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COMITE POLITIQUE

RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES AVEC LA POLOGNE

Projet de Rapport

Au cours de sa réunion du 20 février 1957 (C-R(57)10, Point VII), le Conseil a invité le Comité Politique à étudier la question de l'aide économique à la Pologne.

Le Comité Politique a examiné le problème qui lui était soumis et a estimé que la question de l'aide économique à la Pologne pouvait difficilement être dissociée de celle des relations économiques avec ce pays. Dans ces conditions, il a retenu à l'intention du Conseil les éléments d'appréciation suivants :

a) En dépit des incertitudes qui pèsent sur la solidité et la stabilité du Gouvernement de M. Gomulka, les puissances occidentales ont intérêt à voir ce dernier rester au pouvoir. Sans doute M. Gomulka est-il un communiste doctrinaire. Toutefois certaines mesures limitées de libéralisation ont été prises sur le plan intérieur et, d'autre part, le Gouvernement polonais a acquis une plus grande indépendance vis-à-vis de l'Union soviétique et cherche à développer ses relations économiques et culturelles avec l'Ouest.

Toutefois il n'y a pas de raison de penser que les dirigeants soviétiques soient prêts pour le moment à permettre à la Pologne de reprendre une complète indépendance vis-à-vis du bloc soviétique, ni que M. Gomulka a l'intention pour le moment de pousser son pays vers cette indépendance.

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b) En dépit du vote de confiance quasi-unanime obtenu lors des élections de février par H. Gomulka, la position politique de ce dernier s'affaiblira si une amélioration n'intervient pas sur le plan économique. La situation économique présente de la Pologne est en effet précaire (voir en annexe le document préparé par la Section économique de la Division Economie et Finances). Les causes en sont nombreuses : insuffisance de matières premières, insuffisance de la production notamment de charbon, ralentissement de l'activité industrielle et de l'approvisionnement en produits agricoles, échelle de salaires trop élevée. Pour absorber cette augmentation du pouvoir d'achat, le Gouvernement polonais a réduit les investissements et accru sensiblement les importations de biens de consommation. La situation de la balance des paiements qui était déjà difficile s'en trouve aggravée sans qu'une menace d'inflation soit écartée.

c) Le premier Secrétaire du Parti a demandé un nouvel effort à ses compatriotes, mais il a également souligné la nécessité de l'aide étrangère. L'annulation des dettes envers l'U.R.S.S. et le prêt soviétique de 700 millions de zlotys ne sont que des palliatifs insuffisants et la Pologne doit faire appel à d'autres puissances.

d) Les puissances occidentales semblent avoir intérêt à appuyer sur le plan économique l'expérience de H. Gomulka afin de permettre à celui-ci non pas tant de redresser l'économie de son pays que d'éviter l'effondrement des bases de la vie économique qui ferait sombrer son Gouvernement et permettrait à l'Union soviétique de reprendre un contrôle complet sur la Pologne. Elles devraient donc accepter les mesures utiles pour faciliter l'orientation du commerce extérieur

polonais vers l'Ouest et, à cette fin, chacune selon ses possibilités, offrir à la Pologne de développer des relations commerciales qui pourraient comporter des avantages commerciaux et des facilités allant jusqu'à l'octroi de crédits à court et à long terme. Une assistance économique et technique pourrait même être envisagée si le Gouvernement polonais le demandait.

e) Cette politique économique des puissances occidentales à l'égard de la Pologne devrait cependant être soigneusement ajustée pour correspondre aux seuls besoins de la Pologne. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue en effet que ce pays conserve un Gouvernement communiste, qu'il a un commerce important avec le bloc sino-soviétique et qu'il est douteux que l'Union soviétique lui laisse en définitive regagner une indépendance complète sur le plan économique. Il est donc nécessaire que les avantages consentis, tout en étant suffisants pour éviter l'effondrement du Gouvernement Gomulka pour des raisons économiques, ne soient trop généreux et ne puissent profiter en définitive à l'ensemble du bloc sino-soviétique.

f) Pour des raisons psychologiques et de propagande il faudra marquer qu'en adoptant une telle politique économique à l'égard de la Pologne, les puissances occidentales ont tenu à montrer l'intérêt qu'elles portent au peuple polonais.

g) Les conséquences que pourrait entraîner la politique économique des puissances occidentales à l'égard de la Pologne au regard des contrôles de produits stratégiques seront le cas échéant traitées au sein du COCCO.

h) La position des puissances occidentales en ce qui concerne leurs relations économiques avec la Pologne et l'aide économique devrait être réexaminée selon les développements qui interviendront dans la situation de ce pays.

5th March, 1957

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN POLAND

Summary

1. Poland's present economic situation is difficult, with little hope of improvement. As a result of territorial shifts and postwar industrialisation, Poland has changed from an agricultural, grain-exporting nation to an industrialised country highly dependent upon foreign trade. This has been achieved at the expense of the standard of living of the Polish people who are badly housed, have few luxuries, and must struggle to provide a bare subsistence diet for their families. The export of coal has become the principle means for obtaining foreign exchange to pay for the greatly increased import demands arising from the changed economic structure of Poland. But exports of coal have been falling, as greater internal demands for fuel swallow up a smaller output of coal. Incentives in the form of higher living standards, to help increase coal output, call for resources which compete with the industrial needs of the country. The balance of payments situation will become more difficult in 1957, and this will be aggravated by inflation engendered by wage increases given to ward off political agitation.

2. Recent measures by the Polish Government to stimulate private enterprise in agriculture and small scale industry, will not be effective for some time to come, and to this extent, Poland will require outside assistance. Loans from the USSR and cancellation of some Polish debts by Russia, have not in reality improved the Polish position. Poland is attempting to raise credits from Western countries, particularly from the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom will not at present grant any loans, while the United States viewpoint is not known.

Economic background

3. Recent announced changes in economic policy in Poland, in particular, the revisions of the 1956-1960 five-year plan, point up the severe economic problems which have been developing since the end of World War II. The efforts of rebuilding war devastated areas, of establishing heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods industry and agriculture, and of imposing heavy defence expenditures on the country, have all combined to keep the standard of living of the Polish peoples at very low levels. A study published by the Economic Commission for Europe,(1) and based on official Polish sources, demonstrated that the majority of workers in Poland did not earn enough to provide for their basic needs, and that hardships could be avoided only by the additional incomes of other wage earners in the household.(2) It has been reported that there are over 300,000 unemployed in Poland, and it is not likely that this situation will improve in the near future.

4. The economic structure of Poland has been greatly changed since 1939, partly due to territorial shifts. The loss of grain-growing areas in the east to Russia, was partially offset by the acquisition of a rich coal area from Germany on the western border. Policies adopted after the war also affected the economic structure,

(1) Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 8, No.2, August, 1956, page 38.

(2) The position of the Polish worker vis-à-vis workers in other Communist countries is shown in the same article:

Number of subsistence food baskets purchasable
with one average wage

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of baskets</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of baskets</u>
Eastern Germany	4.1	Poland	3.1
Czechoslovakia	3.9	Bulgaria	2.9
Soviet Union	3.4	Rumania	2.7
Hungary	3.2		

as planned increases in heavy industry and a drastic shift in foreign trade towards the USSR and its satellites, were accompanied by lagging agricultural output. Thus, whereas prewar Poland was a predominantly agricultural country which exported grain, meat, mineral fuels and timber, which imported industrial materials and manufactured goods, and which conducted nine-tenths of its foreign trade with the West, postwar Poland was more heavily industrialised and far more dependent on the Communist bloc for its foreign trade. While less than one-tenth of the prewar Polish labour force was in industry, the postwar ratio was at about one-third. By 1954, only 30 per cent of Polish trade was with the West, although a substantial change has taken place in the past two years, and in 1956, 41% of Poland's trade was with the West.

5. The economic and geographic changes in Poland have led to a greater importance of foreign trade in the economy. Whereas exports were only 3.6 per cent of the Polish gross national product in 1937, by 1953 the percentage had risen to 6.5 per cent, and is undoubtedly higher for more recent years. At the same time, the composition of exports changed markedly, with coal, timber and machinery being the most significant items. The growing importance of machinery, mainly the simpler types, has been reflected in a sharp increase in the past few years in the share of Polish trade to underdeveloped areas, which amounted to about one-quarter in 1955. Timber exports have been limited by lack of modern transport, as well as by problems of conservation. The rise in coal exports, on the other hand, has been limited by increasing internal demands for industry and by lack of incentives for the miners. Nevertheless, exports of coal have grown in importance, filling the gap caused by the failure in the postwar agricultural programme, and the territorial shift. Poland is today a net importer of grains in contrast with the prewar position. The sharp changes in the composition of Polish trade are shown below:

Percentage Composition of Poland's Foreign Trade

	<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
	<u>1938</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1955</u>
Raw materials	45	65 ⁽¹⁾	54	52
Equipment goods	0	13	23	31
Consumer goods	13	7	10	4
Foodstuffs	42	15	13	13
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

(1)47% for coal and coke, against 19% in 1938.

6. The changed structure of the Polish economy and pattern of foreign trade has led to larger imports of food, to make up for losses due to lower agricultural output; to greater needs for raw materials such as iron ore and cotton to meet the expanded industrial capacity, and to increased imports of specialised machinery for industry, mining, transport and agriculture. Payment for these greater needs could be effected only through a decrease in imports of consumer goods, but particularly by a large expansion in exports.

Poland's dilemma

7. The dilemma of Poland is that the resources needed to provide incentives compete strongly with those needed to strengthen the economic base. The economic situation will be alleviated by modernising industry and transport, which will require larger imports, which in turn can be paid for by larger exports of coal. However, unless more incentives are provided to the miners, by way of increased supplies of consumer goods, it is not likely that production will be raised significantly.

8. Furthermore, the economic situation in Poland is highly inflationary. As a by-product of last year's political agitation, wage increases have already been granted to 2 million workers and other increases are pending. The wage bill has risen 15% over the

past year, and it is clear that the government cannot hold the price line. Gomulka has called for restraint by the workers in their demands, and has painted a dismal picture of their future, pointing out that increases in their living conditions will be slow and small. The government has arranged for sharp increases in consumer goods imports, to meet the immediate demands of the workers, but it is evident that the long-term outlook for the Polish workers is bleak.

The coal situation

9. The recent announced changes in the five-year plan show a decline in coal production in 1957, which follows upon small increases in the past few years. At the same time, exports have been falling as internal needs for coal, aggravated by the inefficient use of power, have been rising.

The Coal Situation in Poland

	<u>Production</u>	<u>Exports</u>
	(millions of tons of hard coal)	
1950-1955 average	87.2	25.0
1954	91.6	21.6
1955	94.5	24.3
1956	95.2 ^(e)	19.7
1957 (plan)	93.0	11.0

(e) = estimate.

Wage increases have been granted to the miners and the number of Sunday shifts has been reduced from 23 in 1956 to 12 in 1957, with a complete abolition planned for 1958.

The agricultural situation

10. Changes recently announced to attempt to increase agricultural output are as follows:

- (a) Farm collectives are allowed to disband. This may increase output, since productivity on private farms is one-fifth higher than that of collectives. However, it appears as if the efficient farms are disbanding, with the inefficient ones anticipating state subsidies. The number of farms in collectives has been sharply reduced in the past few months, from 10,000 units to 2,000 units, and very little of Polish agriculture is presently run by collectives or state farms.
- (b) A reduction in the amount of compulsory deliveries to the state by farmers.
- (c) An increase of 100% in the delivery price of cereals.
- (d) Private farmers can now own farm machinery, and in fact, the state has made available credits for purchase of machinery.

11. Despite these changes, only a small increase in agricultural output has been arranged for in the 1957 plan, and increased imports of materials, including a \$10 million purchase of surplus US cotton, have been announced. The 1956 grain crop was not up to the level of the previous few years, and an increase in deliveries from the USSR has been arranged to make up part of this deficit. The 1956 sugar crop has been a failure and delivery of 200,000 tons to the USSR has been cancelled.

The balance of payments

12. The 1957 balance of payments situation of Poland will be difficult. More trade will be done with the West, imports will rise sharply, while the rise in exports will be limited. Poland will attempt to minimise this problem by conducting its trade on the cheapest market principle; this represents a radical change for

a communist country which had previously given priority to other countries in the communist bloc. A multiple exchange rate has been set up for the zloty, maintaining its parity with the rouble, but devaluing it to one-sixth of its former value in Western currencies. Although all trade with the West is usually quoted in sterling and will not be affected by the devaluation, the cost to Western businessmen of trips to Poland is now only one-sixth of its former level, and should be a stimulus to trading relations.

13. To meet the needs of the 1957 plan, there will be large increases in imports of some consumer goods and raw materials for industry (over 100%), foodstuffs (38%), and other raw materials and fuels (24%). Exports of coal will be lower, although the reduction will be in deliveries to the USSR and its satellites, with the tonnage to the West remaining level. Poland has insisted on payment in hard currency from Finland on deliveries, which previously had been made to fulfil a three-cornered arrangement between Poland, Finland and the USSR, to clear up a Finnish surplus vis-à-vis the USSR.

14. It is possible that the proportion of trade with the West in 1957 may rise to over 50% of total Polish trade. A trade agreement signed with the UK for 1957 provided for a sharp increase in imports by Poland, while France has granted a \$28 millions credit to Poland for purchase of industrial equipment.

Construction and investments

15. Revisions in the five-year plan show the proportion of investment devoted to housing rising from 10.7% to 14.4%, and it is expected that 183,000 apartment units will be built in 1957. Savings derived from cutbacks in other construction will be devoted to housing, but the overall situation will still be critical. Ochab has stated that even if the goals of the five-year plan are achieved

"there will still be the very acute housing problem which today haunts like a nightmare hundreds of thousands of families in Poland."

16. The 1957 plan provides for a 50% increase in the output of consumer durable goods, including motorcycles, bicycles, television sets and wireless sets. On the other hand, the planned increases in the textile and footwear industries are generally below those planned for heavy industry.

Encouragement to small-scale private enterprises

17. Resulting from severe legislation, the number of small scale enterprises fell from 200,000 before the war to 94,000 today, with those employed falling more sharply from 1,000,000 to 130,000 persons. This legislation has now been relaxed, and more encouragements have been offered to artisans engaged in trade, repair, tailoring and baking. Charges instituted include more liberal taxation, credit facilities and allotment of materials and premises.

Foreign aid

18. Poland has received from the USSR loans totalling \$275 millions, consisting of:

- \$100 millions in grains, to be delivered in early 1957
- \$175 millions in rouble currency, to be drawn in 1958 and 1959.

At the same time, Russian postwar claims on Poland, amounting to \$500 millions have been dropped.

19. However, Poland is no better off after these concessions than previously. First, the granting of the loans entailed the cancelling of a 100 million rouble credit, granted in September 1956, and payable partly in gold. Secondly the currency loan will not be drawn upon for a year, and could be easily cancelled, as the Russians recently did with the Yugoslav loan for an aluminium project. Thirdly, other unused credits Poland had obtained from

Russia were cancelled. Finally, the dropping of a \$500 million Soviet claim on Poland, does not even offset the losses incurred by Poland in the past ten years, in the sale of coal to Russia; 60 million tons were sold at a reported price of \$2.00 a ton, when the world price ranged between \$12.00 and \$22.00 a ton. Poland may have incurred losses of from \$600 millions to \$1.0 billions on this transaction, so that the Soviet concession was not altogether magnanimous.

20. At the present time, Polish negotiators are in London and Washington seeking credits from the West. The United Kingdom will not at present grant credits to Poland, and it is not yet known what the United States viewpoint will be.