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PART II

Summary record of a meeting of the Council  
held at the Palazzo dei Congressi, Rome,  
on Tuesday, 26th May, 1970 at 3.00 p.m.

PRESENT

President of the Council: H.E. Mr. Emil Jönsson  
Chairman and Secretary General: Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P. Harmel Minister for Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Mr. Mitchell Sharp Secretary of State for  
External Affairs  
The Hon. Mr. Ross Campbell Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. P. Hartling Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. H. Hjorth-Nielsen Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Schumann Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. F. de Rose Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Mr. W. Scheel Federal Minister for  
Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. G.F. Duckwitz State Secretary  
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe Permanent Representative

GREECE

H.E. Mr. P. Pipinelis Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. Ph. A. Cavalierato Permanent Representative

NATO SECRET

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. E. Jónsson Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. N.P. Sigurdsson Permanent Representative

ITALY

H.E. Mr. A. Moro Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. C. de Ferrariis Salzano Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. G. Thorn Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. L. Schaus Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. W. den Toom Minister of Defence  
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. S. Stray Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. O.G. Tidemand Minister of Defence  
H.E. Mr. G. Kristiansen Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. Rui Patrício Minister of Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. I.S. Çağlayangil Minister for Foreign Affairs  
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
The Rt. Hon. Denis W. Healey Secretary of State for Defence  
H.E. Sir Bernard Burrows Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Williams P. Rogers Secretary of State  
The Hon. Robert Ellsworth Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. O. Olcay	Deputy Secretary General
Mr. K. Nash	Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy
Prof. G. Randers	Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs
Mr. F.E. Maestrone	Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
The Lord Coleridge	Executive Secretary

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson	Chairman
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DECLASSIFIED/DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSED/MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Contd)

1. Mr. MORO (Italy) expressed satisfaction that the North Atlantic Council had accepted his Government's invitation, which provided a fresh opportunity to consider ways and means of achieving the basic objective of the Alliance, namely, to increase world security through a relaxation of tension in Europe. Briefly reviewing the developments in East-West relations since December, he pointed out that although the various contacts which several member countries had initiated with Eastern Europe had already paved the way for negotiations, there had also been some less favourable developments which ought to be reflected in the appraisal of the situation on the strength of which the Alliance would define its attitude to East-West relations. However, he was still convinced that the only possible course for the Alliance was to strive for a relaxation of tension and that, to this end, there was a need for an active approach, entailing either the development of bilateral relations or a variety of contacts or negotiations in areas with a more direct bearing on security. It was in this spirit that the Italian Government had tried to establish, for example during recent official visits to Budapest and Sofia, why the Warsaw Pact countries had reiterated their proposals for a European Conference once they had got over the most acute phase of the Czechoslovak crisis.

2. The Alliance's dynamic view of European security, which was in keeping with the epoch-making events the world was now witnessing, was to be contrasted with the static attitude to European security taken by the Eastern bloc which, in demanding the ratification of the status quo deriving from the Second World War, seemed to be bent on perpetuating the division of Europe into two opposing blocs. While condemning this attitude, he stressed that efforts to achieve European stability must be a gradual process leading in successive stages to wider and freer-ranging international co-operation. This had been the case with the many initiatives by the Federal Republic, which had therefore invariably been supported by his Government. It was also essential that some progress should be made - if only on basic principles - during the current bilateral and Four-Power talks before further headway could be made towards negotiations.

3. After these general comments, he went on to express his country's views on a European Conference. In the first place, he felt that subsequent developments in the international situation had not invalidated the conclusions reached by the Council at the December Ministerial Meeting, namely, that any conference of this kind should represent a progressive attempt to establish a lasting peace in Europe and that there could be no question of confining negotiations to the two blocs. On the latter point, he said that although the blocs should pursue a policy of détente, it might be dangerous to make too sharp a change in the balance which had kept the peace in Europe for the past twenty-five years. At all events, he felt that the neutral and non-aligned countries should be involved in this undertaking.

4. Secondly, the conference would have to be adequately prepared. In stipulating this, the Italian Government was not trying to hold up progress; on the contrary, it was anxious that the intervening period should be used to draw up an acceptable agenda so that all the basic problems could be dealt with in successive stages. One of the points which should be considered was the economic and political integration of Europe, since the creation of an outward-looking Western community was bound to give a fillip to the dialogue with the East. On the issues which might be suggested for a conference, he urged that the Alliance should reiterate its proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions as a complement to the SALT negotiations. This could be incorporated in a separate declaration based on the draft prepared by the Permanent Representatives. He hoped that, in the light of the reactions to the exploratory contacts with the East European countries - which should be initiated as soon as possible - the Alliance's views on this problem could be clarified.

5. As regards the other subjects which might be dealt with in exploratory talks, he felt that, in preparation for what would be long, drawn out negotiations, it was particularly important for the West to be able to put forward a wide range of topics as a basis for concrete negotiations aimed at gradually resolving the major issues. One of these was the "Code of Good Conduct" which, provided that it was based on a unanimously-agreed definition of the principle of free and genuine coexistence, might help to clarify the doctrine of limited sovereignty and ensure that, whatever the circumstances, there would be a genuine renunciation of the use of force. Other topics which should be suggested were the development of economic, technical and, especially, cultural co-operation to preserve man's environment in the context of the challenges of modern society. In this connection, he recalled Italy's favourable reaction to President Nixon's initiative regarding the problems affecting so many aspects of present-day life.

6. In his view, the procedure to be adopted could comprise three phases:

- initially, exploratory talks should be held to establish whether the countries concerned were prepared to negotiate on concrete issues. The form these exploratory talks took was less important than the topics suggested and the means used to demonstrate that member countries really wanted negotiations. Balanced force reductions, marking the beginning of a process of limited disarmament in a specific geographical area, would provide a gage of this genuine wish for détente;

- if reactions were favourable, the second phase could then be initiated; this would consist of multilateral contacts, perhaps in the form of an informal, open-ended meeting attended by Ambassadors of the countries concerned, together with experts, the sole purpose of which would be to make arrangements for negotiations and decide on a suitable date for a conference;
- the third and final phase would be the negotiations proper and the conference.

7. Turning to the situation in the Mediterranean, he stressed that events here had taken a turn for the worse. He was particularly concerned at the Soviet Union's strategic, political and economic pincer movement in the Middle East. Although the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean was not unprecedented, the opportunity the Soviet Union was now being given to keep forces permanently concentrated in the area and use various bases was a new development and this Soviet penetration, which was manifest in a large number of Mediterranean countries, had been helped on by the worsening of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his view, the situation in the Middle East - the main features of which were the direct military support now being provided by the Soviet Union and the growth of the anti-Western Palestine resistance movements - could be solved only by political means. He was convinced that the Soviet Union had nothing to gain from a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and that the only way to bring about a situation which would allow the Arab countries to free themselves from its protection - which, for the moment, they deemed to be essential - would be for the parties to comply fully with the Security Council's Resolution 242, which would enable the two sides' demands to be reconciled. It was in order to elicit the Egyptian Government's views on the prospects of doing this that he had recently paid a visit to Cairo, where he had had talks with President Nasser.

8. Reporting on these talks, he said that President Nasser had acknowledged that he had been obliged to entrust his country's security to the Soviet Union, whose influence might even increase as long as Israel continued to enjoy extensive military superiority and refused to take the necessary steps to restore peace, in other words, agree to the Security Council Resolution already accepted by Egypt. While stressing that, in so far as Egypt was concerned, the clause in the Resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories was not negotiable, President Nasser had pointed out that he had neither accepted nor rejected the Rogers plan. He had seemed to recognise that a mass movement of Palestinian refugees into Israel would threaten the latter's very existence by altering its national identity. He had expressed willingness to sign a solemn statement, to be deposited at the United Nations, in which Israel would agree in principle to the total evacuation of the occupied Arab territories and the United Arab Republic, for its part, would recognise the so-called Armistice lines as Israel's permanent frontier. Egypt would also agree to various international peace-keeping arrangements in the Middle East,

such as the de-militarisation of some areas, the presence of United Nations forces and a guarantee by the Security Council or certain Powers. Generally speaking, it was clear from the points made by President Nasser that the two sides had arrived at a military stalemate, and this was a new development which deserved to be studied.

9. Turning to the position of Malta, he drew the Council's attention to the archipelago's political and strategic importance for the defence of Europe at a time when the balance in the Mediterranean was being upset. He felt that no effort should be spared to ensure that domestic economic difficulties did not cause the Maltese Government to yield to the temptation to give the Soviet Union access to its ports, dockyards and airports and thus enable it to use this vital base in the central Mediterranean area, with all the repercussions this could have on the position of countries such as Yugoslavia and Albania. He therefore urged that consideration should be given to the overall situation in the Mediterranean and that, now that the Alliance was making ready for a dialogue on European security and co-operation, it should bear in mind that security was just as indivisible as peace.

10. Mr. THORN (Luxembourg) said that any foreign or defence policy needed to be dynamic and constantly responsive to changes so as to exert some influence over their outcome. It was from this standpoint that he proposed to review the international situation. He hoped that this study would bring to light a number of practical conclusions, particularly as regards the Final Communiqué, which should reflect the present image of the Alliance for the general public.

11. Three major considerations should be borne in mind in the course of this study:

- there had been no change in the basic goals of the Alliance, as defined in the Harmel Report, which were still centred on the inter-dependent concepts of defence and détente;
- nor did there seem to have been any change in the basic goals of the Soviet Union, whose entire policy was undoubtedly aimed at the ultimate triumph of Communism throughout the world and, in the short term, at the ratification of the status quo in Europe. At all events, the conclusion of the new Treaty of friendship and assistance between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the Soviet Union was not prepared to relax its hold on Eastern Europe;
- trends in public opinion - as manifested in the democratic countries' parliaments, press articles, radio broadcasts and public opinion polls - were a factor which had to be borne in mind by Western statesmen so that they could be guided and, where necessary, restrained.



12. With these considerations in mind, he proposed to deal with the problems of European security from two standpoints: first, that of methods and procedures and, secondly, that of the substantive problems, i.e. the issues to be negotiated. It seemed clear that, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, which would perhaps prefer the members of the Alliance to reject any idea of a Conference, the majority of the East European countries wanted a major European Security Conference, probably in the belief that this would afford them an opportunity to acquire some freedom at the expense of their overlord. The inconsistency of the Agenda proposed by the satellite countries was perhaps due to the fact that they wished to use the Conference for propaganda purposes or to ratify the status quo and enhance the international standing of the GDR. Another possibility was that the Soviet Union was not allowing its satellites to take bolder initiatives. The Alliance's position was radically different; it was anxious for a lasting solution to European problems, and this could not be achieved by holding a show-conference. He therefore agreed that the Conference would have to be carefully prepared and that it should not be convened unless there were reasonably good prospects of success.

13. It was also important not to lay down a hard-and-fast procedure. While the proposed Conference was only one of several possible solutions, strong pressures were being exerted in most countries, if not for a major Conference at an early date, at least for thorough-going exploratory studies and multi-lateral initiatives. These elements represented a large majority of the public and if they met with a point-blank refusal there was a danger that NATO might lose some of the latter's support, together with that of the younger generation. In order to reconcile all these various factors, the Alliance would have to be imaginative and try to go a step further than the December Communiqué. In his view, the best solution would be to propose a multilateral dialogue designed to sound out the other side's intentions. He therefore agreed with the Belgian proposal for an exploratory working group free from all publicity. On issues for possible negotiation, he would, by and large, go along with Mr. Moro's suggestions in this connection. He was in favour of reiterating the proposals for mutual and balanced force reductions since, provided adequate precautions were taken, this would serve the interests of the Alliance and, more especially, because of the attractiveness this project had for the public. As regards the probable Soviet reaction, he had noted Mr. Scheel's report that, according to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn, the Soviet Union had some interest in this subject. However, this was not the impression he had been given during his visit to the Soviet Union. As for the other possible Agenda Items - namely, the renunciation of the use of force and economic, social and technological co-operation, he felt that these would be pointless unless they offered a real basis for discussion. However, he feared that the other side regarded them simply as pretexts for holding a conference. He, therefore,

supported the Belgian proposal for multilateral exploratory talks to establish whether the East European countries were genuinely willing to take part in a bona fide discussion of the basic principles which should govern international life. He also agreed with Mr. Rogers that environmental problems were a particularly suitable topic for exploratory talks with the East. Although the Soviet leaders had made it clear that they were disinclined to place this matter on a conference agenda, there had been some more favourable reactions in the Warsaw Pact countries.

14. In conclusion, he stressed that there could be no future for NATO unless it had its place in the social and political structures accepted by its members; it could not, therefore, simply take up a passive or "wait-and-see" attitude. There would be no danger in making a cautious and rational approach to the East and the public support this aroused would help to secure acceptance of the Alliance's defence functions. In some quarters, regret had been expressed that it was proposed to hold the East-West dialogue on a bloc-to-bloc basis; however, a question had been put to the Alliance as a whole and it must respond as such, even if the neutral countries were associated with the steps it took. He could, therefore, approve the decision to undertake an overall study of Alliance defence problems for the 1970s.

15. Mr. CAGLAYANGIL (Turkey) said that in the present fluid situation, the key features of which were a fresh outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and South-East Asia, counter-balanced by a trend towards discussion in Europe, the Council's approach to the formulation of NATO policy would have to be both imaginative and cautious. It was in this spirit that the negotiations on European Security questions should be tackled. Quoting recent developments, such as the signature of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, to illustrate his point, he said it would be unrealistic to expect too much from the talks some Western nations had initiated with certain of their East European counterparts. However, it was essential to prevent the Warsaw Pact from retaining the propaganda advantage it had derived from its proposal for a European Security Conference while, at the same time, bearing in mind that the principal goal of the Alliance was to persuade the East European countries to engage in a genuine discussion of basic problems. The best plan would, therefore, be to combine flexibility on procedure with firmness on essentials. It was on this basis that Turkey had proposed a three-fold procedure, as follows: the purpose of the initial multilateral exploratory contacts should be to convene a Conference with a single item on the Agenda: the establishment of a Commission for a specific period to deal with all questions bearing on European Security and co-operation. This was not an original proposal but a combination of ideas deriving from the document on procedures for negotiation and from his recent contacts with the Polish and Rumanian leaders, who had shown a very marked inclination to concentrate on preparing for negotiations. It might be objected that the proposal failed to cater

for the dangers involved in the preparatory stage; however, neither this nor the subsequent phase should be contemplated unless the preliminary exploratory talks produced encouraging results, in other words, unless the East European countries agreed to negotiate on the questions suggested by the Alliance, and especially on mutual and balanced force reductions.

16. In this connection, he wished to make a number of general comments on the Final Communiqué. While he fully agreed that this should be positively worded, he felt that negotiating procedure should be mentioned only in general terms, without any detailed reference to the contacts involved in settling this procedure. He also felt that an independent declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions would help to highlight this proposal. However, there must be a clear understanding that all the countries concerned should participate in negotiations on MBFR, for the defence of the Alliance was indivisible and any changes in the forces in a given area were bound to have an impact on all the other areas. This remark did not apply to cases where a NATO country was invited to sound out the intentions of the East European countries, but to the exploratory contacts and MBFR negotiations proper. If these negotiations took place, due account should be taken of the security factor and equal consideration should be given to all the proposed models so as not to make things easier for the other side. Nor should the Declaration stipulate that exploratory contacts would be confined to the question of force reductions.

17. Turning to Alliance defence problems for the 1970s, he agreed that, considering the special importance of the question, this study should be pursued at a high level. He expressed the hope that a detailed report would be submitted at the December Ministerial Meeting since, if reductions were to be made unilaterally and not on a mutual basis, the flexible response and forward defence strategies would be more difficult to implement. The purpose of the study should not be to alter the existing strategy but to determine what joint action could be taken to carry it out properly. In order to be objective, the study should be based on an analysis of actual data and it should be borne in mind that the aim was not to justify a unilateral reduction.

18. He went on to express deep concern at the situation in the Middle East, where hostilities were building up and bipartite and quadripartite diplomatic initiatives had so far borne little fruit. It was clear that, for the present, the only country deriving advantage from this crisis was the Soviet Union, which could thus increase its political influence and strengthen its fleet in the Mediterranean. Two aspects of this situation called for special attention. The first was the activities of the Palestine resistance organizations in the Lebanon and Jordan. It appeared from the Turkish leaders' contacts with their Soviet counterparts that the latter were

quite concerned at the growing influence of these organisations, which they could not refuse to assist, yet which were capable of involving them in an adventure with unforeseeable consequences since the Arab leaders might find themselves obliged to escalate the conflict lest they were taxed with taking too soft a line towards Israel. The second aspect was the question of arms deliveries, which should be brought under control so as to avoid compromising still further the prospects of a peaceful settlement. All these problems had been reviewed at the Izmir summit meeting attended by the Heads of State and Government of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Basically, the Turkish position was that, in the absence of any likelihood of a prompt solution, the main problem was to isolate the conflict as much as possible so that:

- (1) it no longer threatened to erupt into a major confrontation;
- (2) the situation could be exploited as little as possible to the Alliance's disadvantage; and
- (3) with time, the two sides would become increasingly disposed to reach a workably modus vivendi.

In view of the complexity of the question and the many hidden factors at play, he was increasingly convinced of the need for continuing thorough-going consultations with the other member countries.

19. Briefly reviewing the problems raised by the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, he said that, in so far as remedial action was concerned, it was less important for the Alliance to announce that it was keeping a watchful eye on developments and report the countermeasures it proposed to take than to make effective improvements in its defence and surveillance capabilities without necessarily giving details of these measures.

20. In conclusion, he recalled that negotiations had been under way for the past two years in an effort to find a basis for reconciling the two communities of the Republic of Cyprus. He deeply regretted that the talks between the two communities had not produced the desired results and that, notwithstanding a partial agreement on secondary matters, one of them was continually denied a share in the State's resources and activities. He, for his part, was convinced that from the contractual and constitutional standpoints, as well as in material and moral terms, there was an adequate basis for a negotiated solution founded on the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties concerned. It was in this spirit that he could endorse the comments in the Secretary General's Annual Political Appraisal. He stressed that the latest developments on the island had demonstrated the need for a prompt and peaceful solution. In this connection, he wished to pay tribute to Mr. Pipinelis, who had pursued the dialogue with the Turkish Government throughout the recent crisis in Cyprus.

21. Mr. STRAY (Norway), whilst recognising the need for member countries to maintain their security, stressed that every attempt should be made to avoid giving the impression, particularly to the new generation, that the Alliance might be a barrier to détente. Furthermore, although it was recognised that many of the proposals from the East were not genuine, it was essential to avoid jeopardising any prospects of achieving relaxation of tension.

22. After drawing attention to the work performed by the Alliance since the Harmel Report to prepare for negotiations on a broad range of questions with the East, he indicated that this task should be carried a step further at the present meeting. In order to uphold general support in Europe for the Alliance in the future, he believed that it was of paramount importance for NATO to clearly demonstrate that it was doing its utmost to achieve a lasting détente in Europe.

23. Turning to the recently initiated bilateral and multilateral East-West talks, he stated that his Government attached great significance to these developments. Although he agreed that the major powers would have to take the lead in this process, he felt strongly that all the nations concerned would have to take part in exploratory talks and ultimately in negotiations on questions affecting security and co-operation in Europe not covered by talks already under way. It was now necessary to explore the possibilities of meaningful negotiation on a multilateral basis with the members of the Warsaw Pact and the non-aligned countries. However, he stressed that at this stage only exploratory talks should be considered and that participation in such talks should not imply automatic commitment to hold a security conference, which should be entirely dependent on the outcome of these soundings. Although the true motives behind the Soviet Union's interest in a conference were not known, he believed that a majority of the East European countries genuinely wished to promote détente through more extensive and multilateral contacts with the West and that exploratory arrangements could serve as a clearing house for ideas put forward by various countries on questions on security and co-operation. The Alliance could advance again the ideas contained in the December Declaration which had not yet been covered by existing negotiations. The political risks involved in entering such consultations should be manageable. Furthermore, the non-aligned countries in Europe would probably tend to support Western positions. In such exploratory talks, MBFR should play a central but not an exclusive rôle, and should be treated as a separate item.

24. His Government believed that the Communiqué should indicate the Alliance's readiness, in principle, to enter into multilateral exploratory contacts with other governments who were willing to discuss the desirability of negotiations on matters proposed by all the three groups of interested states. Such action did not exclude MBFR being given a somewhat higher priority as far as timing was concerned. In general, the Norwegian Government's position was very close to the one expressed by his Belgian and United Kingdom colleagues.

25. Before concluding, he wished to mention a problem which, in the long run, might have serious consequences for the cohesion and the security of the Alliance. NATO was not only a defence organization but, as the North Atlantic Treaty put it, a free association of nations "... founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". There had been strong reactions in Norway due to the fact that Greece did not comply with some of these principles.

26. In conclusion, he restated his Government's support for NATO and indicated that his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was not the result of a change of government or of policy.

27. Mr. HARTLING (Denmark) expressed full support to the many substantive East-West talks which had taken place since December at Western initiative and which he hoped the East European countries would recognise as genuine attempts to solve various international problems. However, the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the recent treaty of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia underlined the very narrow limits to the freedom of movement of the East Europeans in relation to the Soviet Union.

28. Although Denmark endeavoured to contribute to the policy of détente in various areas, it was recognised that there were certain limits to the results that could be achieved at a bilateral level. It was therefore felt that a need existed for deliberations on East-West relations to be conducted within a multilateral framework. As a supplement to bilateral contacts, his Government believed that a deliberate effort should be made to prepare for a security conference or perhaps for a conference on European security and co-operation. It was essential for the Alliance to retain the initiative in East-West relations and not to restrict itself to the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact countries. After recalling that Denmark had suggested the establishment of exploratory and preparatory multilateral arrangements for consultations for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of meaningful East-West negotiations, he expressed his support for the British and Belgian ideas on multilateral explorations and on the setting up of permanent machinery in the form of a standing commission for East-West relations. With regard to the subjects to be discussed, it appeared that both the East and West felt it was premature to discuss at such a conference the question of fundamental European security problems. The items in the Prague Declaration, insufficient in themselves, should be supplemented. In this context, MBFR was particularly to be noted. Other topics such as the drafting of a Code of Good Conduct and the expansion of cultural and personal contacts might also be considered.

29. Turning to the current crisis in the Middle East, he announced that the report on this subject made by his Italian colleague earlier at the meeting corresponded to a large degree with the impressions he had gained during his recent visit to this area. He believed that the situation had reached an absolute deadlock and that there was little hope of achieving a peaceful settlement within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, it seemed vitally urgent to strengthen Ambassador Jarring's mission.

30. With regard to Vietnam, the Danish Government had noted with satisfaction the measures that had been taken to reduce military operations. However, the latest developments, especially in Cambodia, had caused deep concern on account of the potential risks and implications of a wider Asian war.

31. In conclusion, he stated that it was the task of the Alliance to defend the democratic principles contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. It was a strain on NATO that conditions within its own circle did not, in certain cases, correspond with the ideals expressed in the Treaty. His Government in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Danish Parliament wished to urge member Governments which supplied military equipment to Greece to discontinue such supplies until democratic conditions had been restored in that country.

32. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) opened his statement with a survey of the status of East-West relations. Progress into the era of negotiation was, he said, slow and confused; despite the absence of any major crisis since Cuba, despite positive developments in the initiation of talks with East European Governments, a significant breakthrough was not yet in sight. Furthermore, it was difficult to avoid the impression that there was little response on the Soviet side to the strong and obvious desire of the West for détente and consolidation. Both the words of the Moscow leaders and their factual policy in the international field implied first and foremost their intent to strengthen Soviet power and influence.

33. There were, however, positive trends. Not only had the present Soviet leaders shunned direct confrontation with the West, they had also, to the benefit of both East and West, shown themselves willing to negotiate at least in areas related to their own interests. Their proposals for a conference on European security, on the other hand, were equivocal, and in any case too restricted to lead to substantial results, and the discussion already engaged on Germany had not as yet produced evidence of a more forthcoming attitude; the Netherlands earnestly hoped that the vision, moderation and patience of the Federal Republic would yield concrete results.

34. Mr. Luns went on to say that Mr. Janos Peter, during a recent visit to The Hague, had strongly supported the Warsaw Pact position on an all-European conference and had suggested that the NATO Ministerial Meeting might usefully formulate its own suggestions for an Agenda. In reply, he had clearly propounded the NATO approach and had recalled the Declaration of December 1969, adding that it was essential to explore in advance of the event whether specific subjects would in fact lend themselves to fruitful negotiations. He had reminded Mr. Peter of the disturbingly different interpretation which the East applied to the first point of the Prague Declaration, and had gone on to mention the positive aspects of current bilateral explorations and their possibilities for development into a multilateral forum. Mr. Peter had not explicitly rejected a Netherlands suggestion for the creation of a preparatory group, which would be limited, open-ended, and comprise experts from East, West and perhaps neutral countries.

35. The question of procedures was indeed of importance and in this connection he paid particular tribute to the suggestions of Mr. Harmel and Mr. Stewart. In his view, a presentation to Moscow and its allies should make clear the priority which the West attached to a joint effort to achieve a balanced reduction of forces in Europe and at the same time point out that the subjects mentioned in the Prague Declaration, though interesting, could not be considered sufficient, since they did not touch upon vital security problems. As an alternative to the conception of a European security conference or, preferably, series of conferences, Mr. Luns said he believed the United Kingdom suggestion for a permanent committee was worthy of consideration, preceded perhaps by the proposed preparatory group of experts.

36. Turning to the increasingly disturbing situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East, the Minister said he was pessimistic about a possible peaceful solution of the differences between the Arabs and Israelis. It was unlikely that Israel's recent operations on Lebanese territory would achieve the desired political and military goals, and the implications of a possible confrontation between Israeli forces and Soviet military personnel cast doubt on the view that time would work in Israel's favour.

37. He said that it was his impression following a recent Middle East tour that the moral elements in the Arab world were losing ground and that despite internal dissension, unanimity on foreign policy appeared to be more solid than ever. Furthermore, the emergence of a Palestinian Resistance might well prove a difficult and decisive factor in reaching a solution. He did not believe the Arabs would enter any negotiations until the Israelis indicated that their territorial claims were limited and that they accepted the principle of withdrawal. Finally, and most disappointingly, the situation afforded an opportunity to the Soviet Union to consolidate her position in the area, to the strong disadvantage of the West.



38. Mr. Luns then drew attention to one aspect of recent developments in South East Asia which was related to the Middle East crisis and which had not been given sufficient public attention. He said there was a danger that Soviet misjudgement of possible American reaction could be most dangerous to world peace; however, if United States action in Cambodia gave credibility to the possibility of United States intervention in the final event on behalf of Israel, reckless Soviet moves would be less likely.

39. Concluding, Mr. Luns reaffirmed the Netherlands strong attachment to the principle of democratic freedom, and expressed the hope that inside and outside the Alliance, democracy and the democratic freedoms would continue to be applied.

40. Mr. SHARP (Canada) preceded his remarks on an approach to East-West relations by touching briefly on the Mediterranean situation and Cambodia. He said his recent Middle East tour and the visit of Mr. Eban to Ottawa had borne out the pessimism expressed by preceding speakers on the chances of an early settlement. The thankless intermediary endeavours assumed by several of the Allies merited firm support and encouragement.

41. On South-East Asia he said Canada was well aware of the background to the recent United States operations in Cambodia but was disturbed by the possible risk of an enlargement of the war as a consequence of what must have been a regrettable military necessity. In this connection, he added, Mr. Roger's reassurances were comforting. As a long-standing member of the Cambodian International Control Commission, Canada had been consulting recently regarding reactivation proposals, but in view of strongly antagonistic or negative reactions from various quarters, they were not hopeful of the prospects. The Commission, he argued, could not perform a symbolic function and should be reactivated only if it could function properly and with full support; it would be irresponsible to participate under any other circumstance.

42. Turning to the conditions of relative stability existing in Europe, Mr. Sharp said he believed it appropriate that NATO's principal political preoccupation at the present time should be to exploit these circumstances in order to improve relations and find negotiated solutions for outstanding European problems. The best approach was that adopted in December 1969 in which the Alliance had advanced reasonable proposals and main emphasis was placed on the substance of issues for negotiation. He further believed that whilst avoiding an unduly negative attitude, NATO should take care not to commit itself to the proposals of the East, including the suggestion for a large-scale conference.

43. He said this last idea appeared to have lost momentum recently, despite strenuous efforts by the Warsaw Pact to maintain it. In fact, the Soviet position had not been substantively developed, nor the agenda elaborated, and there was little indication of a real interest for the discussion of substantive issues. In this connection, he had been interested to hear Ambassador Enckell's comments on the increasing realisation of the difficulties involved in respect of a conference, and his significant statement that a well-prepared conference in due time was preferable to an ill-prepared conference very soon.

44. In other areas, considerable progress had been made in coming to grips with issues affecting European security. SALT was important not only for its contribution to arms control but also because an understanding between the two powers engaged in the talks was a prerequisite for any long-term security arrangements. The Four-Power talks could help to reduce tension and the Federal Government's discussions with the East were an imaginative attempt to break a long-standing deadlock. Was there anything else that might usefully be done at this stage?

45. Bearing in mind the importance to the West of maintaining the initiative, he believed there were two possible courses: a further substantive proposal or a procedural move. Canada had looked seriously at the suggestions for possible procedures for negotiation but had concluded that to embark on multilateral discussion, even informally, might place NATO in a position of committing itself, or appearing to commit itself, prematurely to the holding of a conference. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that multilateral negotiations would be more successful than the current exploratory talks, and, finally, it might prove unwise to attempt to proceed at this stage in face of certain differences of opinion amongst the Allies on the usefulness of the conference idea. For the same reasons, it was too early to consider the possibility of a standing commission, despite the considerable merit of this idea in the right circumstances.

46. Current divergencies of opinion would make it difficult even to advance an agenda for a large conference. Canada, for its part, had reservations about three of the topics already proposed. The renunciation of force, the code of good conduct and co-operation in economic, cultural and technical fields seemed superfluous in view of the existence of other fora; mutual and balanced force reductions ought to be taken up in the first instance by the governments directly concerned.

47. The most useful contribution the Alliance could make at this time would therefore rather than delve on the idea of a conference to launch a new substantive proposal and it was MBFR on which, he felt, a new major East-West dialogue could be concentrated. If the Soviet Union was not prepared to discuss a subject of such obvious importance, this fact should be known.

On the other hand, given sufficient goodwill, an exploration could be opened which would lead to negotiations of substantial importance to European security and provide a concrete example of willingness to come to terms with the divisive issues in Europe. In such an approach, account must be taken of certain requirements; an offer to explore how negotiations might be initiated should be expressed in clear and forthright terms, together with an indication of precisely how such exploration would be carried out, which invited a definite response. The offer should include a statement of principles or guidelines as a common basis for exploration and should recognise the relationship between progress on mutual and balanced force reductions and similar issues of substance and the eventual convening of a large conference.

48. Mr. PATRICIO (Portugal) questioned whether the talks which had been held since the December Ministerial Meeting had made enough headway to warrant the conclusion that the essential basis for multilateral negotiations now existed. While agreeing that the present situation held out opportunities which the Council should be ready to grasp, he felt that the moves the West had made in an effort to bring about a relaxation of tensions had not met with a sympathetic or constructive response from the Soviet Union. He was convinced that the Soviet Union had no intention of progressing beyond peaceful co-existence so as to ratify the status quo, ensure that it kept its hold on the East European countries and retain its present freedom of manoeuvre in other areas, such as Latin America, Africa and Asia, where Soviet activities were on the increase. It was on this realistic basis that efforts should be made to resolve the problems of Europe. At the December Ministerial Meeting, the Council had agreed that the Prague proposals for a European security conference agenda were inadequate and nothing more than propaganda. These proposals still held good and the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, formally ratifying the Brezhnev Doctrine, seemed to indicate that the Soviet position was unalterable. Consequently, it did not appear feasible to hold a conference for the moment, no agreement having been reached on the agenda which, in any event, would have to cover the basic issues bearing on European security, such as mutual and balanced force reductions, Germany and Berlin.

49. As regards the suggestions that the difficulties in the way of a conference might be overcome by establishing either a preparatory commission or a more or less permanent group to deal with European security questions, his Delegation felt that another solution would be to prepare an agenda in line with the December 1969 Ministerial Declaration. Should any other basis be adopted, this might result in a faulty interpretation of the present situation and in unwarranted public optimism.

50. For all these reasons, the exploratory phase should be pursued until sufficient progress had been made to warrant further action. At the same time, the Alliance should beware of adopting a static policy and make active preparations for the next phase. He therefore attached special importance to the studies on balanced force reductions. He welcomed the fact that these studies had made enough headway for the Alliance to retain the initiative it had taken at Reykjavik and, when the time came, to table concrete proposals which the Soviet Union would find it difficult to ignore without seriously compromising itself vis-à-vis world public opinion. He also noted with satisfaction that a great deal of groundwork had been done during the detailed studies on possible procedures for negotiation.

51. Turning to the problem raised by the Soviet naval presence in various parts of the world, he said that the Portuguese Government had noted with great interest document C-M(70)12(Final) on the situation in the Mediterranean. He fully agreed that the systematic and progressive improvement of the Soviet position in this area represented a growing danger. However, this was only one aspect of an overall policy which was also manifesting itself in the North and South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. He was especially concerned at the potential threat which the large numbers of Soviet vessels off the West African coast represented for shipping on the Cape route. The gravity of this situation was heightened by the depth of Soviet penetration in the Indian Ocean where, in plain language, an attempt was being made to seal off the African continent. In this connection, he drew attention to the appearance of Soviet vessels off the coast of India and in Ceylonese territorial waters, the increasingly frequent use they were making of Singapore harbour and the Malacca Straits and the growing Soviet influence in Mauritius. This was all the more disturbing since there were no corresponding Western forces. He had therefore welcomed the points made by the Secretary General in document C-M(70)18 and the briefing by SACLANT during Exercise SHAPEX 1970.

52. In conclusion, he said that the Portuguese Government attached great importance to the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. In this field, which it had not hitherto explored, the Alliance had taken a major initiative and clearly demonstrated its potentialities. The initial results were highly encouraging and it was to be hoped that these studies would give rise to practical conclusions which, as was stated in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, would help to promote conditions of stability and well-being by contributing to peace and mutual understanding.

53. Mr. SCHUMANN (France) said that the fundamental issue in so far as East-West relations were concerned was whether the Alliance wished to secure a tactical advantage or to find some means of making an effective contribution to détente. France had opted for the second of these alternatives and thus considered it necessary to assess the continuing impact the

Alliance's initiatives would have on the East European countries' relations with the Western nations and with one another. This was especially important now that the key problem - that of Russo-German, German-Polish and intra-German relations - had entered upon a new phase. Having stated what his country's decision had been, he proposed to go into the conclusions that should be drawn with regard to each of the problems now before the Council: the proposals for a European security conference, mutual balanced force reductions and the situation in the Mediterranean.

54. His country felt that it was most important to hold a European security conference so that each of the European countries could have an opportunity to assert its national identity. The conference was needed to ratify, not the status quo, but the détente and, in the final analysis, whether or not it was convened and proved successful would depend on the progress which was made in the various negotiations currently under way.

55. He would deal with the problem of mutual balanced force reductions from the same standpoint. Should this proposal be accepted as a basis for negotiations, the question arose whether the Alliance was, in fact, prepared to take the matter further; also, how would these negotiations be coupled with the strategic arms limitations talks between the Soviet Union and the United States? Moreover, according to the Military Committee's Report, proportionate percentage reductions were unacceptable and the asymmetrical models could not be put forward as they stood at present.

56. For the above reasons, he felt that it would be undesirable for the Communiqué to put forward a combination of the Warsaw Pact's proposals, those on European security and those on force reductions. It would be preferable for the problem of European security to be dealt with in a separate paragraph setting out a joint position, with special reference to the fact that if the talks on Germany and Berlin made headway, this would pave the way for a review of the other problem bearing on security by all the Powers concerned.

57. As regards future procedure, he had noted from the statements by Mr. Harmel and Mr. Stewart that there had been a change in one feature of the Anglo-Belgian proposal which had been causing him special concern - namely, the establishment of a Standing Commission on East-West problems. In particular, he understood that Mr. Stewart could now agree to consider the exploratory talks and the negotiations proper as two independent phases and to retain the proposal for a Standing Commission as one of the possible arrangements for the second phase, to be considered if the other side's response provided a basis for negotiations. He felt that this proposal would be acceptable on

condition that the multilateral approach was not considered to be the only possible solution for the exploratory talks since, if so - and contrary to the intentions of the originators of the proposal - there was every prospect that the preparations for the conference would be deemed to ratify the continued existence of the two blocs.

58. Basically, while his country had reservations about procedure and the issues suggested for negotiation, it wholeheartedly acknowledged the need to press ahead with the dialogue and its aspirations went beyond the agenda which had so far been contemplated. There was no need to hold a conference in order to renounce the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter or to develop trade. What was important was that it should be prepared in such a way as to facilitate the exchange of ideas and individuals and provide a basis for moving on from peaceful coexistence to interpenetration. To this end, the bilateral approach was the best solution, for it enabled all shades of opinion to be expressed. In this connection, he rejected the idea that the Warsaw Pact countries constituted a monolithic bloc in the full sense of the word. He added that for the bilateral approach to be successful, there would have to be a continuing exchange of information between member countries so that any opportunities which came to light during the bilateral contacts could be turned to good account.

59. On developments in the Mediterranean, which, he agreed, called for special vigilance on the part of the Alliance, he stressed that, from his experience of the Maghreb countries, it was important to refrain from any arrangement or move tending to accentuate rivalry between the two blocs in this area. The countries which had acceded to independence found it repugnant to be regarded as one of the stakes in the East-West confrontation and it was by striving to understand them that they could best be preserved from subjection.

60. In conclusion, he wished to comment upon the trends in United States policy in South-East Asia. Recalling that the French Government had recently expressed reservations about certain moves which had extended the war, he said that, in so doing, France had, in his view, served the basic cause of the Alliance. As regards the fear which was expressed in some quarters - understandably, he felt - that the United States might withdraw from Europe, he pointed out that even if the United States reduced its forces in Europe to the utmost limit compatible with its commitments, which he had no doubt would be fulfilled regardless of the circumstances, this would represent a saving of only \$1 billion, whereas the Vietnam war was costing 25 or 30 times this amount. From this comparison, it was clear where the West's real weakness lay and consequently what, in the long-term, was the real threat to Western credibility. Like several previous speakers, he was convinced that the war in South-East Asia could be brought to an end only by a negotiated solution, namely, the establishment of a demilitarised zone. In persistently suggesting ways and means of achieving this goal, France was convinced that it was assisting its Allies and serving the Alliance.

61. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) recalled that the Alliance had agreed that three conditions would have to be met before it could take a final decision on the proposal for a European security conference. It was by reference to these that he proposed to review political developments in the past six months. His findings were as follows:

- as regards preparations, no agreement had been reached on any of the proposals;
- although various talks had been started with the East European countries, it had not been possible to create a favourable political atmosphere for a conference;
- neither the bilateral contacts nor the bilateral or multilateral negotiations had yielded any proof that there were genuine prospects of resolving the basic issues relating to European security.

62. Considering the rate of progress so far, he even wondered whether the dangers entailed in the process of détente on which the Alliance had embarked did not outweigh the hopes this initiative was arousing. In this connection, he naturally endorsed the comments in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Secretary General's Political Appraisal regarding the motives of the Soviet Union and the danger that it might use the favourable reaction to a conference in Western public opinion to bring pressure to bear on governments. At the same time, he realised that the Alliance had certain tactical and political reasons for taking a more accommodating attitude. He therefore felt that a number of concrete issues should be suggested for exploratory talks with a view to gauging the chances of success. Should these talks fail, the negative attitude of the Communist bloc would be more clearly apparent to the world.

63. As regards the list of issues, he recalled that in December 1969 the Greek Delegation had suggested the preparation of a draft code of good conduct. He therefore supported the Warsaw Pact's proposal to this effect. He could also agree to the consideration of human relations, economic, technological and cultural co-operation, environmental problems and mutual balanced force reductions.

64. Recalling his Delegation's reservations on force reductions, he stressed that, in view of the geographical configuration of South-Eastern Europe and relative military strengths in this area, no system of force reductions - even if they were mutual and balanced - could be applied in this sector without compromising the minimum level of security Greece had attained at the cost of heavy sacrifices. As regards the possibility of force reductions in Central Europe, he feared that a step of this kind would enable the Warsaw Pact to increase its military pressure on other sectors. He pointed out that the Military Committee had drawn attention to this danger in its

report MCM-27-70, but that no solution had so far been put forward in the studies on these problems. This being so, and in view of the difficulties identified during the studies - which, moreover, were still under way - he was against initiating multilateral exploratory contacts until the Alliance was satisfied that it had a clear picture of all facets of the problem.

65. On the procedure for negotiations, he felt that the solution lay in bilateral exploratory contacts, for this was the best way of assessing the true intentions of each country, it being understood that these contacts would be co-ordinated by the Council. He was also inclined to favour a preparatory Standing Commission; this would be a flexible instrument enabling the negotiations to be broken off without undue publicity should they offer no prospects of success.

66. He went on to give an account of his Government's bilateral contacts with a number of Warsaw Pact countries during the past six months. Generally speaking, these had proved satisfactory. His Government had noted a greater desire for economic co-operation on the part of the Soviet Union and Rumania had seemed more willing to co-operate in various cultural, economic and political fields. Albania had shown some interest in renewing ties which had been severed since the Second World War. A trade agreement between the Athens and Tirana Chambers of Commerce had been signed a few months ago and a further agreement on bank payments had recently been concluded. However, the most noteworthy factor was perhaps the improvement of relations between Greece and Bulgaria which had hitherto been traditional enemies.

67. Reporting on the recent visit to Athens by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Bachev, he said that during their talks it had been noted that the 1964 agreements between the two countries were working well and that it would be to their mutual advantage to give early consideration to a number of problems relating to co-operation in various technical fields. Mr. Bachev had agreed that the principles the Greek Government had drawn up in 1968 for a code of good conduct to be adopted between the Balkan countries should henceforth be observed in dealings between Greece and Bulgaria. The two Ministers had also declared that, in their relations, they were willing to observe the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and of respect for each country's territorial integrity, on the understanding that the effort to improve their mutual relations would be made in the context of Greek membership of NATO and Bulgarian membership of the Warsaw Pact and that Greece, as a loyal partner in the Atlantic Alliance, would not enter into any commitment likely to prove incompatible with its strategic and political obligations towards the NATO countries or damaging to the interests of the other Balkan countries. Mr. Bachev had accepted these prior conditions in so far as his country was concerned.



68. As regards the reasons for the slight improvement in the Eastern bloc countries' attitude to Greece, he suggested that it might be a diplomatic manoeuvre designed to stir up trouble among the Western Allies at a time when the Greek Government was being harshly criticised in certain North European countries; alternatively, it might reflect a wish for wider contacts with free market countries after the present succession of disappointments which the East European countries were having to face in every field.

69. As regards the situation in the Mediterranean, he expressed the view that its political and military repercussions were equally serious and that, since the Soviet naval presence could not be eliminated, there was a need for a balance of forces which would restrict the amount of harm it could do to the interests of the Alliance. He thought that NATO's best hope of reversing the present trend was to take military measures aimed at strengthening its naval presence, enhancing its deterrent value and increasing its vigilance.

70. Turning to the situation in Cyprus, he said that in recent months, the Greek Government had done its best to contribute to the progress of the talks between the two communities, to keep in constant touch with the Turkish Government and to refrain from any action or statements likely to prejudice the relaxation of tension in Cyprus and in Greco-Turkish relations. He was convinced that these three principles of conduct should be permanently adopted by the two countries since it was clear from recent developments in Cyprus that the situation was still uncertain, and regrettable misunderstandings might arise in times of tension should there be a lack of contact between the two governments. In this connection, he wished to pay tribute to Mr. Çaglayangil for his tireless efforts and for the cool-headedness with which he had faced up to all the difficulties they had had to tackle together. He added that, in February and March, the Soviet Union had made two almost overt attempts to sow discord between Greece and Turkey and make capital out of the developments in Cyprus.

71. This led him to stress that there had been no change in the aims and strategy of the Communist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, whose apparent readiness to co-operate was perhaps due to domestic and external difficulties, or else to its wish to turn the anarchistic trends in the West to its own advantage. It was therefore essential that the keystones of the Alliance should continue to be cohesion, solidarity and readiness to defend itself. In this connection, he regretted certain comments on his country's Government which had been made during the discussion. He pointed out that the Council was not empowered to interfere in any State's domestic affairs and that the Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty could not be interpreted as making certain specific forms of democratic government mandatory. As regards the principles referred to in the Preamble, he felt that the principle of democracy could not be regarded as the only issue at stake, and that the Preamble

was just as much concerned with the well-being, security and political stability of the Parties to the Treaty and, above all, with their defence. Considering the dangers of the present world situation, it would seem to be hypocritical to talk about other principles than that of defence. On this point, he said that when it was a matter of facing up to a threat and making sacrifices for a common cause, Greece did not stand in need of any lessons, as it had proved in 1941 in defying Hitler's armies, despite the Allied Governments' inability to come to its assistance.

72. Mr. JÓNSSON (Iceland), after pointing out that member countries had been continuing their efforts to secure better relations with the Eastern European countries, referred to his recent visits to Bulgaria and Rumania. He believed that both these countries were keenly interested in a conference on European peace and security although their views on this question were not entirely identical. In particular, the Rumanians had emphasised the need for careful preparation and had stated that each nation should speak for itself.

73. Continuing, he indicated that his Government had hoped that the different efforts made by member Governments to improve East-West relations would have led to early negotiations on European security problems. However, he noted that no substantial progress had been achieved as a result of the various approaches undertaken by the Western countries. It would not, therefore, be opportune to hold a European security conference at the present time, although the Communiqué should indicate the Alliance's desire to continue its efforts to work towards a stable relationship in Europe. In this respect, the importance of the SALT talks was fully recognised.

74. After referring to the need for the Alliance to retain the initiative and to intensify its studies in connection with MBFR, he emphasised the importance of informing public opinion about the substantive and various work undertaken by NATO to prepare for fruitful negotiations with Eastern European countries.

75. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE, in reply to Ministers' statements on MBFR, said the Military Authorities shared the view that the study of mutual and balanced force reductions was one which vitally affected the security of the Alliance and which must continue, but from the military point of view, he emphasised that at this time nothing more than an exploration of this subject could be envisaged.

76. The models that had so far been produced were a first step, but they illustrated the complexities associated with developing models for MBFR in Central Europe. Their military risks had not yet been thoroughly assessed and this assessment, among other things, must be completed before a suitable basis for negotiation could be developed. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe had already begun analysing the risks of the

models thus far developed and it might be that a result of this analysis would be to modify approaches to the present models. Whilst recognising this possibility and the hope that a stable security balance might be found at some reduced level of forces on both sides, he could not emphasise too strongly the danger of premature action which might impose further difficulties on the security of NATO.

77. The CHAIRMAN commented that the exhaustive discussion which had taken place under this Item had succeeded in meeting two requirements which were of equal importance and not easy to combine: on the one hand it had allowed Ministers to comment on the general situation and on general problems, and, on the other, it had focussed their remarks on the precise question of East-West negotiations. This was a question which had actually to be solved and which would be translated into the wording of the Communiqué now under preparation.

78. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made in discussion and of the Chairman's conclusion.

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