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COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA

Note by the Chairman

The Committee entrusted the Chairman with the task of preparing a working paper for consideration at the next meeting.

2. I have prepared the text attached hereto as an informal working draft for members of the Committee. As we agreed, this will not be regarded as a Committee paper, or given any distribution beyond the members of the Committee, until the Committee has met again to consider it.

3. May I remind you that the Committee is scheduled to meet next on Wednesday, 11th March, at 3.30 p.m. (Conference Room VII). Any members of the Committee who are not able to attend may care to send me their comments in writing.

(Signed) EVELYN SHUCKBURGH

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

Part I. Background. The Situation in
Africa south of the Sahara.

1. General.

Africa is in a state of transformation and ferment. The peoples and races of the continent, who have never before been conscious of one another's existence, and whose civilisation has been long determined by outside power, are beginning to be influenced by new and universal ideas and to become aware of a common destiny. The African awakening coincides with the weakening of European power and the contraction of the white man's self assurance and influence. It also coincides with the growth of social and economic tensions resulting from industrialisation and development and with the first fruits of the education which the West has given to the African. By the mechanics of modern communications these influences are spread round the Continent and penetrate into corners not previously touched by outside thought.

2. Hitherto, it has been possible to look upon the different territories of Africa separately, in terms of the interests and methods of the different European powers administering them. Now, events in one part of Africa interact with those in another and all the problems tend to become common problems. Central Africa is profoundly affected, for example, both by the conflict in North Africa and by the racial policies of the Union of South Africa, and the constitutional changes

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introduced by the administering Power in one dependent territory intimately affect the position in others. Cairo radio is a notable stimulant to this tendency in all areas where it can be heard. The Sahara, which has hitherto stood as a dividing line between the Arab-Mediterranean civilisation of North Africa and Black Africa, is beginning to lose this significance.

3. There is, however, no single pattern to be drawn of political or social development in Africa, and no rules are applicable to Africa as a whole. All generalizations must be received with caution. The only certain universal features are change and awakening.

2. Political Evolution.

4. The outstanding political feature is emergent nationalism. This idée-force can be felt to an increasing degree in all parts of Africa, in the dependent territories as well as in the independent national states. It takes many different forms. It is not exclusively concerned with national independence in the political sense but includes, in varying degrees, as it did in the Middle East, longings for social revolution, racial status, education and economic progress. It presides over the emergence of independent African states from the hitherto mainly colonial body of Africa.

5. Up to 1950 there were only four sovereign states in Africa - Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa. Libya became independent in 1951 and since the Conference of Bandung in 1955 five more have done so - the Sudan, Morocco,

Tunisia, Ghana and Guinea. 41% of the population and 33% of the territories of Africa now belong to independent states. In 1960, Somalia, Nigeria, Cameroon and Togo will join them, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will follow. Many other territories have a large degree of autonomy - notably the Republics of the French Community.

6. The character and consequences of African nationalism can be studied with advantage at the point where new independent states are in formation. From the examples of the Sudan, Ghana and Guinea certain trends may be detected. The 'nationalist' ambition is not necessarily limited to the territorial or racial unit in question; it may become identified with regional, pan-African or even wider racial ideas. It may attach itself to wholly unrealistic aims. It finds its expression in numerous parties and political movements. It is not necessarily wedded to democratic principles. Where there are important white settlements the African nationalist movement has additional motivations, and special tensions exist. Nowhere are European settlers in a majority and nowhere do the Europeans and Africans have political or social equality. Though demanding from Africans an acknowledgement of white leadership, Europeans in Africa have never yet noted as if they were of identical race, culture or group. Their divisions are now more than ever exploitable.

3. The appeal of authoritarianism.

7. Accustomed, before the colonial period, to be ruled by native minorities, the Africans seem inclined to revert to

that type of system when the colonial power is withdrawn. Earlier tribal and religious disciplines, seldom completely submerged in the colonial period, re-appear to compete for power with newer forms of political authority. In this struggle, the new, centralising, 'party-boss' type of leader, at the head of a single party, tends to prove stronger than the tribal or religious leader. There seems to be no inherent distaste for dictatorial rule, and consequently no automatic repugnance for systems such as Nasser's in Egypt or even for the Communist system. Authoritarian rule that succeeds in eliminating cultural backwardness, corruption and tribal divisions, and in bringing about rapid industrialisation, will continue to be profoundly attractive to the African intellectual.

8. Although, therefore the emancipation of Africa has hitherto been modelled on the example of the West, and has indeed been forwarded by the conscious policy of Western countries, the institutions eventually adopted by independent African countries are likely to be very different from those of the Western world. This need not, however, necessarily prevent a Western orientation of their policies, unless the West adopts a very rigid attitude towards it.

4. Economic and Social change.

9. The economic and social transformation of Africa in recent years has been no less striking than the political. From an economy of primary type, Africa has passed rapidly into the age of industrialisation and the large-scale exploitation of agriculture and mining resources. The consequent alteration in

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the social structure has created a new class, living on the margins of the industrial and commercial centres, severed from traditional institutions and open to new influences good and bad. The discomfort and loneliness of the towns, the effect of repetitions and purposeless work, the loss of tribal restraints, have often had deleterious effects on character. Problems of labour, salaries and professional associations have arisen. Most African Trades Unions have shown revolutionary political aims. Sekou Touré, N'krumah and Tom M'Boya were Trade Union leaders. Directed against the white man, the rich man, the imperialist and the exploiter, trades unionism has become the main source of African political action and leadership. The new and more direct contacts with the white coloniser brought about by industrialisation have not, in many cases, improved understanding. Racial tensions have increased and the reaction against the colonial situation has become intensified. New group movements have arisen in place of those left behind in the tribe and to meet the needs of the new economic situation.

10. At the same time, with the failure of Christianity to extend and hold its influence, the way has been opened for religious proselytism of the masses religious, messianic and racist creeds through secret associations and societies, some of which carry direct political undertones. (Kibangism in the lower Congo, Lassisme in French Equatorial Africa and the Mau Mau in Kenya are cases in point). The influence of Islam, spreading from the north, is an important factor. On the whole it has attached itself to the more advanced elements of society and has

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become a more powerful influence on the emerging nations than Christianity. Through the influence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia its influence has recently been anti-western. The forms of Islam prevalent in Africa south of the Sahara, however, have wide divergences from orthodox Islam.

11. Education, in the meantime, has begun to create a class of elite or évolués, who play an essential part in the discontents, as well as in the achievements, of the new society. Many of these educated Africans bear within them, besides the ambitions of a young generation, special sources of instability and resentment. Isolated amongst the Europeans who have given them degrees but not equality they find themselves estranged from their own countrymen by the alien culture and the technical skills which they have acquired. They are the standard bearers of revolution and change.

5. The Economic problems.

12. In the dependent territories, the administering powers have usually taken steps to ensure the orderly and profitable marketing of local products and to provide capital for development of local industry. After independence, however, these problems assume new importance, and a major factor in the economic relations between independent African states and the West is the extent to which the West can offer dependable markets for African products. This is important even in the case of minerals and other commodities produced by Western companies. It acquires a

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special political significance in the case of crops produced by a large number of African small farmers; and the effect is further heightened when the economy of an African country depends almost entirely on the export of a single crop (e.g. cotton, cocoa, bananas).

13. As these countries become independent, their aspirations for economic development grow; and in particular they aspire to large-scale and spectacular public works which can serve as the symbols of economic progress. But this is precisely the moment at which their economic development encounters new difficulties. Not only does the economic assistance and technical expertise hitherto supplied by the Administering Power naturally diminish, but private investors feel less sure of the economic and political future and the rate of private investment therefore also tends to fall off.

14. Much the same applies to the question of technical assistance, which is vital for the development of African territories, and which has been largely supplied from Western countries. The Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (CCTA), a non-political, regional body, has for several years been working for the establishment of technical and scientific

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co-operation between the states and territories of Africa south of the Sahara. More and more African countries are joining the CCTA, and its importance is increasing. The F.A.O. already works through it and the I.L.O. is believed to be about to do the same. The Foundation of Mutual Aid to Africa (FAMA) is another organization through which all Western Powers can offer technical assistance to Africa.

6. The Soviet factor

15. In this scene of ferment and change, a vital factor is the appearance of the Soviet Union and of Communism as a new external influence. It provides African peoples with an alternative source of political support in their struggle for emancipation and an alternative potential source of economic aid. The fact that the source is tainted, and that the interest of the Soviet Union of Africa is primarily indirect and negative, and related to her effort to undermine Western civilisation, is not at once apparent to Africans. The task of the Soviet Union in Africa is, basically, to exploit the strains and stresses arising from the revolutionary situation described above.

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~~AC/146-WP(59)1~~Part II. Methods of Soviet penetration1. General

16. The Soviet Union enjoys certain initial advantages in her approach to the problems of Africa. In the first place, she is not physically involved, and has no history to live down of colonial expansion in that Continent. (Her colonial and imperialist actions in Europe and Asia are scarcely known to Africans.) Offers of support and assistance coming from this outside and distant source can be made to seem disinterested, and do not have to bear comparison with past performance. When the Western 'colonial' powers undertake development projects in Africa they tend to be regarded by Africans as doing no more than their bare duty; whereas mere offers and promises by the Soviet bloc are taken as gratuitous generosity. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is widely admired as a country which was until recently "under-developed" and which pulled itself up into the front rank of industrial powers by its own efforts. This is what the newly emergent national states of Africa desire to do themselves. China is considered to be another example. Thus the claims of communism as a system to be followed by primitive nations aspiring to economic progress are easily accepted. Against this, it must be remembered that the Russians are also white men, and that they are likely to experience much the same difficulties as does the West in learning to appreciate the African mentality and the problems facing African leaders today.

2. Russia's new strategy in Africa

17. Soviet interest in Africa goes back to ideas developed by Lenin as early as 1912, on the occasion of the outbreak of the Chinese

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revolution, concerning the role of the colonial peoples in the final victory of international communism. Up to about 1950, however, Communist attempts to penetrate Africa were very limited. Africa was too remote, too well protected and too strange to the Soviets to present itself as a promising target. The Communist parties in Europe tried to agitate the Africans by the use of slogans which were not understood, but had little success. The beginning of the African peoples' struggle for independence and the inroads made into the Middle East have brought the African Continent closer to the Soviets ideologically as well as geographically and strategically.

18. Soon after the death of Stalin the USSR took a new look at Africa. Dogmatic conceptions, which had blinded them to the growing opportunities for exploitation of African currents, were set aside. Stalin's tendency to see the world divided into two camps - the 'socialist' and the 'imperialist'-and to regard even neutralist leaders as "imperialist stooges" and independent countries as still "semi-colonial", was replaced by a more flexible approach. The Soviets began to see the importance of the intelligentsia and middle class in Africa, as the leaders of the new nationalist movements. From the early 1950's the USSR set itself the task of persuading and influencing the emerging political movements in the areas which it obviously could not yet hope to control, and of re-examining its theoretical estimate of the role of the "national bourgeoisie" in semi-dependent and dependent areas. The attempt to create indigenous Communist Parties ceased. Instead, Communists were infiltrated

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into national parties (e.g. the UPC in the Cameroons, the African Independence Party in Senegal) or extremist groups formed within such parties (as in the case of the Istiqal in Morocco and the numerous political parties in Central Africa). The penetration of international groups and movements concerned with Africa also became an important part of the programme.

19. The USSR began at the same time to make full use of all the conventional techniques of diplomacy, trade, economic assistance and cultural relations in order to become accepted by Africans as a powerful, respectable and sympathetic friend. Between 1950 and 1952 a complete programme for penetrating Africa and for undermining the relations of the West with the African peoples was worked out and put into effect with great thoroughness. The broad strategy seems to be aimed, not at military conquest and only to a small extent at subversion by Communist parties; it concentrates rather on trying to detach the existing independent nations of Africa and the new countries which are emerging, from their economic and political ties with the West.

20. At the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in February, 1958, Mr. Khrushchev declared that Africa had awakened and that the support of the colonial peoples' struggle for national liberation was one of the most topical and urgent problems and a principal aim of Soviet policy. Moukhitdinov, a member of the Praesidium of the Central Committee, aroused great enthusiasm at Al Azhar University in Cairo in September, when he announced the imminent collapse of the imperialist camp led by the United States and predicted that the countries of Africa would shortly conquer their freedom and

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their political independence. In October, Radio Peking hailed the birth of the Republic of Guinea with the words "Africa - the last line of defence of the imperialist world". The theme was fully re-stated at the 21st Congress in February, 1959.

3. Preparations for Action

21. In order to carry out this programme the Soviet bloc had first to develop the material and technical means of exploiting the African situation. They set out to acquire a thorough knowledge of the Continent and its problems. Soviet study and research institutes, such as the Ethnological Institute of the Academy of Sciences, the Institute for the Study of Contemporary Capitalism, the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Soviet Academy of Science, conducted major surveys of Africa and have published numerous works, some of real scientific value. Their premises and their staffs have been expanded. The Institute of Oriental Studies has added a special African division and has drawn up a comprehensive long-term study plan for the years 1957-60 which provides inter alia for the publication of 25 to 30 works on Africa. The most important of these, entitled "The Economic Situation and the National Liberation Movements in Africa after the Second World War", deals mainly with Nigeria, Congo, French West Africa, Uganda and North Africa. These publications are designed "for governmental institutions dealing with Africa in their practical work". The institutes are also editing dictionaries of African languages such as Swahili, Amharic and Hausa, preparing atlases and text-books and conducting language courses. The Universities of Moscow, Leningrad and Prague have

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started courses in African languages such as Luganda, Congo, Yoruba and Luba. New courses on African economic and other problems such as climate, soil, nutrition etc. have been created in Soviet universities. On several occasions Soviet organizations or departments have asked to be allowed to send observers to the technical and scientific meetings promoted by the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara. The aim is to create a nucleus of Soviet experts on Africa and to equip young engineers and scientists from the Soviet orbit with the necessary knowledge for work in Africa. Students from the bloc are also trained in methods of propaganda and subversion.

22. At the same time the official Soviet machinery for dealing with African problems has been greatly expanded. For some years the Communist Party of India has had a special African division whose function was to adapt Marxist ideology to African conditions. There is now almost certainly a separate African section in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. There is also a newly established African Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Influencing the Africans

23. As a counterpart to this effort of self-preparation, the Soviets have undertaken a systematic effort to influence African opinion and to build up cadres for penetration and subversion in the various territories of Africa.

(a) Training and Indoctrination of Africans

24. Alongside the expansion of research and training of bloc personnel for work in Africa goes the preparation of Africans as

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instruments for the spread of Soviet influence in their territories. African students are attracted in considerable numbers to the Soviet Union and Satellite countries by scholarships. These are financially attractive and they flatter the traditional African respect for learning. Africans also attend agitation training centres in Prague and Bucharest. At the Prague "African College" several hundred Africans from all regions are reported to be trained by Russian and Czech instructors in Marxist technology and economics, in courses lasting two years. At the "Institute of Economics" several hundred are said to be trained annually in methods of preparing revolution, including guerilla warfare and sabotage. After three-year courses some graduates are sent to the U.S.S.R. for further training.

(b) Visits

25. An increasing number of visits are being arranged from Africa to the countries of the Soviet Bloc with the object of indoctrination and improving mutual contacts. 78 Africans (mainly technologists, scientists, trades unionists, journalists and party functionaries) visited Bloc countries during the first six months of 1958, an increase of 50% over the previous year. A growing number of goodwill visits and missions to the Soviet Bloc are being arranged.

(c) Contact with Africans studying in the West

26. Communist contacts are sought with African students in the U.K., France and other Western countries and are seriously exploited. A large number of the Africans who attended the Moscow Youth Festival in 1957 were students at Western Universities.

(d) Conferences

27. The organisation of international conferences and congresses has become one of the main Soviet methods of influencing intellectuals from under-developed countries. The technique of inviting private individuals and representatives of opposition groups from territories whose governments decline to be represented officially enables these conferences to have an air of worldwide Communist support. Notable amongst the organisations used are the Peace Partisans, the Federation of Democratic Women, the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Trade Unions. During the last few years these organisations have given special attention to African colonial questions. The Afro-Asian Movement and all its offshoots is also fully exploited. See below.

(e) Propaganda through broadcasting

28. The broadcasts to Africa started by Radio Moscow in April 1958 with a programme of fifteen minutes daily in English and French were trebled in October of that year. The programme is being extended to include African languages. The African propaganda of Radio Cairo is much more intense, though not much heard in East Africa. The semi-clandestine station "The voice of Free Africa" is intense and widely heard. It has been found that battery-operated miniature wireless-sets suitable for tropical conditions are being distributed in African territories.

(f) Diplomatic Representation

29. In order to facilitate its contacts with Africa the Soviet Union has opened Embassies in Addis Ababa, Khartoum,

Tripoli and Rabat and maintains a trade mission in Tunis. Agreement has been reached in principle for an exchange of ambassadors with Ghana. There is some evidence of a sharing-out of duties amongst the bloc countries in this field. There is Soviet consular representation in the Union of South Africa and in the Belgian Congo. A czech consulate is established at Leopoldville, East Germany was one of the first states to send a trade representative to Conakry, but the communist country selected to open a Diplomatic Mission there is Bulgaria. Soviet efforts to open embassies in Monrovia and Tunis have not yet succeeded, though Tunisia has agreed in principle. The Soviet Union has trade agreements with Ethiopia, Morocco and the Sudan and has also been able to negotiate trade agreements and to participate in trade fairs in countries with which it has no diplomatic relations, e.g. Tunisia and Guinea. East Germany and Czechoslovakia sent missions to negotiate trade and cultural agreements with Guinea well before such active interest was shown by the West. Delegations from Communist China visited a number of African countries during 1958 and were successful in negotiating various trade accords and commercial arrangements. Communist China has been recognised by Morocco and the Sudan but no agreements have yet been reached on the establishment of Chinese missions in those countries. Ghana holds that it inherited recognition of Communist China from the U.K. at independence, but there has been no exchange of diplomatic representatives to date.

30. In addition the Soviet Union attempted unsuccessfully to have observation and research stations assigned to it in Africa

under cover of the International Geophysical Year. The Polish Government has sought permission to send trade missions to French Equatorial Africa.

5. Exploiting the Economic Factors

31. The first and most obvious method of penetrating into the African scene has been by use of the economic weapon. The economic factors described in Part I above clearly offered wide opportunities to the Soviet Bloc and they have not failed to take advantage of them.

(a) Financial aid

32. The offer in 1956 to finance the first stage of the Aswan Dam was, if not the first, certainly the most spectacular of the moves in this field and was to be followed by others of a similar kind. Offers of economic aid for relatively small amounts have been accepted by the Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia. South of the Sahara, however, loans, grants and technical assistance have not yet played a significant role.

(b) Bulk purchase of surplus export products.

33. The dependence of most African countries on one or a few export products for foreign exchange earnings could enhance the Bloc's bargaining position as the financial situation of these countries tightens. The Soviet bloc's ability to absorb several major African commodities is sufficiently great for concentrated buying to have a profound effect in such African states as Ghana, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In any case, Bloc competition for key African exports will increasingly threaten the virtual monopoly which the West has enjoyed in the purchase of African products and raw

materials. At present, Africa supplies the major share of Free World's needs for industrial diamonds, chrome, cobalt, tantalum, manganese, and copper, and is an important source of uranium, iron ore, beryl and columbite. The Bloc will not, however, be in any position to deny Western access to these materials over the next few years as they are largely produced by European controlled companies.

(c) Bloc trade.

34. Bloc trade with Africa, while still minor, has made substantial gains in recent years. Between 1954 and 1956 total trade rose by about 17% and in 1957 alone it increased by more than 55%, mainly because of purchases of wool from South Africa and cocoa from Ghana. African imports from the bloc have risen steadily but exports have been erratic owing to the irregular character of Soviet purchases. In no case, except Egypt, does trade in the bloc constitute more than 5% of a country's external trade.

(d) Arms.

35. Finally, the bloc have come forward (again starting with Egypt) as a source of supply of arms wherever Middle East or African States have difficulty in obtaining what they think they need from Western sources.

6. Exploiting External Political Factors

36. The Afro-Asian movement is the principal external instrument through which the communists seek to influence Africa. This movement, to which formal expression was first given at the Bandung Conference, began with a relatively respectable philosophy of independence and

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neutralism and was not in its origin Communist. Since its inception the Communist powers have made every effort to dominate the movement and to divert it into anti-Western channels. In particular they have sought to replace the original influence of India in its affairs by that of Egypt, which is more ready to be used for Communist ends. The measure of their success has been the setting up of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, with its headquarters in Cairo rather than New Delhi, in which the USSR, the Communist Chinese and the Egyptians play predominant roles. The Secretariat is staffed by Communists, fellow-travellers and extremist politicians in exile. The African elements are largely overwhelmed by representatives of countries or groups under Sino-Soviet direction. The Solidarity Council and the conferences which it organizes must be regarded as in effect Communist-front organizations.

37. At the second Afro-Asian Conference Egypt, which had until then given assistance only to the North African nationalists, and whose subversive efforts had been directed towards Somalia and East Africa, first displayed interest in West Africa south of the Sahara by giving aid to the UPC in the Cameroons. During the Conference of Independent States at Accra in April, 1958, Egypt initiated attacks on the Western Powers and sought to implicate a number of African states in its own quarrels with the West. It has now become a major part of Communist and Egyptian policy to control the African nationalist movement through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement.

38. By consistently supporting nationalist causes, whether Arab or African, especially in the U.N. and through the Afro-Asian

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Solidarity Movement, the Soviet Union seeks to be recognized by Africans as the leading anti-Colonialist power. By giving propaganda support to regional and Pan-African movements, as at the Accra Conference in December, 1958, and in favour of the Ghana-Guinea confederation project, they pose as the friends of African unity, much as they exploited Arab nationalism in the Middle East.

39. The Pan-African Movement was founded by negroes in the U.S. and the U.K., whence it spread to West Africa with Dr. N'Krumah as its most active apostle. The relationship between the Pan-African Movement and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee has hitherto been tenuous. Some connecting links have been established; for example, (Ghana, Ethiopia, Morocco and Tunisia sent delegations to recent Afro-Asian conferences and an observer delegation from the Solidarity Committee attended the All African Peoples' Conference in Accra in December, 1958. But no Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees appear yet to have been established in Africa south of the Sahara. The Solidarity Committee will certainly make vigorous efforts to improve these links. It will lay emphasis on anti-colonialism, which it genuinely shares with the Pan-African Movement, in order to blur the distinction between the two movements it will appeal to the "have-nots" in the colonial territories, notably in East Africa, and to opposition elements in the independent countries. It holds a means of pressure on moderate African leaders through the presence in Cairo of African extremist politicians and exiles such as Moumié (Cameroon) and Kale (Uganda). The emphasis placed on the struggle to liberate the African territories from colonialism at the Afro-Asian

Youth Conference at Cairo in 1959 and the setting up of a committee on racial discrimination within the Solidarity Secretariat showed clearly what is to be expected. Cairo is a major source of propaganda broadcasts directed to Africa.

40. Even in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement there have been some signs of resentment at Russian and Egyptian domination, specially from Asian sources. African leaders have also shown a disposition, notably at the Accra Conference, to challenge Egyptian and pan-Arab efforts to take control of the African Movement. It seems right to conclude that, just as there are nationalist and pan-Asian activities in Asia independent of the Communist-dominated Solidarity Movement, so the pan-African movement has purposes of its own and is capable of development on independent lines. Though demonstrably open to Communist infiltration and domination and having an undeniable appeal to the anti-colonial sentiments of the area, pan-Africanism cannot be said to have come under Communist control.

41. Another device increasingly used is the summoning of what may be termed "mock" international conferences, to which, in addition to the official representatives of communist governments, private citizens and opposition leaders are invited from territories whose governments refuse to attend. The impression is thus given of world-wide unity and enthusiasm for anti Western and pro-Communist causes.

7. Exploiting Internal Factors

(a) Trades Unions and Political Movements

42. Similar considerations apply to internal African

organisations such as political parties, religious movements and trades unions which are an obvious target for Communist infiltration. The Communist Party is outlawed in almost all African countries and the Soviet authorities consider that the situation in Africa does not yet lend itself to the establishment of such parties. Their policy is to attain the same object through front organizations whose Communist tendencies are not easily recognised by Africans. The chief instrument is the World Federation of Trades Unions whose African regional office was recently transferred from Cairo to Accra. The World Peace Council and the International Democratic Women's Council also have set up organizations in Africa recently. Nationalist and other subversive movements are supported even where they are led by non-Communists and even at the expense of direct Communist action where the latter is deemed inexpedient. The aim is to create unrest, conducive to the weakening of the West's position in Africa and to destroy the Africans' confidence in the colonial powers. For example the Communist infiltrated Union de Populations de Cameroun (U.P.C.) organized a rebellion at the beginning of 1957 and weapons were supplied from the Soviet Bloc. Communist influences were also recognisable in the disturbances in French West Africa and particularly in Senegal. Cairo appears to serve as a base and Cairo Radio as a voice for these activities.

43. In general it is noted that European Communist Parties are little used for contacts with Africa, it being held that action through them would be rejected as reminiscent of colonial tutelage. Instead, the infiltration operations are generally given an international flavour. The propaganda itself is well adapted to African conditions. It avoids

unintelligible Marxist doctrines and uses slogans such as "the elimination of colonialism" and "the expulsion of Europeans". The danger of this is that moderate political leaders find themselves forced to adopt similar language. The formal espousal by Communists of many of the goals of African nationalism brought them many eager listeners among Africans and left an ideological imprint on many Africans who later rose to importance as moderate leaders. Many nationalist actions have as a result been "conditioned" by the contacts of these leaders with the USSR.

(b) Youth movements

44. The guiding instrument here is the World Federation of Students, to which the "Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique Noir" in Paris and the "Union Générale des Etudiants d'Afrique Noir" in Africa (? amongst other) belong as collective members. Other aspects of youth work are handled by the Democratic World Youth Federation to which ten organizations of Africa south of the Sahara belong. Delegations from all independent African countries took part in the World Youth Festival of 1957 in Moscow.

(c) Religious sects

45. The extent to which the Communists make direct use of religious movements and messianic sects in Africa is still a matter of dispute. A study of this problem and of the outside sources on which such movements rely for finance, might be rewarding.

As regards Islam, the Soviets have recognised its dogmatic incompatibility with communism and carefully avoid religious topics in their propaganda. The torch is left in the hands of Egypt, but many of the sects popular in Africa are so "heretical" that orthodox Sunni Islam has difficulty in appealing to them.

(d) Cultural influences

46. Special attention is paid to this field. An Afro-Asian Writers Congress held in Tashkent in October 1958 was not a great success and national divergencies were ill-concealed. Others however are likely to follow. Films and books are widely used to influence the intellectual life of Africa. The cultural section of the W.F.T.U. takes an active part in this work which is designed to improve African understanding of the Soviet Union and to increase her reputation among the Africans. Sport is also increasingly used as a means of influencing opinion through the exchange of football teams, etc.

47. It should be noted here that the number of Communists in Africa is still not large and that mass acceptance of Communist ideology is slight.

The influence and example of Egypt

48. The influence and example of Egypt are of direct assistance to the Soviets in their policy of penetration in Africa. Africans have concluded from the example of Egypt that one can oppose the West without disaster and work with the Soviet bloc and not be subverted. Egypt has persistently advocated using the USSR as an alternative source of supply and support, in order to liquidate western prerogatives in the area. These efforts tie in closely with Egypt's efforts to expend its own influence in Africa - particularly in the Sudan and beyond to East Africa. Cairo is using Islam as much as it can as a vehicle for its national policies in Africa. In Western Africa, the strongly religious element of the Moslem population tends to side with the West rather than with Cairo, but in Eastern Africa, which is more within the range of Egyptian power and where Cairo broadcasts can be heard the Moslems are more deeply infected by nationalist and anti-western propaganda. Many of the younger people in particular are attracted by the dictatorial structure of Nasser's state and by his successful defiance of the West. A strong influence is exerted by African pilgrims who have been to Mecca and who were there subject to political propaganda. All this is at present complementary to Soviet and Communist activity.

Part III. ACTION OF THE WEST

1. General

49. The West holds certain advantages which can be set off against those enjoyed by the Soviet Bloc as described at the beginning of Part II. Foremost amongst these are its (~~relatively~~) profound knowledge and experience of African conditions and the wide range of technical, commercial and administrative connections which it has established in all parts of the Continent. It must be a fact that, alongside the hostility created by the colonial relationship, ^{many} ~~some~~ bonds of sympathy and mutual comprehension have been created which may show their value to greater advantage when the transition to independence has been completed. Moreover, the Western Powers are still able, in large parts of Africa, to influence directly the future course of political development, or at least to affect the conditions in which these territories set out upon the path of independence. This ability must not be over-stated, and it is certainly a wasting asset; but if wisely used, and in good time, it may have great importance.

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50. As the area of independence grows, the influence of the West becomes more restricted. It also changes in character. Direct control of events becomes impossible, and even advice ceases to be acceptable. New ways have to be found of influencing African thought and action. Persuasion, example and common interest become the necessary ingredients of any friendly relationship. Amongst the

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principles which appear to be essential parts of this evolution are that the West should not treat the African continent as if it were a theatre of operations in the East-West struggle; that they should be able to see African problems from the point of view of Africa itself; and that in their economic and other relationships with African territories they should be seen to concern themselves with the interests of Africans as well as their own. In general, it appears that such an attitude not only provides the best and only way of countering Soviet policies in Africa, but also offers possibilities of real mutual benefit.

51. It follows that no concerted action by the West should be undertaken under the aegis, or in the name of NATO, this organization being regarded as primarily an instrument in the East-West struggle. It also follows - and has been recognised by the European powers themselves - that any concerted action between powers having responsibilities in Africa must be extremely carefully handled, so as to avoid impression of a common front against African interests.

52. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc are conducting a concerted attack on the position of the Western world, in Africa and some common resistance to this attack is essential, indeed inevitable. Wide and regular exchange of views between member countries in regard to the progress of events in Africa and the measures adopted to meet the threat would seem to be the necessary first step. Certain member countries have special responsibilities and problems in particular

territories; others have a wide range of relations with the independent countries of Africa. The greatest possible harmonisation of attitudes amongst all concerned and a pooling of the experience and knowledge of different countries seems desirable.

53. This is particularly evident in the light of the efforts of the Soviet bloc and some other countries to use the world platform and the machinery of the United Nations as instruments for propaganda against the West. The effect of this upon the Africans and upon the position of the Western powers in Africa can be very damaging. The public attitudes and actions of Western countries, and notably the position they assume in the United Nations, are an important factor in this situation owing to the effect they may have in Africa. All differences are exploited by the Communists to the detriment of the Western position as a whole. It would also, of course, be highly shortsighted of the Western powers to transplant their old rivalries into a jealous tutorship of new independent African states. On the contrary, inter-European co-operation may prove of decisive assistance in solving the difficult questions which confront new states on their emergence.

2. Western attitude towards independence and African nationalism

54. Soviet propaganda seeks to persuade the African peoples that the Western powers are determined to keep them in subjection. It also spreads the idea that the Western powers are interested in

the Continent merely as an area from which to draw raw materials and other sources of wealth, and which they can use for strategic purposes in their opposition to the Communist world. In other words, the West is portrayed as having a purely selfish approach to African problems. Western policy has to overcome these attacks upon the heart and mind of the African peoples.

55. In the dependent territories, the European powers concerned have the task of developing political institutions which will, so far as possible, satisfy the aspirations of all sections of the communities - African, Asia and European - and ensure the development of stable government. They must try to keep abreast of the rising political consciousness of the Africans and at the same time encourage a sense of co-operation and genuine partnership. This involves associating as many Africans as possible in the government and administration, including posts of high responsibility wherever suitable candidates can be found, so as to make the Africans feel that they are participating actively in the development of their country.

56. Conditions and problems vary in different areas and there are different opinions about the optimum pace of political advancement. On the one hand, the capacity of the indigenous peoples to assume responsibility must be a factor. Too rapid an advance towards independence could lead to administrative breakdowns and chaos and provide the Soviet bloc with opportunities no less dangerous to Africa and to the West than the frustration caused by too slow a progress.

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On the other hand, the spread of education and freedom of speech - and the example of other territories - inevitably produce African leaders who demand independence before their country is - at least in the opinion of its present administrations - capable of sustaining it. The pressure of events and of world opinion relentlessly forces the pace and harries the administrator. He, for his part, seeks to keep his aim before him, which is to build communities where responsible people of all **races** can feel secure and free. This is particularly important in territories where peoples of different races and cultures, and communities in different stages of development, have made their homes.

3. Western attitude towards Pan-Africanism

57. The Pan-African idea takes many forms. In some parts it may represent merely a vague sense of solidarity between African territories struggling for independence and progress; elsewhere it may range through ideas for regional groupings and confederations to the more illusory concept of a "United States of Africa" or "Associated States of Africa", such as was mooted at the Accra Conference. It is impossible for the West to adopt a defined attitude towards these ideas. In general, however, the tendency of the independent African states to form groups for mutual support and even to create larger federal or unitary states need not be regarded as, in itself, contrary to Western interests. It could indeed strengthen the ability of newly-independent African peoples to resist Soviet, Communist and Egyptian pressure.

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4. International Organizations(a) Afro-Asian solidarity movement

58. The main 'front' organization to which attention must be given in any formulation of Western policy is the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement described above. It is a matter for discussion whether the right attitude for the West to adopt towards this organization and its many offshoots is to seek to exploit divergencies and hesitations within its ranks, for example by encouraging the expression of opposition to Russian and Egyptian leadership at conferences under its aegis or, on the other hand, to brand it as a more or less completely Communist-dominated organization and to seek to encourage other African and Asian movements at its expense. In any case, it seems desirable to curtail the Movement's influence in Africa south of the Sahara as much as possible.

(b) Pan-African Movements

59. These movements, and meetings at which the African element is more fully reflected, may provide a counter-poise to the attraction with which the Communists have managed to clothe the Afro-Asian meetings. At any rate they provide Africans with an alternative form of action and energy and may help to meet their legitimate needs.

In addition, it may be possible for African conferences to be organized within a western framework, such as the British Commonwealth or the French Communauté. The influence of India within the Commonwealth

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has recently been constructive in this connection. It is also for consideration whether more support and encouragement could be given to the newly-formed Economic Commission for Africa, in order to assist it in working on constructive lines in examining the economic problems of Africa. Other UN agencies may have a similar role to play.

(c) The United Nations and its agencies

60. The question of United Nations agencies and their operations in Africa presents, however, particular difficulty. The United Nations has a special appeal to Africans and the newly-independent states tend to prefer a United Nations channel for outside aid and advice. Unfortunately these agencies naturally reflect the composition and political tendencies of the General Assembly and of the Secretariat of the UN. Since there is now no western majority in the Assembly, it cannot be expected that UN agencies will necessarily advise Africans to co-operate with the West. Their activity may even be directly inimical to western interests. This may be largely a question of taking care in the recruitment of senior personnel for missions in Africa under these auspices, and in ensuring that political considerations are not ignored. The point has been made that UN activity in Africa should not be allowed to prejudice the work of the CCTA.

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5. Economic Assistance

(a) Financial aid and investment

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61. It is in the interests of the West to ensure that capital resources are made available to African countries by the West in sufficient quantities to meet their essential needs and to keep them from having resort to Communist sources. This applies particularly to newly independent countries and to those which are emerging into independence because, as we have seen in Part I, their needs grow at the moment when the help available from the administering power falls off. Most of these countries probably prefer western to Communist sources of capital, but their neutralist political inclinations will dispose them to turn eastwards if they are not satisfied from the West. Where governmental aid is concerned, they tend to prefer international sources, such as the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Moreover, if private investment is to be attracted to the independent territories, the latter will need help from friendly governments, as well as from reputable foundations and organizations like the Bank, in creating an adequate "economic infrastructure" of communications, technical training for personnel, etc. They must also be prepared to provide the necessary assurances and conditions for capital development, including the assurance that foreign enterprises will be able to operate on reasonable terms in conditions of fair political stability and economic order. Here again, the International Bank may be in a better position than any national authority to seek the assurances without giving offence to the country concerned.

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62. Members of the North Atlantic Alliance who have no administrative responsibilities in Africa will have an increasing role to play in providing the means to keep the independent and emerging states of Africa linked economically with the West. In the case of newly-emergent countries, the first years of independence, before they have established their international credit, are particularly difficult for them and they need special help and advice. The manner in which the western aid is presented is of great importance and here again a sense of partnership must be fostered. If the motives of the West are not to be suspected, western economic assistance to Africa must be seen to be of advantage to the West as well as to Africa; in other words, to represent a relationship of equality.

63. There seems to be a need for some co-ordination between the western countries extending economic assistance to Africa and some system of consultation in cases of special urgency. Attention has been drawn in Part I to the work being undertaken by the CCTA and FAMA. Much is being done also in the British Commonwealth and the French Community, and also bilaterally.

(b) Markets

64. As regards markets for African products, three main points emerge:

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(a) that diversification of production should be encouraged;

(b) that African countries should be shown that the West can be relied on over a period to take a substantial part of their produce;

(c) that some effort should be made to deal with the problem of long-term price stability, so that these countries may be able to plan their production in advance. This is a subject of particular difficulty and there is no agreed solution to it. It should be observed, however, that if these emergent nations are to become independent economically as well as politically, they will have made themselves competitive largely by their own efforts, and not rely in the long term upon special help from outside.

6. Technical Assistance

65. The chief asset of the Western powers, and particularly of those which have had direct responsibilities in Africa, lies in their practical knowledge of the African continent. This gives the West a special advantage as regards technical assistance which is one of the most effective means of action at their disposal. Technical assistance is welcomed even by peoples whose national pride is susceptible, when they are sufficiently aware of their own shortcomings in technical matters and are anxious to learn. It is particularly needed in the first few years of independence. It is

all the more welcome when offered under an international flag.

66. The CCTA last year launched a technical assistance programme in Africa, to be carried out by the FAMA. The latter body has the advantage that outside countries may participate in its activities. The work of these organizations, and the possibilities which they offer for co-ordinating western assistance to Africa, might be studied by member governments. In particular, it is for consideration whether something should be done under international auspices to build up a corps of top-level advisers and experts who could be made available, free of charge, to African (and other underdeveloped) countries when required. The International Bank might be consulted about this.

7. Arms

67. The question of supplying arms to independent African states has not yet become acute, but it may well do so, and it is a familiar subject of Soviet exploitations. Owing to the unnatural frontiers in Africa, the temptations for local aggression after the withdrawal of European control may be great. Western countries will certainly not want to encourage the purchase of arms by newly emergent African states, but it is clear that, as in the Middle East, a refusal to supply them will not prevent their being obtained elsewhere. It will be important wherever possible to prevent the Soviets becoming a source of supply.

8. Education

68. Education is particularly important in the task of enabling African countries to run their own affairs successfully, both politically and economically. In many parts of the area educational facilities, up to and including university level, are being provided in the countries themselves. Some African students will necessarily need to study at institutions in Europe and elsewhere for some time to come, but general reliance on this system for advanced training could lead to students becoming divorced from their own communities and to unrealistic demands on their part. The experience of most European countries with interests in Africa suggests that education of the African is better developed on the spot, in the native environment. The entire educational structure, from primary grades up to advanced graduate levels, is in need of improvement and expansion in almost all parts of Africa. Where Africans do study abroad, special attention should be paid to their welfare so that they do not develop hostile feelings towards the West or fall a prey to Communist influences. A great deal remains to be done in the educational field, particularly for the independent countries. This seems to be another matter in which European powers without direct political responsibility in Africa could play a part.

9. Information policy in Africa

69. Any useful discussion of information policy in Africa

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must start with an attempt to study the African's view of themselves and of the outside world, and the influence being brought to bear on them from sources hostile to the West. Only thus is it possible to form an idea of the image which the West must create of itself in the minds of the Africans in order to counter the Communist appeal. This is in fact an epitome of the whole problem discussed in this paper and may serve as a summary of the paper itself.

70. An essential feature of the "emergent" or "awakening" condition of the African peoples is that they feel themselves to be underprivileged and are easily led to blame others for the backwardness and the difficulties of their situation. The white people are associated not only with colonial rule, but with racial and economic privilege. In territories where there is substantial white settlement, the resentments go deeper and are increased by the prospect of a long struggle for supremacy.

71. At the same time, in rejecting colonial rule and asserting African values in all fields, the Africans in fact aspire to repeat the achievements of the white man and to win the material advantages which they see resulting from his technical skills. Unlike Asia and even the northern parts of Africa, Africa south of the Sahara has no ancient civilisation of its own to fall back upon, and ~~owns~~ every knowledge it possesses to European sources. Consequently, emulation goes hand in hand with resentment and there is admiration even in the rejection of the white man's predominance.

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72. The Western powers, since they are present in Africa, are particularly liable to be cast by the new African intelligentsia for all the unpopular roles in this play. They are easily presented not only as the oppressor, but also as the exploiter, the economically privileged, the racially arrogant. The motives of their presence and their actions in Africa are automatically suspect. They are represented as nations which have made their pile or even inherited their wealth from their forebears, and which are now trying to prevent younger, poorer, and more numerous peoples from getting a fair share. With this goes the idea, which the Communists sedulously spread amongst African intelligentsia, that Western procedures are out of date; that the methods which made them rich in the 19th century will not do the same, quickly enough, for the newly emerging nations.

73. The Russians, on the other hand, are able to pose in a different light. They are not widely known in Africa; they have no colonial past in this continent; they claim that they make no distinction of race, colour or class; they claim to be the champions of the poor and the oppressed. In addition, they assert that they have found a better way than democracy and capitalism of achieving industrialisation and economic advancement quickly. The fact that they pay no account of personal freedom, western "moral principles" does not unduly worry the Africans, for reasons which have been discussed in Part I above. The Africans have never belonged to the "personal freedom" type of society and they have not been persuaded of the superiority of our morals.

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74. From the point of view of African self-interest, these considerations weigh much more heavily than questions of ideology. To the majority of Africans, Communism is an alien doctrine not easily assimilable and not of practical interest to them in the material situation in which they find themselves. Anti-Communism is equally devoid of interest to them and the ideological struggle between East and West appears remote and unimportant. Thus, any propaganda based on exposing the fallacies of Communism would have little or no appeal. One of the reasons why Soviet penetration has more success to-day than in the time of Stalin is that they no longer try to force Communist doctrines on the Africans.

75. Other aspects of the East/West struggle, such as strategic considerations, are equally irrelevant to Africans, since they are basically uninterested in the outcome. Any sign that western actions in Africa are determined by the requirements of this struggle would be resented. Western publicity will be effective only insofar as it is seen to be directed towards the interest of the Africans and motivated by a concern for their future.

76. The most exposed flank of the Soviet position from this point of view is the fact that their expansion and imperialism offer a threat to national independence. The history of Soviet expansionism and aggression, and the fact that they are a great and growing colonialist power, should be in the forefront of our public position. It should be shown that for the Russians and the Communists the African continent, its people and its resources, are nothing but a

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means to an end and that the newly-found independence of the Africans is threatened by Soviet expansionism in all its forms.

77. Thus, it is important to encourage in the Africans a critical attitude towards Soviet offers of assistance, especially in the economic field, and towards the arrival of Soviet and satellite technicians missions, etc., in Africa. This should be done not simply by warning Africans of the political consequences or of the tainted source, but by demonstrating the often spurious and insincere character of Soviet proposals. A systematic study of Soviet promises and of the extent of their implementation might be useful for this purpose.

78. On the positive side, which is the more important, western publicity should show genuine interest in the problems and in the ambitions of African peoples. In territories still under European control, this is done as a matter of policy by keeping in close touch with African public opinion, explaining clearly and firmly the objectives of the administration (including the prospects and timing of independence), and by setting forth in imaginative terms the joint themes of progress and partnership. In the independent territories it demands an effort to persuade the Africans that their best interests and their chances of rapid development lie in co-operation with the West, without, however, denying that the West expects to derive compensating advantages from the relationship in trade and commerce.

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79. When placed against the hostilities and resentments of the situation, this programme may seem light in the scale; but its purpose is to hold the relationship between Africa and the West until the tide turns, and Africans are able to see more clearly that European presence and European help, in a spirit of partnership, may be a condition for the building of African nations. The main spring of our public attitude could perhaps be summed up by the following quotation from one of the national papers submitted to the Committee: -"There are perhaps very few direct counter-measures against Communism to be taken in Africa, but there are many measures to be taken in favour of Africans, trusting them in order to be trusted... and hoping that... out of the seeds which Europe has sown in African soil, something will grow of benefit to western civilisation".

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