands; that is the job of the Prime Minister's advisor, not of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; but if we should speak here for example about radio transmitting behind the Iron Curtain that should be the task of my colleague of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

We have a very small body representing the military information service, foreign affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, agriculture, and myself, who have a daily contact and we speak about all the questions of the day before we handle those to coordinate the work for us. This is only to give you a very small idea of our organization. Now as what we do want and what we expect from NATO I should say that, practically, of course, I quite agree with the words of Mr. Bellingen, an old friend of ours. We must make no direct propaganda in our country. That would be absolutely impossible, and it is a fact which we can't change and which we do not want to change. But we give as much information as we can to the press, to the radio, to the newsreel companies, also our facilities and if we have, the material so that they can do their own jobs.

I have often heard and especially in our country about a kind of neutralism there was an I'd like to say here that there is no more neutralism in the Netherlands. There has been perhaps and that is very clear after five years of occupation; besides, we happen to be most destroyed country in the world. And another thing which I haven't heard today, which deals with the mentality of our people: they are afraid of propaganda from the Government.

But everybody knows now in any case that what the government asks is necessary: with the exception, of course, of the communists. However, just as I heard from Iceland, and so on, they are not a big danger to our country; they will not be a danger in the

future, either, because our social situation is fortunately such that makes it possible to keep strikes from our doors.

What we need and what I hope that we can reach from NATO is more material; the NATO Information Service can be a source which we are willing to feed and from which we can get what we need. I don't know if it is much which we can give but we hope to get anything that will be useful for our country. And although in these discussions of the general stages there will be no time to go into further details, I should be very glad if I could go back to my country with the knowledge that the source has been formed and that we can start a new course to get an exchange of materials and everything so that incorporation may be possible.
Thank you.

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Mr. Hans Olav, Director of Information Service,

Norwegian Foreign Office, Oslo

Alphabetically Norway comes so far down the list that it would be mainly a reiteration of what has already been said if I were to go into any details. I would, however, like to make it plain that there is no national Government information service in Norway. There has been for some 30 years a section of Public Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that was expanded during the war and somewhat since the war. It operated in the known media of information from the oral to the visual and written, and it, of course, had its press attachés and press counsellors in foreign countries.

The Government of Norway is however interested in placing before this group its views of what might be called the substance of the role to be played by the NATO Information Service. We feel that the Information Division of NATO shall carry out a programme of public information under the direction of the Council of Deputies.

The task is to make NATO known as a defence organization against the encroachments of Russian imperialism - we think we should call a spade a spade - and to strengthen the feeling of solidarity among the member nations.

The scope covers two main fields of action; One would be factual information beamed to the member countries, spreading knowledge of NATO, its background, development, aims and achievements; the ties and relationship between the member states - (geographically, culturally, economically and politically), stressing their common interest in preserving and defending their way of life, their moral values and democratic liberties.

Two would be comparative (or stimulating) information, the spreading of knowledge in the member states of true conditions in the communist countries, the exposure of Cominform and Communist aims and methods, and the measures needed to counteract false and misleading propaganda claims made by the communist nations.

Information beamed by NATO to its member countries must be worked out with a clear understanding of the national character, the moods and conditions of every single treaty nation. The Norwegian people, for one, is individualistic and sceptical and prefers to make up its own mind. An information programme must, therefore, not take the apparent form of mass persuasion or a collective propaganda offensive. Given light the people will find their own way. Informational activities may be consistent and efficient but they should also be restrained and ingenious and always true and factual. It will be of extreme importance to the success of NATO's information work that it be carried out in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect.

The NATO Information Division shall be - in the opinion of the Norwegian Government - the coordinating organ for informational activities pertaining to NATO membership and its privileges and obligations in all member states. It will advise the treaty nations of the general policy of information as laid down by the Council of Deputies and invite suggestions from the member countries as to the implementation of such policy.

Details referring to these policies or programmes may be returned to us as we proceed with our discussions.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

Strategy in the Ideological Struggle

- Dr. José Manuel da Costa, National Secretary of Information, Lisbon, Portugal

The Portuguese Delegation begins by presenting its compliments to the Conference and by stating that the feelings that encourage it are of sincere spirit of collaboration and loyalty; being as it is the first time that our Delegation contacts the N.A.T.O. Service, its position cannot help being one of serene expectation and of attentive observation. It expects that from the contact entered upon now among the Directors of Information of our countries will result a collaboration which will be emphasized and will fructify as days go by.

Precisely because N.A.T.O. is composed by free Nations, it is more difficult to obtain a joint action of aims, of ideological struggle or of counter-propaganda, than in the countries of Soviet influence in which all is subject to the same firm, implacable, and sole will. This difficulty is surely in all our minds, in the minds of the representatives of those countries whose public opinion react unfavourably to all planned propaganda.

Such evidence cannot however mean that, with pending arms, one should allow the most dangerous planned propaganda to consume all the foundations of western civilization and society. Therefore the Portuguese Government, that since a quarter of a century has been effecting its Revolution in Peace, has felt since the beginning the exact sense of the communist danger in its double feature of imperialistic expansion and of spreading of a doctrine which would leave nothing standing, things that we love and respect - therefore the Portuguese Government is apt and wishes to collaborate efficiently in the joint action the settlement of which brought us all here.

A remark, however, seems to us just and fundamental and so I wish to present it right from the beginning. From the reading of the N.A.T.O. documents, which I get in touch with for the first time, a brief reading and undoubtedly an incomplete one, it seemed to me that it has been settled - as a direction to be followed - that N.A.T.O. will fight not only Soviet Imperialism but also the tendentious use of the communist doctrine. The careful manner in which this formula was written, having in mind realities, from this side of the Iron Curtain, which weaken our internal structure is a sign of weakness of our convictions that will necessarily have all the effort we intend to effect in this field.

One of our eventual enemies' power is conviction. This is a reality we gain nothing in pretending to ignore. If before their deep conviction, we present a feeble indecision upon the eternal values that we defend - if we exhibit our lack of courageous conviction - we immediately place ourselves in such a position of inferiority that our enemies will take full advantage and full profit of it.

The fight against the tendentious use of the communist doctrine seems to involve the acceptance of that doctrine since it is not used tendentiously. This seems to us a very

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dangerous condescendence and it is not even justified by the state of necessity; it is the wide opening of the gates through which we accept the incoming of the Trojan Horse belonging to the worst enemies of our civilisation.

It seems to us that it is not enough to condemn the tendentious use of the communist doctrine. The restoration effort of the moral and material power of the West must be followed by the virile statement that against the communist doctrine, annihilating all that we are, we love and we defend, the Western World opposes a more universal doctrine, which is not monolithic, because it includes different kinds of moral, social and political aims, adapted to different peoples.

Ours is a sole doctrine in the respect of conscience, family, religion and property.

To give up the courage of stating what we are fighting against is to take away from the soldiers who will eventually handle the war weapons supplied to them the indispensable moral support for their fight.

In what relates to that part of the public opinion in some of our countries which would accept a sui generis communism free from Moscow dictatorship, I must say that we cannot allow ourselves to hide our clear and sincere thoughts.

The condemnation of communism, in the action we are going to exploit, should not give the world the idea that the Western crusade is either inspired or conducted by the defence of capitalism, which is a word - we must admit - hated by the great European masses.

All anti-communist proclamations, in our opinion, must be accompanied by the vigorous statement that, within the Christian order we defend, social justice, welfare, frank approaching of classes, and elimination of misery are achieved without our needing to hand over collectively, to a monstrous State, our conscience, our right to live and the fate of our children.

It is inherently ours and not our enemy's, that great feeling of Man: social justice. Nevertheless, let our deeds not give the impression that we are granting our enemy the exclusiveness of this social justice, by denying ourselves feebly in our positive and constructive attitudes.

After these remarks, I shall pass on to the technical part of our future action. It is already settled that the Information Service of our different countries will receive information data from N.A.T.O. Information Service which will be used by us. On the other hand, N.A.T.O. will be supplied with information of common interest by all our Information Service.

In what concerns the use in Portugal of information supplied by N.A.T.O., the Portuguese Information Service is ready to use it as it will be deemed convenient for the common cause; but I must stress that if we have legal procedure to avoid the Press to harm the cause of peace and of harmony among the peoples, we cannot force it to publish what it does not want to; and we find the Portuguese Press very hostile towards planned propaganda. Therefore we must do our best to supply it with information which is of real interest, which

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is easily understood in all its features and which possesses publicity value.

To-day in all international and national organizations there is such an abundance of paper that the importance of the written word is diminished and because of the scepticism it arouses it means very little to the public opinion. But the information to be given must not, as it often happens to-day, fall on the dangerous indiscretion which is constantly affecting, to the eyes of the world opinion, the unity of the Western Countries and so often even the latter's own security.

We must be inventive: we must study ways to "frapper les imaginations" without drowning them and without drowning ourselves in words that have already lost their own value. Words, words, words....

Our collaboration is entirely linked with this cause which is looked upon by us as the supreme condition of life and existence. As regards our contribution of information that may be of interest to N.A.T.O. Service, I wish to tell you that it must be scarce. We do not maintain diplomatic relations with any of the Iron Curtain countries; we have no contact whatsoever with any of them, neither with their populations. We are farther away from them than many of the nations represented here and all information that reaches us comes normally through your countries.

We consider ourselves comparatively immune from the danger of communism at home, thanks to the work for peace and social justice we have been effecting and thanks to the distance that separates us from the infected zone. But this immunization will only be effective - the Portuguese are very sensitive in this matter - if Western propaganda is made in such a careful way that the public will not be given the idea of a superposition of influences or even of the creation of hegemonies attempting against the equality of the nations united in this common cause.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

NATIONAL INFORMATION STATEMENTS.

Sir Robert Fraser: Central Office of Information, United Kingdom.

Mr. Newton and gentlemen: first a word or two on the actual structure of the Information Services in this country, then a word or two about the information programme which we carried out during the last years, on NATO, and before that on Western Union; and thirdly, a word or two about the kind of things I think that your organization could be most helpful about.

First, then, about the structure. We, of course, in this country, have a fairly extensive domestic Government Information Service. The larger part of that structure is the Central Office of Information, which stems directly from the Ministry of Information. But we have no longer a Ministry of Information, and I ought to emphasize that the Central Office of Information very much follows the pattern we heard described to us by the Netherlands representative this morning.

The Central Office of Information is a technical agency which receives and carries out orders from the Ministerial Departments, as in the Netherlands. The Ministerial Departments are themselves responsible for the policy of the information programmes carried out on the subjects for which they are responsible; that is to say, the Ministry of Health is responsible for the health campaigns, the Ministry of Transport for the road safety campaign, and from that it follows that it is the Foreign Office which is responsible for publicity in this country (and for the moment I shall confine myself to publicity in this country) about NATO. That is to say, any publicity programme for NATO is a part of the domestic information programme of the Foreign Office itself. Well, that is the pattern of responsibility.

It so happens that we have in fact been carrying out in this country during the last two years a steady information programme (rather than a sizable or spectacular programme) about the defence of the West. It began fairly soon after the Treaty of Dunkirk, and got into stride about the time of the Brussels Treaty and Western Union; and a year ago it was easily extended to cover NATO itself. That information programme is divided into two parts; there is firstly the ordinary supply of necessary information and interpretation to the press, and which is the responsibility of the Foreign Office itself, just as that particular form of activity is the responsibility of the Ministerial Departments in this country rather than the Central Office of Information. I should perhaps at this point just mention the B.B.C. Of course, in its home operation it is an independent organization; and from the point of view of the Government it is one means for the distribution of information just as are newspapers of Fleet Street.

The second part of this programme is that which falls in the executive and technical field, and into the province of the central agency acting for the Government. Now this, roughly speaking, is the field that may be defined as that which requires the actual creation of official publicity material in the form of films, or murals, displays, or exhibitions, as against the practice of press relations in its broader sense.

In this field we have, during the last year or two, produced a certain amount of material. We have for a couple of years been running a series of lectures on the defence of the West, which has included in it special lectures on NATO during the last twelve months. There are two films in the programme, one has been produced and successfully distributed a little before NATO came on the scene. The second one is now almost ready, and that covers the whole of the defence of the West, with NATO in the primary place. of course.

We have produced a certain amount of visual material of the kind that Roscoe Drummond has been kind enough to produce, of which you have a display downstairs. There is more of that coming forward. And we have produced a certain amount of reference material, and one or two pamphlets which have been distributed in this country, but not put on sale.

You will see that it is a systematic programme rather than one of a very large dimension, but that it runs quite smoothly, and it is very easy to include NATO in it.

On the third and last point, we have found ourselves in great need, not so much for guidance about NATO - because for that, of course, we can rely on the Foreign Office, and upon the Ministry of Defence for the military side - but of factual raw material, which we could process into the various forms of publicity material. And it would, from our point of view, be a very great step forward indeed if we could look to you for possibly two things: essential factual raw materials; and most important, I think, examples of the work of others on these particular subjects. If you had in mind acting as a physical clearing house for the exchange of actual examples of things produced by the government, as well as anything of course you should produce yourselves, we should be much helped.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

Statements by National Information Officials.

Mr. S.C. Leslie, C.B.E., Head of Economic
Information Unit, United Kingdom Treasury,
London.

I was glad to see on the list of matters about which you expect to receive information from member governments the items which refer to economic facts - arms production, and the impact of the arms program on the economics of the different countries.

We heard something yesterday - I believe it was from General Lanham - about the value of acquainting each country with the military activities and developments of the others, in order to foster a sense of solidarity. And I think exactly the same thing applies to their economic activities, not only their defense production programs but the way their economies are sustaining the impact of defense. I realize that there is some risk here of duplication with the work of other agencies concerned, international agencies concerned with the exchange of economic information -- OEEC and perhaps to some extent the Economic Commission for Europe -- and that there is also a problem here for those particularly concerned with economic information in member countries. But there is one particular aspect of the relations between economic conditions and defense which I would like to mention, in order that others may say what they think about it and may have an opportunity to think it over.

It seems to me that one of the most important and difficult problems in the field of information that NATO has to face will come in this matter of the impact of defense on national economies. We have already heard the argument used - and we have already seen some response to the argument in individual countries - that there is a possibility of losing the "Cold War" in the very act of trying to win it. There is a grave risk, we are told, of over-burdening civilian economies by armaments programs that are too heavy for them to sustain, of preventing constructive capital developments, projects that represent long term additions to the wealth of the country, of lowering the standard of living, of causing inflation with all its associated consequences in rising prices and shortages of material - all this owing in one way or another to the demands of defense. The argument is used, and is gaining some response, that this shows the unwisdom of too great an effort in the defense field.

Another argument that we know we can expect (we are already getting some of it) has reference to the alleged unevenness of sacrifice among the participating countries - the alleged excessive difference between the civilian standards of life in various countries, after taking account of their defense efforts. This sort of thing is beginning even now, when the rearmament programs of different countries have scarcely begun to "bite". You can imagine the sort of problem that this is going to present when they have begun to bite. As the Cold War goes dragging on for quite a long time, as the burden of heavy rearmament programs becomes a familiar thing, all this may become a very serious problem. It is a different kind of argument from the ones that Communist propagandists are accustomed to use, because in a certain sense this argument is real, it is actual, the people can see the facts for themselves in their

explode by pointing out that it "goes bang". Everything that is said about the impact of defense on civil standards people will be able to verify for themselves. That, I think, is one reason why it is a serious problem.

Another reason is that people who have no connection with the Communist party are apt to be found using the sort of argument I have referred to.

A third reason, why I fear the problem is particularly serious and difficult, is that the constructive answer in the economic field is not easy to find. If we could say that all problems could be solved by a great productive effort it would help - but can we at a time when materials are so short?

What should we do about this problem? Anyone who pretended to come along with a cut and dried program to deal with it now would merely show that he underrated the difficulty of the job. But there are perhaps one or two ideas one might tentatively throw out that are worth consideration.

First of all, and this is general and obvious, we might ourselves clearly recognize the existence of this problem, and do what we can as Information Officers and Information Advisers to see that it is present to the minds of those in our countries who represent the policy-making sides in relation to NATO. I don't think I need elaborate that; but it does seem to me that one of the functions that economic information officers might well assume is to see that this important and difficult aspect is not overlooked in policy-making.

But the main answer - and we must face this - the main answer can only be to show that at whatever cost and whatever sacrifice rearmament is necessary to the preservation of the Western way of life. That is not a matter in the economic field at all, but it does underline the importance of close association between the political and economic fields in the present phase of the work of national information services. One or two of our great newspapers have pointed out recently, here in this country, in dealing with the Budget, that the extent to which the sacrifices would be cheerfully borne by the country would depend on whether the case for rearmament was clearly apprehended. That brings home to us, in a topical and concrete way, the need to keep the economic and political sides closely tied up together.

Then, thirdly, I suggest that we recognize a special need to exchange information about the national effort, the national sacrifice represented by domestic rearmament programs, so that what it all means in other countries can be made known in each of our own. It is important to ensure that no public gets the opportunity to concentrate too exclusively on its own sacrifices. That seems to me one of the main reasons why an interchange of information about the impact of rearmament programs is so important.

Finally, we might perhaps make a special point of exchanging information about the ways in which we ourselves in the individual information services find that we are able to cope with this problem. More than most others, of course, it is peculiar to each country and its form is apt to differ in each one. But there may be common lessons to learn, there may be advantages to be got from hearing how the problem is tackled in other countries. It might even be, and if these rather gloomy forecasts about the gravity and importance of this problem are borne out, I think you may find that it will be, valuable to get information officers from the participating countries together from time to time to look at this particular matter.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL INFORMATION OFFICIALS

Mr. Edward Barrett, United States Assistant Secretary
of State for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel very fortunate indeed to-day because it has been two or three times within the last three days when I didn't think I was going to get here, first because of the Congressional hearings and second because of difficulties in air transport. My head is still swimming a little bit; I had a rough trip in the last part.

I was amused to hear the story, Mr. Chairman, that you told about the three boy scouts leading the lady across the street, I thought I'd like to tell the story about the grasshopper and the cricket, the grasshopper who wanted more than anything else to make sounds like a cricket. So he went to this wise friend the owl and asked the owl if there wasn't some way to learn to make a noise like a cricket. The owl thought and said, "Well, there is one very simple way, just turn yourself into a cricket." The grasshopper said: "Well, how do I do that?" The old owl said, "Don't ask me. I'm just responsible for policy guidance." (Laughter)

Well, I think we are all convinced that there is a great big job to be done in this field. It must be done, but sometimes we're in the position of policy guiders because there are difficulties in working out ways and means. However, I'm sure it's going to be a great deal easier than turning ourselves into crickets.

We do appreciate the opportunity to participate in this exchange of ideas. We feel it is potentially very valuable, and I'd like to say that at this point also we of the United States particularly appreciate and admire the work that has been done in this direction already by the very small staff of the N.A.T.O. Information Service, which, by the way, we have started calling N.A.T.I.S.

I noted, in having one of my colleagues sum up for me what was said this morning, that a good deal of attention has been given to the importance of including, I understand with some admiration, the statement from General Eisenhower. I'd just like to associate ourselves with those statements, because we believe that it is enormously important that popular understanding of, and enthusiasm for, the N.A.T.O. concept should be developed in every way possible.

I gather a good deal was said about propaganda, versus fact and truth. We certainly do not feel that we want a great, sky-writing type of propaganda campaign, utilizing a great many empty arguments and polemics. But we do think that it is essential that the facts regarding N.A.T.O., the facts regarding the Eisenhower Command, the facts regarding the thought and convictions of the leaders who are embarking on this really great movement should be disseminated. Facts are no good if they are just locked up in the closet, and they don't disseminate themselves. And it is for that reason that we are particularly eager to see the individual national information agencies and the unofficial information facilities of the countries concerned brought into this picture and utilized on a cooperative basis to the greatest extent possible.

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I say truth and facts, rather than propaganda in the sense of polemics and empty fanfare, and I am glad to note that from what I have heard from the plan submitted this morning by Mr. Newton that there is no proposal for a great flamboyant organization. The plan for N.A.T.I.S. - as I call it - seems to me to be quite a modest plan. I hope we won't permit it to become too modest, because the mere production of factual information and raw material and assistance to the national organizations, if it is factual, is a kind of work that requires a certain amount of manpower. Any damn fool can sit at home at night and write a tract of empty arguments without any factual support, but if you are going to provide factual material, material that can be used in speeches, raw material of the sort our private organizations are going to need, it's going to take a certain amount of real work at the central headquarters.

That is the reason why I'm glad the plan you proposed is modest, but I think not too modest.

I haven't had a chance since I have been here, to speak with my colleagues at any length, but in thinking of this programme I have been thinking particularly in terms of - to begin with - speeches, and statements from the Headquarters involved, from the individual leaders of the individual countries on this theme, to get across the very sort of fact that I have been speaking of. Of news dissemination designed to get that material disseminated to the publics in our countries; a photo and film coverage of actual facts and events; of newsreel coverage, perhaps of some meetings of the sort that I believe that the Italian representative spoke of this morning.

I have been thinking particularly in terms of bringing private groups of citizens into this effort itself as much as possible, because in each of our countries there is a certain amount of suspicion of government propaganda that doesn't obtain in the case of groups of private individuals who have become enthusiastic about the Atlantic Community idea. For example, in America, I think, with all due credit to Mr. Russell of the State Department, who has done a very good job in helping to familiarize the people of the United States with the United Nations, I believe the greatest work has been done by groups of private citizens. I think we should explore this aspect very carefully before we finish.

I have a number of other things I would like to say, but they are all in the direction of underscoring the importance of getting public enthusiasm for and understanding of N.A.T.O. and S.H.A.P.E., and the whole concept. I believe that subject has been adequately covered. So, I'd just like to say that we of the United States have looked forward with enthusiasm to working with all of your countries, and with the N.A.T.O. Headquarters, with N.A.T.I.S., for pouring into it such ideas as we have, such data as we have, cooperating in every way possible because we are eager to get on with the job. We confidently believe that by united and vigorous effort we can make a real contribution toward preventing a war and making peace certain.

Mr. Francis Russell, United States Public Affairs Officer,
Washington, D.C.

The situation in the United States with respect to the press, and the general feeling of the public is, I think, that they don't want to be propagandized. Our press is fiercely independent, and the people insist on that. At the same time, there has developed

within the
 / last six or seven years a situation that I think is of considerable significance. First, the American people - I think it is quite generally known - are joiners. Someone has computed that out of the 150 million people in the United States, in all ages, at least 100 million belong to an organization of some kind.

Then during World War II, America suddenly changed from a country that was predominantly isolationist to one that was very strongly in favour of U.S. participation in international cooperative movements of various kinds. At that time, all of these organizations, labour, drama, business, women's groups, religious and education groups, started very active programs of information, of education, of discussion, passing resolutions, and so on. They very quickly developed an intense feeling that they didn't want that kind of activity merely to be taking place in a vacuum, a kind of fanning of the breeze. They wanted a feeling that their views and attitudes were brought to the attention of the people in the Government who were making the decisions. They wanted to see these men face to face, see what kind of men they were, what their motivations seemed to be. And, as a result of that demand there grew into existence the operation of my office of Public Affairs, under Mr. Barrett.

We have three principal operations: One is the Division of Public Liaison, which is the focal point in the Department where organizations of that kind, where radio, background writers, - not the press which is attached directly to the Office of the Secretary - but magazine writers, people who want to come in and either get information of some kind or present their views, come.

Then we have the Division of Publications, which produces and distributes a wide variety of background material.

And then the Division that analyses public opinion trends for the Department.

There has been the problem of evolving techniques by which generally agreed upon and wholly desirable facts of contact between responsible elements of the American public and the State Department can take place. We have meetings twice a year of some 250 representatives of organizations coming into the Department for three days. The Secretary speaks to them for an hour or two, to start them off, speaking rather frankly on what is on his mind, and other top officers. Then they break up into a number of groups of 20 or 30, with an Information Officer who is responsible for the area in which that particular group is most interested. Then we have meetings around the country, 10 or 15, each year, where 4 or 5 of the Department Officers at the invitation of some local university or some foreign policy association let themselves loose for a couple of days.

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Then we have various smaller meetings whenever Ambassadors come back from their posts, in areas of particular interest. Fifty or sixty organization representatives will come in for a couple of hours some afternoon and the ambassadors will talk to them and answer questions. And then, last year, a total of 1,200 or 1,300 talks in addition to what I have been talking about were given by Department Officers in all parts of the country. We try and make sure that they cover each section geographically, and before the different kinds of groups, like business, farmers, and so on. Always with questions, and give and take. That is the essence of it.

Then, finally, I might mention another type of meeting where some particular question of foreign policy comes up and lends itself to the technique of bringing in 15 to 25 of the leading experts of the country from business, academic life, labour and so forth, and we give them a list of 15 or 20 questions, to indicate the scope of the discussion, and we just let them talk around the table, like this, with the State Department chairing the meeting, but not taking part in the discussion very much.

As a result of all of this, and a number of things that I won't go into in detail, there has grown up what I think is a very real sense of contact, I think the key word was "participation". That is the thing to strive at. These people really feel they are participating in the deliberations, and thinking of the State Department, and the Department is aware of what they think. They also feel that they have a first-hand knowledge of what the Department is thinking.

Now, it has occurred to me that whereas up to the present time the State Department has maintained, partly through lack of any attention to the problem, but partly a rather deliberate disassociation from the efforts of other countries in their information activities in the U.S. You will recall in the early days of UNIO, the United States State Department and the OWI were not formally members of that group. It seems to me one result of this meeting might be that, in the Department, where we might get together with the Information Officers of the N.A.T.O. countries, where we can meet as the UNIO group used to in the United States. And, say, just once a month, have an informal meeting with an exchange of views, a kind of co-ordination of activities to get the N.A.T.O. idea across, because it is the most effective spokesman for what is being done in each of the countries, and for the rest of the countries what is being done in the U.S.

And I am sure that it could be worked out, and I hope that we can work it out so that at some of these meetings that I have been describing there can be representatives of N.A.T.O. countries present. But it seems to me it would be a rather dramatic and effective epitomization of what we are doing here to-day, if under the aegis of the Chairmanship of the State Department, representatives of the N.A.T.O. countries could take part in some of these meetings and describe what their countries are doing and what their problems are.

/ CHAIRMAN:

CHAIRMAN: It strikes me as an excellent idea, Mr. Russell. We all realize that the branches of the National Information Services of one country operating within another country represent valuable channels for N.A.T.O. publicity and a clear demonstration of the fact that that effort is a joint effort. I should think, that as far as the operation of such a scheme in the U.S. is concerned, it would be immensely helpful if you had the cooperation of the National Information Heads operating in the United States, of these other eleven countries.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

M. G. Walravens. Belgian Foreign Office. Brussels.

Practically everything has been said before me which is a very lucky thing. The situation in Belgium is just the same as has been in some of the other countries, especially the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. We have a Communist Party; it is protected by our constitution, and there are certain things we shouldn't do. The Belgians do dislike the idea of official propaganda; they have had too much of it during the two occupations we had. And besides there are the individualists. So, to sum up, I agree with what has been said by our colleagues around this table, and I'd like myself to add a few points which I think haven't been mentioned.

As Mr. Bellingen said, I am not a propaganda specialist. I am the Head of the NATO Section of the Foreign Office. Incidentally, I have something to do with ideological warfare, and here in paragraph D, I see "Strategy in the Ideological Struggle." The strategy used in ideological warfare. Well, ideological warfare is more than only propaganda or information. Propaganda or information are to ideological warfare the same as artillery is, for instance, to the Hot War. And, as Mr. David said yesterday very well, we must meet the communists on all their grounds, not only on the propaganda ground but everywhere.

Well, there are two ways to meet this. First there is the offensive, active way - that is to bring home to them our point of view - and for that Belgium is too small a country to work alone, we will work with you but we can't do it by ourselves; we must work with your materials.

The other is the home front, the morale at home. That, with your help, must certainly be the primary aim for Belgium.

Communism in Belgium is in regression. For instance, in Parliament the strength of the Communist party is 3 percent as against 10 percent in other elections. The drop in all the communist papers in Belgium is spectacular as readers and circulation has gone down and they have serious financial trouble. They have had a strike of their personnel because they were not paid. But, although cheerful as that may seem, an experience in the matter show that Communists are mostly dangerous when they are hiding, when they appear to be powerless, - they are acting behind the curtain, behind the Iron Curtain, behind the curtain of secrecy. So we mustn't let them have their way even though they seem to be so powerless. The Communists have their agents who are not known and who work cleverly.

Let's analyze the action of the communists in Belgium. They don't undertake mass action they mostly work on syndicates, (trade unions) and certain classes of intellectuals. In the syndicates what do they do? They try to ask, to propose the syndicates to have more pay and more salaries when it is justified and when it is not justified, more part in the government of the concerns and all those things, fighting for lower prices, shorter service in the Army, all that. They actually have not been very successful because it was countered by our own labour movement.

So that as far as the syndicates are concerned, they are trying to place men in key posts, as unobtrusively as possible, and I must say that they are selected men; they are active men. They don't have the quantity, they don't have mass, they have quality. This same thing is also true on other levels. they are

trying to capture intellectuals, mainly young intellectuals. Why is it that young intellectuals who can explain to you all the most mysterious things, are always fooled by the most fallacious and obvious arguments of the communists I can't understand, but there it is, and that raises another problem which I will come to later.

They work on equivocation, they are all the time trying to make all the intellectuals think they are fighting for the cause which is not communist but peace, prosperity, neutralism. That is the main stage of their action with the intellectuals and proportionately it has been much more successful than any other action they have tried.

Naturally, the number of intellectuals is small in proportion to the masses, so at first glance it is not bad, but proportionally they are more successful there. That is why efforts should be made to bear on that particular class because they are leaders of the masses. Some of them are growing out of it, but not all. There is a difference.

Then also, they work on the emigres from the Iron Curtain in Belgium and they work on the foreign workers, either Poles or Czechs, or foreign workers of another country like Italian foreign workers. They try to work on them and for some reason there is no effective way of blocking that work of the communists on those people that has been devised. So that they have those intellectuals, neutralists, all those people who also are galvanized by anti Anglo-saxon doctrines. That is also one of the main stages of the communist propaganda.

I agree that among certain ways advised by NATO one may find useful material to combat in countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and so on, but posters, pamphlets, are not enough. One must reach the intellectual level and something must be done for educational purposes. So many professors in colleges are not quite communist but they are very deep pink, and even very deep red, and influence their pupils. This is a great danger because these pupils will vote and vote the wrong way. If I may suggest, I would like very much one day for the committee of experts to study what could be done in the field of education. It is one of the greatest problems, and some good text books, some good lectures that could be given by the government to the several educational institutions in the country might do a lot of good and do it when the young minds are influenceable. Remember what Mr. David said about the Roumanian girl of 8 years of age.

So, having said that I can't add very much to what has been said by my other colleagues and I thank you, very much.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie, Assistant Undersecretary of State,
Canadian Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Mr. Chairman, as other delegates have said, we in Canada have no Ministry of Information, and we have no government propaganda campaign in the sense. The press in Canada has been pretty effective, I think, in exposing the countering communist propaganda spontaneously. In the trade unions, too, this has been a very constructive effort in the last year or so particularly to show up communistic activities, and I think in that respect it is a pretty healthy situation. Ministers, of course, frequently make statements designed to expose communist propaganda. The Minister of External Affairs in particular has made a number of speeches dealing with the Peace campaigns, some of which, I think, have been remarkably good. The Peace Campaign is the main weapon of the communists in Canada. It has not been successful, but it has not been entirely negligible. The line that the communists seem able to take with us is to represent communism as a sort of an extension of Christian doctrine and in certain circles this has had a little success. It is really quite pathetic to see the well meaning and quite high-minded people who from time to time have been used in this way. They are not influential figures, but it is quite tragic to see them being misguided.

Another communist propaganda line which has been singularly unsuccessful has been to try to represent us as being dragged in the wake of American Imperialism. It is rather hard to make an ordinary Canadian believe that about the American people as we happen to know the Americans rather well. So this has largely backfired. In fact, I might say entirely backfired.

In the field of counter-propaganda abroad the Canadian Broadcasting Service, the International Service Broadcasts to Czechoslovakia and now lately the Soviet Union, and we hope they may be achieving something in a modest way, and I think as far as the broadcasting to the Soviet Union is concerned, it is useful to have another broadcasting service to counter the jam.

We have close contact in the field of Broadcasting with other NATO countries, informal contacts and discussion of programmes and mutual criticism and advice, and that's a useful example of the sort of informal arrangement in this field which have been very helpful, and which go on a continuing basis.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Mr. Sigvald Kristensen, Chief of the Danish Foreign Office
Press Division, Copenhagen.

I can be quite brief because when looking at Denmark you will be facing almost the same picture that Dr. Landre, my friend Mr. Olav, and my friend Haakon Lie from Norway, have pointed out. We have almost the same conditions and almost the same way of handling problems. While the Communists in Denmark had formerly more than 15 percent of the voters, they have now since the last election only got 4 percent, and are, in a political sense, no real problem in Denmark any more.

They have been divided by the Labour movements and by the Marshall plan aid. We have enough stability in employment so that we won't have an open communist problem anymore.

We have to build up quite a new policy and in that connection human considerations are important in Denmark, as the communists know well. Therefore, we have to fight in the psychological battle with special weapons just as our Netherlands colleague. Our people too have a distaste for government information so that we can't arrange any direct State propaganda, but that does not mean that we shouldn't effect any propaganda at all. We work in a way that we have built a committee, where my office is represented by Mr. Kappel, sitting behind me, and where we collect together all the materials we can find for this project. We have direct contact with the labour movement on all sorts of official propaganda matters. That is why there is need for the material we could get from you, Mr. Chairman. In the committee we do have a contact, I may state, from the American and British Embassies in Denmark, and we get many materials equally needed from them. So let us collect it together and take those things out we can use in Denmark, and in this committee we can spread it all over the community.

I think that the NATO Information Service will be a very big help to us in this work, and I believe in the success by having the struggle fought through so that we can have all the Danish people behind us and at least have a situation where only the communists, and we know them very well, are left to stand as a little group without any resources at all.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Monsieur M. Breal - Consul General, Foreign Office, Paris.

I think it would be superfluous for me to discourse on the situation of the Communist Party and Communists in France, an analysis of which would be very lengthy. In any case, I believe that all of you have a pretty general idea as to what the situation is at the moment. The Communist Party in France is a factor which has to be borne in mind. The importance of the Party at the moment is unfortunately considerable. It runs various numbers of papers such as "Humanité", "Ce Soir", "Action", etc., and on this account, as I said, it has to be borne in mind and taken into account. However, as the Luxembourg delegate said yesterday speaking of his own country, communists in France are to employ modern terms - "losing momentum" and I think the time is opportune to make use of this "loss of momentum" which is occurring at the moment and to exploit it. We should exploit furthermore the hesitations and possibly the present great misgivings which are being felt in the minds of various communists.

As for the fight against communism and that is the fight especially in exposing the lies which are brought forth by the communists, I think that it is important that we should distinguish regarding the methods which can be used. There are official methods and there are private methods, private methods which can be used jointly in conjunction with the official governmental methods, such, for example, as the organization Jean Paul David mentioned yesterday, his "Paix et Liberté". With regard to the official means, the official methods which could be employed by France, I think it would be wise to avoid, as stated yesterday by Mr. Warner and other, anything which smells of propaganda. I entirely share the opinion Mr. Warner also expressed with regard to the British press. The same applies to our own press. If any directives or instructions of any sort were issued to the press, it is very likely that such directives and instructions would have exactly the reverse effect to the effect which we desire and want.

We have, however, various effective means of transmitting material to the notice of the press and the radio, and in this way this material can be quite effectively exploited by these media. There are in France various information services and these are in close touch with the wireless networks, with the press, and even with the individuals who come personally to enquire and to obtain information.

It is the information service of the French Foreign Office with which I am closely connected, and I can assure you that journalists are on a very friendly basis with it, coming regularly to obtain whatever information is available about events and conditions behind the Iron Curtain, and for whatever information we can give them about our defence efforts. The relationship of mutual trust which exists between the journalists and our information services is an excellent arrangement for those who seek the truth, between those who seek the facts and those who supply them.

I think that the information which can be supplied from the North Atlantic Information Service, and NATO generally, would be best understood and best used if that information were brought to their knowledge through our own national services rather than by NATO directly. I say this because it is my honest opinion that the effect would be better if it came through our own services. But this in no way implies a negative attitude or negative feeling on my part; and I can assure you that it does not represent a negative attitude on behalf of the French government. In fact, if

I may reiterate what I said yesterday when the meeting opened, I am sure that the French Government believes that we must collaborate with NATO and the NATO Information Service as much as possible. And that the NATIS should supply us with all the information which is available for them to supply. We, in our turn, will transmit that information to the press and to the radio networks.

With regard to private means and private methods of fighting communism, there is, for instance, as has just been brought to your knowledge, the organization "Paix et Liberté". There are other organizations, some existing already and others to be set up. I think that these organizations which exist, or future organizations, would be very grateful for the help of NATO; such help could be considerable. But, there again, I think that this help should come through our national services. It would be better understood and the information would be made a better use of if it came through our national services. In any case, it is my sincere hope and desire that we should have the closest collaboration between our various national information services and the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Mr. Gudmundsson, (Iceland) Chief of the Press Department,
Foreign Ministry, Reykjavik.

In Iceland the three political parties are solidly united against the communist party and represent, at present, 80.5% of the electorate. The remaining 19.5% have voted for the communists, and they have nine Deputies out of the total of fifty-two. The communist party, which incidentally calls itself the unification party of the workers, included the Socialist Party, which is rather strong and pretentious in number because it is neither a united party nor an associated party. To call a spade a spade, as I shall do now, we call them simply communists. The leadership of the party is united and affiliated with Moscow, whereas the broad membership of the party is believed to be widely divided between Moscow communism and the more national sort of communism or radical Socialism.

The Stockholm appeal was launched with great publicity, but nothing was exactly known about it, because after some time it was decided to keep the names secret which, of course, made them rather the laughing stock of everybody. What was the point in putting your name to an appeal if the name was going to be kept secret. So no names have been actually given of the adherents to the Stockholm Appeal, but it has been rather a flop. Their strength of propaganda lies only in one daily paper and in the sort of evening classes which they hold for members and which are lead and controlled by the Party Directorate and very much influenced by Moscow communists.

As against that, we have all the remainder of the press which is almost 80% of the total circulation of the papers. The Labour Party, which is the Socialist Party, is now regaining control of the Trade Unions, and of the remaining unions which are still held by the communists, there are only two or three important Trade Unions left and we hope that this will shortly give way to common sense.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Mr. Carlo Ferrone-Capono, (Italy) ^Head of the Press Dept.
Foreign Ministry, Rome.

Mr. Chairman: I want to make two remarks and they are real plain speaking. Why we have assembled here, why we have been extremely interested in this conference is due to the fact that we expect to use more and more of the instruments that N.A.T.O. can place at our disposal in what Mr. Newton has called the "strategy of the ideological struggle". But I think we shall be missing the real meaning of our meeting unless we realize clearly what we are fighting against. We are not fighting Communism but Cominformism, or Soviet imperialism; and I want to put to you a question: are you convinced that the Soviets have the initiative in the world on a worldwide basis in propaganda? Are you convinced that they have succeeded in reversing even the meaning of words? If you are, and I think your reply to the remarks of Mr. Lie and Mr. David the other day means yes, you have to agree that something must be done. It is not enough to print a speech to have a problem solved. I insist we have to do something. The Italian Delegate may put forward some suggestions; Mr. Lie in his convincing words was stressing the same necessity the other day; so did, splendidly, Mr. David. People in Italy are of the same opinion. Why? Because we are on the front line, we have to withstand the first shock, and, therefore we get the strongest impact of Communist propaganda. +) We open or put on a raincoat. Today we are walking in the street completely naked, and it is pouring. So, let's do something, let's fight the Cominform on a worldwide basis, let's put the Soviets on the defensive instead of always breaking our neck by thinking how we could answer their propaganda. On a national scale we have done a lot and very efficiently. You heard what the French Delegate told you about the action taken in France; you heard about our fight against the Communists in Italy which was brought successfully and efficiently conducted; you heard what the other national Delegates have said about the same struggle in their respective national spheres. But we have to admit that internationally the Communists have the upper hand. It is up to the Council of Deputies to tackle this matter; it is up to them and the Governments they represent to find out what can be done altogether. We don't want to create a machinery of State propaganda or of super-national propaganda. We are all in agreement that we can't have

+) If it rains, what do we do?

State propaganda. In Italy for instance we had so much propaganda for 20 years that people are deeply suspicious of it. If they see something printed with N.A.T.O. on it, they will react in such a same way. So all we have to do is to seek other channels and the initiatives I have put forward as simple suggestions have to be taken up by private committees, by private agencies, who must be supported discreetly. But it is about time that we take the initiative. We had enough of the Stockholm Appeal, the peace conference, and the agitation for four or five conferences. We want to see something impressive being done by the West. And we think the West can do it and do it just using the truth. That is why I recommend to you the following resolution:

(Reading): "The N.A.T.O. Conference of National Information Officials at its meeting in London on 14th April considering that the Soviet propaganda machine has for too long had a free run in providing aggressive campaigns, on a world-wide basis, by distorting facts and even the meaning of words:

"Agreed on the desirability for the Council Deputies to study what effective steps could be taken to establish policies designed to turn the present defensive position of N.A.T. countries in the counter-propaganda field into active initiatives likely to make a strong impression on public opinion."

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIESStrategy in the Ideological Struggle- M. G. Heisbourg, Luxembourg Legation, London

Since the war, Communism has gone down in Luxembourg. Whereas Communists were represented in the Government from November 1945 to February 1947 the only official body on which they are at present represented is the Chamber of Deputies where they hold 4 seats out of 51. This gives them a platform which they use extensively but on the other hand they can be answered from the same platform. There is a Communist Daily with a low circulation and the non-Communist press does all it can to counteract Communist propaganda. The methods, aims and objectives of Communists in Luxembourg are the same as those in Belgium or France and without wishing to anticipate what the representatives of those two countries will have to say in a few moments, I think I can endorse their remarks in advance.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.Dr. J. M. Landre,Director Netherlands Government Information Service, The Hague.

Mr. Chairman. I will say it in a few words, as I did already yesterday in a very brief statement at the first meeting. Just as Mr. Warner said, in my country any direct propaganda against Soviet imperialism from the Government is impossible. We can't do that and we don't want to do that. But, on the other hand, we are willing to try to be as stimulating as possible by giving facts which we hope to get more and more from NATO Information Service, to all these organizations peoples, churches, and so on, which we think are useful to them. Of course, in a case of direct propaganda attack on our country from the Soviet Union which has happened from time to time, as you know especially in our recent policy, the government gives straight answers. But that is more an exception than the normal thing. We think it is more useful for the Government to give positive information on principles as freedom of religion, justice, on the social and economic field, freedom of cultural matters, freedom of man, etc. We call that our present deal which we can do ourselves. I can't say like the representative of Portugal that we have no communist programme at all, but especially our labour organizations are very keen to give an answer to everything the communists do, and the communists can't do much. What they can do: they have a newspaper and that is all they print. They have no posters in our country, they have no pamphlets, they can't come into the movies, so that we have no films with the communist ideals and things like that. So our free organizations handle the matter, and we think they do that well, because it is a fact that in the years behind us the percentage of communists in our country has gone down and down more and more, although the situation is of course ripe to give them all advantages by the unpleasant measures which every government has to take at the moment for defending our common freedom.

Nevertheless, the figures, for example, we had from the communist newspaper, especially in the town of Amsterdam, are going down still. So we view the future in this special case with confidence which normally does not mean that we leave to be done in our way what the French gentleman told us. It is very useful for our neighbours if they need help in their fields that also other countries do something only to show our mutual interests in the whole field. That is all that I can say about the thing as far as the Netherlands is concerned.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

Mr. Hans Olav, Director of Information Service,

Norwegian Foreign Office, Oslo.

I think Mr. Haaken Lie yesterday painted a picture of what non-governmental associations are doing on a broad scale. I might add that the communist party has been steadily reduced in numbers and influence in Norway. The last election they lost every mandate they held in our National Assembly. There is in general a fight between what might be called the national "Titoists" and the Moscovites. There are many signs of political disintegration. Officially, the Russian Embassy does circulate in Norwegian a weekly publication which is dropped in many mail boxes. I don't know to what extent it is read, but they have not been dynamic enough in their approach to the Norwegian public at all.

There has been a growing tendency in the Norwegian press and other ways to depart from the niceties of salutation and call the Russians not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but The Russian Bear, Russian Imperialists, because I think it is generally felt in Norway that Russians have long since appropriated most of the good names such as peace conferences, peace councils, appeals and peoples' democracies. Otherwise, I think an effective counteraction has been made in Norway to pick up Russian statements on known events in Norway. For instance, when American ships have come with materials, then we will find a week or less later in Russian newspapers, or Russian Broadcasts rather a fantastic description of the reception of the ship - thousands of people turned out in the middle of the night to protest against it. We will simply publish that because everybody knows how transparently fallacious such statements are; they know that did not happen.

Two or three weeks ago, 3000 workers in one of our Western towns had to quit their jobs because there was a lack of water power. There had not been enough downpour. That was presented in the Iron Curtain area as a report to the effect that 3000 Norwegians protested against the present government and the rising prices and they had walked out in solidarity. But with the Russians making such propoganda, it was a simple matter to reproduce this and thus we created a very fine boomerang effect.

I think that is just about all I have to say at this time, but on the whole I believe that the problem we have with the communists is one of security rather than one of keeping them politically in check.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Mr. Paço d'Arcos, Press Chief, Portuguese Foreign Office, Lisbon.

Dr. J.M. da COSTA prefers to delegate his colleague Mr. Paço d'Arcos, who has been for so many years Chief of the Press Department of the Portuguese Foreign Office, to speak on the matter.

Mr. PAÇO d'ARCOS: Having to speak now about Soviet propaganda in Portugal and its influence on the Portuguese public opinion, I have to turn first to the matter of our declaration at the beginning of this Conference. In this declaration we called your attention to what we have seen in the NATO documents about the objectives of our efforts. We had only time for a brief study of the NATO documents, but in them we saw that we are fighting not the communist doctrine but only its vicious utilization. This means that if we are fighting only the vicious utilization, and not the doctrine in itself, we are accepting the doctrine. This is what we consider wrong and to such a dangerous mistake we called your attention in our declaration.

Now we saw, in the work of this Conference yesterday and today, that almost all the speakers have been dealing with the way of fighting communist propaganda and I think this is the true ground in which we have to work, because in our point of view both things are linked: Soviet imperialism and Communism.

Yesterday we heard the most interesting statement of the Norwegian Labour representative and today the statement of the French gentleman; both came to explain their ideas and methods to this Conference and I am happy to see that they confirm all that we have insisted for. We are not dealing here with the military problems but with the information aspect, and it is in such a field that we have to fight communist propaganda.

As you, perhaps know, the Communist Party is not legal in our country and so our defence against communist activities is not so difficult as in the countries where the Party has legal existence. We are also not so near the Iron Curtain as some of the countries represented in this Conference and this makes things different, too.

We have for many years fought communist propaganda in our country but we cannot say that our public opinion has no sensitiveness to world currents. So, the Peace offensive of Stockholm had in fact, when it was started, a small effect on our public opinion, but the Press did their best to clarify the matter and to show how this Peace Conference was only the way to disarm the Western Countries in face of the power of the East block.

Neutrality had some small effect in the way that it was born in France, and Portugal is much linked, by cultural ties, with France, and has a long French tradition. Portuguese opinion reacts with great sensitiveness to the declarations, so many times in contradiction one with the other, of the statesmen of the West, especially when the public finds that they have not a clear idea of their intentions and thoughts, and when we see a statesman saying one thing one day and the opposite the next day, this has a very bad influence on our public opinion. Generally speaking, labour is always the class where communism can more easily open its way and as labour has been for the last twenty years the class that has received better protection in social welfare from our Government - and I am at ease to say so because they have been much more protected than we civil servants have been - we must agree that we have not a serious communist problem in Portugal. However, with the rearmament and all the expenses that it brings to the Governments and to the member countries we have to take much care and we are taking all the care to show Labour and all classes that these that these sacrifices are absolutely necessary for the defence of our civilization.

We agree that we must approach one another, in this matter of mutual information for the effort of the defence of the West. We have not an Information Department prepared yet for this kind of work, in this sphere of international collaboration, but we have paid much attention to everything that was said here during these two days and we have the best intention to return to Portugal and organize in our Information Department a section in which we will collaborate with you and Mr. Newton's service with the best intention of helping you in your job and of receiving all your suggestions to clarify Portugal's public opinion about these matters, which mean for us the cause of the freedom of all our peoples.

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

Mr. C.F.A. Warner, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
in charge of Information, Foreign Office, London.

I just want to say, very shortly, that we are absolutely convinced of the need for a co-ordinated and important information programme, and we are ready to give it all the backing and help that we can. There is no doubt at all of the great and important task which we are together here to consider

As regards our own population here, we are one of the countries where it is undoubtedly necessary to avoid the appearance of propaganda. Overt government propaganda is the task of Ministers. Many of them make speeches which contain anti-communist statements. But if the government machine issued official handouts to the press and public, it would be obvious that there was an official propaganda going on. The way we work, therefore, is by giving reliable information and guidance where it is wanted, to the journalists, publicists, and what I call in the resolution which you have been kind enough to pass, key men in other walks of life.

I think in your own countries the first thing that you have got to do is to know the theory and practice of Soviet and communist strategy and tactics and the second is to have absolutely reliable information. You can, if you slip up on a few occasions and the communists make an effective reply, do damage which will shake the confidence of the key men and publicists you need for a very long time. Therefore, second, I would put an effective research and intelligence organization to ensure that what you give them is absolutely accurate and can stand fire.

We consider that in our country (it may be different in others) the communists themselves are the least part of the target, the second and third targets are much more important in our view here, that is the fellow travellers and sympathisers, and (third) to prevent the public being deceived by perfectly innocent-looking activities and propaganda which are in fact organized by the communists by exposing their communist origin. And, of course, on top of that one wants to indoctrinate the public against the myth of the Soviet paradise, and against Soviet methods and manoeuvres so that they spontaneously react in an intelligent way and see through communist manoeuvres.

So, what we have accumulated, and are continually accumulating, first of all are facts about life in the Soviet Union, secondly, about life in the Satellites, and third, facts on Soviet methods and intentions towards the outside world. For the rest, as I have suggested, we believe that the best way to go about it in countries which are like ours is to feed these facts, to publicists and others who can influence large numbers of people. I agree very much with what Mr. Haaken Lie and Mr. David said that the best way of all, when you can do it, is to condemn the communists out of their own mouths by publicizing their own statements which explode their propaganda. Some of you may remember that we exposed the Soviet forced labour legislation, and I think that has had repercussions - with perhaps a little help - which are still going on and can still be worked up. That, I believe, is the best and most effective kind of operation. As I said, you supply information of that kind to contacts and people who want the information for writing, for speaking and so on, in as many different walks of life and sections of the population as you can.

I think the way to do it is to analyse the population into its various sections of opinion - trade unions, churches, and so on and then find suitable contacts in each. If you like, it is a question of getting a voluntary cell, or cells in each section of the population. That is the way we work and you will see from what I have said the kind of material we produce and kind of research and intelligence work that we do, and we should be very glad, if it is of use, to put the fruits of that research and analysis continuously at the disposal of the member governments.

STRATEGY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE.

Mr. Edward Barrett, United States Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

"Soviet propaganda; counter-propaganda and factors affecting public morale in member countries."

It is a broad subject; let's take propaganda. As you are well aware we did a pretty thorough job of studying and analysing Soviet propaganda to the home audience and the Soviet propaganda to audiences abroad based on the monitoring reports, on the press readings, and so on. And we do have a great deal of material in that regard, some of it duplicating the material that Mr. Warner has referred, as some of it comes from the same sources. And we would like to throw this into this general pool of NATO.

Second, we have done a good deal of experimenting with culling from the Soviet's own propaganda source-material that can be used against them. That is evidenced in Soviet affairs notes that we put out once a week from the State Department, and distributed, I think, to some of you. It is also evident in the HICOG publications, "Ost Probleme", of which many of you are aware and which Mr. Lie referred to yesterday.

Finally, we do get from certain of the Iron Curtain countries bits of news that are collected locally, which we use primarily for broadcasting back on the Voice of America, and which we have found to be extraordinarily good audience bait.

Now, on counter propaganda, as affecting public morale in member countries: We have endeavoured in America in the case of the "Peace" Offensive, in the Stockholm "Peace" Petition, to get the private organizations early in the history of these "peace" efforts to respond with quite a drive to expose it. That was done through Mr. Russell's meetings with the representatives of these private organizations, and the net result is that it was quite well exposed in America before it gained much headway there. We also endeavoured, of course, by the Voice of America, and our Information Service, to expose it in other areas. We have had very little experience in this field within the United States. About last month, in Washington, the "Peace Crusade" was joined by a number of the Commie front organizations that are now recognized by the American public as dummy fronts. We managed by the placement of statements with the Secretary of State, with the Congressional Committees, and with several members of Congress, to get the "Crusade" exposed before it started. We ridiculed it, got it ridiculed by government officials and private organizations before it got underway, with the result that I think we can say it was pretty much of a flop.

I feel that we certainly still have the job, not at home, but in much of the world, to expose the phoney "peace" crusade of the communists. It's a difficult one in parts other than in Europe. I think the "Exploding Dove" needs to be shown in much more widely than has been to date, and I think that is one of the things that each of us is going to have to concentrate on in our own National Information Services as we go back and roll up our shirt sleeves and get to work at our desks.

I believe that NATO Information Service can be of particular value on that one. For example, we have noted that we have inadequate information coming to us as to what other governments are doing to combat the Stockholm "Peace" Petition and the other commie and sponsored "peace" movements. We have not got a good sampling of what other governments have been doing. We've got a great deal of your material, Mr. Warner, and from Norway, I believe, and a few other countries, but I think that we are going to contend for a long time with that endeavour of the commies to capture the world "peace". I would like to see NATIS give priority in pooling together the materials, and ideas that have been utilized by the member governments and sending it out to the member governments.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

Speech by M. Jean Paul DAVID, Member of the
French Assembly, Mayor of Mantes, and
President of "Paix et Liberté".

"I am honoured to come and address this assembly, but I wish to stress that any comment which I make in no way commits the French Representative or his colleagues. Furthermore, some of the things which I say may appear unpalatable, even unpleasant, but I can assure you that I shall speak honestly as I feel.

The first idea which I would like to convey is to express my concept of information and propaganda. It is absolutely useless, it is, indeed, a waste of time if all that we are going to discuss is a matter of words. I know that some delegations do not wish to have propaganda and that all they want is factual information. Days can be spent and wasted on discussing what we do not want. I suggest that we spend our time discussing what we do want.

Meetings such as yours can convene and discuss various points and discussions can occur on the best way of carrying things out, but there is one point which should be definitely borne in mind. We must sacrifice everything for the sake of effectiveness. As to the means with which we can carry out our tasks, these are very simple. We must use every means available. After all, the opposite camp uses every means, and if for some reason or another, we decided not to use such means that would be a criminal act. We would be acting as criminals in the light of those whom we seek to protect.

That is how we in "Paix and Liberté" act. We use every possible means at our disposal. Some objections may be encountered; people may have scruples that the methods which we suggest might shock, might vex, might even, in a way, be embarrassing. If you are going to be hampered by such scruples, the result of your work will simply be a lot of papers. What we want are the results of action, and action against the opposite camp.

The enemy, if I may use this term, has a very great advantage. They have one chief and when that chief gives an order, that order is carried out on the double. They have one aim, one method and speed. It is up to us to use the same principles to combat them. If, when a poster is put up by the communists, we cannot answer with a similar poster the very same day, it is useless - that is to say, it is useless to wait some three or four days before effective counteraction. If we decide to have a meeting to fix methods for combatting his propaganda, that is excellent; but if it is necessary to have some four or five meetings before we can decide to give news to the free world, that is useless, because by that time all the news will have been undermined by the communist propaganda.

In order to do all this we must have the necessary information. If we cannot answer these various points raised by the enemy, we will not be worthy of the part which we have to play, and worthy of those whom we have to protect.

/ All is....

All is fair in love and war. The enemy uses every weapon he has at his disposal. It is up to us to use every weapon possible, to think of those weapons before our adversary himself is going to use them. If we do not do this, the result will be neutralism, pacifism, or indifference.

I can give various personal examples which have been the result of my work with "Paix et Liberté". This organization was created last year. Its creation was ridiculed but I think that its action has proved its efficiency and its use. Since the liberation, communists alone, until recently, have made use of posters, stickers, bills, pamphlets, and so on. As M. Belliard pointed out in his statement yesterday, a lot of people think that posters, stickers, and pamphlets have no effect. They say, "We don't look at them." They say that during the war the walls were plastered with pamphlets by the Germans and they had no effect. But I wish to point out and explain that pamphlets do have, and posters do have, a very definite effect on people.

I can give an example: we intend very shortly to commemorate - if I may use the word - the Black Sea Mutiny. If you were to ask anybody in the various European countries, and especially in France, what the Black Sea Mutiny was, or who André Marty was, you will probably get no answer. Those who do know who André Marty was might say he was a rebel, a mutineer, that he went over to the Soviets, that he gave his ship to them. He was the ship's engineer. If the person of whom you ask this question does happen to know to whom you refer, if he is a communist he will applaud the action of André Marty, if he is not a communist he will say, "Well, André Marty's action was a pity", and do no more about it. Yet for the last thirty years, the communists have been applauding André Marty's actions. For thirty years they have been giving out propaganda lauding what he said, and yet he was not a rebel. He was brought to trial, and it was proved that he only tried to sell his ship, that he had no intention of giving it to the Bolsheviks, that from what he knew about the Bolsheviks, he hated them. Indeed, in a letter which he wrote to his family at the time of the trial, he stated that he was terribly sorry for all the trouble which might accrue to the family as a result of this bringing in of the Bolsheviks.

For thirty years, communists have been perpetrating this lie; for thirty years they have been spreading false propaganda about this. Accordingly, out of a population of some 45 million Frenchmen, there are 35 who may know who André Marty is, but they would say he is a traitor. Yet, he was no traitor.

If you are to use posters, you must have the means of using them, you must have the will to use them, and you must use them repeatedly. I have another example which I can give you, a more up-to-date example, possibly; and it deals with propaganda in Roumania. You may have read in your papers recently of a girl, eight years old, who returned from Roumania and when she arrived at the Station in Paris all she could do was raise her clenched fist and shout communist slogans. She refused to eat any croissant - French bread; she wanted to eat only black bread. She was utterly impervious to Western civilization. She said all that we said here in the West was a pack of lies. It was a fortnight before, under

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the influence of her family she could be persuaded to eat anything at all. It was a fortnight or more before she would even believe that food was unrationed here in France. It was much longer before she could believe that the taxis she saw running in the streets were not just running for her own benefit.

It is quite understandable when you realize the French textbooks on which she was brought up contained Victor Hugo, Balzac and the remainder just Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and so on and so forth. It will take some 12 - 15 years, if ever, before the false impressions which have been created in that child's mind can ever be rectified.

But it must be realized that lies, if not contradicted, will eventually have an effect on the minds of those who hear them, they will permeate. That, unfortunately, has turned out to be true especially in France and Italy, and there have been no reasonable countermeasures for some time. We must use authentic documents, truths, to combat these communist lies. In a way, perhaps, we are very lucky that we can use truths, that in fact we don't have to use anything else but truths. Although I may state possibly, off the record, that I myself would lie black in the face if it would be of any use to combat communist methods. But we don't have to lie, the truth is our ally, and we can use it.

We must do everything that we can, and I suggest that the best way is to use their own documents. If we throw back to them their own sayings, their own documents will confound them more than anything else, though possibly it may take months, possibly even years before the necessary results are achieved.

Now in "Paix et Liberté", we issue 200,000 posters a week and even the smallest Parish in France, which has only ten inhabitants, receives its poster. It may take some four months before workmen start coming to fetch their pamphlets, or six months before people are willing to abandon ideas which they have cherished dearly, or possibly one year before we can achieve superiority in propaganda, but results depend on our will to overcome the subservient propaganda of the opposite side. Only will can fight will.

If possible, we must answer what the enemy puts out, within the hour. If we are to answer within the hour, or even within the day, we must have the necessary material wherewith to answer. It isn't only in those countries where the communist danger is the greatest that action must be taken; it must be taken in those countries where communist danger and infiltration is possibly less than elsewhere.

After all, we are all here together. We are linked. There is a solidarity and we must act in that solidarity. We must act in such a way that what we do will be of benefit to our neighbours. We must not forget that there are tourists in our various countries. What they see in our country will be repeated elsewhere, and it is our intention that what they see and what is done in our various countries is repeated in all other countries. And that will eventually wear down and worry the enemy, which is what we want to achieve.

/ Therefore....

Therefore, we must have these posters, we must have these pamphlets, these stickers. We must use these media, as well as films and the wireless. We have acted in some little way in the latter already, but we must set up on an active footing in these various media. We must be definitely superior in them.

Of course, I admit, I have an advantage. Our organization is a private organization. I am all alone, I do not have to consult with anybody. I do not have to refer to anybody. As such, therefore, I have the advantage of being able to act quickly. But, before I give certain general personal ideas as to what should be done in order to counteract Soviet propaganda, I would like to remind you that communist action is subtle, and it is organized. And this subtlety, this organization, very often escapes the notice of people, unless one looks particularly closely. Communist activity permeates and invades all professional fields. For instance, the concierges, the doorkeepers, in France have a newspaper. That one newspaper is under communist control. The Old Soldiers' Associations have three newspapers - two of them are under communist control, and of those two, one is so subtly under control that you really have to look closely before you can discover communist influence.

In every professional field there is communist influence. And what have we to combat it on the opposite side? On our side we have goodwill. There are certain public spirited citizens who will undertake to do various things, and that is fine. If there are no public spirited citizens to undertake this work, frequently nothing is done, and in that case the communists are left with a free field as they have been for the last two years in various domains.

On the other hand, if things are done, they may not always be the right things and sometimes more harm than good is done by well intentioned actions which have not really taken into account all that has to be done. It is the task of such agencies as the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service to make sure that the proper action is taken in the proper place.

There are three measures which I would like to suggest to you - measures which have to be carefully studied and carefully carried out. The first is, what I would call a neutral measure - and when I say neutral, I mean neither official nor unofficial. In this category fall such things as photographs. Photographs can be taken of various events and the negatives sent to the press. The press reproduce them, or do not reproduce them, according to what they think.

Similarly, with newsreels. Films are made of events or not made, according to the importance which the newsreel companies attach to certain events. They may add certain commentaries; they may add a caption; the same with radio coverage of various events. All these are neutral measures - the press, the wireless, the newsreels. It is a factual reproduction of events that occurs and no one can accuse it of being propaganda in any way. I would like to suggest that the governments themselves suggest that various events be covered in this way; by press, wireless, or newsreels. The governments themselves could first of all define

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what exactly there is to do and not to do. They should orchestrate the whole result.

The second measures which I would like to suggest are official measures. In these, the various governments should concert together for co-ordinated action. This is mainly to counteract the various Soviet lies which are issued. These lies should be noted and refuted by concerted action, which is possibly what the Deputies are doing at the moment in the Palais Rose.

Furthermore, action should be taken on a national basis, that is to say, information should be coordinated and then disseminated without arousing public suspicion. The public should not be acutely aware that the various governments have agreed that such and such should be done.

The third type of measure concerns organizations such as my own. Unofficial organizations, such as the one I represent and of which I am Chairman, can exist anywhere. They can even be bigger than my organization. However, there are many fields which "Paix et Liberté" does not cover. These are fields in which the governments have no concern, fields which they should not enter for polemics and even insults enter into this, for, if the opposite camp are going to use insults, we have to answer them with insults and shock tactics. In this respect, governments may often find themselves in great difficulty in agreeing on the texts, the drawings, the types and the colours of various posters.

What we must agree is on what we have to do and which of us is going to do what, so as to make sure that the whole field is properly covered. I can give examples of what has been done in the way of pamphlets. For example, I will speak of my own end, the Paris end. I have received from London various pamphlets in Polish about happenings in Warsaw; I have also received pamphlets from Rome, Washington and elsewhere. Granted, these are very fine efforts, but the actual result is really not very much. We need this information from behind the Iron Curtain, but it must be coordinated. At present there is chaos in this field - that is to say, you see snippets of information from one side or from the other. We want coordinated information and a bulletin which could be issued to all the countries containing coordinated and correlated information of this sort.

If, on a military operation you are going to use counter propaganda, you will make sure that you have inside information. This is the same in this respect. You must make sure that you have inside information, informants inside the Iron Curtain, and then the information which you receive must be centralized, coordinated and issued.

The next point of which I take account is possibly a delicate one and one with which you may have to deal outside this room, though possibly not inside: I mean the coordination of police activities, the activities of watching over agitators. I believe that there has been a conference in this respect, and they got so far as to voting a resolution although if my experience in these matters is anything to go by, they have not gone far beyond the resolution stage. I consider it essential that there should be information from the 12 Powers as to police surveillance of various agitators, that there should be an exchange of information about the coming of any agitators, shall we say, to France, to start strikes, and then going from France

/ to Belgium....

to Belgium, and so on. It is not a fairy tale that these agitators do go around. It is unfortunately grim fact. This may already have been in the thoughts of various people, but it is up to you gentlemen to make quite sure that these thoughts are carried out, and to suggest that there should be periodic meetings of what we might call a "brains trust", to exchange what information they have as to the activities of these agitators. There are many other similar activities which could be carried out in this field.

It is necessary to coordinate the action of the press, to coordinate the action of posters, police, radio, wireless, possibly to have simultaneous wireless emissions. Sometimes a wireless transmission should be complementary. One country should carry part of a story and another country another part. You may decide to widen, to enlarge the wave bands; you may also decide to spread the listening hours. I am sure that if you look carefully at this problem of transmission you would find three or four countries all transmitting at the same time, thus losing valuable listening time. We should act not only in the countries of the Atlantic Community, but prolongate that action. All of us - including myself - should act not only in our own countries, but beyond the Iron Curtain. Some of us do, and these sources which do are possibly unsuspected.

I know that in Poland, agents, books, pamphlets have infiltrated, but there has been no coordination in this infiltration. I would like to call your attention to the fact that it must be done not only in Poland, not only in Bulgaria and the other satellite countries, but we must do it in the U.S.S.R. We must do it not only by radio, but by every means at our disposal. After all, this hydra, this bloodsucker gets hold of you. Of course, if you cut off its arms, one or two arms, you will obtain temporary relief, but you can only obtain permanent relief if you still the beast. After all, the U.S.S.R. is carrying out propaganda in your country, and you must carry out propaganda in his and by subtle methods. You must use every possible method to reach his ears. As my "Dove which goes boom!" has proved, this is no Utopia. Five thousand copies have reached Roumania. I issued these posters as a private individual and never asked any government to insure that they reach Roumania or anywhere else. The fact that 5,000 copies reached Roumania means that possibly, not millions, but at least thousands of Roumanians will be able to see this poster. But, if such possibilities are within the reach of a private individual, the immense possibilities of concerted action are patent. So far, there has been no co-ordination on an international basis and it is even worse to realize that there has been no coordination on a national basis.

There is no one single person, man or organization, or bureau which knows everything which goes on within his own country. The Foreign Office, the Home Office, the other Ministeries at times issue bulletins devoid of any knowledge of what is issued or what is going on in other Departments. Similarly, with the radio, some states have state radios and private stations. They all issue broadcasts without knowing what is going on elsewhere. Similarly, with the press. If only the various representatives of these various organizations could meet and coordinate their work, they would be surprised at what could be achieved.

I know that if a person from one office was to go across the corridor to the other person's office and that would be a / world-shaking....

world-shaking revolution. That is the trouble with democracies, and it is the penalty we have to pay for being a democracy. We have to break down this type of national inertia to preserve our personal freedoms. If we could break down this inertia, we could settle problems which are indeed vital to our existence.

I will give an example - a French example, because, naturally, I know best what occurs in France: I wished to put up some propaganda posters in the French Railway Stations. I approached the stationmaster and he referred it back to the SNCF, the National French Railways. The National French Railways referred me back to the Ministry of Works. The Ministry of Works were very worried about possible repercussions, and they would have to inquire from higher authority as to what could or could not be done. This took six months. If there had been a central agency, a central bureau, I could have had the answer and a clearance within a matter of a week. And this example could be multiplied up and down the line.

The important thing is to have a will to do what we have to do and what we want to do. This meeting, gentlemen, is very important and if it can reach any decisions on what is to be done, it will have achieved a very great purpose. It will not have achieved that purpose if it simply decides at the end of this meeting to meet again in a fortnight, and at the end of that fortnight to meet again in some two or three months.

We must realize, gentlemen, that we have a very, very strong opponent, and we must break the iron will and the iron methods of that opponent by using his own methods.