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COMMITTEE OF POLITICAL ADVISERS

REPERCUSSIONS IN SATELLITE COUNTRIES OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

Note by the United States Delegation

Following are United States comments on the note on this subject by the French Delegation (AC/119-WP(61)60).

Military

Page 2, paragraph 1

We have no information to support the contention that Soviet forces are now stationed also in Eastern Poland.

Paragraph 2

Similarly, no reports have come to our attention to suggest that a series of bilateral manoeuvres has been held. According to our information, the joint Warsaw Pact manoeuvres - with the participation of Soviet, East German, Polish, and Czech forces - began in East Germany and possibly also in western Poland on or about 8th October.

Paragraph 3

We have no corroborative data on the alleged new military command system. The officially reported presence of Soviet marshals in Bulgaria and in Rumania could have been in connection with vacations or celebrations - as was officially claimed.

Paragraphs 4 and 5

Retention in the military service of servicemen due for discharge has been officially announced by Bulgaria (29th September), Hungary and Poland (5th October), East Germany (10th October) and Czechoslovakia (23rd October).

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Page 4, last paragraph

Soviet troops have entered Czechoslovakia. We have no information as to their entry into Rumania and Bulgaria.

We also question whether the conclusion that satellite armed forces constitute hardly more than auxiliaries (in appoint) to Soviets does not minimise too much the potential usefulness of these forces to the USSR in some conceivable contingencies.

General

Regarding the effects of the Berlin crisis on the people of East European countries, the French paper correctly reports alarm and hoarding of supplies which it caused at the end of the summer and which were particularly marked in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Some of this feeling of alarm continues and may be expected to increase if the crisis intensifies. The Poles and Czechs are especially likely to fear war since they would expect to be the most immediately exposed. We believe the paper is also correct in stressing hostility among East Germans toward the USSR in connection with the Berlin crisis, but we believe there has been at least some increase of such hostility among people of other satellites as well, particularly to the degree that they have learned of resumption of Soviet nuclear testing.

The French paper does not deal with the effect of the Berlin crisis on the policies of satellite governments toward the West. While perhaps the crisis has not yet caused any decisive change in this sphere, it has at least given rise to signs of uncertainty, on the part of the Polish Government for example, as to the future of some aspects of its relations with Western Governments.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.