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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the
Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on Tuesday,
15th December, 1964 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

President : H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak
Chairman and Secretary General : Mr. Manlio Brosio

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak : Vice-President of the Council,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
(President of the NATO
Council)
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke : Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Paul Martin : Secretary of State for
External Affairs
The Hon. Paul Hellyer : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff : Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen : Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux : Permanent Representative

NATO SECRET

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder : Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel : Federal Minister for Defence
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe : Permanent Representative

GREECE

H.E. Mr. S. Stephanopoulos : Vice-President of the Council and Minister for Economic Co-ordination
H.E. Mr. S. Costopoulos : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Garoufalias : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. C. Mitsotakis : Minister of Finance
H.E. Mr. Ch. X. Palamas : Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Pétur Thorsteinsson : Permanent Representative

ITALY

The Hon. Giuseppe Saragat : Minister for Foreign Affairs
The Hon. Giulio Andreotti : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini : Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. P. Werner : Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. A. Wehenkel : Minister for the National Economy and the Budget
H.E. Mr. M. Fischbach : Minister for the Armed Forces, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter : Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns : Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.J.S. de Jong : Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon : Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange : Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Georg Kristiansen : Permanent Representative

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PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. General Gomes de Araujo : Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Vasco da Cunha : Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin : Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Ilhami Sancar : Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. Ferit Melen : Minister of Finance
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi : Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt.Hon. P.C. Gordon Walker : Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs
The Rt.Hon. Denis Healey : Secretary of State for
Defence
H.E. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh : Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk : Secretary of State
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara : Secretary of Defense
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter : Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. J.A. Roberts : Deputy Secretary General
Mr. F.D. Gregh : Deputy Secretary General,
Assistant Secretary General
for Economics and Finance
Mr. R.W.J. Hooper : Assistant Secretary General
for Political Affairs
Mr. Johnson Garrett : Assistant Secretary General
for Production, Logistics
and Infrastructure
Dr. John L. McLucas : Assistant Secretary General
for Scientific Affairs
The Lord Coleridge : Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

It.Gen. C.P. de Cumont : Chairman, Military Committee
General Sir Michael West : Chairman, Standing Group
General L.L. Lemnitzer : Supreme Allied Commander
Europe
Admiral Harold P. Smith : Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic
Admiral Sir Wilfrid J.W. Woods : Allied Commander-in-Chief
Channel
Major General W.W. Stromberg : Standing Group Representative

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1. Mr. COSTOPOULOS (Greece) said that, in general, his Government shared the views of the previous speakers on the great problems of the hour. His own country's opinion on the scope and implications of the latest international developments was based on an analysis of the situation as it appeared, firstly, on the side of the possible antagonist, and, secondly, within the Atlantic Alliance, and on a comparison between these two aspects of the same problem.

2. With regard to the possible antagonist, the main facts were as follows. First of all, there was the continuation by Moscow of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev and of the policy of peaceful coexistence. It might be wondered, however, whether those continuing this policy could be regarded as valid interlocutors and whether some new dictator was not getting ready to take over power. Meanwhile, the West faced a situation which was both more fluid and richer in unforeseen factors. However, certain signs were already apparent: for example, greater flexibility towards Peking in the hope of preserving at least the appearance of unity in international Communism; conversely, some hardening with regard to the West, noticeable in the latest Moscow statement on Viet Nam and in the allegedly spontaneous anti-United States demonstrations by African students in Moscow over the Congo. Greece was particularly interested in a third phenomenon which it believed was especially important, namely the praise which, for the first time in many years, Moscow had given Tirana in place of the customary abuse. If a political change were to follow on the heels of this modification in tone, such an event would deserve very careful attention.

3. On the subject of the Chinese atomic bomb, Greece felt that its importance should not be minimised nor should its practical development be assumed to be too far off. Very soon it would probably be necessary to reckon with a Chinese Communist régime which had not yet come of age, but whose potential in human terms exceeded by far that of any other country in the world.

4. The satellite countries were practising a wait-and-see policy. While Yugoslav revisionism remained a potential target for any Soviet reappraisal, Tito's régime was facing up to anything the future might bring with courage and determination. As before, Bulgaria would follow slavishly all instructions emanating from Moscow. Albania was openly parading its joy and its hope of achieving a reconciliation with Moscow whilst strengthening its ties with Peking.

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5. For the Free World, the balance was therefore a negative one and the threat more serious. More than ever before, the Alliance needed to have a shield and display its unshakable solidarity. At this very time, however, it was going through a difficult period which, nevertheless, Greece refused to regard as a real crisis. What the international press was fond of calling a crisis really amounted to difficulties of adjustment. Today, as yesterday, NATO fulfilled an essential need and remained the effective means of defence against the threat from the East. While everyone was agreed on the objective, it was understandable, and even normal, that difficulties should occur as to method, strategy or policy.

6. The problems facing the Alliance were changing rapidly and confronting it with fresh situations which called for an effort of adjustment. Thus far, the Alliance had been able to furnish the necessary effort of adjustment to changing problems.

7. The field of action was widening and the Atlantic Alliance must therefore strengthen the solidity of its structure. In that respect, despite certain press reports, difficulties were neither fundamental nor insurmountable. In the face of the need to share the responsibility for atomic defence it was normal for countries to put forward several proposals. This variety of projects should be studied with the aim of arriving at acceptable solutions. As an example, the setting up of a national nuclear force appeared, at first sight, to be quite a different formula from that of the multilateral force. Yet, the nuclear strength of the Alliance was nothing more than the sum of the national forces, as far as they existed, and as far as they were allocated to the common defence. With regard to the MLF, this represented an attempt to share nuclear responsibility among those member countries which did not desire, or were unable to have, a national nuclear armoury.

8. The solution to the nuclear defence problem would set the pattern for the further development of the defence capability of the Alliance. The current study of NATO forces and the resources needed to finance them for the period 1965-70 was being carried out at present in the absence of an agreement on the strategic doctrine applicable to that period. Such an agreement would be much more easily reached following an agreement on nuclear problems.

9. In conclusion, he emphasised that the external and internal difficulties which currently beset the Alliance called for more extensive co-operation and increased solidarity. Any progress achieved in that respect following the present meeting would constitute a victory over routine. In any case, the Alliance owed it to itself today to make a strong declaration of its members' solidarity and of their determination to continue working together for security, peace and progress.

10. He concluded by associating himself with Mr. Martin's highly reasonable and useful proposal for a study by Permanent Representatives of the commonly accepted purposes of the Alliance. ✓

11. Mr. LANGE (Norway), opening his statement by a brief comment on East-West relations, said he had nothing to add to the previous speakers' analyses of Khrushchev's deposition. Personal first-hand observation of the man had led him to understand how it had come about.

12. The declaration and behaviour of the new Soviet leaders indicated that the main lines of their policy towards the West would remain unchanged. Although the Sino-Soviet conflict was too deeply rooted in ideological beliefs and differing national interests to be completely eliminated, it might be attenuated at least in form. In the Soviet Union there would probably be attempts to reduce military expenditure in reply to the needs of an expanding industrial economy. Satellite countries would, within the limits of security, be permitted to develop the capacity to assert their own national interests. Unforeseen changes could occur and the West must continue to exercise prudence, but with this reservation, it should accept the Soviet's stated intentions of a continued policy of peaceful coexistence. In line with this reasoning, the Norwegian Prime Minister had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow in the Spring.

13. Mr. Lange said there was little hope of an early solution to the problem of disarmament. Nations would probably continue to pay lip service to the idea of general and complete disarmament without having much hope for material progress. However, every possibility of progress through collateral measures must be explored. The psychological effect of the first step, however modest, towards the limitation of arms should not be underestimated. In this context the Norwegian Government was interested in the possibilities of regional disarmament, particularly in Central Europe. With respect to nuclear weapons, the greatest danger was not the possession of such weapons by the five great powers, but their dissemination, and the time to prevent further dissemination would soon run out. He agreed with Mr. Martin that a serious effort must be made at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly to seek commitments from all non-nuclear nations against the acquisition or production of nuclear arms. Moreover, such commitments must not be contingent upon advance agreement on the setting up of universal control machinery which would be time-consuming and complex.

14. Norway felt it was satisfactorily protected by the United States deterrent and hoped, for the reasons proposed by Mr. Spaak, that this situation would continue. However, the fact remained behind the proposal for a multilateral force that there was no proper balance in responsibility and influence between the United States and the other countries of the Alliance. Mr. Lange appreciated the United States effort to meet European desires in this matter while on the other hand he attached great importance to the assurances that the United States had no intention of giving up ultimate control. Any other decision would lead to dissemination, would affect the status of the Alliance vis-a-vis the East and would have a grave effect on the uncommitted world. The MLF plan seemed artificial and unnecessarily complicated and its effect had been contrary to its original purpose of unification. For the time being, security was assured by interallied agreements; eventually, less controversial ideas for an equal share of responsibility and influence would develop. Until then new proposals, such as those circulated by the United Kingdom Delegation, should be heard with an open mind.

15. Referring to the German situation, Mr. Lange associated himself with the Canadian statement welcoming the flexible attitude of the Federal Republic confirmed by Mr. Schröder. There was no change in the fundamental Soviet attitude but there were signs of amelioration in the Soviet Zone and, in the interests of the Federal Republic and the Alliance, this trend must be encouraged by all the means outlined by Mr. Schröder.

16. A proposal for more frequent Ministerial or Deputy Ministerial meetings had been reported in the press, Mr. Lange said, but he personally felt more frequent Ministerial participation in meetings of the Permanent Council was preferable. No steps must be undertaken which lessened the importance of the Permanent Council. Referring to the widespread misunderstanding that the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty and Treaty Organization would be terminated in 1969, he suggested it might be useful for the Secretary General to find occasion to clear up this misunderstanding publicly. In conclusion, he reminded Ministers of the possibilities of reviewal of the Treaty set out in Article 12 and said that an examination of the fundamentals of the Alliance, as proposed by Canada, was eminently worthwhile, as long as information on such work was withheld from the public until the likelihood of a positive conclusion was certain.

17. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) considered that the fall of Mr. Khrushchev was not likely to entail any modification of Soviet foreign policy with respect to the West, although sudden change in Soviet leadership was always liable to destroy the stability of international relations in view of Soviet military and political potential. The Chinese nuclear explosion presented greater short-term and long-term concern because it might stimulate aggressiveness in Chinese policies. Although Chinese nuclear capability did not yet constitute a direct threat to the West, it might soon affect the balance of power in South-East Asia. The sole conclusion to be drawn by the West from these two events was the necessity to maintain vigilance and readiness to defend its liberty. He went on to associate himself with previous speakers regarding the problem of German reunification and Berlin, which was one of the main causes of existing world tension preventing a real detente in Europe.

18. Prevention of war was the main purpose of the Alliance and it was imperative to maintain and, where necessary, reinforce the Western deterrent in face of the Communist threat. The problem currently confronting the Alliance was that nuclear capability was possessed by only a few of the Allies, in differing quality and quantity; but the Netherlands, which only contributed to the conventional part of the deterrent, was confident that these Allies would neither endanger world peace unnecessarily nor abandon their Allies in the event of Soviet aggression. For this reason, the Netherlands had to date felt no inclination to have a voice in the use of nuclear weapons. It recognised, however, the different position of other countries and was currently participating in studies to reach a solution to the paramount problem of nuclear responsibility. The Netherlands was of the view that co-operation and integration in the nuclear field was more of political than military importance. It would also be ready to examine any other proposal leading to rapid solution of the problem, provided it did not involve any difference in the influence of the nuclear or the non-nuclear Allies on the overall policy of the Alliance, which was incompatible with an alliance of free nations. Any solution must be based on the maintenance of Western unity and of the deterrent against Communism, which could not be effected by any one of the Allies singly.

19. At the same time, it was neither necessary nor realistic that all actions should be carried out in common by all the Allies, and a limited number of countries with similar interests could continue to undertake certain projects in co-operation. As regards the question of determining which countries should have a voice in nuclear matters, it should similarly be possible for a number of Allies to co-operate more closely within the framework of the Alliance, provided this was in accordance with the principles of the Treaty and strengthened the Alliance.

20. Both NATO, and the principle of transatlantic co-operation, would continue to be the basis of Netherlands policy. He considered that more frequent meetings of the Council at Ministerial level would enable discussion of problems affecting areas within and without the Alliance and would promote close contact between national governments in the rapidly developing modern world. The future would demand closer Atlantic co-operation and action by the Allies would be stronger and more united in purpose if a foundation had been laid of Atlantic integration. He recalled that Article 3 of the Treaty provided for the organization of Western defence in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, which included fundamental values on whose preservation depended the survival of the Western world.

21. In the discussions of the Council, highest priority should continue to be given to strengthening Atlantic unity, to which end allied policies should constantly be adjusted. This did not necessitate an alteration of the present basic structure of the Alliance, which resulted from carefully considered decisions taken in the belief that commonly accepted objectives would thus be more easily attainable, while a constant adaptation to any additional tasks assumed or to any modification of its objectives would be beneficial. He suggested that any proposals concerning the adaptation of the Alliance in the military or political sphere should be advanced without delay. The Netherlands envisaged the future basic objectives of the Alliance to include closer co-operation, but not any change in the nature of this co-operation which entailed the radical reorganization of NATO's structure. Progress in the constant evolving of allied co-operation depended on mutual consultation, planning and willingness to reach agreement, which objectives the Netherlands Government would continue to promote.

22. Mr. RUSK (United States), having conveyed to the Council the greetings of President Johnson, said that the result of the recent United States Presidential election had confirmed the statements made by President Johnson at Georgetown University. He emphasised the loyalty of the United States as a fully committed member of the Alliance and he appreciated the expressions by previous speakers of full confidence in this commitment. However, he stressed the grave consequences of any belief, particularly of the Soviet Union, that one member of the Alliance would not accept a nuclear exchange in order to defend another member; such a possibility should have no place in an Alliance, one of whose major purposes was deterrence.

23. The United States would support any effort to improve consultations in NATO prior to the formulation of definite national policy decisions. The large attendance at and publicity given to Ministerial meetings necessarily limited the possibility of frank consultation; but the holding of more frequent meetings between members of national governments, and attendance by Ministers at meetings of the Permanent Council, as circumstances demanded, would enable discussion of matters of common interest at an early stage and establishment of the basis of a more common policy approach in the Alliance. He went on to inform the Council that the Prime Minister of Malta had recently expressed to him the hope that Malta could be admitted as a member of NATO and he suggested that the Council in Permanent Session might discuss this issue further.

24. On the question of the nuclear forces of the Alliance, he considered it reasonable that some detailed aspects of the broad issues previously exposed to the Council should be under discussion by interested governments in view of the new philosophy advanced by a freshly appointed member government. He recalled that proposals had first been submitted by the United States in December 1960 as a result of existing dissatisfaction with the status quo of the Alliance in the nuclear field, based both on a desire for more knowledge and experience in nuclear questions and on oft-repeated doubts concerning the intentions of the United States in a crisis and its involvement with the forces of Europe. He felt that nations entered the nuclear field as a result either of possessing nuclear weapons or of being on the "receiving end" of nuclear weapons situated within range of their territory. During United States consultations regarding allied participation in nuclear questions, although some countries had indicated a preference for preserving the status quo, no direct and specific opposition to this concept had been expressed in the Council at Ministerial level during three and a half years of discussion. He felt that the 200 megatons which constituted the proposed nuclear force could not be disregarded as an insignificant military force of the Alliance, but would enable heads of governments, not in direct contact with nuclear problems, to think operationally and realistically about the significance of nuclear war.

25. With regard to the question of East-West relations, he stressed the need for caution in assessing any reduction in tension, which, as had been stated by Mr. Schröder and Mr. Luns, was necessarily related to the strength, unity and determination of the Alliance. In order to consolidate the period of relative easing of tension since the Berlin and Cuba crises, it was necessary to develop the spirit of détente and to seek additional points of agreement with the Soviet Union, but without demobilising forces or destroying Western unity in the face of Eastern threats.

26. Recent talks which Mr. Gromyko had held with President Johnson and with himself had created the impression that no significant changes in Soviet policy had resulted from the fall of Khrushchev. Mr. Gromyko had emphasised that the Soviet Union was committed to a policy of peaceful coexistence and sought an improvement in relations with the United States, as well as agreements on outstanding bilateral and international questions. The eleven partial measures mentioned by Mr. Gromyko at the United Nations had been explored with him and although no significant change could be reported, the United States would continue to examine these points. The Soviet Union had not expressed any interest in Western proposals for technical discussions on national defence budgets or on the possibility of seismic detection of underground nuclear testing. As regards the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, Mr. Gromyko had expressed the view that the establishment of any agreement was necessarily impeded by Western discussions on the Multilateral Nuclear Force, but the United States felt that if the position of the Soviet Union depended on the issue of non-dissemination, the provision of fuller information to the Soviet Union might encourage a different attitude. Mr. Gromyko, however, had also expressed more profound opposition to NATO and to the arming of NATO in any way. Although encouraged by the refusal thus far of India and Japan to enter the nuclear field, Mr. Rusk warned that if Communist China continued to construct nuclear weapons, neighbouring countries, militarily menaced by China, would link the problem of non-dissemination with that of the organization of their own security.

27. On the question of Berlin, Mr. Gromyko had enquired regarding Western views on the expediency of resuming discussion broken off two years previously on the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, and had indicated that the possibility could not be excluded that some new elements might enter such a discussion; he felt that Mr. Gromyko might consider an arrangement whereby the problems of troops and access to Berlin were linked. However, it did not seem that Moscow envisaged any permanent settlement of the German question which might lead to far-reaching disarmament measures and organized stability in Central Europe, and he felt that the West should confirm to the German people the opportuneness of a permanent settlement in Europe which could reduce the current heavy burden of armaments.

28. The United States would further consider the possibility of developing commercial relations between the United States and Eastern Europe. The manifest desires of the smaller East European countries to improve their relations with the West, to increase their independence from Soviet control and to adopt pragmatic attitudes in matters of national interest to them and moderation within their own societies should be encouraged as being in the interests of

the West. In this respect, he welcomed the improving relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and some Eastern European countries and considered that the West could take some satisfaction from developments in Eastern Europe over the previous two years and from the fact that the fall of Khrushchev had indicated lack of confidence in the achievements of the Soviet system.

29. Some recent events in Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, British Guiana and Cuba were also a source of encouragement for the West and indicated that Latin America was beginning to settle some of its political problems by itself and that the large economic expenditure of the Alliance for Progress was making some impact in Latin America. In this connection, the extensive visit by the French President had been very fruitful and had recalled the historical, cultural and economic links between Europe and Latin America.

30. The United States was greatly concerned with recent developments in Africa and especially with the tendency of some African countries to facilitate the intrusion of extra-continental elements, especially Soviet and Chinese, which threatened the possibility of stability in Africa. He hoped that the stake of NATO countries in Africa might be the subject of early consultation in the Council in Permanent Session or through Government representatives.

31. In the Far East, despite the political agreements of 1954 and 1962 governing South-East Asia, North Viet Nam was conducting systematic subversion, infiltration and military pressures against Laos and South Viet Nam, and President Soekarno, thus far on a lesser scale, was applying pressure on Malaysia. Yet if Hanoi, supported by Peking, were to leave Laos and South Viet Nam unmolested, the United States forces would leave South Viet Nam; if the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos were meticulously respected and South Viet Nam was free from external penetration to organize its own national life, the United States would have achieved the sole objectives of its policy. Yet infiltration into South Viet Nam was increasing and being drawn from the regular forces of North Viet Nam, and Saigon was experiencing serious problems regarding the organization of effective government supported by the principle sections of the population. The United States would make every effort to prevent individual disunity and group rivalry in Saigon in order to promote a unified resistance to external threats and infiltration from the North. The United States hoped that the Western Allies would inform Communist China of their dissatisfaction with events in South-East Asia, express to Saigon full support of the efforts of South Viet Nam to secure its territory, and ensure that the presence in South Viet Nam of numerous personnel from different

countries would act as a political signal of support to South Viet Nam and of opposition to North Viet Nam and Communist China. Unless the latter modified their present policy, the United States foresaw the development of grave events in South-East Asia.

32. The United States which took great interest in the security of Malaysia had made clear to the Indonesian Government the United States treaty commitments towards Australia and New Zealand in the event of their forces being attacked in the Malaysian region and hoped that a modification of President Soekarno's policy would prevent further deterioration of the situation.

33. Mr. NOGUEIRA (Portugal) felt it his duty, in view of the special responsibilities of his country, to draw the Council's attention once again to the problems of Africa. Realities, in that continent, had proved to be stronger than wishes and slogans, and these realities had emerged in all their harshness; this was clearly apparent from the report on the situation in Africa which the Group of Experts had prepared for the Council. There could be no doubt that the Communist countries had decided to step up their activities on the African continent in order to try to dominate it. Furthermore, whatever their differences, Russians and Chinese were working actively hand in hand in Africa; the neutralist and non-aligned African countries were siding with the Communist bloc on world issues. The situation was becoming particularly serious in North Africa and in other countries (Ghana, Tanganyika, the Sudan, Mali, Kenya, Guinea, Uganda and the Congo-Brazzaville) where the leaders now scarcely concealed the predominantly Communist nature of their régimes.

34. The recent events in the Congo (Leopoldville) showed that it was not by sheer chance that that country was being subjected to Communist subversion: by virtue of its resources, its vastness, its geographical situation, it was the key to the whole of Africa, the gateway to the continent south of the Sahara. Like Brazil in Latin America, the Congo pointed the way in Black Africa. The extremist African countries, and, in fact, the whole Organization of African Unity had elaborated a most dangerous theory, claiming the right to intervene in the affairs of independent and sovereign African states, whose institutions and policies did not suit them. Since the Organization of African Unity was dominated by radicals, no government, no policy which was not or did not become extremist would be acceptable to it. It even objected to individuals, which explained its hostility to the present Congolese Government and its efforts to jeopardise its stability. A number of Arab countries seemed to be interested in increasing the confusion and in maintaining the chaos in the Congo because they feared the coming about of a united Black Africa. Unless adequate measures - measures which would inevitably be unpopular among the African radicals - were taken, the present situation would continue to deteriorate during the next ten or twenty years.

35. Portugal had welcomed the rescue operation launched in Stanleyville by Belgium and the United States; it considered the operation fully justified on legal, political and humanitarian grounds. He wished to extend his thanks to Belgium and the United States, whose troops and transport aircraft had made it possible to evacuate more than a hundred Portuguese citizens. He wished to stress in this connection that, for the first time in modern history, hostages had been held for purely political reasons. He believed that the international community could not allow such a trend to take root; for this reason alone the rescue operation was fully justified. He pointed out, that apart from the white victims, thousands of Congolese who had had some education or who were suspected of leanings towards the West had been and were still being massacred by the rebels, without the African and Communist Delegations in the United Nations showing any concern. From this it could be concluded that the rebellion was not only anti-Western, but also anti-white, a point Mr. Spaak had very effectively made in his speech before the Security Council.

36. While the situation in the Portuguese overseas territories was stable the border in the North of Angola had to be guarded against infiltration from the Congo (Leopoldville); consequently it was keenly hoped that order would be restored and a responsible government established in that country. As regards Mozambique and East Africa, alarmist rumours about war-like actions had recently been disseminated by different African states, particularly Tanganyika; in fact, all that had happened was that five small armed groups had entered Mozambique but had soon been caught by the security forces.

37. He stressed the importance for the security of the Western world of the African continent where the present conditions would probably continue for some long time. He suggested that the Council examine the problem in depth and endeavour to find a solution by means of a real exchange of views which would highlight the different options. They should do this unemotionally and on the basis of constructive ideas which might be submitted to the Council by the governments who bore major responsibilities in that part of the world.

38. Mr. GORDON WALKER (United Kingdom) began by extending an invitation to the Council to hold its next Spring meeting in London.

39. He agreed with previous speakers that on all essentials and particularly in the field of coexistence, no real change in Soviet policy was to be anticipated. Mr. Khrushchev had, it was true, led Russia away from the Lenin doctrine of the inevitability of war, although he had preserved that of the justification of wars of liberation. The latter was evidenced by the recent Soviet aid to the Congolese rebels.

40. While the disappearance of the colourful personality of Mr. Khrushchev might perhaps be regretted, he had undoubtedly exposed the world to serious dangers and alarms. The new Soviet leadership might be expected to pursue the permanent national interests of the Soviet Union in a colder but no less calculating fashion.

41. The dismissal of Khrushchev had, he felt, weakened the Soviet Union while a solution of the deep-rooted Sino-Soviet dispute was not in sight. A further notable disruptive influence was provided by certain of the East-European nations' reactions to the fall of Khrushchev. These demonstrations of independence offered the West an opportunity to establish new relations with these countries in various fields on the lines already followed by France and Germany. In this process, however, certain governing conditions should be observed:

- (a) it should be borne in mind that the traditions, history and culture of Europe were shared by these countries;
- (b) these countries still looked for leadership and security to the Soviet Union; thus, any attempt to wean them away from the Warsaw Pact or to use these contacts for political or military aims would defeat the main purpose.

42. The Communist camp was no longer a monolithic bloc, partly owing to the activity of NATO, whose primary objective had in large measure been achieved; nonetheless, the Alliance remained more necessary than ever and could count upon the solid and unquestioning loyalty of the United Kingdom Government.

43. The most notable development since 1949 lay in the creation of a nuclear balance between East and West, whose stability was, however, dependent upon the existence of mutual confidence between Allies in respect to their use of - or responsibility for - nuclear weapons. Thus, a major war in Europe now appeared unthinkable - on condition, of course, that the nuclear and conventional balance was maintained. However, the extent to which weapons were retained must depend upon one's estimate of the probability of a war. And, like all nations on both sides, the United Kingdom Government was increasingly realising the need to adapt its defence expenditures to the economic resources of the country.

44. In view of the world-wide nature of the Communist threat and of the present shifting of Communist pressures to other areas of the world, he agreed with Mr. Schröder's recommendation that the Alliance should give collective consideration to the need to provide defence in other parts of the world than Western Europe.

45. As the Council was aware, the United Kingdom Government had recently been considering the future of nuclear arrangements within NATO. Its thoughts in this connection had been guided by the following basic requirements:

- (a) the need to achieve more widespread participation in nuclear planning;
- (b) the need to arrest the dissemination of nuclear weapons;
- (c) the urgency of associating the non-nuclear powers of the Alliance with the collective nuclear defence of its members, while at the same time preventing any new national nuclear forces from arising.

46. Recommending that careful consideration should be given to his Government's tentative proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, Mr. Gordon Walker stressed that the United Kingdom was prepared to commit the whole of its nuclear weapons to such a force for the duration of the Alliance; this, he felt, was essential if the nuclear and non-nuclear powers of Western Europe were to be placed on an equal footing.

47. Contrary to certain reports, the United Kingdom was not against the principle of mixed manning; it had, however, reserved its position with respect to whether the force should take the form of a surface fleet.

48. Mr. Gordon Walker opposed Mr. Spaak's proposal for a nuclear directory on the grounds that an Atlantic Nuclear Force should not only be controlled but should also be owned by a central authority. It was primarily on this authority that the nuclear and non-nuclear powers participating in the force would be absolutely, juridically and in fact equal one with another.

49. In order to avoid the real or apparent dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom was also particularly anxious that the United States and other vetoes upon the use of the force should be maintained for the duration of the Alliance. Also, with a view to achieving a now essential measure of integration and sharing in the control of nuclear weapons, and in nuclear strategic planning, the Atlantic Nuclear Force should be targetted and generally planned together with the United States nuclear forces.

50. Rejecting any suggestion that the North Atlantic Treaty was due to be reviewed or renewed in 1969, Mr. Gordon Walker said that that date merely opened to any member the right to withdraw with twelve months' notice - an eventuality which, he was sure, would not arise. The United Kingdom stood firmly by the joint declaration of the Nine Power Conference of 1954 that the North Atlantic Treaty would be regarded as being of indefinite duration.

51. He largely agreed with the points made by Mr. Lange on the question of disarmament and arms control. The possible lack of confidence of the new Soviet leadership might well temporarily hinder advances in this field; this same lack of confidence might however cause the initiative to pass to the West, which must therefore be ready for sensible initiatives.

52. The United Kingdom hoped that efforts could be made to secure a full Test Ban Treaty; to this end, a good deal of scientific information would be required as to the number of on-site inspections which would be necessary in the light of technical advances. He also continued to believe that the Alliance should go on pressing in various quarters for a non-dissemination and non-acquisition agreement.

53. His country was well aware of the various arguments which had been advanced against the creation of observation posts in Central Europe, and would never advance any specific proposal in this respect without first consulting its Allies; nor would it put forward any suggestion which would perpetuate the division of Germany and Europe. Nonetheless, it attached great importance to this project, and even more so to the trial of some form of inspection which might result in the development of mutual confidence in the methods of inspection. Only if such confidence was achieved could there be any real advance towards disarmament in Europe.

54. Nor should the possibility be ignored of some disarmament by mutual example, although progress in this respect would probably be dependent upon an East-West agreement on the comparability of military budgets, on which subject proposals might usefully be put forward by the West.

55. Mr. Gordon Walker added that the impressions which he had gathered from his Washington talks with Mr. Gromyko were entirely consistent with those reported by Mr. Rusk. His general impression was that while the Soviet Union was not at present prepared for initiatives, it would also take great care not to lessen the détente.

56. In conclusion, he said that disarmament and relaxation would release enormous energies and resources in both East and West, and that the final objective of the Alliance was clearly to secure a general relaxation in the world, an important element of which would of course be provided by German reunification. He looked forward to the day when the problems of defence would no longer be to the fore, and proper attention could at last be given to meeting the social challenges in the West and combatting the problem of hunger among the great majority of the human race.

57. Mr. HÆKKERUP (Denmark) said that while his talks with Mr. Gromyko in New York had given him the same impression as that described by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gordon Walker, a long discussion with Mr. Rapacki had confirmed his belief that the tendency of the Eastern European countries towards a greater independence from Moscow was just as marked as before the fall of Khrushchev. Western policy should encourage this development without overestimating possible achievements, because however much the Eastern European countries longed for a greater measure of independence, they remained, and would remain, faithful to the same basic Communist philosophy as Moscow.

58. Denmark greatly appreciated the efforts by the German Government to pursue a more flexible policy towards Eastern Europe and the Communist world generally, and was prepared to support Germany as far as possible. Such a course would probably contribute to the easing of tension between Western powers and Eastern European nations, although not so much with the Soviet Union itself.

59. Turning to Africa, he said that Denmark fully appreciated the difficult decision Belgium had been forced to take in the Congo. Discussions at that General Assembly meeting had revealed the extent to which tension between black and white races had increased in the past year, and if Western nations did not wish to lose ground in Africa, it was important for them to frame their policy in the light of recent developments.

60. Speaking as the representative of a nation which was on the "receiving end" of nuclear weapons without any means to reply, he said that Denmark had full confidence in the United States and was satisfied with the present arrangements on nuclear weapons in NATO. He stressed that his Government did not wish to see any change in the present arrangements nor did it intend to change its own atomic policy. Nevertheless Denmark was prepared to participate with an open mind in any discussions on nuclear strategy. With such discussions it was imperative to find a solution which would unite and not divide its members. A way should also be found to decrease and not to increase the tensions in East-West relations, and in this respect it should be borne in mind that plans for a multilateral force inspired genuine fear in the Eastern European countries; and that might also apply to the British version.

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61. With respect to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, care should be taken not to diminish the powers of the NATO Council even if changes to the present structure of NATO proved to be necessary. This did not mean that Denmark did not accept that the atomic powers themselves, whether working together as a directory or in some other form of partnership, had the right to make the final decision when the critical moment arose.

62. Mr. COUVE de MURVILLE (France) said that he had nothing to add to the statements which had been made regarding the situation in Eastern Europe and the developments in the Soviet Union.

63. He associated himself with the views advanced concerning peace and the absence of any immediate and serious threat, and said that this situation was obviously due to the nuclear balance existing between the United States and the Soviet Union. This state of affairs had already been apparent at the time of the Berlin emergency and had become even more concrete during the Cuban crisis when the effectiveness of the atomic deterrent had been put to the test. He added that France considered it necessary to draw the relevant conclusions from this situation as regards the definition of a common strategy and to recognise that a threat of immediate nuclear retaliation represented the only really effective deterrent.

64. Such being the general world situation, he felt that there were no proper grounds for speaking of a crisis within the Atlantic Alliance, but rather of an evolution in which it was perfectly normal that supporters of the status quo should come into conflict with the advocates of change, and that this conflict should focus on the essential problem viz nuclear defence. It was natural in view of the special character of these problems which had been under discussion for years within the Alliance that no solution had as yet been reached. He emphasised that, given the tremendous power of destruction and the extraordinary responsibility it represented, nuclear weapons could not be handed over and their use could not be delegated. In his opinion, this was why there could be no NATO nuclear force and why the discussion of nuclear issues had centred for so long on the national deterrent of the United States, with the latter's partners wishing to know how they could have a say in planning and in the decision to use the United States weapons. This was how the question had been discussed by Ministers at Ottawa and, quite naturally, a solution had not been found. Since then the attention had been focussed on the new concept in the discussions of which France did not participate. It seemed difficult to have a clear understanding of the objectives of the new concept. Those which were indicated were incompatible: to give certain rights to those who did not possess nuclear weapons was in contradiction to the objective of non-dissemination.

65. If the project in question materialised, it would become necessary to examine its repercussions on the Alliance itself, and on the problem of the reunification of Germany. Although he underlined that these implications could be serious and even grave, he thought that there was no need at the moment to dramatise the situation and that, since current trends in the international situation gave no cause to fear a threat in the immediate or near future there should be time for reflection and appraisal.

66. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said that these basic questions of the Alliance had now been raised for the first time in a multilateral discussion held at Ministerial level and that, in his opinion, it would be a serious mistake to consider the debate as closed. Leading countries of the Alliance, such as France and Canada in particular, were not taking part in the work of the committees studying the project for an Atlantic multilateral force and might one day be faced with a fait accompli. He was also doubtful whether the comments made in the present meeting would be fully examined before those concerned had agreed on the Multilateral Force. In view of the vital importance for the future of the Alliance of the problems which had been raised, he thought it would be very unwise to settle them unless the Council as a whole had been able to resume the discussion, weigh up certain arguments and endeavour to find an answer to them. For this reason, he proposed that the discussion on the Multilateral Force be resumed by the Council in Permanent Session and that, if necessary, a last exchange of views should be held at Ministerial level before final decisions were taken.

67. He also held the view that Africa raised a serious problem at the present time which might lead to situations in which war or complete retreat were the only solutions, and that a special meeting of the Council in Permanent Session should be held early in January to carry out a detailed study in which Ministers really concerned with the African problem could co-operate.

68. The CHAIRMAN said that, after the very full exchange of views which had just taken place, the discussion could be regarded as temporarily suspended, but not closed. It was extremely important to decide how these preliminary exchanges of views could be followed up; also how the Council in Permanent Session could continue to examine the different problems referred to in connection with the nuclear issues.

69. Mr. RUSK (United States) said that though he had not expected the question of the MLE to be raised at the present meeting, he agreed that it was a matter of interest to all members of the Alliance. The nuclear forces of the

Alliance were central to its purpose. There had been great difficulties in obtaining normal consultation on this point within the Alliance. He did not know whether or not unanimous agreement would ever be reached, but discussion was desirable and he was willing to talk informally with Ministers during the present meeting.

70. Summarising the discussion, the CHAIRMAN felt that there had been an exhaustive discussion on the question of East-West relations revealing a general and substantial agreement on the assessment of the situation, which was rendered uncertain by the fall of Mr. Khrushchev and by the Chinese nuclear bomb. While it raised some hope it also called for great caution. He agreed with Mr. Rusk that two years of relative easing of tension were not a course of history, and with other speakers that the changes in the Soviet régime had been so sudden and so unforeseen that other changes, either in the régime or in policies might be expected in the future. Therefore, and this seemed to be the general feeling, an attitude of fairly confident caution should be adopted for the future.

71. The Council also seemed to agree in recognising the situation frequently referred to as the crisis of the Alliance and had confirmed that the unity and solidarity of NATO which had ensured peace throughout the fifteen years of its existence should continue. At the same time, the need was generally felt to continue to improve relations between East and West, including relations with the Eastern European countries, as distinct from the Soviet Union. Relations with the developing countries were also important, as forming part of the general pattern of the East-West struggle.

72. The Chairman thought that Ministers were also agreed on the necessity for disarmament, as well as on the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. He had noted with great interest Mr. Rusk's warning about the difficulties of non-dissemination, with special reference to the possible position of such countries as India and Japan, should the Chinese armament really become a positive and effective threat to them.

73. He had also noted statements about relations with Communist China. Some Allies were continually preoccupied with the situation of China and her relations with the West, as had already been demonstrated in the meeting of the Council mentioned earlier by President Spaak, in which Mr. Cattani, Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Spaak had taken part.

74. The question of Africa had also been raised and reviewed from different standpoints by Mr. Spaak and Mr. Nogueira, who both agreed on the necessity and the benefit of the parachute operation conducted in the Congo, for humanitarian and perhaps too for political reasons. The Chairman agreed with Mr. Spaak that it might be useful to have further discussions on this important subject.

75. Concluding his summary of the review of the East-West situation, the Chairman referred to the special problem of Berlin and Germany. Mr. Schröder had been supported in his remarks by several speakers, and the Chairman himself agreed wholeheartedly with Mr. Luns that the solution of this problem was essential to the achievement of a real détente in Europe.

76. The problem of the state of the Alliance had also been the subject of a useful and fruitful discussion. It had been suggested that consultation could be improved by more frequent meetings of members of governments, perhaps at the level of deputy Ministers: and a further suggestion was that certain Ministers might more often attend normal meetings of the Council in Permanent Session when a problem of particular importance was under discussion. This would not make the administrative machine more cumbersome, nor would it add an unnecessary burden to the obligations of Ministers and deputy Ministers, but it might give the Council more prestige, without diminishing in any way the rank and authority of the Permanent Representatives or of the Council itself.

77. Another proposal which seemed to have a consensus of opinion behind it was that of Mr. Martin, who had suggested that the Permanent Representatives should be asked to examine the purposes and objectives of the Alliance as a first step towards adapting it to new circumstances. He agreed, as, he thought, did everyone else present, with those who had said that there should be no light talk of the reform or reorganization of the Alliance. The words adaptation, development, progress and evolution of the Alliance had been mentioned, and the Chairman thought that all could agree on a proposal, which, without committing anyone, invited the Permanent Representatives to present to Ministers some general outlines to serve as a guide to this task of adapting the Alliance to the new realities, in some future meeting of Ministers. The Chairman felt that this idea too, might be expressed in the communiqué: there would be considerable public surprise if the impression were given that Ministers had met without giving their consideration to this possibility, or necessity, of looking at the new problems of the Alliance in the future, already so much voiced in the press and in public opinion.

78. The Chairman emphasised, however, that this question should not be linked with that of the revision proper of the Treaty, nor with its denunciation: these were both separate questions. He agreed with what had been said on these points, and also with the interpretations given to Articles 12 and 13 of the NATO Treaty.

79. On the question of nuclear armament, the Chairman said it was difficult to know the real feelings of the Council, but that he had noted two important opinions, those of Mr. Spaak and Mr. Rusk, which had not been contradicted. These were inevitably matters for discussion in the Council. Much had been said about the question of unanimity. Questions of this importance could not escape discussion within the Alliance.

80. At the proper time there should be a serene, calm discussion of the merits and objections to any nuclear plans, and the possibility of their unanimous implementation. If no agreement could be reached, there must be an agreement to disagree. It would be dangerous to have a formal public conference of a group of Allies about such an important fundamental subject, before all possible ways to try to reach an agreement had been explored within the Alliance.

81. The Chairman emphasised that in his opinion, a sensible solution which would not hurt any fundamental interest or fundamental principle could still be reached by calm discussion on all sides. He was inclined to favour Mr. Spaak's suggestion, should the Council think fit to approve it. The Council should agree to give the matter constant attention and to pick it up again whenever the time was appropriate for submitting proper recommendations to governments.

82. Concluding, the Chairman apologised for having omitted many details and useful suggestions from his necessarily brief summary; however, he thought that he had mentioned the fundamental points of the discussion.

83. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements made in discussion and of the summing-up by the Chairman.

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