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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY

Note by the Secretary

Attached is the text of an address by Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, of the University of London, broadcast by Radio Free Europe, Munich, on 25th April, 1957.

(Signed) LUCILLE M. PEART

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

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Perhaps one might begin simply by some obvious remarks about the balance of the events of last October. I must confess I find myself very confused. I can't see any very clear picture at all. However, let us begin with the simple question, "In what way has the situation changed as a result of the crisis in Poland, the Hungarian Revolution and its suppression?" Take first the most unsensational aspect, the economic. The material condition of the people in Eastern Europe as a result of these events, probably has improved. In Poland I think that the peasants have already gained, they really are better off now as a result of what has happened. Collective farms have been broken up, the pressure on the peasantry has been greatly reduced, compulsory deliveries apparently simply aren't being carried out. The peasants are getting better prices for their goods. And Gomulka has announced that he is going to carry on with this policy of concessions to the peasants, and I imagine even if he wanted to go back on it, he would find it rather difficult. I noticed the speech by Ochab recently in which he reiterated this policy. He appeared to be on the defensive against Party theorists, who obviously feel that this is bad Communism, but nonetheless he defended it. And this was Ochab, not Gomulka, justifying the new policy, and even at one point encouraging the formation of peasant committees! I'm not quite sure what the tasks of these peasant committees will be, but from the way he spoke, it looked as if he actually intended to give the peasants some sort of organization which would enable them actually to defend their interests. All this is something quite new. Then I think even in Hungary the peasants' condition has probably improved as a result of the revolution. Of course the line which the Kadar Government is putting out, that the peasants were loyal to the government and didn't follow these nasty counter-revolutionaries, is nonsense. The real reason why the peasants were not involved was simply, I suppose, a matter of time. The whole thing was over so quickly that there wasn't time for the peasants to be drawn into the fighting much. If the struggle had gone on for months instead of a week, no doubt the peasants would have been involved too. It wasn't that they didn't sympathise with the revolution. However, as a result of it, they dissolved a large part of their collective farms, and though the government has announced that about half of these have been reconstituted, one must be very sceptical as to what this means in practice. I very much doubt whether the government will be able to force the old situation back. In Rumania too certain concessions have been made to the peasants. The only serious exception in this field is Bulgaria, where there is 85% collectivisation now, and an extremely tough policy is being maintained toward the peasants. In fact to sum up, in most of Eastern Europe the peasants have gained; They have been able to push their demands across to some extent because the governments are weakened. That, I think is something positive.

As for the working class, here again, in the case of Poland, the intention is to give the workers better conditions, to demand much less of them, to reduce the pace of industrialisation, to organize the whole system of economic planning in a more humane manner. The only reservation here of course is that Poland is economically in such a bad condition that it won't, in fact, be possible to improve workers' real wages for some time, so they will no doubt continue to live in very great hardship. But even so, it is again that the avowed purpose of the government is not one of exploiting the working class as it was before. The workers may hope for better conditions fairly soon, unless there is some new major disaster which, of course, is always possible. In Czechoslovakia the situation of the workers is rather better than elsewhere, it

appears not to have got worse. These things are obviously a result of the revolutionary movement, insofar as if there hadn't been revolutionary movements frightening and weakening the government and also frightening the Soviet Government and causing it to make concessions, the economic gains wouldn't have been made.

I think in this respect the Soviet attitude and the Communist attitude generally follow a familiar pattern which was first clearly revealed at the time of the Kronstadt rising in 1921 in Russia when the result of this uprising was very far reaching economic concessions, combined with no political liberty, no political concessions. I think the economic concessions in Eastern Europe now are in a way a bigger blow to Communist rule than they were then. In 1921 Lenin gave the peasants most of what they had wanted, but at that point he hadn't yet gone very far. He had imposed terror on the peasants during the civil war but he hadn't committed himself to collectivising them. In a sense the concessions which he made to them in 1921 were things he had always promised but hadn't previously granted. But what has been happening in Eastern Europe is a bit more than that, because here the "correct" Communist policy is to follow the Soviet path of mass collectivisation, and of course de-Stalinisation has not involved any repudiation of collectivisation. But the East European Communists are going back on collectivisation, they are going back beyond the 1930's to 1921. They are making a bigger concession, a greater blow to their prestige I think than Lenin ever had to make. All this so far I think one can regard as a gain.

On the other hand, the political situation obviously is much more distressing. Of Hungary, there really nothing one can say. I suppose there is less political freedom now than there was in the last months of the Rakosi Regime. I mean in May and June of last year when Rakosi was still in power but on the defensive, there was more freedom of argument, there was more freedom of political discussion than there is now. Whether the police terror is worse now in Hungary than then, it is hard to say. I think possibly it is because by the end of the Rakosi regime the police were a good deal less effective, less brutal than before, but my impression is that the police terror in Hungary is not as bad as it was in the worst period, in 1949-1953. As for Poland, I came here three days ago, having followed a certain amount of the Polish events from London, chiefly through the Warsaw radio broadcasts, wanting to know a great deal more, and I have been able to read a good bit in the last few days, and the impression I get is rather more encouraging than I had in London. It seemed there that the tendency for Gomułka to go back on the liberties which were promised or hoped for after October was rather alarming, it would appear to me now that it is a bit less alarming. Here again it's for you to tell me rather than for me to tell you. But at least brutal repressive measures are not being used. People are being prevented from expressing some of their opinions, and therefore are extremely discontented with Gomułka, but they aren't being persecuted and brutally treated, they are not being arrested for their views as far as I know. They have to hold their tongues and are discontented, but outside the purely political field they obviously have very great freedom, in this somewhat resembling Yugoslavia, where non-political things are fairly free. You can write as you

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please and talk about non-political matters as you please, which you couldn't under a totalitarian regime. Obviously Poland is not totalitarian, but it is still dictatorial. Elsewhere, there doesn't seem to be much change.

Looking at this situation for a moment from a Soviet point of view, can one perhaps say that Khrushchev's new policy toward Eastern Europe which began in 1955, with the visit to Belgrade, was based on the belief that the peoples of Eastern Europe basically loved the Soviet Union, basically wanted Communist rule, peoples' democracy, but were being alienated (a) by the brutality of the police and the abuses connected with the cult of the personality, and (b) by a tendency which Khrushchev even admitted to some extent, of the Soviet Union to exploit their countries in the Soviet interest; and that therefore in order to give a free rein to the natural love that these peoples had for peoples' democracy and for the Soviet Union, it was necessary to do away with these abuses and give them rather more freedom of expression? I mean, it seems to me that at that time Khrushchev did believe that if he treated them better, they would show affection and gratitude, and that politically the position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe would be strengthened, by a more conciliatory policy. And if that was his belief, of course the events of this autumn have shown his policy to be a failure. They have shown that the people don't want any sort of people's democracy and that they don't want anything to do with the Soviet Union. In that respect then, the events both in Poland and in Hungary represent a terrific political defeat for the Soviet Union.

If one looks at it not on the political plane but purely on the military plane I am not so sure this is true. Those who always doubted that they could get anywhere by kindness and believed that toughness and force were the right line, appear to have been justified, doubly justified. First they are justified because the milder policy led to this revolt, and secondly justified because once they decided to repress it by force they succeeded. The Hungarian Revolution was smashed, and at the same time the Soviet leaders claim that it was their threat of force which put an end to Anglo-French action in Egypt. Whether they really believe that, I don't know, but it seems to me they might. I'm not sure that I wouldn't believe it if I were a member of the Soviet Government. Force and threat have brought rich rewards, and the Soviet Union has emerged from the crisis of autumn militarily in a rather strong position. Politically, it has been defeated; militarily it has been successful.

Now, what about the prospects of the future from a Soviet point of view? Coming back to what I call the Kronstedt formula, I think this is their general line: Economic concessions throughout Eastern Europe coupled with repression, political inflexibility, reinforced military occupation. Now what is the effect of this? I think it is that Eastern Europe becomes a liability to them. And a double liability, both economic and military. In the earlier period, the attempt was made, perhaps not completely successfully, but I think fairly successfully, to exploit Eastern Europe as a colony in the traditional sense. I mean colonial exploitation in the sense of a Marxist caricature of what capitalist exploitation at its worst ought to be. This was what in fact they proceeded to carry out. Exploiting the economy of Poland, this extraordinary business of coal at cheap prices, the figures of which have now been revealed, and similar kinds of exploitation throughout the area.

At any rate, they gained something economically out of it. The whole thing was probably inefficient, maybe they would have gained more if they had run the economy more rationally. But at least they did gain something. But if now they are going to make economic concessions and even give economic aid, to rehabilitate these countries in order to keep them in the Soviet bloc, then it's going to be an economic liability rather than an economic asset. Secondly, militarily, it was clearly hoped that the Satellite armies would be a useful addition to the total Soviet war potential. And here again, the lessons of October show that this has been a complete failure. Obviously neither the Hungarian nor the Polish army is going to be much good to the Soviet Union in a war, and it is extremely unlikely that they now think the armies of Czechoslovakia, Roumania or even Bulgaria would be much good either. So here again, instead of getting a military gain out of the military potential of Eastern Europe, it is a military liability which ties up their own troops, holds down their troops. And this double drain, this double liability, economic and military, seems likely to go on indefinitely.

What conclusions should one draw from that, if one were in the Soviet Government? Forgive me for speculating this way, but I can only speculate, as I said earlier, because I don't know. I'm afraid none of us knows. If one were a purely empirical politician, I think that one might come to the conclusion that it really wasn't worth it, because Eastern Europe is not much use to them. Why go on draining the resources of the Soviet Union, better clear out altogether. However, I don't think for a moment that this is how the Soviet leaders will argue, I believe that they think not empirically but dogmatically. The overriding consideration for them is to maintain peoples' democracy and the Communist system. This simply isn't discussed. Indeed it is even more difficult to discuss it in a rather weak and divided leadership than it was in the days of the strong leader. Stalin might, if he had reached the conclusion that Eastern Europe should be written off, have been able to carry it out, but I can't conceive any member or group of members of the Presidium at present daring to say we would do best to clear out, because if they did, they would at once be accused of treason and expose themselves to the fate of Beria. This, I think, has been an important factor in their foreign policy ever since Stalin died, and particularly since Beria's fall. No-one can afford to be unpatriotic. No-one can afford to behave as if he were a traitor to the cause of Communism. Consequently, they won't give it up, although their national self-interest, I think, might justify their clearing out.

Well, then if they don't clear out, but if they maintain their positions at the cost of a constant drain, one must feel that they ask themselves very seriously, what are the roots of this trouble. And the roots of it, I suggest, are the mere fact of the existence of Free Europe, of Western Europe. Now we all know that the West did nothing for Hungary, and is only offering rather modest economic help to Poland. Therefore one might argue that nobody in Eastern Europe now has much hope in the West. This may or may not be true. Help from the West in the sense of the West coming in and defending Eastern Europeans against Russian intervention seems unlikely. But the existence of the West, I think, is an important factor

and is recognised in Moscow as being an important factor. In other words, it is not that Moscow fears that the West is going to intervene militarily or is going to use the Eastern European countries as bases against the Soviet. Rather, the fact that a Free Western Europe exists is the source of permanent discontent in Eastern Europe, because as long as there is a free Western Europe, so long do people in Eastern Europe know that the system under which they live is not a permanent thing and they know of something else and will go on hoping, and because they go on hoping they will go on being discontented. This is the basic cause of what I call the perpetual drain on Soviet resources. Moscow can't ever put an end to this drain, and have Eastern Europe reliable and docile, as long as the free West exists. The only logical conclusion from this, therefore, would be that if you want to make Soviet rule in Eastern Europe secure, the only way is to finish off the West. In other words, destroy Western Europe. Now that is a very abstract answer, because obviously it comes up against the point that if the Soviet Government tried to invade Western Europe, the chances are that it would produce an atomic world war, which the Soviet Government is afraid of. However, there are some slight indications, I think, that the Soviet leaders are thinking more in these terms. Obviously it wouldn't be safe to attack Western Europe now, but there is a more urgent need to face up to this problem of dealing with Western Europe and to work out a way of doing it without destroying themselves because of what happened in October in Poland and Hungary. There is one little indication which I know indirectly only, because I haven't read the sources myself. A friend of mine who studies the Soviet military press very carefully, has drawn my attention to the fact that there has been a change of emphasis recently in official military theory, and that much more interest is being shown in the problem of surprise attacks. In the Stalin era military theory was based on what were called the constant factors, which were said to be decisive for the outcome of any war. The constant factors included the industrial potential, degree of armament, and above all, degree of morale on the home front. The gist of it all was that a state that is overwhelmingly powerful in these constant factors was bound to win in a war and that surprise is not an important factor. You can't win wars by surprise. Hitler's whole conception of the blitzkrieg, the Japanese Pearl Harbour affair were thoroughly unsound, were bound to lead to disaster, as indeed they did. Lately Soviet military doctrine seems to have changed from this point of view, and while it is continuing to say that the constant factors are important, it does also say that surprise can be of the very greatest importance. So, that military theory seems to be devoting a great deal of attention to the factor of surprise. Now this is, as I say, merely a change in theoretical doctrine, but changes of emphasis in theoretical doctrine in the Soviet Union, tend usually to have some relationship to real political thought and real political argument. And this I think is a subject of some interest. I don't know the answer to it. Another point which emerges from Soviet military writing at the present time appears to be great stress on the importance of conventional weapons. They are also very much stressing the atomic weapon, and this obviously fits in with the idea of surprise attack. But at the same time, they say, under no circumstances must we consider conventional weapons unimportant. They are stressing that very much. At the present time, as you know in Great Britain, there is a tendency to play down conventional weapons. And this again, I think has a certain sort of political implication. All these recent Soviet manoeuvres in connection with disarmament, may in

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fact be connected to the idea of getting a situation in which the Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons will be relatively more valuable than it now is. It seems to me that it would be wise to reckon with the assumption that the Soviet policy is very much watching out for any opportunity which may come and perhaps working harder than ever before to make the opportunities, for a more aggressive policy. I think this is a thing of which one ought to be more aware in the West than people are.

Now I would like to talk about another rather theoretical problem which I have discussed in the article Mr. Griffith mentioned - that is, the question of neutralisation in Europe, of a neutral zone of Germany and Eastern Europe. Personally I think this is a thing very worth studying, and I think it's even a desirable aim of Western policy. But having said that, I shall now emphasise the difficulties and the reservations rather than the desirability. It is all very well to say let us have Germany neutral and Eastern Europe neutral and then we will have the beginnings of freedom in Eastern Europe and peace in Europe as a whole. As far as it goes it is true, but one has to consider what is meant by these different phrases. The Soviet Government of course, talks from time to time about German unity, although the prevalent tendency recently has been to talk about necessity of having two Germanies and the two Germanies coming to terms with each other. Nonetheless it does pay lip service from time to time to German unity, but as far as I can see, if one judges what the Soviet Government has meant at different stages from about 1949 onward by German unity, or procedure for German unification, it has always been -stripped of the verbiage - the sort of German unity which could be obtained by extending the Ulbricht DDR régime to the whole of Germany. The kind of German unity that Moscow is prepared to have is Bolshevisation of the whole of Germany and nothing else. It is sometimes openly said, Ulbricht has recently stated that, before unification can take place, Western Germany must have the social institutions which have been created in Eastern Germany. It is really another way of saying Communist rule. But on the whole the Soviet argument is put in a more subtle, a more camouflaged form, and the kind of procedures which they would consider for unification are the kind of procedures which would enable the DDR to enter a united German government in the same sort of way that the Communist party entered and dominated the Kosice government in Czechoslovakia in 1945, giving it the same sort of key positions from which it would later pass on to complete control. Soviet proposals all seem to build down to something like that. I don't think that the Western powers or the West German Government, even in its more naive and enthusiastic moments, will be so foolish as to fall for that kind of thing, because we all know about the Kosice government and these manoeuvres. Therefore I don't think that there is a very great danger that this kind of bogus unification and communisation will happen. But what I do think is that as soon as serious negotiations get going about unification in Germany, in any circumstances whatever, it is bound before very long to become clear that there are only two alternatives, one is a Bolshevisation of Germany which the West will never accept, and the other is unification by freedom, by free elections in Germany. Any free elections would abolish the DDR as a separate state, and the SED as a separate power apparatus within the state, and this, of course, is unacceptable to Moscow. I think that the refusal of the Soviet government to scrap the DDR is probably the main single

obstacle to any settlement of Germany. But of course there are other obstacles too. And let us for the moment assume, what I don't regard as a practical assumption, that they do agree to unification of Germany by a free election. There then remain a number of other problems which are pretty intractable.

The first, of course, is the Polish-German frontier. If you have an independent, united Germany it must reach an agreement with Poland. And as far as I can see (again it is only my personal view and I suppose my personal prejudice is involved) the only possible settlement is one which essentially recognises the Oder-Neisse line as it now is. It might be possible in a new situation to make some token concessions, to give Germany a few small areas as a face saving operation, but this isn't very important, essentially it seems to me that the Polish-German frontier is going to stay where it is. And this is a thing which in Western Germany clearly, though a great many people really wouldn't mind accepting it, no politician is going to get up in public and say so. That is another fairly powerful obstacle.

Let us assume that these two main problems of the DDR and the Polish-German frontier are settled, you then still have a third set of problems connected with neutralisation. Now, this is where emphasis has been laid lately in the West. British Labour speakers and to some extent SPD people tend not so much to stress the first two points I have mentioned, although they are fully aware of them, as this third problem of neutral status. Now what is it that one can argue about? It seems that from a Western point of view, one must consider (a) what the West must insist on, what is the minimum that the West must demand from the Soviet Union, and (b) the maximum that the West would be prepared to argue with the Soviet Union about. The absolute minimum from the Western point of view is that Soviet troops should be completely evacuated from the whole of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany. And this, I think one can say after what one saw in October, would have drastic effects in Eastern European countries. I must say that a couple of years ago if somebody had said to me, would you be in favour of making concessions of any kind in order that Soviet troops would be removed from Eastern Europe, I should have said no, because I would have thought at that time that the Communist régimes, based not just on Soviet military forces but on the whole apparatus of Communist power trained under Soviet tutelage, would be strong enough to stand up to any internal strains and stresses even if the Soviet army was removed. But now after what we have seen in Poland and Hungary, I would have thought it is very clear that this is not so, and in fact, that the presence of the Soviet army is the key question. Now no neutralisation of Germany is acceptable to the West if it is not accompanied by neutralisation of Eastern Europe, because that would destroy the European balance completely; and secondly, no neutralisation of Eastern Europe makes sense unless all Soviet troops are removed from it. That then is the minimum. Now look at it from the other point of view, what is the maximum that the West could offer to the Soviet Union? The sort of talk which has occasionally been heard on the Soviet side consists of very vague references to neutralisation and to a European security pact. The kind of European security pact that Malenkov has in mind is an absolutely shapeless, useless and meaningless pact to be signed by all European states, in return for which existing alliances should be abolished and in particular NATO should cease to exist. And American troops should leave the continent of Europe altogether. Now this, it seems to me is absolutely unacceptable, absolutely undiscussable in any

circumstances at all. What the West could argue about with the Soviet Union is not the scrapping of NATO, but the exclusion of Germany from it. In other words, if Germany becomes united freely, the West should agree that this united Germany should not be a member of NATO. Equally at the same time, the Eastern European states should be independent of the Soviet Union. This solution would involve very grave risks for the West and very grave risks for Eastern Europe also, because after all, a reunited Germany, independent of any allies, is not altogether a happy prospect, either for the East Europeans or for the West Europeans. But it is a risk which might be worth taking if it were accompanied by a neutral independent status for the East European countries. But what is not worth even thinking about is the scrapping of NATO, and that distinction should be clear. I don't think the distinction is always clear in the West. Some people talk very vaguely in favour of neutralisation, and provoke equally vague opposition. The argument very often used against a policy of neutralisation is the argument that we cannot afford to give up NATO. Well, I would reply to that, of course we cannot afford to give up NATO, there is no question of it. The only kind of argument about neutralisation is an argument about Germany and Eastern Europe.

The final point is the question of a security pact. Now if you did reach an agreement on the points I have mentioned, that is, evacuation of Eastern Europe, reunification of Germany, settlement of the German-Polish problem, and neutralisation for Germany and Eastern Europe, this settlement would have to be guaranteed, and this is the point where you would have to think of a European security pact. "European security pact" are three words which can of course be used with various meanings or with none. As put forward by Molotov, they are just a mumbo jumbo phrase that doesn't mean anything. A security pact is only a security pact if it has teeth in it, definite commitments against certain eventualities. And it seems to me that the whole settlement could only be conceivable if there were a pact of that kind, which pledged all the powers that signed it, and one of them of course would be the United States, to immediate action against any aggressor. If the settlement were laid down that all Western troops should leave Germany and the Dutch army entered Germany, this would be an act of aggression just as much as if the Russian army entered Rumania. Actually it is not very likely that the Dutch army would enter Germany, but the obligations clearly should be reciprocal. And further, I think it would have to be made clear that appeals for external military help by a government against revolution must equally be a casus belli. It seems to me that this again would have to be accepted if the pact were to mean anything at all. Because if you have a kind of Kadar régime inviting the Soviet army in, the whole thing falls to the ground. Personally I would be in favour of the most categorical assurance of that kind. I don't think that the danger of a Communist revolution in France or Italy is anything to be afraid of. But if there were a revolution against the Government of France or Italy or Germany, under no circumstances should the French or British or Dutch or other neighbouring countries of the West accept any invitation to intervene to suppress it. In fact of course this eventuality would be much more likely to arise in Eastern Europe against a Communist government. We might have,

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shall we say, a Roumanian Communist Government appealing for aid to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union accepted the invitation it would make itself an aggressor, and casus belli would arise. If there is going to be any real settlement it must involve a formal binding obligation to go to war with the aggressor, and to treat intervention "at the request of a government" as aggression. Otherwise the whole thing is meaningless. Now I think it is perfectly reasonable to argue against what I have just said, that no Western governments are going to commit themselves to that. And if they are not going to commit themselves to that then there is no solution, I am afraid. Because if one is going to take the view that under no circumstances would the government of the United States or England or France take military action if aggression were committed at the other end of Europe, well then, there is in fact no prospect at all of anything ever being done. The position now is after all that the NATO governments are committed to go to war with an aggressor against a NATO country. What I am suggesting now is that this obligation should be extended to all parties to this European security pact, and a thing less than that, it seems to me, can secure peace and freedom in Europe. Now if I don't think this is a practical prospect in the near future, why talk about it at all? I think the answer is that one must try and think about ways of getting out of this impasse and it is only in this direction that one can advance and the fact that it may take time, that it is not possible now, does not mean that it may not become possible. The sooner you begin thinking of it the better. It reminds me of the story of Marshal Lyautey who wanted to replant forests all over Morocco where they had been in the Roman days and cut down by the Arabs after the 7th century. Somebody said to him, "but Marshal, this will take 100 years." To which he replied: "Then there's not a minute to lose." I think this is really the only possible attitude one can have and I think it is therefore important to think it out seriously. Of course all that I've said is rather abstract. The attitude to be taken on each of these five very concrete and difficult points I mentioned, depends on a multiplicity of concrete factors, including technical defence factors. For example, the role of the different kinds of guided missiles, of which I have no expert knowledge; these problems ought to be discussed very concretely in the press, in parliaments, in public speeches, and by technical experts, in order to minimise the confusion, in order to make the issues clear for three reasons. First in order that people in the West should not be deceived by fine sounding slogans from the Soviet side, because from time to time some Soviet politician may speak in favour of a security pact, or say "let us all be happy and peaceful in Europe together," and this kind of thing always diverts and misleads public opinion and hampers morale. The clearer people are about this and the clearer these issues have been worked out and stated, the less likely people in the West are to be deceived by Soviet manoeuvres. The second reason I think is that this is the only way of approaching our problems which offers hope for Eastern Europe in the next years, and now we've it to the people of Eastern Europe to do one's best to think the problems out, also to discuss them between Western governments, and finally, to put them before the Soviet public. It seems to me that we now have grounds to believe that for the first time in the Soviet Union we have the beginnings of an audience to whom we can talk about these things. There is evidence that people in the Soviet Union, particularly the younger generation of the intelligentsia and the upper class, are worried about their government's behaviour, were very worried about Hungary, are extremely interested in what is going on in Poland, discuss these things, are much less frightened to discuss them among each other,

and therefore any argument and debate on these issues is of interest to them. I think it is terribly important for us to make our interests and views known to these people in the Soviet Union. It is difficult with radio jamming and so on, as one knows. But if something can get through, a trickle can get through, and the more that can get through on these lines the better. Otherwise I feel rather haunted by yet another nightmare, in addition to all the other nightmares which threaten us. This nightmare is that in ten years from now, or perhaps earlier, when you get new people coming into power in the Soviet Union, the young generation and people who really have not got this dogmatic hatred of the West that Khrushchev and his generation have, people with whom you might expect you could find a common language, coming to power, why then - if we have failed in the meanwhile to talk to them in any way, they may prove as incapable of understanding us and as incapable of living in peace with us as Khrushchev and Bulganin.

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