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COMMITTEE OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Tenth report by the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy
covering the period January to December, 1964

The attached report is the tenth(1) in a series initiated in August 1957. It is divided into three parts:

- Part I : Summary and Conclusions - page 3
- Part II : Main developments of economic activities by Communist countries in developing areas of the free world during 1964 - page 9
- Part III : Statistical Annex - page 23

2. It is submitted, in accordance with the usual procedure, for consideration to the Committee of Economic Advisers, which may decide to transmit to the Council such parts of it that may be found relevant as has been done previously (for instance: Part I, Charts I, II, III and IV, and Table I).

(Signed) A. VINCENT

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) For the ninth report see C-M(64)67 and AC/127-D/170

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PART I

Summary and Conclusions

After a two-year lull (1962 and 1963)(1), the economic activities of the Communist countries in the developing areas of the free world revived during 1964, and this renewed drive appears to be continuing in 1965 if information so far available is to be confirmed in the latter part of the year; in particular, the activities of Communist China have markedly increased.

2. The main developments during 1964 can be summarised as follows:

- new economic aid commitments by Communist countries reached an all-time record of over \$1,500 million. Actual drawings on these long-term economic development loans by the recipient countries during the year under review amounted to some \$500 million representing an 8.4% increase over 1963;
- military aid was continued at the 1962/1963 level of about \$400 million per annum;
- the number of Communist civilian and military personnel currently at work in the developing countries under the Communist technical assistance programmes increased by more than 25% over 1963 to reach 18,000;

(1) See Ninth Report C-M(64)67

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- In spite of openly expressed discontent, the number of academic students and technical and military personnel from developing nations of the non-Communist world undergoing training in Communist countries during 1964, rose to 21,700, representing a 23% increase over the 1963 figures;

- trade between Communist countries and developing areas of the free world outside Europe rose during 1963 by 1% over 1962 as compared with increases of 9.5% in 1962 and 4% in 1961. This higher rate of increase has been maintained during the first half of 1964 though for the whole year it might slow down somewhat.

3. The increase in economic and technical aid to and trade with the developing areas of the non-Communist world was particularly marked in the case of Communist China. The latter's trade with developing countries expanded during 1963 by 12.6% over 1962 and thus regained the level reached in 1960. It continued to grow at an even more rapid pace during the first half of 1964. While trade with developing countries in 1963 represented about 17% of total Chinese foreign trade, this share will probably increase in 1964 to over 20% if trends, apparent from the most recent available information on 1964, are maintained.

4. Communist China made its most spectacular headway during 1964 in the field of economic aid by undertaking new commitments in favour of 10 developing countries of the non-Communist world, 5 of which were African. The total value of these new aid ventures (\$340 million) represented a nearly four-fold increase over 1963 and an amount equal to that which Communist China had promised in total during the four preceding years (1959-1963 inclusive). If compared to the Soviet 1964 economic aid programme, Communist Chinese commitments during that year amounted to 40% of those undertaken by the USSR. Simultaneously, the number of Chinese technicians and labourers currently at work in developing areas of the free world rose from 470 in 1963 to 2,160 at the end of 1964. Thus far 19 countries have accepted a total amount of \$786.5 million and actually drawn \$132 million of Communist Chinese economic aid. Nine of these countries are located in Africa, seven in Asia and three in the Middle East.

5. Although the 1964 aid and trade figures for the Soviet Union, both in absolute size and in the number of countries affected, have been greater than those of Communist China, they did not expand at a comparable rate. Soviet trade with developing countries, according to the statistical reports of the latter, had grown by less than 9% in 1963 over 1962, mainly on the Soviet imports side, and, if the information on 1964 so far available is to be confirmed, Soviet trade with these countries will not show any significant increase in 1964 over 1963. Thus, the Soviet Union will probably direct no more than about 11% of its total foreign trade to those areas in 1964.

6. The Soviet Union extended during 1964 new economic aid to 13 countries (7 of which were African) thus bringing the total of developing countries outside Europe that have accepted Soviet economic aid up to 28 (13 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 1 in Latin America and 5 in the Middle East). The total value of new Soviet commitments in 1964 (\$833 million) represented a considerable increase if compared with 1963 and 1962 (\$252 million and \$77 million respectively) although it did not exceed the amount extended during the earlier peak year 1959 (\$854 million). In total, since the launching in 1954 of the Communist economic aid programme, the Soviet Union extended some \$4,246 million of which \$1,575 million had been utilised by the end of 1964. In addition, the Soviet Union remains almost the only source of Communist military aid to developing countries. As regards technical assistance, following the completion of a number of projects, the total number of Soviet civilian personnel in developing countries declined from 8,850 in 1963 to 8,705 at the end of 1964, but the bulk of the 3,500 Communist Military Advisers in these countries at the end of 1964 were of Soviet origin. The USSR is by far the most important Communist host country extending educational and training facilities for academic students, technical trainees and military personnel coming from the developing areas.

7. The Eastern European countries participated in the overall Communist drive. They expanded their trade during 1963 and 1964 at an annual average rate of more than 10%. In addition, they promised new credits to a total value (\$341.2 million) roughly equivalent to the new undertakings of Communist China, but not exceeding what they had extended during 1961 when Eastern European new economic aid commitments reached a peak of about \$380 million. Taken as a group, the Eastern European countries remain the most important trading partners within the Communist area with the developing countries. In this group, Czechoslovakia plays the main rôle, conducting about 9% of its total foreign trade with the developing areas, although more recently Poland, Roumania and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany have been making special efforts to increase their trade relations with the developing areas of the non-Communist world.

8. In the previous report on the Communist economic activities in the developing countries, it was stated "that the Soviet/Chinese ideological rift has now reached a point that might affect their respective foreign aid policies. Economic penetration efforts by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries on the one hand and Communist China on the other seem less co-ordinated than in the past and are even, in some cases, clearly competitive"(1). From the information available for 1964, it appears that this competition has been intensified.

(1) See Ninth Report O-M(64)67, paragraph 1.

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9. On the occasion of an Afro-Asian Economic Seminar held in Algiers in February 1965, the Delegate from Communist China explained the aims of Peking's economic "cold war" policy. He stated clearly that the main objective was to deprive Western countries of their traditional sources of supply of some essential goods. Petroleum, coffee, cocoa and cotton, various minerals such as copper, uranium, cobalt and rare metals, niobium, lithium, beryllium and tantalum used in nuclear and space research were all quoted in this context. The Representative of Communist China stressed that the Chinese approach to Communism gave priority to the development of agriculture over heavy industry, and presented this policy as a model of economic development achieved by "self-reliance". The Communist Chinese Delegate, while insisting on the fact that his country had freed itself from any foreign assistance, including aid extended by the Soviet Union, indicated that his Authorities nevertheless remained ready to assist, within the limits of their still restricted means, on an equal and mutually advantageous basis in the development of the economy of the Afro-Asian nations. He quoted the exceptionally generous terms under which Communist China extends its economic aid (loans free of interest or bearing very low rates of interest, longer periods of repayment) in comparison to the credit terms extended by other countries including the Soviet Union. He also argued that the technicians sent by Communist China enjoyed a living standard not exceeding that of the local specialists of comparable rank.

10. In a number of cases (for instance credits extended during 1964 to such countries as Pakistan, the Yemen, Tanzania, the Central African Republic and Congo (Brazzaville)) the efforts of Communist China aimed as much to undercut or anticipate Soviet aid proposals as to reduce Western influence in those countries. This was also the case with the long-term interest-free credit that Communist China offered to Indonesia apparently as a likely counterweight approach to past Soviet arms shipments, and more recently, during the opening months of 1965, with the interest-free long-term loan granted to Afghanistan. China's increased effort in 1964 might also possibly reflect an attempt on its part to support its verbal declarations of goodwill which had in the past been followed by only extremely modest aid commitments.

11. To some extent this increased competition might have led the Soviet Union to respond by offering additional credits, by modifying (longer periods of repayment, interest-free loans or even large-scale grants) the traditional Soviet terms (2.5% interest - 12 years) under which such loans were generally extended, and by pressing the Eastern European countries to

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increase their aid. The renewed momentum of Soviet economic aid extensions further confirms the fact that it now constitutes an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. The removal of Khrushchev has not reduced the awareness of the Communist leaders that a failure to maintain a high level of new extensions would lead eventually to a substantial decline of Soviet influence in the developing areas of the free world.

12. Notwithstanding the increased efforts of Communist China, it is obvious that this country has so far not reached a stage of economic development enabling it to compete seriously with the Soviet Union as a source of financial aid for developing countries, let alone with the much greater aid issuing from the more advanced Western countries. With a population more than three times larger, Communist China's gross national product amounts to hardly more than 30% of that of the Soviet Union. In such a country, still in its early stages of development, the nuclear research programme must mean a severe burden on the economy adding to the existing limitations of Communist Chinese foreign aid capacity. Hence the tendency of the Chinese to rely on the emotional appeal of racism and the stressing of the "need" for developing countries to "free" themselves from any foreign economic assistance. Apart from the recent new commitments, aid so far actually delivered by Communist China to non-Communist developing countries has been small. Up till the end of 1963, out of a total of aid promised since 1956 of about \$450 million, only some \$110 million had been drawn by recipient countries, and even during 1964 such drawings did not exceed \$22 million. This total of \$132 million is to be compared with aid actually delivered by the Soviet Union since 1954 amounting to \$1,575 million (of which \$370 million during 1964) and \$407 million by the Eastern European countries (of which \$111 million during 1964); economic aid extended by Western countries during recent years averaged some \$6,000 million annually. Nevertheless, it seems likely that Communist China might continue its efforts by offering spectacular, but sporadic, interest-free loans, thus keeping alive the paradox of a "poor" country extending financial aid to countries sometimes relatively richer than itself.

13. In addition, the Soviet Union is bound to remain within the Communist Camp the main, if not the sole source of military aid, with Czechoslovakia playing only a marginal rôle for light military equipment. Similarly, in the field of technical assistance, the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union have much more to offer to developing countries than has Communist China, but by imposing a standard of living on technicians and labourers well below Western or even Soviet standards, the latter has been seeking to exploit its closer identification with the local population.

14. As far as the West is concerned, however, the growing internal competition within the Communist Camp offers little consolation: both the Soviets and the Chinese aim at eliminating Western influences and their contest might indeed lead them to make larger individual efforts than they might otherwise have collectively contemplated. Nevertheless Western countries still

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maintain a considerable lead over Communist economic activities in the developing areas of the Free World : the flow of official economic aid from Western Industrialized Countries is still twelve times that coming from the whole of the Communist area and it is in the West that developing countries find markets for over 70% of their total exports.

15. By concentrating on selected countries, Communist aid and trade has, in some cases, been able to derive greater benefits than this global picture might warrant. Western countries should therefore remain alert to the threat presented by the Communist economic activities and take the appropriate measures to avoid an excessive growth of the share taken by Communist countries in the overall economic foreign relations that might lead ultimately individual developing countries to a dangerous degree of economic dependance on continued Communist aid and trade. Past experience has shown that Communist countries do not represent the stable market they generally claim to offer, that, for political reasons, Communist aid and trade can be stopped abruptly and that the re-orientation of exports from developing countries towards their former traditional Free World markets might present serious difficulties.

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PART II

Main Developments of economic activities by Communist Countries in developing areas of the Free World during 1964

16. Communist aid to and trade with the non-European developing countries of the Free world increased substantially in 1964. The main developments are briefly described according to the pattern adopted in previous reports (1) :

- A. Economic aid (credits and grants extended and drawn)
- B. Military aid (credits and grants extended and drawn)
- C. Technical assistance (communist civilian and military technicians in developing areas of the free world and students from these areas trained in Communist countries)
- D. Trade (overall trends, direction of trade, commodity composition)

In view of the growing competition between the Soviet Union and Communist China, more attention than in the past has been attached to the policies pursued and the results achieved by individual Communist countries. Cuba has been considered as part of the Communist area, and is, therefore, no longer listed among developing countries of the free world.

A. ECONOMIC AID

17. Communist countries undertook during 1964 new economic aid commitments amounting to an all-time record of \$1,511.6 million (2). This figure is to be compared with \$1,091.9 million extended during the previous peak year 1961, \$322.8 million in 1962 and \$364.2 million in 1963. Nearly all of the new 1964 commitments consisted of credits; grants did not exceed the equivalent of \$25 million.

18. The total value of economic aid extended since the launching of the Communist economic aid programmes reached, by the end of 1964, \$6,453 million, 23% of which was extended during 1964 only. Of these credits (\$6,097 million) and grants (\$352 million) one third, or \$2,114 million, had been actually drawn by recipient countries during the period 1954-1964, of which 24%, or \$503.1 million, during the year 1964.

(1) See Ninth Report C-M(64)67.
 (2) For a chronological list of new communist economic aid commitments, see statistical annex, Table III, Pages 29-40.

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19. The number of recipient countries of the free world outside Europe reached 32 by the end of 1964. Six nations, all of them located in Africa - the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda - were added to this list during 1964. As regards the utilization of the aid promised, 29 countries had actually drawn various amounts of Communist economic credits. Four of them, India (\$575 million), the United Arab Republic (\$401 million), Afghanistan (\$333 million) and Indonesia (\$203 million) had so far absorbed 72% of the total aid drawn.

20. The Soviet Union provided the bulk of this aid. During 1964, the USSR undertook new economic aid commitments amounting to \$832.6 million. Since 1954, the Soviet Union has extended a total of \$4,246.4 million to 28 countries, of which \$853.8 million during the peak year 1959. Only \$76.8 million had been extended in 1962 and \$252.4 million in 1963. Of the aggregate total volume of economic credits thus far extended by the Soviet Union, \$1,584.2 million had been actually utilized by the recipient countries. The rate of implementation of soviet credits has been growing steadily to reach some \$370 million in 1963 and an equivalent amount in 1964. Thus, while in 1964 the USSR extended 55% of the total new communist aid commitments, drawings on outstanding soviet credits and grants during that year represented about 74% of aid actually delivered by the whole of the Communist countries.

21. Communist China emerged during the year under review as the main competitor of the USSR within the Communist camp for gaining the favours of the developing countries by extending \$337.8 million (or 24% of total Communist aid) worth of credits and grants to 10 different countries (5 of which were in Africa). Communist China started to provide aid to non-Communist countries in 1956 and has, since then, extended in total \$786.5 million to 19 different countries. The previous highest annual amount of Chinese aid was extended in 1961 when \$163.0 million were granted. This amount was reduced to \$16.3 million in 1962 and reached only \$88.1 million in 1963. Implementation of the Chinese Aid Programme has been slow. Total actual drawings on such aid over the entire period 1956-1964 amounted to \$131.9 million and for the year 1964 only to \$21.8 million. Thus, while Communist China promised in 1964 new aid representing 40% of comparable Soviet commitments, it actually delivered aid amounting to less than 6% of the Soviet real effort. It must be borne in mind, however, that Communist China only started such operations two years after the first Soviet initiatives and that its large-scale expansion of aid commitments took place too recently to be utilized before the end of 1964.

22. Among Eastern European countries (1), Czechoslovakia was once more in the lead, extending \$124.2 million of new aid during 1964. In total, since 1954, Czech economic aid commitments amounted, at the end of the year, to \$585.2 million, extended to

(1) Throughout this document, this wording covers: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Roumania and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany.

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22 different countries (mainly to India, the United Arab Republic, Brazil and Indonesia). Though less important than the Chinese programme as far as commitments are concerned, the Czech aid actually delivered largely exceeded that from China, reaching by the end of the year a total of \$203.1 million. Annual drawings by recipient countries on Czech loans have risen steadily over the years to reach \$69.3 million during 1964, or three times more than the drawings by the developing countries on Communist Chinese aid.

23. The Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany, whose rôle in the overall communist efforts aimed at the developing countries of the free world had so far been negligible, undertook in 1964 to improve its image as a source of economic aid by extending far more new credits during that single year (\$85.7 million) than during the nine preceding years (\$54.9 million), but drawings on Soviet zonal credits by recipient countries barely exceeded \$2.4 million. Up till the end of 1964 the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany had extended aid to 10 countries, among which the United Arab Republic had absorbed more than half and Indonesia about 31% of the total zonal aid extended and utilised.

24. Roumania extended in 1964 \$70.0 million new economic aid and actually delivered some \$8.0 million. Poland undertook new commitments up to a value of \$60.0 million and delivered \$25.6 million worth of aid. Hungary (new extensions: \$1.3 million; drawings \$4.4 million) and Bulgaria (new extensions: nil; drawings \$1.3 million), did not participate in the 1964 renewed drive.

25. During 1964 new Communist economic aid was distributed among the main recipients as follows:

(In million US \$)

Recipient Countries	DONOR COUNTRIES			Total
	Soviet Union	Communist China	Eastern European countries	
United Arab Republic	280.3	80.0	138.7	499.0
India	211.0	-	84.0	295.0
Algeria	129.5	-	15.0	144.5
Pakistan	11.0	60.0	28.0	99.0
Tanzania	30.0	45.5	18.5	94.0
Indonesia	-	50.0	35.4	85.4
Yemen	39.0	28.5	1.3	68.8
Kenya	48.7	18.0	-	66.7
Other African countries	31.4	51.6	-	83.0
Others	51.7	4.2	20.3	76.2
TOTAL	832.6	337.8	341.2	1,511.6

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26. Credits extended by the Soviet Union, Communist China, Roumania, the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany and Poland to the United Arab Republic are allocated to various projects included in the Egyptian Second 5-Year Plan, which is to start in July 1965. In addition to the \$499 million extended in 1964, more credits were reportedly extended by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany during the early months of 1965, bringing the total aid from Communist origin under the second 5-year plan to over \$800 million.

27. In India, the USSR undertook to provide for the first stage of the BOKARO steel mill project which is to become the fourth large-scale steel plant in the Indian public sector (the "Rourkela" project was erected in earlier years under the aid programme of the Federal Republic of Germany, the "Durgapur" steel mill with aid from the United Kingdom and the "Bhilai" plant with earlier Soviet assistance). Czech aid extended in May 1964 consisted of a line of credit for the development of heavy industrial enterprises.

28. The Soviet Union extended large-scale credits to Algeria, for the construction of a metallurgical complex while the Czech loans are to be utilized for the establishment of industrial enterprises, such as a shoe factory, and the delivery of Radio and Television equipment.

29. Pakistan, who accepted in 1961 some \$30 million credit from the USSR for petroleum exploration, received during 1964, not only additional Soviet credits for agricultural equipment, but also loans from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Communist China. The latter, by extending a line of credit for economic development of some \$60 million, became in October 1964 the main supplier of Communist financial assistance to Pakistan.

30. Zanzibar was a target of special interest for Communist China and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany. Both Communist countries renewed their offers after the merger with Tanganyika and the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania soon followed by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1964, Communist China appeared to be the main source of Communist aid to this country also.

31. While the USSR agreed, after some negotiations, to defer repayments due from Indonesia on earlier loans, the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany and Communist China extended sizeable amounts of new credits, the former for deliveries of transport and other equipment, the latter in an effort to assist Indonesia not only in economic development, but also in redressing its financial situation.

32. In Yemen, both the USSR and Communist China, continued their efforts by extending supplementary credits for road construction and industrial plants. Hungary, who before 1964 had not been active in this country also provided a small amount of aid.

33. The interest of both the Soviet Union and Communist China in African countries south of the Sahara, was not only demonstrated by their efforts in Tanzania but also by Soviet economic aid offers directed towards countries such as : Kenya (\$48.7 million), Uganda (\$15.6 million), Congo (Brazzaville) (\$8.9 million) and Senegal (\$6.7 million), all of them accepting Communist economic assistance for the first time. Simultaneously, Communist China extended, under more generous terms than the Soviet Union, credits to Kenya (\$18.0 million) and Congo (Brazzaville) (\$25.2 million). In addition, it pursued its earlier efforts in Ghana by extending additional loans (\$22.4 million) and was the first Communist country to provide economic aid to the Central African Republic by granting a \$2.0 million loan in cash, supplemented by a similar credit for various commodities.

34. The real cost of the most recent developments in Soviet aid commitments is likely to remain relatively small. Over the next several years, drawings on credits extended by the Soviet Union can be expected to continue at a rate of about \$450 million annually during the period 1965-1968. The burden which such deliveries might impose on the Soviet economy will, to some extent, be reduced by a growing level of repayments. Assuming that the recipient countries meet their obligations on schedule, repayments might amount to some \$200 million annually, thus leaving a net outlay of about \$250 to \$300 million which represents for the next three or four years an actual cost of aid of the same order of magnitude as the one which has been currently met during the last two years.

35. Drawings on Communist Chinese loans will probably increase more markedly in view of the very low level of utilization of such credits by recipient countries up till now (in 1964 Communist China provided \$337.8 million new credits but delivered actually only \$21.8 million of aid). Experience on drawings on Soviet credits has, however shown that such increases are gradual, and that a period of five years elapses before economic aid actually materializes. Even if Communist China maintained its present level of new commitments during coming years, the actual cost of its aid programme would probably only reach some \$50 to \$75 million by 1968 at a time when repayments would start to mitigate to some extent the burden imposed by such deliveries on the Chinese economy.

36. The recipient countries, on their side, can be expected to experience increasing difficulties in meeting their obligations as the burden of repayments due not only on Communist economic and military credits but also on credits from advanced free world countries increases. Rescheduling of the repayment period had already been asked for and obtained by Indonesia for her military indebtedness vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1963 it has been estimated that a total of \$130 million was scheduled to have been repaid on Soviet economic credits and that an additional \$40 million were due in interests.

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B. MILITARY AID

37. New military aid extended during 1964 by Communist countries amounted to at least \$400 million, a figure of the same order of magnitude as the annual commitments during the two previous years, 1962 and 1963 (but well below the 1961 peak, when some \$850 million had been extended). About three-quarters of this total were extended in the form of credits, the other quarter consisted of grants or discounts. The Soviet Union provided 95% of the new Communist military aid commitments, Czechoslovakia about 4% and Communist China only 1%.

38. The main beneficiaries of the 1964 military aid agreements were India (about \$150 million on credit terms), Indonesia (valued at over \$150 million) and the United Arab Republic, although no information is so far available on the military aid agreement concluded at the end of the year, and therefore not included in the \$400 million indicated above: Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan were allocated about \$35 million each, while the Yemen and Cambodia accounted for some \$10 million each.

39. Since September 1955, when the Communist military aid programmes were initiated, up till the end of 1964, about \$3,700 million have been extended by the Communist countries (of which 86% by the Soviet Union). Of this amount, some \$3,100 million had been drawn by the end of 1964 by 14 developing countries. Indonesia and the United Arab Republic each accounted for slightly less than one-third of this total, the other Arab countries (Iraq, Syria, Algeria and the Yemen) for about one-quarter, the remainder being mainly directed towards India and Afghanistan. Minor recipients of Communist military aid were: the Somali Republic, Morocco, Guinea, Cambodia, Ghana and Mali.

40. Deliveries of military equipment under earlier agreements were continued during 1964, especially to Algeria, Indonesia and the UAR, and the USSR decided to provide to a larger number of countries more complex weapon systems, as well as a greater variety of military equipment. Such an expansion in deliveries of advanced weaponry by the USSR to less-developed countries may be expected to continue.

C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

41. The number of Communist civilian and military personnel in the developing countries as well as that of nationals of developing countries being trained in Communist countries, continued to grow rapidly during the year under review. During the early months of 1960, technical assistance personnel, both civilian and military, currently at work in developing countries of the free world outside Europe numbered about 6,750. Two years later, this figure had increased to 10,750. At the end of 1963, they were 14,195 and their number reached 18,020 by the end of 1964, of which 14,775 were civilian and 3,545 were military technicians.

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42. This increase reflects in part the growing implementation of accumulated outstanding economic credits and the delivery of more complex weapon systems, but also the fact that Communist countries have been increasingly engaging in the conclusion of purely technical assistance agreements for the extension of know-how not directly linked with the actual implementation of specific agricultural or industrial projects. Thus, while by mid-1963 15% of the total civilian personnel were engaged in solely technical assistance activities, by the end of 1964, this proportion reached 25%. As the number of technical assistance agreements increases, as the volume of economic credits rises and the delivery of more advanced weaponry continues, the number of Communist technical and military personnel sent to developing countries is likely to increase in the coming years.

43. Following the completion of some projects, the total number of Soviet civilian citizens in developing countries (8,705) declined somewhat during 1964 in comparison to 1963 (8,850) but this decrease was more than compensated for by the growing number of nationals from Eastern European countries (3,610 in 1964 as compared to 2,565 in 1963).

44. The most important development in this field was, however, the large increase of Communist Chinese civilian personnel from 470 in 1963, to 2,160 in 1964. This rapid growth of Chinese technical assistance was particularly marked in Africa where the number of technicians and labourers rose from 145 in 1962 to 225 in 1963 and to 1,050 in 1964. While Chinese civilian personnel still represent only 15% of the total number of Communist technicians engaged in various assistance activities, by concentrating on selected countries, the Chinese outnumber Soviet personnel in such countries as: Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal and Yemen. It must, however, be noted that in the Chinese numbers are included workers who cannot be compared to the other Communist technicians. For instance, of the 700 Chinese working in Nepal, 400 are labourers actually working on road construction.

45. Approximately 3,545 military technicians from Communist countries were in less-developed countries by the end of 1964 as against 2,765 one year earlier. Their number increased in Indonesia, Syria, the UAR and more markedly in India and Algeria. It declined in Iraq and Yemen after the completion of some military construction projects. The bulk of the military technical assistance provided by Communist countries is of Soviet origin, out of this total reportedly only 20 military technicians were Chinese.

46. In spite of continued student dissatisfaction leading, in some cases, to open clashes with Communist authorities, as reported from Rumania by the end of the year (1), the number of

(1) Also noteworthy, although for quite different reasons, was the large-scale participation of foreign students (Chinese, but also reportedly African), in the demonstrations of 4th March, 1965 that opposed them to police forces protecting the U.S. Embassy shortly after the beginning of air-raids over N. Vietnam.

academic students, technical and military trainees currently studying in Communist countries continued to increase. While in December 1963, some 17,600 students (1,785 technical trainees, 12,805 academic students and about 3,000 military trainees) were being trained in Communist countries, their number had risen in December 1964 to 21,685 (3,900 technical trainees, 14,540 academic students and 3,245 military trainees).

47. Altogether, from 1956, the year when this form of assistance was started, till December 1964, some 44,610 nationals from developing countries, including some 9,500 military personnel have so far gone through some kind of training in Communist countries.

48. The bulk of the technical trainees came from the United Arab Republic (1,655), India (620), Algeria (345), Ghana (230), Indonesia (190), Mali (130), Yemen (120), Guinea (105) and went to the U.S.S.R. (2,695), Czechoslovakia (440), Poland (205) and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany (185), while Communist China played host to only 25 of them.

49. Out of the total of academic students from less-developed countries currently studying in Communist schools and universities, more than half (7,500) came from some 40 different African countries (mainly from Ghana (915), Kenya (840), Somali Republic (840), Mali (710), Sudan (510), Tanzania (445), Guinea (450), Nigeria (435), Cameroon (330), Algeria (300)), but the largest single national groups came from Iraq (1,965) and Indonesia (1,025). The U.S.S.R. remains by far the main Communist host country with over 9,000 academic students followed by Czechoslovakia (about 2,000) and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany (1,000). Here again Communist China plays a negligible rôle extending educational facilities to only about 300 academic students.

50. Military personnel from 12 different countries undergoing some training by the end of 1964 came mainly from Indonesia (850), Afghanistan (550), the UAR (465), Algeria (415), and Yemen (275). About 90% of the total military personnel were instructed in the U.S.S.R. and the rest in Eastern European countries. Only 15 Algerian and 30 Somalians were reportedly being trained in Communist China.

D. TRADE

51. Total trade (imports plus exports) between the Communist area and developing countries of the free world outside Europe

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amounted in 1963 to about \$2.5 billion (1). The Eastern European countries accounted for 43% of this total, the Soviet Union for 39% and Communist China for 18%. The 1963 overall results represented an increase of 11% over 1962 and may be compared with a 9.5% increase in 1962 and 4% in 1961. This expansion of Communist trade resulted mainly from a rapid increase of Communist exports to Asian countries combined with a further growth of imports from African and Middle Eastern countries.

52. On the basis of partial information covering the first six months of 1964, the annual total will probably show a slower rate of increase than in 1963 although during the first half of 1964 Communist trade with developing countries continued to rise by about 11% over the same period of 1963. A growing flow of Communist exports to African countries (in part as a result of increased economic aid commitments) and increased imports from Latin American and African countries can be anticipated.

53. World trade of non-Communist developing countries outside Europe rose in 1963 by 7.4% over 1962 and in 1964 by 6.6% over 1963. The share of the Communist area in this trade remained practically unchanged at about 5% during recent years. However, a number of developing countries have apparently no trade relations with the Communist area. On the other hand, in some cases, in particular in that of a few selected ones, trade with Communist countries plays a far more important role than would appear from the above global average.

(1) Figures in this section are based on trade statistics of the developing countries. Imports as reported by developing countries are considered as exports by Communist countries. Exports as reported by developing countries are considered as imports by Communist countries. Because of time lags, differences in reporting procedures and definitions, inclusion or deletion of c.i.f. charges, these figures differ considerably from those reported in official Communist sources on the same trade.

For instance :

Soviet exports to India :	\$127.8 million (according to Indian statistics)
(Jan.-Dec. 1963)	\$221.9 million (according to Soviet statistics)
Soviet exports to UAR :	\$ 49.1 million (according to Egyptian statistics)
(Jan.-Dec. 1963)	\$135.2 million (according to Soviet statistics)

Part of the explanation for these discrepancies results from the fact that some developing countries do not include in their trade statistics imports received under long-term economic aid credits whereas Communist countries include such deliveries in their export statistics. Trade statistics, as reported by the developing countries, are to be used in the absence of official statistics from Communist China and some other Communist countries.

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54. The non-European developing countries which in 1963 conducted a substantial share of their total trade with the Communist area, are listed hereunder :

	% of total exports directed to Communist countries	% of total imports from Communist countries
Afghanistan	29	50
United Arab Republic	43	17
Guinea	27	24
Iraq	26	21
Syrian Arab Republic	23	10
Cambodia	13	19
Sudan	20	11
Indonesia	12	17
Ceylon	11	17
Mali	negl.	26
Burma	5	19
India	12	10
Ghana	11	9

55. During 1963, the five main trade partners of the Communist countries located in the developing areas of the free world outside Europe accounted for 54% of total trade between these two areas : India (17%), the United Arab Republic (15%), Malaya-Singapore (10%), Brazil (6%) and Indonesia (6%). Communist trade with the whole of the African countries (other than U.R.), represented about 13% of this total and was mainly conducted with Sudan, Ghana and Morocco.

56. Out of the available partial information for 1964, the most salient facts appear to be the following:

- Indian exports to the Communist area increased during 1964 very rapidly while Indian imports from that area registered an important, though less impressive expansion.

- Trade with Malaysia dropped sharply as a result of considerably reduced Communist purchases of natural rubber from that country.

- The United Arab Republic, which had sold 62% of its cotton crop August 1962-July 1963 to Communist countries, reduced this share to 51% during the cotton season August 63-July 64.

- Trade with Latin American countries increased as a result of large-scale Communist Chinese purchases of grain from Argentina and Mexico, while Communist exports to that region declined.

- In Africa, exports of Communist countries increased markedly while imports rose at a slower rate. Communist trade with African countries has been steadily growing over the past years from about \$250 million (exports and imports) in 1960 to about \$365 million in 1963 and reached probably some \$440 million in 1964.

57. Trade between the Soviet Union and the developing countries of the free world outside Europe during 1963 increased by 8.7% over 1962 to reach a total turnover of \$960 million. Soviet exports rose however by only about 2%. To African and Middle Eastern countries, Soviet exports even declined while those to Latin American remained at their 1962 level and exports to Asian countries (Afghanistan and India) expanded somewhat. On the imports side, an overall increase of 14% was registered in 1963, the main increases resulting from Soviet purchases in Middle Eastern countries (Egyptian and Syrian cotton) and from African countries (Ghanainian cocoa and Sudanese cotton). Soviet imports from Asian countries increased only slightly, while those from Latin American countries declined.

58. On the basis of information so far available, it seems doubtful whether the 1964 total turnover will have shown any increase over 1963. On the import side, a stagnation, if not an actual decline, might be expected while Soviet exports, which did poorly in 1963, may increase some 10% (mainly to African and Asian countries) over the 1963 level.

Geographical distribution of Soviet trade
with developing countries of the free world outside
Europe

<u>Area</u>	<u>Soviet exports to</u>			<u>Soviet imports from</u>		
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u> ⁽¹⁾
Africa	15	12	13	9	10	10
Asia	48	54	56	57	53	55
Latin America	10	10	7	14	11	11
Middle East	27	24	24	20	26	24
	100	100	100	100	100	100
In value (million US \$)	407.9	416.9	about 450	473.8	541.4	about 520

59. In 1963, the total trade turnover between Communist China and the developing countries of the free world outside Europe rose to reach again its 1960 level (between \$450 and \$460 million). As compared with 1962, the 1963 total represented a 12.6% increase, almost equally distributed between exports and imports. On the export side, the most important increases were directed towards the Asian countries (Malaya - Singapore and Ceylon) and to a lesser extent towards the Middle East (Iraq). Communist Chinese

(1) Estimates on the basis of partial information and on trends during the first half of the year.

exports to African countries declined slightly while those to the Latin American countries remained negligible. Simultaneously, Chinese imports from Africa (Sudanese cotton, Moroccan phosphates, products from Tanganyika and Uganda) as well as from Middle Eastern countries (Syrian cotton) grew considerably.

60. For 1964, on the basis of partial information, it would seem that trade between Communist China and the developing countries, particularly the African countries continued to increase rapidly. Chinese trade with the latter might even have exceeded Soviet trade. The largest increases were probably on the import side where the exceptional purchases of grain from Argentina (\$75 million) and from Mexico (\$30 million) must have affected the total level of Chinese imports.

Geographical distribution of Communist Chinese trade with developing areas of the free world outside Europe

Area	Communist Chinese exports to			Communist Chinese imports from		
	1962	1963	1964(1)	1962	1963	1964(1)
Africa	13	11	20	11	25	22
Asia	72	74	66	55	50	28
Latin America	1	1	1	17	1	33
Middle East	14	14	13	17	24	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
In value (million US \$)	243.4	272.6	about 310.0	155.6	179.0	about 320.0

61. Within the Communist area, the Eastern European countries, taken as a whole, expanded their trade with the developing nations of the free world more rapidly than the Soviet Union and slightly faster even than Communist China. They reinforced their traditional leading position within the Communist camp, particularly in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Trade turnover exceeded for the first time in 1963 \$1 billion, representing a 12.8% increase over 1962. This trade expansion was however, the result of a 20% increase of their imports from developing countries while their exports grew by only 5%. During 1963, the Eastern European countries increased their purchases almost to the same extent in each of the main geographical areas concerned while their export expansion was mainly directed at Asian and African countries. The most striking increases in the total value of goods delivered during that year by the countries of Eastern Europe were reported by Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia in Africa, and by Burma, India and Indonesia in Asia.

(1) For 1964, estimates on the basis of partial information for the first half of the year.

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62. For 1964, it would seem that Eastern European exports to developing countries have increased more rapidly than their imports from these areas. Thus their trade balance with these countries, which was only negative in 1963 on account of their deficit with Brazil and Argentina, should again show a surplus.

Geographical distribution of trade between Eastern European countries and developing areas of the Free World outside Europe

<u>Area</u>	<u>Eastern European Exports</u>			<u>Eastern European Imports</u>		
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964(1)</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964(1)</u>
Africa	18	20	22	15	14	16
Asia	29	32	32	33	33	34
Latin America	15	14	15	21	22	23
Middle East	38	34	31	31	31	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
In value (Million US \$)	496.4	523.1	about 560	443.3	535.8	about 550

63. The commodity composition of Communist trade with the developing countries showed little change in 1963 from earlier years. Imports by the Communist area consisted mainly of raw materials, which accounted for almost 67% of total imports. Cotton (UAR, Syria, Sudan, Brazil) and rubber (Malaya - Singapore, Indonesia) are among the main raw materials imported representing together more than 40% of total Communist imports from developing countries. Natural rubber imports declined by about 2% from the 1962 level. Imports of food products increased by 23%, but on the whole such products still account for only 28% of total imports. The Eastern European countries purchased 40% more foodstuffs (coffee, tea and cocoa) than in 1962. Communist imports of manufactured products from developing countries increased considerably from a very low level but still amounted to 8% of total imports (\$95 million) and consisted mainly of cotton yarn (UAR), footwear and jute manufactures (India).

64. Exports by Communist countries to developing areas of the free world still consisted mainly of manufactured goods (28% of total exports) and machinery, complete plants, and transport equipment (20%) although the share of such exports in the total declined somewhat to the advantage of food products (sugar). Petroleum and petroleum products accounted for about 10%. Communist exports of manufactured goods comprise mainly textile fabrics, yarns and threads, and iron and steel.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

(1) For 1964, estimates on the basis of partial information for the first half of the year.

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PART III

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CHART 1


ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

PERCAPITULATIVE TOTALS 1954-64

		(Million US \$)
1	AMOUNT OF AID EXTENDED	6,438.6
	OF WHICH	
	IN THE FORM OF GRANTS	342.0
	IN THE FORM OF CREDITS	6,096.6
2	DRAWN	2,114.2
		= 32.8% of extensions
3	CREDITS AVAILABLE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT UNUTILIZED AS ON 1st JANUARY 1965	4,324.4

CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO AND DRAWN BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
OF THE FREE WORLD FROM 1954 TO 1964 INCLUSIVE (1)

Million US \$



(1) Revised on the basis of most recent information (Cuba excluded)

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TABLE I
ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Receiptulative totals - January 1954/December 1964
(by recipient country)

(in million US dollars)

Recipient country	Credits and Grants extended by			Total extended	Total drawn
	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China		
AFRICA	767.4	224.3	254.2	1,245.9	221.4
Algeria	230.1	22.4	51.8	304.3	10.5
Central African Republic	-	-	4.0	4.0	-
Congo (Brazzaville)	8.9	-	25.2	34.1	1.8
Ethiopia	101.8	11.8	-	113.6	12.6
Ghana	88.8	81.5	42.0	212.3	31.3
Guinea	73.1	25.2	26.5	124.8	71.0
Kenya	48.7	-	18.0	66.7	1.4
Mali	55.5	22.6	19.6	97.7	36.5
Morocco	-	17.2	-	17.2	4.8
Senegal	6.7	-	-	6.7	-
Somali Republic	57.2	5.6	21.6	84.4	23.9
Sudan	23.0	-	-	23.0	10.6
Tanzania	30.0	18.5	45.5	94.0	3.0
Tunisia	28.0	19.5	-	47.5	8.0
Uganda	15.6	-	-	15.6	-
ASIA	2,112.2	567.3	389.2	3,068.7	1,243.3
Afghanistan	583.5	7.1	-	590.6	333.3
Burma	13.7	1.5	84.0	99.2	17.7
Cambodia	21.4	5.4	49.4	76.2	48.9
Ceylon	30.0	10.1	41.0	81.1	24.4
India	1,022.1	255.2	-	1,277.3	574.9
Indonesia	368.9	260.0	107.4	736.3	203.1
Laos	7.6	-	4.0	11.6	1.5
Nepal	20.8	-	43.4	64.2	18.8
Pakistan	44.2	28.0	60.0	132.2	20.7
MIDDLE EAST	1,266.8	426.9	143.1	1,836.8	605.9
Cyprus	-	1.3	-	1.3	0.9
Iran	39.4	21.1	-	60.5	7.6
Iraq	183.9	33.6	-	217.5	97.0
Syrian Arab Republic	150.5	45.5	16.3	212.3	58.3
United Arab Republic	833.3	323.1	84.7	1,241.1	401.1
Yemen	59.7	2.3	42.1	104.1	41.0
LATIN AMERICA	100.0	187.2	-	287.2	43.1
Argentina	100.0	183.3	-	103.3	32.6
Brazil	-	-	-	183.3	11.0
TOTAL EXTENDED	4,246.4	1,406.8	786.5	6,438.6	
TOTAL DRAWINGS	1,574.9	407.4	131.9		2,114.2

TABLE II

COMMISSION ECONOMIC POUR LE MONDE EN DEVELOPPANT COURM.I.S. O. TEL. PRES. WORLD
(by recipient country - year by year)

(million US \$)

	Economic Credits and Grants extended											TOTAL	Drawings Drawn as on 1.1.67
	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964		
AFRICA					1.8	150.1	115.3	352.7	48.7	179.1	388.2	1,245.9	221.4
Algeria									3.8		144.5	304.3	10.5
Central African Republic											4.0	4.0	-0-
Congo (Brazzaville)											34.1	34.1	1.8
Ethiopia					1.8	111.8	46.8	243.1	15.0	22.4	113.6	212.3	12.6
Ghana						48.3	60.5	1.0		1	124.8	71.0	37.5
Guinea										66.7	66.7	66.7	71.0
Kenya								84.6	13.1		97.7	97.7	1.4
Mali								0.4	16.8		17.2	17.2	36.5
Morocco										6.7	6.7	6.7	4.8
Niger											84.4	84.4	-0-
Somali Republic								62.8	21.6		84.4	84.4	23.9
Sudan								23.0			23.0	23.0	30.6
Tanzania										94.0	94.0	94.0	3.0
Tunisia								37.8	1.5		0.2	47.5	8.0
Uganda										15.6	15.6	15.6	-0-
ASIA	10.8	110.0	311.6	164.6	225.8	629.6	164.6	615.1	98.6	82.7	535.1	3,068.7	1,243.3
Afghanistan	10.8		100.0	15.8		131.8	3.5	197.3	35.9	54.3	41.2	590.6	333.3
Burma				7.2			23.6	84.1	5.3	2.6		95.2	17.7
Cambodia				6.0			2.1	7.5		12.6		76.2	43.9
Ceylon				15.8			26.9		10.5	8.0		81.1	24.4
India		121.4	26.4	127.0	40.5	468.5	31.6	140.9	32.5		4.2	1,277.3	574.9
Indonesia		8.6	136.5		34.0	21.8	281.6	145.5	11.6	5.6	83.4	736.3	203.1
Laos					51.3				2.8			11.6	1.5
Nepal			12.6			7.5	21.0	9.8		10.5		64.2	18.8
Pakistan			3.2					30.0		99.0		132.2	20.7
ISRAEL		151.2	244.4	179.7	316.1	463.5	238.7	244.1	105.5	101.6	538.1	1,836.8	605.3
Cyprus								1.3				1.3	0.9
Iran					2.5	3.6			0.5	38.9	15.0	60.5	7.6
Iraq						137.5	78.6		1.4			217.5	97.0
Syrian Arab Republic		6.1	3.6	163.2			2.8		15.0	16.3	5.3	212.3	58.3
United Arab Republic		9.8	9.8	16.5			257.3	12.8	88.6	46.2	49.0	1,241.1	401.1
Yemen			21.0		12.7	1.4				0.2	68.8	104.1	41.0
LATIN AMERICA		14.2	2.0			100.0		110.0	20.0			287.2	41.6
Argentina		1.3	2.0			100.0		110.0	70.0			103.7	32.6
Brazil						1.5						181.5	11.0
TOTAL	10.8	147.2	348.0	344.3	543.9	936.1	818.6	1,091.9	322.8	363.4	1,511.6	6,438.6	2,114.2
Drawings	1.0	2.7	32.2	57.2	132.2	143.9	160.5	256.9	360.8	464.0	503.1		

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TABLE III

ECONOMIC AID (CREDITS AND GRANTS) EXTENDED BY COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES AND DRAWN BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES YEAR BY YEAR AND BY DONOR COUNTRY

	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	Total
<u>SOVIET UNION</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	5.8	119.9	250.8	305.1	405.8	853.8	594.0	549.4	76.8	252.4	832.6	4,246.4
<u>drawings</u>	1.0	2.7	8.8	33.4	94.3	100.3	122.3	212.1	258.1	371.5	370.3	1,574.9
<u>COMMUNIST CHINA</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	0	56.4	15.8	34.4	1.2	73.5	163.0	16.3	88.1	337.8	786.5
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	20.9	7.1	5.1	25.5	9.6	8.2	12.6	21.1	21.8	131.9
<u>EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	5.0	27.3	40.8	23.4	103.7	81.1	151.1	379.5	229.7	22.9	341.2	1,406.8
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	2.5	15.7	32.7	18.1	28.6	36.6	89.8	71.4	111.0	407.4
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	5.0	10.0	31.8	21.1	24.9	72.9	83.9	147.0	58.8	5.6	124.2	585.2
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	1.5	7.5	17.8	9.3	13.1	10.6	30.1	43.9	69.3	203.1
<u>Poland</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	0	2.3	0	41.7	8.2	43.0	82.5	154.4	8.0	60.0	400.1
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	0	0.2	2.0	2.5	10.1	8.3	35.9	11.3	25.6	95.9
<u>Roumania</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	0	1.0	0	10.1	0	0	100.9	0	0	70.0	182.0
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	0	1.0	0	2.0	4.4	3.0	0	3.7	8.0	22.1
<u>Soviet Zone of Germany</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	11.6	5.7	2.3	26.1	0	5.0	2.4	0	1.8	85.7	140.6
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	1.0	6.0	9.2	4.1	0.6	13.6	9.2	7.4	2.4	53.5
<u>Hungary</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	5.7	0	0	0.9	0	19.2	36.1	11.7	0	1.3	74.9
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	0	2.0	3.7	0.2	0.4	1.1	12.6	4.3	4.4	28.7
<u>Bulgaria</u>												
<u>extensions</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10.6	4.8	7.5	0	22.9
<u>drawings</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0	0.8	1.3	4.1

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TABLE IV(a)

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF NEW COMMITMENTS OF ECONOMIC AID
(CREDITS AND GRANTS) EXTENDED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
TO DEVELOPING ONES OF THE FREE WORLD

January - December, 1964

JANUARY:

(1) INDONESIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$4.0 million

(Construction of a 30,000 spindle cotton spinning mill)

- Repayment over 8 years starting 2 years after the last shipment of equipment.

(2) ALGERIA/USSR:

Grant: one IL-18 aircraft (valued: \$1.7 million).

FEBRUARY

(3) IRAN/Poland:

Line of credit for economic development: \$15.0 million.

(Machinery and equipment for three sugar refineries, alcohol producing factories, glass factories, cold storage plants, electrical equipment for power generating installations.)

- Repayment 10% cash on delivery, credit to be repaid over 8 years starting 2 years after delivery 2.5% interest.

(4) ZANZIBAR/Communist China:

Grant: \$0.5 million

(Budgetary support and technical assistance.)

MARCH

(5) TUNISIA/USSR:

Credit: \$0.2 million

(Machine tools)

(6) YEMEN/USSR:

Line of credit for economic development: \$29.0 million.

(A cement plant, a fish-freezing and canning plant, half a dozen medium-size fishing boats and a trawler, road construction from HUDAYDAH to TAIZ, a land reclamation and cotton cultivation project, a geological survey, work on the Hudaydah's shipyards.)

Commodity loan: \$10.0 million

Grant: (three schools (2,000 students), a 100-bed hospital to be staffed by Soviet doctors and nurses.)

- Loans to be repaid in 15 years - no interest.

APRIL

(7) NEPAL/USSR:

Credit: \$10.5 million.

(Construction of a 75-mile link of the East-West highway, an agricultural tool factory and various commodities.)

- No interest.

(8) TUNISIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

(Delivery of ten fishing vessels) - credit conditions not available.

MAY

(9) ALGERIA/USSR:

Credit: \$127.8 million.

(Construction of a metallurgical complex with a capacity of 300,000 to 350,000 tons of rolled steel annually and a chemical by-product plant.)

- 2.5% interest.

(10) INDIA/Czechoslovakia:

Line of credit for industrial development: \$84.0 million.

(A thermal power plant, a foundry and forge plant, two machine tool factories, a tractor factory, expansion of earlier projects such as the high-pressure boiler plant in Madras State and the heavy electrical power equipment plant in Andhra Pradesh State, imports of various components.)

- Repayment over 12 years: 2.5% interest.

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(11) ALGERIA/Czechoslovakia:

Line of credit: \$15.0 million.

(Engineering equipment for nationalised factories, transmitters for a radio and television station, construction of a shoe factory.)

- Repayment in 10 years: 2.5% interest.

(12) KENYA/Communist China:

Grant: \$2.8 million (in pounds sterling for budgetary support).

Line of credit for economic development: \$15.2 million.

(Equipment and technical assistance for projects to be negotiated.)

- Long-term loan, repayment to start in 1975: no interest.

(13) INDIA/USSR:

Credit: \$211.0 million.

(First stage of the BOKARO project, India's fourth steel mill in the public sector. Planned annual capacity = 1.5 million to 2 million tons to be expanded later to 4 million tons.)

- Repayment in 12 years: 2.5% interest.

(14) KENYA/USSR:

Grant: \$4.3 million (a 200-bed hospital and Polyclinic Technical school - 1,000 students).

Line of credit for economic development: \$44.4 million.

(Various industrial feasibility studies, an irrigation development project, a fish cannery, a fruit and a vegetable cannery, a textile factory, a sugar refinery, a radio station.)

- Repayment over a 12-year period after completion: 2.5% interest.

(15) ZANZIBAR/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Line of credit: \$6.0 million.

(A hospital and a nurses' training school, a medical school, a girls' school, food canneries and 10 apartment houses.)

(16) ZANZIBAR/Communist China:

Line of credit for economic development: \$14.0 million.

(Various machinery and equipment, housing construction)

- Repayments in commodities or convertible currency over a 10-year period starting in 1975: no interest.

(17) TANZANIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany

Grant: \$0.5 million (consumer goods, a photo laboratory, 2 apartment houses).

(18) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/USSR:

Grant: a 10 000 acre experimental farm (valued at \$0.3 million) with equipment, machinery and technical assistance.

Line of credit for economic development: \$280.0 million.

(Projects under the Egyptian Second Five-year Plan (to start in July 1965) among which: a steel complex with an annual capacity of 1 million tons including a sintering plant, a coke-chemical plant, blast furnace, continuous-pour smelter and rolling mill; an electric power station, two transformer stations, a machine tool factory, a lubricants plant; expansion of the steel forging plant set up earlier and assistance to the fishing industry.

- Repayment over a 12-year period: 2.5% interest.

JUNE

(19) TANZANIA/Communist China:

Grant: \$1.5 million in foreign exchange and \$1.5 million of commodities to generate local currency for development projects.

Line of credit for economic development: \$28.0 million

(An agricultural tools factory a cotton textile mill and a 5,000 acre experimental state farm, with equipment and technical assistance.)

- Credit available over the next 5 years - repayment in commodities starting in 1975: no interest.

(20) PAKISTAN/USSR:

Credit: \$11.0 million.

(Agricultural equipment, earth-moving equipment and rotary drilling machines and technical assistance for training in the operation and maintenance of the equipment.)

- Repayment in 5 years starting after the first delivery: 3% interest.

(21) SYRIA/Czechoslovakia:

Credit: \$5.2 million.

(Construction of a beet sugar refinery in the GHAB valley)

- Repayment in 10 years.

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(22) YEMEN/Hungary:

Grant: a school, medical and hospital equipment
(valued at \$0.3 million).

Line of credit: \$1.0 million.

(Industrial equipment)

(23) YEMEN/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$28.0 million.

(A textile factory, construction of a road from SANA to SADA and repairs of the SANA-HUDAYDAH road.)

- Repayment over 20 years: no interest.

JULY

(24) CONGO(Brazzaville)/Communist China:

Credit: \$5.0 million.

(In cash \$2.0 million, commodities \$3.0 million)

- Repayment in 10 years starting in 1977, in Congolese exports, French francs or another convertible currency: no interest.

(25) GHANA/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$22.4 million.

(Specific projects to be negotiated, including training of Ghanaian technicians, technical assistance, equipment.)

- Repayment over a 10-year period starting in 1974, in Ghanaian exports, or a third-country currency acceptable to both governments: no interest.

(26) AFGHANISTAN/USSR:

Credit: \$30.0 million.

(Road construction from PUL-I-KHUMRI to SHIBARGHAN, the survey of which had been undertaken under an earlier credit.)

(27) INDONESIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$2.9 million.

(Purchase of printing equipment)

- Repayment over a 10-year period, starting in 1968.

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AC/127-D/198AUGUST(28) AFGHANISTAN/USSR:

Credit: \$5.6 million

(Construction of prefabricated housing in Kabul, technical assistance, additional building materials and equipment.)

(29) TANZANIA/Czechoslovakia:

Line of credit for economic development: \$6.0 million

(Various projects including a shoe factory, a tube and tyre factory, a ceramics factory, model state farms.)

(30) TANZANIA/Poland:

Line of credit for economic development: \$6.0 million

(Various projects related to the fishing industry, the jute bag industry, a sugar estate and a bakery.)

(31) TANZANIA/USSR:

Line of credit for economic development: \$30.0 million

(Various projects including: mineral and oil prospecting; a technical school, a 250-bed hospital, a 50 kW. radio station, a secondary school equipment for a 200-bed hospital, equipment for veterinary laboratories, a state cotton farm, expansion of the telephone network, assistance to the fishing industry.)

SEPTEMBER(32) CONGO(Brazzaville)/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$20.2 million

(To start industrialisation, including a hydro-electric plant, with emphasis on production of consumer goods. Specific projects to be negotiated.)

- Repayment in 10 years starting after a 10-year grace period: no interest.

(33) CEYLON/Communist China:

Credit: \$4.2 million

(Purchase of machinery and equipment)
To be utilised between 1965 and 1967.

- Repayment over a 10-year period: no interest.

(34) INDONESIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$11.9 million

(Purchase of railroad equipment: 20 diesel locomotives and spare parts, 117 passenger coaches and pullman cars.)

Long-term credit - Repayment to start in 1968.

(35) SYRIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$0.1 million

(Purchase of equipment for a television assembly plant.)

(36) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Roumania:

Line of credit: \$70.0 million

(Projects under the Egyptian Second Five-year Plan including: a caustic soda plant, two cement factories, two brick factories; equipment for phosphate mining and concentrating, for barytes concentrating; technical assistance for the petroleum industry.)

- Repayment over a 10-year period by deliveries of Egyptian iron ore, phosphates and calcinated soda.

OCTOBER

(37) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC/Communist China:

Credit: \$4.0 million

(Cash payment of \$2.0 million; the commodity credit of \$2.0 million to be spread out over 5 years and to be used for the establishment of a chemical industry, housing construction and investment in various industries.)

- Repayment to be extended for as long as 40 years: no interest.

(38) YEMEN/Communist China:

Credit: \$0.5 million

(Purchase of various commodities.)

(39) PAKISTAN/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$60.0 million

(Purchase of railroad equipment, textile machinery, cement and sugar factories, projects to be negotiated.)

- Repayment over a period of 20 years starting after a 10-year grace period, with Pakistani exports: no interest.

(40) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Line of credit: \$43.7 million

(Projects under the Egyptian Second Five-year Plan including textile mills, cement factories, metallurgical plants, electrical installations, assistance for the mining industry.)

- Repayment over a 12-year period in Egyptian exports (primarily crude oil and petroleum products) and/or local currency: 2.5% interest.

NOVEMBER

(41) SENEGAL/USSR:

Credit: \$6.7 million

(Establishment of a tuna-fishing complex.)

(42) UGANDA/USSR:

Line of credit: \$15.6 million

(Equipment and machinery for several projects including: a cotton mill, garment shops, a training centre for farm equipment operators, a cold storage and dairy plant facilities. Technical assistance for these projects and training facilities in the USSR for Ugandans.)

- Long-term credit repayable in Ugandan commodities.

(43) AFGHANISTAN/USSR:

Credit: \$5.6 million

(Additional credit to a similar amount extended in August (see (28)) to initiate production at the existing Soviet-supplied prefabricated housing factory at Kabul and to finance prefabricated housing developments.)

(44) INDONESIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$6.3 million

(Equipment for a broadcasting centre.)

(45) PAKISTAN/Czechoslovakia:

Line of credit: \$14.0 million

(Probably to be used for the construction of several cement plants and sugar mills.)

- Repayment in 8 years: 2.5% interest.

DECEMBER

(46) CONGO(Brazzaville)/USSR:

Line of credit: \$8.9 million

(For specific projects such as: an hydro-electric dam, an irrigation project, geological surveys and the construction of a hotel in Brazzaville.)

- Repayment to start 1 year after the completion of individual projects with Congolese exports: 2.5% interest.

(47) INDONESIA/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$50.0 million

(Of this amount \$10.0 million to be extended in hard currency, the utilisation of the remaining to be negotiated.)

(48) INDONESIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$10.0 million

(Equipment and technical assistance for the rehabilitation of a coal mine in South Sumatra to increase output from 450,000 tons to over 2 million tons.)

(49) PAKISTAN/Poland:

Line of credit: \$14.0 million

(Complete industrial plants, sugar mills, cement plants. Projects under Pakistan's third Five-year Plan (1965-1970). Feasibility studies to be undertaken by Polish experts in early 1965.)

- Repayment in 9 years by exports.

(50) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Poland:

Line of credit: \$25.0 million

(In addition to an earlier credit of \$20.0 million extended in 1962. Delivery of an aluminium plant at Aswan, a lead and zinc plant and seven metal alloy foundries.)

- Repayment in 10 to 15 years after the plant begins operations: 2 to 2.5% interest according to the project.

(51) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Communist China:

Line of credit: \$80.0 million

(Machinery and equipment for various industrial projects to be constructed between 1965 and 1968 among which: spinning and weaving mills, paper mills and sugar refineries.)

- Repayment to start in 1972: no interest.

TABLE IV(b)

NEW COMMITMENTS OF ECONOMIC AID

January - April, 1965

JANUARY

(1) INDIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$2.3 million

(Financial assistance under commercial terms for optical instruments factory.)

(2) MALI/USSR:

Credit: \$6.0 million

(Cement plant with a capacity of 50,000 tons and related infrastructure.)

N.B. It is still unclear whether this is a new credit or the implementation of an old one.

(3) AFGHANISTAN/USSR:

Commodity Credit: \$11.0 million

(For delivery of commodities over the next two years: Sugar, petroleum products, motor vehicles, tyres, iron and steel, automotive spare parts, ceramics, construction materials, cotton textiles - to generate local currency for Soviet aid projects under the Second Five-year Plan.

- Repayment in 10 years starting in 1968 by exports, (raw cotton, oilseeds, goat and sheep skins, fruit.)

(4) INDIA/Poland:

Credit: \$22.0 million

(Two 125 megawatt units and auxiliary equipment.)

- Repayment in non-convertible rupees over a 12-year period: 2.5% interest.

(5) SUDAN/Czechoslovakia:

Credit: \$10.0 million

(To finance projects under Sudan's 10-year Plan (July 1961-June 1971) including equipment for various light industrial enterprises, construction of bridges and warehouses.)

- Repayment: 8 years. 3% interest.

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(6) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Czechoslovakia:

Credit: \$20.0 million

(For a 220,000 kilowatt electric power station at Ismailia.)

- 5% repayable at delivery;
- 90% in twelve annual instalments starting 1 year after final shipment;
- 5% together with the first instalment.

FEBRUARY

(7) COLOMBIA/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$1.0 million (extended to a Colombian association of small and medium-size manufacturers))

(Import of machinery.)

- Repayment in exports of coffee over a period of 5 years: 6.5% interest.

MARCH

(8) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Line of credit for economic development: \$100 million

(For projects under the Second Five-year Plan to be negotiated later.)

(9) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Poland:

Line of credit for economic development: \$92 million.

(Ratification of a 1964 credit offer for the Second Five-year Plan.)

(10) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC/Czechoslovakia:

Line of credit for economic development: \$75.6 million.

Czech participation in the Egyptian 5-year development plan 2.5% interest.

(11) AFGHANISTAN/Communist China:

Long-term development credit: \$28.0 million (\$10 million) to be used over a five-year period for projects to be agreed later on.

- Repayment over 20 years with a ten-year grace period
- Interest-free.

(12) IRAQ/USSR:

Credit: \$140.0 million (50 million dinars).
(Euphrates - dam construction).

(13) YEMEN/Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany:

Credit: \$13.8 million.
(For improving communications facilities and construction of electric power stations in Hudaydah.)

(14) BURMA/Poland:

Credit: \$10 million.
(Machinery and equipment for the construction of complete industrial plants in Burma.)
- Repayment over an eight-year period - 2.5% interest.

(15) PAKISTAN/USSR:

Credit: \$30 million.
(Farm machinery, roadbuilding equipment, power generating equipment.)
- Repayment over 10 years with a ten-year grace period.
- 2.5% interest.

(16) ETHIOPIA/Bulgaria:

Credit: \$5 million
(For the establishment of joint-Bulgarian/Ethiopian agricultural enterprises for growing cotton, cereals, sisal and for the construction of medium-sized industrial plants.)
(Credit terms so-far unknown)


CHART II

MILITARY AID EXTENDED BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
RECAPITULATIVE TOTALS 1955-64

1	AMOUNT OF AID EXTENDED	3,700
	OF WHICH	
	IN THE FORM OF DISCOUNTS AND GRANTS	1,500
	IN THE FORM OF CREDITS	2,200
2.	DRAWN	3,090 or 85% of extensions
3.	MILITARY AID AVAILABLE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BUT UNUTILIZED AS ON 1st JANUARY 1965	650

AID IN THE FORM OF DISCOUNTS, GRANTS AND CREDITS EXTENDED TO AND DRAWN BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
OF THE FREE WORLD FROM 1955 TO 1964 INCLUSIVE (1)

Million U.S. \$




(1) Revised on the basis of most recent information, (Cuba excluded) since military assistance for a number of countries cannot be distributed by year, annual figures are only estimates

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CHART III
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

PERSONNEL (TECHNICIANS, EXPERTS AND LABOURERS) IN NON-EUROPEAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD (1)



(1) Minimum estimates on a 6 monthly basis of Communist personnel in less developed countries of the Free World for a period of at least one month excluding personnel solely engaged in trade promotion

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TABLE V
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Development of the Number of Communist Civilian Personnel in Non-European Developing Countries
(by geographical area and by country of origin)

	Number of persons in developing (1) countries during the later half of each year, for 1958, first half of the year.							
	1956	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
TOTAL	1,075	2,925	4,915	6,210	7,680	9,465	11,885	14,475
from the Soviet-Union	645	1,985	3,150	4,205	5,330	6,975	8,850	10,705
from Communist China	25	55	855	960	820	425	470	2,160
from Eastern European countries	405	880	910	1,045	1,530	2,065	2,565	3,610
MIDDLE EAST								
Total	335	915	2,160	2,660	2,475	3,140	4,790	4,155
from the Soviet-Union		385	965	1,430	1,535	2,485	4,085	3,210
from Communist China		10	700	700	500	20	20	195
from Eastern European countries		520	495	530	440	635	685	750
AFRICA								
Total	10	-0-	100	545	2,005	2,365	3,090	5,665
from the Soviet-Union		-0-	20	300	1,070	1,185	1,520	2,415
from Communist China		-0-	-0-	55	160	145	225	1,050
from Eastern European countries		-0-	80	190	775	1,035	1,345	2,200
ASIA								
Total	805	1,565	2,580	2,935	3,130	3,895	3,940	4,590
from the Soviet-Union		1,200	2,165	2,470	2,730	3,500	3,240	3,075
from Communist China		45	155	205	160	260	225	985
from Eastern European countries		315	260	260	250	335	475	600
LATIN AMERICA								
Total	5	45	75	70	70	65	65	65
from the Soviet-Union		-0-	-0-	5	5	5	5	5
from Communist China		-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
from Eastern European countries		45	75	65	65	60	60	60

(1) Minimum estimates of Communist civilian personnel in developing countries of the free world outside Europe for a period of at least one month excluding personnel solely engaged in trade promotion. Cuba is excluded from the list of free world developing countries, for a geographical definition of the area considered see Table V in the situation during the second half of 1964.

TABLE VI

COMMUNIST CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (Technicians, experts, advisers and labourers) IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1964

(number of persons) (1)


	FROM			TOTAL
	U.S.S.R.	Communist China	Eastern European Countries	
AFRICA				
Algeria	525	65	1,085	1,675
Ethiopia	170	0	35	205
Ghana	460	30	140	630
Guinea	400	450	350	1,200
Kenya	10	15	0	25
Mali	300	415	155	870
Morocco	0	0	15	15
Congo (Brazzaville)	0	10	0	10
Somali Republic	350	10	20	380
Sudan	120	0	50	170
Tanzania	35	55	40	130
Tunisia	45	0	310	355
ASIA				
Afghanistan	1,860	0	115	1,975
Burma	50	100	10	160
Cambodia	75	110	10	195
Ceylon	40	0	45	85
India	660	0	330	990
Indonesia	210	5	60	275
Nepal	70	700	30	800
Pakistan	110	0	0	110
MIDDLE EAST				
Cyprus	0	0	75	75
Iran	160	0	60	220
Iraq	300	0	175	475
Syrian Arab Rep.	150	15	160	325
United Arab Rep.	2,100	0	260	2,360
Yemen	500	180	20	700
LATIN AMERICA				
Argentina	0	0	35	35
Brazil	5	0	25	30
TOTAL	8,705	2,160	3,610	14,475

(1) Minimum estimates of Communist personnel in developing countries for a period of at least one month excluding personnel engaged in trade promotion or military activities.

CHART IV

TRADE BETWEEN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD OUTSIDE EUROPE (1)

ANNUAL TOTALS (IMPORTS & EXPORTS) AT THE END OF EACH YEAR



(1) Based on official trade statistics of the non-European free world countries. From 1960 onwards Cuba has been deleted from the list of the reporting countries of the free world.

TABLE VII

TRAIL BETWEEN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD
(by major geographical area since 1960) (1)

(in million US \$)

	Communist Exports to					Communist Imports from				
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964 (4)	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964 (4)
Total Communist Area										
AFRICA	130.5	162.3	183.8	183.7	(240)	121.9	110.8	128.7	179.5	(280)
ASIA	351.9	404.4	517.2	593.0	(635)	435.8	451.1	505.2	551.9	(530)
LATIN AMERICA (2)	163.5	147.5	113.2	113.7	(117)	159.8	155.6	185.8	180.7	(390)
MIDDLE EAST	286.9	309.1	333.5	320.2	(320)	308.8	289.6	258.0	344.1	(340)
TOTAL (3)	955.3	1024.9	1151.4	1215.9	(1350)	1023.0	1010.0	1080.4	1260.3	(1380)
Soviet Union										
ASIA	26.7	37.5	60.7	48.3	(60)	57.7	38.7	44.5	56.7	(50)
ASIA	82.8	120.9	196.5	223.8	(250)	188.2	284.4	270.0	285.3	(280)
LATIN AMERICA	42.4	32.8	41.0	41.0	(30)	31.7	34.2	66.8	50.4	(60)
MIDDLE EAST	104.1	123.0	110.3	101.8	(110)	117.0	100.3	92.5	138.8	(140)
TOTAL	236.0	315.7	407.9	416.9	(450)	396.6	397.6	473.8	541.4	(580)
Communist China										
ASIA	27.6	33.1	32.2	30.2	(60)	25.7	23.9	18.0	45.4	(70)
ASIA	192.7	144.9	175.4	202.4	(205)	123.5	105.9	87.6	89.3	(90)
LATIN AMERICA	1.5	2.5	1.9	2.1	(2)	6.2	7.8	26.5	3.4	(105)
MIDDLE EAST	31.1	29.8	33.9	37.9	(40)	48.5	28.2	27.5	40.9	(55)
TOTAL	252.9	210.3	243.4	273.6	(310)	203.9	165.8	159.6	179.0	(320)
Eastern European Countries										
ASIA	76.2	91.7	90.0	105.2	(120)	38.5	48.2	66.2	77.4	(85)
ASIA	76.4	138.6	145.3	164.8	(180)	124.1	120.8	147.6	177.1	(185)
LATIN AMERICA	115.6	112.2	70.9	72.6	(85)	115.9	113.6	92.5	116.9	(115)
MIDDLE EAST	151.7	154.3	189.3	180.5	(170)	143.3	151.1	138.0	164.4	(150)
TOTAL	423.9	496.8	496.4	523.1	(535)	421.8	443.7	443.3	535.8	(545)
Asian Satellites										
TOTAL	2.5	1.6	3.7	3.3		0.7	2.9	2.7	4.1	

(1) On the basis of trade statistics reported by developing countries. For a definition of the geographical areas concerned see Table VII.
 (2) Cuba excluded.
 (3) Including Asian Satellites (India, North-Vietnam, North-Korea, Angola).
 (4) Rough estimates on the basis of trends resulting from partial information for the first half of the year. The figures reproduced under this column are only indicative of the expected trend.

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TABLE VIII

TRADE OF SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH THE COMMUNIST AREA

B. Developing countries to Communist countries

	1961				1962				1963				1964			
	Mil- lion US \$	% of total imp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total exp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total imp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total exp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total imp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total exp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total imp.	Mil- lion US \$	% of total exp.
AFRICA																
Algeria	7.7	1	20.6		2.0		0.8		0.8		2.7	1	3.9	2	4.5	2
Angola	0.4		0.5		1.0		1.6		1.6		3.2	3	6.2	3	5.1	4
Cambodia	1.1	1	1.1	1	0.5	1	0.5		0.5		3.6	5	27.0	6	30.8	5
Congo (Brazzaville)			0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		4.0	10	58.8	14	62.2	21
Congo (Kinshasa)	0.5		0.4		1.3	2	1.3		1.3		6.7	1	8.5	1	13.4	10
Ethiopia	4.0	4	5.5	6	6.8	6	6.8		6.8		7.3	6	8.3	7	14.2	10
Guinea	1.9		1.7		12.0	2	15.0		15.0		20.1	4	14.4	3	n.a.	n.a.
Guinea-Bissau	21.1	5	22.1	7	10.5	3	25.1		25.1		19.2	10	6.2	3	10.4	4
Kenya	29.8	40	25.8	41	16.4	22	12.4	27	13.4	27	16.2	24	31.0	13	21.5	17
Madagascar	0.1		0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		4.9	3	6.2	3	6.2	4
Mali	0.6		1.0		0.2		0.5		0.5		19.2	10	31.0	13	21.5	17
Mali	6.4	15	12.5	8	3.2	25	3.9	27	3.9	27	166.2	24	165.3	24	153.5	17
Morocco	26.9	7	28.5	8	17.6	5	23.7	7	23.7	7	47.7	3	23.4	2	15.5	2
Niger	0.2		0.2		6.9		4.4		4.4		0.2		0.2		0.2	
Nigeria	20.8	3	19.6	3	21.8	4	6.9	1	6.9	1	0.2		0.2		0.2	
Senegal	3.4	2	5.3	3	2.5	1	0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8		0.8	
Sierra Leone	2.7	3	3.1	3	2.7	3	2.7	3	2.7	3	4.7	3	4.7	3	4.7	3
Sudan	24.5	10	26.8	11	1.7	3	1.7	3	1.7	3	0.8		0.8		0.8	
Tanzania	0.1		0.8		7.7	7	6.3	5	6.3	5	6.0	1	0.4		0.4	
Togo	10.1	5	6.7	3	10.0	9	1.7	2	1.7	2	6.0	1	0.4		0.4	
Tunisia	0.1		0.2		7.7	7	6.3	5	6.3	5	0.5		0.5		0.5	
Uganda	0.1		0.2		10.0	9	1.7	2	1.7	2	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.2	2
ASIA																
Afghanistan	39.4	40	40.1	39	49.7	37	25.8	36	25.8	36	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.2	2
Burma	29.7	13	39.3	15	41.3	16	33.3	11	33.3	11	0.9		0.6		0.6	
Cambodia	12.5	12	17.4	17	3.5	5	7.1	13	7.1	13	3.4	3	1.2	2	1.2	2
Ceylon	18.2	7	27.6	8	33.9	40	47.9	13	47.9	13	1.3	3	1.5	2	1.4	2
India	134.4	6	215.3	10	113.5	8	163.9	12	163.9	12	0.4		1.0		0.5	
Indonesia	78.8	14	73.2	15	77.4	10	79.8	13	79.8	13	4.1	2	3.0	1	4.8	1
Malaya	67.9	3	76.2	5	109.4	5	133.1	9	133.1	9	5.7	2	5.3	1	4.8	1
Singapore	10.6	2	16.9	2	27.0	7	13.4	3	13.4	3						
Pakistan	6.6	5	1.1	n.a.												
Sri Lanka	1.2	1	1.1	1	7.8	2	2.5		2.5		5.7	2	5.3	1	4.8	1
Taiwan	6.3	1	5.0	1												
Thailand																
AMERICA EAST																
Armenia	2.7	1	3.2	1	2.0		0.8		0.8		2.7	1	3.9	2	4.5	2
Cyprus	3.2	3	6.2	3	1.0		1.6		1.6		3.2	3	6.2	3	5.1	4
Iran	33.6	5	27.0	5	0.5		0.5		0.5		43.0	10	58.8	14	62.2	21
Iraq	43.0	10	43.0	10	0.2		0.2		0.2		6.7	1	8.5	1	13.4	10
Israel	6.7	1	8.5	1	1.7	2	1.3		1.3		7.3	6	8.3	7	14.2	10
Jordan	7.3	6	8.3	6	6.8	6	6.8		6.8		7.3	6	8.3	7	14.2	10
Lebanon	20.1	4	14.4	3	1.7	2	1.3		1.3		20.1	4	14.4	3	n.a.	n.a.
Libya	4.9	3	6.2	3	6.8	6	6.8		6.8		4.9	3	6.2	3	10.4	4
Syria	19.2	10	31.0	13	12.0	2	15.0	2	15.0	2	19.2	10	31.0	13	21.5	17
United Arab Rep.	166.2	24	165.3	24	16.4	27	12.4	27	13.4	27	166.2	24	165.3	24	153.5	17
LATIN AMERICA																
Argentina	47.7	3	23.4	2	0.2		4.4		4.4		47.7	3	23.4	2	15.5	2
Barbados	0.2		0.2		6.9		4.4		4.4		0.2		0.2		0.2	
Bolivia	0.8	1	1.2	1	0.1		0.1		0.1		0.8	1	1.2	1	1.6	1
Brazil	70.3	5	65.3	4	0.8		0.3		0.3		70.3	5	65.3	4	75.6	5
Chile	1.4	1	2.7	1	31.1	8	23.7	7	23.7	7	1.4	1	2.7	1	3.4	1
Colombia	6.0	1	0.4		0.2		0.2		0.2		6.0	1	0.4		0.6	
Costa Rica	0.8		0.1		0.8		0.2		0.2		0.8		0.1		n.a.	n.a.
Cuba	0.5		0.4		0.5		0.2		0.2		0.5		0.4		n.a.	n.a.
Dominican Rep.	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.2	2	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.7	2
Ecuador	0.9		0.6		0.9		0.2		0.2		0.9		0.6		n.a.	n.a.
Guatemala	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.2	2	1.4	2	1.2	2	1.7	2
Honduras	0.9		0.6		0.9		0.2		0.2		0.9		0.6		n.a.	n.a.
Jamaica	3.4	3	1.2	2	3.4	3	1.2	2	1.2	2	3.4	3	1.2	2	1.7	2
Mexico	1.3	3	1.5	2	26.6	29	25.8	36	25.8	36	1.3	3	1.5	2	1.4	2
Paraguay	1.0	2	1.0	2	27.8	5	33.3	11	33.3	11	1.0	2	1.0	2	0.1	
Peru	0.4		0.4		38.5	11	47.9	13	47.9	13	0.4		0.4		0.5	
Trinidad	0.4		0.4		192.1	12	163.9	12	163.9	12	0.4		0.4		0.5	
Uruguay	4.1	2	3.0	1	70.9	12	79.8	13	79.8	13	4.1	2	3.0	1	4.8	1
Venezuela	5.7	2	5.3	1							5.7	2	5.3	1	4.8	1

n.a. less than 1%
no figure in the column million US \$ indicates that the value of trade is negligible (less than \$50,000)

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